Property Law Notes PDF

**Property Law notes -- 1-10** **Theories of Property:** - **Natural** theories of property - natural rights (is property 'God given' or a natural right? - **Utilitarian** theories of property - property is a creation of law - **Lockean** theory of property - property essential to huma...

**Property Law notes -- 1-10** **Theories of Property:** - **Natural** theories of property - natural rights (is property 'God given' or a natural right? - **Utilitarian** theories of property - property is a creation of law - **Lockean** theory of property - property essential to human freedoms - **Marxist** theory of property - property as a source of alienation and an obstacle to human freedoms - **Margaret Davies**: The idea of property is not universal and is contextual (economic and political power) **Types of Property:** - Private Property - rights to sell due to ownership over it - State Property - Communal Property: right to not be excluded from it - No-property: no rights (only privilege) - **Hunter v. Canary Wharf (1997):** - Residents of Isle of Dogs complain that they are no longer able to receive television signals after Canary Wharf tower was built - Residents claim they have a *right* to television signals (property claim) and it was interfered with (tort claim). - Court of Appeals decided that everyone has the *privilege* to use television signals, but no *right* to use it. - They have no *right* to complain if their use is interfered with. - **R v. Kelly & Lindsay (1998):** - K was an artist who drew anatomical specimens. L worked at the Royal College of Surgeons - They removed the body parts from the college, so that K could make casts of them for anatomical models. - Charged with theft. - Did the appellants commit theft of human body parts? - Is the human body capable of being property? In what circumstances can it be considered property? - When skill is applied to a body part to make it have some use, to distinguish it from a mere part of a corpse, there can be property in it. - **Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust (2009):** - Men diagnosed with cancer - Were given the option of freezing their sperm - The hospital freezing mechanism broke down midway - Men's semen thawed and became unviable - Men sued psychological damage (tort claim) - Bailment (property claim) - When I give my property to you for safekeeping (e.g. a coat check) - Property claim -- was semen a form of property? **Judgment by the Court of Appeal** - Notes that historically, neither a living human body nor a dead one could ever be property - Distinguishes entire body from parts of the body - "parts of a corpse are capable of being property.. If they acquired different attributes by virtue of application of skill, such as dissection..." (citing *R v. Kelly*) - Made by their body, for used for a future purpose; could direct how it not be used ('fundamental feature of ownership') - Court of appeal breaks new ground by holding a part of a body can be thought of as property. - The men had a claim both in tort and in bailment **Introduction** - **Property** is not just about ownership or valuable things. It refers to the relationship between individuals and the world, often expressed as rights in or over things. - Property rights are often considered a \"bundle of sticks\"---a collection of rights that individuals hold in relation to property. **Basics of Land Law** - Land law forms the basis for most property law concepts, and understanding land helps grasp broader property rights. **Feudal System & Estates** - **1066 and the Feudal System**: Land ownership in England traces back to the Norman conquest. William the Conqueror parcelled land to lords for military service, and they in turn distributed it to others like knights and peasants. - **Estates**: Under the feudal system, all land ultimately belonged to the Crown, and everyone else merely held an *estate* in the land. This estate was time-bound, with the Crown owning the land in perpetuity. - **Estate in Fee Simple (Freehold)**: Largest estate, of indefinite duration. Ownership here refers to owning rights in the estate, not the land itself. - **Life Estate**: An estate tied to a person's life, after which it passes to another (often termed the *remainderman*). - **Fee Tail (Entailment)**: Historically restricted inheritance to certain heirs, e.g., male heirs, influencing historical narratives like those in *Pride and Prejudice*. **Tenure and Radical Title** - **Tenure**: Refers to the terms on which an estate is held, for example, what services or duties are owed in exchange for the land. - **Radical Title**: The Crown holds ultimate ownership of all land, with individuals holding an estate in the land rather than the land itself. **1925 Reforms: Law of Property Act (LPA) 1925** - **LPA 1925**: Established that the only legal estates in land capable of subsisting at law are: - **Fee Simple Absolute in Possession (Freehold)**: Effectively means one holds rights indefinitely. - **Term of Years Absolute (Leasehold)**: Estate with a fixed, defined duration. **Multiple Estates in the Same Land** - It\'s possible to have multiple estates in the same land at different points in time. For example, one person may hold a freehold while others hold leaseholds over the same land. **Dimensions of Land** - **Four Dimensions**: Length, width, vertical (subjacent/superjacent), and time. Property rights can extend both above and below the land\'s surface. - **Subjacent**: Ownership may extend below the ground, including minerals unless alienated by law. - **Superjacent**: Ownership above the ground is limited to the height necessary for the enjoyment of the land. **Definition of Land** - **Land (LPA 1925, S.205(1)(ix))**: Includes land of any tenure, mines, minerals, and rights over land, including corporeal (physical) and incorporeal (intangible) hereditaments. - **Corporeal Hereditaments**: Physical items, like buildings, trees, etc. - - Wild animals cannot be subject of absolute ownership -- limited right to hunt - - Water is incapable of being owned -- ownership of an estate in land carries with it, certain rights over superadjacent water (i.e. right to fish) - - You can own the riverbed, but not the water. - **Incorporeal Hereditaments**: Intangible rights, such as easements (e.g., right of way) or profits a prendre (right to take resources from the land). **Interests in Land** - **Estates** (titles such as fee simple and leaseholds). - **Interests**, which refer to rights in land that do not amount to ownership (such as easements, restrictive covenants, etc.). - Examples of **Interests**: - An easement -- right of way over someone else land (later this term). - A profit a prendre -- right to take produce away from another's land. - A Restrictive covenant -- where one person can place restrictions on another person's land -- eg Russel family's right to be consulted on building design. **Legal vs Equitable Estates and Interests** - English law distinguishes between estates and interests at law (under common law) and those that exist in equity. - **Equity**: Adds an additional dimension where estates and interests can be recognised parallel to common law. This is explored in more depth in later lectures. **Property Rights** - **Rights in Rem**: Enforceable against the world (e.g., property rights). - **Rights in Personam**: Enforceable against specific individuals (e.g., contractual rights). **Summary: Unpacking the Bundle of Rights** - Property rights can be divided spatially (horizontally, vertically) and temporally. Different estates and interests can coexist over the same land, including: - Freehold estates, leasehold estates, easements, restrictive covenants, and trusts. **Real Property:** In legal terms, \"real property\" refers to land and anything permanently attached to it. In English law, **land** is broadly defined in section 205(1)(ix) of the *Law of Property Act 1925* as including: 1. **The physical soil or ground itself**: This encompasses not only the surface of the land but also the natural resources within it, such as minerals, rocks, and soil. 2. **Fixtures**: Anything that is permanently attached to the land, like buildings, structures, or trees, is also considered part of the land. The general principle here is that if something is permanently fixed, it becomes part of the property. 3. **Rights above and below the surface**: This includes airspace above the land to a reasonable height for the landowner\'s use (although there are limits for public use, such as in aviation) and subsurface rights below the land to a certain depth. 4. **Corporeal and Incorporeal Hereditaments**: - *Corporeal hereditaments* are tangible things attached to the land, like buildings. - *Incorporeal hereditaments* refer to intangible rights attached to the land, such as easements (the right to use part of someone else\'s land, like a shared driveway) or profits à prendre (rights to take something from another's land, like fishing or mining rights). **Property - Real or Personal:** - Personal -- all that is not land - Chattel -- moveable personal property - Land will include chattels which have become part of the property -- annexed (attached) to the land The law determines whether an item is **annexed** (attached) to land, and thus a **fixture** (part of real property) or remains a **fitting** (personal property), by applying a test based on two key factors: **the degree of annexation** and **the purpose of annexation**. 1. **Degree of Annexation**: - This refers to the extent and permanence of the attachment to the land. Generally, the more securely something is fixed to the land or a building, the more likely it is to be considered a fixture. - Items that are physically attached to the land or structures, such as bolted or cemented, are often considered annexed. For instance, a window frame embedded in a wall would be classified as a fixture due to its strong attachment. - Conversely, items that simply rest on the land or structure without a permanent attachment (e.g., furniture) are less likely to be considered fixtures. - **Presumption for Fixtures**: If an item is physically attached to the land or a building, there's a presumption it's a fixture. In such cases, the burden of proof is on the person claiming it's still personal property. For example, in *Berkley v Poulett*, objects physically attached were presumed fixtures unless proven otherwise. - **Presumption for Fittings**: Items that are simply resting by their own weight without attachment are presumed to remain personal property (fittings). Here, the burden is on the person claiming it's a fixture to prove this. *Deen v Andrews*supports this presumption by holding that items not physically attached are generally considered personal property unless shown otherwise. 2. **Purpose of Annexation**: - This factor looks at the intention behind **(why)** placing the item on the land. If the item is attached to enhance the land or building\'s value and use as a whole, it is more likely to be classified as a fixture. - For example, if machinery in a factory is bolted down as a necessary part of the operational use of the building, it would be a fixture. However, if it's clear that the item was brought in temporarily or for personal convenience, it's more likely to be a fitting, remaining personal property. - The courts will also look at whether the item was meant to be a permanent feature of the property (fixture) or something that can be removed without damage (fitting). - **Sole Enjoyment of the Chattel**: If an item is attached solely for its enjoyment as an item (e.g., artwork on display), it's likely not considered part of the land, as demonstrated in *Berkley v Poulett*. Items serving as décor, for instance, are often fittings, not fixtures. - **Functionality as Part of the Land**: As in *Elitestone v Morris*, it's "the purpose which the object is serving" that matters, not the intent of the person who placed it there. In *Elitestone*, for example, a bungalow was seen as part of the land, as its purpose and structure integrated it with the land. **Key Distinctions in Case Law** Two common cases illustrate these principles: - **Holland v Hodgson (1872)**: In this case, looms attached to a mill floor by bolts were deemed fixtures because they were integral to the mill\'s use as a textile factory. The court held that items secured to the property for its functional purpose (here, industrial operation) would usually be fixtures. - **Berkley v Poulett (1977)**: This case distinguished between statues and a sundial placed on pedestals (which were held to be fittings, as they were not essential to the building's purpose and could be removed) versus other immovable items like a paneling or wall mouldings considered part of the building structure. **Chattel**: If annexation is intended purely to enjoy the item independently, it remains a personal possession and can be removed by the owner (e.g., decorative furniture or personal belongings). **Fixture**: If the annexation improves or adds to the property itself, the item becomes a fixture and thus "travels with the land" in any sale or transfer of property (e.g., fitted kitchen units, bolted industrial equipment). **Ownership of Land and Attached Items** Under common law, the owner of the land has rights to everything that is attached to it. This principle is well-established, as demonstrated in the case of **Elwes v Briggs (1886)**. In this case, the court held that the landowner is entitled to all chattels that are attached to the land. For instance, if a person finds something of value buried in the land, that item typically belongs to the landowner. **Chattels Found on the Land: Parker v British Airways** The case of **Parker v British Airways Board (1982)** clarifies the legal position regarding chattels found on land: - **General Rule**: Chattels found on land belong to the finder, unless the landowner has shown a clear intention to control the items on their property. - **Manifestation of Intention**: If the landowner has made efforts to assert control over the chattels (for example, through signs indicating that lost items should be handed to a specific location or through regular checks for lost property), then those chattels are likely to belong to the landowner. In *Parker v British Airways*, the claimant found a gold bracelet in the British Airways' executive lounge. The court ruled in favor of Parker, stating that because the landowner (British Airways) had not demonstrated a clear intention to control the items within the lounge, Parker retained ownership of the bracelet. **Ownership and Possession** The distinction between **ownership** and **possession** is also crucial in property law: - **Ownership** refers to the legal right to possess, use, and control property, including land and chattels. The owner has the ultimate rights over the property, as outlined in *Elwes v Briggs*. - **Possession** is a physical control over an item or property. A person can possess an item without owning it (as seen in *Parker v British Airways*), which can lead to competing claims over found items. ***Waverly Borough Council v Fletcher* (1995):** **Basic Case Facts:** - Council owned the freehold to a public park. People were free to enter. - F (Fletcher) was a man with a metal detector who found a medieval gold brooch, 9 inches below the surface. - The coroner determined it was not treasure trove and returned the brooch to him. - Council brought suit, claiming the brooch, asserting their rights over items found within their land. **If I Were F\'s Lawyers** 1. **Claim to Ownership**: - **Possession vs. Ownership**: I would argue that F\'s possession of the brooch, as the finder, grants him superior title over the item since it was not treasure trove and thus not claimed by the Crown. - **Public Access Does Not Equate to Ownership**: The fact that the park is publicly accessible does not imply that the council retains ownership of all items found there. The presumption should be in favour of the finder unless the landowner has explicitly claimed such items. 2. **Absence of Intention to Control**: - I would contend that the council did not manifest any intention to control objects found in the park. There were no signs or policies indicating that all found property would belong to the council. 3. **Legal Precedent**: - I would reference relevant cases and legal principles, including the principle established in *Parker v British Airways*, which emphasises that possession by the finder is a strong claim unless contradicted by the landowner\'s clear intention. **If I Were the Council\'s Lawyers** 1. **Ownership of the Land**: - I would argue that the council, as the freehold owner of the land, retains the right to all items found on their property, including those below the surface. This ownership extends to any valuable items found on the land. 2. **Public vs. Private Property**: - I would emphasise that while the park is publicly accessible, it is still the property of the council. The council has a duty to maintain and manage the park, which includes claiming ownership of items found therein. 3. **Relativity of Title**: - I would discuss the concept of the relativity of title, asserting that the council\'s title to the land is superior to F\'s title as the finder. The council\'s claim to ownership should prevail, as they are responsible for the area and its historical context. **If I Were the Judge** As a judge, I would need to weigh the arguments of both parties and apply the legal principles involved. - **Ownership Rights**: I would acknowledge that the council holds the freehold title to the park, which gives them rights to the land and its contents. - **Finder\'s Rights**: However, given that the brooch was not classified as treasure trove and was returned to Fletcher by the coroner, I would consider the legal precedent regarding finders' rights. Fletcher, as the finder, has a legitimate claim to the brooch. - **Intention to Control**: If there was no evidence that the council intended to control items found on the park, this would support Fletcher\'s claim. **Ruling**: I would likely rule in favour of Fletcher, recognising his possession as the finder of the brooch. I would assert that without clear evidence of the council\'s intention to claim such items, the finder's right takes precedence, especially given that the item was not deemed treasure trove. Therefore, Fletcher would retain ownership of the medieval gold brooch. **Concurrent Interests in Land** - A lease is a form of estate in land, known as **leasehold**. - Multiple estates can exist over the same property. - Leaseholders have **rights in rem** (rights enforceable against the world) regarding their interest in the land. **What is a Lease?** - Defined by the **Law of Property Act 1925**: - Only two estates can be legally held: - **Fee simple absolute in possession** (freehold). - **Term of years absolute** (leasehold). - **Lease**: An estate in land for a set period, essentially a \"slice of time.\" **Distinguishing Lease from License:** - **Lease**: - An estate in land. - Conveys **exclusive possession** and a **proprietary right**. - A relationship to the land. - **License**: - Merely a contract, granting permission to use the land for specific purposes. - Conveys a **personal right** (**right in personam**), not proprietary. - If ownership transfers, the license usually does not bind the new owner. **Example**: - **Lease**: If A leases property to B, and A sells the property to C, C is bound by B\'s lease. - **License**: If A licenses B to operate a café, and A sells to C, C is not bound by the license. **Benefits of Lease vs. License:** - **Lease**: - Grants exclusive possession. - Provides security and a right to stay even if ownership changes. - Allows potential legal action for reinstatement if evicted unlawfully. - **License**: - Grants limited rights of use. - Can be more easily terminated by the landowner. - Offers fewer legal protections in the event of removal. - **Key Case: *Street v Mountford* (1985)** - **Facts**: - Mrs. Mountford (S) was granted the right by Mr. Street (M) to occupy two rooms in his house for £37 per week. - The agreement explicitly stated it was a \"license agreement,\" emphasising that there was no intention to create tenancy rights, aiming to avoid tenant protections under the Rent Acts. - Street retained the right to alter the terms and could ostensibly terminate the arrangement more easily due to the \"license\" classification. - Mountford, however, sought protection under the Rent Act, claiming the agreement amounted to a lease and thus afforded her tenant protections, such as security of tenure. - **Issue**: - The central issue was whether the arrangement was a **license or a lease**. Despite the label of \"license,\" Mountford argued that the substance of the agreement, which provided her with exclusive possession, meant that it was effectively a lease. - **Decision**: - The House of Lords ruled in favour of Mountford, holding that the arrangement was indeed a **lease**. Lord Templeman, delivering the leading judgment, emphasised that courts must look to the **substance over form** in distinguishing between leases and licenses. - **Key Principle**: A lease must have exclusive possession, a defined term, and usually rent, although rent is not always necessary (as per s. 205 of the Law of Property Act 1925). Even if the parties intend for an arrangement to be a license, if it meets the criteria of a lease, it will be classified as such. - **Test for Lease** (as outlined by Lord Templeman in *Street v Mountford*): - - - **Elements of a Lease:** **1. Rent** - Rent is not strictly required but supports the intention to create a legal estate. - ***Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold (1998)*:** Highlighted the importance of consideration (such as rent) in establishing contractual intent. - Arnold (the defendant) owned a leasehold interest in a property. - He assigned his interest to Ashburn Anstalt (the claimant) as part of a sale agreement. - The agreement allowed Arnold to remain on the property rent-free until the lease was terminated with a three-month notice. - A dispute arose over whether this agreement created a lease or mere license. - - - - The court clarified that rent is not a mandatory requirement to create a lease. What matters is the **intention to create legal relations** and the existence of exclusive possession. - The arrangement allowing Arnold to occupy the property with exclusive possession was sufficient to create a lease, even without rent. - - Arnold had exclusive possession of the property, which distinguished the arrangement from a license. - The Court emphasised that exclusive possession and the terms of the agreement showed intent to create a legal interest. - - Consideration (e.g., rent) usually demonstrates intent to create legal relations but is not indispensable. - The court focused on the agreement\'s wording and circumstances to infer intent. **2. Term** - **Certainty of term** is required so both parties know when the lease begins and ends. - **Cases**: - ***Lace v Chantler (1994)***: Lease for \"the duration of the war\" was invalid due to uncertain term. - **Facts**: In this case, a lease was granted for \"the duration of the war.\" - **Issue**: This language created uncertainty in the term because the end date was unknown, dependent on the end of World War II. - **Decision**: The court held the lease invalid due to the **uncertain term**. For a valid lease, the term must have a definite end date or duration. - ***Prudential Assurance v London Residuary Body (1992)***: Conditional lease created uncertainty; however, periodic rent allowed a yearly tenancy to be inferred. - **Facts**: A council leased land to a company under a conditional lease that allowed the council to reclaim the land whenever needed for \"road widening purposes.\" However, the council never exercised this clause. - **Issue**: The conditional term created uncertainty, as it was unclear when or if the council would need the land. - **Decision**: Although the initial lease was uncertain, the court resolved this by viewing the yearly rent payment as indicative of a **yearly periodic tenancy**. This case demonstrated that **periodic rent payments can infer periodic tenancies** and remedy uncertain terms, provided the periodicity aligns with rental payments. **3. Exclusive Possession** - Grants the tenant the right to exclude everyone, including the owner. - Signifies a **right in land**. - If the owner retains a right of entry or control, this may indicate a license. **Avoiding a Lease:** - Landlords may prefer licenses to avoid tenant protections, such as: - Evasion of **Rent Act** protections. - Freedom from obligations that bind future property holders. - **No intention to create a legal estate** or **legal relationship** may indicate a license (e.g., family or service occupancy). **Case Reference:** - Lord Templeman in *Street*: \"The manufacture of a five-pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer insists it's a spade.\" **Cases Illustrating the Lease vs. License Distinction** - **Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phillips (1904)**: 21-year \"license\" at rent creates lease due to long term and exclusive use. - **Facts**: A \"license\" was granted to the company to occupy land for 21 years with an annual rent payment. - **Issue**: Despite the label of \"license,\" the duration and the nature of the agreement raised questions about whether it was actually a lease. - **Decision**: The court found that this arrangement was a lease, as it provided a **long-term right to occupy the land** and involved exclusive use. The extended duration and payment structure supported the characteristics of a lease rather than a license. - **Mayhew v. Suttle (1854)**: Occupation by a servant does not create a lease. - **Facts**: In this case, a servant was permitted to occupy a room in his employer\'s house. - **Issue**: The servant\'s occupation was questioned to see if it constituted a lease. - **Decision**: The court ruled that this was not a lease because the occupation was tied to the servant\'s employment and did not confer **exclusive possession** in the same way as a lease. The servant occupied the room by virtue of his employment relationship, not as an independent tenant. - **Mehta v. RBS (1998)**: Hotel room for days does not create a lease. - **Facts**: Mehta rented a hotel room for a short period (5 days). - **Issue**: This short-term stay raised the question of whether it constituted a lease. - **Decision**: The court held that renting a hotel room did not create a lease, as it lacked **exclusive possession** and the independence associated with leases. Hotel guests generally have a **license to occupy** rather than a lease, as the arrangement is temporary and often lacks the control over the premises typical of a lease. **Bruton v L&Q Housing Trust (1999)** - **Facts**: L&Q, holding a license from Lambeth Council, let property to Bruton on a weekly basis. - **Issue**: Bruton claimed he held a lease, despite L&Q having only a license. - **Decision**: Held that Bruton had a **non-proprietary lease** based on **exclusive possession** granted by agreement, despite the landlord\'s limited interest. **Implications:** - Recognised **non-proprietary leases** (exclusive possession without proprietary interest). - Challenged the traditional view that a lease requires a landlord\'s proprietary estate. **Multiple Occupants:** - **Joint Tenancy**: - Four unities required (*AG Securities v Vaughan*): - **Possession**: Shared possession. - **Interest**: Same share and duration. - **Time**: Interest acquired at the same time. - **Title**: Same legal document. **Antoniades v Villiers** vs. **AG Securities v Vaughan (1990)**: - **Antoniades**: Young couple with exclusive possession, lease upheld. - **Facts**: - A young couple, Antoniades and Villiers, rented a small flat from a landlord. - The landlord required them to sign separate documents labeled as \"licenses\" instead of a single joint lease. - The agreements included a clause allowing the landlord to introduce additional occupants into the property if desired. - In practice, the flat was unsuitable for more than two occupants, and the landlord never attempted to introduce others. - **Issue**: Were the agreements truly licenses as stated, or did they constitute a joint tenancy (lease) due to the couple\'s actual use and control of the flat? - **Decision**: - The House of Lords held that despite the \"license\" label, the arrangement was a **joint tenancy (lease)**. - **Reasoning**: The court emphasised the **substance over form** approach: - **Exclusive Possession**: The couple enjoyed exclusive possession of the flat, and the \"license\" clause about introducing other occupants was deemed a sham, as the flat was clearly only suitable for two people. - **Joint Tenancy Indicators**: The couple signed the agreements simultaneously, and their intended use of the flat was as a shared home, not separate, individual accommodations. - The court held that these characteristics met the requirements for a lease, as established in *Street v Mountford*: exclusive possession, a definite term, and implied rental payments. - **Significance**: *Antoniades v Villiers* highlighted that the presence of sham clauses (e.g., adding other occupants in unsuitable spaces) cannot mask a genuine lease. A **lease exists if the occupants jointly hold exclusive possession** and satisfy other lease characteristics, even if the agreement is framed as a \"license.\" - **AG Securities**: Separate agreements with strangers, no exclusive possession, license upheld. - **Facts**: - In *AG Securities*, four unrelated individuals rented rooms in a large property, each under a separate license agreement with the landlord. - The individuals signed their agreements on **different dates** and moved in independently of one another. - The agreements explicitly limited the number of people in the property to four, a restriction the landlord enforced. - The tenants each paid separate rents, had no shared agreement, and had no common intent to occupy the premises as a group. - **Issue**: Did the multiple occupants collectively hold a joint tenancy (lease) or were they simply individual licensees without shared exclusive possession? - **Decision**: - The House of Lords ruled that each occupant held an **individual license** rather than a joint tenancy. - **Reasoning**: The court found that: - **No Joint Tenancy**: The lack of a **single joint agreement** meant there was no joint tenancy, as each tenant had a separate arrangement and no shared intent to occupy the space collectively. - **Separate Occupancies**: The staggered entry dates, lack of relationship among tenants, and separate payment arrangements indicated a license rather than exclusive joint possession of the entire property. - **Control by Landlord**: The property's design and the landlord's retained control to introduce or remove occupants indicated a contractual license rather than a property right as a lease. - **Significance**: *AG Securities v Vaughan* underscores that **occupants without a joint agreement and no shared possession are likely licensees rather than tenants**. For a lease, tenants must have joint, exclusive possession of the entire property and meet the criteria of *Street v Mountford* (exclusive possession, term, and rent) with the four unities of joint tenancy: **possession, interest, time, and title (PITT)**. **Conclusion** - To determine a **lease** under *Street v Mountford*: - Exclusive possession + certain term. - Rent supports intention but is not essential. - For multiple occupants: - Must satisfy **joint tenancy** criteria to create a lease. - Statutory formalities must be followed for valid legal leases. **Why Do We Need Formalities?** Formalities in property law exist to create clarity, protect parties involved, and ensure legal certainty. The significance of land as a valuable asset, both historically and in the present, underscores the need for strict procedural rules: 1. **Historical Context** - Land historically represented power and wealth. - The feudal system developed rules favouring the wealthy and those with court access, reinforcing landownership as a key source of social and political authority. 2. **Certainty and Predictability** - Formalities aim to eliminate ambiguity in property transactions and prevent disputes over ownership and rights. - The **1925 Property Legislation Reforms** --- including the **Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925)**, the **Land Registration Act 1925**, and the **Trustee Act 1925** --- sought to modernise and simplify property law while balancing legal and equitable interests. **Key Statutory Provisions:** 1. **S.52 LPA 1925** - All conveyances of land must be made by deed to be valid. - Exceptions: Leases under three years may not require a deed. 2. **S.53 LPA 1925** - Governs **equitable interests** (e.g., trusts of land): - S.53(1)(b): Trusts of land must be evidenced in writing. - S.53(1)(c): Transfer of equitable interests must be in writing. 3. **S.54 LPA 1925** - Leases under three years can be created without a deed. 4. **Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 (LP(MP)A)** - **S.1:** Defines the requirements for a deed (e.g., signature, witnessed, and clear intention). - **S.2:** Contracts for the conveyance of land must be in writing. **Registered Land** 1. **Compulsory Registration under the Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002)** - Registration becomes mandatory upon a \"triggering event\" (e.g., sale, lease over seven years, or mortgage). (**S.4 LRA 2002**) - Failure to register renders rights unenforceable at law but potentially valid in equity. 2. **Legal Leases** - Leases under three years: Oral agreements are sufficient (S.54(2) LPA 1925). - Leases over three years: Must comply with S.52(1) LPA 1925 (requires a deed). - Leases over seven years: Must also be registered (S.27(2) LRA 2002). **Equitable Leases** - When legal formalities fail, an **equitable lease** may arise if it meets certain criteria, including written terms (S.2 LP(MP)A). - Case Example: **Walsh v Lonsdale (1882)** - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - Lonsdale agreed to grant Walsh a lease for seven years. - The lease required Walsh to pay rent in advance. - No deed was executed, so the lease was invalid at law. - Lonsdale sought to enforce the advance payment of rent. - **Issue:** - Could the lease be enforced despite the lack of a deed? - **Outcome:** - The court held that in equity, the lease was enforceable as an equitable lease. - **Principle:** \"Equity looks on as done that which ought to be done.\" - Equity gave effect to the agreement, treating it as if the lease had been validly granted. **Proprietary Estoppel** Even without formalities, equity may intervene to enforce rights based on unconscionable behaviour. 1. **Elements of Proprietary Estoppel**: - **Assurance**: A promise or conduct leading another to believe in a right. - **Reliance**: The claimant acts based on that belief. - **Detriment**: The claimant suffers a loss or disadvantage. - **Unconscionable conduct**: It would be unjust to deny a remedy. 2. **Key Cases**: - **Crabb v Arun DC**: Assurance and reliance led to property rights. - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - Crabb owned land with no direct road access. Arun DC provided an access point, and Crabb sold part of his land, assuming the access would remain. - Arun DC later blocked the access. - Crabb claimed he had been assured access and had relied on this assurance to his detriment. - **Issue:** - Did Crabb have a right to the access based on proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court found in Crabb\'s favour. - **Principle:** Assurance, reliance, and detriment established a proprietary right through estoppel. - Remedy: Arun DC was required to provide an access point at no cost. - **Taylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria Trustees**: Set out the test for estoppel based on assurance, reliance, detriment, and unconscionable conduct. - **Court:** High Court, Chancery Division - **Facts:** - Taylor Fashions leased a property, intending to renew the lease with an option to purchase. - Taylor Fashions made improvements to the property, relying on the assumption that they had the right to purchase. - However, no formal agreement existed for the purchase option. - **Issue:** - Could Taylor Fashions enforce the right to purchase via proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court held there was no proprietary estoppel in this case because no assurance had been given. - **Principle:** Proprietary estoppel requires assurance, reliance, detriment, and unconscionability. The assurance must be clear and unambiguous. - **Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management (2008)**: Assurance must be clear. - **Court:** House of Lords - **Facts:** - Cobbe (C), a developer, entered into an oral agreement with Yeoman's Row (Y) to redevelop a property. - C obtained planning permission, incurring costs, on the understanding that he would receive a share of the redeveloped property. - Y reneged on the agreement after planning permission was granted. - **Issue:** - Did Cobbe have a claim under proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court held that proprietary estoppel did not apply. - The agreement was incomplete and lacked the certainty required for assurance. - **Principle:** Proprietary estoppel cannot enforce vague or incomplete agreements. - **Thorner v Major (2009)**: Assurance can be implied through conduct. - **Court:** House of Lords - **Facts:** - Thorner (T) worked unpaid on Major\'s (M) farm for 30 years, believing he would inherit it based on M's conduct. - M died intestate, and the farm went to M's heirs. - T claimed the farm via proprietary estoppel. - **Issue:** - Did Major's conduct constitute assurance sufficient for proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court ruled in favour of Thorner. - Assurance can be inferred from conduct and need not be explicit. - **Principle:** Assurance may arise through conduct if it gives a clear impression of intent. **Remedies in Proprietary Estoppel** 1. **Minimum Equity to Do Justice**: The remedy is tailored to the detriment suffered. **Full Ownership** - **Meaning:** - The claimant is awarded complete legal and beneficial ownership of the property in question. - The property is fully transferred to the claimant, and they become the absolute owner, with all rights to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of it. - **Principle:** Full ownership is granted where it is necessary to satisfy equity and where the assurances made by the defendant were clear, unequivocal, and resulted in significant reliance and detriment. - **When it's used:** - When the assurance made to the claimant was clear (e.g., \"This house will be yours\"), and their reliance and detriment were significant. - Examples: Investing money in the property, maintaining or improving it based on the assurance. - **Practical Impact:** - The claimant's reliance and detriment justify giving them the property outright to satisfy equity. - **Full Ownership**: *Thorner v Major*, *Pascoe v Turner*. - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - Pascoe assured Turner (his partner) that she would own his house. - Turner acted in reliance, spending her money to improve the property. - Pascoe later tried to evict Turner. - **Issue:** - Could Turner enforce her right to the property based on proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court ruled in Turner's favour. - Remedy: Turner was granted full ownership of the house. - **Principle:** Where reliance and detriment are clear, full ownership can be granted to satisfy equity. - **Meaning:** - Instead of transferring the property, the court orders the defendant to pay a monetary sum to the claimant. - This sum compensates the claimant for the disadvantage they suffered as a result of relying on the defendant\'s promise. - **Principle:** When the expectation cannot or should not be fully realised (e.g., if it would be disproportionate or impossible), the court may award a monetary sum to compensate for the claimant\'s detriment. - **When it's used:** - When giving the full property would be disproportionate or unfair (e.g., the claimant relied on a vague promise, or the detriment doesn't justify full ownership). - **Practical Impact:** - The claimant receives enough money to undo their detriment or put them in a fair position, without granting them the property. - **Compensation**: *Jennings v Rice*. - Jennings worked for Rice, an elderly woman, caring for her without pay based on an implied promise that he would inherit her house. - No formal assurance was made, but Jennings relied on her conduct. - After Rice's death, her will left Jennings nothing. - Did Jennings have a claim under proprietary estoppel? - The court held that Jennings had a claim based on proprietary estoppel. - Remedy: Jennings was awarded a sum of money reflecting the detriment he suffered, rather than the full value of the house. - **Principle:** Remedies in proprietary estoppel are based on the \"minimum equity to do justice.\" - **Meaning:** - An easement is a legal right to use someone else\'s land for a specific purpose, without owning it. - Examples: Rights to use a path, a driveway, or, as in *Bibby v Stirling*, a greenhouse. - **When it's used:** - When the claimant's reliance relates to a limited or specific use of the property, rather than ownership. - Example: If a claimant was promised ongoing access to a portion of land and spent money maintaining it. - **Practical Impact:** - The claimant gains a formal legal right to continue using the property as promised, while the ownership stays with the original owner. - **Easements**: *Bibby v Stirling*. - **Court:** High Court - **Facts:** - Bibby relied on Stirling's assurance to use a greenhouse on the property. - Bibby spent money maintaining and improving the greenhouse. - Stirling sought to revoke Bibby's use. - **Issue:** - Could Bibby claim an easement via proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court upheld Bibby's claim and granted an easement for greenhouse use. - **Principle:** Proprietary estoppel may establish limited property rights such as easements. - **Meaning:** - A life license grants the claimant the right to live in a property for the rest of their life. - It does not transfer ownership; it simply guarantees the claimant's occupancy rights for their lifetime. - **When it's used:** - In cases where the assurance involved long-term housing security but not outright ownership. - Example: A family member being told they can \"live here forever\" and then investing in the property or giving up alternative housing options. - **Practical Impact:** - The claimant can live in the property securely without fear of eviction, but they cannot sell or transfer the property. - **Life License**: *Matharu v Matharu*. - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - A widow lived in a house owned by her husband's brother, who assured her she could live there for life. - She relied on this assurance and invested in the property. - The brother later sought to evict her. - **Issue:** - Did she have a right to remain under proprietary estoppel? - **Outcome:** - The court granted her a life interest in the property. - **Principle:** Equity can grant a life interest based on reliance and detriment. **Limitations of Proprietary Estoppel:** 1. **Uncertainty of Outcomes**: - Remedies are discretionary and case-specific, leading to unpredictability (e.g., **Jennings v Rice \[2002\]**). 2. **High Burden of Proof**: - Claimants must prove assurance, reliance, and detriment. The subjective nature of these elements often complicates claims. 3. **No Automatic Right**: - Proprietary estoppel does not create automatic proprietary rights but rather relies on judicial remedies, which can vary in scope. 4. **Statutory Overrides**: - Proprietary estoppel may be overridden by formal legal interests, such as registered legal titles, which have priority under **Land Registration Act 2002**. 5. **Reliance on Conduct**: - Estoppel depends heavily on behaviour, making it unsuitable in cases where actions are ambiguous or informal assurances were made without clear intent. **Limitations of Lease:** 1. **Rigid Formalities**: - Creation of leases often requires adherence to strict formalities under the **Law of Property Act 1925 (LPA 1925)** and **Land Registration Act 2002**. Failure to meet these can render the agreement invalid. 2. **Exclusive Possession Challenges**: - Determining whether exclusive possession exists can be ambiguous (e.g., **Street v Mountford \[1985\]**). Courts look beyond labels, which may lead to disputes. 3. **Termination Risks**: - Leases are subject to forfeiture clauses. Minor breaches of terms, such as non-payment of rent, can lead to termination. 4. **Limited Protection for Tenants**: - Tenants may have limited statutory protection, especially in short-term leases or unregulated sectors. 5. **Non-Registration of Short Leases**: - Leases under seven years do not require registration, but their enforceability may depend on awareness by third parties, increasing the risk for tenants. **Limitations of Licence:** 1. **Lack of Security**: - Licences do not grant proprietary rights, meaning licensees have minimal protection against eviction (e.g., **Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold \[1989\]**). 2. **No Right to Assign or Sublet**: - Licences are personal agreements, unlike leases that often allow assignment or subletting. 3. **Uncertainty of Tenure**: - Licences are typically terminable at will, creating instability for the licensee. 4. **Ambiguity in Classification**: - Disputes can arise over whether an agreement is a lease or a licence, particularly in informal arrangements (**Somma v Hazelhurst \[1978\]**). **Limitations of Formalities:** 1. **Failure to Comply**: - For legal leases, failure to adhere to required formalities (e.g., written agreements or deeds under **s.52(1) LPA 1925**) can invalidate the transaction. 2. **Informal Agreements**: - Informal agreements not satisfying the **s.2 LP(MP)A 1989** requirements for contracts can be unenforceable unless they fall under an exception. 3. **Time-Consuming and Costly**: - Meeting all formalities may delay transactions or increase costs, especially in complex commercial arrangements. **Adverse Possession:** Adverse possession, often pejoratively referred to as \"squatters\' rights,\" is a legal mechanism through which a person (adverse possessor) can acquire ownership of land belonging to someone else (paper title owner or PO) by occupying it for a specified period under certain conditions. **Key Elements of Adverse Possession:** 1. **Intention to Possess** - The adverse possessor must demonstrate an intention to possess the land **to the exclusion of all others**, including the PO. - This is not equivalent to ownership but reflects a desire to control and use the land as their own, irrespective of knowing the PO\'s rights. - Example: A mistaken belief that the land belongs to the possessor does not negate the \"adverse\" nature if no permission exists. 2. **Physical Possession** - The adverse possessor must **physically manifest their intention** to possess the land by using it in a manner that asserts control and excludes others, including the PO. - Examples of physical possession include fencing off the land, cultivating it, or using it for personal purposes like parking vehicles or grazing animals. 3. **Duration** - The adverse possessor must satisfy the statutory limitation period. - **Unregistered Land:** 12 years (Limitation Act 1980, s. 15). After this period, the PO's title is extinguished (s. 17). - **Registered Land (post-LRA 2002):** 10 years, followed by a formal application under Schedule 6 of the Land Registration Act (LRA) 2002. 4. **Adverse Nature** - Occupation must be without the PO\'s permission. - If the adverse possessor mistakenly believes they have permission, their possession is no longer \"adverse.\" **Statutory Framework and Key Differences:** - **Unregistered Land:** Governed by the Limitation Act 1980. After 12 years of continuous adverse possession, the PO loses their title. - **Registered Land:** - **Before 13 October 2003 (LRA 1925):** Same rules as unregistered land, with the addition of the adverse possessor becoming the equitable owner post-successful claim. - **Post-13 October 2003 (LRA 2002):** No automatic extinguishment of title. Instead, adverse possessors must apply to the Land Registry after 10 years. The PO is notified and has two years to recover possession or consent to the claim. **Case Studies:** - **Powell v. McFarlane (1979, Court of Appeal)** - **Parties:** - Plaintiff: McFarlane (Paper Title Owner, PO) - Defendant: Powell (Adverse Possessor) - **Timeline:** - 1951: McFarlane purchased a plot of land adjacent to Powell's grandfather's property. - 1955-1956: McFarlane leased the land to a farmer, but it became vacant after the tenant left. - 1956: Powell, aged 14, began using the land, initially grazing his cow without any response to a letter he sent to McFarlane for permission. Over the years, Powell engaged in sporadic activities, such as fencing the land, shooting, and using it for business signage. - 1972: McFarlane returned to the area and took issue with Powell's use of the land. - 1973: McFarlane commenced proceedings to regain possession. - Did Powell meet the requirements for adverse possession by demonstrating: - - - - The Court dismissed Powell's claim. - His actions were inconsistent and intermittent. - The fencing was primarily to keep animals in, not others out. - His sporadic use did not demonstrate an unequivocal intention to possess the land. - **Significance:** This case emphasised the **high threshold for proving adverse possession**---physical possession must be accompanied by clear evidence of intent to exclude others, including the paper title owner. - **Pye v. Graham (2003, House of Lords)** - **Parties:** - Plaintiff: Pye (Paper Title Owner, PO) - Defendant: Graham (Adverse Possessor) - **Timeline:** - 1983: Pye granted Graham a grazing license to use the land until December 1983. After the license expired, Pye refused to renew it. - 1984-1997: Graham continued using the land, cutting hay and farming it as his own. Graham retained the key to the locked gate, giving him exclusive access. - 1997: Graham applied to register the land via adverse possession. - 1998: Pye commenced proceedings to evict Graham. - Did Graham satisfy the requirements of adverse possession by: - - - - The House of Lords ruled in Graham's favour. - Graham had **exclusive physical possession**, demonstrated by his farming activities and control of the land. - His **willingness to pay** if requested did not negate his intention to possess. - The statutory period of 12 years had elapsed. - **Significance:** The case clarified that **intention to possess** does not require intention to own. This decision was later challenged at the European Court of Human Rights, where the court upheld that adverse possession was not a violation of property rights under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR. - **Buckinghamshire County Council v. Moran (1990, Court of Appeal)** - **Parties:** - Plaintiff: Buckinghamshire County Council (Paper Title Owner, PO) - Defendant: Moran (Adverse Possessor) - **Timeline:** - 1967: The Council purchased land for a potential road development. The land remained vacant, and no development occurred. - 1971: Moran, whose property bordered the land, began using it as an extension of his garden. He enclosed it with fencing, installed a lockable gate, and maintained the land. - 1976: The Council discovered Moran's use of the land and objected. Moran refused to vacate, asserting adverse possession. - Did Moran meet the requirements for adverse possession by: - - - The Court of Appeal ruled in Moran's favour. - **Physical Possession:** Moran's fencing, maintenance, and use of the land as part of his garden demonstrated exclusive possession. - **Intention to Possess:** Moran intended to possess the land until the Council required it for development. His knowledge of their future plans did not undermine his intention. - **Duration:** Moran had used the land continuously for over 12 years. - **Significance:** This case highlighted that **knowledge of the PO's future intentions does not negate adverse possession** if the adverse possessor meets the criteria during the statutory period. **Policy Considerations** 1. **Encouraging Active Land Use:** - The doctrine prevents landowners from \"sleeping on their rights\" and incentivises efficient land use, especially during housing crises. 2. **Balancing Rights:** - While Pye v. Graham raised questions under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions), the courts upheld adverse possession as a proportionate mechanism to balance societal and individual rights. 3. **Social Relevance:** - With thousands of empty properties and homelessness on the rise (e.g., 271,000 homeless people in England as of 2023), adverse possession serves as a potential tool for redistributing underutilised land. **Key Legal Takeaways** - **Tests for Adverse Possession:** - Physical possession + Intention to possess + Duration (12/10 years depending on the land\'s status). - **Impact of LRA 2002:** - Shifts the burden to adverse possessors to apply for registration after 10 years, with a process designed to protect registered landowners\' rights. - **Human Rights Compatibility:** - While controversial, adverse possession is justified within a framework balancing property rights and societal benefits. **Nature of Easements and Interests in Land:** - **Definition of Easements:** - Easements are incorporeal hereditaments, meaning intangible rights attached to land that benefit one landowner (dominant tenement) while burdening another (servient tenement). - A servient tenement is a piece of land that is subject to an easement, which gives another piece of land (the dominant tenement) the right to use it in a certain way. The owner of the servient tenement is required to not interfere with the dominant tenement\'s use of the easement. - These rights must be capable of forming a proprietary interest, passing with the land to subsequent owners. - **Key Examples:** - - **Right of Way:** The ability to cross another's land. - **Right to Light:** The right to receive light through defined apertures. - - **Movement of Aircraft:** Easement for low overflights (*Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews (1978)*). - **Parking Rights:** Right to park vehicles (*Batchelor v Marlow (2001)*). - **Crossing with Shopping Trolleys:** Business-related access. - **Lighting or Signage:** Utility-related easements, e.g., ensuring visibility of signs. **The Essential Characteristics of an Easement:** **Test Established in *Re Ellenborough Park (1956):*** Lord Evershed MR laid out four criteria, later affirmed in *Regency Villas v Diamond Resorts (2018):* 1. **There Must Be a Dominant and Servient Tenement:** - Easements cannot exist in gross; they must attach to land rather than individuals. - Example: A right of way benefits the dominant land, burdening the servient land. 2. **The Easement Must Accommodate the Dominant Tenement:** - It must enhance the utility or value of the land, not just benefit the individual. - *Hill v Tupper (1863):* A boat hire business on a canal was a personal advantage, not tied to the land. - *Moody v Steggles (1879):* An easement for a pub sign increased the utility of the dominant tenement. 3. **The Dominant and Servient Lands Must Be Owned by Different Persons:** - If both tenements come under common ownership, the easement is extinguished (*Boe v Saddons (1888)*). 4. **The Easement Must Be Capable of Forming the Subject of a Grant:** - Requirements: - **Grantor and Grantee:** The parties must have the legal capacity to create the easement. - **Certainty of Terms:** The right must be sufficiently clear and defined. - Rights that are vague or overly extensive cannot qualify as easements. **Accommodation of the Dominant Tenement:** 1. **Proximity:** - The dominant and servient lands need not be adjacent but must be sufficiently close (*Bailey v Stephens (1862)*). 2. **Utility vs. Personal Benefit:** - Rights must enhance the utility of the dominant land rather than provide purely personal advantages. - Case Examples: - *Hill v Tupper (1863):* A right benefiting a business unrelated to the land was not an easement. - *Platt v Crouch (2003):* Mooring rights connected to a hotel's land were upheld as benefiting the land. 3. **Recreational Uses:** - Purely recreational purposes (e.g., leisure) can qualify as easements if they enhance the utility of the land (*Regency Villas v Diamond Resorts (2018)*). **Legal and Equitable Easements: Creation and Formalities:** **Legal Easements:** 1. **Statutory Requirements:** - Must be annexed to a freehold or leasehold estate (*s.1 Law of Property Act 1925*). 2. **Methods of Creation:** - **Express Grant or Reservation:** Created explicitly through a deed or statutory process. - **Implied Creation:** - *Necessity:* Required for land access (*Wong v Beaumont Property Trust (1965)*). - *Common Intention:* Based on mutual understanding (*Pwllbach Colliery v Woodman (1915)*). - **Prescription:** Arises after long, continuous, and uninterrupted use (e.g., 20 years under the Prescription Act 1832). - **By Statute:** For public utilities or public purposes. 3. **Formalities:** - Must be created by deed (*s.52 Law of Property Act 1925*). - For registered land, it must be registered to bind third parties (*Land Registration Act 2002, s.27*). **Equitable Easements:** 1. **Creation:** - Where formalities for a legal easement are not met, an equitable easement may arise if there is: - A written agreement (*s.2 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989*). - Proprietary estoppel (*Ives v High (1967)*). 2. **Binding Nature:** - **Registered Land:** May bind as an overriding interest under *Sch. 3 of the Land Registration Act 2002*. - **Unregistered Land:** Must be registered as a Class D (iii) land charge under the *Land Charges Act 1972*. **Case Summaries for Easements:** **Re Ellenborough Park (1956)** - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - A large piece of land (Ellenborough Park) was used as a private garden for nearby houses. The land was owned by a company, but nearby homeowners were granted rights to use the garden. - During World War II, the land was requisitioned for military use, leading to compensation claims. The government contested whether the homeowners had proprietary rights or mere licences. - **Legal Issue:** - Did the rights over the garden constitute an easement, giving the homeowners a proprietary interest in the land? - **Decision:** - The Court of Appeal held that the rights constituted valid easements. - **Reasoning:** - The four essential characteristics of an easement, as defined in this case, were satisfied: 1. **Dominant and Servient Tenements:** The gardens (servient) were for the benefit of surrounding houses (dominant). 2. **Accommodation of the Dominant Tenement:** The garden increased the utility and enjoyment of the houses. 3. **Separate Ownership:** The houses and gardens were owned by different parties. 4. **Capability of Grant:** The right was sufficiently certain and definable. **Hill v Tupper (1863)** - **Court:** Exchequer Court - **Facts:** - The claimant, a tenant of canal-side land, was granted the exclusive right to put boats on the canal for profit. - Another party also began using the canal for the same purpose, prompting the claimant to sue for infringement of his alleged easement. - **Legal Issue:** - Was the right to operate boats on the canal a valid easement, or was it a personal right? - **Decision:** - The court held that the right was not an easement but a personal contractual right. - **Reasoning:** - The right benefited the claimant\'s business, not the land itself. Easements must enhance the utility of the dominant land, not merely provide personal or commercial advantage. **Moody v Steggles (1879)** - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - The claimant owned a pub, and the sign advertising the pub was placed on neighbouring land. - The servient owner attempted to stop the use of their land for this purpose, claiming it was not a valid easement. - **Legal Issue:** - Was the right to hang the pub sign a valid easement? - **Decision:** - The Court of Appeal held that the right was a valid easement. - **Reasoning:** - The sign enhanced the utility of the dominant land (the pub) by promoting its use as a business. - The court distinguished this from purely personal benefits, as the pub's use was inherently tied to the land. **Regency Villas v Diamond Resorts (2018)** - **Court:** Supreme Court - **Facts:** - Easements were granted for recreational purposes, such as access to a golf course, tennis courts, and a swimming pool, benefitting timeshare owners in a nearby development. - The servient owner claimed these rights were not valid easements because they were recreational rather than enhancing the land's utility. - **Legal Issue:** - Could recreational rights, such as the use of leisure facilities, qualify as easements? - **Decision:** - The Supreme Court held that these rights constituted valid easements. - **Reasoning:** - Easements could include recreational purposes if they increased the utility and enjoyment of the dominant land. - The court rejected the notion that easements were limited to traditional uses such as access or light, recognising modern land use needs. **Wright v Macadam (1949)** - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - A tenant was allowed to use a coal shed on the landlord's property to store coal. This arrangement continued informally after the renewal of the tenancy. - The landlord later attempted to charge the tenant for this use, arguing that it was not a formal right. - **Legal Issue:** - Was the use of the coal shed a valid easement? - **Decision:** - The court held that the tenant had acquired a valid easement through implied grant. - **Reasoning:** - The right was sufficiently defined, limited to a specific part of the property, and enhanced the tenant's use of their premises. - The court emphasised that easements do not deprive the servient owner of reasonable use of their land. **Platt v Crouch (2003)** - **Court:** Court of Appeal - **Facts:** - The claimant operated a hotel that benefited from mooring rights on adjacent land. - The servient owner argued that the rights were not easements because they primarily benefited the hotel business rather than the land itself. - **Legal Issue:** - Did the mooring rights accommodate the dominant tenement? - **Decision:** - The court held that the mooring rights were valid easements. - **Reasoning:** - The mooring rights enhanced the utility of the hotel's land, as they were tied to the business operations of the hotel, which depended on access to the river. **Copeland v Greenhalf (1952)** - **Court:** Chancery Division - **Facts:** - A claimant claimed an easement to store an unlimited number of vehicles on a strip of land belonging to the servient owner. - **Legal Issue:** - Was this an excessive use that would exclude the servient owner's reasonable use of their land? - **Decision:** - The court held that this was not a valid easement. - **Reasoning:** - The right was overly extensive and amounted to exclusive possession of the servient land, inconsistent with the nature of an easement.