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Chapter 15 International and global security john baylis Framing Questions Does globalization increase or decrease international security? Which international relations theories best help to provide an understanding of global security and insecurity? How do the challenges to globaliza...

Chapter 15 International and global security john baylis Framing Questions Does globalization increase or decrease international security? Which international relations theories best help to provide an understanding of global security and insecurity? How do the challenges to globalization and the resurgence of nationalism and geopolitics affect the prospects of contemporary international security? Reader’s Guide considering a range of alternative approaches. The chapter goes on to examine recent debates about This chapter looks at the question of whether inter- globalization and geopolitics. The conclusion con- national relations, especially in an era of growing siders the continuing tension between national and challenges to globalization, are likely to be as vio- international security and suggests that, despite the lent in the future as they have been in the past. It important changes associated with the processes of begins by looking at existing disagreements about the globalization, there seem to be few signs that a fun- causes of war and whether violence is always likely damentally different, more peaceful paradigm of to be with us. It then turns to traditional/classical international politics is emerging. Indeed contem- realist and more contemporary neorealist and neo- porary international politics are going through a par- liberal perspectives on international security, before ticularly uncertain and difficult period.  Chapter 15 International and global security 241 Introduction Students of international politics deal with some of to offer some hope for greater international order. In the most profound questions it is possible to consider. contrast, during the cold war, which developed after Among the most important of these is whether it is 1945, realism became the dominant school of thought. possible to achieve international security in the world War and violent conflict were seen as perennial features in which we live. For much of the intellectual history of inter-state relations stretching back through human of the subject, a debate has raged about the causes of history. With the end of the cold war in 1989, however, war. For some writers, especially historians, the causes the debate began again. For some, the end of the intense of war are unique to each case. Other writers believe ideological confrontation between East and West was that it is possible to provide a wider, more generalized a major turning point in international history, usher- explanation. Some analysts, for example, see the causes ing in a new paradigm in which inter-state violence lying in human nature, others in the internal organiza- would gradually become a thing of the past and new tion of states, and yet others in international anarchy. cosmopolitan values would bring greater coopera- In a major work on the causes of war, Kenneth Waltz tion between individuals and human collectivities of considers what he calls the three ‘images’ of war (man, various kinds (including states). This reflected more the state, and the international system) in terms of what optimistic views about the development of a peaceful thinkers have said about the origins of conflict through- global society. For others, however, realism remained out the history of Western civilization (Waltz 1959). the best approach to thinking about international secu- Waltz himself puts particular emphasis on the nature rity. In their view, very little of substance had changed of international anarchy (‘wars occur because there is as a result of the events of 1989. Although the end of nothing to stop them from occurring’), but he also rec- the cold war initially ushered in a new, more coopera- ognizes that a comprehensive explanation requires an tive era between the superpowers, realists argued that understanding of all three. this more harmonious phase in international relations In this on-going debate, as Waltz points out, there was only temporary. Some believe that contemporary is a fundamental difference among political philoso- events confirm this view. phers over whether conflict can be transcended or This chapter focuses on this debate in an era of mitigated. In particular, there is a difference between increasing challenges to globalization, highlighting the ‘realist ’ and ‘idealist ’ thinkers, who have been respec- different strands of thinking in these two optimistic tively pessimistic and optimistic in their response to and pessimistic schools of thought. Before this can be this central question in the international politics field done, however, it is necessary to define what is meant (see Ch. 8). After the First World War, idealism claimed by ‘security’ and to probe the relationship between widespread support as the League of Nations seemed national security and global security. What is security? Most writers agree that security is a ‘contested concept’. ethnocentric (culturally biased) and too narrowly There is a consensus that it implies freedom from threats defined. Instead, a number of contemporary writers to core values (for both individuals and groups), but have argued for an expanded conception of security, there is a major disagreement about whether the main outward from the limits of parochial national security, focus of inquiry should be on ‘individual’, ‘national’, to include a range of other considerations. Barry Buzan, ‘international’, or ‘global’ security. For much of the in his study People, States and Fear (1983), argues for cold war period most writing on the subject was domi- a view of security that includes political, economic, nated by the idea of national security, which was largely societal, and environmental as well as military aspects, defined in militarized terms. The main area of interest and that is also defined in broader international terms. for both academics and statespeople tended to be the Buzan’s work raises interesting and important questions military capabilities that their own states should develop about whether national and international security con- to deal with the threats they faced. More recently, how- siderations can be compatible, and whether states, given ever, this idea of security has been criticized for being the nature of the international system, are capable of 242 john baylis At the same time, other commentators argue that the Box 15.1 Notions of ‘security’ emergence of an embryonic global society in the post- A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of cold war era renders the stress on national and inter- having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is national security less appropriate. Like the ‘societal able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. security’ theorists, they point to the fragmentation of (Walter Lippmann) the nation-state; however, they argue that more atten- Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats tion should be given, not to society at the ethno-national to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear level, but to global society. These writers argue that one that such values will be attacked. of the most important contemporary trends is the broad (Arnold Wolfers) and on-going process of globalization. They accept that this process brings new risks and dangers. These In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of include the risks associated with international terror- the international system, security is about the ability of states ism, a breakdown of the global monetary system, global and societies to maintain their independent identity and their warming, cyber conflict, and the dangers of nuclear functional integrity. proliferation. These threats to security, on a planetary (Barry Buzan) level, are viewed as being largely outside the control of nation-states. Only the development of a global com- Human security can no longer be understood in purely mili- tary terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, munity, they believe, can deal with this adequately. social justice, environmental protection, democratization, and Other writers on globalization stress the transfor- respect for human rights and the rule of law... Moreover, mation of the state (rather than its demise) and the new these pillars are interrelated; progress in one area generates security agenda in the early years of the twenty-first progress in another. century. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Kofi Annan) in September 2001 and the new era of violence that fol- lowed it, Jonathan Friedman argues that we are living thinking in more cooperative international and global in a world ‘where polarization, both vertical and hori- terms (see Box 15.1). There has also been a growing zontal, both class and ethnic, has become rampant, and interest in the concept of ‘human security’, with writ- where violence has become more globalized and frag- ers like Kofi Annan and Amitav Acharya emphasizing mented at the same time, and is no longer a question of the individual as the main focus of security analysis (see wars between states but of sub-state conflicts, globally ‘Critical, feminist, and discursive security studies’). networked and financed, in which states have become Not all writers on security accept the focus on the one actor, increasingly privatized, amongst others’ tension between national and international security. (J. Friedman 2003: ix). For many of those who feel like Some argue that the emphasis on state and inter-state this, the post-9/11 era ushered in a new and extremely relations ignores the fundamental changes that have dangerous period in world history. Whether the world been taking place in world politics. For others, the dual is so different today from in the past is a matter of much processes of integration and fragmentation associated contemporary discussion. To consider this issue we with globalization that characterize the contemporary need to begin by looking at the way ‘security’ has been world mean that much more attention should be given traditionally conceived. to ‘societal security’ (see Case Study 15.1). According to this view, growing integration in regions such as Europe is undermining the classical political order Key Points based on nation-states, leaving nations exposed within larger political frameworks (such as the EU). At the Security is a ‘contested concept’. same time, the fragmentation of various states, such as The meaning of security has been broadened beyond military considerations to include political, economic, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created new prob- societal, and environmental aspects. lems of boundaries, minorities, and organizing ide- ologies that are causing increasing regional instability Differing arguments exist about the tension between national and international security. (Wæver et al. 1993: 196). This has led to the argument that ethno-national groups, rather than states, should Different views have also emerged about the significance of globalization for the future of international security. become the centre of attention for security analysts.  Chapter 15 International and global security 243 Case Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1999, fighting continued in the eastern part of the country. In January 2001 Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. Fighting continued until 2003, partly due to ethnic divisions (the DRC is a country of 250 ethnic groups and 242 dif- ferent languages), but also because of the continuing occupation by foreign troops (often engaged in illegal mining of minerals and diamonds). Negotiations designed to broker a peace agreement eventually led to the Pretoria Accord in April 2003. As a result, some of the foreign troops left, but hostilities and massacres continued, especially in the east of the country, as rival militias backed by Rwanda and Uganda continued to fight and plunder the resources of the DRC. On 18 July 2003, the Transitional Government was set up as a result of what was known as the Global and Inclusive Agreement. Campaign rally in December 2018, Democratic Republic The Agreement required all factions to help reunify the coun- of Congo try, disarm and integrate the warring parties, and hold elections. © ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo Continued instability, however, meant that elections did not take place until 2006. Conflict continued among foreign troops and Events in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since the end numerous militia groups on the Rwandan and Ugandan bor- of the cold war provide a good illustration of the complexities ders, causing serious refugee crises and civilian deaths. Elections of contemporary conflict and the dangers of providing simple to replace President Kabila were scheduled for November 2016 explanations of why wars occur (see Case Study 21.1). Between but were postponed until the end of 2017, when they were post- 1996 and 2016, in this ‘forgotten war’ (sometimes called ‘Africa’s poned again. Protests from those opposed to President Kabila led World War’), it is estimated that 6 million people lost their lives as to violence and the deaths of large numbers of people. New elec- a result of ethnic strife, civil war, and foreign intervention, as well tions finally took place in December 2018. In January 2019, it was as starvation and disease. The key events are as follows. announced that Felix Tshisekedi, leader of the main opposition In 1996 the conflict and genocide in neighbouring Rwanda (in party, was the surprise winner, defeating the government candi- which 800,000 people died) spilled over into the Congo (named date, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary. This represented the first elec- Zaire at the time). Rwandan Hutu forces, who fled after a Tutsi- toral transfer of power in 59 years. However, concerns remained led government came to power, set up bases in the east of the about electoral fraud and continuing violence, with another oppo- country to launch attacks on Rwanda. This resulted in Rwandan sition candidate, Martin Fayulu, also claiming victory. Continuing forces invading the Congo with the aim of ousting the exist- militia violence in eastern DRC also complicated attempts by ing government of Mobutu Sese-Soko and putting in power health workers to deal with the outbreak of Ebola during 2019. their own government under Laurent-Désiré Kabila. This was achieved in May 1997. Kabila fell out with his backers in August Question 1: Why did the Global and Inclusive Agreement of 2002 1998, however, and Rwanda and Uganda initiated a rebellion fail to resolve the conflict in the DRC? designed to overthrow him. This led to further intervention, this time by Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan, in sup- Question 2: Is the conflict in the DRC a good example of the value port of the Kabila government. Although a ceasefire was signed of the concept of human security? The traditional approach to national security As Chapter 2 shows, from the 1648 Treaties of In the historical debate about how best to achieve Westphalia onwards, states have been regarded as by national security, such writers as Hobbes, Machiavelli, far the most powerful actors in the international sys- and Rousseau tended to paint a pessimistic picture of tem. They have been ‘the universal standard of political the implications of state sovereignty. They viewed the legitimacy’, with no higher authority to regulate their international system as a rather brutal arena in which relations with each other. This has meant that security states would seek to achieve their own security at has been seen as the priority obligation of state govern- the expense of their neighbours. Inter-state relations ments. States have taken the view that there is no alter- were seen as a struggle for power, as states constantly native but to seek their own protection in what has been attempted to take advantage of each other. According to described as a self-help world. this view, permanent peace was unlikely to be achieved. 244 john baylis All that states could do was to try to balance the power Liberal institutionalism of other states to prevent any one from achieving over- all hegemony. This view was shared by writers such One of the main characteristics of the neorealist approach as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, who developed to international security is the belief that international what became known as the realist (or ‘classical’ realist) institutions do not have a very important part to play in school of thought in the aftermath of the Second World the prevention of war. Institutions are seen as the product War. More recent attempts to update these ideas can of state interests and the constraints imposed by the inter- be seen in the works of Alastair J. H. Murray, Thomas national system itself. It is these interests and constraints Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth, that shape states’ decisions about whether to cooperate and Fareed Zakaria. Their work is sometimes referred or compete, rather than the institutions to which they to as neoclassical realism. belong. Neorealists point to the contemporary problems The realist, pessimistic view of international rela- faced by a number of international institutions (such as tions is shared by other writers, such as Kenneth Waltz the UN and EU) to reinforce their view. and John Mearsheimer. The pessimism of these neo- Both statespeople and a number of International realists rests on a number of key assumptions they Relations specialists challenge these neorealist views make about the way the international system works on institutions. For example, former British Foreign and its inherent propensity for violence. According to Secretary Douglas Hurd made the case in June 1992 the neorealist view, national security, or insecurity, is that institutions themselves had played a crucial role in largely the result of the structure of the international enhancing security, particularly in Europe. He argued system (this is why these writers are sometimes called that the West had developed ‘a set of international insti- ‘structural realists’). The structure of anarchy is seen tutions which have proved their worth for one set of as highly durable. The implication of this is that inter- problems’. He went on to argue that the great challenge national politics in the future is likely to be as violent of the post-cold war era was to adapt these institu- as international politics in the past. In an important tions to deal with the new circumstances that prevailed article entitled ‘Back to the Future’, John Mearsheimer (Hurd, quoted in Mearsheimer 1994/5). (1990) argued that the end of the cold war was likely to Hurd’s view reflected a belief, widely shared among usher in a return to the traditional multipolar balance Western statespeople, that a framework of complemen- of power politics of the past, in which extreme nation- tary, mutually reinforcing institutions—the European alism and ethnic rivalries would cause widespread Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization instability and conflict. Mearsheimer viewed the cold (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and war as a period of peace and stability brought about by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in its prevailing bipolar structure of power. With the col- Europe (OSCE)—could be developed to promote a lapse of this system, he argued, there would be a return more durable and stable European security system. to the kind of great power rivalries that had blighted This view is also shared by a distinctive group of aca- international relations since the seventeenth century. demic writers that has developed since the 1980s and For neorealist writers such as Mearsheimer, inter- early 1990s. These writers share a conviction that the national politics may not be characterized by constant developing pattern of institutionalized cooperation wars, but nevertheless a relentless security competition among states opens up unprecedented opportunities takes place, with war always a possibility. They accept to achieve greater international security in the years that cooperation among states can and does occur, but ahead. Although the past may have been characterized such cooperation has its limits. It is ‘constrained by the by constant wars and conflict, important changes were dominating logic of security competition, which no taking place in international relations, they argued, amount of co-operation can eliminate’ (Mearsheimer creating the opportunity to mitigate the traditional 1994/5: 9). Genuine long-lasting peace, or a world in security competition between states. which states do not compete for power, therefore, is This approach, known as liberal institutional- very unlikely to be achieved. Neorealists predicted that ism or neoliberalism, operates largely within the the post-cold war unipolar structure of power, with US realist framework, but argues that international pre-eminence, was likely to give way to a new interna- institutions are much more important in helping to tional structure with the rise of states such as China, achieve cooperation and stability than ‘structural India, and Brazil. realists’ realize (see Ch. 8). According to Keohane  Chapter 15 International and global security 245 and Martin (1995: 42), ‘institutions can provide Key Points information, reduce transaction costs, make com- mitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination and, in general, facilitate the opera- Realists and neorealists emphasize the perennial problem of insecurity. tion of reciprocity’. Supporters of these ideas point to Some writers see the ‘security dilemma’ as the essential source of conflict among states. the importance of European economic and political institutions in overcoming the traditional hostility Neorealists reject the significance of international institutions in helping many states to achieve peace and security. among European states. Liberal institutionalist writers suggest that in a Inwritecontrast, contemporary politicians and academics who under the label of liberal institutionalism or world constrained by state power and divergent inter- neoliberalism see institutions as an important mechanism ests, international institutions operating on the basis of for achieving international security. reciprocity will at least be a component of any lasting peace. In other words, international institutions them- Liberal institutionalists accept many of realism’s assumptions about the continuing importance of military selves are unlikely to eradicate war from the interna- power in international relations, but argue that institutions tional system, but they can play a part in helping to can provide a framework for cooperation that can help to achieve greater cooperation among states. mitigate the dangers of security competition among states. Alternative approaches example, Wendt argues that the security dilemma Constructivist theory is a social structure composed of inter-subjective Another group of writers who describe themselves as understandings in which states are so distrustful that ‘constructivist theorists’ posit that international rela- they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s tions are affected not only by power politics but also intentions and as a result define their interests in by ideas and identities. According to this view, the fun- ‘self-help’ terms. In contrast, a security community damental structures of international politics are social (such as NATO) is a rather different social structure, rather than strictly material. This leads social construc- composed of shared knowledge and identity in which tivists to argue that changes in the nature of social states trust one another to resolve disputes without interaction among states can bring a fundamental shift war (see Box 15.2). towards greater international security (see Ch. 12). Emphasis on the structure of shared knowledge is At one level, many constructivists, such as Alexander important in constructivist thinking. Social structures Wendt, share a number of the major realist assumptions include material things, such as tanks and economic about international politics. For example, some accept resources, but these acquire meaning only through that states are the key referent in the study of interna- tional politics and international security; that interna- tional politics is anarchic; that states often have offensive Box 15.2 The security community capabilities; that states cannot be absolutely certain of A security community is a group of people which has become the intentions of other states; that states have a funda- ‘integrated’. By integration we mean the attainment, within mental wish to survive; and that states attempt to behave a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and rationally. Some, such as Wendt, also see themselves as practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure... structuralists; that is, they believe that the interests of dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its pop- ulation. By a ‘sense of community’ we mean a belief... that individual states are, in an important sense, constructed common social problems must and can be resolved by pro- by the structure of the international system. cesses of ‘peaceful change’. However, constructivists think about international (Karl Deutsch) politics in a very different way from neorealists. The latter tend to view structure as comprising only a Security regimes occur when a group of states co-operate distribution of material capabilities. Constructivists to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their view structure as the product of social relation- assumptions about the behaviour of others. ships. Social structures are made possible by shared (Robert Jervis) understandings, expectations, and knowledge. For 246 john baylis the shared knowledge in which they are embedded. have defined critical security studies in the following The idea of power politics, or realpolitik, has meaning terms: ‘Contemporary debates over the nature of secu- to the extent that states accept the idea as a basic rule rity often float on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and of international politics. According to social construc- deeper theoretical issues concerning to what and to tivist writers, power politics is an idea that affects the whom the term security refers... What most contri- way states behave, but it does not describe all inter-state butions to the debate thus share are two inter-related behaviour. States are also influenced by other ideas, concerns: what security is and how we study it’ (Krause such as the rule of law and the importance of institu- and Williams 1997: 34). What they also share is a wish tional cooperation and restraint. In his study, ‘Anarchy to de-­emphasize the role of the state and the need to is What States Make of It’, Wendt (1992) argues that conceptualize security in a different way. Critical secu- security dilemmas and wars can be seen, in part, as the rity studies, however, includes a number of different outcome of self-fulfilling prophecies. The ‘logic of reci- approaches. These include critical theory, the concept procity’ means that states acquire a shared understand- of human security, ‘feminist’ approaches, and ‘post- ing about the meaning of power and act accordingly. structuralist’ approaches (see Buzan and Hansen 2009). Equally, he argues, policies of reassurance can bring Given that these are covered in other chapters, they are about a structure of shared knowledge that can help to dealt with only briefly here. move states towards a more peaceful security commu- Robert Cox draws a distinction between problem- nity (Wendt 1999). solving theories and critical theories. Problem-solving Although constructivists argue that security theorists work within the prevailing system. They dilemmas are not acts of God, they differ over whether take the existing social and political relations and they can be escaped. For some, the fact that structures institutions as starting points for analysis and then are socially constructed does not necessarily mean see how the problems arising from these can be solved that they can be changed. This is reflected by Wendt’s or ameliorated. In contrast, critical theorists focus (1995: 80) comment that ‘sometimes social structures their attention on the way these existing relation- so constrain action that transformative strategies are ships and institutions emerged and what might be impossible’. However, many constructivist writers are done to change them (see Ch. 11). For critical security more optimistic. They point to the changes in ideas theorists, states should not be the centre of analysis introduced by Gorbachev during the second half of because they are not only extremely diverse in char- the 1980s, which led to shared knowledge about the acter but are also often part of the problem of insecu- end of the cold war. Once both sides accepted that rity in the international system. They can be providers the cold war was over, it really was over. According of security, but they can also be a source of threat to to this view, understanding the crucial role of social their own people. structures is important in developing policies and According to this view, attention should be focused processes of interaction that will generate coopera- on the individual rather than on the state. This led to tion rather than conflict. For the optimists, there is greater attention being given from the 1970s and 1980s sufficient ‘slack’ in the international system to allow onwards to what has been called human security, states to pursue policies of peaceful social change resulting in a further broadening of the conception of rather than engage in a perpetual competitive strug- ‘security’ to include areas such as poverty, disease, and gle for power. environmental degradation. The concept was devel- oped largely by non-Western scholars such as Mahbub al Haq and Amartya Sen, who felt that traditional Critical, feminist, and discursive national security approaches did not take sufficient security studies account of conflicts that arise over cultural, ethnic, and Despite the differences between constructivists and religious differences. According to Amitav Acharya, realists about the relationship between ideas and mate- ‘the most pressing challenges to security come not from rial factors, they agree on the central role of the state great power rivalry or interstate wars, as in the past but in debates about international security. Other theo- from multiple and complex forms of internal conflicts rists, however, believe that the state has been given too and transitional challenges that defy military action by much prominence. Keith Krause and Michael Williams state actors and that demand economic, political and  Chapter 15 International and global security 247 normative action by the international community’. (Enloe 2014 ). She highlights the traditional He argues that we are experiencing the emergence of exclusion of women from international relations, sug- a very different and much more complex world than gesting ‘that they are in fact crucial to it in practice and in the past and this brings with it new challenges and that nowhere is the state more gendered in the sense approaches to global stability and order. In light of of how power is dispersed than in the security appa- this, he calls for a new Global International Politics ratus’ (Terriff et al. 1999: 91). She also challenges the approach which focuses on the contemporary threats concept of ‘national security’, arguing that the use of to peace given the challenges brought about by global- such terms is often designed to preserve the ­prevailing ization (Acharya 2014c). male-­dominated order rather than protect the state In many ways, human security is a contested con- from external attack. cept. Some critics argue that it widens the boundaries Feminist writers argue that if gender is brought of the meaning of ‘security’ too much and that it is too more explicitly into the study of security, not only vague to have much conceptual value. Others believe will new issues and alternative perspectives be added that the focus on internal conflicts ignores the very to the security agenda, but the result will be a funda- dangerous geopolitical changes that are currently tak- mentally different view of the nature of international ing place in international relations. Detractors also security. According to Jill Steans, ‘Rethinking security argue that it is too moralistic, as well as being unattain- involves thinking about militarism and patriarchy, able and unrealistic in practice. Even among supporters mal-­development and environmental degradation. It of the concept there is disagreement between those who involves thinking about the relationship between pov- focus on the need for greater ‘freedom from fear’ and erty, debt and population growth. It involves thinking those who emphasize the need for more ‘freedom from about resources and how they are distributed’ (Steans want’. Other supporters, however, argue that there is 1998; S. Smith 2000). considerable overlap between the two, and both are The emergence of poststructuralist approaches to important in the search for greater human security. For international relations have produced a somewhat all supporters of the concept, human security provides different perspective towards international security an essential non-Western approach to international (see Ch. 11). Poststructuralist writers share the view security (neglected in the past) and is a vital concept in that ideas, discourse, and ‘the logic of interpretation’ understanding the new world order. are crucial in understanding international politics Academics championing the human security and security. Like other writers who adopt a ‘critical approach argue that there is a close relationship with security studies’ approach, poststructuralists see ‘real- feminist writers who study international conflict. ism’ as one of the central problems of international Feminist writers also challenge the traditional empha- insecurity. This is because realism is a discourse of sis on the central role of the state in studies of interna- power and rule that has been dominant in interna- tional security. While there are significant differences tional politics in the past and has encouraged secu- among feminist theorists, all share the view that works rity competition among states. Power politics is seen on international politics in general, and international as an image of the world that encourages behaviour security in particular, have been written from a ‘mas- that helps bring about war. As such, the attempt to culine’ point of view (see Chs 9 and 17). In her work, balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that J. Ann Tickner argues that women have seldom been leads to war. According to this view, alliances do not recognized by the security literature despite the fact produce peace, but lead to war. The aim for many post- that conflicts affect women as much as, if not more structuralists, therefore, is to replace the discourse of than, men. The vast majority of casualties and refu- realism or power with a different discourse and alter- gees in war are women and children and, as the war in native interpretations of threats to ‘national security’. Bosnia confirms, the rape of women is often used as a The idea is that once the ‘software program’ of real- tool of war (Tickner 1992). ism that people carry around in their heads has been In a major feminist study of security, Bananas, replaced by a new ‘software program’ based on coop- Beaches and Bases, Cynthia Enloe points to the patriar- erative norms, then individuals, states, and regions chal structure of privilege and control at all levels that, will learn to work with each other and global politics in her view, effectively legitimizes all forms of violence will become more peaceful. 248 john baylis Key Points Constructivist thinkers base their ideas on two main assumptions: (1) that the fundamental structures of The concept of human security focuses on the individual and the threats that arise from poverty, disease, and international politics are socially constructed; and (2) that environmental degradation. changing the way we think about international relations can help to bring about greater international security. Feminist writers argue that gender tends to be left out of the literature on international security, despite the fact that war Some constructivist thinkers accept many of the assumptions impacts men and women differently. of neorealism, but they reject the view that ‘structure’ consists only of material capabilities. They stress the importance of Poststructuralist writers believe that the nature of international politics can be changed by altering the way we social structures, defined in terms of shared knowledge and think and talk about security. identities as well as material capabilities. Critical security theorists contend that most approaches put too much emphasis on the state. Globalization and the return of geopolitics In recent years there has been a debate among schol- is no longer important). Douglas E. Streusand rejects ars about whether ‘globalization’ and ‘geopolitics’ are the idea that there is opposition between the two con- compatible in the changing world in which we live. cepts, ‘both as historical forces and as policy alter- There have also been debates about whether the world natives’. He argues that ‘the era of globalization has is reverting to ‘traditional power dynamics with untra- not ended the need for geopolitical analysis’ and ‘the ditional players’ or whether a ‘new geopolitics’ can suc- policy imperatives that geopolitical analysis gener- cessfully emerge based on the importance of soft power ates do not contradict the principles of globalization’ rather than traditional hard military power. This section (Streusand 2002). will consider these important contemporary debates. Those who take this position argue that traditional Some writers argue that ‘globalization’ and ‘geo- ideas of geopolitics remain as important as ever in the politics’ represent fundamentally different approaches twenty-first century, indeed that they are becoming to policy. Brian Blouet argues that ‘Geopolitical more important. These ideas originate from the works policies seek to establish national or imperial con- of such writers as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas trol over space and the resources, routeways, indus- Spykman. Mackinder’s ideas were very influential after trial capacity and population the territory contains.’ the First World War, especially his dictum: In contrast, he sees globalization as ‘the opening of national space for the free flow of goods, capital and Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. ideas’. ‘Globalization’, he says, ‘removes obstructions Who rules the Heartland commands the World to movement and creates conditions in which inter- Island. national trade in goods and services can expand’ Who rules the World Island commands the World. (Blouet 2001). Another writer, Ellen Frost, contends (Mackinder 1919) that globalization is changing the world in a radical way. We are moving, she argues, towards a much more These ideas were updated during the Second World ‘interconnected world system in which independent War and the cold war by writers such as Spykman, who networks and flows surmount traditional boundaries emphasized the need to prevent the emergence of a new (or make them irrelevant)’. For Frost, ‘external threats hegemon by preventing any single state from dominat- have increasingly assumed transnational forms’, ing Eurasia. Echoing Mackinder, Spykman argued that which renders traditional geopolitics, with its empha- ‘Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who con- sis on balance of power and inter-state conflict, largely trols Eurasia rules the world’ (Spykman and Nicholl irrelevant (Kugler and Frost 2001). 1944). These ideas led to the policy of containment Not all writers, however, accept that globalization of the Soviet Union in 1946 and the formation of the and geopolitics are incompatible (or that geopolitics NATO alliance.  Chapter 15 International and global security 249 With the end of the cold war, the threat of a Eurasian For Bernstein and Munro, traditional geopolitics is just hegemon receded. In recent years, however, the impor- as important as ever, and requires a significant shift in tance of the ‘Rimland’ has re-emerged in the works of American grand strategy. For those who support this such writers as Ross Munro and Richard Bernstein. view, the shift (or ‘pivot’) of US strategic priorities from the Their concern focuses on the Pacific Rim and the rise of Middle East towards the Pacific under the Obama presi- China. They argue that: dency and the radical changes to US foreign policy under President Trump indicate that such geopolitical analysis is The central issue for the United States and its Asian an important element in contemporary strategic thinking allies and friends is whether an increasingly powerful in Washington. Equally, it is argued that the rise of China China is going to dominate Asia, as its leaders intend, and Chinese policies regarding islands in the disputed or whether the United States, working primarily with South and East China Seas indicate similar thinking in Japan, can counterbalance China’s emergence to great Beijing (see Case Study 15.2). Graham Allison has argued power and eventually to super-power status. That issue that America and China are currently in a ‘Thucydides’ will be resolved on Asia’s eastern rim—in the band of Trap’. This refers to the fifth-century BC clash between territory that begins in the Russian Far East and con- the rising power of Athens (akin to modern China) and tinues through the Korean peninsula, Japan and Taiwan the established military hegemon Sparta (akin to modern and probably the Philippines and Indonesia as well. America). In Allison’s view, disaster is likely unless each (Bernstein and Munro 1998) shows more respect for the other (Allison 2017). Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China Seas Although the origins of territorial disputes in the South and East The South China Sea disputes China Seas go back centuries, there has been a recent upsurge The main dispute over the Paracel and Spratly islands is between of tensions between China and its neighbours (and among the China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China claims historical neighbours themselves). In the South China Sea the disputes rights to the islands dating back 2,000 years. China’s claims centre on the ownership of the Paracel and Spratly islands, are mirrored by those of Taiwan. Vietnam rejects these his- together with various uninhabited atolls and reefs, especially torical claims and says it has ruled over both the island chains the Scarborough Shoal (see Fig. 15.1). In the East China Sea the since the seventeenth century. The Philippines also claims the dispute is largely between Japan, China, and Taiwan over what Spratlys because geographically they are close to its territory. the Chinese call the Diaoyu islands and what the Japanese call The Philippines also has a further dispute with China over the Senkaku islands (see Fig. 15.2). These disputes are leading to growing anxiety in the Pacific region. Miles 0 200 NORTH Sea of CHINA Miles KOREA Japan 0 200 South SOUTH HAINAN China Sea CHINA KOREA Yellow JAPAN Paracels Sea Scarborough VIETNAM Shoal Boundary claimed by Japan Spratlys Shanghai East China PHILIPPINES Sea CHUNXIAO Boundary GAS FIELDS claimed by China MALAYSIA BRUNEI (Approximate area) MALAYSIA DISPUTED INDONESIA OKINAWA AREA China’s claimed territorial waters Pacific UNCLOS 200 nautical mile SENKAKU ISLANDS Ocean TAIWAN Exclusive Economic Zone (Administered by Japan, Disputed islands claimed by China and Taiwan) Figure 15.1 Disputed areas in the South China Sea Figure 15.2 Disputed areas in the East China Sea Source: UNCLOS and CIA Source: UNCLOS and CIA 250 john baylis the Scarborough Shoal. These islands lie 100 miles from the private owners. In recent years new tensions have arisen over Philippines and 500 miles from China. To complicate matters Chinese oil rigs near the disputed islands and in 2018 when Japan further, Malaysia claims that some of the Spratlys fall within its dispatched a submarine to the disputed waters southwest of economic exclusion zone. Scarborough Shoal as part of an anti-submarine warfare exercise. The most serious conflicts, however, have been between China In both cases, while major military conflict among the states and Vietnam. In 1974 China seized the Paracels from Vietnam, involved has been avoided in recent years, the renewed dis- and in the late 1980s clashes took place in the Spratlys, with putes have raised the level of regional insecurity. In July 2016 further Vietnamese losses. Tensions have risen higher in recent the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled against years due to a belief that the region contains vast quantities of China and its claims to rights in the South China Sea in a case natural gas and oil. Recent rumours suggest that China has plans brought by the Philippines. The Court said that China’s ‘nine-dash for an undersea base to exploit the natural resources near the line’, which it uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is unlaw- Spratlys. In 2018 Vietnam became increasingly alarmed by fur- ful under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). ther Chinese reclamation work, the development of military air- China declared that the ruling was ‘unfounded’ and that it would strips and munitions warehouses, and the reported deployment not be bound by it. More recently, however, there has been a of missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. rapprochement between China and the Philippines. China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ of providing major invest- The East China Sea disputes ment in infrastructure projects in Pacific countries (as well as in Japan’s claims over eight uninhabited islands and rocks that it Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas) caused fears calls the Senkaku islands date back to 1895, when they were in Australia, Japan, and India that China’s ‘string of pearls’ strat- incorporated into Japanese territory. It claims that this right was egy was designed to establish a chain of air and naval bases from recognized under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. In contrast, the South China Sea to the Horn of Africa. This led Australia to China argues that what it calls the Diaoyu islands have been part reopen a major military base (with US support) in Papua New of its territory since ancient times. Taiwan also claims the islands Guinea in 2018, and to a US, Australian, and Japanese initiative to with a similar argument. Clashes have occurred in recent years establish ‘an alliance of friendly nations’ for joint overseas invest- between Japanese patrol boats and Chinese and Taiwanese fish- ment to counter Chinese economic diplomacy in the region. ing vessels. A confrontation involving a Chinese fishing vessel in 2010 prompted anti-Japanese protests in multiple Chinese cit- Question 1: What do you understand by the term ‘Thucydides’ ies and diplomatic protests until the Chinese crew were released. Trap’ in relation to the rise of China? In 2012, tensions re-emerged after Chinese and Japanese activ- ists landed on a number of the islands. These tensions escalated Question 2: What role does the ‘security dilemma’ play in the after the Japanese government bought three of the islands from ­territorial disputes between China and its neighbours? Contemporary international relations appears to be Russia for allegedly interfering in the US presidential characterized by important challenges to globalization election, and in its pursuit of a vigorous nationalist for- and a greater emphasis on the role of geopolitics. The eign policy agenda against many of America’s allies, rise of populism in Europe and the United States, caused including some of those on the borders with Russia. in part by the effects of globalization, has resulted in the This has led to concerns among many of America’s upsurge of nationalism and trade wars. Many believe allies that he has significantly undermined the old that the presidency of Donald Trump in the United international order which since 1945 has been led by States, in particular, has had a disruptive effect on the the United States. In turn, US policies and the wider international order. President Trump was elected on spread of populism are seen by many as major threats to the slogan of ‘Make America Great Again’, and since contemporary international security. For Trump sup- his election he has challenged a number of key aspects porters, however, the possibility of a deal with North of the international order which has generally prevailed Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula since the Second World War. He has at times been criti- and pressure on Iran to improve the 2015 Iran nuclear cal of the NATO Alliance (calling it ‘obsolete’ at one agreement (following America’s withdrawal from the point) and of the European Union; he has had trade agreement) indicate that President Trump’s more radi- disputes with Canada and Mexico, and has launched a cal approach to diplomacy can bring more peaceful major trade war with China. He has withdrawn from a results. Only time will tell if this proves to be the case. number of global arms control agreements, supported At the heart of geopolitical thinking is the real- Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran, and withdrawn ist notion of the importance of achieving world order from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. At through a balance of power that seeks to prevent regional the same time, he has often been reluctant to criticize or global hegemons from emerging. The great danger,  Chapter 15 International and global security 251 however, is that geopolitical competition will create between the West and Russia over Ukraine and Crimea; global disorder. This seems to be very much a feature the dispute between China and its neighbours over of the contemporary world. Espen Barth Eide, manag- islands in the East and South China Seas; Western con- ing director at the World Economic Forum, has written cerns over the growing strategic partnership between that ‘recent developments have led to tectonic shifts in Russia and China; and the differing interpretations of state interaction. Geopolitics—and realpolitik—is once the 2015 nuclear agreement between the P5 + 1 them- again taking centre stage, with potential wide-ranging selves and Iran (see Opposing Opinions 15.1); as well consequences for the global economy, politics and soci- as the complex set of alliances designed to deal with the ety’ (Barth Eide 2014). This is evident in the tensions emergence of so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Opposing Opinions 15.1 The 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran enhanced international security For Against It removed nuclear proliferation risks. ‘Every pathway to It will not prevent a nuclear Iran. The nuclear agreement with a nuclear weapon is cut off ’ (Barack Obama). The agreement Iran is ‘a mistake of historic proportions... Concessions have reduced Iran’s uranium-enrichment centrifuges from 20,000 to been made in all areas that were supposed to prevent Iran from 6,104 for ten years; it barred Iran from enriching uranium above obtaining nuclear weapons’ (Benjamin Netanyahu). As a result 3.37 per cent for 15 years; and it required Iran to sell 98 per cent of the agreement, Iran will eventually become a nuclear power. of its stockpile of uranium. It also restricted the sale of ballis- Prior to withdrawing from the agreement in May 2018, Donald tic missile technology to Iran for eight years and conventional Trump declared that ‘the Iran deal is defective to its core’. It was, weapons for five years. he said, ‘a horrible and one-sided deal’. Verification ensures success. ‘This deal is not built on trust’ Iran will continue to support reactionary forces. ‘Instead of (Barack Obama). All the limitations in the agreement have making the world less dangerous, this deal will only embolden been verified by an elaborate system of unprecedented on-site Iran—the world’s largest sponsor of terror—by helping to stabi- inspections. The UN’s atomic watchdog, the International Atomic lize and legitimize its regime’ ( John Boehner, former Republican Energy Agency (IAEA), reports on whether Iran has complied Speaker of the US House of Representatives). The lifting of sanc- with the nuclear-related aspects of the agreement. If it identifies tions was ‘used as a slush fund for weapons, terror, and opposi- a suspicious site, it will convene an arbitration panel to decide tion across the Middle East’ (Donald Trump). Following the lifting whether Iran must grant access to that site. The IAEA believes that of sanctions, including the $150 billion of assets frozen abroad, Iran has complied with the agreement since 2015. Iran was free to continue its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the Assad regime in Syria. Arms control benefits international stability. ‘We negoti- ated arms control with the Soviet Union when that nation was Insecurity in the Middle East will continue. ‘It didn’t bring committed to our destruction. And those agreements ultimately calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will’ (Donald Trump). made us safer’ (Barack Obama). The nuclear diplomacy by the Given opposition to the agreement by Israel and Saudi Arabia, P5 + 1 and Iran between 2003 and 2015 was much better for the accord has not brought greater stability to the Middle international stability than military attacks on Iranian facilities. East. Indeed it has accelerated a regional arms race and added For this reason, the other members of the P5 + 1 (China, France, insecurity. Russia, the UK, and Germany) have continued to support the A broken agreement will be worse than no agreement. If Iran deal even after the US withdrawal. responds to US withdrawal by breaking the agreement itself, it Normalization of relations brings security. Gradually lift- will be extremely difficult to re-impose the kind of hard-hitting ing economic sanctions, ending the oil embargo and allowing international economic sanctions agreed on in the past, given the Iranian companies back into the international banking system contemporary difficulties in relations between the US, China, and was designed to help over a period to normalize relations with Russia. Iran and to re-integrate it into the international community. This normalization was undermined by President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement in 2018. 1. Why did President Trump withdraw from the Iran agreement? 2. Why have the other members of the P5 + 1 continued to support the agreement? 3. Does the 2015 agreement have a future? For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers www.oup.com/he/baylis8e 252 john baylis Richard Falk provides a rather different view of the In summary, different views of globalization and parallel impact of both globalization and geopolitics on geopolitics give rise to very different conclusions about contemporary world politics. Falk contends that tradi- world order. For some, globalization can bring greater tional geopolitics ‘was dominated by the United States, peace and security, while for others it can lead to greater and operationally administered from Washington, fragmentation and conflict as some states and non-state and continued despite the collapse of colonialism to actors challenge the dominant economic and political be West-centric when it came to the shaping of global status quo. Similarly, some view geopolitics as a force security policy’. The problem, he argues, is that this ‘Old that helps to prevent the emergence of overly domi- Geopolitics’ has not registered the implications for the nant states in the world. In contrast, others see ‘Old world order of the collapse of the colonial order or the Geopolitics’ in particular as resulting in thinking that relative weakening of US primacy. However, he argues encourages constant violence and war. In the complex that while the ‘Old Geopolitics’ remains embedded, world in which we live, globalization and geopolitics especially in Western thinking, a ‘New Geopolitics’ is are powerful forces and both have contradictory effects emerging which rests less on the importance of mili- on global security. tary power and more on the importance of soft power. This trend, enhanced by the processes of globalization, is exemplified by the emergence of the BRIC countries and the rise in importance of a wide variety of non-state Key Points actors. Falk also argues that the ‘winless withdrawals’ of the US from Iraq and Afghanistan are evidence that Some writers see globalization and geopolitics as contradictory concepts, while others argue there is no superiority in hard military power ‘is no longer able to opposition between them. reach desired political outcomes in violent conflicts’. The US should learn that depending on military power, Traditional ideas about geopolitics originate from the writings of such people as Harold Mackinder and Nicholas the main currency of the ‘Old Geopolitics’, will bring Spykman. only ‘frustration and defeat’. The problem, he says, is Different interpretations of the concepts of globalization and geopolitics give rise to alternative views about how a that the aged architects of the ‘Old Geopolitics’, for a peaceful world order can be achieved. variety of reasons, are unable to learn from failure, and so the cycle of war and frustration goes on and on with Inglobalization practice, global politics exhibits the effects of both and geopolitics. disastrous human results (Falk 2012). Conclusion At the centre of the contemporary debates about global At the same time, however, globalization also and international security discussed in this chapter appears to be having negative effects on international is the issue of continuity and change, as well as dif- security, in part due to the challenges it creates. It is ferent ways of thinking about ‘security’. This involves often associated with the rise of populism, fragmenta- questions about how the past is to be interpreted and tion, identity politics, rapid social change, increased whether international politics is in fact undergoing a economic inequality, terrorism, threats to cyber secu- dramatic change as a result of the processes of global- rity (see Box 15.3), and challenges to cultural and reli- ization. There is no doubt that national security is being gious identities that contribute to conflicts both within challenged by the forces of globalization, some of which and among states. The role of social media, in partic- have a positive effect, bringing states into greater con- ular, played an important part in the rise of so-called tact with each other, while others have a more malign Islamic State, which led to major global insecurity in effect. Bretherton and Ponton have argued that the recent years (see Box 15.4). Globalization has also facili- intensification of global connectedness associated with tated the proliferation of weapons technologies, includ- economic globalization, ecological interdependence, ing those associated with weapons of mass destruction, and the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction which remain a major potential source of international means that ‘co-operation between states is more than insecurity, especially with the contemporary chal- ever necessary’ (Bretherton and Ponton 1996: 100–1). lenges to a number of arms control agreements. This  Chapter 15 International and global security 253 These trends, however, are offset to a significant Box 15.3 Globalization and cyberwar extent by geopolitical changes and regional con- The damage that can be done in cyberwar now is in principle flicts that threaten the contemporary world order almost unlimited... Unlike nuclear weapons, you won’t know (see Box 15.5). It is evident that military force contin- where the attack has come from... and there is no deterrent. ues to be an important arbiter of disputes both among, Or if there is, they haven’t told us. and particularly within, states, as well as a weapon used (Professor Sir Michael Howard) by terrorist movements who reject the status quo. Also, Globalization has introduced a new form of warfare: cyber- conventional arms races continue in different regions war. More than 30 countries... have the capability to launch of the world. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons strategic level cyber attacks. The interconnectedness of many still exert a powerful influence on the security calcula- nation’s infrastructures means that a successful cyber attack tions of many states as some global arms control agree- against a single sector in one country could result in adverse effects in other sectors within the same country, or those of its ments begin to unravel; crazy and ambitious politicians neighbours. Indeed, intended (or unintended) adverse effects remain at the head of some governments; and cultural could well travel globally. differences, as well as diverse values and the tensions (Antuliuo J. Echevarria II, Globalization and inherent in globalization itself, prevent the emergence the Nature of War (Carlisle: Pennsylvania, 2003)) of global agreements on a wide range of important issues. Water resources, food, energy, and large-scale migration are all potential sources of conflict, and it Box 15.4 So-called Islamic State (ISIS) viewed through the lens of globalization ISIS draws its support from disaffected people from across the Box 15.5 Alternative contemporary views world. Moreover, its very method of advertising itself on social about world order media is one that is likely aped from combatants, civil society and individuals seeking to draw attention to their narratives In recent years we have seen the steady erosion of the liberal during previous conflicts. Its support network is multifarious order and the institutions that protect it. Citizens of many and transnational (amongst a number of complex networks) nations have turned away from universal values toward old ties and... its goal—the restoration of the caliphate... is directly of ethnicity, race and sectarianism. They have become increas- opposed to the status quo of a state-centric international sys- ingly resentful of immigrants, refugees and minority groups. tem. It is not merely a ‘threat’ or a ‘brutal’ criminal organisation, They have turned inwards economically and prioritized pro- in the singular... rather it should be seen as representative of tectionism over integration. They have warmed to authori- an emergent category of non-state actor that is desperately tarianism and embraced strong man politics... they seem to opposed to the status quo... It is certainly the worst kind of have given up on the very idea of liberalism itself, betraying the representative of a non-state actor one can imagine. underlying will that is necessary to maintain any world order. (Philip Leech, Middle East Monitor, 30 September 2014) ( John McCain) The old liberal international order was designed and built in ambivalent effect of globalization, in turn, reinforces the west. Brazil, China, India and other fast emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experi- the search for national security and unilateralism, ences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and while at the same time encouraging other states to seek anti-colonialist pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of greater multilateral and global solutions as they are less development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced able to provide security for their citizens. capitalist states. Despite important changes taking place in world (G. John Ikenberry) politics, the traditional ambiguity about international The traditional centres of global politics are unable to play a security remains. In some ways the world is a much safer leading role in establishing a new world order... the previous place to live in as a result of the end of the cold war and Yalta-based global political system has been all but destroyed the removal of nuclear confrontation as a central ele-... yet there is nothing to replace it. The world is increasingly ment in East–West relations. It can be argued that some sliding towards chaos... Over the past two decades Russia of the processes of globalization and the generally coop- and China have been promoting the idea of a ‘multi-polar world’ as the most sustainable, dependable, and fair structure erative effects of international institutions have played for international relations. an important part in mitigating some of the competitive (Igor Ivanov) aspects of the security dilemma among states. 254 john baylis remains unclear how great power relations will develop There seems no sign that a paradigmatic shift towards in the years ahead as geopolitical and geostrategic a more peaceful world is taking place in international changes unfold. There are also the security issues asso- politics, or indeed perhaps that such a permanent shift ciated with what one commentator has called the ‘crisis is possible. The empirical historical evidence, as well as of international institutions’ (Weiner 1995). contemporary events, suggest caution. Periods of more At a time of uncertainty and anxiety, compounded cooperative inter-state (and inter-group) relations have by the challenging and what some regard as the dis- often in the past led to a false dawn and an unwarranted ruptive effects of the diplomacy pursued by President euphoria that ‘perpetual peace’ was about to break out. Trump and the emergence of other ‘strongman lead- The structure of the international system, geopolitical ers’ in recent years, individual and societal insecurity is challenges, particular kinds of political systems, human increasingly evident as the forces of fragmentation and nature, and the forces of nationalism and globalization integration associated with globalization destabilize all impose important constraints on the way that indi- traditional identities and thereby complicate relation- viduals, states, and international institutions behave. So ships within and among states. does the continuing predominance of realist attitudes In many ways, contemporary international politics towards international and global security among many are characterized by what might be described as a ‘secu- of the world’s political leaders (see Ch. 8). It is also rity paradox’. Many in the West argue that international possible that contemporary discussions and discourse security since the Second World War has been largely about ‘geopolitics’ may themselves be self-fulfilling. maintained at a global level by a rules-based Western This is not to argue that there is no room for peaceful liberal international order. In recent years, however, that change, or that new ideas and discourses about world order has been challenged by claims that it serves only politics are unimportant in helping us to understand Western interests and undermines the security of non- the complexities of contemporary global security and Western states and non-state actors. There has also been to open up the opportunities for reducing international some unease in the US and some other Western coun- tension and conflict. In a world of continuing diversity, ties that some dictatorial regimes have exploited the mistrust, and uncertainty, however, it is likely that the prevailing order against their own interests. Attempts search for a more cooperative global society will remain to mitigate, or even overturn, what some regard as the in conflict with the powerful pressures that exist for injustices of the prevailing order have resulted in greater states, and other political communities, to look after contemporary international insecurity. Lawlessness is what they perceive to be their own sectional, religious, becoming ‘the new normal’ (according to UN Secretary- national, or regional security against threats from with- General Antonio Guterres). In this sense, the prevailing out and within. Whether and how greater international international order is both stabilizing and destabilizing and global security can be achieved still remains, as at the same time. One of the great challenges of the age, Herbert Butterfield once argued, ‘the hardest nut of all’ therefore, is to rethink or renew the world order. If this is for students and practitioners of international politics not achieved, there are dangers of miscalculation lead- to crack. This is what makes the study of global security ing to serious international conflicts in the future. such a fascinating and important activity. Questions 1. Why is security a ‘contested concept’? 2. Why do traditional realist writers focus on national security? 3. Why do wars occur? 4. Why do states find it difficult to cooperate? 5. Do you find ‘liberal institutionalism’ convincing? 6. Why might democratic states be more peaceful? 7. How do ‘constructivist’, human security, ‘feminist’, and poststructuralist views about international security differ from those of ‘neorealists’?