GOVN 390 - Public Policy & Admin Govn PDF

1 GOVN 390 - Public Policy & Admin Govn Unit 1: Introduction to Public Policy and Administrative Governance Reading assignments Guy, J. J. (2010). The administration of government. In People, politics, and government: A Canadian perspective (7th ed., pp. 190–215). Pearson...

1 GOVN 390 - Public Policy & Admin Govn Unit 1: Introduction to Public Policy and Administrative Governance Reading assignments Guy, J. J. (2010). The administration of government. In People, politics, and government: A Canadian perspective (7th ed., pp. 190–215). Pearson Prentice Hall. J.J. Guy’s chapter, The Administration of Government, provides an in-depth look at the structures, roles, and complexities of government administration in Canada. He starts by explaining the concept of public administration, which encompasses the implementation of government policies and the management of public programs and services. The author emphasizes the significant role of civil servants and administrative bodies in translating the policies developed by elected officials into practical actions that affect the everyday lives of citizens. Guy highlights the bureaucratic structure of government, which is characterized by a hierarchical organization of departments and agencies, each with specific responsibilities and a chain of command. He discusses the importance of bureaucracy in ensuring that government functions are carried out efficiently, though he acknowledges common criticisms. These criticisms include issues such as red tape, inefficiency, and a lack of responsiveness to public needs, which are often associated with large bureaucratic institutions. The chapter delves into the concept of ministerial responsibility, a fundamental principle in Canadian public administration. Under this principle, ministers are accountable to the Parliament for the actions of their respective departments, even if they are not directly involved in decision-making. Guy explains how this principle ensures a level of accountability and political oversight over the administrative operations of the government. Guy also addresses the interplay between elected officials and civil servants, describing the balance of power and the potential tensions that arise from their interactions. He notes that while politicians are responsible for making policy decisions, civil servants are expected to implement these decisions impartially. However, this relationship is not always straightforward, and civil servants may influence policy through their expertise and knowledge of the practical implications of various proposals. The author further examines the mechanisms for ensuring accountability and transparency in public administration. These mechanisms include parliamentary committees, the role of the Auditor General, and the access to information laws that allow citizens to request and review government records. Guy argues that these tools are crucial for maintaining public trust and ensuring that government actions align with democratic principles. Throughout the chapter, Guy provides examples of administrative challenges and reforms that have taken place in Canada. He discusses efforts to modernize public administration, improve service delivery, and respond to the evolving needs of Canadian society. He also explores the impact of globalization and technological advancements on government administration, noting how these factors have changed the ways in which governments operate and interact with citizens. Overall, the chapter paints a comprehensive picture of the complexities of governing a modern state, highlighting the importance of effective administration in achieving policy goals and serving the public interest. Guy’s analysis underscores the need for a well-functioning administrative system that is both efficient and accountable, recognizing that government administration is a dynamic and ever-evolving aspect of political life in Canada.  2 Johnson, D. (2017). Organizational design and management decision making. In Thinking government (3rd ed., pp. 161–199). University of Toronto Press. Note: Read pages 161 to 181 only. No government can exist without bureaucracy, and no bureaucracy can function without management. Governments that set expansive public policy objectives need large numbers of educated, trained, and directed public servants, organized into numerous institutions, to execute the will of elected ministers and, in the largest sense, to promote the interests of society. Such a vast undertaking demands effective organization, human and material resources, and legal expertise, all channelled into meeting the needs and goals of the government. The remainder of this text concentrates on the management function in government, with particular focus on its history, evolution, and current dynamics at the federal level. As an introduction, this chapter undertakes a theoretical review of the schools of thought about organizational design and managerial decision making, especially in relation to the public sector. In doing so it explores the two dominant broad conceptual models of organizational structure and the ideal flow of bureaucratic influence and power. We also look at theories of decision making and the techniques associated with them and assess the motivations of those who apply them. An emerging theme in any examination of public sector management is the significant difference between its values and operational dynamics and those of the private sector. The public sector is the more demanding environment, but this conclusion often seems counterintuitive to people brought up with a rather cynical view of government, and so the underlying reasons need to be explored.We also consider the elastic nature of the terms political and administrative in relation to public policy. At the highest level of public sector management, administrative and political considerations are intrinsically related (Whitaker 1995). Although some organizational theorists insist there should be a clear division between politics and administration, we can see already that such a demarcation is impossible, especially at the most strategically important level of managerial decision making. We do not live in a simple world where political leaders design policies and the public service implements them. Senior managers play an important role in the development, review, analysis, and reform of policies and programs, working closely with ministers. Another theme is the tension between structural-mechanistic and organic-humanistic models, both of which strongly influence how we think about public administration and the working of governments. The structural-mechanistic approach once dominated the field but has waned in the past half-century under pressure from the organichumanistic approach. We assess the strengths and weaknesses of this ascendant model, concluding that in fact the structural-mechanistic approach remains very useful to an understanding of the levers and pulleys of management. The final theme is the tension between rationalist and incrementalist forms of management. Despite a long-standing managerial drive to promote rationalism over incrementalism, we identify the problems associated with both models and the pervasiveness of incrementalism as an important and viable way to conduct management. Many of the theoretical concepts addressed here will be encountered again in subsequent chapters as we turn from theory to practice. THE FUNCT IONS OF MA N AG E MENT What does management do? Many analysts have used this question as a starting point for studies of organizational theory and practice, and regardless of whether one is looking at public or private sector bureaucracy, certain management functions are common. In his studies of French management in the early twentieth century, Henri Fayol (1971) documented five functions common to managers in all organizations: 1 planning 2 organizing 3 commanding 4 coordinating 5 controlling GUL IC K’S FUNCTIONS OF MANAGE MENT American organizational theorist Luther Gulick (1937) later expanded this list into seven categories in his own study of management within the American federal government: 1 p lanning 2 o rganizing 3 s taffing 4 d irecting 5 co ordinating 6 r eporting 7 b udgeting These activities, known collectively as POSDCORB , delineated not only government management but administrative responsibilities essential to the success of any bureaucratic organization. As Robert B. Denhardt has noted, these elements provide a checklist to managers “about what they should be doing” (1999, 286). Gulick’s list of management functions quickly became a classic within the field of organizational theory, and POSDCORB the thumbnail explication of management roles and responsibilities (see Table 5.1). While the list is instructive, it is not definitive, and numerous other organizational theorists have reformulated or elaborated on it, using Gulick’s taxonomic technique to search for more precise interpretations of management functions. M I N TZ B E RG ’ S FUN CT I ON S OF M A N AG E M E N T Garry Yukl (2012, chap. 2) highlights several reinterpretations of Gulick in his work on organizational leadership, devoting special attention to the analysis of Henry Mintzberg. Mintzberg’s review of management roles (1973, 92– 93) identifies ten concepts that echo Gulick’s findings, but he also emphasizes the importance of leadership and crisis management. In this taxonomy, Mintzberg divides management functions into three fields: 1 Information-processing roles : monitoring information, disseminating information, and acting as a spokesperson for the organization 2 Decision-making roles : being involved in policy  3 and program development and administration, resource allocation, negotiation between interested actors, and conflict resolution 3 Interpersonal roles : performing as a figurehead for the organization, making connections with other bodies in its broad operational environment, and providing leadership Mintzberg sees the leadership role as pervading all others. Leadership unites all other management functions in a coherent direction, coordinating and focusing responsibilities and actions toward the realization of basic organizational goals. It is the most important managerial function because the success or failure of an organization is contingent on the quality of its managerial leadership. Among the leadership qualities Mintzberg highlights is skill in handling crises, the “disturbance handler role” (Yukl 2012, 28). Managers are called on to deal with unforeseen threats to the effectiveness of the organization in pursuing its given tasks. All organizations face such problems sooner or later, and the ability of the manager to resolve them is paramount. Mintzberg suggests, furthermore, that crises should be seen as learning opportunities, providing the impetus to rethink operational behaviour, redesign the organizational methods in use, and even to re-evaluate and renew the purposes and goals of the organization itself. To be successful over the long term, institutions need to adapt constantly to the operational environment as it evolves. Successful adaptation requires the manager to seize opportunities for creative action to resolve difficulties while maintaining the best of the organization’s operational and managerial heritage. P UBL I C V ERS US PRIVATE SEC TO R MANAGEMENT Organizations of any considerable size become intricate, comprising many human, material, and MINTZ B E RG ’ S FU NCT IO NS O F MANAG E ME NT Information-processing roles: 1 Monitoring information 2 Disseminating information 3 Acting as a spokesperson for the organization Decision-making roles: 4 Developing and administering policy and programs 5 Allocating resources 6 Negotiating between interested actors 7 Handling disturbances Interpersonal roles: 8 Figurehead for the organization 9 Liaison officer for the organization and other bodies. intellectual components with a multiplicity of interests and power dynamics that may not always be directed to the same organizational goals. A fundamental objective of management is to define, coordinate, and direct those elements toward the realization of established organizational ends. This is an involved task in any institution, but consider the heightened complexity of management within the public sector (Inwood 2004, 9– 14). Public sector managers confront a Byzantine policy and program environment in which organizations routinely possess several goals, often attached to sweeping concepts of socioeconomic, cultural, and political well-being. These organizations have convoluted reporting relationships with innumerable “superiors,” not all of whom agree about even the fundamental policy purpose. Managers serve a range of interests and responsibilities that may at times compete because of the omnipresent political manoeuvring. In fact, achievement or failure are as likely to be assessed in political terms as in administrative ones. That great managerial challenges are found within the public sector is readily discerned through a comparison with the operational environment of the private sector. Gulick’s Functions of Management Planning WHAT? The assessment of an organization’s current condition, direction, and goals— in modern terms the SWOT analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats— and its future aims. HOW? Understanding the organization’s raison d’être , effectiveness in its organizational goals, and operational environment. Organizing Staffing A collection of activities related to the structure of the bureaucratic entity, establishing an organizational design and defining the roles and responsibilities of management and staff. “Acquiring, training and developing of personnel to conduct the organization’s activities” (Denhardt 1999, 286), including hiring, promotion, discipline, demotion, and firing. Deciding whether the organizational hierarchy should be steep or shallow, centralized or decentralized; whether the flow of information, authority, and influence should be top down, bottom up, or some balance of the two; and whether power relations between management and staff and within management itself should be more authoritarian or egalitarian. Managing personnel using communication, motivation, resolution of interpersonal conflict, and promotion of sound management– workforce interaction. WH Y ? Enables the organization to respond to changes in its environment, to address weaknesses in its operational behaviour, and to develop new and better policies and programs that will also promote its interests into the future. An organization that neglects planning will devote too much attention to routine administration and not enough to overall objectives and ways to achieve them. Thinking about the fundamental goals and responsibilities of the organization and creating the bureaucratic structure to fulfill them in the most economical, efficient, and effective ways is an integral aspect of smooth functioning. Human wants and needs, likes and dislikes, attitudes, and expectations— with all the potential for disagreement and conflict that human interaction implies— require management and negotiation for effective organizational functioning. E XAMP L E The Canadian Armed Forces have long planned for the acquisition of a modern jet fighter to replace the aging CF-18. This planning process has been going on for over a decade within the Department of National Defence. But such a lengthy period is justified on the grounds that the replacement  4 aircraft will possess an operational lifespan of some 30 years. National Defence established a specialized new jet fighter procurement and assessment project team within the department, tasked with finding the appropriate aircraft and its industrial support package. The department staffed this jet fighter project team with a range of experts, from Air Force pilots to strategic analysts and military procurement and industrial development officials. Directing Coordinating Reporting Budgeting WHAT? Directing staff toward the realization of institutional goals and the application of material, financial, and legal resources toward the same end. Bringing things together, or “making a mesh of things,” in Paul Thomas’s (1999) phrase, to ensure that personnel and resources are connected in a timely and productive manner to facilitate organizational ends. Communicating information throughout the organization and beyond. Securing, planning for, and managing organizational funds. HOW? Making decisions and undertaking “the three critical management activities: leading, motivating and changing things when necessary” (Denhardt 1999, 286). Networking by bringing together people and offices with shared or related interests and responsibilities. Coordination is rooted to joint planning, sharing information, and institutionalized systems of meetings. Turning information into organizational intelligence and then disseminating it to everyone who needs it. The process can flow internally, either downward to subordinate managers and staff or upward to managers and political leaders; or externally and laterally to other organizations and parties. Raising, handling, and distributing money within and beyond the organization. WH Y ? One of the natural outcomes of managerial– workforce interaction and a vital component of good leadership, directing is “often the most dynamic and most visible management function” (Denhardt 1999, 286). The resources and functions of the entity— along with the interests, responsibilities, and needs of personnel— must be recognized and integrated into the development and implementation of organizational objectives. Sound information management is central to effective management in general and crucially important in helping a bureaucratic entity to understand its current operational strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats and its future needs, goals, and options. All organizations run on money, and budgeting may develop overarching organizational significance, dominating even the leadership of the bureaucratic entity. E XAMP L E The jet fighter project team was under the direction of a senior Air Force officer charged with staffing the team, giving it direction, and overseeing its research and deliberations. The team coordinated its work with officials from the departments of Industry, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Public Works and Government Services, as well as regional development agencies. Coordination also extended to Air Force and Defence counterparts in the United States and NATO. The project reported regularly to National Defence senior officials, the minister, and PCO/PMO senior officials. Ultimately the department reported regularly, through the minister, to parliament. National Defence financed the activities of the project team. And the team was charged with determining the final cost of the entire operational package to replace the CF-18s. T H E P RO FIT MOTIVE The private sector is always geared to the demands of profitability. All the activities of the staff and management of a private organization are directed toward making a profitable return on investment. This focus is the ultimate test of the private organization’s worthiness: is it making money? This fundamental business goal is easily verifiable through a review of budget, balance sheets, and financial statements. Acceptable profit margins indicate overall organizational, and hence managerial, success, while losses are a clear indication of managerial failure leading to organizational decline. The profit margin thus constitutes an acid test of private sector managerial capability. Organizations that pass the test will continue to prosper, and their management will remain relatively secure; for those that fail, owners and boards of directors will find new managers; if business success remains elusive, the organization will sooner or later die. Government organizations (with the exception of most Crown corporations) simply do not possess the same bottom line focus. The primary purpose of most is not to realize a profit but to provide a public service to meet public needs and interests, as defined by an elected and accountable government. One role of public sector organizations is to provide operational form to the plans and vision of a prime minister or premier and cabinet. An equally important purpose, however, is to serve the long-term interests of the public through the fair, competent, and professional implementation and administration of government policies and programs (see Table 5.2). In fulfilling these roles, profitability is rarely, if ever, a factor, nor would most Canadians want commercial considerations to come into play. For example, the administration of justice, the enforcement of law, and the operation of the courts cannot be measured in terms of profitability, and the same generally holds true for other public services such as health care, education, social assistance, environmental protection, cultural promotion, and national defence. While most people expect programs to be administered efficiently, they do not assume that the state should be generating profits and its managers approaching their duties with that perspective. The provision of publicly administered education and health care policy, for example, has come to be perceived as a collective good, an entitlement held by all citizens and designed to enhance individual and collective security, just as environmental and defence policies are seen  5 as serving the wellbeing of the entire society. Of course, there is much current debate over the commercialization of health care and educational policy, and the potential for two-tiered systems in which those who could afford it would be entitled to purchase arguably superior forms of services. The vehemence of the debate. TABLE 5.2 Private Sector/Public Sector Differences Purpose PRI VATE SECTOR Provision of private goods and services through commercial activity P U B L IC S E C TOR Provision of public services Goals Simple, economic Complex, economic, social, political Service recipients Customers, clients Citizens Criteria of success Profitability Effective implementation of services Evaluation of success Financial, objective Political, subjective Accountable to Owners/shareholders Elected leaders/citizens Operational environment Focus of Management Skills of Management Marketplace, business realm, private One-dimension Business oriented Government, political realm, public Multidimensional Program and policy oriented reveals the degree to which most Canadians hold these policy fields to be essential public services divorced from the commercial realm. MEAS URING OPERATIONAL S UCC ESS In the absence of a clear profit-and-loss method for measuring operational success, the public sector nonetheless provides a vital managerial motive: to allocate finite financial and human resources in order to get the most desirable results. Political and administrative judgements of success or failure take into account not only quantitative issues such as resources deployed and the numbers of goods and services produced or delivered but also the qualitative benefits that ensue. How can the success of a government program be determined? How can we measure the merit or quality of a program that provides a necessary public service but doesn’t make any money? In this environment, the ends, means, and evaluation are all subject to differences of opinion. Let’s look at the administration of the Canada Health Act. Do we take into account the amount of money currently spent on health care and the medical facilities, staff, and patient care that such spending supports? Or at the pattern of spending support over the past decade, comparing the responses of appropriately sampled staff and patients against the decline in funding over the mid-1990s? Do we look at the new and developing medical procedures available to Canadians and at their increasing life spans? Or at their quality of life? And how does one measure quality of life? Evaluation of a government policy might also be made from beyond the system. For example, how does Canadian medical coverage compare with that of the United States, Britain, or the Scandinavian countries? Where in the spectrum of publicly and privately administered health care in North America do Canadian health services fall? Should we focus on the right of all citizens in this country to advanced standards of medical care regardless of ability to pay, or on lengthening waiting lists and the number of physicians relocating to the United States? The answer to each of these questions— indeed, the wish to answer them at all— depends greatly on political and ideological orientation. And how a public sector manager within the health care system would answer depends on the leadership of senior management, the minister, the cabinet, and the prime minister. All managerial actions are evaluated in light of the policy objectives of the particular government, whatever the policy field. Rather than possessing a single, essential form of evaluation— the profit motive in the private sector— the public sector has many, some primarily quantitative and some principally qualitative. Performance evaluation can be more or less comprehensive, more or less detailed, more or less oriented to policy or to administration. Future chapters devote greater attention to program evaluation and government efforts to improve their evaluation methodologies, but a basic truth remains: organizational performance evaluation within the public sector is at heart a political act. DISPATC H B OX T HE OBL I G AT I O NS O F T H E P U B L I C SE RV I C E To deal with people as citizens To respect the rights of citizens To treat all citizens equally To implement and administer public policy professionally To serve the political executive in developing public policy To uphold the law To serve and promote the interests and traditions of the public service To serve and promote the public interest P RI VACY V E RS US ACCOUN TA B I LI T Y Within the private sector, and without any legal requirement for openness or public disclosure of decision making, managers operate in a largely confidential environment. Their workplaces are private property, and they usually insist on their rights to conduct management functions behind closed doors. Contrast this with the public sector, where management is accountable to senior departmental officials, who are accountable to elected ministers, a cabinet, and the prime minister or premier, in turn accountable to a parliament or legislature, which is accountable to the public. This system of public. service, founded on public policies and funded by public monies, naturally engages public interest. And as public sector management is the outgrowth of public policies developed by an elected government and enshrined in law, it is administratively and legally obligated to be open. The accountability relationships extend to central agencies and the auditor general in relation to financial management; to the Public Service Commission of Canada, the Public Service Labour Relations Board (PSLRB), the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, and the Canadian Human Rights Commission with respect to personnel policy; and the Canadian courts in regard to all matters of administrative law. Furthermore, government decision making carried out in the public interest is subject to freedom of information legislation that allows members of the public, usually media employees, to gain access to government files and reports. The logic behind such  6 openness and reporting relationships is that the public service is public and its actions therefore subject to scrutiny, comment, and oversight. CO NS UME RISM VERSU S RIG HTS AND ENT ITLEMENTS Think of the differences between consumers/ clients and citizens. The private sector deals with people who are consumers or clients in a strictly commercial setting. Transactions between a private organization and its consumers/clients involve the provision of goods or services in exchange for payment. If the would-be consumer or client cannot afford the fee, he or she has no right to the product and the organization will refuse to engage in the transaction. Now, although some Crown corporations such as Canada Post and VIA Rail engage in commercial relationships with consumers/clients, most government organizations— departments, regulatory agencies, and other Crown corporations— deal with people as citizens. As citizens, we are equal members of society. We bear, simply by virtue of citizenship, rights or entitlements to government services such as elementary and secondary education; medical care as provided by federal and provincial health care legislation; legal protections as enshrined in the Criminal Code and human rights legislation; occupational health and safety protections under federal and provincial product standards and labour codes; and environmental protection, social welfare, border security, and national defence as outlined in public policies. Specific groups of Canadians— children, parents, or pensioners; farm producers, fishers, or forestry workers; the unemployed, those seeking job skills retraining, or students seeking loans— may also be entitled to particular federal or provincial program assistance. The government has a legal obligation to treat all citizens equally, whether as individuals or as a group. It must provide for the legitimate needs and interests of all citizens as mandated by law and refrain from illegally discriminating against individuals. For example, a bureaucratic decision to refuse a citizen necessary medical care, law enforcement protection, or public education because he or she could not otherwise afford the service would constitute blatant discrimination. and a breach of the law. Whereas the private sector deals solely with transactions between sellers and buyers, the public sector deals with a much broader array of policy concerns, ranging from rights and duties as defined by law to the regulation and promotion of “peace, order, and good government.” T H E C H AIN OF COMMAND Managers in the private sector face a range of actors and forces among the customers/clients of the enterprise, along with certain legal obligations, but their essential duty is to render service to their superiors. These superiors in turn are part of a generally straightforward chain of command leading to either an owner or a board of directors. Public sector managers, in contrast, confront several different superiors. They have formal reporting and accountability relationships with their immediate departmental or agency superiors, and these officials report up the chain of command to a deputy minister, and beyond to the minister and eventually the prime minister. But managers simultaneously serve their organization, its senior management, and their minister in a relationship that becomes more intricate and sophisticated the higher up the organizational pyramid one moves in a blend of broad political and administrative duties. Senior departmental managers are often closely involved with ministers in formulating policy and resolving program implementation difficulties, and the most senior among them— assistant deputy ministers, associate deputy ministers, and deputy ministers— interact closely and continuously with their ministers. Deputy ministers, as administrative heads of departments, are in daily contact with their ministers, briefing them on departmental developments, helping them to deal with issues emerging from the portfolio, and working with them on new project undertakings. Deputy ministers also work with ministers to determine the best ways to defend and promote departmental and ministerial interests within the broader context of the government bureaucracy, the operations of cabinet, the interests of the prime minister, and the requirement to deal with parliament and the media. From this perspective, deputy ministers are as closely involved in the political life of their ministers as they are in the operation of their departments, and the general understanding is that these are two sides of the same bureaucratic coin. Just as managers possess a duty to serve their minister, they must also report to and serve other administrative actors: the central agencies, parliamentary committees, and the various commissions noted above. Deputy ministers likewise serve both their minister and the prime minister through their management of departmental responsibilities, possessing two masters while also maintaining a close operational liaison with the clerk of the Privy Council. T H E D UT Y OF P UB LI C S E RVA N TS All members of the public service have a further three duties: to uphold the law, to promote the interests and traditions of the public service, and to serve the public interest. The actions and powers of the public service are prescribed by law, policy and program activities are mandated by law, and public servants bear a duty to preserve and promote the law in all their undertakings. Public servants thus have a duty to the law, and under no circumstances are they to counsel a subordinate or a superior to violate the law. Public servants also have a duty to abide by and promote the interests and traditions of the public service as a profession with its own principles and expectations. Members of the public service, and especially its managerial leadership, are expected to embody these values and put them into practice through their work. Thus they must always undertake their duties in a manner that brings credit to the profession of public service. Finally, public servants have a duty to serve the public interest, as  7 defined by law and understood through the professional judgement of public managers themselves. The basic rationale for public service is to affirm the legal rights of citizens and to improve the quality of life within society. Far from the materialistic self-interest that lies at the heart of the private sector, public service has at its core the noble aspirations of collective duty and assistance to others. O RG A N I ZATIONAL DES IGN Management functions are crucially important to the success of any organization. The complexity of the public sector environment, moreover, heightens the difficulty of the management role. To appreciate the nature of management and its work, however, it is necessary to understand the organization being managed. All bureaucracies, whether public or private, are founded on organizational principles designed and practised in one of various different ways. Over the past century two broad models of organizational design have emerged from the theory and practice of bureaucratic activity. Both models have proven highly influential in the structural and operational characteristics of public sector management in this country. The structuralmechanistic model of organization supports a hierarchical, authoritarian, centralized, top-down command-and-control approach to management. The organic-humanistic model focuses on the importance of people over structure and promotes a more egalitarian, decentralized, top-down and bottom-up participatory approach to management in which managers and employees work together to achieve organizational goals. T HE ST R U C T U R A L- M E C HA N IST IC M OD E L M AX W E B E R Organizational theory has its origins in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when ways of thinking about bureaucracies were explored by such authors as Max Weber (1946), Frederick W. Taylor (1967), and Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (1969). Among these classical theorists Weber (1864– 1920), a German sociologist and political economist, contributed the most to our modern understanding of bureaucracy. According to Weber, bureaucracy , a composite of the French word for office and the Greek word for power , should be seen as a strictly neutral noun. Bureaucracy is a system of organization in which power and influence is held by officials in offices assigned specific roles in order to achieve ends set by the overseers of the organization. The work of all offices is orchestrated by these leaders to serve the broader goals and interests of the organization in total. A bureaucracy is found in any complex private or public organization of an appreciable size. A properly constituted bureaucracy within any organization, Weber contended, embodies eight principles: 1 a hierarchical structure 2 a unity of command 3 specialization of labour 4 employment and promotion based on merit 5 positions based on full-time employment 6 decisions founded on impersonal rules 7 work recorded and maintained in written files 8 a clear distinction between bureaucratic work responsibilities and the private interests of employees The first five are organizational principles designed to create a professional bureaucracy capable of the efficient and effective administration of organizational goals. To obtain these ends, Weber added three principles of ideal bureaucracy. Hierarchical Structure Weber suggested that the structure of any bureaucracy must be hierarchical, its components arranged in a series of superior– subordinate relationships based on a formal chain of command between managers and employees. Each component within the hierarchy has its head official, who reports directly to the head of the next most superior office, and so on up the chain of command to the very top of the organization and its most superior officer. Unity of Command The chain of command allows directions to be transmitted speedily and effectively from top management down through the hierarchy, and information, reports, and advice to be similarly passed upward from the lower echelons of the organization. The chain of command maintains strict control and managerial leadership over administration and policy direction while facilitating communication and accountability throughout the organization. Along the chain, subordinate managers know precisely what their duties are, and they receive all the necessary instructions and directives from their immediate superiors. They know what they are responsible for, to whom they owe responsibility, and the consequences of failure to perform those duties. If this understanding of bureaucracy sounds highly militaristic, that’s because it is— Weber was greatly influenced by the structure and organization of the Imperial German Army. Specialization of Labour Within an organizational hierarchy labour is specialized: broken into particular jobs with clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and requirements. Once work duties have been determined, managers or employees are assigned to them according to their education, training, skills, experience, and abilities. They then devote all their labour to their assigned tasks, becoming specialized in their roles and therefore performing their work as efficiently as possible. Specialization produces the most effective results. Employment and Promotion Based on Merit Closely associated with the specialization of labour is the principle of merit. Management and staff gain and keep their positions solely on the basis of objective professional merit. Appointment to particular duties is based on education, training, skills, or experience. Retention of a position or promotion to a higher one within the hierarchy is then contingent on demonstrated merit: improving upon education and training and undertaking given duties and responsibilities successfully. Positions Based on Full-Time Employment Officials in a bureaucracy should not be subject to other occupational or professional obligations or factors that could affect or interfere with the performance of their duties. They are expected to devote all their occupational attention to their jobs, and their service belongs to the organization as a  8 whole. This principle serves the organization rather than the individual. Decisions Founded on Impersonal Rules The first of Weber’s three principles of ideal bureaucracy is that decisions must be founded on impersonal rules. They cannot be based on personal likes and dislikes, whims, bias, or selfinterest. By adhering to established rules based on the long-term goals of the organization, officials use their bureaucratic power and influence in the interests of the organization. Furthermore, reliance on rules enhances objectivity, consistency, regularity, and uniformity in decision making. It ensures that like cases are treated in a like manner, and therefore that everyone who deals with the bureaucracy receives equal, fair, and objective treatment. It also signals to management that its aims are being consistently implemented across the organization— that the actions of the bureaucracy and its officials reflect the professional policy and program objectives rather than the arbitrary and subjective interests of subordinates. The Use of Written Records Closely related to the principle of impersonal rules is that of maintaining written records. The rules on which bureaucratic decision making is founded need to be formally delineated in all official decisions. They require codification and promulgation so that all interested parties understand which rules apply to a given situation and are able to track precedents. Written records can be useful to the organization in a number of ways: Records permit field-level officials to document their actions, demonstrating that they have applied the rules properly and fairly to a given case. This verification is an important aspect of organizational accountability. Records can be used to identify when officials have misapplied or misunderstood the rules through either misconduct or interpretive errors. Records provide the opportunity for review and analysis as part of the accountability function, enabling senior management to maintain oversight, correct faulty decisions, and determine when officials need further education, training, advice, supervision, or discipline. Records provide senior managers with an overview of operational decision making, the types and volume of cases with which the organization deals, and the nature of the ensuing bureaucratic decisions. Records enable senior managers to review the achievements of the organization and to identify the need for staffing and job growth, for employee training, for redesign or finetuning of rules, and for wholly new policies and rules. Records explain how and why decisions were made and why alternatives were not considered or pursued. If a person or group wishes to challenge a bureaucratic decision over violation of established rules, unfair or improper application of rules, or inadequacy in the rules themselves, the written record is vital to launching a specific appeal or a broader policy protest. The Position versus the Person The power, responsibilities, and privileges associated with a bureaucracy are understood to reside in its positions and not in the people who hold them. A position is held by the organization, and its leadership decides who will occupy it. Bureaucratic employment is thus a form of professional service: management and staff are organized within a system of full-time, permanent employment that provides them with job security while ensuring that they are dedicated to the work of the institution and not under obligation to other occupational forces. In keeping with this logic, employees should be well remunerated for their work, and it is further understood that no employee will use the powers and responsibilities of an office for private gain. An official cannot pass a position along to a chosen successor. Influence peddling (selling access to the decision-making power inherent in a position), bribery, and conflicts of interest constitute improper behaviour that corrupts the professionalism, efficiency, effectiveness, and rationality of the organization. W E B E RI A N B URE AUCRACY Weber elucidated what bureaucracy is and how and why organizations are bureaucratically structured. But he also asserted that bureaucracy in its ideal form is the best means of achieving the organizational ends of professionalism: efficiency, effectiveness, and rationality. According to Weber, these are the most important considerations of any organization, regardless of whether its goals are commercial, philanthropic, or governmental: Experience tends to universally show that the purely bureaucratic type of administration... is... capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in its intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks. (Weber 1947, 337) The impact of the Weberian approach to bureaucracy on the evolution of organizational thought and practice, especially in relation to public sector management, merits consideration. The bureaucratic features and principles that Weber. describes are clearly discernible in the structure of organizations. As a rule, government organizations are hierarchical, with formal managerial and accountability systems based on linear chains of command. Specialization of labour and the merit principle have become the essential organizing principles of personnel management. And record keeping has become a fundamental component of bureaucracy, especially important for the legal dimensions of rule application and dispute resolution. Bureaucratic professionalism— the clear differentiation of bureaucratic obligations and private interests— has also always been a topic of concern for those interested in the well-ordered functioning of organizations. Weber’s assessment of bureaucracy identifies  9 components of organizational design and function that are as significant now as they were a century ago. Problems of Bureaucracy Weber’s interpretation helps us as well to understand how the pejorative connotation of the term bureaucracy emerged. Although his use of the word was neutral, the establishment of large bureaucracies designed to work along Weberian lines has led to organizational systems that many people find difficult to deal with and easy to criticize. Large and complex hierarchies can be hard to comprehend and intimidating to those affected by or forced to cope with bureaucratic decision making. Their size can cause people to view them as populated by nameless, faceless bureaucrats whose real life is far removed from those whom their decisions affect. The requirement for established rules can cause the nuances of a real case to be lost or ignored by decision makers. People who believe their cases to be special and unique— either because the situation is genuinely unusual or simply because the rules apply uniquely to it— find their needs treated routinely and like any other case. The bureaucratic ideals of consistency, uniformity, and fairness can leave affected individuals feeling that rule-bound officials have applied ill-designed and rigid approaches in a thoughtless and regimented manner that subverts the individual characteristics of a particular case. The bureaucratic ideal of written documentation can lead to an organization awash in paper, whose decision making becomes bogged down in paperwork. This criticism holds that documents come to matter more than people and that excessive reliance on formal records prevents officials seeing the human side of the case before them. Finally, the Weberian principle that decision making be efficient, fair, and rational can lead to criticisms that an organization is remote, intimidating, rule bound, confusing, short-sighted, stupid, delay ridden, or obsessed with red tape— in other words, bureaucratic in the pejorative sense. Bureaucracy as Machine Final reflections on Weber must be directed toward his analytical focus. His approach was highly structural and systematic. He conceptualized bureaucracy as a hierarchical organization subject to the will of a centralized and decisive managerial authority, exercised through a clear chain of command. The fundamental purpose of bureaucracy, moreover, was instrumental, rational administration: the creation of a system through which the organization could achieve its goals in the most economical, efficient, and effective. manner conceivable. The realization of operational and instrumental competence was viewed as the hallmark of rationality— organizational ends conceptually and systematically correlated to the most carefully crafted and efficiently implemented means of achieving them. From this perspective, a bureaucracy is analogous to an elaborate machine, or a military organization, designed and controlled by managers and their superiors to exercise some form of power in society and, by so doing, to serve the ends of those superiors. The machine is a structured system of means– ends relationships, subject to the will of a unified managerial presence, and, when effectively led, it can produce phenomenal organizational results. The actual ends of the machine and their moral worth, however, were subjects that Weber refrained from exploring, asserting that these were subjective matters more suited to political and philosophical analysis. F R E DE R ICK W. TAYLOR While Weber’s work offered a classic statement of the mechanistic approach to organizations and the importance of formal, hierarchical structures, Frederick W. Taylor (1856– 1915) presented a systematic analysis of desirable operating practices within an organization (Taylor 1967). Whereas Weber focused on macro-institutional dynamics, Taylor was interested in the micro-management of industrial employees and the ways by which their work could be made more efficient, and therefore more productive and more profitable. Taylor’s approach complements Weber’s in that both sought organizational rationality through the development of structures and operating procedures calculated to realize managerial and organizational ends. Like Weber, Taylor adopted a mechanistic view of organizations, seeing them as equivalent to machines and employees as the components of and adjuncts to these machines. According to Taylor, the role of management was to ensure that the organizational machine ran as smoothly as possible and that individual workers were used as productively as possible. This approach was called scientific management : the reduction of management to clearly defined, objective, and systematic principles and practices through which organizational behaviour could be rendered most rational— rationality conceived in terms of means– ends relationships à la Weber. As a part of the quest for rationality, Taylor placed great stress on the duty of management to review every job performed by an employee. Using the techniques of scientific management, a manager could break down the functions of every job into component elements to determine how each was undertaken and how it could be improved upon and made more rational, which would lead to the discovery of the “one best way” by which the employee should perform the task. This technique invited managers to analyze the entire work process for which they were responsible; to devise ways to make the process better and speedier; and to decide how to evaluate each worker’s performance in light of established rational expectations. Employees who exceeded expectations could be financially rewarded, while those who fell short could be better trained, or warned, or otherwise disciplined. Taylor viewed all employees as essentially poorly educated, lazy, and uninterested in the organization. that employed them, seeking at best to get the most pay for the least amount of work. The role of management was to study and supervise employees closely, selecting them for particular jobs  10 based on their physical or mental attributes and then working them like machines to gain the maximum productivity while paying them accordingly. He saw management personnel as the enlightened members of any organization, those who were to practise the principles of scientific management in organizing and running the institution along eminently rational lines. LUT H E R GULICK AND LYNDALL URWIC K In the 1930s and 40s, American public administration analysts Luther Gulick (1892– 1993) and Lyndall Urwick (1891– 1983) redirected attention to broad institutional dynamics, seeking to establish a “science of administration” by identifying, analyzing, and defining administrative truths common to the design and working of all organizations (Gulick and Urwick 1969). They were most concerned with developing systemic knowledge about managerial issues such as institutional design, span of control, the effectiveness of command systems, the nature of departmentalization, the functioning of management, and the politics/administration dichotomy. Gulick and Urwick stressed the importance of hierarchical organization but noted that a bureaucracy could be organized into various forms, based on the desired span of control of superiors. Span of control determines the pattern of reporting relationships between a superior and his or her immediate subordinates. It can be narrower or wider, with each articulation causing strengths and weaknesses in the organization as well as defining its structure, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. More detailed coverage of the issues surrounding span of control can be found on the Thinking Government website. Departmentalization Systematic attention to management problems also led Gulick and Urwick to address the issue of departmentalization. How should government departments and sub-units be organized, and by what defining principles of organization? They identified four concepts of departmental organization: 1 purpose 2 process 3 persons or things served 4 place Purpose refers to the function that department or sub-unit is conceived to do or provide, while process refers to the means by which it achieves that end. Thus departments or sub-units can be organized, for example, around the purposes of “furnishing water, controlling crime, or conducting education,” or around the processes of “engineering, medicine, carpentry, stenography, statistics, or accounting.” Or they can be organized around the persons or things served , such as “immigrants, veterans, Indians, forests, mines, parks, orphans, farmers, automobiles or the poor,” or around the place of service, such as “Hawaii, Boston, Washington, the Dust Bowl, Alabama, or Central High School” (Gulick and Urwick 1969, 15). Gulick and Urwick found that there was no firm rule for selecting the appropriate method of departmentalization. Moreover, a department may have to blend some or all of these features through its sub-units, especially large departments of a federal government with geographically dispersed responsibilities. For example, the Department of National Defence is based on purpose— the provision of military services for national defence and the promotion of strategic interests— but has functional sub-units based on process, such as land, air, and naval services; specialized equipment procurement; legal and medical services; and officer training systems. These departments, furthermore, are highly influenced by considerations of place, as operational elements of each are largely decentralized across the country and abroad. In determining the appropriate form of departmentalization and the desired blend of organizational requirements for a single institution, Gulick and Urwick emphasized the importance of administrative and managerial judgement based on organizational functions and attributes and the desired role of the institution. Line and Staff Functions Concern for departmentalization also led Gulick and Urwick to devote attention to the concepts of line and staff functions as considerations in organizational design: A line function is one in which officials provide a service directly to the public or to a client group within the public. A staff function is one in which officials possessing a specialized skill or mandate provide services either to officials engaged in line functions or to the government as a whole. Classic examples of staff functions are legal support, personnel and financial management support, and policy and planning support to those engaged in line functions. This distinction between line and staff functions is common, and most government departments possess sub-offices devoted to the staff support functions just listed. In fact, departments themselves can be classified as either line or staff, depending on the nature of their activities and whether they provide services directly to the public or to specialized client groups or to the government as a whole. The organizational feature explained in Chapter 3, whereby federal departments have either service or support roles, is a classic line/staff function distinction. As Gulick and Urwick sought to develop a science of administration, Gulick devoted special consideration to the essential functions of management, eventually delineating them with his now-famous taxonomy of POSDCORB, as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The Politics/Administration Dichotomy Gulick and Urwick also noted the importance of the politics/administration dichotomy, which had emerged from the writings of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson argued that matters of a purely political and partisan nature should be clearly separated from matters of management and administration. The former is the focus of passionate political and ideological debate over leadership and policy ends, while the latter is the preserve of systematic rationality to develop the means to those policy ends. The logic of the dichotomy, as understood by Gulick and Urwick, was that matters of policy definitely shaped the  11 purposes of state action, but that the actual design and implementation of policy and the operationalization of government activity were subject to the dispassionate, reasoned, and professional wisdom emerging from the science of administration. As we have already noticed, however, the politics/administration dichotomy cannot withstand critical scrutiny as either a description of or DISPATC H 1 B OX T HE ST RUC T U R ALME C H A N I ST IC A P P ROAC H 2 3 Organizations are best understood in structural terms. Hierarchy is the best means of organizing a bureaucracy. The logic of an organization is to achieve ends by the most economical, efficient, and effective means possible. Institutional rationality is to be understood in instrumental means– ends terms: the use of the necessary means to achieve desired ends. Management should possess a command and control role within the organization. Power should flow from the top down. Senior management is the “driver” of the organization. Employees are expected to faithfully execute the orders of management. 4 5 6 7 8 a prescription for bureaucratic activity. And, as we will see, much of the work of Gulick and Urwick was subjected to serious criticism. Even Gulick and Urwick themselves came to realize that they had been privileging systematic analysis of organizational phenomena and considered managerial judgement over scientific truth in the making of decisions. But this does not diminish the importance of their contribution to the study of organizations. In speaking of their intellectual legacy, Kernaghan and Siegel wrote that “Gulick and Urwick contributed to the theory of organizational behaviour by synthesizing and disseminating other people’s ideas. Nevertheless, these two men made a valuable contribution both by forcing people to think about management in a systematic manner, and in beginning to set out certain principles— many of which are still seen as beneficial guides to action today” (1999, 54). T HE OR GA N ICHU M A N IST IC M OD E L M A RY PA RK E R FOLLE T T Even as the structural-mechanistic model dominated organizational thought and practice in the early decades of the twentieth century, it became the subject of criticism by analysts seeking a more accurate approach. One of the first of these was Mary Parker Follett (1868– 1933), whose studies of organizations led her to question the commandand-control approach to power (Follett 1951, 1965). Follett argued that instead of viewing power as operating through the organizational hierarchy in a linear and downward-flowing fashion it was better to understand it as flowing in a circular manner, like a current. Power, according to Follett, can be exercised downward upon subordinates, but their reactions, both positive and negative, will flow back up the hierarchy and influence those who wield formal power. Hostile employee reactions to the exercise of managerial authority will weaken an organization’s ability to realize its goals, while supportive reactions will enhance it. Thus, Follett recognized a distinction between the formal power held by management and the informal power held by employees through their reactions to formal power. The sound exercise of management power, so Follett believed, is to be found in management making decisions in a manner that motivates employees and elicits positive reactions. From this perspective, the exercise of power is part of a human and interactive process, with the reaction of subordinates being just as important as the objectives and methods of superiors who initiate executive decisions. T H E H AWT HORNE STUDIES Interest in the sociological and psychological aspects of organizational life was heightened by the Hawthorne Studies of the 1920s (Mayo 1960; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1964). The studies got their name from the Hawthorne Works, a Western Electric factory outside Chicago that initially commissioned a study to see if worker productivity would change in higher or lower levels of light. Productivity seemed to improve when changes were made but slumped again when the study was over. It seemed that workers became more productive not so much because of the change in light levels but because they were motivated by the interest in their lives that the study demonstrated. Other changes, such as moving obstacles away from the path of workers or keeping work stations clean, also changed productivity levels. Later on, the term Hawthorne effect came to be used for any short-term increase in worker productivity. These experiments into worker behaviour, undertaken in the spirit of scientific management, led researchers such as Elton Mayo to argue that organizational behaviour could not be understood in simplistic terms of incentive and power. Employee reaction to management efficiency initiatives was nuanced, but the main factor was the existence of informal groups of employees and their attitudes to work. The Hawthorne Studies broke ground in identifying factors of organizational life outside the formal parameters of the structural-mechanistic model. The discovery of informal groupings within organizations— that is, the tendency of employees, and even managers, to band together with similarly situated and like-minded colleagues for mutual comradeship, socialization, and support— fundamentally challenged assumptions about organizational behaviour and called into question the relevance and effectiveness of many “truths” of scientific management. The discovery of informal groups led a new wave of organizational theorists to devote attention to informal interpersonal relations, especially between superiors and subordinates. If such group relations were the dominant factor in explaining employee activity, as the Hawthorne Studies indicated, then the whole realm of informal organizational dynamics merited closer attention.  12 Dunn, Christopher. “Introduction,” pp. 1–12. Parts I-V: The third edition of The Handbook of Canadian Public Administration reviews both the enduring structures of public administration and the challenges posed by new issues. Part I, Mapping the Canadian Public Service, provides an introduction to the wide vistas of Canadian public administration, with several authors drawing taxonomies of the federal public service itself. Part Il, The Central Institutions, reviews stability and change in the major institutions of government— the central executive, Parliament and the public service, judicial administration, provincial and local public ad-ministration, departments, and the deputy minister cadre-and their capacity to learn from each other. In Part III, The Broad Public Sector, the articles discuss some of the organizational forms outside the walls of the departmental public services, namely Crown corporations; agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs or arm's-length agencies); and Indigenous public administration. Canada and considers the innovations that have come about in service delivery and employee relations. Part V, Changing Expectations of Government, deals with societal pressures on the public service to deliver values-based government, equality-based public administration, justice for the third sector, balancing of the roles of exempt staff, regular public service, and horizontal management. All this amounts to a large order. The Handbook does not have all the answers. But we believe it asks most of the right questions. The Handbook's Conceptual Framework Public officials work in a multiplicity of organizational forms. The most familiar are government employees who work in departments under the political direction of a cabinet minister and the administrative direction of the deputy minister. However, central agencies and central departments have developed a considerable influence over the direction of government departments. Further, a variety of Crown corporations and semi-independent agencies, boards, and commissions do not operate according to the traditional departmental model of public administration. When we think of the staff of the various governing institutions, we often ignore those who work for Parliament and the courts. Of particular importance has been the establishment of various Officers of Parliament who, with their staffs, help Parliament in trying to hold the executive accountable for its actions and assist people who have complaints about government. With different forms come different issues. A New Way to Understand Bureaucracy Beyond the departmental public service, a wide variety of organizations can be found whose staff also support the workings of the political executive (prime minister and cabinet). In addition, legislative and judicial institutions receive support from their own bureaucratic organizations and officials. In other words, bureaucracies take on many differing forms. Since understanding the rather labyrinthine federal public service is a challenge, even for public servants themselves, this text takes a different conceptual approach. It arranges the public service according to a "rule of threes." The way to understand the shape of the service is to see it as a series of influences and bodies arranged in sets of three. In other words, there are three sectors of Canadian society, three national influences on the bureaucracy in Canada, three bureaucracies (executive, legislative, and judicial), three categories of executive institutions,. three categories of executive departments, three levels of bureaucratic elite in departments,  13 three kinds of officials in parliamentary institu-tions, and three kinds of officials in judicial institutions. This is a unique and simple way to present complex information. The Three Sectors of Canadian Society Public bureaucracies exist in a specific context, namely a tripartite division of Canadian society. It is common to talk of the private (or market) sector, the public (or governmental) sector, and the third (or voluntary non-profit) sector. The private sector exists in a competitive environment and strives to maximize profit for private owners, be they corporations, family-owned businesses, or self-employed individ-uals. The public sector, which consists of the institu tions and agencies of the state, is ideally concerned with acting in the public interest. The third sector consists of voluntary non-profit organizations that contribute to the general good of the public. This sector includes, among others, charitable organiz-ations, religious and cultural institutions, and nonprofit childcare facilities and nursing homes (see the Evans and Shields chapter in this collection). There is also a tendency for one sector to influence another sector's administrative practices. In the last quarter century, the public sector has been deeply influenced by something called new public manage-ment, a school of public administration that mod-elled itself on private-sector precepts. The financial practices of the public sector (such as the accounting systems and planning and budgeting tools) more and more resemble approaches in the private sector. For its part, the third sector depends increasingly on the public sector for funding. One implication of this trend is that non-profit organizations have begun spending more of their time and resources on meeting the reporting and accountability requirements that come with dependence on public financing. Some non-profit organizations even complain that such efforts sidetrack them from their core missions. As well, the third sector tends to mimic the private sector in its financial management practices: "Many voluntary organizations operate as if they were profit-and-loss entities, with cash flows (from fundraising, endowments, or fees charged for services) that dictate the scope of their activities in a similar way to [private-sector] firms that are fully revenue-dependent. While their objectives are public in a broad sense, they can act like private organizations from a money-management perspective" (Graham, 2007, p. 8). The Composition of the Public Bureaucracy The federal bureaucracy is just one among many in this country. Statistics Canada indicated at one point that over 3.6 million Canadians were employed in the many different public organizations. Indeed, the federal general government bureaucracy accounts for only a small proportion of total public sector employment (in 2011, 427,000 of 3,631,837) (Statistics Canada, 2012). Some Canadians think of government as a collection of minister-directed departments, but this is only part of the picture. Andrew Graham (2007) insists it is necessary to define government expansively, given the extensive reach of the public sector in modern times. For example, he points out that there is a "shadow government": people working for the private sector under government grants or grants to non-profit organizations. As well, government often achieves its aims by using a variety of governing in-struments, some of which are practices that depend on the private sector for their implementation, such as regulations, inducements, and persuasion designed to change private-sector behaviour. The Three Origins of the Public Bureaucracy in Canada There have been three national influences on the bureaucracy in Canada. The public bureaucracy, especially the departmental bureaucracy, owes its origins to British and American sources and to  14 the Canadian nation-building ethos, which carried with it some aura of patronage and doing what was necessary. British Influence The traditional British style of public administration, modified by Canadian practice and convention, came to be known as the Whitehall Model. It consisted of a number of interrelated principles (see Table I.1). The British model was a subject of both pride and consternation to Canadians. It offered a familiar and relatively workable set of principles that could be passed from generation to generation, but it also proved to resist easy change. Table 1.1 The Traditional Whitehall Model and Its Canadian Application Traditional Whitehall Model Modifications by Canadian Practice and Convention Parliamentary supremacy Subordinate (delegated) legislation Ministerial responsibility Answerability and accountability Public service anonymity Accounting officers/ Boards of Crown corporations and commissions/ Media access to public servants Public service neutrality Rights to engage in various forms of political activity The secrecy norm Access to information or freedom of information The rule of law Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms The merit principle Employment equity / Representative bureaucracy American Influence American influences have also left a lasting mark in Canada. In the late nineteenth century, the Progressive movement, spearheaded by individuals like Woodrow Wilson, sought to break the "spoils system" (in which the winning political party gave government jobs to its supporters) by making the public sector at all levels more business-like and shielding it from the political realm. The Progressive movement had its strongest effect at the local and state levels, where the patronage-ridden political "machines, the target of the Progressives, had their greatest hold. Among the Progressive movement's effects in Canada were the creation of city managers for urban govern-ance, the foundation of special-purpose bodies to manage some politically sensitive services, and reforms in public budgeting. Around the turn of the century, the second American influence, the scientific management school, first set in motion by Frederick Taylor (1856-1915), gained in popularity.' Frederick Taylor was a member of the New England upper class who was accepted to Harvard but instead chose to become immersed in the burgeoning American manufacturing sector, first as an ordinary worker, then as an engineer, then as what would be called today a "management consult-ant." Tireless study of the nature of work and management led him to publish his immensely popular work The Principles of Scientific Management in 1911. Taylor's ideas on the organization of work found many expressions throughout his career; practitioners have tended to seize on discrete elements of his thought and use them as they see fit. He reckoned that the job of managers was to acquire the knowledge of work that traditionally  15 belonged to workers and to organize it so as to make it available to current and future managers. He rather optimistically referred to this as "scientific management," by which he simply meant the organization and quantification of such knowledge as well as finding "the one best way" to perform tasks.Scientific management principles influenced the federal public administration for the better part of the twentieth century. In particular, the Civil Service Commission (established in 1908) ultimately adopted an extensive employee classification system based on a report by American consultants (Dawson, 1929). New Public Management A third American influence was to come. In the final decades of the twentieth century, ideas and practices from Britain, the United States, and New Zealand influenced thinking about public administration: new public management (NPM), the adaptation of the practices of private business to the administrative activities of government (see Table 1.2). It emerged as the result of two overlapping influences: rational choice theory and principal-agent theory. Rational choice theory (also known as public choice theory) assumes that all individuals, including bureaucrats, are self-interested. Principal-agent theory is based on the idea that the bureaucrat (the nominal agent, or "servant" who is supposed to follow the will of theprincipals (the minister or the legislature) often uses specialized knowledge to thwart this arrangement. The emphasis of NPM was on establishing institutional and behavioural counters to these two alleged. The tendencies. Other factors were at play as well. Ideologues Peo such as British Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US Republican President Ronald Reagan convinced many people that behind poorly performing governments were self-serving bureaucrats who in some areas had scaled the heights of power and needed to be checked. The book Reinventing Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) was key to popularizing entreprestar depevel one braister each sperneurial government in Canada. In particular, Osborne and Gaebler argued that governing should involve "steering"-setting the policy direction-rather than "rowing"; the delivery of services should instead be contracted out to private busi- Exe ness as much as possible. NPM was seen as the opposite of the traditional bureaucratic form of the government. In fact, it was hailed as an antidote to bureaucratic ills, which, it was claimed, resulted in inefficient governing. Table 1.2 Principles of NPM versus Bureaucratic Government Principles of New Public Management (NPM) Traditional Bureaucratic Government Entrepreneurial government Emphasis on spending Steering rather than rowing Concentration on one or a few governing instruments (or means) Competition Monopoly Performance measurement Rule-driven Customer-driven government Ministerial responsibility  16 Decentralization Centralization Market orientation Command and control Empowerment Service Canadian Development Although influenced by British and American ideas, the Canadian public bureaucracy has developed, to some extent, in its own way. Until 1917, there was only nominal attention to the merit principle (the right person for a specific job) and more to patronage (a public-service job seen as a political favour to be bestowed on those who supported the governing party). For the next 50 years (1918-67), the merit system-focused Whitehall Model largely dominated. Since 1967, collective bargaining by public service unions and the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have modified the Whitehall Model. For example, strict restrictions on the political activities of public servants to maintain their political neutrality were struck down by the Supreme Court as a violation of the freedoms protected by the Charter. New public management also had an effect-although not to the same extent as in some other countries. The long-term effect of these developments is the current blend of rights-based, bargaining-based, and entrepreneurial-based management. The Three Bureaucracies (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) People often think of bureaucracy as involving the standard public service, with the employees in each department answering to a cabinet minister. How-ever, there are many kinds of bureaucracies, and only one kind answers to ministers. The three powers or branches of government-the executive (prime minister and cabinet), Parliament, and the judiciary— each have their own bureaucracies with a variety of specific aspects. The Three Categories of Executive Institution Executive institutions are those that are tasked with the implementation of laws passed by the Parliament. They fall into three categories: 1. executive departments headed by cabinet ministers; 2. semi-independent public agencies: Crown corporations and assorted agencies, boards, and commissions; and 3. alternative service delivery (ASD), a variety of different methods for delivering public services. Executive Departments Headed by Cabinet Ministers Ministers preside over executive departments. Executive departments are those listed in Schedule I of the Financial Administration Act (FAA), a list that may only be amended by Parliament and not at the discretion of the minister or cabinet. Departments are financed through parliamentary appropriations. As of March 2017, there were 19 departments. Ministers, in the language of most of the acts creating departments, have "direction and management" of the department. According to convention, ministers are individually responsible to Parliament for implementing the mandate that is conferred upon them by the act. A minister may have personal responsibility to Parliament for personnel management, staffing, and finances of the department, but does not in fact exercise direct responsibility over the employees or finances of the department. The Public Service Commission is given exclusive responsibility for the staffing of departments under the Public Service Employment Act, which came into effect in 2005. This  17 power is often delegated, but it is delegated to the deputy minister, not to the minister of the depart-ment. Personnel management other than staffing is the responsibility of the Treasury Board and the department's deputy minister, not the minister. Sim-ilarly, control over financial administration is shared between the Treasury Board and the department's deputy minister under the Financial Administration Act, and the minister is excluded. The reason for these exclusions is historical: in the past, ministers enjoyed much greater powers, but they abused them, aggrandizing the power of their departments, their parties, and themselves. Christopher Rootham in Chapter 1 deals with these and other acts that attribute responsibilities in the public sector. Semi-Independent Public Agencies The semi-independent public agency, the second type of executive institution, differs from its departmental counterpart in important ways. Although both have a designated minister, Parliament does not usually scrutinize the agency's affairs to the same extent. Ministers will generally submit less readily to questioning in the House of Commons on matters related to boards, commissions, or Crown corpora-tions. These agencies generally have more freedom from central controls in their budgeting and staffing practices. Some are advisory agencies, some perform regulatory functions, and some engage in commercial or business activities-all activities that are rare for departments to perform. ABCS (or arm's-length agencies). A wide variety of agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs) serve a number of functions, which may overlap to a large extent. They may have adjudicative roles, such as the role played by the Canadian Human Rights Tribu-nal, which decides cases arising from the Canadian Human Rights Act. Some regulate particular indus-tries. For example, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) determines which companies can have broadcasting licences and sets requirements for Canadian content in the broadcast media. Other agencies have operating responsibilities, like those undertaken by provincial, and territorial tax programs and other ser-vices. It is managed by a board of management with 15 members appointed by the cabinet, 11 of whom are nominated by the provinces and territories. Crown corporations. Crown corporations are legal entities set up by the government to pursue commercial or other public policy objectives. The type of Crown corporation most Canadians are familiar with is called a parent Crown corporation. A parent Crown corporation is a legally distinct entity wholly owned by the Crown and managed by a board of directors. As of December 31, 2014, there were 45 parent Crown corporations, excluding subsidiaries (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2014). Some of these affect Canadians directly every day, like the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Marine Atlantic, or the Bank of Canada, whereas others have a more indirect impact, like the Business Development Bank of Canada, Atomic Energy of Canada, and the International Development Research Centre (IRDC). Crown corporations report through specific ministers to Parliament, but the relationship between corporation and minister is not as close or direct as is the case with ministers and departments. The reason the Crown corporations came into existence in the first place was to free them from the rules and political control that are evident in the regular bureaucracy. How-ever, the arm's-length relationship raises difficulties for those used to thinking in terms of the orthodox doctrine of ministerial responsibility, where the minister is responsible for all matters administrative and political. This has been the problem Parliament has dealt with in various reform efforts over the past several decades. Accountability frameworks for Crown corporations are dealt with by Luc Bernier in this collection. Alternative Service Delivery (ASD) The third kind of executive organization features alternative service delivery (ASD). This category is aimed particularly at improving the delivery of government services, reducing the role of  18 government, increasing flexibility, improving coordination among government departments and programs, and generally making government more business-like and responsive to the needs of the recipients of services. ASD usually means turning to unusual organizational forms and instruments that do not fit the traditional view of government instruments. They may include establishing new organizational forms within departments or outside traditional departmental structures, termed special operating agencies (such as the self-financing Passport Canada). Alternative service delivery may also involve setting up partnerships with business and voluntary non-governmental organizations, commercializing the provision of ser-vices, or contracting out services to private business or to former government employees (Inwood, 2009). The Three Types of Executive Departments Three types of executive government departments exist: 1. central agencies and central departments; 2. central coordinating departments; and 3. line departments. Central Agencies and Central Departments Central agencies, the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), are headed by the prime minister and perform service-wide policy, fa-cilitative, and control functions. Their authority comes from the statutory and conventional authority of cabinet itself, and their roles are to assist the prime minister directly and to help with the setting of objectives by cabinet. They have a formal or an informal right to intervene in or otherwise influence the activities of departments. The central departments (Department of Finance and the Treasury Board Secretariat) also perform these service-wide functions, but they are headed by ministers rather than by the prime min-ister, their authority comes from statute, and their objectives are usually collectively set or influenced by cabinet. They also have the right to intervene in or otherwise influence the activities of other depart-ments. The term central agency is often used to refer to both types of structures. However, differentiating between the two can be useful, since one type, central agencies, provides a venue for direct prime ministerial power and the other, central departments, does not. In fact, one of the central departments, Finance, occasionally jockeys with the prime minister and the central agencies for relative influence. In contrast, line departments are charged with delivering the basic services of government, such as health and defence. Line departments do not normally have a mandate to intervene in the affairs of other departments. Although the central agencies and central departments exert great influence over government policies and actions, they do not have as large a staff or budget as most government departments do. Despite their importance, the central agencies and central departments are the organs of government that parliamentarians (and most Canadians) know least about and whose workings are the least transparent, compared with the others. Table 1.3 Roles and functions central agencies and central departments agencies & departments Roles Functions Prime Ministers Office The PMO gives partisan political Advising on political strategy and prime advice to the prime minister and is minister's senior appointments staffed by supporters of the party in Organizing the prime minister's power. Staff are hired under the correspondence and timetable Public Service Employment Act  19 (PSEA) but classified as "exempt Liaising with ministers, caucus, and staff" in order to free them from national party normal public service hiring practices Privy Council Office This central agency provides Facilitates the cabinet decision-making non-partisan policy advice to the process and implementation of prime minister and cab-inet.? It government's agenda serves as the secretariat for the Acts as main designer and adviser for cabinet and its committees. The Clerk of the Privy Council serves as machinery-of-government issues the prime minister's deputy minister, Advises the prime minister (by Clerk) on the secretary to the cabinet, and the appointment of deputy ministers (since the early 1990s) the head of Coordinates strategy for federal-provincial the public service, responsible for and territorial (FPT) relations. matters relating to public-service renewal. Treasury Board The Treasury Board Secretariat In general, the responsibilities of the TBS Secretariat (TBS) is a central department that include the following: serves the central management setting management policies and board for the public service, the monitoring performance; Treasury Board. The Treasury Board directing expenditure management and establishment and mandate is performance information systems; and outlined in the Financial serving as principal employer of the Administration Act, which gives the public service. department responsibility for The Office of the Chief Human Resources general administrative policy, Officer (OCHRO) within the TBS, financial management, human centralizes human resources policy, and resources management, internal acts as the employer in relations with audit, and public service pensions public-service employees, and benefit programs. It also has responsibilities under a number of other acts, such as the Public Service Employment Act, the Official Languages Act, the Access to Information Act, and the Employment Equity Act. Department of Finance The most influential department in Finance is instrumental in setting policy the gov-ernment, Finance sets for policy in the most important taxes, tax expenditures, and tariffs; transfer and economic programs, as federal borrowing; well as setting the annual federal transfer payments to provincial and budget. territorial governments; Canada's role within international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World  20 Trade Organization, and the World Bank; and major economic issues. Central Coordinating Departments In addition to the central agencies and central de» partments that are key actors in virtually all policy decisions and play a major role in coordinating government decisions, there are central coordinating departments that also have a coordinating role. For example, the Department of Justice has been responsible for "Charter-proofing" federal legislative proposals across government. Likewise, the minister (in effect, the department) of Public Works and Government Services is allocated exclusive jurisdiction under the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act of 1996 and under the Defence Production Act of 1985 to procure goods for other departments, as well as for the Armed Forces, Other departments are sometimes placed in this category. Line Departments Line departments are the third type of organization found in the executive government. They function as the backbone of government, delivering most of what we have come to expect in the way of services from government, from the military to the protection of aviation. As noted, they do not usually intervene in the affairs of other departments. There are conflicting images of line departments in the literature. Line departments have often been portrayed as the drab, unexciting area of government. They are said to be the most driven by bureaucratic rules, the most dominated by politicians— their own ministers and the prime minister-and the most in need of, but at the same time the most deeply resistant to, basic reform (A.W. Johnson, 1992). At a broad level, there has been an almost constant tension between the need for rigorous accountability on one hand and the desire for creative and flexible management on the other (PCO, 2007). However, others consider the line bureaucracy as a more independent and a more challenging place to work. Some theorists of the rational choice school, or those who are attracted by the principal-agent theory, see the average bureaucrat as a significant power-seeking agent, one whose nominal superiors do not under normal circumstances have enough information or resources to control their employees. The move to the new public management approach to public-sector organization and management is a sign of just how much politicians fear the power of the bureaucracy in Canada and Britain (Aucoin, 1995, and Aucoin chapter in the first edition of this Handbook, 2002). The Three Levels of Bureaucratic Elite in Departments Three levels of bureaucratic elite characterize departments: 1. the deputy minister (DM) level (and in some departments, associate deputy ministers), 2. the assistant deputy minister (ADM) appoint-ments, and 3. director-level appointments. Deputy Minister Deputy and associate deputy ministers are called Governor-in-Council (GIC) appointments because they are made by the Governor General upon the advice of the cabinet (acting in the name of the Privy Council). In practice, it is the prerogative of the prime minister, not the minister of the department, to appoint these individuals. In doing so, the prime minister takes into account the need to ensure that the appointees can be trusted to carry out his or her will and see to the  21 needs of the government of the day. The Clerk of the Privy Council provides advice to the prime minister on these appointments. Despite being chosen by the prime minister and closely associated with the policies of the govern-ment, most deputy ministers are retained even when a new government is elected. The deputy minister is expected to be politically neutral and impartial— neither for the government nor against it, but rather the guardian of the administrative order. The task at hand is to advise, to speak truth to power, and to supply the government with the best and most cautious information in spite of how unpalatable this may be politically. The deputy minister controls the management of the department. Although traditionally it is the minister, rather than the deputy minister, who is responsible to Parliament for the actions of the department, the Financial Administration Act (2007) has modified this tradition. Specifically, the deputy minister is the accounting officer for the department and, as such, is legally obliged to appear before parliamentary committces to report on conformity to that act (Inwood, 2009). Thinking about the role of the deputy minister has evolved in recent years, as Bourgaul's article in this collection shows. Assistant Deputy Ministers Assistant de