Organizational Implementation Tools PDF

Chapter 8 Organizational implementation tools Organizational implementation instruments include a broad range of governing tools which rely upon the use of government and non-governmental institutions and personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process chang...

Chapter 8 Organizational implementation tools Organizational implementation instruments include a broad range of governing tools which rely upon the use of government and non-governmental institutions and personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process change. There is a wide variety of substantive organizational tools available to affect both the production and consumption/distribution of goods and services in society. However, these generally fall into two main types depending on the proximity of their relationship to government and hence the ability of government to control the effects of their utilization: direct government and quasi-governmental or societally-based organizational tools. Procedural organizational tools generally involve the organization and reorganization of government agencies and policy processes in order to affect key parameters of governmental activity and that of the policy communities’ governments face in making public policies. Each type of tool is closely associated with a different mode of governance. Direct government tools, for example, are a principle component of legal modes of governance, while quasi-governmental tools are a feature of corporatist modes and procedural organizational tools are commonly used to construct market and network governance arrangements and architectures which, in turn, often utilize non-state tools. Substantive organizational instruments There are many types of substantive instruments which rely for their effectiveness upon the organizational resources of governments and non- governmental agencies and actors. Most involve (and rely primarily) on the use of government personnel to achieve government goals, usually operating in structures created and controlled by governments. These are ‘direct’ government organizations, but can also include ‘indirect’ or quasi- or 165 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN parastatal ones; the best-known example of which is the state-owned or ‘public enterprise’ – which itself comes in many shapes, sizes, colors and flavors (Bernier 2011) – as well as non-state ones such as co-production or certification (Cashore 2002; Voorberg et al. 2015). Direct government The direct use of government agencies for substantive policy purposes involves the ‘delivery of a good or service by government employees, funded by appropriations from government treasury’ (Leman 1989 and 2002). This is what has sometimes been referred to as ‘the forgotten fundamental’ (Leman 1989) within policy instrument studies, as its ubiquitous nature is often ignored in studies focusing on more esoteric kinds of tools. Within this general type of direct government organizational tool, there are several common forms or subtypes found in many jurisdictions. These include the following. Line departments In most countries, government agencies undertake a wide variety of tasks on a direct basis. These include, but are certainly not limited to, those listed in (Table 8.1). These services are provided at all levels of government (central or federal, provincial, state or regional, as well as urban or local) in slightly different configurations in different countries. Unemployment, welfare, or social security payments, for example, can be the task of central governments in some countries and eras and of provincial or local governments in others. Typically, modern government agencies follow what is known in the public administration literature as a Weberian ‘monocratic bureaucracy’ form of organization (Brubaker 1984; Beetham 1987). This is a type of organ- izational structure first systematically described and analyzed by the German political sociologist Max Weber in his early twentieth-century work, Economy and Society. Weber argued that although bureaucratic forms of organization had a long history, a significant change had occurred in the modern era as such organizations had come to be viewed as providing services to the public rather than being the property of a monarch or emperor to do with as he or she pleased. The main characteristics of a modern government agency, in Weber’s view, were: Personnel are appointed on the basis of a merit system of appointment, retention and recruitment. Office holders do not own the office in which they work, but hold it subject to the provisions of the merit system. 166  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS Those offices tend to be organized in a hierarchical fashion with a relatively small span of control and multiple levels. Activities in the agency operate according to the rule of law – office holders are not above the law and must operate within its limits (including provisions for their accountability – via some form of a ‘chain of account- ability’ to representative assemblies in modern liberal democracies who actually establish and promulgate laws. (Albrow 1970; Weber 1978) What are commonly referred to as ‘line’ departments (in order to distinguish them from central, headquarters, or ‘staff’ units) have this ‘classic’ hierarchical Weberian monocratic bureaucratic form and are thoroughly embedded in legal forms of governance. Such units are typically organized in a pyramidal shape linking offices of civil servants in various branches and sections to a single department head, such as a department of health or a department of highways. A subvariation of this is the ‘ministry’; a form in which, typically multiple pyramids of departments culminate in a single head (e.g., a ministry of lands, parks and housing) or an ‘agency’, which operates separately from the policy-making level of managerial control (Verhoest et al. 2010). These forms of government organization are the ‘workhorses’ of publicly provided goods and service delivery in most modern states (see Table 8.1 for an example of their use in government service delivery in a modern state, Canada). Although many modern states originally practiced legal modes of governance in most sectors, establishing legal rules and forms of legitimation through the rule of law, they have grown dramatically through the creation and expansion of ministries, departments and agencies in areas such as defence, transportation and, later, social welfare, education and health provision. This has resulted in the conversion of many sectors from legal modes of governance to more corporatist ones featuring larger and active state organizations, often with a monopoly over the goods and services they provide. These kinds of organizations can be very large (the US Depart- ment of Defense, for example, has over 2 million employees, including approximately 750,000 civilians) and can be subdivided into hundreds of separate branches, bureaus, sections and agencies. They employ the most personnel and deliver by far the largest percentage of state-provided goods and services in liberal-democratic and virtually all other, forms of modern government. The ‘government employees’ employed in line departments are typically civil or public servants. In most liberal-democratic countries, these are unionized and well-paid positions and although this is not the case in many other countries where officials may supplement their wages illegally through various forms of corruption (‘kickbacks’, bribes, ‘service’ payments, expediting ‘fees’ and so on), in either case the use of public servants to directly deliver public services is an expensive proposition, which in itself discourages its use. 167 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN Table 8.1 Tasks typically undertaken by government agencies Task Examples Facilitating commerce Mint, standards of weights and measures bureaus Managing public lands Commissioners of public lands, ministries of lands and parks, or environment or natural resources Constructing public works Departments of public works – airports, highways Research, testing and statistics National statistical agencies Law and justice Courts, solicitor-general or attorney general offices, corrections and prisons and policing Technical assistance, Farm extension, ministries of agriculture, record-keeping and libraries national archives, national libraries Health care Ministries of health – hospitals. clinics, dentists, nursing, home care. Social services Ministries of welfare and social, family, or community services Education and training Ministries of education, post-secondary education colleges and universities, technical and training institutes Labor relations Ministries of labour and labour relations Marketing Tourism, ministries of small business and ministries of trade and commerce Defence Ministries of defence, army, navy, air force and coast guard Supplying internal Ministries of supply and services, Queen’s government needs printers Finance Ministries of finance and treasury boards International affairs Ministries of external or foreign affairs Source: Adapted from Hodgetts, J. E. 1973. The Canadian Public Service: A Physiology of Government 1867–1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 168  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS How well these officials are educated and trained and what kinds of facilities and information they have to work with also affects their capacity and perceived competence and, along with cost, can play a significant role in their placement within a policy design (Brunsson 2006). Countries or sectors with well-resourced administrative systems regarded as highly efficient and competent by their citizenry are more likely to feature direct government service provision in their policy designs than countries with corrupt or inefficient civil services, given the advantages the former often hold for governments in terms of cost and ease of programme administration. Central support agencies These are agencies which are similar in appearance to line departments, but often act more like private companies; delivering services within governments rather than to external constituencies. Some of these are very old (like government stationers and printers) while others (like government systems and information technology units) are much more recent. Many of these agencies are quite large and since they often serve functions similar to private companies they are and have often been, primary targets for government efforts to develop market modes of governance in some sectors through contracting out or privatizing government services – that is, they are simply turned into ‘firms’ supplying government services by severing their funding through general appropriations revenue and establishing autonomous boards of directors. Cost issues are typically a major factor influencing their inclusion in policy designs. Social and health insurance and pension plans Social and health insurance and pension schemes like those used in many countries for unemployment insurance, elderly income support and health care are other government organization-based schemes, ones in which all individuals in certain categories are mandated to make payments to a government agency which acts, usually, as a monopoly insurance provider for that group (Katzman 1988; Moss 2002). Some of these schemes, of course, are among the largest areas of government expenditure and are virtually identical in organizational form to direct government organizational tools given their universal and mandated nature – with the main difference being that programme funds come from dedicated insurance payments rather than general tax revenue. These schemes are generally very high profile and targeted to specific kinds of outputs. They are often intended to be revenue- neutral, although any short-term shortfalls in these schemes typically have to be made up by governments. They also can provide large pools of capital which governments can use to finance infrastructure and other kinds of investments. As such, they are very popular and found throughout the world, 169 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN although their configuration and extent of private sector involvement varies greatly from country to country. Countries which do not have such schemes typically cite reasons related to costs or intrusiveness upon already existing private sector programmes. Quasi-governmental organizational forms All of this type of government agencies have an essentially bureaucratic organizational structure and also exist largely as Weberian forms of administration – although most are structured in a more ‘business-like’ fashion with fewer rules and regulations guiding their behaviour than government departments and agencies. These include the following main types. Public enterprises and other corporate forms Public enterprises or ‘state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) are the most common and well-known type of quasi-governmental substantive organizational tool. SOEs undertake or have undertaken a wide variety of tasks in many jurisdictions (see Table 8.2). There are many different definitions of public enterprises with different levels of public ownership ascribed to these organizations. Hence, for example, in Canada the Ontario Auditor’s Act defines ‘public enterprise’ as: a corporation which is not an agency of the Crown and having 50 percent or more of its issued and outstanding shares vested in the government or having the appointment of a majority of its Board of directors made or approved by the Lt. Gov in Council thus including a specified level of ownership and a means of control within the definition itself (Prichard 1983). Perry and Rainey (1988) developed an exhaustive typology of these kinds of government organizations by examining the different types of ownership, sources of funding and mode of social control exercised over them. The key feature of these organizations, however, is that they have a corporate form and are not administrative agencies. That is, they operate under separate legislation or under general corporate legal principles and government control is exercised indirectly as a function of government share ownership; typically through voting control over appointments to the company board of directors – who usually can be removed ‘at pleasure’ by the government. The board of directors then hires and fires senior management so that government control is indirect and ‘arm’s-length’, unlike the management and control of direct government administrative agencies. Some public enterprises can raise and borrow money on their own authority, while others are limited in their sphere of independence and must 170  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS Table 8.2 Examples of tasks undertaken by public enterprises (Canada – twentieth century) Task Example (Canada, twentieth century) Housing Canadian mortgage and housing Corporation Finance Bank of Canada, small business Development Bank, Caisse de Depot et Placement de Quebec Wartime production Canadian Arsenals Transportation Canadian National Railways, Via Rail, Air Canada/ Trans-Canada Airlines, St Lawrence Seaway Co., BC Ferries, Northern Transportation Company Ltd Strategic industries Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, Petro-Canada Communications Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Radio-Canada Cultural industries Canadian Film Development Corporation, National Film Board, National Museum Corps Utilities SaskTel, Hydro Quebec, Ontario Hydro and BC Hydro Infant industries Petrosar, Athabaska Tar Sands, Canadian Development Corporation Sick industries Skeena Cellulose, BC Resources Investment Corporation Property management British Columbia Building Corporation Regional development Prince Rupert Coal Corporation, DEVCO, Cape Breton Development Corp Lotteries and vice BC Liquor Stores, Société des Alcools de Quebec, Casino Nova Scotia, Lotto-Canada Local utilities Translink, Edmonton Telephones Marketing boards Canada Wheat Board, British Columbia Egg and Milk Marketing Board and Freshwater Fish Marketing Board Source: Adapted from Vining, A. R. and R. Botterell. 1983. ‘An Overview of the Origins, Growth, Size and Functions of Provincial Crown Corporations’. In J. R. S. Pritchard (ed.), Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument Choice. Toronto: Butterworths, 303–68. seek funding or permission to borrow from governments. Similarly, some are free to set whatever prices they would like for their products while others must seek government permission to alter prices and may be subsidized to provide a good or service at below market value. While government share ownership can drop below 50 percent and still exercise control if the remainder 171 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN of the shares is widely held, it is more common for a government to own 50 percent or more of voting shares (in fact it is very common for them to own 100 percent). However, there is a growing number of ‘mixed’ enterprises with joint public–private or multiple government ownership. These companies can be exceedingly large, although they can also be much smaller, in some cases limited to one or two factories or offices. Sovereign wealth funds, holding the proceeds of oil and gas or pension revenues in countries such as Singapore and Dubai, for example, are among the largest firms in terms of assets and can control hundreds of billions of dollars in investments (Elson 2008), while large public hydroelectrical or petrochemical utilities in countries such as Canada, Norway, Mexico, Iran and Venezuela also rank first among companies in those countries based on size of assets controlled (Laux and Molot 1988). The use of state-owned enterprises is common in corporatist forms of governance which prize their high levels of automaticity, intrusiveness and visibility as well as their generally low cost and ability to be precisely targeted to different sectors and policy areas. However, there have been many efforts to privatize these companies, or move their ownership from the government to the private sector as some governments have attempted to shift from corporatist to more market modes of governance or cut costs or reduce their balance sheets or level of debt (Savas 1989). These efforts have been successful in sectors where competition exists, such as marketing boards, product producing companies and property management (Savas 1987; Laux 1993) but have generally foundered in other areas where the privatized corporation has simply become a monopoly service provider. This has often been the case with large-scale utilities such as water, electricity, or public transportation providers where natural monopoly conditions often exist (Chapman 1990; Gayle and Goodrich 1990; Bos 1991). In these cases, they have often been re-nationalized or re-regulated through the creation of regulatory oversight agencies and mechanisms (see Chapter 9) (Mees 2005; Leland and Smirnova 2009). Policy designers now very much take these contextual circumstances into account in proposing or recommending either the creation or privatization of SOEs. Table 8.2 provides examples of the many public enterprises used in Canada in the twentieth century, a country which has not been at the forefront of the deployment of such tools. Organizational hybrids (alternative service delivery) In recent years, numerous hybrid forms of indirect government organizations have also been developed and implemented in many jurisdictions. These have often been proposed in situations where governments would like to privatize or contract out government services but where there is not a competitive market; thereby limiting the utility of outright sale or divestment by a government (Mathur and Skelcher 2007). 172  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS Examples of these types of tools include so-called ‘special operating agencies’ (SOAs) (Koppell 2003; Birrell 2008) which were established in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s in the effort to grant more autonomy to central service agencies and remove them from day-to-day government control. This was typically done by ‘outsourcing’ whatever services could be secured from a competitive external marketplace, while allowing agencies providing those goods and services which could not be so relocated to charge real prices to purchasers and to retain their earnings and make their own reinvestment decisions (Aucoin 2006; Flumian et al. 2007). A second type of hybrid is the ‘quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization’ or quango, an organizational form in which a non-governmental agency is established and given a grant of authority by a government to provide a particular good or service (Hood 1986b). These can be precisely targeted and many airports, ports and harbors are run by such ‘independent authorities’ which rely on governments for their monopoly position but which are answerable to their own boards for their activities rather than to the government itself (Kickert 2001). These agencies are usually then able to charge their own prices for the good or service they provide, retain their earnings and raise funds on capital markets for investments, removing these items from government books and balance sheets (Flinders and McConnel 1999; Lovink 1999; Advani and Borins 2001). There can be serious principle-agent problems with these kinds of agencies, however, which can affect their use in fields with legal or corporatist modes of governance (Koppell 2003). Maintaining the arm’s-length nature of the relationship of public enterprises and quangos to government is difficult and such agencies may not have enough autonomy for governments to avoid the consequences of scandals or other problems associated with them. That is, these relationships can be either too close (day-to-day interference) or too distant (agencies become distant and aloof powers unto themselves). Utilizing this form of substantive organizational tool can be also very expensive and linked to unpopular actions with political and economic consequences for governments – such as price increases, political scandals and high-profile financing and operational issues. Many public agencies also do not have to face the discipline of the market in terms of meeting shareholder or investor expectations for profitability and hence lack at least this incentive to operate in a cost-efficient manner, raising difficulties for many governments practicing market forms of governance in specific sectors (Kernaghan 1993; Ford and Zussman 1997; Flumian et al. 2007). These kinds of visibility and cost issues generally discourage the inclusion of these agencies in policy designs. Partnerships, commissioning and contracting out More recent efforts on the part of some governments to shift some sectors from legal or corporatist to market modes of governance – that is, to offload legal and financial responsibility for goods and service delivery and have 173 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN existing goods and services delivered through the private or quasi-govern- mental sector – have evolved into several distinct forms of organization which are more private than public, with the public sector acting mainly as a purchaser of goods and services provided by private companies (Grimshaw et al. 2001; Grimsey and Lewis 2004; Greener 2006). One typical form of such activity is ‘contracting out’ or outsourcing, in which internal provision of some good or service is simply replaced with a source external to government (Zarco-Jasso 2005). This can be more complicated if a non-governmental provider does not exist for a particular product or service, so that a government must first, or simultaneously, create a non-governmental provider (Brown et al. 2008). Outsourcing of highway and railway maintenance in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, involved government managers creating their own firms, which then bid on and received government contracts to provide maintenance services; those companies then immediately hired former government workers and in some cases used former government equipment, to provide the same service (McDavid and Clemens 1995). More recently this form of activity has moved to the capital goods sector with the development of so-called ‘P3s’ or ‘public-private partnerships’ in which governments encourage private sector firms to build and operate public infrastructure such as schools, office buildings, hospitals and sports facilities and even prisons and transportation infrastructure such as bridges and roads, in return for a government guarantee of a long-term lease or use agreement with the provider (English and Skellern 2005). The net effect of this activity is to remove capital costs from government budgets while retaining the service (Rosenau 1999; Boase 2000). Different kinds of these partnerships exist, such as collaborative partnerships with NGOs to control hospital admissions for the disabled, operational partnerships with companies and other governments, to share costs for many of the items discussed above; and contributory partnerships where governments may provide funding without necessarily controlling the use of such funds, as occurs when matching funds are provided for local or community-based environmental improvement projects (Kernaghan 1993; Daniels and Trebilcock 1996; Hodge and Greve 2007). Although popular in some countries and sectors in recent years as examples of ‘collaborative’ or ‘joined-up’ government, such schemes often stretch the resources of non-profit or volunteer organizations and can result in inefficient or incompetent goods and services delivery (Evans et al. 2005; Riccucci and Meyers 2008; Smismans 2008; Tsasis 2008). These kinds of cost and reliability issues increasingly have affected considerations of such tools and their inclusion in policy designs. Commissioning Commissioning is the most recently recognized collaborative technique in which, as Taylor and Migone (2017) put it: 174  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS Generally refers to a more strategic and dynamic approach to public service design and delivery with a clear focus on aligning resources to desired outcomes by injecting greater diversity and competition into the public service economy. By creating public service markets, the expertise and resources of the private and not-for-profit sectors can be harnessed and leveraged through new business and delivery models. Commissioning goes well beyond traditional procurement and out- sourcing agendas (Tanner 2007; Macmillan 2010; Martikke and Moxham 2010) with the aim of increasing service levels from both private and community partners by involving ‘third sector’ actors, such as NGOs in both service target formulation and design (‘co-design’) as well as service delivery (‘co-management’). The provision of stable funding and ongoing interactions with government funding agencies, it is argued, allows the capacity of third sector actors to be enhanced at the same time that co-design and co- management ensures that outcomes match the expectations of clients rather than agencies (Bovaird et al. 2014). Commissioning suffers from many capacity issues, however. Again, as Taylor and Migone (2017) also note: This means that the various organizations involved redefine their relations with the public administration on one level, with the clients/users of the services on another and finally with each other. A critical element in this relationship is the creation of high level trust relations among the stakeholders. This trust will affect the flow of information and help in the creation of a contestable environment where multiple parties can move away from hindrances to outcome-based approaches such as overly legalistic contracts, enable the devolution of meaningful autonomy to those who are ultimately accountable and responsible for the delivery of services. As they note in some cases the new relationship will modify established sets of interactions, such as when increased competitiveness of non-profit organizations results in decreased cooperation among the providers (Buckingham 2009; Mills, Meek and Gojkovic 2011). Contracting Contracting is probably the most well-known such activity and involves governments in reducing the level of direct state involvement in the provision of public services, including internal state services, through the replacement of civil servants and internal procurement processes with contractual arrangements with, usually, non-governmental organizations, primarily businesses (Ascher 1987; Vincent-Jones 2006). Various forms of contracting out exist, such as the PPPs or Public–Private Partnerships discussed above, 175 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN which have grown in popularity in areas involving large-scale infrastructure investments, whereby private firms absorb many investment costs and construct or rehabilitate infrastructure projects in water, highways, dams and other such areas, in exchange for long-term contracts to operate and profit from them (English and Skellern 2005; Vining et al. 2005). Other less rigorous forms of contracting out exist in areas such as healthcare, education and prisons, in which contracts may not involve large investments and profit sharing but rather simply remove major expenditure areas, such as penitentiaries, from government books and budgets (Thadani 2014; Roehrich et al. 2014). In the case of contracting, many supporters of the concept have noted significant limitations which can prevent contracting from functioning effectively. The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics, for example, was awarded to two economists who specialize in detailing the significant flaws and limits of contracting in areas such as prisons and healthcare (Hart 2017; Holmström and Milgrom 1991). Their concern is with the difficulty encountered by governments in enforcing quality control in such contracts when the nature of the service provided (i.e., its quality) is dependent on difficult to monitor interactions between, for example, patients and doctors or prisoners and prison guards. However, many other criticisms of such partnerships exist (Newman 2014) which highlight the need to carefully negotiate realistic contracts and the information asymmetries and knowledge gaps linked to them, as well as other issues such as difficulties encountered cancelling contracts or preventing contractees from simply reneging on their contracted obligations (Jensen 2017). Non-state and society-based tools: co-production and certification Efforts at policy reform have been omnipresent in many developed and developing countries over the past several decades and have often featured efforts to reduce the number of state-based tools and shift their activities toward either hybrid instruments or in some cases away from state-based organizations altogether. Many of these efforts have featured waves of management reforms and administrative re-structuring, including privatiza- tions, de-regulation and re-regulation and the like (Ramesh and Howlett 2006). ‘Anything but the government’, for example, was a popular sentiment in public policy reform for at least two decades (Christensen and Lægreid 2008). These efforts led to the articulation and promotion of several alternative modes of governing to more traditional ‘hierarchical’ or state-led ones. Many of these techniques are ‘market-based’ and constitute efforts to replace government activity with private sector actions (Savas 1987). However, others are focused less on zero-sum notions of state-market relations but rather involve more complex ideas about involving ‘civil society’ actors more directly in ‘collaborative’ policy-making, administration and implementation 176  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS (Brudney 1987; Salamon 1989). These kinds of activities come in many forms but two which have received a great deal of attention in recent years are ‘co-production’ and ‘certification’. Certification Certification is a term used to capture the activities of many non-state actors involved in areas such as forestry, fisheries, organic foods and other similar areas in which quality control and enforcement of standards is accomplished less directly than is the case with traditional command and control regulation (Cashore et al. 2004; Cutler et al. 1999; Gulbrandson 2010). In these cases, for a variety of reasons from cost to ideology, ‘certification’ of standards is undertaken by civil society organizations such as the Forestry Stewardship Council or the Marine Stewardship Council which lack the formal authority to compel business and industries to abide by regulatory standards but which utilize (often negative) publicity, boycotts and other actions to encourage compliance (Cashore 2002; Pérez-Ramírez 2012). These tools are often referred to as non-state market-based (NSMD) tools (Cashore 2002) since they do not rely upon state authority for their power and legitimacy to regulate private sector activity, but rather do so through market activities such as product labeling and producer certifications; affecting consumer behaviour and preferences for, for example, organic produce or sustainably harvested timber, fish or coffee, among others. While it is debatable if they could work without the ‘iron-fist’ of a threat of potential government regulation lurking in the background, it is clear that their impact and operation is through market mechanisms, affecting the supply and demand for products and services by affecting consumer views of their costs and benefits. Almost all products can be certified in this sense, although many do not need to be if consumers can themselves judge their quality and desirability. When information is lacking on, for example, the provenance or production techniques used in wine or food products such as olive oil, however, certification can enhance prices and encourage consumption, as occurs, for example, with the certification of ‘pre-owned’ (i.e., used) cars, electronic equipment, or art works. Such schemes rely heavily on the reputation of the certifier for honesty, accuracy and precision. In the case of certification, legitimacy and trust are key aspects of the certifying organizations and predictors of the success of voluntary certification arrangements (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Certification only functions effectively if trust exists between the public and certifiers and between the certifiers and certified companies and governments. Concerns about second-class regulation or corrupt standards can easily undermine years of work building up a certified brand. Similarly competing or dueling certifiers can also undermine existing schemes and lead to their ineffectiveness (Zelli et al. 2017). If their reputation is damaged, as has 177 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN happened from time to time with products such as wine or olives in which additives were added or cheaper products substituted for expected ones, such schemes can collapse and require either substantial reform or government takeover, revealing their dependence on government, ultimately, to serve as the guarantor of quality. Co-production Co-production is a short-hand term for a variety of governance arrangements which involve citizens in the production and delivery of public services. First set out by Elinor Ostrom (Parks et al. 1981) in her work on community policing in the 1960s, the term has been expanded and popularized by Victor Pestoff and Taco Brandsen in their many books and writings in the years since then (Brandsen and Pestoff 2006; Pestoff et al. 2012). The idea of co-production can be traced back to Ostrom’s (1973) study of the Chicago police force and is part of her theory of polycentric governance (Ostrom 1996). In the US, these ideas generated interest among public administration scholars in the 1970s and the 1980s (Parks et al. 1999; Brandsen and Pestoff 2006) and experienced a revival in the decades after the turn-of-the-century (Pestoff et al. 2012). The idea has since been picked up and studied by scholars around the world (e.g., Whitaker 1980; Parks et al. 1981; Ostrom 1996; Alford 2002; Brandsen and Pestoff 2006; Prentice 2006; Bovaird 2007; Pestoff and Brandsen 2009; Pestoff et al. 2012). Originally, co-production was narrowly defined as the ‘involvement of citizens, clients, consumers, volunteers and/or community organizations in producing public services as well as consuming or otherwise benefiting from them’ (Alford 1998: 128). Drawing on the experience of countries in Scandinavia in areas such as parent-teaching associations, Brandsen and Pestoff highlighted the extent to which many governance arrangements, even those thought to be purely hierarchical, such as public schooling, in fact combine aspects of hierarchical or state-based governance with elements of civil society mobilization (Pestoff 2006). In early studies of activities such as parent–teacher interactions, this involvement in co-production activity was typically voluntary, meaning it existed as a positive externality reducing production and delivery costs of public services. This made it very attractive to governments seeking cost reductions in public service delivery, especially ones favorable to notions of ‘social enterprise’ and enhanced community participation seen as an end- or good-in-itself (Parks et al. 1981; Salamon 1981 and 1987). Although co-production emerged as a concept that emphasized citizens’ engagement in policy design and delivery, its meaning has evolved in recent years to include both individuals (i.e., citizens and quasi-professionals) and organizations (citizen groups, associations and non-profit organizations) collaborating with government agencies (Alford 1998; Poocharoen and Ting 2015). In this sense, as public management studies have showed, 178  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS non-governmental organisations can act as effective facilitators of the participation by individual citizens while managerial reliance on trust and shared responsibility can discourage competitiveness and foster knowledge sharing among participating organisations (Pestoff and Brandsen 2010; Poocharoen and Ting 2015). Two aspects of the use of co-production as a policy tool are critical. First, at the macro-level, governance arrangements, actors and their interaction matter to co-production success, just as is the case with any policy tool, highlighting the need to combine policy and public management thinking in order to achieve service delivery success. Second, at the meso and micro level, some balancing of state and societal roles are required if co-production is to be sustained (Howlett 2000c, 2004a). Like all others, co-production also has a downside as a policy tool. In the case of co-production, it has long been recognized that expectations of free labor from co-producers may not materialize (Sorrentino 2015; Brudney and England 1983) and schemes to incentivize co-producers through payments are susceptible to all of the usual harms of public expenditures, including corruption, clientelism and goals displacement, among others (Howlett et al. 2017). Procedural organizational instruments Substantive tools, of course, are only one half of the uses toward which government and non-governmental organizational resources can be put. The second use is procedural. This involves the use of the organizational resources such as personnel, staffing, institutionalization and internal procedures to alter or affect policy processes in order to better achieve general government aims or specific programme activities. It bears repeating that these tools do not involve direct or indirect goods and service delivery mechanisms, as do their substantive counterparts, but rather affect procedural activities, generally efforts aimed at creating or restructuring policy community structure and/or behaviour through government leadership or ‘network management’ efforts. According to Agranoff and McGuire (1999: 21), this latter activity involves ‘network managers’ in ‘selecting appropriate actors and resources, shaping the operating context of the network and developing ways to cope with strategic and operational complexity’. The key dimensions or tasks involved in these kinds of network management activities include the identification of potentially compatible network actors, given the issue at hand; limiting potential conflicts that would hinder flexibility; recognizing legal requirements; balancing political objectives/conflicts with policy objectives; and assigning costs in implementation. That is, any policy process, policy managers need to work with the structure and operation of any network which already exists in the area; recognize potential new actors, limit the role of ineffective actors; balance 179 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN their time and resource commitments (money, technology, expertise, etc.); maintain the focus of the network in achieving goals; and build trust between actors/reduce possible conflicts (Mandell 1994; 2000; Agranoff 1998; Agranoff and McGuire 1999; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Wu et al. 2010). In order to achieve these ends, various kinds of organizational network management tools can be used. Several of the most common of these are set out below. Network management tools There are many different types of procedural tools linked with the use of specific government organizational resources which can affect various aspects of policy subsystem behaviour in policy processes. Interest in these tools has grown as many governments, as discussed in Chapter 1, have moved in the direction of more overt network management in some sectors in recent years. Staff or central (executive) agencies This is an old form of government organization, one in which a small, co- ordinating government agency, rather than one which directly delivers services to the public, is created to centralize agency initiatives in some area. Such ‘staff or ‘central’ agencies are generally created as a means to control other administrative agencies and are often linked very closely to the political executive (Bernieret al. 2005). In Westminster-style parliamentary systems, for example, older examples include Privy Council offices and treasury board secretariats, while newer ones include presidential, premier and prime minister’s offices, ministries of state, communication units, intergovernmental secretariats and various kinds of implementation units (Chenier 1985; Savoie 1999; Lindquist 2006). Although small (even most prime minister’s offices until recently had less than 100 personnel, most of whom handled correspondence) these are central co-ordinating units which exercise a great deal of control over other bureaucratic agencies through their links to the executive and to the budgetary and policy processes in government. They have seen much growth in recent years as political executives have sought to re-establish control over far flung administrative apparatuses (Campbell and Szablowski 1979; Rhodes and Weller 2001; Bevir et al. 2003; Bernier et al. 2005). Unlike line departments, these staff or central agencies are less, or non- hierarchical, flatter organizations typically staffed by political appointees, although others also employ permanent officials as well. Key officials are chiefs of staff, principle secretaries and specialized positions such as a clerk of the Privy Council or cabinet secretary. These agencies play a major and increasing role in designing and coordinating policies and policy-making, ensuring accountability to legislatures and controlling the budgets, activities 180  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS and plans of line departments and ministries. Their small cost is a major design consideration although this is often offset by their high visibility and high level of intrusiveness in the affairs of the government agencies they control or co-ordinate. Tribunals and other quasi-judicial bodies These are created by statute and perform many administrative functions, such as hearing appeals concerning licencing (e.g., of pesticides), certification (of personnel or programmemes) and permits (e.g., for disposal of effluents). Appointed by government, they usually represent, or purport to represent, some diversity of interests and expertise. Administrative hearings are conducted by tribunals in a quasi-judicial fashion, often in order to aid tribunals in their activities. These hearings are bound by rules of natural justice and procedures may also be dictated by statutory provisions. The decisions of tribunals are designed to be binding on the ministry in question but may be subject to various political, administrative and judicial appeals. Public hearings may be statutorily defined as a component of the administrative process. In the framework of administration, tribunals are directed toward securing compliance with administrative edicts and the achievement of identified standards of behaviour by both governmental and non-governmental actors. They may act as a mechanism with which to appeal administrative decisions, but in most cases, proceedings are held at the discretion of a decision-making authority and public hearings are often ‘after the fact’ public information sessions rather than being true consultative devices (Grima 1985; Stewart and Sinclair 2007). They can be precisely targeted and are an important component of legal modes of governance which are generally low cost and nearly invisible. However, in other forms of governance, like market or corporatist modes, their relatively high levels of intrusiveness can diminish their appeal in the eyes of policy designers. Creating or reorganizing government agencies Another fairly commonly used procedural organizational tool is to establish new government agencies or reform existing institutions in order to focus or re-focus state and societal activities on specific problems or issue areas (Goetz 2007; Durant 2008). Setting up a new government ministry for technology or a new research council to promote advanced technologies such as biotechnology, e-technologies, or other high technology sectors, for example, is a common action on the part of governments wanting to target a new area of activity for further development (Hood 2004; Lindquist 2006; van Thiel 2008). However, such actions are highly visible and, if repeated too often, quite costly. They are also quite intrusive and, as a result, are proposed and used, only infrequently. 181 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN Establishing analytical units Some governments have also set up internal think tanks or research institutes in order to provide policy advice to governments (Dobuzinskis et al. 2007; Marchildon 2007). Many government departments and agencies also have established specialized policy units designed to generate studies and reports which can influence or help to persuade both government officials and non- governmental actors of the merits of government plans. These agencies also often employ outside consultants to bring additional expertise and knowledge to policy formation, implementation and evaluation (Schwartz 1997; Perl 2002; Speers 2007). The knowledge they generate is used to inform internal policy-making processes and also to garner support for government positions from outside groups (Whiteman 1985 and 1995). New analytical units such as those policy shops created in many jurisdictions in the 1970s and 1980s in order to promote formal policy analysis and what is now referred to as ‘knowledge-based’ or ‘evidence- based’ policy-making are good examples of procedural organizational tools (Prince 1979; Prince and Chenier 1980; Chenier 1985; Hollander and Prince 1993; Lindquist 2006). These agencies can be precisely targeted and are generally low cost and have low visibility. However, their impact on policy- making can raise the ire of stakeholders and others in market, corporatist and network forms of governance, while other agencies in more legal modes also find them to be rivals. Such considerations have dampened enthusiasm for such units in many jurisdictions and sectors and reduced their appeal in policy designs in recent years. Establishing clientele units New administrative units in areas like urban affairs, science, technology and other areas flourished in the 1970s, as did new environmental units in many countries in the 1970s and 1980s; they were joined by units dealing with areas such as youth and small business in the 1990s; while in the post-1990 period other new units were developed in countries such as Canada and Australia to deal with aboriginal affairs and in many countries to promote multiculturalism, women’s and human rights. Human rights units dealing with minorities and the disabled are good examples of network mobilization and activation occasioned by government organizational (re)engineering (Malloy 1999, 2003; Teghtsoonian and Grace 2001; Teghtsoonian and Chappell 2008; Osborne et al. 2008). In general, these agencies can be precisely targeted in order to undertake the management functions set out in Table 8.3. They are very popular in network governance modes given their generally low cost, high visibility and high levels of automaticity. They are also popular in policy designs in legal governance given their relatively high levels of intrusiveness. 182  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS Table 8.3 Analytical agency network managerial tasks 1 Vertical and horizontal co-ordination 2 Overcome institutional blockages such as federalism and divisions of power 3 ‘Mainstreaming’ 4 Building commitments 5 Building legitimacy/developing visions and agreement on alternatives 6 Building coalitions 7 Structuring NGO activity, for example, lobbying activities Source: Adapted from Mandell, M. P. ‘A Revised Look at Management in Network Structures’. International Journal of Organizational Theory and Behaviour 3, nos.1/2 (2000): 185–210. Establishing government reviews, ad hoc task forces, commissions, inquiries and public hearings A sixth common procedural organizational tool used by governments is the establishment of a government review. These range from formal, mandated, periodic reviews of legislation and government activity by congressional or parliamentary committees and internal administrative bodies to ‘ad hoc’ processes such as task forces or inquiries designed to activate or mobilize network actors to support government initiatives (Gilmore and Krantz 1991; Bellehumeur 1997; Marchildon 2007; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2007, 2010; Rowe and McAllister 2010). Ad hoc task forces and inquiries are typically temporary bodies, much shorter term and often more issue related than institutionalized advisory committees. Ad hoc commissions are also created as instruments to consult a variety of interests with regard to economic and other areas of planning activity. These range from the presidential or royal commissions to those created at the departmental level. Presidential and royal commissions are the most formal and arm’s length and therefore, are the most difficult for governments to control and predict and therefore are used less often (Maxwell 1965; Doern 1967; Clokie and Robinson 1969; Wilson 1971; Chapman 1973; Flitner 1986; Salter 1990; Jenson 1994). Task forces have been created in many jurisdictions for planning, consultation, or conflict resolution concerning many specific issues. The task force may be invoked by a government when there is an area of conflict in which different groups have different interests and perspectives or where they require information in order to arrive at a decision or judgment (Marier 2009; Rowe and McAllister 2006). The subject matter of an ad hoc commission is typically urgent, of concern to more than one ministry and level of government and is the subject of some controversy (Resodihardjo 2006; Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2010). It is invoked at the discretion of government and is subject to political, economic 183 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN and social pressures. Indeed, the very initiation of the commission is likely to be the product of pressure by public groups. But, as Chapman (1973: 184) noted ‘Commissions may also play a significant political role and are often used as a method for postponing to an indefinite future decision on questions which appear to be embarrassing but not urgent’. Employment of these instruments for this purpose can result in serious legitimation problems for governments utilizing these policy tools, however, given their high level of visibility (Heinrichs 2005; Hendriks and Carson 2008; Stutz 2008; Marier 2009). Public participation through hearings is the most common type of public or network consultation in many sectors (Rowe and Frewer 2005). Hearings vary by degree of formalization and when they occur in a policy process. The most effective and influential are often flexible processes that are geared toward policy formulation such as project reviews or environmental assessments, but the most common are rigid processes that take place in or after the implementation stage of a process, such as a formal policy evaluation exercise (Dion 1973; Baetz and Tanguay 1998; Edelenbos and Klijn 2005). Public hearings are often mandated by legislation and most often occur after a decision has been taken – that is, purely as information and/or legitimation devices. Actual instances of open, truly empowered public hearing processes are very rare (Riedel 1972; Grima 1985; Torgerson 1986). Although sometimes used for other purposes such as information collection or blame attribution, these tools are often also used to overcome institutional ‘blockages’ and veto points such as those which are commonly found in federal–state or intergovernmental relations or in interdepartmental jurisdictional struggles (Ben-Gera 2007). They can also help bolster the capacity of groups to become more involved in the policy process if funding is extended to their participants, thereby promoting network governance (Robins 2008). They can be precisely targeted and are generally low cost. However, their high level of visibility can cause problems for governments and results in their less frequent appearance in policy designs than would otherwise be the case (Rowe and Frewer 2005). Legislative and executive oversight agencies This category of organizational tools also includes specialized agencies with very different policy-making functions, such as arm’s-length independent auditor-generals or access to information commissioners, which are units typically attached to legislatures, providing some oversight or control over executive branch activities (Campbell-Smith 2008). Many principle-agent problems can also be overcome through administrative procedures mandating oversight agency reviews of government actions (McCubbins and Lupia 1994; McCubbins et al. 1987), especially if these are linked to funding and budgetary issues (Hall 2008). These latter units are usually fairly small, inexpensive and highly visible and there has been a proliferation of such units in recent years 184  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS dealing with areas such as corruption, human rights and the promotion of ethnic and gender equality (Malloy 2003). They often represent an effort to promote legal governance in sectors typically configured in other modes. Conclusion: organizational tools – the forgotten fundamental in policy design studies Practical experience and ideological predilections have shaped the substance of much of the debate on governance, ranging from preferences for democracy, popular participation and collaboration to concerns about budget deficits and public sector inefficiencies in hierarchy-based systems. These have often driven preferences for the use of specific forms of governance from hierarchical ones to market or network-based ones. In recent years, however, for a variety of reasons a strong preference for shifts toward non-hierarchical forms of governance coupled with discontent with the results of market-based reforms in the 1970s–1990s has led to increasing attention being paid to different kinds of more civil-society or networked forms of governance, often referred to by the shorthand term ‘collaborative governance’ (Meuleman 2009). Lost in the identification of alternative forms of collaboration followed by governments around the world in a variety of sectors, however, has been the understanding of exactly what kind of governance arrangement is ‘collaborative’ and especially, under what conditions a preferred governance mode could actually address a particular sector’s problems. Given that all collaborative modes are vulnerable to specific kinds of failures due to these inherent vulnerabilities when governments reform or try to shift from one mode to another mode, policy-makers and advisors need to understand not only the nature of the problem they are trying to address and the skills and resources they have at their disposal to address it, but especially the innate features of each potential governance tool and the capabilities and competences each requires in order to operate at a high level of performance. How specific government capabilities and competences can be bolstered or augmented by collaborative arrangements when governance reforms are contemplated or implemented will vary from case to case depending on the distribution of available capacities. Organization-based implementation tools are generally costly and have high visibility. This is because they rely on government personnel funded by appropriations from general revenue raised through taxes or royalties, although some are also funded from market revenue stemming from the sale of goods or services. The use of tax-based funding makes the use of public servants expensive in the sense that governments tend to have a limited capacity to tax citizens to pay for services and incur opportunity costs no matter which activity they choose to adopt. It can also lead to governance failures, as the link between system outputs and inputs (expenditures and 185 THE ELEMENTS OF POLICY DESIGN revenues) is usually not clear, providing the opportunity for funds to be misallocated and effort misspent, all in the fishbowl environment of public government (Le Grand 1991). However, in some countries additional sources of revenue – such as those accruing from natural resources rents or ‘royalties’ – especially from oil and natural gas activities in many states in the contemporary era – can make the expenses involved in direct delivery appear less onerous for the public at large and in such circumstances such tools are much easier for governments to establish and maintain. It is also the case that some publicly delivered goods and services can be charged for – for example, through highway or bridge tolls, or publicly run electricity, fuel or food services, among many others – and can be priced like any other private good or service, helping to explain why many resource-rich countries have large public sectors and why many countries of all types have large public sectors and state-owned enterprises. Despite their real or perceived cost and in spite of many efforts to create or replace them with other forms of service and goods delivery, direct delivery of goods and services by public agencies remain ‘the forgotten fundamental’ of implementation instruments and policy designs. That is, much attention has been focused in the past three decades on the privatization of public goods and service production and distribution facilities and organizations and many efforts have been made to replace chargeable publicly provided goods (‘toll’ or ‘club’ goods such as toll bridges or publicly run recreational facilities) (Potoski and Prakash 2009) with privately supplied ones, largely in the effort to improve productivity or reduce the burden on taxpayers and governments of the wages of public servants involved in direct government provision (Dunleavy 1986; Ascher 1987; Cook and Kirpatrick 1988; Donahue 1989; Finley 1989; Cowan 1990; Hanke and Walters 1990; Heald 1990; Connolly and Stark 1992). However, these efforts have generally been less successful than often thought or alleged. Many new hybrid and non-state practices from contracting to partner- ships were also a key component of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) thinking in the 1980s and 1990s in many countries and are a key component of many contemporary efforts to promote ‘public-private partnerships’ and ‘collaborative government’ (Linder 1999). However, it is sometimes over- looked that ‘old-fashioned’ government agencies are still the most common and pervasive policy instrument in most sectors (Leman 1989; Aucoin 1997; Olsen 2005). Even in the ostensibly most private sector-oriented market governance systems (like the USA or, more recently, New Zealand), direct government goods and service production usually reaches close to 50 percent of gross national product (GNP) – that is, half of the dollar value of all goods and services produced in a country in one year – while direct civil service employment typically hovers in the area of 15–20 percent of the labor force but can also be much higher (Christensen and Pallesen 2008; Derlien 2008; Busemeyer 2009). The difference between the two figures having to do with the fact that many expenditures are composed of transfers to individuals 186  ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION TOOLS which can involve large sums but only a small administrative overhead – for example, unemployment insurance or old age security payments. This organizational activity is somewhat sectorally focused, due to large publicly provided expenditures on direct government activities such as defence and the military which cannot be delivered by the private sector and/or items such as health care, social security, education and pensions associated with the development of modern welfare states and the extension of legal rights to these services to members of the public. It also includes what statistical agencies refer to as the ‘MUSH’ sector – municipalities, universities, schools and hospitals – which in many countries are established as autonomous or semi-autonomous operating agencies of more senior levels of government. In many countries, MUSH sector agencies are among the largest employers since the activities they undertake – such as education and health care, as well as sewer, road and parks maintenance – are very labor intensive. Many of the recent innovations in organizational forms, from special operating agencies, to quangos, private–public partnerships and various kinds of hybrid organizations, have emerged largely in the effort to reduce the size of existing organizations and transform some sectoral activities from legal and corporatist to market modes of governance (Hardiman and Scott 2010). This is done in the name of improving the efficiency of service delivery, or in order to try to reduce the resource burden large public service delivery agencies place on budgets and taxpayer loads (Verhoest et al. 2007; O’Toole and Meier 2010). Either way, it has promoted the frequent appearance of experiments in alternate instruments and policy designs, although much less often their realization in practice. Significant areas of public expenditure and effort such as health care and education, for example, have generally proved immune to privatization efforts given their overall cost structures, mandatory service delivery nature and high levels of citizen support (Le Grand 2009). Most successes have come in either small-scale direct service privatizations or in single-industry company privatizations which have generally not altered earlier governance modes (Verhoest et al. 2010). Procedural organizational instruments have also been growing in frequency of appearance, but for different reasons: under efforts to shift sectoral activity undertaken through older legal forms of governance to more corporatist or network forms. Government reorganizations are increasingly common and these reorganizations and the new agencies often created alongside them often are intended to use government organizational resources to refocus government efforts and interactions with policy community/network members rather than directly improve the delivery of particular types of goods and services (Herranz 2007; Bache 2010). 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