Weimar Germany Class Notes 2018 PDF

The Rise & Fall of the Weimar Republic Germany 1918 - 1933 Introduction AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC The story of t...

The Rise & Fall of the Weimar Republic Germany 1918 - 1933 Introduction AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC The story of the Weimar Republic is an intriguing one, not least because of its tragic ending. The Weimar Republic was born in the last days of World War I, as a mutiny among sailors and dock workers forced the abdication of the German monarch. The future of Germany was seized by idealists, who hoped to make their homeland the most liberal democratic nation in Europe. Instead, the Weimar Republic lasted barely 15 years, ending in 1934 with the emergence of totalitarian rule under Adolf Hitler. Even as the Weimar Republic was being dismantled by the Nazis, historians and political scientists began to seek answers about why democracy had failed in post-war Germany. They found no easy solutions. The Weimar Republic died a death of a thousand cuts, hamstrung and undermined by a myriad Social life during the of factors and forces. Golden Age of Weimar In November 1918, as the German war effort was collapsing and surrender to the Allies was imminent, the German navy mutinied and the Hohenzollern monarchy collapsed with scarcely a whimper. The government of Germany was assumed by civilian politicians, liberals and social democrats like Friedrich Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann and Gustav Noske. These men were political moderates – but they were also optimists who believed that Germany could make a successful transition to democratic republicanism. True to their liberal values, they crafted a constitution that gifted the German people probably the freest, most democratic political system of its time. Once commanded to follow and obey, Germans could now select their representatives, their government and their head of state. All were given legal equality, civil liberties and the right to vote, regardless of status, wealth, education or gender. But for all their idealism and good , the men of Weimar were confronted with enormous challenges and difficulties. They inherited a nation exhausted, depleted and starved by four years of total war. Even as they planned the future Germany was threatened by a struggle for power between the Spartacists (local communists who wanted revolution), the Freikorps (former soldiers of nationalist political views) and other nationalist counter- revolutionaries. Germany was also at the mercy of foreign powers, who wanted to punish it for the war and prevent future threats by decimating the German economy. The humiliating terms of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) ignited paranoid nationalists, who already clung to the belief that the 1918 surrender was unjustified, the work of socialists and Jewish Post-war Germany was conspirators. The men of Weimar crafted an ambitious model for republican government – burdened with an but uniting all or even most Germans behind this model proved almost impossible. enormous reparations debt The most pressing and visible problems of Weimar Germany were political instability, violence and economic suffering. These problems were particularly acute in the early 1920s. The government’s ability to respond was constrained by the new political system. The proportional voting system adopted by the new Republic was more democratic than any ever devised – but this proved detrimental to getting things done. Rather than encouraging decisive leadership and facilitating action, the Reichstag became a swamp of small parties, conflicting ideas and self-interest. The perils of the 1920s screamed for strong leadership but the Weimar system coughed up a series of weak coalition governments and no less than 15 different chancellors, most of them politically impotent. The Reichstag was divided, paralysed and unable to implement necessary policies or reforms; running the state proved a difficult, if not impossible task. Weimar Germany still speaks to us. Paintings by George Grosz and Max Beckmann are much in demand… Bertold Brecht and Kurt Weill are periodically revived in theatres around the world… Kitchen designs invoke the styles of the 1920s and the creative work of the Bauhaus… What film buff has not seen The Cabinet of Dr Caligari or Metropolis? Weimar Germany speaks to us in other ways as well, most often as a warning sign. This was a society battered by economic crisis and unrelenting political conflict. Weimar Germany conjures up fears of what can happen when there is simply no societal consensus on how to move forward, and every difference becomes a cause of existential political battles. It is a warning sign because we all know how it ended. Eric D. Weitz, historian Germany’s economic condition was even more perilous. Though hostilities formally ended in November 1918, Germans continued to suffer from an Allied food blockade that continued until mid-1919; the ensuing starvation contributed to the deaths of more than one million civilians. The Treaty of Versailles stripped Germany of her colonial possessions, important European territories and valuable industrial regions. In 1921 Berlin was handed a reparations bill totalling more than $US30 billion. This outrageous burden killed off any hope of post-war economic recovery. The already devastated German economy could not shoulder this burden and by 1922 Berlin was defaulting on its quarterly reparations payments to the Allies. France and Belgium responded by sending troops to occupy the industrial Ruhr regionand seize German material and produce. Germans responded by initiating a paralysing general strike and – as a last resort by the desperate Weimar government – frantically printing of banknotes, a move that triggered the devastating hyperinflation of 1923. Germany was eventually raised from this swamp by the pragmatism of Gustav Stresemann, the restoration of foreign relations and American financial assistance. Recognising that a bankrupt Germany would destabilise Europe and threaten its own economy, the United States intervened, negotiating with a more conciliatory Weimar government. The Dawes Plan of 1924 reconfigured reparations payments and facilitated billions of dollars worth of foreign loans to kick-start the German economy. This injection of capital allowed German industrial and manufacturing sectors to quickly recover, leading to rapid improvements in employment, wages and standards of living. The period 1924-29 is consequently referred to as the ‘Golden Age of Weimar‘. It was a time of progress of improved living standards, of Gustav Stresemann, bourgeois values and surges in art, film and popular culture. who steered Germany back into the European But the Golden Age was a temporary and artificial prosperity – something that Germans fold themselves seem to understand. In 1929 the nation was ravaged by the Great Depression, which drained Germany of foreign money and capital. Threatened with unemployment and starvation for the second time in a decade, German voters lost faith in the government and abandoned mainstream political parties. Instead, they turned to fringe groups who were committed to dismantling and destroying democracy. One of these groups, the NSDAP or National Socialist German Workers Party, had been small and insignificant during the 1920s. But as conditions in Germany deteriorated, the NSDAP’s electoral fortunes improved – and the ranting speeches of its leader, Adolf Hitler, began to strike a chord with the German people. By 1932, the path to a Hitler-led government – and to the death of Weimar republicanism – was being cleared.  Reform & Revolution IMPERIAL GERMANY The story of Weimar Germany must begin with its predecessor, Imperial Germany. The German nation was comparatively young, formed in 1871 by the unification of more than two-dozen German-speaking kingdoms and duchies. The men who instigated and led this process were nationalist politicians and generals, some of whom had been urging German unification for many years. Advocates of unification were convinced that a German superstate – with its sizeable territory, natural resources, industrial might and military power – could come to dominate Europe. The most powerful of the German-speaking states was Prussia, the Hohenzollern kingdom fixated with war and militarism. The Prussians were renowned for their military prowess: their army contained an elite officer corps leading A depiction of the ranks of highly trained soldiers. Prussia had Europe’s most skilled army of the 1800s, a fact unification of Germany borne out by stunning victories over Austria (1866) and France (1871). These victories paved in 1871 the way for German unification, as the smaller German-speaking kingdoms began to see the political and economic advantages of falling in behind the powerful Prussian monarchy. The creation of the German Empire was finalised in Versailles, near Paris, in 1871. From 1871 to 1890, imperial Germany was guided by the firm but watchful hand of Count Otto von Bismarck. No single figure contributed more to shaping imperial and modern Germany – and indeed to pre-war Europe. Though Bismarck was a nationalist at heart, he was also a realist who wanted to protect the new German state by preventing another major European war. His greatest fear was a two-front war with both France and Russia, Germany’s strongest military rivals in mainland Europe. Bismarck adopted foreign policy methods later known as Realpolitik. Its most visible feature was the ‘Iron Count’s’ web of treaties, which furthered German interests without risking war. Bismarck focus on maintaining the balance of power in Europe meant he had little interest in expanding or developing Germany’s foreign colonies, which remained small and under-utilised in comparison to those of Britain and France. At home, Bismarck’s domestic leadership was a study in ‘benevolent authoritarianism’. Both Germany and its parent state, Prussia, had the trappings of a democratic state: constitutions, elected legislatures and multiple political parties. But limited voting rights and restrictive electoral systems ensured that conservative elites maintained their grip on power. Prussian Junkers (land-owning aristocrats) dominated the imperial government and the upper ranks of the military. Bismarck and his ministers also adopted policies to unify Germany beyond the political arena. German was sanctioned as the empire’s official language; its use became compulsory in civil administration, business and schools. Bismarck’s notorious Kulturkampf of the 1870s attempted to curtail the social influence of the Catholic Church. The government imposed a national system of law that overrode or replaced legal systems from pre-unification. “At the highest level of government, the existence of a German nation-state seemed to guarantee continuity. The nation was legitimate and sacred, so that the citizen would give his life for it, declared Hans Delbruck in 1913. The political institutions of the empire had quickly acquired a national aura which, by the 1890s at the latest, seemed self-evident to all parties. The political institutions of the Reich gained legitimacy on their own account, as organs of a ‘constitutional’ system of government. [But] it is true that obstacles to democratisation remained.” Mark Hewitson, historian Economically, imperial Germany progressed and developed at great pace under Bismarck’s government. Using British industrial growth as a model, German companies invested heavily in factory-building, engineering, motors, chemical research and electrification. The government assisted trade and growth by commissioning large-scale railway and infrastructure projects. German capitalism boomed, generating increases in urban growth, employment and standards of living. During the 1880s, Bismarck introduced unemployment relief, old age pensions and protections for sick or injured workers. These reforms, the first implementation of a modern welfare system, were popular with German workers. They slowed emigration to the US and Britain and won the loyalty of ordinary Germans. The Bismarckian state which, while authoritarian and largely undemocratic, appeared genuinely interested in protecting its people. All this would change with the ascension of a new emperor. When 29-year-old Wilhelm II became kaiser in 1888, it marked the beginning of the end for Bismarck, European Realpolitik and paternalist domestic policies. The brash young kaiser was uninterested in maintaining European stability – his ambition was to expand the German Empire abroad, by increasing German naval power and adopting a more forceful international approach. By 1890, Bismarck had been forced into retirement. The old chancellor’s cautious but pragmatic Realpolitik was replaced by the Kaiser’s Weltpolitik (‘world politics’) which was aimed at securing Germany’s “place in the sun”. The German Empire embarked on two decades of political and military transformation, leading to the largest war in human history. 1. The German state was formed in 1871 by the unification of numerous German-speaking European kingdoms. 2. Imperial Germany was dominated by Prussian militarism and the nationalist but pragmatic Bismarck. 3. The imperial government was a limited democracy, with most power residing with conservative elites. 4. In 1871-90 Germany underwent rapid industrial and economic growth, coupled with progressive social reforms. 5. The era of Bismarck ended with the rise of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who pressured the old chancellor into retirement and set about expanding Germany’s naval and imperial power. WORLD WAR I AND GERMANY Germany’s involvement in the outbreak of World War I is well documented. In the years prior to 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II and his government adopted policies, both foreign and domestic, that contributed to rising tensions in Europe. German militarism, nationalism and imperialism – along with the kaiser’s personal and diplomatic belligerence – all fuelled the mood for war. Every sinew of German socio-politics screamed for war. German industrialists had equipped the kaiser’s army with a host of deadly new weapons: artillery, machine guns, chemical weapons and flame throwers. German admirals had taken receipt of new battleships, cruisers and submarines. German strategists had drawn up ambitious war plans that promised the conquest of France in just a few weeks. Nationalists talked of expanded Food stores in Berlin, German imperial control and influence in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. German looted during the newspapers thundered against the bully-boy tactics being used by the ‘old empires’ of shortages of 1918 Britain and France. In another time, the national leader might have sought to defuse this belligerent mood. But Germany’s kaiser, Wilhelm II, was unworldly, ambitious, impatient and eager for confrontation. Where other heads of state might have said little or nothing, Wilhelm talked tough about German interests and intentions. In June 1914 Franz Ferdinand, an Austrian archduke who was heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was gunned down by Serbian radicals in the streets of Sarajevo. Rather than encouraging a measured and careful response, the German kaiser gave the Austrians tacit approval for an invasion of Serbia. If Serbia’s allies, the Russians, became involved, the kaiser promised to intervene. One historian later called this ‘the kaiser’s blank cheque’ for war – though it should be noted that Wilhelm’s position was supported by most German civilian politicians, even moderates in the Social Democratic Party (SPD). When war did erupt in late July 1914, Germany initiated its famous Schlieffen Plan: a long-standing strategy to invade France via neutral Belgium, thus avoiding heavy fortifications along the French border. The plan succeeded for a time before stalling then ultimately failing. Instead of marching into France and capturing Paris within a month, Germany’s invading forces became bogged down in northern France. Defensive warfare replaced rapid advances, leading to the evolution of the Western Front – a 450-mile long network of trenches, minefields and barbed wire, running from the Swiss border to the North Sea. In the east, German forces were hurriedly mobilised to withstand a Russian advance into East Prussia. They succeeded in pushing the Russians out of German territory, though this too led to the development of another front. The war raged for almost four more years. By 1915 all major combatants, Germany included, had implemented a condition of ‘total war’. German military might, backed by the nation’s industrial sector, held its own on both the Western and Eastern Front. But within Germany, the civilian population became affected by isolation, blockades and shortages. Germany was not only sandwiched between enemy combatants – the Russians in the east, the British and French in the west – her coastline was also blockaded. In late 1914 the Allies took the unusual step of deeming food to be “contraband”; shipments of food headed to German ports were therefore subject to naval attack. The blockade halted German trade and imports, forcing the nation to rely on its domestic production of food. But this had also fallen significantly, due to agricultural labour being conscripted into the army or redeployed to essential wartime industries. “Effective power law with the so-called ‘silent dictatorship’ of the Supreme Army Command. As a result, several opportunities for a negotiated peace were turned down; the Auxiliary Service Law was introduced to militarise society; and Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced the unfortunate Bethmann-Hollweg out of office… In the final year of the war, the power of the Supreme Army Command reached new heights. The constitutional authority of the Emperor and the Chancellor was effectively sidelined. Even the Reichstag, having expressed its desire for peace, proved unable or unwilling to exert any further political pressure.” Geoff Layton, historian By mid-1916, the German people were feeling the strain of two long years of total war. The civilian government, led by the ineffectual chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, had no real answers. Meat, potatoes and dairy products became difficult to obtain, while bread was often replaced by unpleasant ersatz substitutes, made from bran or wheat husks. As both the chancellor and Reichstag dithered, the General Staff began to dictate domestic policy. This period, known by some historians as the ‘Silent Dictatorship’, saw Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff assume control of civilian as well as military matters. The junta seized control of the press and propaganda, imposed food rationing and ordered compulsory labour for all civilian males of adult age. In August 1916 they introduced the Hindenburg Program, which sought to double munitions production by relocating agricultural workers into factories. Ludendorff also forced through the reintroduction of unrestricted submarine warfare against Allied ships – a policy that helped trigger the United States’ entry into the war. In July 1917 the Reichstag, hitherto supportive of the war effort, responded to the deteriorating situation by passing a resolution calling for peace. This forced the resignation of chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg; he was replaced by unimportant men who served as puppets for Hindenburg and Ludendorff. By the winter of 1917-18, availability of food in German cities was critically low. The British naval blockade of German ports had halted food imports, while Hindenburg’s reallocation of agricultural labour had a detrimental effect on domestic production. Germany may well have sought a peace deal in mid- to late-1917, if not for two revolutions in Russia. The collapse of the Russian tsarist government in February 1917, followed in October by the overthrow of its liberal successor, the Provisional Government, spelled the end of Russia’s involvement in World War I. The Eastern Front war was now drawing to a close, allowing Germany to concentrate its forces on the Western Front. To the German High Command, the war that in early 1917 seemed as if it might drag on forever, now appeared winnable. 1. Germany and its kaiser played a leading role in the tensions that contributed to the outbreak of World War I. 2. Germany’s initial strategy involved an attack on France through neutral Belgium, drawing Britain into the war. 3. By 1916, with the war in stalemate, Germany found itself surrounded, blockaded and short of food and supplies. 4. Control of Germany passed to its military leaders, who redeployed labour to the war effort, with dire effects. 5. Revolutions in Russia in 1917 ended the war on the Eastern Front and reignited the German war effort. GERMANY IN LATE 1918 Germany in late 1918 was a nation on the brink of defeat. With hindsight, the capitulation of Germany seems to have been inevitable: she was surrounded, starved, outnumbered by her enemies and failed by her allies. Yet only a year before, most Germans – and indeed some neutral observers – had been anticipating a German victory in Europe. Two revolutions in Russia in 1917 spelled the end of Russia’s involvement in World War I; by late 1917 the Russians had begun negotiations for a peace treaty. With the war on the Eastern Front over, Germany had more than a million men she could relocate to the Western Front. The United States’ April 1917 declaration of war loomed as a potential obstacle – but the German General Staff believed a final major offensive could break through weakened Allied defences German revolutionaries before any significant influx of American troops. take to the streets in 1918 In November 1917 Hindenburg authorised plans for this major offensive, which was scheduled for the following spring. Its objective was the penetration of the Western Front at two of its weaker points. One army would advance to threaten Paris and force the exhausted French to sign an armistice; another larger force would outflank British forces, push them north and hem them in along the North Sea coast, forcing a surrender. To prepare for this offensive, German commanders ordered every Western Front division to release its most capable battle-hardened soldiers. These men were organised into battalions of shock troops called Sturmmann (‘stormtroopers’); they were given training in how to infiltrate enemy lines through pre-determined weak points. The Spring Offensive, as this last German assault became known, began in March 1918. The advances of the Sturmmann were initially successful and led to incursions and rapid advances into enemy-held territory. In some areas the Western Front was pushed back 60 kilometres, its most significant movement since 1914. German troops advanced close enough to Paris to allow them to shell the city with a massive artillery piece. But much like the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, the advances of the Spring Offensive proved impossible to sustain. The stormtroopers moved more quickly than their supply lines, so constantly found themselves short of food, ammunition and reinforcements. The use of Germany’s best troops meant they suffered a higher rate of casualties, while the quality of rear defensive positions was weakened. The attack gained considerable ground but at a significant cost, and by July 1918 it had lost its momentum. Almost one million German soldiers died in a six month period. Hindenburg’s advisors suggested 1.1 million new soldiers would be needed to sustain the war into 1919 – but that conscription would barely fill one-quarter of this quota. The harvests of 1917 produced 12 million tons, down from 21 million tons before the war. A disproportionate share of food was set aside for the military: civilians received 33 per cent of the grain, though they comprised 67 per cent of the population. Germans received pitifully low amounts of meat (12 per cent of pre-war levels) fish (five per cent) and eggs (13 per cent). Farmers, able to grow their own produce, were coping – but conditions in German cities had become drastic. There were reports of malnourished factory workers collapsing at their machinery, of widespread outbreaks of dysentery, and of gangs of skin-and-bones children begging on major streets. Civilian deaths in 1918 increased by more than 200,000 from the previous year, mainly from starvation. Ten per cent of hospital patients, including many women in childbirth, were reported to have died from malnutrition. “The army, it could be argued, had fought a heroic battle and would therefore maintain its prestige in the eyes of the nation, after the war. The fleet, on the other hand, had spent most of the war bottled up in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. It was expected that the country would never wish to rebuild a navy that had proved so useless. A spectacular battle in the North Sea was supposed to rectify this. When ordering that thousands of sailors be sent to their deaths in a final do-or- die battle, the admiralty had its own future in mind. But the sailors wanted to go home rather than die as heroes in the North Sea… The ‘revolution from below’ had broken out.” Volker Berghahn, historian By September 1918, the situation had become drastic. The arrival of American and British Commonwealth troops on the Western Front had forced German forces there to retreat; the Spring Offensive had failed utterly and an invasion of Germany itself now seemed likely. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who had effectively acted as military dictators since 1916, concluded that the war could not be won; Ludendorff sank into a severe depression and was later sacked by the kaiser. On September 29th the German High Command, encouraged by US president Woodrow Wilson’s conciliatory fourteen-point peace plan, sought an armistice from the Allies; this was subsequently refused. Rumours that Berlin was seeking an armistice reached the ranks of the military, which sparked dissent, disorder and rebellion. Commanded to engage the Allied fleet in one last battle, German sailors at Kiel mutinied; they refused the orders, occupied their base and drafted a list of demands – including an end to the war and the introduction of civilian government. The Kiel mutiny marked the death knell for the German imperial government. It now seemed that the kaiser and his generals were unable to control the military. In addition, left-wing political groups, comprised of communists and SPD members, were forming across Germany. These groups control in provinces and cities across Germany, including Bavaria, Hanover, Brunswick and Frankfurt. The German Revolution, as it became known, had begun. 1. In late 1917, German leaders still held high hopes of achieving victory in the war. 2. A Spring Offensive in 1918 was initially successful but eventually stalled due to inadequate personnel and supplies. 3. Germany’s civilian population suffered severe food shortages, caused by an Allied blockade and domestic policies. 4. With an invasion of Germany imminent, its leaders began seeking an armistice, triggering civilian and political unrest. 5. The Kiel mutiny of October 1918 instigated the German Revolution, which ended both the war and the reign of the kaiser.  THE KIEL MUTINY The Kiel mutiny unfolded in late 1918, as the war drew to a close, German sailors mutinied and the kaiser’s government collapsed. By September 1918 German generals were resigned to the fact they could not win the war. In October 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II named Prince Max von Baden, a minor royal of liberal political views, as chancellor. This appointment, it was hoped, would facilitate armistice negotiations with the Allies – preferably with the Americans, who were viewed as being more reasonable. The day after his appointment, von Baden contacted US president Woodrow Wilson with peace overtures. Wilson was at first prepared to broker a ceasefire – until when London and Paris became aware of his actions, they intervened. On October 23rd, von Baden was told that no armistice would be possible Workers and sailors without an unconditional German surrender. rally in Kiel in 1918 But as von Baden was working to negotiate a ceasefire, German U-boats were continuing their aggression against Allied mercantile shipping. Three Allied vessels were attacked in October 1918, a factor in the Allied refusal to accept any terms other than total surrender. Its U-boat campaign aside, the German admiralty had failed; the kaiser’s fleet had spent most of the war in port at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, boxed in by Allied ships and mines. The war’s only major European naval engagement, the Battle of Jutland (1916), did not affect the British Royal Navy’s dominance. With the war drawing to an end, the German admiralty gave orders to instigate one last major North Sea battle. Two German destroyer groups would break from harbour and attack the French and British coastline, enticing Allied ships to respond. Once in the open, they would be engaged by German U-boats and the rest of the kaiser’s fleet. It would be, according to Admiral Reinhard Scheer, “an honourable battle, even if it became a death struggle”. “Whether the sailors and soldiers identified with any socialist party is difficult to ascertain with any certainty. They raised the usual red flags, but those flags were just as likely to stand for a bourgeois republic and improved living conditions as for the creation of a vaguely conceived socialist order. What is clear is that the Kiel mutiny was the opening volley in a period of intense social unrest in central Europe that was to continue well into 1923, during which the fate of Europe itself seem to hang in the balance.” Murray Bookchin, historian But Operation Plan 19, as it was called, was little more than a suicide mission. The German navy, for all its ingenuity and U-boat strength, was hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned by the Allied fleet, which included British, British Commonwealth, French and American ships. German officers seemed to acknowledge, accept and even relish this fact; on receiving their orders, some were observed drinking joyful toasts to the imminent battle and the “death of the Kaiserliche Marine”. Enlisted men responded much differently. Few were interested in sacrificing their lives in the freezing waters of the North Sea, so that the admiralty could restore some of its lost prestige. On October 29th, sailors aboard two major ships at Kiel failed to return from shore leave. Within a few hours, the revolt had spread to several battleships and cruisers. The growing mutiny forced the admiralty to abandon Operation Plan 19. Instead, they attempted to divide and disperse the mutineers by relocating the troubled ships to other German ports. Within 48 hours, the mutiny had spread to other ports and naval stations. On November 3rd the sailors at Kiel, joined by workers from the nearby city, detained their officers and took control of their ships. They also formed elected councils, not dissimilar to the ‘workers’ soviets’ that had precipitated the Russian Revolution the previous year. Echoing the fourteen-point peace plan of US president Woodrow Wilson, the Kiel mutineers drafted their list of demands, the first six points being: 1. The release of all inmates and political prisoners. 2. Complete freedom of speech and the press. 3. The abolition of mail censorship. 4. Appropriate treatment of crews by superiors. 5. No punishment for comrades returning to ships and barracks. 6. No launching of the fleet under any circumstances.” As the days passed, the Kiel mutiny spread across Germany and adopted a distinctly political tone. What had begun as a revolt against orders had transformed into a fully fledged political revolution. Workers’ councils in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, Munich and other cities demanded political reforms: the abdication of the kaiser and of local princes, the end of aristocratic privilege, the empowerment of the Reichstag and the implementation of socialist policies. On November 7th the Bavarian king, Ludwig III, fled to Austria in fear of his life; he later surrendered his power to a republican government. But Ludwig would not be the last nor the most significant German royal to be dethroned. Two days later, the kaiser himself was forced from power, beginning Germany’s transition to republican government. 1. In late October 1918, German ships were given orders to instigate one last major battle in the North Sea. 2. The news of this apparent suicide mission instigated a rebellion amongst the enlisted ranks stationed in Kiel. 3. On the day the attack was to commence, Kiel sailors refused to return to their ships, sparking a mutiny. 4. The Kiel mutiny quickly grew, drawing in workers and spreading to naval bases and cities around Germany. 5. The political councils formed as a result of Kiel demanded republican and socialist reform, leading to the abdication of several German royals, including Kaiser Wilhelm II. EBERT AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC Friedrich Ebert was the first president of the Weimar Republic. Born into a working class family in 1871, Ebert was trained in leathercraft and made his early living as a saddler. In his twenties Ebert became involved in trade unions, then the left-wing of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). He became a member of the Reichstag in 1912 and leader of the SPD the following year. By then, Ebert’s own political views had mellowed – he remained sympathetic to unions and working class interests, but was no radical, preferring the civility and certainty of political reform to upheaval, disorder and revolution. “Without democracy there is no freedom”, Ebert said in 1918. “Violence, no matter who is using it, is reactionary.” Friedrich Ebert During World War I, Ebert had invited criticism and controversy by supporting the war effort and the Kaiser’s wartime government – a position that caused a major split in the ranks of his party. In 1915 a radical anti-war faction of the SPD broke away to form the Spartakusbund; this group would form the basis of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In October 1918, with the war going poorly and public morale collapsing, government was assumed by a coalition let by liberal politician Prince Max von Baden. Ebert and Philipp Scheidermann became ministers, the first time that members of the SPD had been appointed to the national cabinet. When Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated on November 9th, von Baden resigned and Ebert became the first president of the new German republic. As this was transpiring, KPD members were themselves preparing to fill the power vacuum left by the departing kaiser. As the communists organised and rallied their members for an attempt at socialist revolution, Ebert stood firm. His preference was for Germany to evolve into a social democracy, not have socialism thrust upon it by force. (He would later say of the revolution: “I do not want it, I even hate it like sin!”) On November 9th, the day he was proclaimed as president, Ebert made a handshake agreement with Wilhelm Groener, a member of the Reichswehr high command. Recognising the weakness of his government, Ebert sought the backing of the army. Groener reluctantly agreed, though he insisted that the new civilian government agree not to disband, reform or interfere with the Reichswehr. The Ebert- Groener pact, as it became known, proved critical factor to the government’s survival. The brigades of Freikorps (returned soldiers) who would defeat the Spartacist revolt acted with the endorsement of Reichswehr officers. “In the early years of Weimar, Ebert acted as primus inter pares, or ‘big brother’, to coalition governments. Ebert possessed mixed values. On the one hand, Ebert had strong paternal tendencies… On the other hand, he was a self- proclaimed democrat and considered himself to be above petty factional disputes. Ebert was the idol of the revolutionary factions. He was a strong silent type who despised the hierarchical nature of the old order… To his followers within the Weimar coalition, he was often regarded as a saint… But to his enemies, Ebert was the devil incarnate, referred to by a collection of derogatory titles (the ‘November Criminal’, the ‘Traitor to Germany’, the ‘Back Stabber’).” Matthew C. Wells, historian To the radical left-wing of German politics, Ebert was damned as a traitor, a man who aligned himself with monarchists, militarists and reactionaries so he could cling to power. But to the moderates and liberals, he seemed the best candidate to oversee Germany’s transition to democracy. In December 1918, Ebert convened elections for a new National Assembly; these elections were held on January 19th the following year. The new assembly met for the first time on February 6th in Weimar, due to the continuing unrest in Berlin. This first meeting place lent its name to the new government: the Weimar Republic. Ebert was confirmed as president, a position he held until his death in 1925. But in his six years in office, Ebert would be confronted by political opposition and economic crises which threatened the fledgling republic. The communists, defeated in 1919 but not annihilated, continued to threaten revolution; so too did radical elements in the Reichswehr and Freikorps. Though the political right wing had helped save Ebert and the republic in 1919, their ranks contained few supporters of republicanism or liberal democracy. The 1920s would be littered with dozens of right-wing political and paramilitary groups, all dreaming of the return of the monarchy, Bismarckian authority, restored military power and revived German prestige. The Weimar Republic managed to survived these internal challenges – but it came at considerable cost. The political divisions in Germany made government a long, arduous and sometimes impossible task. Extremists conducted a campaign of intimidation and political violence; several high profile Weimar politicians were assassinated. Ebert and other leaders were subject to stinging political and personal criticism. In 1924 a conservative judge declared the president to be guilty of “high treason” because he had supported striking munitions workers during the war. All this took a toll on Ebert’s health, and he died in office shortly after (February 1925). Ebert’s successor as president was Paul von Hindenburg, the Junker aristocrat who had been Germany’s military commander and de facto dictator for much of World War I. Hindenburg’s election was indicative of growing conservatism among German voters. Historians are divided about Ebert’s legacy and the effectiveness of his presidency. His fellow socialists criticise Ebert as a traitor for ignoring fundamental left-wing values and relying on the dangerous Freikorps to impose control. To those on the political right wing, Ebert was a ‘November criminal’, a signatory to the hated Treaty of Versailles and a weak politician infected by socialist and democratic values. More realistically, Ebert’s challenge of uniting Germany – at a time when it was so bitterly divided and stricken by economic problems – was perhaps an impossible one. 1. Ebert was leader of the SPD and a former socialist whose views had moderated over time. 2. He became a minister in October 1918 and then first president of the German republic in November. 3. His support for the war led to radical breakaway factions of the SPD, such as the Communist Party. 4. Ebert opposed the communist revolution in January 1919 and called in Freikorps units to quash it. 5. This made him controversial, despised by radicals on both the left- and right-wing of German politics. THE GERMAN REVOLUTION The German Revolution forced the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II, ending the Hohenzollern monarchy and plunging Germany into weeks of political struggle and uncertainty. The revolution began with the Kiel mutiny of late October, which within a week had spread to numerous towns and military bases across Germany. Revolutionary councils, in a similar mould to Russian soviets, formed across the nation and began demanding political reform. Most of these demands were socialist or social-democratic: an end the war, the abolition of the monarchy, greater democratic representation and economic equality. On November 7th the revolution claimed its first royal scalp, when Bavarian king Ludwig III fled across the border to Austria. On the same day in Berlin, radical revolutionaries demanded the Karl Liebknecht abdication and trial of the kaiser. addresses supporters in late 1918 Faced with dwindling support in his entourage and from his military advisors, Wilhelm equivocated about whether or not to abdicate. Even if he was forced to give up the imperial throne, the deluded kaiser believed he could remain as king of Prussia. The decision was made for him on November 9th, when chancellor Max von Baden announced the kaiser’s abdication, without his endorsement. Wilhelm sought advice from defence minister Wilhelm Groener and military chief Paul von Hindenburg, who told the isolated kaiser that the military could no longer support him. The following day, November 10th, he boarded a train and fled to the Netherlands, where he would remain until his death in 1941. Allied demands for his extradition and trial were ignored by the Dutch monarch. Back in Germany, the abdication of the kaiser was swiftly followed by chancellor’s resignation. During von Baden’s month in office he had been unable to broker a peace deal, so he departed, handing the reins of power to Friedrich Ebert. This was a move of questionable legality; the kaiser’s departure meant there was no head of state to appoint a new chancellor, while von Baden did not seek advice from his cabinet or endorsement from the Reichstag. Still, Ebert was probably the logical successor. He was the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Germany’s largest political party, and had been a member of von Baden’s cabinet. Ebert’s appointment was probably designed to appease the left- wing groups that had taken control of German cities, and thus take the sails out of the revolution. As the ink was drying on Ebert’s signature, his SPD colleague Philipp Scheidemann made a proclamation – without Ebert’s permission or knowledge – declaring the beginning of the new German republic: These enemies of the people are finished forever. The Kaiser has abdicated. He and his friends have disappeared; the people have won over all of them, in every field. Prince Max von Baden has handed over the office of Reich chancellor to representative Ebert. Our friend will form a new government consisting of workers of all socialist parties. This new government may not be interrupted in their work, to preserve peace and to care for work and bread. Workers and soldiers, be aware of the historic importance of this day: exorbitant things have happened. Great and incalculable tasks are waiting for us. Everything for the people. Everything by the people. Nothin may happen to the dishonor of the Labor Movement. Be united, faithful and conscientious. The old and rotten, the monarchy has collapsed. The new may live. Long live the German Republic! But Ebert and Scheidemann were not the only contenders for power. Two hours after Scheidemann’s declaration, Karl Liebknecht – a far more radical socialist – issued his own proclamation, announcing the birth of the Free Socialist Republic of Germany. Liebknecht belonged to the Spartakusbund (or ‘Spartacus League’, often simply referred to as ‘Spartacists’). The Spartacists began as the radical left-wing of the SPD, before splitting from the party in 1915 over its support for World War I. They were led by Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, socialist activists and writers of Jewish descent who drew their inspiration from the 1917 Russian Revolution. They had no regard for Ebert and the moderate wing of the SPD, damning them as instruments of the bourgeoisie: pro-war, conservative and counter-revolutionary. The Spartacist program instead favoured an armed revolution to seize power and begin the formation of a German Soviet state. In the last weeks of 1918, as Ebert’s government was finalising the armistice and organising elections for a national assembly, the Spartacists were preparing for an armed uprising. The revolution reignited on Christmas Eve 1918, when unpaid sailors occupied a government building, where they were joined by Spartacist members and armed guards. The Reichswehr was sent to arrest the protestors but withdrew after a brief stand off. On December 30th, the Spartacists held a congress in Berlin where they re-formed as the KPD (Communist Party of Germany). There, Rosa Luxemburg told those assembled: The 9th of November was a weak, half-hearted, half-conscious and chaotic attempt to overthrow the existing public power and to put an end to class rule. What now must be done is that all the forces of the proletariat should be concentrated in an attack on the very foundations of capitalist society. There, at the base, where the individual employer confronts his wage slaves… there, step by step, we must seize the means of power from the rulers and take them into our own hands… And we must not forget that the revolution is able to do its work with extraordinary speed. On January 5th 1919, the Spartacists attempted an armed takeover of Berlin. Hundreds of industrial workers and unionists were given arms and ordered to seize critical points around the capital. Telegraph offices, police stations, government buildings and the SPD headquarters were all occupied; the revolutionaries also barricaded or manned checkpoints on key roads and intersections. Liebknecht and Luxemburg also called for a general strike, hoping to trigger a workers’ revolution against the Ebert government. The Spartacist uprising was initially successful, chiefly because it had caught unprepared Berlin police and government units by surprise. In the first few days of the revolution, the Spartacists won most of their street fights and managed to paralyse significant areas of Berlin. But while Liebknecht had orchestrated the capture of Berlin and drummed up support from a half-million Berliners, he had no clear plan for seizing power. With the uprising at its peak, the Spartacist leader and his 53-person revolutionary committee dithered; rather than demanding the overthrow of the government, Liebknecht withdrew to an office to write newspaper articles. Meanwhile, the SPD government was coddling together political and military support to resist the revolution. Ebert recalled defence minister Gustav Noske and sent him to Berlin. Noske began organising the mobilisation of around 3,000 Freikorps, or volunteer militias comprised of former soldiers. The men of the Freikorps were, for the most part, fiercely nationalist and anti-communist. More importantly, they were trained, battle hardened troops who were still equipped with weapons of war: rifles and machine guns, artillery, even flamethrowers. By January 10th, these Freikorps were massing and preparing in the suburbs of western Berlin. They advanced into the city the following morning and engaged in a series of bloody street battles with the rebels, who for the most part were hopelessly outgunned. “During the first months of 1919, we lived under siege in Berlin and under the terror of martial law. Any political activity was prohibited for us communists. We had no journal and no legal means to confront the lies and defamations of the government and the press. Any expression of public discontent, anything that did not suit the authorities, was blamed on the Spartacists… We had to organise illegally and under the most dangerous conditions. But the death of our party leaders could not keep us from following their vision. The KPD had to be consolidated.” Karl Retzlaw, Spartacist It took less than three days for the Freikorps to crush the Spartacist uprising and capture Berlin. Its leaders, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, were chased through the suburbs for another two days, before being betrayed and captured. Luxemburg was beaten to death with rifle butts, her body hurled into Berlin’s largest canal. Liebknecht was shot in the head and dumped at a local morgue. These summary executions invited criticism from Ebert and his ministers, who promised that those responsible would be held accountable. But evidence obtained later suggests that Noske and probably Ebert authorised their murder. Two Freikorpsmembers were tried but given light sentences. Around 100 other Spartacists and 17 Freikorps were killed during the battle for Berlin. Though the Spartacists had been defeated, the German Revolution had not yet breathed its last. In April 1919 communists attempted another revolution, this time in southern Germany. Taking advantage of local disorder, they seized control of the local government in Bavaria and declared an independent Soviet republic. They named Munich as their capital, appointed ministers and established contact with Bolshevik rulers in Russia. But the Bavarian communists were only marginally more successful than their Spartacist cousins. In May, after just four weeks in power, the Bavarian Soviet was attacked by 9,000 Reichswehr soldiers and 30,000 members of the Freikorps. After days of bitter fighting, control of Bavaria was returned to the Weimar government. More than 1,700 communists were killed in the battle for Munich or subsequently executed by the Freikorps. 1. The Kiel mutiny inspired revolutionary councils to appear in German cities, leading to the abdication of the kaiser. 2. In November 1918 both Scheidemann (SPD) and Liebknecht (Spartacists) proclaimed a new national government. 3. The Spartacists formed a communist party then launched an attempt to take over Berlin and the Weimar government. 4. The revolution was defeated after the SPD mobilised several units of Freikorps, who crushed the revolution in days. 5. In May 1919 another socialist revolutionary government, this time in Bavaria, was also suppressed by the Freikorps. THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION The design and implementation of the Weimar constitution began in late 1918, with the abdication of the kaiser and the collapse of the monarchy. The new government, headed by chancellor Friedrich Ebert and the SPD, believed Germany should become a democratic republic. This reflected their own political values. Though Ebert and his cohort were nominally socialist, in reality the SPD was dominated by moderates who favoured progress and transition, rather than radical change. They also believed that transforming Germany into a representative democracy was important for the peace process. If the victorious Allies could see genuine and lasting signs of political reform, Germany would fare better in the ensuing peace treaty. Members of Scheidemann’s 1919 In November 1918, Ebert and his cabinet decided to convene elections for a national cabinet. assembly, which would be tasked with formulating a new political system. These elections were held on January 19th 1919, just a few days after the suppression of the Spartacist uprising in Berlin. The SPD returned the most votes of any single party, its representatives filling 38 percent of seats in the assembly. Other parties with significant representation included the Catholic Centre Party (20 per cent), the liberal German Democratic Party (18 per cent) and the right-wing German National People’s Party (11 per cent). With Berlin still at risk of renewed violence, the National Assembly met in the town of Weimar on February 6th. Within a week, the assembly had formed a coalition government comprised of the SPD and other left-wing or liberal parties. Ebert was elected as the Weimar Republic’s first president, with Philipp Scheidemann as his chancellor. The Weimar National Assembly convened for almost 18 months. During this time it completed two major tasks: the drafting of the Weimar constitution and the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Neither of these proved easy or popularly accepted by the German people. The broad framework for a constitution came from Hugo Preuss, a little known lawyer who was rushed into Scheidemann’s cabinet as minister for the interior. Preuss suggested a political system modelled on that of the United States. It would be federalist but must ensure the continuation of a single German nation; it would be democratic but would contain strong executive powers for dealing with emergencies. Above all, the new constitution would be liberal: it would protect the rights and liberties of the individual. The draft constitution was prepared in the spring of 1919. Some of its key features included: There were flaws. The constitution had no stirring preamble that laid out a vision of a democratic Germany. The proportional voting system contributed mightily to the political fragmentation of Weimar. The electoral law that followed [the constitution] authorised representation in the Reichstag for every party with 60,000 votes. The powers granted to the president in emergency situations were too extensive. But the flaws in the constitution had less to do with the political system it established than with the fact that German society was so fragmented. A less divided society, and one with a more expansive commitment to democratic principles, could have made it work. Eric D. Weitz, historian Federalism. The Weimar constitution recognised the seventeen German states and allowed for their continuation. Law- making power would be shared between the federal Reichstag and state Landtags. The national government would have exclusive power in areas of foreign relations, defence, currency and some other areas. The Reichstag. The German parliament (Reichstag) was elected every four years, or sooner if the need arose. All German citizens aged 20 or more would be permitted to vote in Reichstagelections, regardless of status, property or gender. All elections would utilise a secret ballot. Reichstag deputies would be chosen using a system of proportional representation, meaning that parties would receive seats in proportion to their total votes. The chancellor. The broad equivalent of a prime minister, the chancellor was responsible leading the government of the day. The chancellor was chosen, appointed and dismissed by the president, and led a cabinet of ministers. The chancellor did not have to be a sitting member of the Reichstag, though to pass legislation they required support within the Reichstag. The president. The German president would be elected by the people to serve a seven-year term. The president was head of state and was not part of the Reichstag. In principle, the president was not intended to exercise much power or personal prerogatives, other than the appointment of the chancellor and ministers. However Article 48 of the constitution granted the president considerable powers in the event of an ’emergency’, allowing him to rule by decree and override the Reichstag, to suspend civil rights and to deploy the military. This constitution made the Weimar Republic one of the most democratic and liberal political systems of its time. It provided for universal suffrage, contained a limited bill of rights and offered a proportional method of electing the Reichstag. But this was to prove a risky experiment, giving such an expansive liberal democracy to a nation and a people who had previously known only rigid monarchic and aristocratic rule. This view is echoed by historian Klaus Fischer, who suggested it was “doubtful whether such a democratic constitution could work in the hands of a people that was neither psychologically nor historically prepared for self government”. Even Hugo Preuss, the man who drafted much of the constitution, wondered aloud whether such a progressive system should be given to a people who “resisted it with every sinew of its body.” 1. German politicians met in the city of Weimar to form a new government, since street-fighting made Berlin unsafe. 2. They drafted, accepted, debated and approved one of the most liberal constitutions in the world at that point. 3. It replaced the king with a president, who was not part of the Reichstag, though he could exercise emergency powers. 4. The Reichstag was retained as a parliamentary body, though its electoral system allowed minor parties to win seats. 5. The nation was effectively ruled by a chancellor, who operated within the Reichstag but was appointed by the president. Political Instability THE KAPP PUTSCH In March 1920 a group of army officers, Freikorps and right wing nationalists attempted to overthrow and replace the SPD government. The Kapp putsch, as it became known, exposed the political divisions of the young republic and the weakness of the new government. The putsch was eventually thwarted by public opposition, divisions within the military and misjudgements by the men who initiated it. But it highlighted the fact that German militarism was far from dead. The Reichswehr (army) remained an important and potentially influential political force. The government, in contrast, seemed weak and at risk of being easily overthrown. Reichswehr soldiers Even before the November 1918 armistice, Germany was fast becoming a hotbed for during the Kapp putsch, reactionary groups and political extremism. The defeat suppressed the nation’s faith in and 1920 affection for monarchism and ultra-nationalism – but only in some circles. These ideas instead took refuge in a number of political parties and fringe groups, who clung to theories like the Dolchstosslegende (‘stab-in-the-back legend’), a baseless conspiracy theory that Germany had lost the war because of treacherous elements in the civilian government. The Dolchstosslegende allowed the military to dodge criticism or accountability for Germany’s defeat in 1918. Military commanders like generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, who were both public exponents of the Dolchstosselegende, both avoided personal responsibility – in fact both continued to be feted as heroes. As a consequence, the ‘stab in the back’ legend contributed to the survival of German militarism and military prestige, at a time when they should have been scrutinised, criticised and dismantled. As the army was demobilised and its soldiers discharged, they returned to civilian life – only to find Germany exhausted by the war, starved by the Allied food blockade and disrupted by attempted communist revolutions. Civilian jobs were hard to come by so many ex-soldiers found themselves out of work. Many joined the ranks of the Freikorps, the paramilitary brigades and militias formed to suppress the Spartacist revolution in early 1919. By the middle of the year Freikorps membership was estimated at around 300,000 men. Its numbers grew in response to the Treaty of Versailles, which limited the size of the regular army to just 100,000. Military commanders and some in the government encouraged and supported the Freikorps. General Hans von Seeckt, for instance, considered the Freikorps to be an important reserve army, illegal under Versailles but essential for the defence of Germany (in some quarters the Freikorps was known as the ‘Black Reichswehr‘). “In Berlin sat Kapp, surrounded by a few thousand soldiers as though he were sitting on a powder barrel in the midst of a hostile population of millions. The attitude of the army to the Kapp Putsch was not uniform. While a number of officers and certain regiments openly declared themselves in favour of Kapp, others remained neutral; and others again were loyal to the constitutional government… The army was so disintegrated by the Putsch that it would not have been capable of any united action against the government.” A History of the German Republic As the Freikorps grew steadily through 1919, the relationship between Ebert’s government and the regular Reichswehrdeteriorated. The civilian government urged reductions in the Reichswehr and structural reforms to its officer corps and recruitment – the first to comply with the terms of Versailles, the second to ensure the Reichswehr’s compliance and its loyalty to the republic. Reichswehr generals resisted these changes. They opposed significant reductions, claiming they would put Germany at risk from external threats or an internal revolution. The Reichswehr officer class was also panicked by rumours, totally unfounded, that the government was about to consent to the extradition of some officers to Allied countries, to stand trial for war crimes. Some officers began to talk of a military putsch to remove the SPD government. One of their number was Walther von Luttwitz, commander-in- chief of Reichswehr divisions in Germany’s north, one of the country’s highest ranked officers. The trigger for this putsch came in March 1920, when the government removed von Luttwitz from several posts for urging defiance of the Versailles treaty. The outraged von Luttwitz connected with the Marinebrigade Ehrhardt, a 6,000- strong Freikorps unit located in Berlin which itself had been resisting government orders to disband. On March 13th the Ehrhardt brigade took up critical points around Berlin and took control of the capital, forcing Weimar ministers to flee to Stuttgart. To disguise the military nature of the putsch, von Luttwitz recruited Wolfgang Kapp, a minor public servant, as its nominal leader. For two days Kapp attempted to justify the putsch and whip up support. He issued a grandiose public statement, attempting to legitimise the putsch by claiming that Germany was in danger of a communist invasion: Militant Bolshevism threatens us with devastation and violation from the east. Is this government capable of fending it off? How will we avoid external and internal collapse? Only by re-establishing the authority of a strong state. What concept should lead us in this endeavour? Nothing reactionary, instead a further free development of the German state, restoration of order, and the sanctity of law. Duty and conscience are to reign again in German lands. German honor and honesty are to be restored. But the response to Kapp’s rallying cry was a combination of military indifference and public opposition. The Reichswehr found itself so divided by the putsch that it did almost nothing. The army defied government orders to move against the rebellious Freikorps in Berlin – but it also ignored Kapp’s call to arms against the government. SPD ministers called on the German people to resist the “counter-revolution” and protect the republic by implementing a general strike. This move was broadly supported by the USPD, other left wing and centrist parties and trade unions, which provided organisation for these strikes. The response was rapid. Within two days, Berlin had no trains, no water, no gas and no electricity. The aspiring Kapp government was confined to the capital and paralysed by what one socialist called the “terrible silent power” of the general strike. Five days after it had begun, Kapp and von Luttwitz’s attempted coup fizzled and both men fled Berlin. Ironically, the Kapp putsch almost triggered the communist revolution it was fomented to prevent. The mobilisation of KPD, USPD and radical union groups in response to the putsch led to several communist insurrections around Germany. Red Army units took control of several cities in the Ruhr region, only to be suppressed by the Freikorps and Reichswehr within three weeks. The SPD government was exposed as tenuous, fragile and easy prey for revolutionaries. The Reichswehr, which should have come to the government’s assistance, had failed to do so and left the government to its own fate. The Freikorps, a group the civilian government had encouraged and relied on January 1919, seemed to have turned against it. The realities of power and influence in the republic had been painfully exposed. 1. In 1919 the Weimar government attempted to reform and downsize the military, in line with the Versailles treaty. 2. This was resisted by some in the Reichswehr who claimed Germany would be exposed to communist aggression. 3. In March 1920 a large Freikorps brigade seized Berlin and a public servant, Kapp, claimed the chancellorship. 4. The attempted putsch failed within days, after the Reichswehr ignored its calls and a general strike paralysed Berlin. 5. The Kapp putsch exposed the critical weakness of the Weimar government and highlighted both the Reichswehr and Freikorps as forces of considerable political influence.  THE WEIMAR REICHSTAG The Weimar Reichstag (the German parliament or assembly) was notorious for its division, instability and ineffectiveness. Historians often cite these conditions as a contributing factor to rising extremism in Weimar Germany. Under Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germans had grown accustomed to strong, stable and decisive government. But the Weimar political system was fundamentally democratic, designed to allow a multiplicity of voices and points- of-view. This arrangement may have worked if there had been a national consensus about Germany’s political and economic future. But the Weimar period was one of extreme political divisions – and the troubled Weimar Reichstag reflected and exacerbated these divisions, rather than serving to close them. A ballot paper from Weimar Reichstag A significant problem in the Reichstag was its plethora of divergent political parties. The elections. electoral law adopted in April 1920 implemented a proportional system of voting. Parties were awarded Reichstag seats not by winning an absolute majority but by meeting a quota, based on the proportion of votes cast. This system encouraged the participation of a wide variety of parties, including fringe or regional groups. It was quite common for ballot papers to contain more than 30 parties and candidates (the ballot paper on this page, from the 1928 election, contains 21.) But the system not only encouraged smaller parties to participate, it made it easier for them to win seats. In most Reichstag elections around 60,000 votes, sometimes less, was enough to win a seat. In 1920 the tiny Bavarian Farmers’ League party won just over 200,000 votes – almost all from Bavaria – yet this was enough to net it four seats in the national Reichstag. As a consequence, the Reichstag was clogged with more than a dozen different parties from across the political spectrum. In the 1920 election, 11 different parties won Reichstag seats. By 1930, there were 14 different parties represented on the floor of the Reichstag. Proportional voting and the abundance of parties made it impossible for one or even two parties to ‘dominate’ the Reichstag. No party ever held a majority of seats in its own right; the closest any party came was the NSDAP in July 1932 when it won 37 per cent of seats. This political disunity in the Reichstag required the chancellor and his cabinet to organise coalitions (voting blocs containing different parties) in order to get legislation passed. The lack of majority government in the Reichstag made executive government difficult and, at times, almost impossible. The nominal head of government was the chancellor, who led a cabinet of ministers. All were appointed by the president, who in most cases selected a cabinet he believed could steer laws through the Reichstag. Passing legislation was necessary to govern effectively – but in the Weimar Reichstag it was difficult at the best of times, and impossible at the worst. Coalitions were continually being formed, consolidated, tested by legislation, undermined by , fragmented, patched up and dissolved, only for the process to begin again. Parties found it difficult to set aside their ideological differences for any length of time. The Reichstag was often paralysed by division and unable or unwilling to pass legislation. “The Reichstag – that is, an assembly of close to 500 representatives of the most highly opposed political tendencies, split into six large and constant party groupings and a number of smaller and fluctuating groups. This Reichstag produces at best a simple majority, and then usually only at the cost of painful coalition and compromise. [It functions] only if the majority coalition, brought together to form a government, is able to convince a large enough part of the opposition of the necessity of legislation.” Richard Thoma, writer These difficulties meant that most Weimar chancellors found it impossible to get much done. When it seemed that a chancellor could no longer work with the Reichstag to pass legislation, there were two options: the chancellor could ask the president to pass emergency decrees, or the president could replace him. Between 1919 and 1933 the German chancellor was replaced fifteen times, each change also requiring a new cabinet of ministers. The Reichstag itself was hardly more stable: there were nine general elections held during the same fourteen-year period. The period after 1924, with its less frequent changes of government and improved economic conditions, is often described as the ‘Golden Age of Weimar’. To the outsider it seemed a brief period of stabilisation. Political violence and extremist rhetoric eased; domestic government functioned better than it had done in the early 1920s; and Stresemann led reforms in foreign policy and international relations. But these outcomes disguised a lack of fundamental stability and cohesion, particularly within the Reichstag. Forming and maintaining coalition governments continued to be enormously difficult. The lack of trust between the SPD and centrist and right-wing parties remained the most significant obstacle to enduring coalitions. 1. The Weimar government is known for political instability and frequent changes of chancellor and ministers. 2. This is in part due to the voting system, that encouraged the presence of many parties in the Reichstag. 3. With no party ever winning an absolute majority, government was based on coalitions of several parties. 4. Chancellors were chosen based on their ability to steer laws through the Reichstag, a most difficult task. 5. Changes in government eased after 1924, though the appearance of greater stability was superficial. THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SPD) At the time of Weimar, the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, or SPD) was Germany’s oldest formally constituted political party. It began in 1875, primarily as a Marxist organisation, formed from the union of two workers’ parties. The newly formed SPD was able to quickly tap into a large supporter base of industrial workers and unionists. In the 1877 Reichstagelections SPD candidates received more than 500,000 votes and won 13 seats. Though these figures meant the SPD was a minor party and unable to influence policy, its rapid growth and increasing popularity alarmed the imperial government. In 1878 the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, promulgated the first of several Anti-Socialist Laws. Two failed attempts to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm I in 1878 An SPD campaign provided Bismarck with a pretext; he blamed the SPD and its Marxist ideology for fuelling poster, 1920 revolution and terrorism. For much of the 1880s, the SPD was targeted by numerous police raids, individual arrests, surveillance and hostile government propaganda. Several militant unions were also targeted or broken up. Though the SPD continued to operate during this period, the party found it difficult to attract members or potential candidates for the Reichstag. The SPD survived Bismarck’s suppression, however, and by the late 1880s it was again on the rise, fuelled by a revived union movement. By the 1890s the SPD – or at least its more public candidates – had adopted a more moderate political position, urging social democratic reforms rather than socialist revolution. The SPD embraced a number of causes beyond the conditions of workers, calling for improved rights for women and condemning the killing of natives by German colonials in Africa. The numbers of SPD candidates grew steadily during the 1890s and 1900s. By 1912, the SPD had more than a million members and was the largest party in the Reichstag. It began to assert influence on public policy, achieving improvements in education and healthcare, as well as better rights and conditions for industrial workers. The party also began to work with, rather than against Kaiser Wilhelm II’s government. In 1913 the SPD supported increased taxes that were necessary to fund the kaiser’s program of military expansion. As is often the case in large political parties, the SPD’s main weakness was its ideological diversity. With more than a million members, the SPD housed a range of views from across the political spectrum. The party’s leadership were moderate socialists, committed to progressive reforms through democratic processes. August Bebel (the SPD’s founder and first leader) and Friedrich Ebert (Bebel’s successor) believed that socialist improvements could be won through parliamentary means, rather than violence or revolution.The SPD also had a right wing, comprised of liberals and centrists, and a radical left wing, containing hardline socialists and Marxists. The divisions within the party were generally manageable, though at times of controversy or crisis the SPD’s factions tended to turn on each other. “During the period of the Weimar Republic the SPD remained essentially a party of the working class, and made very little inroad into the middle classes. Part of the problem for the SPD at this stage was that it was limited by attachments to its trade union movement and was concerned that any attempt at a more concerted appeal to the middle classes would lose it votes to the communists.” Stephen Lee, historian These internal divisions were fatally exposed in 1914, when the kaiser’s government declared war on France and Britain. The SPD’s radical left wing had taken a strong stance against the war, arguing that it was an unnecessary, aggressive and imperialistic action. These activists condemned both the war and the moderates in their own party, both inside and out of the Reichstag. Some were arrested and imprisoned by the government; by early 1917 most others had been expelled from the SPD. Some, like Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, instigated the Spartacist League that led an unsuccessful revolution in January 1919. Those who survived the German Revolution reformed as the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). The KPD loathed SPD leaders for their reliance on the right wing Freikorps and their alleged involvement in the murders of Luxemburg and Liebknecht. As a consequence the SPD and KPD never reconciled; they remained bitter rivals during the 1920s and early 1930s. Until the rise of the NSDAP (Nazi) Party in the early 1930s, the SPD was the largest political party of the Weimar era. It was the only party to win more than 100 seats at every Reichstag election, beginning with 165 seats in January 1919. Despite its internal divisions and Germany’s political and economic woes, the SPD remained a strong and consistent supporter of the Weimar Republic and its constitution. The SPD was a major partner in all but one of the Weimar coalitions; SPD deputies sat in all Weimar era cabinets, three of them as chancellor (Philipp Scheidemann, Gustav Bauer and Hermann Muller). The party’s approach during the 1920s was moderate and conciliatory: it tried to walk the fine line between steady, conservative policies and progressive reforms, without really succeeding at either. By the early 1930s the SPD had lost almost half of its voter base, most of them frustrated at the party’s inability to secure stable and lasting progress in Germany. 1. The SPD was originally a Marxist party, formed in Germany in 1875 from two workers’ groups. 2. In the 1880s the rapidly growing SPD was suppressed and persecuted by Bismarck’s Anti-Socialist Laws. 3. By the early 1900s the core of the party had adopted moderate social-democratic ideas and policies. 4. It was split by its support for World War I, with the radical left wing breaking away to form the Sparticist League. 5. The SPD supported the Weimar Republic and was the largest single party for its duration, involved in almost all coalitions and cabinets. WEIMAR COMMUNIST PARTIES (KPD AND USPD) Divisions over ideology and policy in the ranks of the SPD gave birth to two Weimar left wing parties: the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland, or USPD) and the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, or KPD). Both emerged in 1917, in response to the SPD’s support for the war effort. The USPD was comparatively shorted lived, lasting until 1922, however the fracture between the SPD and KPD would continue until the last days of the Weimar Republic. The USPD’s founder and first leader was Hugo Haase, a Jewish lawyer who had served as A USPD poster, SPD chairman prior to the war. In April 1917, Haase and several like-minded colleagues depicting the building of broke away from the SPD to begin their own anti-war campaign. They organised mass socialism strikes, chiefly as a means of protesting against food shortages and the commandeering of civilian necessities by the military. The USDP’s strong stance against the war, the imperial government and the mainstream SPD won it many supporters. The USPD position was that the leaders of the SPD had ‘sold out’ the party’s socialist values by making concessions to the kaiser and his government. The end of the war brought about a temporary easing of hostilities between the USPD and SPD. The two groups agreed to work together on the preparations for a future national assembly; their leaders, Haase and Friedrich Ebert, both sat on a ‘council of people’s deputies’. But six weeks later the USPD again split from the SPD, this time over the latter’s inaction over Reichswehr and Freikorps street violence. The USPD decided to go it alone as a parliamentary party. It fielded candidates in the first two Weimar federal elections, winning 22 seats in January 1919 and 84 seats in June 1920; the latter result made it the second largest party in the Reichstag after the SPD. However the murder of Haase triggered internal divisions within the USPD, which allowed the KPD to overtake it as Germany’s largest left wing party. USPD membership dwindled and in 1922, most of the party was absorbed back into the SPD. The KPD was formed by the Spartacist League in late December 1918. The KPD platform initially called for socialist revolution along Bolshevik lines: class consciousness, organisation of the working classes, armed revolution and a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. But the failed January 1919 uprising Berlin, along with the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht and several other leaders, forced the KPD to reinvent itself as a functioning parliamentary party. The KPD fielded candidates in the 1920 election, but won just two per cent of the vote and four Reichstag seats. The KPD’s fortunes changed in late 1920, for two reasons. Firstly, it came under the direction of the Communist International (or Comintern) in Moscow, which provided tactical and organisational advice. Secondly, a split in the USPD sent around 300,000 members of its left wing to join the KPD. This boosted the KPD’s potential share of the vote to as high as 10 per cent. In December 1924 the KPD won 62 Reichstag seats, mostly at the expense of the SPD. The Great Depression and its impact on Germany saw the KPD’s electoral fortunes improve further, mirroring the rise of the NSDAP. In September 1930 the communists returned 77 Reichstag seats. In the two elections held in 1932, this increased to 89 seats (July) and then 100 seats (November). Like the Nazis, the KPD was an obstructionist party with no commitment to the republic and no willingness to support the government. The party’s rhetoric and propaganda campaign against the Weimar constitution, democracy and capitalism helped to lower public morale and drive voters away from the mainstream parties. 1. Ideological divisions, particularly over support for the war, saw two groups break away from the SPD in 1917. 2. The USPD was the more moderate, taking a strong anti-war stand but supporting the Weimar Republic. 3. The more radical and revolutionary KPD was formed from the ruins of the Spartacists after their failed revolt in 1919. 4. By 1922 the USPD had split and around 300,000 of its members crossed to the KPD, which boosted its prospects. 5. The Great Depression saw voter support for the KPD rise significantly, alongside that of the Nazi Party. THE CENTRE PARTY The Centre Party (Zentrumspartei or Zentrum) was the political voice of Germany’s Catholics. It was formed in 1870, a time when Catholics made up a little over one-third of the empire; the remainder of Germans were Lutheran or other Protestant denominations. The young party would face considerable challenges in its first years. In 1871 Bismarck, who was himself Protestant, launched his Kulturkampf (or ‘culture struggle’) – a campaign to reduce or eliminate Catholic influence in the newly unified Germany. Bismarck’s persecution of German Catholics drove many of them toward the Centre Party; both its membership and voter numbers doubled through the mid-1870s. By 1880 the Centre Party was the second A Centre Party poster largest party in the Reichstag. focusing on family values After Bismarck’s departure, the Centre Party reconciled with and generally supported the imperial government. In terms of public policy, the party sought to protect the rights of German Catholics and the Landtags (state assemblies). Other than that, it had few fixed policies or ideological positions. Like the SPD, the Centre Party was a large party that housed a large range of views. Among its membership were Christian liberal-democrats on the left, moderate conservatives in the middle and strong nationalists on the right. The party threw its weight behind the imperial government during World War I – but it also contained anti-war elements. By 1917 the Centre Party’s left wing, led by Matthias Erzberger, was voicing strong criticisms of the war and calling for a peace resolution. “The Weimar Republic offered the Centre Party its greatest opportunities and its leaders readily rose to the challenge. Its most able politicians in these years came from the ranks of the trade union movement and the professional classes; but the influence of men from these groups received a setback in the last years of the Republic, when under Bruning’s chancellorship, the leadership passed back to the traditional right wing.” Eda Sagarra, historian The Centre Party remained a significant political force in the post-war Republic. It won 91 seats in the first national assembly (January 1919), making it the second largest parliamentary party after the SPD. The Centre Party’s share of the vote slumped in 1920, however its representation in the Reichstag remained consistent during the Weimar period, never slipping below 62 seats. Matthias Erzberger, the Centre Party’s leader until his murder in 1921, promised the party would remain loyal to the constitution and prepared to work in coalition governments with the SPD and other parties. The Centre Party held the middle ground in the Reichstag for the duration of the republic. It had ministers in every cabinet, while the chancellorship was given to five different Centre Party members (Constantin Fehrenbach, Joseph Wirth, Wilhelm Marx, Heinrich Bruning and Franz von Papen). 1. The Centre Party was formed in 1870 to provide political representation for Germany’s Catholic population. 2. Bismarck’s Kulturkampf campaign of the 1870s drove German Catholics to the party, expanding its membership. 3. With a sizeable membership, the Centre Party contained a wide variety of ideological and policy positions. 4. It supported the war effort in 1914-18, though this created divisions and differences of opinion within the party. 5. The Centre Party was an important political player in the Weimar era, belong to all Reichstag coalitions, supplying five chancellors and boasting ministers in every cabinet. THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS (NSDAP) Until the late 1920s, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP, better known to history as the Nazis) was a minor political party, one of several nationalist groups on the fringe of Weimar politics. It emerged from humble beginnings, beginning in January 1919 as a tiny Bavarian group called the German Workers’ Party (DAP, short for Deutsche Arbeitpartei). The party’s founding members were unremarkable characters. Anton Drexler was a factory worker and aspiring poet who had supported German involvement in World War I. Gottfried Feder was an economist with a grudge against greedy bankers. Karl Harrer and Dietrich Eckart were insignificant figures, both previously involved in writing and publishing political pamphlets containing nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas. All four had A local NSDAP meeting links to Germany’s volkisch movement; all were strong nationalists who accepted the in 1922 deluded stab-in-the-back theory as fact. Together they coddled together a few dozen followers and met sporadically through 1919, where they cursed the SPD government, foreign powers and Jews. The DAP’s fate changed irrevocably with the arrival of a new member: Adolf Hitler. He first arrived in September 1919, attending his first meetings as a Reichswehr spy before becoming swept up in its political ideas. The DAP’s early members were struck by the passion and forcefulness of Hitler’s public speaking. The party grew steadily through 1920, due in some part to Hitler’s influence. It reinvented itself as the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, or National Socialist German Workers’ Party. In February 1920 Hitler convened a rally attended by 2,000 people, the party’s largest gathering to that point. The NSDAP also adopted a political manifesto, the ’25 Points’, outlining its core ideas and policies. In July 1921 Drexler stood down as party chairman, allowing Hitler to fill this role. Two months later Hitler scrapped the NSDAP’s council and declared himself the party’s fuhrer (absolute leader). Two years after joining the DAP, Hitler was now solely responsible for policy and decision-making. He ordered the formation of a paramilitary branch, the Sturmabteilung (the SA, later known as the ‘Brownshirts’) to deal with political opponents. He also formed the Hitler-Jugend (Hitler Youth) to attract young people to the party, acquired a newspaper and adopted the swastika (a common motif) as the party’s emblem. By the end of 1921 the NSDAP had several thousand members, a considerable improvement on the few dozen of late 1919. “The breakthrough of the NSDAP as a mass movement was the decisive event in the last phase of the Weimar Republic. At times the NSDAP was able to mobilise more than a third of the electorate, at the expensive of the moderate bourgeois parties. Its inroads among these voters revealed that large sectors of the moderate bourgeoisie were unwilling and unable to accept the social and political conditions of post-war Germany… This produced an unprecedented rise in protest voting that benefited first and foremost the NSDAP, a party that was extremely adept at exploiting the social resentments of the German middle classes.” Hans Mommsen, historian The NSDAP grew slowly through 1921-22. It was popular with ex-soldiers, who identified with the decorated war veteran Hitler, sympathising with his passionate nationalism and his attacks on the Weimar government. Small businessmen and unemployed workers, in search of answers to their own miseries, also joined the group. Hitler’s rousing speeches delivered convenient scapegoats for Germany’s problems: the ‘November criminals’ who signed the armistice, the liberals and socialists who signed the hated Treaty of Versailles, the communists who threatened revolution in Germany, the Jewish bankers and conspirators who plotted to undermine and destroy the German state. Well oiled by free beer supplied at NSDAP meetings and rallies, Hitler’s audiences lapped up these conspiracy theories, hanging on the fuhrer’s every word and applauding his calls for the overthrow of the Weimar government. Yet for all their popularity in and around Munich, Hitler and the NSDAP were very much a regional phenomenon. Their supporter base was mostly in Bavaria; they were hardly known in northern, western or central Germany or in the capital. This would change after Hitler’s failed attempt to overthrow the Bavarian provincial government (November 1923), which thrust the NSDAP leader into the national spotlight. Hitler’s treason trial and his political diatribe in the courtroom received significant coverage and helped increase the party’s national profile. On his release from prison in 1924, Hitler pledged to transform the NSDAP from a revolutionary movement into a legitimate parliamentary party – not to participate in democracy but to infiltrate it and destroy it from within. Nevertheless, for much of the 1920s the NSDAP remained a largely insignificant party holding just a handful of Reichstag seats. Hitler’s extremist rhetoric won him some supporters but alienated a much larger section of the German electorate. It would take the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to boost the NSDAP’s popularity and electoral fortunes. 1. The Nazi Party, or NSDAP, began as the DAP, a small workers’ party of nationalist ideas, formed in January 1919. 2. Hitler joined the DAP in September 1919, at first to spy on it. He quickly joined and rose to prominence within the group. 3. In 1920 it re-formed as the NSDAP, and Hitler contributed to its organisation, expansion and ideological platform. 4. Hitler was the NSDAP’s most charismatic figure, and by September 1921 he had become its fuhrer (leader). 5. The NSDAP continued to grow through 1921-22, though its supporter base remained very much in southern Germany. OTHER WEIMAR POLITICAL PARTIES Post-war Germany was so politically fertile that it gave rise to dozens of Weimar political parties. Though the SPD, the Centre Party and the radical right and left wings dominated the republic, several other notable parties were active in the Reichstag and in German society. The increase in political activity is understandable. Germany was a nation in transformation, confronted by many challenges, both internal and external. Four years of war had produced more questions than answers. There was considerable public interest in emerging political ideas like socialism and fascism. Most importantly, with the removal of the authoritarian imperial regime, Germans were curious about the political direction their nation would take. A diagram showing And the Weimar electoral system encouraged the participation of smaller parties, who parties in the Weimar needed only to muster up 50,000-60,000 votes to earn a seat in the national assembly. Reichstag 1920-1933 Some of the better known parties, listed in order of their formation, included: German National People’s Party (DNVP). Formed in 1918 from a coalition of smaller right wing parties, the DNVP embraced strong conservative policies and values. In its early years the DNVP opposed the Weimar constitution and the new political system, calling for the restoration of the monarchy and an authoritarian government. The party’s best election results were in 1924, when it exploited the misery of the Ruhr occupation and hyperinflation to win 103 of a possible 493 Reichstagseats. But the DNVP was an obstinate political force, refusing to participate in coalition governments. In the mid-1920s the DNVP marketed itself as a ‘classless’ party, setting up party-run unions and appealing to Germany’s farmers. The party leadership and most of its members, however, came from the upper- and middle-classes: aristocrats, businessmen, industrialists and former military men – groups that nurtured the strongest opposition to the Weimar government, the Treaty of Versailles and Germany’s desperate economic state. The stab-in- the-back theory was rife in DNVP ranks, as was anti-Semitism and talk of a right-wing counter-revolution. German People’s Party (DVP). Formed in 1918 from a Prussian group, the DVP was the party of Gustav Stresemann, and for much of its political life it mirrored his own views and values. The DVP began as a nationalist, conservative, pro- industrialist and anti-socialist party, largely dismissive of the Republic. Its more influential members were industrial capitalists and businessmen who wanted a stronger, authoritarian government to protect their corporate interests. Under the influence of Stresemann, however the DVP mellowed. It formed an effective working relationship with other Reichstag parties, forming a long-standing coalition with the Centre Party and the SPD. It also favoured a revision of the Versailles treaty, rather than its total abolition. The DVP enjoyed consistent electoral success during the 1920s, winning between 30-65 Reichstag seats in five different federal elections. The death of Stresemann in 1929 saw the DVP return to its old right-wing values – but this ground was already occupied by the NSDAP and DNVP. By the July 1932 election, the DVP held just seven seats. “The role of splinter