Thailand_notes.docx

**INSTITUTIONS & SOCIAL GROUPS** *[Monarchy. ]* - - ***King Bhumibol Adulyadej.*** Was the kingdoms longest reigning monarch and the world's longest reigning contemporary monarch.  a. During the early decades of his reign, he cultivated the role being the patron of [rural d...

**INSTITUTIONS & SOCIAL GROUPS** *[Monarchy. ]* - - ***King Bhumibol Adulyadej.*** Was the kingdoms longest reigning monarch and the world's longest reigning contemporary monarch.  a. During the early decades of his reign, he cultivated the role being the patron of [rural development]. b. He intervened publicly in politics on rare occasions, such as the [May 1992 crisis.] - Lese-majeste laws shield the king and the royal family from public criticisms. Occasionally, Thai intellects (and foreigners) who write critically about the king or his family members have faces charges and detention for offending the dignity of the monarch. - - - - *[Constitution. ]* - - - - - *[Military. ]* - Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy, the military has possessed a dominant role in Thai politics. - Of the 50+ cabinets organized since 1932, *more than half* can be classified as military or military-dominated governments :\>  - The [civilian governments], which have been the most unstable, have often been replaced by military regimes following army coups. Reasons for the military dominance include (1) the weakness of civilian government and (2) the fact that the military is the most highly organized institution in the kingdom. - The military have proclaimed themselves as the [only institution capable of protecting the Thai sovereignty.] - With Bangkok dominating every aspect in the country's political and economic life, [controlling that city would be equal to controlling the entire kingdom.] - Civilian governments, especially those coalesced around provincial parties, ce difficulty in maintaining a good relationship w the top generals; due to the military being factionalized, forging alliances with one set of generals can prove consequential later. - Standing atop the rest of the military is ***privy councilor Prem Tinsulanond,*** the retired general with unparalleled approbation from the crown and singular influence over the direction of Thai political development. - ***2006 coup d'etat.*** Was an event many Thai's considered as 'desirable'. This event saw the return of the military's domestic political power after happenings of [Black May 1992]---where the Thai community seemed to have lost all tolerance for military intervention; PAD leaders even went abroad to explain why coups are needed in Thailand to "restore democracy". This shows that there are a certain group of Thai's who believe in the military as a political catalyst. - ***People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).*** commonly known as the ["yellow shirts"] was a Thai reactionary, monarchist political movement and pressure group. It was originally a coalition of protesters against Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister of Thailand - In 2008, the de facto insubordination that army generals showed toward [Prime Minister Somchai] further illustrates the enduring independent status of the military as a political actor. - *Eight decades* after it toppled the country's absolute monarchy, Thailand's military remains the country's most formidable and secure state institution. *[Bureaucracy. ]* - For most of the *contemporary era*, Thailand has been a ***bureaucratic polity*** with the arena of politics *within* the bureaucracy itself. - The bureaucracy has been the bedrock of stability in a political system where the top leadership positions have changed unpredictably; it continues its conservative policy role with little change in direction. - ***Technocrats.*** Were highly trained and educated officials who brought a more rational mode to policymaking. They were more inclined to public-regarding values over traditional values of hierarchy, personalism, and security. However, they lost some of the luster during the collapse of their economy in 1997---partly because they weren't able to predict its coming. - Even if their past dominance of the system is gone, Thai bureaucrats remain major actors in the country's political life. *[Parliament & Political Parties. ]* - The country's ***bicameral Parliament*** became independent, particularly on economic matters, through the role granted to it by its leader, [Prime Minister Prem. ] - Despite the frequent changes in its structure and membership, [Thailand's national assembly is more active in engaging in public debate about important issues than other legislatures in the region.] - Because governments change so frequently, [coalition forming can be more politically significant than actual lawmaking functions. ] - In recent years, the Parliament's membership has diversified and ranges from representatives from the business community, provincial political families, women, technocrats, academics etc.  - Many Thai political parties fall into the [moderate] or [nonideological] middle of the political spectrum.  - Voters tend to favor candidates who served their district of regional interest first.  - ***Thai Rak Thai.*** (political party) stood out because its populist message appealed across districts and regions. It conceived its patronage system as [national] rather than local or regional. Other key distinguishing features of TRT include (a) its desire to expand patronage in wider dimensions compared to previous parties and  (2) its new "professional party" approach. - ***Democrat Party.*** Is sixty years old and the longest-surviving party in Thailand. It tends to be a party that is either leading the government or leading the opp(osition). Despite being the oldest party, the Democrats have never enjoyed a parliamentary majority with their last plurality victory happening over twenty years ago. - ***Chart Thai (Thai Nation) Party.*** In terms of longevity and institutionalization, they come second to the democrat party. However, its present state is a "shell of its former self". Founded in the 1970s, it drew support from military-business elites and the central provinces of [Chai Phraya River Basin.] Two of its leaders, [Chatichai Choonhavan] and [Banharn Silpa-archa,] rose to serves as the country's prime minister. The cause of the party's demise was the [2008 political crisis] and a subsequent [court ruling] that dissolved the party on grounds of [electoral fraud].  - During the general elections in July of 2011, a system dominated by two parties emerged for the foreseeable future. Of the 500 seats in the national assembly, 424 (85%) went to [Pue Thai] (265 seats) and the [Democrat Party] (159 seats). The remaining seats went to nine other parties.  - ***Puea Thai.*** [Thaksins] party machine, has won more seats than any party in five straight election (o1', 05'-07', 11'). With virtually no means of dismantling them, the only plausible scenario in which the opposition can see this party dislodged is through its own failure and loss of Red Shirt support.  - ***Red Shirts.*** Are Thaksin's supporters dubbed by their use of red shirts during protests. They formed a populist movement called [The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship] (UDD) that organized protest against the country's latest change of government---they were also the cause of the ASEAN summit cancellation in April of 2009. *[Party Jumping & Vote Buying. ]* - Both of these concepts accompany every election. It is the root of Thailand's political problems. The creation of the [2007 People's Constitution] was designed to inhibit both practices.  - ***Party jumping.*** Occurs due to political expediency and opportunity. This is when a veteran politician brings a network of client MPs (members of parliament) to the new party with him. This concept is closely intertwined with [Party Factionalism] in the country's political system. - ***Vote buying.*** Its effectivity has bee debated on but losers in elections always believe it matters. However, there has ben no hard evidence to demonstrate that this alters the results of an election. What is generally agreed upon, is its extensive use, so much so that the [Election Commission of Thailand] has resorted to use referee-like "yellow cards" and "red cards" to candidates suspected of violating election rules.  - *[Yellow card]* = allows candidates to gain office through a subsequent by-elections - *[Red card]* = bans the candidate from holding office for the next five years. - Vote buying tactics include (1) giving cash to voters in return for promises of support (2) serving free food and drinks at village festivals (3) promising cash to voters if the candidate they were old to vote for wins. - ***Hua Khanen (candidate canvassers).*** Run the vote-buying networks and have close ties with village leaders, teachers, and respected elders.  - Voters tend to go for candidates who have close relations to village or town leaders who have helped out the voters in the past. If the candidate gives an extra amount of money for the leader to divvy up, the chances of the villagers to support the candidate will increase.  - ***Illegal election lottery.*** A more audacious manipulation of the electorate. Voters are invited to bet on who will win in the elections while lottery agents working for the candidates rig the system so voting against their candidate is the same as losing. ***STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS & DEMOCRACY*** - ***Nation, region, and king. The enduring pillars of the Thai state that provides the ideological troika upon which the state supremacy was based. *** - ***By integrating the [military] into the political process, the government established a broad-based regime. Utilizing both collaborative and coercive forces, the state increased its stability and capacity. *** - ***Student-led revolt against the military in 1973. After this event, the number of Thai political institutions have increased and their bases have widened considerably, strengthening the roles of the legislature, political parties, and business associations while reducing direct military domination. *** - ***Along with the increase of Thai political institutions are the rise in the importance of societal groups' roles in the country's politics. With this came the [weaking and loss of the state's autonomy.]*** - ***If autonomy is a key variable for assessing strength, then the Thai state is [weak]; officials in charge for making authoritative decisions are dependent on their state-based sponsorship networks. Without them they're insignificant.*** - ***The relationship between Thailand's state officials and established patron-client exchange networks acts as links between bureaucrats and traditional networks in old business, agriculture, labor, the aristocracy, and the intelligentsia.*** - ***Intelligentsia. A group of highly-educated people or intellectuals.*** - ***The loss of these networks threatens the erosion of associated state institutions and, therefore, state strength. *** - ***With rural citizens making up 65% of the population, the notion of passivity has been a core in the argument that the Thai state can act autonomously. (di ko gets :\