Moral Approval and Disapproval: A Philosophical Essay PDF

far as moral approval, disapproval, and any other sentiment or attitude are concerned, we can be pretty sure that they are not the source, far less the justification or authority, of moral laws, imperatives or judgments. There is a cognitive element not only in moral judgments, but also implicitly i...

far as moral approval, disapproval, and any other sentiment or attitude are concerned, we can be pretty sure that they are not the source, far less the justification or authority, of moral laws, imperatives or judgments. There is a cognitive element not only in moral judgments, but also implicitly in moral laws or imperatives. Especially, moral judgments imply an assertion of some positive or negative moral Enter quality in its object (some act or character trait). This is a typically realistic position which may not be acceptable to other ethicists. It seems quite justified to me, provided we do not get entangled in any realist ontology regarding moral qualities. As understood by me, it simply says that some basic moral principles and judgments based on them are not determined by our culture-specific moral code but are objectively right or true. When we pass a moral judgment that the act of burning the cat is a wrong or evil act, we do so because we \'perceive\' that act or trait to be so. Whatever our attitude towards animals, and whatever our conceptual frame- work, the act of burning the cat has a \'causal\' relation to our judgments, that is, our moral judgment is \'determined\' in some way by the nature of the act. The idea of objectivity need not mean any ontological status for the objects (goodness or badness of acts or character traits) of our judgments. It simply means that they are not the products of our sentiments, or attitudes, or even our conceptual frameworks; and their normative value, truth, or validity are independent of all these sentiments, attitudes and concepts. It is the subject- independence of the moral judgment or imperative that is mainly implied by the objectivity of moral assertions. Again, it is not to deny that our moral judgments are conditioned by what Hans Georg Gadamer calls \'prejudices\', as well as by the conceptual framework and the moral code of the subject\'s society. But a moral assertion (it may or may not be a part of the moral code of the society), in order to claim its superiority to other points of view, must be supra-personal, or independent of the subject or society who is making that judgment.\" Moral assertions assume that the rightness or wrongness of a particular act, or class of acts is not a matter of subject\'s attitudes, or conceptual framework, but in some way inheres in the act itself.\" That is, if I pronounce the burning of a cat by children, or skinning a child alive (the examples are taken from the usual works on the subject) as evil acts, it is not because I feel a disapproval towards those acts; nor is it because my moral code prohibits such acts; Debut because I see that this act, and all acts of this kind are morally wrong or evil. Enter You sent Jocl J. Kupperman presents a strong case for his thesis that ethical assertions are largely cognitive. He argues first, that the commonsense language in moral discourse is cognitive, that is, consistently speaks of the moral subject as \'knowing\' that a certain act is right or wrong. Secondly, the correctness or truth of moral judgments is indepen- dent of its acceptance or rejection by the moral subject, appraiser, or any society. Moral assertions, like any other cognitive assertions, have a truth claim which cannot be sustained if they were conceived in a relativistic manner.\" The limited validity of moral claims to a particular society asserted by the relativists is not satisfying from the moral point of view. A moral imperative such as \"Do not hurt others\" (ahismsa in Indian religions) claims universal validity. This claim implies objec- tivity, that is, independence from the moral rules and imperatives of separate subjects and moral codes. Our moral judgments refer to both the qualities or characteristics of their objects (acts or character traits) and the appraiser\'s choice or decision of some moral principle as applicable (or suited) to a particular situation. This choice or preference of some moral principle would, however, be arbitrary or unjustified if it were not rooted in, or supported by, the demands of the practical situation (e.g. when speaking the truth would endanger the life of an innocent person). Moral terms are like the A words of P.H. Nowell-Smith which \"indicate that an object has certain properties which are apt to arouse a certain emotion or range of emotions.\"\" Let us substitute the phrase \'the choice or decision of moral principles\' for \"certain emotion or range of emotions\", and we get what I have been trying to argue. That is, moral terms and judgments refer to some characteristics of their objects which are judged by us as \'good- making\' or \'bad-making\' characteristics. Our decision as to whether those particular characteristics are \'good-making\' or \'bad-making\' in turn, is determined by our moral principle(s). According to W.D.Ross, the terms \'good\' and \'right\' are resultant or consequential properties. That is, an act is right, or wrong; and a character trait is good or bad, because it has certain other natural charac- teristics. You sent Baier calls the features of the empirical situation, act, or character trait \'considerations\', and our moral principles \'consideration - making beliefs\'. He explains the latter in a propositional form, according to which any moral principle, such as \'stealing is wrong \"is a reason (a moral one) against doing it.\" That is, in any moral reasoning we can cite both facts and moral principles, former as considerations in our judgments and the latter as consideration- making beliefs which give us reasons for our judgments and decisions. As we shall see in our next section, in order to avoid lapsing into mere tautology, universalizability is always explained by ethicists as applicability of a moral judgment to all relevantly similar cases, or to all relevantly similar persons in relevantly similar circumstances. This reference to relevant similarity suggests both the need to take into consideration the objective circumstances and demands of the situation, and the need to understand the similarity of any two cases with reference to moral principles. Only those objective charac The teristics are to be accepted as similar which are morally relevant, and this, in turn, requires a careful consideration of the objective situation, and the (subject-independent) nature of the object of moral judgment. The same idea is expressed by the understanding of moral property of an act or character trait as being consequential or supervenient upon certain objective characteristics of that act or person. An act or character trait is right or good if it responds well to the demands of the objective situation, and conforms to a well-established universal moral principle. The objective validity of our moral judgments means that their object or referent has certain objective (subject - independent) characteristics; and that those characteristics are found by us as \'good-making\', or \'bad- { making\' with reference to some moral principle. The latter is not arbitrarily chosen, but is intimately related to the demands of the objective situatio situation. Furthermore, the moral principle that is appealed to in our moral judgment is a universal one, and its universality can be attested to by rational argument. } II.3 Perhaps the most important characteristic of the moral point of view is that it can only be universal, that is, it necessarily claims Enter You sent universal validity. Kant\'s moral philosophy is the paradigm of universal ethics. His categorical imperative, \"Act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law\" provides perhaps the most important and necessary condition of (universal) morality, or the moral point of view. In other words, only those maxims can be truly moral which can be followed by all humankind in different cultures and times, and even under all possible circumstances. While the relativist says that no moral rule can have any validity beyond the limited confines of. one\'s group, Kant says that no rule or action can be moral unless it is such that it is applicable to the entire humankind, irrespective of their different cultures, moral codes and ways of life. If a person has promised, then it is her duty to keep the promise, period, and the fact that she lives in contemporary Western society or in some preliterate one does not make the slightest difference. Nor is the fact that promise keeping or speaking the truth can only be done under certain circumstances at greatest cost (even that of some one\'s life) is relevant for Kant. The only thing that counts is that it is the moral law that one should speak the truth, or keep one\'s promise, and that moral law is binding on all rational human beings.\" Arguably, a carefully formulated universalism is a much more defensible philosophic position than Kant\'s normative absolutism. The idea of the categorical imperative or any universal moral principle becomes more acceptable if the absoluteness of the categorical imperative is substituted by its applicability to the entire humankind under \'relevantly similar\' circumstances. Kan hodi As we have seen, R.M. Hare and M.G. Singer have opted for a universalist approach to morality, as against the absolutist one of Kant. Both acknowledge the need for exceptions to universal Heupti moral rules. While Hare contends that we modify an already well-Cin Kan recognized moral rule in order to accommodate a need for exception\" Singer says that in such situations we prefer some other moral rule to the one that is apparently applicable to the given situation.\" CE Whether it is the same rule that is being modified, or it is another rule that is being substituted for the earlier one in accordance with Enter You sent the needs of the situation, two things are clear: First, some cases must be acknowledged as exceptions to the original moral rule. And second, the modified or the preferred rule must be as universal in its application as the original one. The acknowledgment of the need of exceptions does not undermine the universality of moral principles and judgments. The conception of relevance becomes crucial here. How do we decide which aspects of an act or a person are morally relevant? Relevance is not an absolute term; it is rather relevance to a particular argument, judgment, decision, or relevance for our purpose, here relevance from the moral point of view. If so, then the aspect of the act or the agent which should be relevant to determine the class of acts or persons to which a given moral principle or a moral judgment applies could only be a moral one. The identification of the members of the appropriate class to which our moral principle applies presupposes a moral standard which helps us in finding the class of acts or character traits to which that principle applies. When we describe an act of killing, as \'murder\' we say something more than giving a mere physical description of the events resulting in the death of someone. Hare affirms that, in order for a moral judgment to be universal, direct reference to some universal moral principle or standard which fiel has application to allother siminal moral or weakened his position by emphasizing the distinction between the descriptive and normative meanings of moral assertions or im- peratives. However, reference to some moral principle is inherent in any morally relevant description, or descriptive criteria. nons When we talk of universalizability in the moral context we mean something more than the mere universalizability of all rational judgments; and the criteria that is adopted in order to define the class of relevant acts or persons includes both a certain description of the act and a moral standard or principle. In order to argue for the universalizability of moral judgments we must bring forward not some morally neutral description of the act or character trait, but a morally relevant one. That is, a moral judgment is universalizable, as it is applicable to all such cases which are judged as right or wrong by an appeal to some moral standard. As J.M. Brennan says, You sent Thus, when we want to judge like cases alike we are not looking for some morally neutral similarity between them, but for a similarity in accordance with certain standards of justification.\" This is very clearly stated by Singer. Having explained the generalization principles in terms of relevantly similar persons in relevantly similar circumstances, he explains the concept of \'rel- evance\' by asserting that, \"the criteria of all similar cases are contained in the general grounds or reasons on the basis of which an act is, or is said to be, right or wrong.\" 30 D.H.Monro gives a sensible piece of argument. According to him, to say that the terms, yellow, good etc., are universalizable is merely to mean that if something is yellow or good, then something else with similar relevant characteristics is also yellow or good. It would be different from saying that if something is yellow or good to you or me, it is necessarily yellow or good to everyone else.\" First assertion refers to moral properties, or rather, to the referents of such terms as right or good; and the universalizability of such judgments which appeal to some descrip- tive (even implicitly evaluative) criteria is easy to accept. But the second assertion refers to moral principles. It asserts that if a moral principle is applicable to a certain person, it is necessarily applicable to all persons under relevantly similar circumstances. And \'relevantly\' similar circumstances are decided on the basis of some universal, rational principle which gives us grounds or reasons for our identification of relevantly similar cases. In other words, moral discourse is above all \"about standards which we apply in appraising the object of our commendation, praise or approval. \"\" And these standards have to be universal in order to constitute the moral point of view. Though concrete moral judgments cannot be applied to all human beings without reference to the relevant difference between them; in another sense, all rational beings are potential objects of moral imperatives or judgments. As Kant said, a moral rule is applicable to all rational beings who are capable of acting on them. According to Bernard Gert, \"a basic moral rule is one that concerns Enter You sent actions open to all rational persons in all societies at all times.\" He adds that, a moral rule cannot be limited to any group smaller than this class \[of all rational persons\]. If a rule applies to any group smaller than the class of all rational persons it is not a moral rule.\" Theoretically, every moral rule is applicable to every rational human being, that is, every rational being is a potential subject to whom all relevant moral rules are applicable. The class of persons to which a moral rule applies is a sub-class of all rational persons. This class would be defined by the nature of the particular act they are contemplating, or undertaking to do. For example, the rule against injury to living beings is potentially applicable to all human beings; it becomes more stringently applicable if someone undertakes an act prohibited by that rule. Several other ethical philosophers have emphasized that universalizability is integral to all moral rules and judgments. To quote W.T. Stace, What do we mean by a universal morality? We do not mean a moral principle which is, as a matter of empirical fact, believed and accepted by all men. We mean a moral principle which is applicable to all men in the sense that even if they do not accept it, they ought to do so. What we have to show is that the same moral obligation in reality falls upon all men. We do not have to show that all men know what this obligation is, or there is among them any agreement about the matter. We have to show that what really is right is the same for all men. We do not have to show that what men think right is everywhere the same. For even if it were the case that not a single moral opinion could be found upon which all men were in agreement, it might still be true that there is some principle which is in reality binding upon all men in the sense that they ought to accept it and act upon it.\" (original italics) Enter You sent Stace is contending here that the same morality is applicable to all human beings, irrespective of all conventional differences. Applicability suggests an \'ought\' on the part of humankind regarding some basic moral principles and obligations. The need here is to make a distinction between what people think as right, and what is morally right. Though what people think and practice as right may be quite divergernt, there still remains a strong case for saying that what really is right or moral is the same for all.\" According to Brennan, moral judgments necessarily make a universal claim. This is a claim on the judgment of others that they should agree with our judgment, provided we are sure that we have reached our conclusions through the application of appro- priate moral standards and reasoning. If a person makes a certain moral judgment, but adds that others are free to arrive at their own judgments which may be contrary to the one arrived at by our subject, then it would mean that the person herself is not sure of the validity of her own judgment.\" (1) Lik law A universalist ethical thinker distinguishes between moral truth\' or universally valid moral norms or principles and local changing moral norms. Granting that moral rules of conduct are local and variable, a universalist hopes to find norms and principles which are sufficiently permanent and universal, though not absolute or infallible; and which can be taken as standards to judge and evaluate the more variable elements in morality. regu The idea of the universalizability of moral judgments is related both to the idea of rationality of moral assertions, and to their claim to objectivity, or some kind of truth.\" To say that \"killing is wrong\" is to utter a universal moral principle. Its claim to universality cannot be sustained except by arguing (i) that it is a rational moral principle; and (ii) that it is in some way rooted in the matter of the case. In other words, the above three characteristics of morality, ie rationality, objectivity and universality, are integrally related and are mutually supported or justified. And it is because the moral point of view is all three, that is, is rational, objective and universal, that it can claim overriding authority over all other points of view (the latter includes perspectives belonging to different fields of human knowledge and activity, as well as different moral codes). These four characteristics of the moral point of view hang together, or are closely related; though there is no necessity about C their interrelationship. III. Impartiality and Reversibility III.1 An important characteristic of the moral point of view is impartiality. It is integrally related to the principle of universalizability. Generally, impartiality is conceived as applying the moral rule to all relevant acts or persons without making exceptions in favor of anyone, especially oneself. Impartiality can be conceived on a narrower or wider canvas. It can be explained in terms of the class of persons towards whom the subject is impartial, and the rule or criterion which the subject is trying to apply. On the other hand, impartiality can be conceived on a universal scale. Then the class of persons towards whom one is expected to be impartial consists of all present and future rational beings. The main idea of impartiality is that it should be irrelevant for making a judgment as to who would benefit or lose from the making of our judgment, decision, or act. It also means that no exception can be allowed in favour of some particular person which is not at the same time allowed to all relevantly similar persons. In the words of Baier, The supreme principle of the application of moral rules is that in the absence of morally relevant differences between people, moral rules must be applied to everyone alike.\" And, since from the point of view of morality, all are to be regarded equally, we would expect that the rules should affect everyone alike.\" (original italics.) Impartiality means nondiscrimination, that is, the principle that all rules qua moral apply to everyone alike. That is to say, a moral rule must not discriminate between people, i.e. differentiate between them on morally irrelevant grounds\.... The system of these grounds of differentiation rests on the principle of equality, that to begin with all other things being equal, i.e. unless there are some specific grounds Enter You sent for differentiation, all moral rules must, therefore, be equally applied to all.\" Ra This idea is developed in an elaborate hypothesis by Rawls. He imagines an original state in which there is no laws or authority. The individuals in the original state are rational persons who want to legislate laws to create a just social order. But in order that they do not create laws which are beneficial to this or that person, or group, Rawls hypothesizes that they are under the veil of ignorance which hides from them all contingent circumstances regarding their relative places in the society, their capacities and needs. He believes that in such a position no one will be able to \"tailor principles for his advantage\", for the simple reason that no one knows what his empirical circumstances will Actually what Rawls has be.\" done strip his rational persons of all individuality. Such disembodied, persons, having no interests of their own, are expected to be capable of reaching an agreement: as to the socio-moral laws which should govern a harmonious and stable society. Rawls has been criticized for supposedly conceiving his rational human beings as self-centred or selfish beings competing for limited natural resources. That is more or less how Hobbes conceived the original human condition. Hence the need of the veil of ignorance which hides the empirical circumstances from the rational persons while contemplating ideal moral laws. Whether the critics\' interpretation of Rawls\' views is correct or not, it seems obvious that true (moral) impartiality cannot be achieved if the moral agent or rational person has no knowledge of her own interests. Impartiality need not be, cannot be, ensured by a forced veil of ignorance. Both moral knowledge and praxis demand real moral agents with real desires, goals, capacities and weaknesses, deciding and acting in the context of real life situations. The veil of ignorance makes impartiality almost mechanical. Real impartiality which would be a moral virtue, as well as a necessary condition of moral judgments, is more profound and difficult to achieve. From the moral point of view, impartiality is the attitude of a person who knows who would benefit and who would not from her decision, or act, and yet sets aside all these considerations while applying a moral principle or norm to a given case, The first two formulations of Kant\'s categorical imperative express the virtue of impartiality. A moral maxim cannot be applied universally unless the empirical circumstances of all individuals are first set aside as irrelevant, and that is what impartiality means. 2 Impartiality also means that all rational persons are regarded as equal in the sense that no person can be treated as a means of the realization of the goals or interests of another person, The concept of impartiality is integral to the very ideas of moral judgment, evaluation, law, norm and imperative. A moral judgment must apply the relevant moral principle to all relevantly similar persons and acts absolutely impartially. A moral imperative must be applicable to all (potential) moral agents impartially. Impartiality means the rejection of any exceptions, unless strictly based on rational considerations of relevance; as also universality (universal applicability) of basic moral principles; above all, impartiality means an assertion of fundamental equality-of all human beings. The value of impartiality has been well recognized in Indian thought, especially in the context of jurisprudence.\" But generally its context and conception are quite different from those of Western moral discourse, and it is often conceived not in the moral context per se but in that of religio-spiritual quest.\" Such conceptions do not easily fit in a discourse, such as ours, which is largely carried out in the Western conceptual framework. III.2 Reversibility is another very important constitutive character- istic of the moral point of view. Reversibility, according to Baier, means that \"the behavior in question must be acceptable to a person whether he is at the \"giving\" or \"receiving\" end of it.\" While other tests, such as universalizability, cationality, assessment of conse quences and conformity to moral code, may be somewhat doubtful, reversibility is the surest test of rightness or wrongness of a certain mode of conduct. Nonreversible behaviour is \"wrong-in-itself\" irrespective of individual or social recognition, irrespective consequences it has.\" of the Hare first suggested the idea of reversibility as a test of vsibilt universalizable behaviour. In order to assess the universalizability Dand moral correctness of a principle, we have only to imagine a Enter #### You sent hypothetical case which is precisely similar to the case being considered in all relevant aspects, except for the fact that the roles of the people involved are reversed, Here Hare gives the long argument about the person who wants to put his debtor in prison. Such a person should be asked whether she would still endorse the policy of putting all debtors into prison if she herself wasn the debtor who could be put into prison. It is expected that when- confronted with this reverse possibility, a normal person would back out of her unjust position, though a fanatic may still persist in her original assertion.\" b It is perhaps to avoid any such complications that Rawls has put the hypothesis of the veil of ignorance. Rawl\'s rational persons do not know whether they would be in a position of the debtor or the financier. But somehow the veil of ignorance makes the rational persons so impersonal or almost disembodied that the actual idea of reversibility loses its experiential basis, and hence its strong appeal. Let us suppose that a person who is willfully torturing another is confronted with the possibility that some day he/she may be in the position of the person being tortured. The immediate confrontation of the possibility of being tortured some day not only horrifies any normal person, but it also brings the realization of the intensely unjust and cruel character of the act of torturing or inflicting any injury on another person, or any living being. This ensures the subject\'s adopting a just, moral, or even a compassionate point of view. P.F. Strawson\'s version of the condition of reversibility is quite convincing. He calls the rules of morality, or the moral code of a society as some form of \"socially sanctioned demands on its members. But such social demands on the members get their Hegitimacy only when they are such that the demands on each person or group are balanced by the demands on others on the former\'s behalf. He locates the essence of morality or a moral point of view in the reciprocal acknowledgment of rights and duties.\" He contends that \"a demand made on an individual is to be regarded as a moral demand only if it belongs to a system of demands which includes demands made on others in his interest.\" Strawson has sometimes been labelled as a relativist. In fact, he emphatically affirms that there is, Enter #### You sent something genuinely universal in morality: the necessary acceptance of reciprocity of claim. And one way in which a demand made on one individual in the interest of others can be balanced by a demand made on others in his interest is through the operation of a general rule or principle having application to all alike.\" - He accepts that it does not follow that all moral claims have universal applicability, or that the system of moral demands is identical in different societies. And yet, there is a core of universal moral principles in every system of moral demands or moral code: What is universally demanded of the members of a moral community is something like the abstract virtue of justice: a man should not insist on a particular claim while refusing to acknowledge any reciprocal claim.\" The idea of reversibility is perhaps absent in ancient Greek thought; but it is quite clearly affirmed in Indian thought, though therein it is presented in a form which is different from the clearly articulated idea of reversibility. The Golden rule, recognized in all religions and cultures as the most fundamental guiding principle of all morality, expresses this very idea of reversibility when it says \"Treat others as you would like them to treat you.\" Or, \"Do not do unto others what you would not like to be done to you.\" Golden rule is the idea of reversibility stated in the form of a direct and noncontroversial proposition which tells us that all moral behaviour is implicitly reversible. It tells us to imaginatively exchange the place with the other, that is, to recognize that there is no one more privileged than others in the field of morality, and the roles can be reversed any time. Therefore it asks us to treat others as we would like to be treated ourselves by them. It has been often argued that the Golden rule appeals to the lowest motive of morality, that is, self-interest. Or, that it presumes that self-love is our only motive, or we love ourselves the most, so that we could be moral only when we treat others as we would like to be treated. It is also said that the morality of the Golden rule being based on self-love belongs to a lower level of morality, and is superseded by other-based or socio-centric morality. Enter This is an entirely mistaken conception of the Golden rule. It definitely does not treat self-love as the only motive of morality. \"Treat others as you would like to be treated yourself,\" is not an appeal to self-love but a suggestion to understand morality in an existential of experiential context. Hare\'s position is nearer that of the Golden rule rather than Rawl\'s., Hare asks the subject to imaginatively conceive herself in the position of the \'other\', or the object (victim) of her (mal) treatment. How would she feel if she were in the position of the object of (unjust) treatment? He expects that confronted by this imaginary possibility, the agent of unjust, harsh, or cruel treatment would refrain from it. It is not so because the agent loves herself most (which may well be the case), but because existential or experiential confrontation with the position of the object (or victim) of the unpleasant treatment meted-out by the subject makes her realize the true meaning or nature of her act. A person who is torturing another or contemplating murder would realize the immorality or unjustfiability of her behaviour, when told by the Golden rule that one must not treat another in a way in which one would not like to be treated oneself. While reversibility, as conceived by Hare and Rawls, is mostly a negative conception, the Golden rule is stated both in negative and positive forms. The maxim \"Do not treat others in a way you would not like to be treated yourself\" resembles Hare\'s position, and only asks us to refrain from morally wrong or unjust actions; while its correlate \"Treat others as you would like to be treated yourself\" presents the same idea of reversibility in a positive form. In this it goes beyond both Hare and and implicitly enjoins upon us the duties of kindness, compassion and helping others. When it reminds us that when in need we would like others to help us, and adds that we should treat others similarly, i.e. help them etc., it is not appealing to our self-love, but is rather helping us to found our morality on an experiential basis. The idea, \"I would like to be treated (or not treated) in this way,\" is not an expression of self-love or egoism, but is just a sensible appeal to human nature and its needs. It also implies that any moral principle cannot be developed and sustained by purely formal reasoning but needs a basis in human nature. It rightly presumes that human beings can Enter #### You sent feel pleasure or pain and other desires and needs only in themselves and not in others. It also recognizes that abstract recognition of one\'s duties towards others cannot motivate a person in the way in which a sensitive personal realization of their suffering or needs can motivate her. And since we cannot experience pleasures or pains of others, the best that we can do is to imaginatively identify ourselves with them, and realize that they feel pleasure, pain and other needs as we do, and that they want to be treated justly and nas kindly as we naturally do. To understand others on the analogy of oneself is not an expression of self-love or ego-centricity. Rather, it means transcend- ing the empirical distinctions between oneself and others and affirming the fundamental affinity, if not unity, of all selves or persons. Regarding and treating others as oneself means expanding the limits of one\'s self (ego) to embrace the entire humanity, and in the Indian context, entire living beings. It makes no distinction between our own interests and those of others, our own self and others. Where is the place for any self-love here? Perhaps the above interpretation of the Golden rule is an idealized one. Yet perhaps it was conceived and interpreted through the centuries in two different ways - one that simply relied on human beings\' self-love, and the other that asked them to transcend the limits of \'T\' and \'thou\' and treat all human beings absolutely equally. The latter version is idealistic as it takes morality to a higher level; and also as it implies an idealistic or spiritualistic version of the basic affinity, or even unity of all-selves. My understanding of the idea of reversibility and interpretation of the Golden rule are largely influenced by Indian thought. Reversibility is understood in ancient Indian texts, not as a tentative hypothetical exercise but, as something more fundamental, and as integrally related to the idea of ontological unity or affinity-ofall living beings. Christ\'s Injunction to \"love thy neighbour as thyself\" presumes the basic affinity of fall human beings (though not all living creatures) as children of one Father; and so, loving one\'s neighbour, the \'other\', as oneself means transcending the demands of self-love, and not being motivated by it. Enter #### You sent IV\. Equality and Justice IV.1 The idea of reversibility brings in the idea of basic or inherent equality of all human beings. While universalizability emphasizes the similarity of and affinity between human beings, so that a moral law can be applicable to all rational human beings, the idea of at reversibility translates that similarity or affinity into complete equality. The idea of equality of all human beings qua humans was not favoured by most ancient Greek thinkers, except Stoics, and medieval feudal European societies which clearly opted for a hierarchical social order. Not only Plato starts with the natural differences and inequality of different groups of humans, his famous discussion of justice justifies a hierarchical social order. Certain aspects of Christian-creed (e.g. the doctrine of predeter- mination) go against any possible assertion of the inherent equality of all human beings, which would have been natural if it had sufficiently emphasized Christ\'s assertion regarding all humans being the children of one Divine Father, and so on. In India, while certain relatively esoteric groups emphatically asserted the Divine Being\'s immanence in all creation, or one Self being the self of all, the predominant Dharmaśāstric tradition strongly supported the hierarchy of classes (varnas) and castes, and even conceived justice as apportioning of punishment relative to the castes of the perpetrator and the victim. Perhaps the factual inequality of different human beings, and their hierarchy according to their abilities, social status etc. were accepted as natural, and hence justified by the ancient and medieval societies. The Renaissance first brought in the idea of humanism which found a stronger support in the Enlightenment thought. J. Rousseau and John Locke separately advocated the basic equality of all human beings. For both, as well as for Thomas Paine and other protagonists of French and American revolutions, the idea of basic equality of all human beings was integrally related to the idea of natural law, and the rights of humans as per that natural lavy. Locke asserted: And reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions\.... And being furnished with like faculties sharing all in one community of nature there cannot be supposed only such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another\'s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.51 Locke sensibly qualifies his statement as referring, not to un conditional equality, since men differ as to \"age or virtue\", but, to \"the equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom.\" The natural equality of men should be the basis of their equal socio political rights. For the first time in the history of Western thought, Locke, Paine and Bayle advocated the right of freedom of conscience and the idea of religious toleration. It was the assertion 7 of the individual\'s right to think and act for herself, For Locke, to the equality of all persons is based on their supposedly essential and or inherent nature which they share between them. He asserted the equality of all human beings not only regarding their basic rights har (to life, liberty and property) but also regarding their capacities and general nature. The declaration of human rights by the pioneers of American and French revolutions assumes that the equality and Fre dignity of human beings is not merely an ideal or a normative principle but is a factual assertion. That is, not only y all humans ought d to be treated equally, they are equal according to the law of nature. When Rousseau declares, \"Men are born free but everywhere they are in chains\", he assumes the natural equality of all humans; and contends that the existing inequalities are due to the society\'s unjust institutions which need to be changed, dizu equ However, glance at the natural differences between the a capacities, inclinations and achievements of different persons makes it clear that equality of a fall human beings can only be a normative principle and not an empirical or factual statement; whereas for some ancient Indian and Enlightenment thinkers it seems to have been both. For the moral point of view, the assertion of the equality of human beings qua humans is a normative assertion, and the affirmation or denial of their natural equality does not make much difference to the normative rule that they ought to be, or are entitled to be, treated equally in spite of all contingent differences. From the moral point of view, all human beings possess a dignity and inviolability in view of their essentially rational naturel am here referring to Kant\'s second formulation of the categorical imperative - \"So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person, or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.\" This imperative is derived from what for Kant is an exiomatic truth, that \"rational nature exists as an end in itself.\" Add to it, Kant\'s assertion of the autonomy of will; and his third formulation of the categorical imperative regarding all rational beings together forming a kingdom of ends;, and there-emerges a categorical assertion of the equality, dignity. autonomy and inviolability of all persons qua rational beings. His universalism-absolutism is derived from this intuitive and axiom- atically conceived truth regarding the essential rational nature of all persons.\" His categorical imperative prohibits that any person can ever be made a means for the realization of the ends of any other person. This rejects in one sweep all attempts at coercion and exploitation. Kant\'s conception of the person is somewhat metaphysical; the rational nature of the moral agent, the autonomy of self-legislating will, the supreme value of the absolute good will) are not argued by Kant but are accepted as axiomatic truths. None of these assertions is acceptable to those contemporary philosophers who are not directly influenced by Kant. However, the equality, dignity and inviolability of human person can be asserted at the normative level without presupposing Kantian metaphysics. As contended by Thomas K. Abbott, the second formulation of the categorical imperative is a purely normative principle which affirms \"the duty to recognize the dignity of every man, to pay homage before the absolute and ultimate worth of every human personality. \"54 And this as such can be affirmed without any metaphysical commitments.. Recognition and respect for the dignity of every person can be asserted on the basis of a priori acknowledgement-of-the-rational nature of man, or the a autonomy of the will but it can also be asserted as a normative principle which is essential or basic for all morality. Being ex hypothesi fundamental or basic to all morality, such a normative principle does not need any rational justification. Enter #### You sent The same idea is expressed in the utilitarian principle)- \"Everyone is to count for one, and no one is to count for more than one.\" It is the basic liberal principle according to which, each individual person has a natural worth, dignity, or inviolability simply by virtue of her being a human person. Those contemporary thinkers for whom the terms \'essence\', or \'basic\', or even \'natural\' are an anathema still need not reject the normative principle of the dignity and inviolability of all human persons. (Of course, while it is natural from a liberal point of view, it becomes problematic from a communitarian point of view. We shall briefly discuss the issue in the next Chapter.) From the moral point of view, as I am trying to develop it here, the idea of \'person\' necessarily includes equality, dignity, and inviolability. Each person is an end-in-herself; and no one can claim greater worth for herself, or exempt herself from the applicability. of universal moral law. mun tawitum Absolute equality of all human persons, qua human beings, is the central theme of Rawls also: equalit Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice, or as some say, on natural right, which even the welfare of everyone else cannot override.5\" The conceptions of impartiality and reversibility are integrally related in Indian (both orthodox and heterodox) thought with the belief in the unconditional equality of all living beings. (Indian thought does not make any distinction between humans and other living beings.) Apparently, equality of all living beings is not a normative assertion for Indians, but is understood as a factual one, or a truth which transcends all empirical inequalities. Equality, turn, is derived from the religio philosophical faith in the immanence of one Divine being or Self Atman) in all. There has been no attempt to develop these ideas separately at the moral level. Even though these ideas are developed in a different conceptual frame- work in Indian thought, they deserve greater attention, as the conceptualization of these ideas therein is very positive, highly moral and idealized (spiritual). (We would have occasion to discuss indian conception briefly in our next Chapter.) Enter #### You sent IV.2 Justice is another substantive principle of our proposed universal morality, or the moral point of view. Justice presupposes the normative equality of all human beings as regards their basic rights, personal dignity and inviolability. It also aims at achieving maximum possible equality among the members of any society. This aim is achieved by a just distribution of the benefits and obligations among all persons, and taking measures to ensure maximum possible equality of rights and opportunity for all. Justice further consists in taking socio-legal steps so as to correct the imbalances in the working of social institutions, resulting in unequal or unjust distribution of goods and opportunities among the members of a society. Justice is required to correct the inequalities inherent in any social order and its institutions. The inequalities of race, religion, economic class, power group, social status, education and sex etc. are natural, and perhaps social life cannot function without some or most of these inequalities. They become unde- sirable when they are extreme, or when they result in degrading certain groups of persons to a position of poverty and deprivation. Justice is also required to correct the imbalance created by an Lindiscriminate application of the principle of equality to everyday functioning of the society. Thus, the equality of opportunity when it is offered to persons belonging to very unequal economic and social (including educational) backgrounds results in an enhancing of existing inequalities. Equality of political rights results in the tyranny of majority over the minorities, whether racial, ethnic, or religious, The allocation of rewards or wealth according to merit, though apparently a just idea, similarly leads to socio-economic inequalities. Justice is further required to correct the imbalance created by some one or some group\'s activities which might have resulted in disadvantage or loss to another person or group. Administration of justice then means taking from the party responsible for the loss and compensating the party who has suffered the loss. This is, according to H.L.A. Hart, \"providing for the restoration, after disturbance, of the moral status quo in which victim and wrong- doer are on a footing of equality and so alike.\"\" Justice, therefore, is \"traditionally thought of as maintaining and restoring a balance or proportion, and its leading precept is often formulated as \'treat like cases alike.\" \"3\" (original italics) The conception of justice has a strong element or idea of distribution of benefits and responsibilities, or what is called distributive justice Justice has long been conceived as \"giving each person his due\" (Ulupi). It is a conception of some kind of distributive justice, and includes the idea of retributive justice. In whatever way we conceive justice, it includes the idea of equal or fair distribution of goods. Distributive justice is usually based on the idea of basic equality of all human beings, so that the benefits and responsibilities are distributed among them as equally as possible. But distributive justice, unlike the normative principle of basic equality of all human beings, is mainly concerned with treating like cases alike. The class of persons to whom a legal or moral law is applicable, or who deserve punishment, moral sanction, or special benefits, is clearly defined in cases of legal-moral offences as murder or cheating. But most of the time the class of persons who are to be treated equally is already determined by social institutions and prejudices, which undermines the very idea of justice. For example, the class of persons who were to be treated equally in ancient India was determined by their hereditary varnas (larger caste groups), and śūdras were totally excluded from any claim to equality. Similarly, in ancient Greece and Rome equality existed only among citizens; and slaves were totally excluded from any claim to equality. And till sixties of the last century, blacks were treated as a separate class altogether in the U.S., so that there was no question of the whites and blacks being equal on the socio- moral plain, even if they were given equal political and legal rights. Whether we conceive justice as \"maintaining or restoring balance or proportion\" (Hart); or \"giving each man his due\"; it leaves the most crucial question, \"What is everybody\'s due?\" unanswered. This latter question may, in turn, be translated as: \"Which cases are alike so that they ought to be treated equally?\" The question \"What is everyone\'s due?\" however, seems to better focus the issue involved. Socio-political thinkers have rightly pointed out that the problem of determining everyone\'s due, or fixing the class of persons who Enter #### You sent should be treated equally or differently, is already decided by the socio-institutional structure, the established customs, or even leg įslation,. Thus, if justice was giving everyone his/her due, and if every person\'s due was already decided (as in ancient India, Greece, Rome and medieval Europe) by the existing social order, then the dues of aristocracy in Greece and Rome, of brālumnas and kşatriyas in ancient India, and of feudal lords in medieval times, would far exceed those of the slaves or śūdras. A system of justice which sought to distribute benefits and disadvantages according to the hierarchy of social classes, and understood it as \"giving everyone his due\" would be a travesty of justice. It is sometimes suggested that justice simply means \"treating equals equally.\" But this conception of justice is as much unable to answer the crucial question as to who are equal, who are not, as any other conception. In fact, the determination of equals and unequals has already been carried out by the social institutions, which themselves may be very unjust. The two formulations of justice - \"giving each one his due\", and \"treating equals equally\" - take for granted the initial inequalities of the socio-political order; and then understand justice as the regulating principle of that social order. They do not face the possibility that the social institutions and the rules that decide the worth and dues of different groups may themselves be unjust. If so, the function of justice-is to challenge those institutions, and not to take them for granted. Justice is to treat all beings in a way so as to maximize equality among them. Justice does not start with, but seeks to achieve, equality among persons. It rather starts with a state of inequality, and its task is to correct the imbalances in society due to some act of aggression by some individual(s), or due to the working of some social institution(s). Hart\'s definition of justice as maintaing and restoring \"balance or proportion\" brings out this aspect of justice very well. A related task of justice is to determine the bases or grounds of inequality or differential treatment by the law or society, so that those who are cHAPTER 6 The Moral Point of View I. Overridingness(an different Pov\'s) So far I have mostly concentrated on the issue of relativism versus universalism in morality. Having first given the relativist perspective, as developed in both modern and postmodern Western thought in my 1st and 2nd Chapters, I have sought to critically evaluate them in my 3rd and 4th Chapters. Then in my 5th Chapter I have given a general account of two non-relativistic trends in contem- porary Western thought, that is, realism and universalism. In the present Chapter my aim would be to develop the idea of a universal moral point of view which does not negate or even undermine separate moralities, but which still claims to have an overriding authority over them, that is, which has cross-cultural validity. Having presumed this, I shall try to understand and explicate the nature of this moral point of view. When the relativists contend that a people\'s morality is relative to their culture and its conceptual framework, the crucial concept of morality is deliberately left undefined by them. The ambiguity in the conception of morality helps them in clubbing together all kinds of beliefs, practices, mores, customs, taboos and norms as morality; and thereby overemphasizing their immense diversity. What is morality, and what is its extension? The idea that morality covers the whole of life has a natural appeal at first glance. But this broad understanding of morality involves a big confusion between customs, norms and rules of interpersonal behavior in a particular society on one hand and morality proper on the other. If Westerners take off their hats and Indians cover their heads to show respect, this has nothing to do with morality. Not only customs associated with different occasions but also patterns of customary Enter You sent behaviour are different from society to society (e.g. Indian bride is dressed in red, heavily bejewelled and is expected to act subdued and coy, as against her Western counterpart who is dressed in white and is vivacious and bubbling). These patterns of behavior are naturally related to, or conditioned by, the system of moral norms and-values of that society. And yet, there is every need to make a distinction between these customary norms and patterns of behaviour which are totally culture-specific, and morality proper. Failure to make this-distinction results first, in undermining the normative of regulative character of morality, and second, in encouraging relativistic arguments which cash in on this confusion.\' If having described the various practices and ways of a different society, an anthropologist or sociologist goes on to assert that these different \'patterns of life\' are deserving equal respect etc., she is guilty of two confusions. First, she is confusing morality proper with the culture-specific norms and patterns of behaviour etc. And second, she is declaring all of them as valid for that particular society lyr and immune from (rational criticism. A large number of social practices, role models, and patterns of interrelationships are totally culture-specific and relative; they are also in most cases beyond rational criticism or an evaluation from a moral point of view, that is, they are morally neutral. At the same time, no social practice, norm, or-pattern of behaviour is beyond the purview of critical evaluation from the moral point of view. Neither the practice of untouchability in India, nor that of slavery in the West, was a moral institution. But they could still be evaluated from the moral point of view, and found immoral or wrong. I am here trying to put two counter theses to the relativist thesis based primarily on cultural diversity First, not all social norms and patterns of behaviour are morality proper. And it means that any observation regarding their relative character can have no bearing on the relativity or otherwise of morality. Second, while many of these social practices are morally neutral, many others are not so, and should be judged or evaluated from the moral point of view. Rather, all social practices are potentially objects of moral evaluation. The latter observatiort strengthens the first, that morality should Enter You sent be necessarily distinguished from social customs and practices as a normative discipline which claims to guide, regulate, and critically evaluate all our activities. from Arguably, the claim to overridingness on the part of the moral point of view requires rational justification. Kurt Baier has tried to present the moral point of view which is at once universal and applicable in the context of a particular society Baier recognizes that morality can be conceived and practised only in the social context, because society, its institutions and rules are necessary for the realization of all human goals. Each society further develops primary and secondary moral rules to regulate interpersonal behaviour. Above all, these moral rules are applicable to everyone and are for the good of everyone alike. Moral rules have overriding authority over reasons of self-interest because they are expected to produce a state of affairs which serves everyone\'s interest much better than if everyone pursued her interest exclusively. The moral point of view is that of everyone and anyone, and hence is superior to the point of view of individual interests: The very raison d\'etre of a morality is to yield reasons which overrule the reasons of self-interest in those cases when everyone\'s following self-interest would be harmful to everyone. Hence moral reasons are superior to all others. I am afraid that Baier is here not able to give a rational justification for the moral point of view, except the egoistic argument that it is in the interest of everyone alike to follow the moral rules. He is also-not able to do justice to the other-oriented nature of morality.. R.B. Perry similarly understands morality in terms of its social function. He defines morality as \"man\'s endeavour to harmonize conflicting interests: to prevent conflict when it threatens, to remove conflict when it occurs,\" Unlike Baier and Rawls, Perry believes that the interests of totality, being more sinclusive, are superior to those of separate individuals. This is a utilitarian-position; but Perry is saved from the inconsistencies of the former by understanding the interests of the whole in terms of harmony, rather than as maximization of satisfactions. Enter You sent dharma is integrally related to that of debt (rna). A person is said to owe his/her life to various sections of the society, eg. to parents and teachers, to fellow human beings, as also to the tradition; and finally to the entire creation. Since the moral subject owes debts to so many persons and nature, he/she is expected to lead his/ her life in such a way that all these debts are paid fully in the process.\" This conception of morality includes: first, the idea of every person being integrally related to the society and the entire creation; and second, the idea of morality or dharma as the supreme regulating principle of human life, both at the personal and interpersonal levels. At the social level dharma was the principle of harmony between various sections of society, and was declared as the basis of the social order. Whether at the individual or the social level, the overriding claim of dharma as the supreme regulating principle of all aspects and activities of human beings was emphasized it every stage. The conception of morality, dharma, or the moral point of view implies the idea of some supreme regulating principle(s). Various sociological phenomena can be understood from different points of view, as anthropological, sociological, historical, psychological and moral. The moral point of view may be conceived as one of the several points of view; or as one which claims the right to offer the supreme criteria of judgment over and above all other points of view. The assertion of a distinct (universal) moral point of view means that it has superior-authority than the customs, mores and other sociological aspects of human life. It also means that it is some unique or rationally superior point of view which can in no way be equated to the diverse moral codes or moralities. When we talk of \'moralities\', which talk is right from an anthropological- sociological point of view, we are e taking a naturalistic position. When we talk of the mor the moral point of view, we are not denying the existence, value and even limited validity, of separate moralities which are suited or integral to different societies and their ways of life. We are rather affirming the moral point of view in addition to all these moralities, and contending that the latter are subject to critical Who ENG Enter You sent evaluation from the moral point of view. We are asserting the supreme authority and the universal or cross-cultural validity of the moral point of view.\" The moral point of view is at once different from other points MY of view which are concerned with other areas of human activity, such as science, sociology, art and religion, as well as from separate moralities. It makes an overriding claim. Art and literature, and even religion to a certain extent, are culture-specific; so are all other human sciences, as sociology, economics and history, as also socio-political ideologies. They are the products of their times, and are relative to their respective cultures, and conceptual frameworks. They cannot, therefore, claim universal validity. Also, these points of view or perspectives conflict with each other even within a given culture. The same is true of separate moralities. They are culture-specific and have limited validity, as the relativists so candidly admit. The moral code of your society is not applicable to, or valid in, my society. And the code of my society leaves all other human beings, except those belonging to my society, untouched. These moral codes or moralities are further supposed to be extremely diverse, con- tradictory, or incommensurable. The moral point of view claims to be overriding; that is, when an action, character trait, practice, or state of affairs is being considered from different points of view, and the evaluations from them come out divergent and heterogeneous, then the evaluation from, and the demands of, the moral point of view have the highest authority which can under certain circumstances override the claims of other ther points of view, as well as of separate moral codes This overriding claim of morality is liable to be challenged by religion (excepting perhaps contemporary Protestant Christianity). Semitic religions which are based on distinct historical \'revelations\' claim their respective revelations as the supreme arbiter or deter- miner of all aspects of human life. If religion is \'the ultimate concern of man\' (Paul Tillich), it cannot allow itself to be judged or sanctioned from the moral point of view. It is, of course, being taken for granted There here that that religion-can-never religion-can-n sanction immoral activities, and insofar as it does (as in fanatic acts) it is open to criticism from the moral point of view. But when religions claim Enter You sent to determine the entire personal and interpersonal lives of their followers, there is bound to be a conflict between the claims of two points of view moral and religious. Various practices, enjoined, allowed, or prohibited, by various religious texts, such as untouchability in Hinduism and practices of polygamy and instant divorce in Islam, are open to criticism from the moral point of view, if they contradict our sense of justice, the dignity of the individual, or some other humanitarian considerations. Take another example: the refusal for blood transfusion to save a human life by Seventh Day Adventists is totally unacceptable from a moral point of view. None of these practices can claim immunity to criticism from the moral point of view simply because it is prohibited or permitted in a particular religion. Of course, the highly secularized Western societies do not need any convincing regarding the superiority of the moral point of view to the religious point of view. But Islam, Hinduism, and to some extent Catholic Christianity, persist in their separate claims to provide norms and rules which have superior or overriding authority in all fields of human life. The problem of the relative superiority of moral and religious points of view is too profound and complex to take it up here. I would, however, refer the readers to my views, presented elsewhere, regarding the need to distinguish the essential from the peripheral matters of a religion.\" I believe that while the essence or faith of any religion is above all critical evaluation, including the one from the moral point of view, the peripheral beliefs, laws, taboos, and practices sanctioned by different religions are open to critical-moral evaluation and sanction. All the practices referred to above are peripheral to their respective religions - so I believe- and can therefore be chal challenged from a rational-moral point of view. I am assuming here: First, no amount of relativistic reasoning can make such practices which undermine justice and other humanitarian considerations immune to sanction from the moral point of view, even though they have all the support of some religious tradition, or the other. Secondly, any criticism of religious practices is possible only from the \'moral point of view\', and not from the points of view of various moralities. Generally speaking, we can say that the moral point of view\'s claim to overridingness, or what is the same, the right to judge the beliefs, activities and values of other fields of life is quite sustainable. Morality probably is not the highest activity, or goal of human life, and so possibly cannot judge other human goals or values. But it still remains the supreme judge to decide which beliefs, activities, norms and values are morally and rationally justified; which are not; and which are morally neutral, and can- be pursued provided they do not conflict with fundamental-moral imperatives. II. Objectivity and Universality II.1 The overriding claim of the moral point of view is based on, or follows from, the essentially rational nature thereof. The moral point of view, as I am trying to develop it here, is that of universal morality, as distinct from separate moralities. As such, IMG\_256it has to be rational, objective and universal, that is, it cannot represent or embody any particular culture-specific conceptual framework and must have (or try to achieve) cross-cultural validity. This presupposes its rational, objective and universal nature and approach. The moral point of view has to be rational in order to be an acceptable judge over separate mores and moralities. While customs and mores, as well as human approbation or disapprobation, are contingent and local, reason alone can claim to have certain universality. R.M. Hare fightly calls morals a rational activity which consists in the search for moral principles, and the testing of them against particular cases.\" According to Kurt Baier, the best course of action from the moral point of view would be \"the course of action which is supported by the best of reasons.\" Rationality or a critical approach to the conventional rules of conduct is regarded as the chief criterion of morality by Baier: We could not properly speak of morality, as opposed to a system of conventions, customs, or laws, unless the question of the correctness or incorrectness, truth or falsity, of t the Enter You sent You unsent a message Enter You sent rules prevalent in a community is asked, unless, in other words, the prevalent rules are subjected to certain tests. Baier questions the practice of anthropologists and sociologists, of listing various divergent beliefs and practices of different peoples; and contends that such practices can at best establish that these types of conduct are believed to be right or wrong in their respective societies. But this cannot even prove that those types of conduct are right or wrong in those particular societies. This can far less prove that they are right or wrong from the moral point of view.\" Not only the relativists, even other thinkers like Toulmin have asserted that whatever is prescribed in the moral code of a community is right for its members. Baier criticizes this view by saying that such persons ignore the crucial question - \"Is what the morality of that group forbids really wrong?\" Or, \"Are the moral A convictions of that group true?\"Is He contends that the mere fact that certain norms or rules of conduct are included in the moral code of a society cannot be taken as a guarantee or proof that those norms or rules are genuinely moral. Any given moral rule or conviction may be either right or wrong, true or false. And their truth or falsity can be decided only on the basis of critical scrutiny\" Baier further believes that while the concrete moral rules which constitute a given moral code are developed in the context of concrete or historically developed institutional demands of a particular society, and are therefore naturally culture-specific, the standards or principles with reference to which they are to be critically or rationally evaluated must be universal, or having cross- cultural validity. In other words, morality proper, as against separate moral codes, is a rational discipline. And as such, it is not tied or limited to a partícular culture or conceptual framework but claims to have universal authority. That authority comes from its rational character.\" By the rationality of the moral point of view we mean: first, that our moral judgments and even imperatives have a strong cognitive element; and second, that we can give reasons for them. Enter You sent Even our moral approvals and disapprovals have a rational element in that we are willing to give reasons for our emotional attitudes. Suppose we make a moral judgment that a particular act of willful cruelty is wrong or an evil act, and then we appeal to a moral principle \"Do not hurt others\", in support of our judgment, we are indulging in a rational activity. We can give reasons for our adverse judgment against an act of cruelty, such as that it is morally wrong because it violates the principle of the sanctity of all life; or undermines the bond that unites the agent with all human beings or the entire creation. Or, we can simply say that it hurts the victim as much as it would have hurt the perpetrator of violence; and so on. By rationality of a point of view is simply meant that reasons can be given for all our assertions.\" II.2 The claim to rationality presupposes certain objectivity in our moral judgments. We have discussed this issue in the previous Chapter. Very briefly, rationality and universality of moral judgments imply their being true or false, and that in turn implies their objectivity. By the objectivity of moral judgments we simply mean that our moral beliefs, values and judgments, and above all, our sense of \'ought\' are not mere products of our approvals or disapprovals, or attitudes; nor are they fully determined by different cultures\' divergent conceptual frameworks. As a contingent fact, this may be so, that is, our moral judgments may seem to accrue from our attitudes, which latter may seem to be derived from our society\'s traditional norms and conceptual framework. But when the question of truth, validity or correctness of moral judgments, norms, or moral principles arises, or when we undertake to justify our moral assertions, we simply cannot go back to those attitudes and/or conceptual frameworks for their rational justification. As responsible for rendering justice may be guided by right moral rules in their allocation of unequal shares of gains or losses to different people. That is, justice seeks to develop the Enter #### You sent criteria for classifying people as equal or unequal in order to guide their different or differential treatment. The aim of differential treatment is to bring about greater measure of equality in the society, or in a particular institution. The number one question remains as to which of existing differences, e.g. those of race, ethnicity, economic or social status, sex, and expertise or merit, are relevant for the allocation of different benefits or losses.\" Most of the above criteria are morally and legally irrelevant for differential treatment. An important aspect of justice is to decide which differences among people are relevant for meting out different treatment to them. Justice is expected to declare most empirical differences as irrelevant and reject them as bases for difference in treatment. In fact, that is the main function of justice in a societal context, i.e. to challenge unnecessary or unjustified inequalities in the social order and declare them as irrelevant in the administration of justice. However, merit, efficiency, sincerity of effort, and hard work are worthy of reward, even though this would naturally result in increased inequality in riches, power, and social status. The task of justice, therefore, is not to erase all inequalities but to minimize them as far as possible, especially those which are not related to individual talents or efforts, but are a product of the functioning of the socio-political order. Rawls has added to the above another task of justice, that is, positive discrimination towards the most disadvantaged sections of the society, so as to minimize the ill effects of socio-economic and other inequalities, Rawls starts with offering two principles of social Justice: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged mem- bers of society. While Rawls feels that the corrective measures (i.e. positive discrimination) are the responsibility of the society, or the state, Rawlsian conception of justice can as well be accepted as one of the two or three most fundamental principles of morality, as universally applicable to individual moral agents. \"Justice as fairness\" transcends the demands of equality as generally understood in socio- political discourse (e.g. \"equal treatment of equals\", or \"giving each person her due\"). When confronted by the inherent inequalities of the social order, justice seeks to right or correct the imbalances and inequalities, so that optimum conditions of equality can be realized. In trying to rectify the social inequalities the principle of justice may demand preferential treatment towards the least advantaged sections of society; or the arrangement of social and economic inequalities in such a way that \"they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.\" It would also include any other corrective measures required to restore \"balance or proportion\" in the functioning of the social order. Even though \"justice as fairness\" is conceived in the socio- political context, it can equally be a worthy and fundamental regulating principle of individual conduct. It means the duty of \"giving each person her due\" when that due is conceived not in terms of the rules of existing socio-political order but in those of what would be morally right, just, equitable, or fair settlement of the other\'s dues. Thus, it not only forbids us to make others a means of our personal goals (Kant), but also forbids us to take advantage of others\' socio-economic, educational, or political disadvantageous position. \"Justice as fairness\" means to work, as far as it lies with us, to achieve \'fair equality\' in our interpersonal relations. As understood here, justice is integrally related to the principles of impartiality, recirprocity and equality. The four concepts together mean that from the moral point of view all persons are equal (normatively, if not empirically); and that justice and morality demand from us that we should treat all human beings equally, or impartially. The concept of reciprocity adds something more to that of impartiality by recognizing the mutual obligations of all individuals in a society. Justice consists in the practice of impartiality and reciprocity; and all three presuppose and imply absolute (normative) equality of all human beings (or as Indians say, of all living beings). Justice is thus the recognition of equality and inviolability of all persons at both the socio-political and Enter #### You sent -personal levels, and is the source of the obligation to impartiality and reciprocity on the part of the moral agent. Reciprocity of demands can be ensured by the restructuring of the social order, or by enjoining upon the individual the duty to acknowledge and act upon reciprocal demands. Reciprocity be- comes justice when an individual fulfills her obligations to others in response to the debts incurred, or acknowledges the moral right of others to make demands on the moral agent. It means at the individual level that we cannot make others a means of the fulfillment of our goals; and they have legitimate moral demands upon us which we cannot ignore. A reciprocal acknowledgement of rights and duties, as pointed out by Strawson, leads to the establishment of a just social order. Significantly, if justice is giving each one her due, not only it is I who have to give to others their respective dues, others - each single recipient of my giving - have as much obligation to give me my dues. The imbalance created by social inequalities is righted by the acknowledgement of the reciprocity-of-demands. h Thus, justice is a principle which presumes the basic equality of all human beings, and seeks to restore the balance in social relationships and institutions when it is disturbed by the activities of some individuals, groups, or institutions. Justice is also giving each person her due. But justice is not ready to leave the decision of what is every person\'s due to the blind functioning of social forces. Instead, it seeks to determine that due itself by taking into consideration various factors that result in inequalities and imbalances in social relationships. Justice keeps the principle of equality as its guiding principle or aim, when trying to determine the dues of various individuals and groups and correcting t the effects of various contingent inequalities. It is also, perhaps above all, reciprocity of demands and duties, so that it would not allow any person or group to be reduced to a mere instrument of others\' interests. It insists that any demands on one person or group can be legitimate only when they are matched with equal demands on behalf of that person or the group on all others. And when we say that justice seeks to correct the imbalance created by social inequalities, we mean, with Rawls, that justice particularly takes care of the interests of the most disadvantaged sections of society, often by offering them preferential treatment so that they are brought to the level of minimum equality with others. I feel that there is something still lacking in the above discussion of justice: Plato was right when he considered justice both as a regulating principle of the society, and as a personal virtue. However, almost all Western writers on justice, including Rawls, conceive justice as a social institution, or at best a normative principle for the regulation of social institutions. The state is mostly regarded as the agency for rendering justice, or the just distribution of benefits or disadvantages. But as far as I have been able to understand the issues involved in the foregoing discussions, it is the moral agent and not the society, far less the state, who is the basic unit or main referent of all moral principles and judgments. That is why, I feel that understanding the principle of justice as a regulative principle of society or state does not do full justice to it. What, then, is justice at the level of the individual moral agent? Who is the just individual? -54 Among modern Western thinkers only Kant has given some consideration to the personal aspect of justice. Kant understands justice in terms of the moral agent\'s indebtedness to others. Justice s giving others their due when that due is understood as the debt one owes to others either because the moral agent has benefited from them, or because she has deliberately or otherwise acted in benefi ways which has resulted in some loss to them. The regulative principle of justice becomes the virtue of justice at the personal level. It then means integrity, rectitude or truth, and a commitment to pay off all one\'s debts and fulfill all one\'s obligations. It again implicitly means giving each person her due; only now the \'due\' is being interpreted in terms of fairness. just du costs This conception of justice as a personal virtue was developed and emphasized in Indian thought a good deal (as we have briefly seen in section I supra). According to it, everyone is born with certain debts (rnas) to parents, teachers and humanity (society), as well as to entire creation (nature). ). A person is what he (she) is because of his (her) parents, hereditary culture and knowledge. of earlier generations, the contribution of other human beings to his (her) Enter #### You sent welfare, as well as due to the bounty of nature. He (she) that seeks his (her) own interests without paying off all his (her) debts to others - from parents to all living beings - lives in sin. Justice which is mostly expressed by the comprehensive and nebulous term dharma means paying off one\'s debts, or giving positive contribution to the welfare of society, nature and even gods.\" Of course, this exalted conception is nowhere developed fully, and is often vitiated by a certain confusion between universal and particular or caste-based duties. But the idea is there that justice means paying off one\'s debts, when those debts are generously conceived as consisting in doing one\'s utmost for the welfare of others, and understanding this contribution as merely paying back what one has received from them. This is a wider concept than Ross\' duties of gratitude, because we are talking here of the requiredness to pay off all the debts of the moral agent not to this or that person (excepting parents) but to the entire humanity by helping the traveller or guest (stranger), contributing towards the maintainence of teachers\' hermitages, and Qatit so on. igratit 18 IV.3 To recapitulate, I have sought to argue in this Chapter that there is a core-universal morality which consists of a minimum number of basic or fundamental moral principles. At first it seemed to me that perhaps this core universal morality cannot have a full- fledged content in view of the fact that, as relativists insist, different moralities have drastically different contents. Therefore I tried to search for some formal characteristics of universal morality which would provide a common framework within which moral dis- course can be carried out cross-culturally. I preferred to call it \'the moral point of view in order first, to distinguish it from what is-generally understood by the term \'morality\'; and second, to emphasize that it provides standards to judge not only different acts and character traits but also different moral codes and socio- moral institutions. This is what is meant by the \'overridingness\' of the moral point of view. Apart from overridingness, I found rationality, objectivity and universality as the formal or definitive characteristics of the moral point of view. The idea was that these characteristics would help us identify the moral point of view as against the separate moral rules, or even separate moral codes. Any principle or assertion, which (i) makes an overriding claim; (ii) is rational or rationally justifiable; (iii) is objective or subject-indepen- ↑dent; and (iv) is universal (universalizable), belongs to the moral point of view, as against that of individual moralities. On the other hand, the principles of impartiality, reversibility, equality and justice are sonstitutive of the moral-point of view. When we assert that moral judgments have overriding claim, and are necessarily those which can be universalized, we are not giving any normative principles. But when we say that the moral point of view consists of the principles of impartiality, reversibility, equality and justice, we are prescribing normative principles which constitute universal morality, a morality which is different from, and overrides, the claims of all separate moralities. y د However during the course of my discussion I realized that even universalizability is not a mere formal condition. It some generally agreed principle or standard for presupposes identifying the class of relevant cases to which a moral judgment can be (universally) applied. And such a principle will have to have some moral content. Same is true of objectivity because it not only implies subject- independence but also reference to the demands of the objective situation, and so cannot but have some content. Even rationality would be value-neutral and vacuous unless conceived in the context of day-to-day life. Anyway, the understanding of the moral point of view or universal morality by citing these four semi-formal characteristics is very incomplete. Gradually I could think of so many other characteristics of the universal moral point of view, 1. impartiality, 2. reversibility, 3. equality and 4. justice. Impartiality is closely allied to universalizability, and the two together form one of the few most fundamental principles of morality that moral principles and judgments are potentially applicable to all human beings, or are meant for everyone alike. This brings in the very substantial principle of equality of all human beings. As a normative principle, the equality of all human beings per se can claim to be the universal (cross-cultural) and Enter #### You sent overriding criterion to evaluate all other moral norms and insti- tutions. Universality and equality are again integrally related to the idea of reversibility on the one hand and justice on the other. As Baier has pointed out, while we can have exceptions to other moral rules, non-reversible behaviour per se is immoral. So, reversibility becomes one of the most important substantive principles which constitute universal morality. In a way, reversibility, like impartiality, is very akin to the ideas of universality of moral judgments and principles and equality of all human beings. The principle of justice is equally fundamental, and is also closely related to the idea of (normative) equality of all human beings. I have tried to understand justice as the principle that aims at achieving maximum possible equality in the society through cor- rective measures that seek to rectify the imbalances and inequalities which already exist in the social order. As such, it is related to, but different from, the normative principle of equality. Some of the characteristics discussed above can be combined together in order to reduce their number and achieve a somewhat greater focus in our discussion. Thus objectivity can be included in rationality; impartiality is easily combined with the need of ratundin universality; and reversibility could be included in a more com-vumban prehensive concept of equality Generally speaking) we can accept four basic characteristics s of the moral point of view or universal equality morality rationality, universality, equality and justice. They are not justore mere formal characteristics but provide substantial criteria for moral decisions and moral judgments. Any act, character trait, or societal institution, is moral, right or good if (i) Reasons can be given for that act, decision, judgment, social institution, or practice. (ii) ira Our moral principle and/or judgment is universalizable, that is, applicable to all persons under relevantly similar circumstances where the relevant similarity is decided according to some moral principle. (iii) The given act, decision, or policy is guided by the normative principle of equality of all persons. (iv) And the ideal of equality is sought to be achieved through the functioning of the principle of (corrective) justice. To a certain extent, the principles of equality and justice can alone form the core of universal morality. However, this still seems to be an incomplete picture of the proposed universal morality. It leaves the personal element out of morality, and still sounds somewhat formal. The above also leaves out all considerations of human welfare which makes such a conception of universal morality incomplete or unsatisfactory. V. Towards Universal Morality V.1 When I or any other philosopher argues for a minimum universal morality, we are neither trying to reject cultural diversity, nor even cultural relativism, but are rather trying to search for our common humanity. To quote Bimal K. Matilal, 3 The claim of the non-relativist is minimum: certain basic moral principles are neither agent relative nor contingent upon any specific type of social order. These principles are sometimes claimed to flow from the \"nature\" of human needs. One may understand this as an attampt to uncover a core of shared rationality that is reached by gradually peeling off or stripping down the overlay of distinctive cultural mores, local customs and individual idiosyncrasies. 63 The moral principles I am here trying to advocate as substantive principles of universal morality would be both universal and foundational in the sense that they would have cross-cultural validity, and also would be expected to form the basis or core of all particular moralities. They would further provide the criteria for the critical evaluation of separate moralities and a corrective to them where needed. As such, without negating the separate moralities, our moral principles would have overriding authority on us inas- much as they are conceived in a universal, rational and objective perspective. Let me quote Baier in same detail: I shall, then, distinguish between true moralities and absolute morality. True moralities are actually embodied moralities, those forming part of a given way of life of a society or an individual which would pass a certain test, if they were subjected to it. Absolute morality, on the other hand, Enter #### You sent is that set of moral convictions, whether held by anyone or not, which is true quite irrespective of any particular social conditions in which they might be embodied. Every true morality must contain as its core the convictions belonging to absolute morality, but it may contain a lot more that could not be contained in every other true morality.\" It seems to me that the several characteristics of the moral point of view that I have been trying to develop directly or indirectly presuppose the axiomatic assertion of the fundamental equality of all human beings. Universality of moral principles means their universal applicability, which, in turn, implies the basic or \'natural\' equality or affinity of the entire humankind. If it were not so, there would be no point in asserting that our moral principles and judgments should be universally applicable (to all relevantly similar cases), and that we should be impartial towards all humans while trying to reach a moral decision or pass a moral judgment. Reversibility is another important characteristic of the moral point of view, that is, a genuinely moral act should be one which would be acceptable to the moral agent even if the roles of the agent and the object are reversed. This again presupposes natural equality and affinity of all human beings, because if they were not so, there would be no possibility of even hypothetical reversal of roles. (Even in theory the roles of the citizens and slaves in Greece and brāhmaņas and śūdras in India could not be reversed due to the deep-rooted hierarchical social order.) The principle of universalizability also assumes the \'natural\' equality of all human beings. Similarly, the principles of impartiality and reversibility presuppose equality of all persons. A conduct which assumes the fundamental distinction and conflict between the interests of the self and others, and is guided by self-interest, is immoral, or at best amoral. It is so, not because morality is chiefly po concerned with our duties towards others but, because the moral point of view asserts the equality of all living beings as an axiomatic truth, thus leaving no scope for making an exception in favour of oneself, or someone else. We can, therefore, accept equality as one of the most fundamental principles of morality which can rightfully claim universal validity. I also think that the principles of universalizability, impartiality and reversibility, if not reducible to equality, are quite akin to it and presuppose it, so that for the sake of simplicity, instead of three or four substantive principles of morality we can have one only, that is, equality. V.2 Justice is the second most fundamental or substantive principle of morality or the moral point of view. Justice starts with the normative principle of equality and ends with restoring the equality in the social order through compensation to the victim, punishment to the aggressor, and other relevant ways. The further task of justice is to help the most disadvantaged sections of society so that they can come up to a position of minimum equality with others. As such, the principles of justice should claim universality as a normative principle which provides both the standard for assessing morality and institutions of any society, and certain guiding norms (vide Rawls) to correct the initial inequalities and injustices. As we have seen, a very similar conception of justice in terms of agent\'s indebtedness (rna) to others was developed and advocated in ancient India\'s socio-moral thought. Thus, the two principles of equality and justice seem to have emerged from our discussion as the most basic, comprehensive and substantive principles of any universal morality, or what I have called the moral point of view. (We would have occasion to discuss the views of Kant and Indian thinkers in our next Chapter, Sections III and IV.) V.3 I would like to add to them \'truth\' or truthfulness as a third substantive ethical principle. All my life I was puzzled by the fact that a large portion of Western moral discourse seems to be centred FUL- round the obligation of promise-keeping, until I realized that the obligation of promise-keeping accrues from the larger principle of truth, or the obligation of being truthful. Kant first affirmed promise-keeping as a universal or categorical imperative of morality, which means that no exceptions can be made to this principle, and it must be obeyed even at the greatest cost. Ever since, both Kantians and their critics have been discussing the obligation of promise- keeping as the paradigm of universal categorical imperative. Enter #### You sent Sometimes we get the impression that promise-keeping exhausts the entire moral discourse. It seems (as in the article of Sealre) that if anything is argued (and proved) about promise-keeping, it automatically holds good for the rest of morality, or our sense of \'ought\'. The duty of promise-keeping is arguably one of the most important and fundamental universal duties; and is given great importance in Indian moral thought also. But it definitely is not the whole of morality; and Ross was right when he included it as (only) one of the six fundamental duties. Possibly, what Western ethical thinkers are trying to affirm through their discussion of promise-keeping is the virtue of (or obligation to) truth or truthfulness. The latter includes the imperative against lying, and is a much more comprehensive concept. As such, it deserves to be included in our enumeration of fundamental moral principles, not as promise-keeping but as truth. The three principles of universal morality, namely equality, justice and truthfulness, cover a substantial part of morality and can be dity unhesitatingly declared as universal moral principles with overriding authority vis-a-vis all other moral codes. All the same, the three Anesthe whole of universal morality. I would like to wale substantive principle of morality which is as add here a fourth foundational and usa) universal as the first three, that is, the principle or imperative against prine hurting others or non-violence (ahimsa). While ahimsā (nonviolence) is the pivotal principle of Buddhist religio-moral thought, it has gradually become equally prominent in the Hindu conception of morality (dharma), so much so that it is often declared as the supreme duty.\" On the other hand, the duty not to hurt others and the virtue of compassion or benevolence are given relatively less priority in Western thought, with the possible exception of Christian texts and writings. Of course, Hume, Butler and other proponents of the moral sentiment theory recognized sentime a universal sentiment of sympathy and benevolence; but even they theow (perhaps with the exception of Hume) did not give any central importance to the sentiment of benevolence in their moral theory. sentimen The place of sympathy or benevolence became even more secondary in the Western ethical thought with the decline in the gen respectability of the moral sentiment theories. Enter #### You sent Kant discussed the duties of benevolence perhaps in greater detail than any subsequent moral philosopher. But his attitudes towards such duties is rather equivocal. While he often downgrades duties done out of benevolence, as they are motivated by our emotions and are not done out of pure respect for the moral law, he also gives a beautiful justification for the duties of benevolence in terms of the moral agent\'s indebtedness towards others.\" Ross has given a list of six fundamental prima facie duties, and includes duty not to hurt others in his list. But somehow the duty of non-violence-being squeezed between various duties and un- related with them - does not come out as an important constitutive - principle of universal morality even in Ross. However, a morality which mainly consists of equality, justice and promise-keeping (or truthfulness) would be a very incomplete and unsatisfactory one. A person who does all her moral duties but not only does not feel pity for the suffering of others but also does not bother if her actions hurt others, even though they may be according to the moral law, lacks something very vital in her personality. Therefore the principle of non-violence (ahimsa) should-be emphatically recognized as the fourth universal and overriding moral principle. While the duty of not hurting others would be a duty of perfect obligation (to borrow Kantian terminology), perhaps benevolence or compassion cannot be enjoined upon us in the same fashion. That is, non-violence, in order to be included as a substantive and constitutive principle of universal morality, is best understood with a slight negative connotation. Thus, the above discussion gives us four substantive principles of any system of universal morality, i.e. equality, justice, truth and non-violence. My intention in proposing these four principles of universal morality as fundamental and overriding is not to suggest any comprehensiveness or finality for my understanding of universal morality. The principles of equality, justice, truth and non-violence are not exactly a priori. Moral experience or our everyday moral responses, decisions and judgments provide an occasion for cognizing these principles as objectively (subject-independently) true or valid. But in another sense, they are a priori or axiomatic, that Enter #### You sent is, they do not need any rational justification. They are also \'fundamental\' or \'foundational\' in the sense that they provide a basis for the justification of all other moral principles and imperatives. They have overriding authority over all other moralities because of their foundational and axiomatic character. That is how, they can provide the much talk