Kant's Ethics Based On Reason PDF

IMMANUEL KANT Ethics Is Based on Reason Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher who lived from 1724 to 1804, has had a great influence on contemporary ethics. For this reason, we thought it helpful to include some short excerpts from his writings. Kant believed in an objective...

IMMANUEL KANT Ethics Is Based on Reason Immanuel Kant, a German philosopher who lived from 1724 to 1804, has had a great influence on contemporary ethics. For this reason, we thought it helpful to include some short excerpts from his writings. Kant believed in an objective right and wrong based on reason. We should do the right thing just because it is right - and not because it promotes our desires or self-interest. We know what is right, not by relying on moral intuitions or facts about the world, but by reasoning about what we can consistently will. To test a moral maxim, we ask ourselves whether we can consistently will that everyone follow it (and thus act that way toward us); we must reject the maxim if we cannot will this. As you read the selection, ask yourself whether Kant's ideal of moral motivation is plausible. Do moral duties command categorically? Does Kant's way to test moral principles work? Good will In order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law; it must also be done for the sake of the law. Nothing can possibly be conceived which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these may become extremely bad if the will which uses them is not good. 1 It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, health, and content- ment inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind. A good will is good, not because of its attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself. The pre- eminent good which we call moral can consist in nothing else than the conception of law itself, insofar as this determines the will.  ETHICS IS BASED ON REASON 15 5 How to test a maxim What sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without regard to the effect expected from it? As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. It is the simple conformity to law in general that serves the will as its principle. The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I readily distinguish two significations the question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise? Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see what results may affect myself. For to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The shortest way to discover whether a lying promise is consistent with duty is to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others?" and should I be able to say to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a diffi- culty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself"? While I can will the lie, I cannot will that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no promises, since it would be vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they did so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itsele I do not need far-reaching penetration to discern what to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Can you will that your maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage from it to myself or to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legisla- tion. Acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything else. 156 KANT Categorical and hypothetical imperatives An objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative. All imperatives are expressed by the word ought, and indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by it. They say that something would be good to do, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good. Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or which one might will). The categorical imperative represents an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary. 3 A categorical imperative commands a certain conduct immediately, with- out having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative may be called that of morality. There is but one [basic] categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Treat people with respect- do not just use them Man, and generally any rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. Nonrational beings have only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves. If then there is a categorical imperative, it must be drawn from that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself. The founda- tion is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. I necessarily conceive my own existence as being so; so this is a subjective principle of action. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, so it is at the same time an objective principle. Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end in itself, never only as means. Study questions 1 Why is a good will the only thing good without qualification? Give an ex- ample showing why other things are not good without qualification. 2 Under what conditions is a will good? Is it good just if it produces good results - or just if it accords with our duty?  ETHICS IS BASED ON REASON 157 3 What is Kant's test of a moral maxim? Apply the test to making a dishon- est promise. Can you see problems with his test? 4 Explain the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Give an example of each. 5 How should our treatment of persons differ from our treatment of things? For further study This selection has excerpts, sometimes simplified in wording, from T. K. Abbott's translation of Immanuel Kant's 1789 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1934). This work (often called "The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morais") is also available in other translations; the one by H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) has a helpful commentary. You might also consult Kant's 1788 Critique of Practical Reason (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1956), translated by L. W. Beck. To see Kant apply his framework, see his Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), translated by P. Heath and J. B. Schnee- wind, especially parts I to Ill. For Kant's life and general thought, see Kant: A Biography, by Manfred Kuehn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Related readings in this anthology include those from Habermas, Hare, Kohlberg, Nagel, O'Neill, Rawls, and Sartre (all of whom are inspired in some way by Kant's approach and accept some analogue of Kant's test of moral maxims); Hume and Mill (who support historically important opposing views); and Mackie (who expresses his rejection of objective values in terms of a rejection of Kantian categorical imperatives). Notes 1 To appreciate Kant's point, consider a serial killer who is more effective at his chosen task because he is extremely intelligent. 2 Kant's followers disagree on how best to apply the "universal law" test. Hare's creative approach (see his reading in this anthology) suggests that we test a proposed moral maxim by (1) understanding the consequences of following it on affected individuals, (2) imagining ourselves in the place of these individuals, and (3) asking whether we desire that the maxim be followed regardless of where we imagine ourselves in the situation. 3 These are hypothetical imperatives: "If you want to relieve your headache, then you ought to take aspirin" and "If you want people to be honest to you, then you ought to be honest to them." In contrast, a categorical (or moral) imperative commands an action directly (not as a means to some further end) - as in "You ought to be honest to others."