Western Sahara Conflict PDF

Western Sahara Con ct: fi fi fi Crisis Management In this currently dormant, 43-year-old interstate-intra-state Africa con ct, with three principal adversaries—Morocco, Polisario (since 1976, also known as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) [SAHRAWI]), and in the early years, Mauritania—cri...

Western Sahara Con ct: fi fi fi Crisis Management In this currently dormant, 43-year-old interstate-intra-state Africa con ct, with three principal adversaries—Morocco, Polisario (since 1976, also known as the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) [SAHRAWI]), and in the early years, Mauritania—crisis management took the form of winding down the ten crises between Morocco and Polisario-SADR from 1975 to 1989. The evidence on crisis management is presented here. Moroccan March (October 16, 1975–April 14, 1976) The UN was active in attempted multilateral crisis management from the onset of this con ct. The Security Council, responding to Spain’s appeal, passed a resolution on October 22, 1975, calling for restraint and requesting the UN Secretary-General to initiate negotiations. They were conducted on October 26–28. The Security Council met twice in November. And mediation was attempted by the Secretary-General and his Representative in March–April 1976. The Arab League [formally, League of Arab States (LAS)] sent its SecretaryGeneral to the region, at the request of the Organization of African Union (OAU) [later, African Union (AU)]. All failed to manage the crisis because of the refusal of Morocco and Polisario to compromise. The crisis was managed bilaterally by two of the three principal adversaries, a Morocco-Mauritania jointly initiated succession agreement on April 14, 1976: Morocco annexed the northern twothirds of the territory of Western Sahara, and Mauritania, the other third of the territory ruled by Spain as a colony from 1885 to 1975. Nouakchott I (June 8, 1976): This one-day crisis was caused by a Polisario attack on Mauritania’s capital. It was managed by a successful Mauritanian counter-attack that forced an immediate Polisario withdrawal. Nouakchott II (July 3–late July 1977): Another Polisario attack on Mauritania’s capital, on July 3, led to an airlift of 600 Moroccan troops on July 18–19 to assist Mauritania. That intervention and the completion of the reorganization of Mauritania’s army by the end of July served to manage this crisis. French Hostages in Mauritania (October 25–December 23, 1977): Two French engineers, working on the Mauritania railway, were abducted by 164 M. BRECHER Polisario guerrillas on October 25, creating a crisis for France and Algeria. Crisis management was successful, via several techniques employed by crisis actors and the UN. One was a meeting of the UN General Assembly at France’s request, on October 31. Another was an offer of good offces by the UN Secretary-General. A third was the dispatch of additional French troops to Senegal at the beginning of November. Still another was talks between French Foreign Ministry offcials and Polisario leaders in Algiers from November 1 to 7. There was also a UN General Assembly resolution, adopted on November 9 calling upon UN members to respect Western Sahara’s right to self-determination, an important interest for Polisario and Algeria, rejected by Morocco if the options included Western Sahara’s independence. Ultimately, the crisis was managed by a violent act—the strafng of Polisario columns in Mauritania by French warplanes from 12–18 December, which led to the freeing of the two hostages on 23 December, ending this crisis. Tan Tan (January 28–March 1979): A crisis for Morocco was triggered on January 28, 1979 by a Polisario attack on the Moroccan garrison town and air force base, Tan Tan. Effective crisis management was achieved by reciprocal conciliatory acts by the two principal adversaries: Morocco’s Foreign Minister informed his Algeria counterpart that Morocco would not exercise its “right of pursuit” against Polisario, and Polisario forces suspended their attack, leading to a faded crisis in March. Goulimime-Tarfaya Road (June 1–25, 1979): Another crisis for Morocco was triggered on June 1 by a large-scale Polisario military attack within Morocco proper. King Hassan’s public announcement on 6 June of Morocco’s intention to exercise its “right of pursuit” in future attacks on Moroccan citizens and territory catalyzed a reciprocal crisis for Algeria. Both North African states appealed to the OAU and sought UN intervention by summoning ambassadors of the fve permanent Security Council members to their Foreign Ministry to publicize their future policy response to attacks on their territory. On June 15, Morocco requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council, which sought to manage the crisis by discussions at meetings from June 15 to 25, without passing a resolution. On the 25th, Morocco requested the indefnite suspension of the Security Council debate on this issue, on the grounds of a lowering of tensions, since Polisario fi fi fi fi fi fi attacks in June had ceased. 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 165 This atypical behavior by a principal crisis actor constituted negative crisis management in this case. Operation Iman (March 1–mid-May 1980): Another crisis for Morocco, within the Western Sahara con ct, was precipitated by a major victory of Polisario forces over a column of Moroccan troops that had been dispatched to clear an area in the north of Morocco, in the direction of Western Sahara. Both adversaries sought external support. Polisario did so by submitting documents to the UN, the OAU, and the NonAligned Movement, charging collusion between Morocco and South Africa, the former seeking weapons to enable Morocco to take possession of Western Sahara; there was no response. Similarly, Morocco criticized Algeria and Libya for allegedly providing Polisario with North Korean weapons, with no beneft. By mid-May 1980, the clashes related to Morocco’s Operation Iman had wound down, ending this crisis, without any attempt at crisis management by the UN or either of the two superpowers. Galtat Zemmour I (October 13–November 9, 1981): A further crisis for Morocco was triggered by a large Polisario attack on its garrison at Galtat Zemmour on October 13, 1981, with 3000 troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers. King Hassan sought support from the presidents of France and the USA, the UN, and the OAU, accusing Algeria and Libya of providing weapons to Polisario. There were no positive attempts at external crisis management. Rather, on November 5, Soviet President Brezhnev denied that the USSR had provided SAM missiles to Polisario, and the USA dispatched a military delegation to Morocco during the crisis, conveying symbolic support for a valued ally in North Africa. Negative crisis management took the form of unilateral Morocco acts—withdrawal from Galtat Zemmour and another military base on November 7 and 9, a severe defeat in this protracted con ct. Sand Wall (February 25–May 4, 1987): This complex crisis was set in motion by an outbreak of heavy fghting between Morocco and Polisario-SADR armed forces on February 25. In mid-April, Mauritania became a third crisis actor because the newly completed Moroccan sand wall, designed to prevent the entry of Polisario forces into a part of Western Sahara, posed a potential threat to Mauritanian territory and its economy, because of that sand wall’s proximity to a vital Mauritanian 166 M. BRECHER railway line—a few hundred meters—that transported iron ore, a vital Mauritanian raw material, to its commercial capital, for export. The crisis became more complex when the president of Algeria, the primary rival of Morocco for infuence primacy in northwest Africa, visited Mauritania and pledged support for its territorial integrity. In this crisis, too, an atypical form of crisis management was utilized—a summit meeting between the leaders of Algeria and Morocco at their border on 4 May 1987, arranged by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. Although a formal agreement was not reached, the meeting reduced the tension level between the two Maghreb regional powers suffciently to end the international crisis that day for all three crisis actors, Mauritania, Morocco, and Polisario. Galtat Zemmour II (October 7–late November 1989): Notwithstanding a peace-seeking atmosphere in the Western Sahara con ct during the summer of 1988, following the acceptance by Morocco and PolisarioSADR of a UN-OAU peace plan on August 30, 1988 [to be elaborated below in the analysis of attempts at con ct resolution], the absence of progress in negotiations during the next 13 months led Polisario to break the UN-OAUengineered truce: on October 7, 1989, it attacked Moroccan forces at Galtat Zemmour a second time. Two days later, Morocco threatened military intervention in Mauritania if Polisario attacks from that neighboring state continued. Crisis management efforts began on October 13, 1989, when the UN Secretary-General urged a resumption of meetings between King Hassan and Polisario leaders, to re-activate the UN-OAU peace plan. Moreover, on November 7, SADR, the formal quasi-state framework of Polisario, called for a dialogue with Morocco to achieve peace in Western Sahara. Nonetheless, a day later, Polisario launched another attack on Moroccan forces. However, despite further clashes on November 16, serious fghting ended in the second half of November, and the Galtat Zemmour II crisis faded. [In response to a request by the UN Secretary-General, Polisario-SADR agreed to a truce on February 21, 1990, to the end of March.] Successful management of the last recorded military-security crisis in the Western Sahara con ct—before serious attempts at con ct resolution began in 1991 (see below)—was achieved largely by the persistent efforts of the UN Secretary-General. In that context, the behavior of the principal fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi adversaries in this con ct, Morocco and PolisarioSADR, and of all other participants in the winding down of these crises did not extend to efforts at con ct resolution: they were confned to 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 167 the narrower realm and the more limited task of winding down specifc episodes of threats of violence, threats of escalation to more intense violence, and of the challenge to terminate violence in these limited time episodes, that is, the realm of crisis management. In the absence of successful con ct resolution (see below), the formal stage of con ct termination has not begun. Western Sahara: Failed Attempts at Con ct Resolution The quest for resolution of the Western Sahara con ct—by Spain, its colonial ruler since 1885, by the principal adversaries, Morocco and Polisario-SADR, and by international organizations, the UN, the OAU— began even before the recognized onset of this protracted con ct in October 1975, which was the result of half a dozen inter-related developments about the uncertain future status of Western Sahara. The frst was Spain’s proclamation of the internal autonomy of its then-existing colony in August 1974, as the frst step toward decolonization. The second was Morocco’s and Mauritania’s submission of their claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in early October. In September 1975, Spain announced that a referendum would be held among the residents of Western Sahara in the frst half of 1976, with the options of independence or continued association with Spain. Morocco and Mauritania responded on October 1, 1975 with an agreement to partition the disputed territory between them, the former declaring its rejection of the option of independence in a referendum, as it was to do repeatedly during the next four decades. On October 15, 1975, a UN mission reported sentiment in Western Sahara favoring independence. On October 16, in a crucial decision, the ICJ ruled that, despite some historical links and legal ties between the claimants and Western Sahara, neither Morocco nor Mauritania had a valid claim to sovereignty over the disputed territory. The same day, King Hassan declared that the “links” cited by the ICJ validated Morocco’s claim to sovereignty and that he would lead a march of 350,000 Moroccan civilians into Western Sahara to secure its integration into Morocco. The result was the Moroccan March crisis, summarized in the discussion of crisis management above, marking the onset of this protracted con ct and the failure of the frst attempt at con ct resolution of this con ct. The frst, abortive attempt to resolve this con ct peacefully occurred in July 1981. The OAU had been foating the idea of direct negotiations 168 M. BRECHER since 1979 as the only likely successful path to con ct resolution. Algeria, the patron of Polisario from the outset, concurred, as did the UN. Polisario consistently favored an UNsupervised referendum, including the option of independence. King Hassan of Morocco, as noted, consistently rejected any reference to an independence option. In July 1981, he offered to hold a referendum. However, when Polisario accepted, conditional on the inclusion of the independence option, Morocco withdrew the offer, ending this attempt at con ct resolution. A promising episode in the search for a mutually acceptable resolution formula occurred on August 30, 1988, when both Morocco and Polisario-SADR accepted a UN-OAU peace plan, which called for a ceasefre and a referendum on self-determination among the people of Western Sahara. However, there was no progress in the further negotiations, and, in early October 1989, as noted, Polisario broke the truce and launched its second attack on the Morocco base, Galtat Zemmour. UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar publicly urged a resumption of direct negotiations on October 13; and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the political entity that represented Polisario to the world, urged a dialogue with Morocco on November 7, 1989, but Polisario ignored these urgings from the UN and its own colleagues. However, following another request by the UN Secretary-General, Polisario relented and agreed to a truce on February 21, 1990 until the end of March. A breakthrough seemed likely with another UN-mediated ceasefre in 1991 and a rare substantive political agreement by the principal adversaries—the Settlement Plan, essentially the 1988 OAU plan, endorsed by Security Council Resolution 658, signed in 1991. It called for a ceasefre, which took effect on September 6, 1991, a self-determination referendum, set for 1992, an exchange of prisoners, the repatriation of refugees, and the total withdrawal of Morocco’s forces from Western Sahara. However, only the ceasefre was implemented—and has been sustained ever since, with few violations. All the other provisions of the Settlement Plan foundered over one contentious issue—who was to be included in fi fi fi fi the voter list? Polisario urged acceptance of the original voter list, based upon Spain’s 1974 census, 74,000 Sahrawi. Morocco insisted on expansion of the list to include Sahrawi residents who fed into Morocco in the 1950s. After 2 years of deadlocked negotiations over this issue, the UN accepted Morocco’s demands. The UN mission in Western Sahara, MINURSO, 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 169 received 244,643 applications for Sahrawi status. From 1994 to 2000, mostly after 1998, it interviewed 198,649 applicants for the right to participate in the referendum. There were 131,036 appeals by rejected applicants, almost all from Morocco-nominated candidates. UN Secretary-General Kof Annan, doubting that the referendum would ever be held, urged a resolution to seek an alternative. The Council accepted his advice and passed Resolution 1292 on February 29, 2000, calling for an “early, durable and agreed solution.” Almost certainly, this was done at the advice of the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative on the Western Sahara dispute, former US Secretary of State, James Baker III, in 1997. Polisario strongly opposed the abandonment of the Settlement Plan; Morocco was relieved because of its unqualifed rejection of any plan that included the independence option. There were two Baker plans for resolution of this protracted con ct, one in May 2001, the other in May 2003. Baker Plan I provided for a referendum, to be held 5 years after the beginning of the Plan’s implementation. The voter list was to include all persons who had been fulltime residents of Western Sahara for the preceding year. A dual system of authority was advocated by Baker for the 5-year transition period: responsibility for most internal affairs was to be granted to an assembly and executive elected by persons on the MINURSO list, including the 1-year residence proviso; all external issues and some internal affairs would be under the control of Morocco. Polisario opposed the 1-year residence criterion, viewing it as the gateway to a large number of persons from Morocco without primary allegiance to the SADR, and it was less than enthusiastic about the division of external and internal authority, and the 5-year waiting period for the referendum. Morocco seemed satisfed with Baker Plan I, which was widely perceived beyond the region, including the UN, as strongly biased in favor of Morocco. The Security Council, in its Resolution 1429, reaffrmed that any solution must “provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.” The result was a more balanced Baker Plan II. The time frame for the transition was made more fexible, 4–5 years. The voter list was made more rigid: it would comprise persons on the MINURSO voter list from December 30, 1999, that is, before the appeals from persons denied inclusion in the Settlement Plan-proposed voter list had been addressed; the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation list from October 31, 2000, and persons who had lived in Western Sahara since December 30, 1999. Moreover, the list of subjects granted to the 170 M. BRECHER Western Saharan autonomous government was enlarged. However, the reaction of the principal adversaries was negative. Morocco rejected the inclusion of the independence option in the proposed referendum, even though it had approved Baker Plan I, which included this option. Polisario initially rejected Baker Plan II in its entirety, noting the lack of guarantees of its control over the subjects to be placed under the jurisdiction of Western Sahara’s autonomous government, and the inclusion of Moroccan settlers in the referendum voting list. Later, on July 11, 2003, Spain’s UN Representative announced that Polisario accepted Baker Plan II. This induced an initiative by the USA, supported by the UK and Spain, to request the UN Security Council to endorse Baker Plan II; China, France, and Russia opposed an act injurious to Morocco. The Security Council did pass a resolution, strongly supporting, but not endorsing, this Plan; and the resolution was not a prelude to UN action—for another 4 years. The most recent attempt to resolve the Western Sahara protracted con ct occurred in 2007–2008, in response to UN pressure: Security Council Resolution 1754, passed in April 2007, called on the two principal adversaries “to enter direct negotiations without preconditions, in good faith.” Morocco and Polisario held four rounds of negotiations, the Manhasset negotiations, in June and August 2007, and January and March 2008, over Morocco’s persistent plan for regional autonomy and Polisario’s persistent commitment to independence for Western Sahara. There was no compromise and no progress, then or since. Western Sahara: Causes of Non-Resolution Viewed in terms of the Con ct Resolution Model set out above, three of the six postulated conditions of the high likelihood of con ct resolution were evident in the Western Sahara fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi con ct. Exhaustion Neither adversary has exhibited exhaustion. Both Sultan Hassan and his son, the current ruler of Morocco, Muhammad VI, have been steadfast in their opposition to independence for Western Sahara. This rejection extended to the inclusion of independence as a legitimate option for voters in a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara—even after the large expansion of the voter list to the beneft of Morocco—except in one instance of attempted mediation, Morocco’s formal acceptance of Baker Plan I (2001), which provided for this option 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 171 in a proposed referendum on Sahrawi self-determination after 4 or 5 years of Western Sahara’s autonomy. Moreover, that Morocco concession was nullifed by Hassan’s insistence on a large expansion of the voting list, far beyond the 74,000 Sahrawi identifed in the 1974 Spanish census of Western Africa’s population, in an attempt to ensure a majority against independence by Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara. Polisario-SADR leaders remained committed to the goal of independence for Western Sahara, though they displayed some fexibility on an expansion of the voter list for the referendum, indicating an optimism regarding a majority in favor of independence, even in a referendum with the inclusion of many Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara as voters. Furthermore, the steady growth of Polisario’s military capability and its successful ‘forward’ policy of attacks on Moroccan military bases, and Morocco’s construction of six massive sand walls in Western Sahara, in an effort to seal much of the disputed territory against invasion by Polisario guerillas, suggest the opposite of exhaustion by either adversary. Changes in the Balance of Capability were conducive to con ct resolution. In the early years of this con ct, the qualitative and quantitative superiority of Morocco’s armed forces and weapons was not successfully exploited by the kingdom in imposing a resolution of the con ct on Morocco’s terms. Later, when the balance between Morocco’s conventional forces and Polisario’s guerrilla forces moved toward relative equality, this condition contributed to a greater likelihood of con ct resolution but was not suffcient to ensure termination. Domestic Pressures There is virtually no available evidence of domestic pressures for compromise in the behavior of either principal adversary. The sole known exception was the urging by the SADR of a dialogue between its activist wing, Polisario, and Morocco, on November 7, 1989, when the fate of the OAU’s 1988 con ct resolution plan hung in the balance. As noted, Polisario ignored the pressure from its political colleagues and launched a fresh attack on a Moroccan base 1 day after the pressure by the SADR. External Pressures Among the six conditions that were postulated as likely to contribute to con ct resolution, the most visible in the Western Sahara con ct was foreign pressures, one of three favorable conditions of termination. These pressures were present in abundance since 1988: the OAU 172 M. BRECHER Plan, supported by the UN in 1988–1989; frequent UN-initiated ceasefre and truce agreements, notably in 1991; an active role by two UN Secretaries-General, Perez de Cuellar and Kof Annan, the former strongly supporting the OAU plan, the latter strongly supporting Baker Plan II; several UN Security Council resolutions calling for a fresh initiative in February 2000—urging the parties in 2000 to seek an alternative to the 1991 Settlement Plan that had reached an impasse, which led to Baker Plan I; a Security Council request for changes in the 2001 Baker Plan, leading to Baker Plan II in 2003; Security Council pressure for changes in Baker Plan II, which failed; and its 2007 resolution, calling for a renewal of direct negotiations between Morocco and Polisario, which were conducted in 2007–2008 but concluded with another impasse. There is no evidence of active external pressures on the principal adversaries in the Western Sahara con ct since 2008 to pursue other possible paths to defnitive con ct resolution. Reduction in Discordant Objective Both of the principal adversaries in the Western Sahara con ct have remained committed to their primary objective throughout this con ct—formal integration into Morocco or unqualifed control over the disputed territory, for Morocco, and independence, for Polisario-SADR: there has never been any reduction of discordance in their diametrically opposed core objective. Decline in Con ct-Sustaining Acts During the frst 15 years of this unresolved con ct (1975–1990), there was a steady fow of con ct-sustaining acts in Western Sahara, as evident in the 10 crises between Morocco and the Polisario-SADR, most of them characterized by moderate violence. However, since 1990, this protracted con ct has been dormant, with no military-security crises between the principal adversaries. This decline in hostile acts, fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fi especially for an extended period, did facilitate several attempts by the adversaries to achieve con ct resolution by thirdparty mediation efforts, e.g., the two Baker Plans in 2001 and 2003, and by direct negotiations in 2007–2008. As such, it supported the postulate that a decline in con ctsustaining acts would enhance the likelihood of con ct resolution. However, that goal remains elusive. In sum, three of the six conditions postulated in the Con ct Resolution Model as most likely to lead to resolution of interstate protracted con cts—Changes in the Balance of Capability, in the direction of relative equality in the military dimension of Capability, 6 SELECT CASE STUDY FINDINGS ON INTERSTATE CONFLICTS … 173 External Pressures on the adversaries, and a Decline in Con ctsustaining Acts—have been present in the Western Sahara con ct. However, thus far, the presence of three conditions acting as likely causes of con ct resolution, including one as highly visible and intense as foreign pressures from the late 1980s to 2008, have not been suffcient to attain that goal. Their presence, acting as Basic Causes, is no guarantee that con ct resolution will occur. The enduring obstacles to resolution of the Western Sahara con ct remain—rigidly incompatible objectives by the principal adversaries, especially Morocco, and the absence of collective exhaustion by both adversaries. Thus, this con ct remains unresolved. In the absence of con ct resolution, there is no evidence of Reconciliation between the political regimes and/or societies of Morocco and Polisario-SADR.