Conflict Theory PDF
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This document explores conflict theory, contrasting it with the consensus view of law. It analyzes how social conflict, particularly racial inequality, influences criminal law and policies. The document further touches on racial threat theory, showing how it can shape the criminal justice system.
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CONFLICT THEORY “In its majestic equality, the law forbids the rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.” - Anatole France How do you interpret this quotation? What is it saying about criminal law? How is the quotation on the “majestic equality of...
CONFLICT THEORY “In its majestic equality, the law forbids the rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread.” - Anatole France How do you interpret this quotation? What is it saying about criminal law? How is the quotation on the “majestic equality of law” illustrated here? What does this tell us about the role of the police in these communities? Plan for the rest of today Criminal law reflecting social conflict and inequality Consensus vs. conflict perspectives. Application of conflict model: racial threat theory Conflict vs. consensus views of law Consensus view of law. Law represents basic values shared by most members of society: fairness, right and wrong; sanctity of life, health, and property. Criminal law prohibits behaviors that are harmful to society. Criminal law is useful for society as a whole. Conflict vs. consensus views of law Conflict view of law. Society is made up of groups with different social experiences and historically conditioned interests (e.g., privilege vs. discrimination & marginalization). Law tends to express the interests and preferences of powerful social groups. This happens in a variety of ways, each of which tends to maintain advantages of powerful groups at the expense of groups that lack power: Origins and definition of criminal laws. Enforcement of criminal laws. Punishment for breaking criminal laws. Example: Racial threat theory In a racialized social system like the U.S., access to political, economic, and social goods is distributed (at least in part) on the basis of race. Thus, whites have privileged access to American politics, the labor market, and other social institutions (e.g., education). Yet, these advantages are sometimes destabilized or have the appearance of destabilization. o For example, if local racial demographics change, white electoral dominance may be threatened. o Likewise, changing local demographics may pose a challenge to white dominance of employment in a particular industry. In these situations, the criminal justice system is used as a tool to suppress threats to structured advantages. How? o More aggressive policing of minority communities. o Increasing criminal punishments for street offenses (especially those for which minorities are arrested at higher rates). o Criminal records then block access to politics, jobs, housing, etc. Examples: racial threat and criminal justice Why do some states have higher imprisonment rates than others? Consensus explanation: States with higher crime rates, particularly serious crimes. Partly true. A conflict explanation: States with proportionally larger African-American populations, even after accounting for crime rates. What accounts for the historical emergence of tough-on-crime policies in the U.S.? Consensus explanation: Higher crime rates over time? More moral condemnation of crime? A conflict explanation: The New Jim Crow (Alexander 2010): Tough-on-crime policies emerge to replace Jim Crow segregation and other forms of racial discrimination. Through criminal records, old forms of discrimination becoming legal again: voting, jobs, housing. What explains the adoption of felon disenfranchisement laws in the U.S.? Consensus explanation: Social contract perhaps (rule-breakers should not help make rules)? A conflict explanation: Maintaining white electoral dominance — states with larger minority prison populations (Behrens et al. 2003).