Martin BA3 Nuclear crises lecture slides 2324.pdf

11/8/2023 Dr Susan Martin Nuclear Crises Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Middle East Crisis 1 Rest of Term  Today: Nuclear Crises—class discussion  17 November: Use and Non‐use of Chemical Weapons, plus practice short answer questions  24 November: Use and Non‐use of CBN in the Vietnam War, plu...

11/8/2023 Dr Susan Martin Nuclear Crises Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Middle East Crisis 1 Rest of Term  Today: Nuclear Crises—class discussion  17 November: Use and Non‐use of Chemical Weapons, plus practice short answer questions  24 November: Use and Non‐use of CBN in the Vietnam War, plus practice essay questions  1 December: Limited Nuclear War 1950s‐1970s, plus practice exam questions  8 December: Questions, Review, Conclusion Term One Exam: 11 December, 13:00‐15:00, King’s Bldg K1.28 2 1 11/8/2023  How do Betts, and Lebow and Stein, explain the origins and resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1972 Middle East Crisis? Key questions on the role of nuclear weapons in crises  What is the role of nuclear weapons: when do states resort to nuclear threats, what was the response to nuclear threats, how did nuclear weapons/threats affect crisis resolution?  What are their arguments about the role of the balance of power (forces) and the balance of interests?  Did nuclear coercion (threats‐‐deterrence and/or compellence) work for the threatening state (did they help it achieve its interests) and if so, how did it work?  What role did reassurance play, if any?  What do Betts, and Lebow & Stein, conclude overall about the role of nuclear weapons, and did either of them convince you? 3 Key questions on the role of nuclear weapons in crises, cont.  Was the crisis over nuclear weapons or were nuclear weapons a means used in the crisis or both?  Nuclear threats (how were nuclear weapons used)?  What was nature of threat (deterrent or compellent)?  How was it communicated/signalled?  Indirect message  Public statement  Movement of weapons (unannounced or announced and if so how)  Alert level  Other?  Was the threat intended to demonstrate/assert capability, to signal resolve, or to manipulate nuclear risk (e.g. by increasing risk of escalation), or some combination?  Is there evidence the threat was received and understood as intended?  Is there any evidence that threat was or was not successful? 4 2 11/8/2023  Deterrence versus compellence  General deterrence versus immediate deterrence  Reassurance  Balance of forces (power, capability) versus balance of resolve; sources of credibility for nuclear threats  Risk Maximising versus Risk Minimizing approach Key concepts and ideas  Different ideas about how nuclear threats might ‘work’:  Nuclear danger (balance of terror)  Nuclear superiority/balance of forces: does the stronger state win, and if so, why? Through resolve?  Balance of interests—state with more at stake wins, and if so, why? Through resolve?  Competition in risk taking—if you are willing to risk more, you win  Madman theory (Nixon—deliberately promoted image that he was ‘out of control’, that he might do anything) 5 Factors that might affect use/success of nuclear threats  Resolve.  Forces/capabilities (nuclear weapons and delivery, conventional capability)—and is relative or absolute capability important?  Issue at stake‐‐is it worth nuclear risk/nuclear war?  General fear of nuclear war.  Other side’s capability (retaliatory capability).  SIOP (plans for use).  Understanding of what nuclear weapons are good for:  Tactical versus strategic;  Deterrence versus compellence;  Understanding of past cases;  Etc.  Compatibility of interests.  Ability to communicate.  Ability to engineer a solution that avoids ‘loss of face’. 6 3 11/8/2023  1948 Berlin crisis  Korean War (1950‐53)  1954‐55 Taiwan Strait Crisis Nuclear threats/crises 1945‐1961  1956 Suez Crisis (Soviet threat)  1958 Taiwan Straits  1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises  Others? [List does not include any threats made concerning withdrawal of extended deterrence/US nuclear umbrella] 7 Background: The Space Race 1957  In July 1955 US announced plans to launch an earth‐orbiting satellite; the Soviets respond on 2August 1955 with plan to launch their own.  On 4 October 1957 the Soviets launch Sputnik –22.8 inches in diameter and 183.9 pounds >>>Start of US‐USSR space race.  Fear that the Soviet ability to launch a satellite translated into an ability to launch a ballistic missile that could hit the United States. 8 4 11/8/2023 Weapons gaps and the Gaither Committee: the Year of Maximum Danger  ‘Bomber gap’: In 1956 CIA estimated that by 1961 USSR would have 500 bombers, and US would only have 100 or so.  August 1957: launch of first ICBM; Sputnik October 1957.  In November 1957, President Eisenhower received a report from the Gaither Committee, a group of outside experts.  Report was commissioned before Sputnik (in April 1957); asked to examine active and passive means to protect civilian population in case of a nuclear attack.  Soviet motives: “We have fond no evidence in Russian foreign and military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that USSR intentions are expansion, and that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of Soviet defense” (p 1).  “The evidence clearly indicates an increasing threat which may become critical in 1959 or early 1960” (p 1).  Report was leaked to public.  1957: ‘Missile gap’: Soviet start ICBM production; CIA national intelligence estimate in 1957 states that by 1961 the Soviet Union will have several hundred missiles, US would only have a few. 9  Kennedy campaigned on missile gap in his 1958 Senate campaign and in his 1960 presidential campaign.  U2 flights had started in 1956; results suggested to President Eisenhower that there was no missile gap, but he does not make a public announcement to that effect (intelligence).  Kennedy and his top officials learned there was no missile gap once they entered office. Background: weapons gaps  But they were still under pressure to expand the American arsenal, as Kennedy had promised in his campaign. February 6 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara told reporters there was no missile gap—and was reportedly ‘blasted’ by the president for doing so. Later that week Kennedy said it was ambiguous— that it was unclear whether or not there was a gap (Preble 2003). 10 5 11/8/2023 Year US ICBMS USSR ICBMS 1959 6 Relative ICBM force size, 1959‐ 1973 from US‐ USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces 1945‐1996 by Norris and Cochran US warheads USSR Warheads 6 1960 12 2 12 2 1961 57 10 57 10 1962 203 36 203 36 1963 597 99 597 99 1964 907 191 907 191 1965 281 854 281 1966 1004 416 1004 416 1967 818 1044 818 1968 1054 1017 1044 1017 1969 1054 1274 1044 1274 1970 1054 1472 1244 1472 1971 1054 1519 1444 1539 1972 1054 1504 1444 1524 1973 1054 1462 1644 1557 854 1054 1962: US > USSR 1969: USSR > US 11 1962 Balance Dobbs, “What was at stake in 1962?” Foreign Policy (2012) emphasis added  Overall Stockpile and ICBMs:  ‘In 1962, the nuclear stockpile of the United States, consisting of more than 3,500 warheads, was six times that of the Soviet Union.’  ‘The most powerful weapons — Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) — had ranges greater than 8,600 miles and were capable of hitting targets almost anywhere within the Soviet Union from American soil.’  ‘The United States had 203 missiles of this type, with a combined nuclear yield greater than 635 megatons, the equivalent of 635,000,000 tons of TNT. By way of comparison, the “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II …had a yield of around 15,000 tons of TNT.’  ‘The Soviet Union had only 36 missiles capable of covering a similar distance, with a combined yield in the range of 108‐204 megatons. Although much lower than the long‐ range missiles held by the Americans, these weapons still represented a nuclear power between 7,560 to 14,280 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb.’ 12 6 11/8/2023 1962 Balance, cont. Dobbs, “What was at stake in 1962?” Foreign Policy (2012)  Bombers:  US had 1,306 deployed bombers, able to deliver 2,962 nuclear weapons.  USSR had 138 bombers.  Western Missiles in Europe:  30 Jupiter MRBMs in Italy; 165 in Turkey; 60 Thor missiles in the UK. Together these meant that another 126 megatons that could reach the USSR. 13 1973 Balance of Forces Blechman, Barry M., and Douglas M. Hart. “The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis.” International Security 7, no. 1 (1982): 132–56.  Assured retaliation: ’By 1973, both superpowers had deployed nuclear forces that, on paper at least, seemed likely to be able to survive a first strike and retaliate with devastating force against the attacker.’(133).  ‘There was a rough balance of strategic forces between the superpowers in the early 1970s.’  Neither side possessed the capability for a disarming first strike, and each would have expected to suffer devastating retaliation if it launched nuclear war.’  What about local conventional forces? ‘It is hard to believe that the alert of U.S. conventional forces, at least in terms of the specific military threat implied by that move, was decisive either. It was probably unclear to both sides which nation would have come out ahead in a naval battle in the Mediterranean or in a contest between their respective interventionary forces in Egypt itself’(150‐152). 14 7 11/8/2023 Nuclear Weapons in Crises Why/how/under what circumstances have states (political leaders) used nuclear threats in an effort to gain leverage in a crisis? How successful have these efforts been, and what determines that success? How do nuclear weapons (either through threats or just through their existence) influence state behavior in crisis? 15 Betts, Overall argument and key concepts 16 8 11/8/2023 Lebow and Stein, Overall argument and key concepts 17 Nuclear Weapons: What, if anything, were they good for in these crises? Together with the others assigned the same reading, prepare a short presentation on the key arguments made in your readings about the role of nuclear weapons in these crises. Your presentation should also reflect your critical engagement with the readings! 1. What are the arguments about how nuclear weapons influenced international politics/crisis behaviour? What was(were) the role(s) of nuclear weapons in these crises?  What was the role, if any, of the nuclear balance?  What was the role, if any, of the balance of resolve (and what determined the balance of resolve)?  Were states able to use nuclear weapons coercively?  Did nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent?  What was the role of nuclear danger/nuclear vulnerability? 2. What kind of evidence did the authors present? How did they make their arguments? Were you convinced? Why or why not? 18 9 11/8/2023 What does Betts conclude about the role of nuclear weapons, and do you agree with him? 19 What do Lebow and Stein conclude, and do you agree with them? 20 10 11/8/2023 Strategy versus reality of nuclear deterrence Why and how do Lebow and Stein distinguish between the strategy of nuclear deterrence and the reality of nuclear deterrence? Does this make sense to you? 21  Lebow and Stein suggest crises arise due to competing objectives, but competing objectives may be A. Real ‐‐in which case deterrence/compellence may be appropriate. However: Two Types of Crises?  Threat‐based strategies can fail  Crisis resolution that only papers over competition, can have long term costs B. A result of misunderstanding—in which case reassurance is appropriate Question: How can one know a priori if crisis is due to misunderstanding or if it is due to ‘real’ conflict of interest? 22 11 11/8/2023  After looking at these crises in detail, are you more or less comfortable living in a nuclear world? Final thoughts on these crises?  Are you reassured that nuclear risks will be managed?  Or are you more scared that things will get out of control? [Note: some summary slides will be released on KEATS after today’s session] 23 Looking around/ looking ahead Ukraine—is it a nuclear crisis? Crises in multipolar versus bipolar nuclear world Nuclear weapons outside US‐Soviet context (e.g. South Asia, Korean peninsula) To what extent do the arguments by Betts and by Lebow and Stein depend on assured retaliation? Are their arguments challenged by emerging technology that may undermine assured retaliation? 24 12