2023 Seminar 3 NPT Review Process.pdf

Arms Control Seminar 2 NPT review process Professor Andrei Zagorski 5 .4 .20 23 NPT review process 1. The 1995 NPT “extension package” 2. Which successive review conferences succeeded adopting substantive decisions, which failed? 3. Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament: the NPT...

Arms Control Seminar 2 NPT review process Professor Andrei Zagorski 5 .4 .20 23 NPT review process 1. The 1995 NPT “extension package” 2. Which successive review conferences succeeded adopting substantive decisions, which failed? 3. Nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament: the NPT Article VI and its interpretations 4. The 2000 13 “practical steps” 5. The 2010 “Action plan” 6. Wither the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 7. The 10 th NPT review conference: main issues and the outcome 8. Is the NPT regime in danger? Different views and arguments Zagorski, 5 April 2023 2 1. The 1995 NPT “extension package”  the 1995 Conference, in addition to reviewing the NPT, was charged with deciding whether the NPT should be extended and how to do so: for one period, for a rolling set of periods, indefinitely or not at all  states parties agreed on the indefinite extension of the treaty based on an interlinked and indivisible package of three decisions and a resolution  this package comprised the decisions on  strengthening the review process for the Treaty  principles and objectives for nuclear -non -proliferation and disarmament  extension of the Treaty, and  a resolution on the Middle East calling for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region Rauf 2020, p. 3 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 3 1. The principles and objectives  recommendations and actions, including  the negotiation of a CTBT no later than 1996  immediate commencement and early conclusion of a fissile material cut -off treaty (FMCT)  determined pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons  the strengthening of IAEA safeguards  facilitating cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy … Gillis 2017, p. 47 -48; 1995 Review and Extension Conference, decision 2 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 4 2. Which review conferences after 1995 succeeded adopting substantive decisions, which failed?  substantive decisions:  2000  2010  failure to adopt a substantive final document:  2005  2015  2020 (2022) Zagorski, 5 April 2023 5 3. NPT Article VI and its interpretations  “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” NPT Treaty, p. 173 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 6 3. NPT Article VI and its interpretations  Article VI requires the parties to start up two nuclear disarmament negotiations: one to stop the nuclear another to eliminate nuclear weapons  a very large group of parties under the treaty believe that the NWS are not fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations, while at the same time they themselves do fulfil their obligations  the NNWS succeeded in convincing the NWS to adopt “13 steps” in 2000 as well as an action plan ten years later  these steps or actions, however, are not implemented, or only to a very limited extent Sauer 2015, pp. 2-3 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 7 3. NPT Article VI and its interpretations  the 2000 final document was remarkable for its so -called “13 practical steps” for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI, including an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals  in so doing, it was understood that nuclear disarmament was not necessarily conditional on “general and complete disarmament” , as there is no reference in the “practical steps” linking nuclear disarmament with general and complete disarmament or to article VI in this context Rauf 2020, p. 5 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 8 3. NPT Article VI and its interpretations  in their joint statement at the 2015 review conference, the five NWS affirmed “the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament … as referenced in the preamble and provided for in Article VI of the NPT ”  thus they renounced the above understanding from 2000 and made nuclear disarmament conditional on general and complete disarmament Rauf 2020, p. 5 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 9 4. The 2000 13 “practical steps” for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons  among the “practical steps” were : 1. early entry -into -force of the CTBT 2. immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an FMCT and the conclusion of a treaty within five years 3. entry -into -force of START II and conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty 4. further reduction of non -strategic nuclear weapons 5. placing excess military nuclear materials under IAEA monitoring 6. engagement as soon as appropriate of all the NWS in a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons Rauf 2020, p. 5 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 10 5. The 2010 “Action plan”  the 2010 review conference succeeded in adopting an action plan containing 64 measures on each of the three pillars of the Treaty  nuclear disarmament  nuclear non -proliferation and  peaceful uses of nuclear energy  and on the 1995 resolution on the Middle East  the final document called for a 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction  it also established benchmarks to be achieved by the 2015 review conference Gillis 2017, p. 49 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 11 5. The building blocs of the “Action plan”  I. nuclear disarmament  principles and objectives, including the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency  disarmament of nuclear weapons  [negative] security assurances  nuclear testing  fissile materials  other measures in support of nuclear disarmament (e.g. reporting, verification)  II. nuclear non -proliferation, including  the additional protocol to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards and  export controls  III . peaceful uses of nuclear energy Final Document NPT Review Conference 2010, pp. 20 –29 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 12 6. Wither the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons  the Austrian delegation warned already at the 2010 review conference: “If there is no clear progress towards ‘global zero’, we will discuss with parties the feasibility of a global instrument to ban these weapons”  like Austria, many NNWS do not believe anymore that the NPT framework is sufficient to pressure the NWS to fulfil their disarmament obligations  too many action plans and promises have been made that have not been implemented Sauer 2015, pp. 4, 7 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 13 6. Wither the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons  after the failure of the 2015 review conference, divisions between NPT states over nuclear disarmament deepened  within the “Humanitarian Initiative,” there was a group that wanted to draw up a treaty on banning nuclear weapons without involving the nuclear -weapon states, without imposing strict verification rules  the TPNW was adopted in 2017 [and entered into force in 2021]  there are now 68 states parties  the treaty embodies a new , uncompromising stance on disarmament Schneider, Horovitz 2022, p. 1 -2 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 14 7. The 10 th NPT review conference: the outcome  despite four weeks of intense negotiations, the review conference was unable to reach consensus on the substantive part of the outcome document  in 2015, consensus was blocked by the Canadian, UK and US delegations  this year, Russia was the only one to openly oppose adoption of the draft outcome document as submitted by the conference president  Ukraine, including the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, became a major issue and the major politicizing factor at the conference Batsanov , Chernavskikh , Khloprov , 2022 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 15 7. The 10 th NPT review conference: main issues  AUKUS  the AUKUS -related safeguards  Middle Eastern WMD -Free Zone  JCPOA  the Korean Peninsula  Nuclear Energy, Safeguards, and Export Controls  deep disagreement over the balance between the inalienable right of all states -parties to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the multilateral and national export control regimes and strengthened IAEA safeguards  many states -parties believe the current balance is not right Batsanov , Chernavskikh , Khloprov , 2022 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 16 8. Is the NPT regime in danger?  without any progress on nuclear disarmament, more states may leave the NPT in the future Sauer, p. 8  the NPT is frequently portrayed as a delicately balanced system of rules in three areas :  nuclear disarmament,  non -proliferation and  the peaceful uses of nuclear energy  it is often assumed that if obligations and pledges are not fulfilled in one of these areas, overall treaty compliance will be eroded and the stability of the NPT as a whole undermined Schneider , Horovitz 2022, p. 3 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 17 8. Is the NPT regime in danger?  recent research on the NPT calls this assumption into question  balanced implementation in the three areas is necessary only when it comes to the further development of the NPT  stricter non -proliferation rules, for example, would have to be offset by meaningful steps towards disarmament  but the stability of the NPT in its current form does not depend on this balance  the NPT will remain stable as long as the NNWS refrain from developing nuclear weapons and do not withdraw from the treaty Schneider , Horovitz 2022, pp. 3 -4 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 18 8. Is the NPT regime in danger? Three reasons why states remain within the NPT  the NPT parties would face severe sanctions if they were to withdraw  countries withdrawing from the NPT or obtaining nuclear weapons would damage the international nuclear legal order  many states value the legally binding renunciation of nuclear weapons by their neighbors  this is especially true for medium -sized powers, which could build nuclear weapons but do not need to as they can rely on the NPT  NPT withdrawals and illicit weapons programmes would undermine the overarching international order of which the NPT is a core part  but a world in which states no longer abide by such fundamental agreements would not be desirable  this applies especially to small and weak countries Schneider, Horovitz 2022, p. 4 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 19 8. Is the NPT regime in danger?  w ithdrawals and successful weapons programmes that violate the NPT are exceedingly rare  exceptions (such as North Korea) emerge only in extreme situations  to an overwhelming majority, it makes little sense to damage the NPT simply to protest against systemic injustice – the costs would be far too high  moreover , it would become much more difficult to achieve disarmament goals if the current order were to unravel. Schneider, Horovitz 2022, p. 4 Zagorski, 5 April 2023 20