POLSC 20 Institutionalism PDF

C 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 MODULE 2 Institutionalism POLSC 20 Introduction to Political Science C 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC...

C 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 MODULE 2 Institutionalism POLSC 20 Introduction to Political Science C 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 POLSC 20 Contexts Institutionalism was political science Dominant until the 1950s Traditional institutionalism ○ Comparing political systems via analysis of their political institutions Institutional turn in politics and development The 90s as the decade of institutionalism Emergence of the “new institutionalisms” ○ Reactions to the limitations of behavioralism and RCT Traditional institutionalism Normative - being concerned with “good government” Structuralist - formal structures determine political behavior Historicist - positing the central influence of history Legalist - laws play a major role in governing (esp. constitutions) Holistic - being concerned with describing and comparing whole systems of government Interregnum - Samuel Huntington’s political development as institution Political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures Stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior (Huntington, 1965) Institutionalization: “Effective establishment of… authority over society through specially created political structures and agents” (Kamrava, 2000). Three new institutionalisms Sociological institutionalism ○ Institutions constrain or offer opportunities to actors within a particular organizational context ○ The process of institutionalization is that of perception, not evaluation. Actors are constrained by cultural norms, conventions, and cognitive frames of reference privileging a certain way of thinking about policy. Three new institutionalisms Sociological institutionalism is based on three ideas: ○ Human agency is dependent on social context. Agency is more context-driven than goal-driven and influenced by cultural logics ○ Such contexts are often heavily institutionalized. Institutions essentially spread their interconnections beyond their fields ○ Institutions operate at a subconscious level where they provide a take-for-granted cultural infrastructure in society It also provides the building blocks for normative Three new institutionalisms Rational choice institutionalism ○ Institutions shape behavior by affecting “the structure of a situation” where actors select strategies for pursuit of their preferences ○ Institutions provide information about the likely future behavior of others, as well as the incentives/disincentives to different courses of action ○ Institutions are purposeful human constructions designed to solve collective action problems Three new institutionalisms Historical institutionalism ○ Explores how state structures reflected and reinforced power relationships between different social and economic groups but does not assume that institutional development followed a functional logic ○ Using a mix of incentive and norm-based explanations, HI showed how the institutional organization of the policy works to privilege some interests while demobilizing others ○ Institutional change happens when power relations Three new institutionalisms Normative institutionalism ○ Political institutions influence actors’ behavior by shaping their values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs ○ Institutions “simplify” political life by ensuring some things are taken for granted in deciding other things New institutionalisms: Core features What’s “new”? ○ Defining institutions ○ Systematic explanation on how institutions affect behavior ○ Making sense of institutional persistence and change New institutionalisms Institutions are “...durable social rules and procedures, formal and informal, which structure – but do not determine – the social, economic, and political relations and interactions of those affected by them (Leftwich and Sen, 2011). New institutionalisms Economic institutions ○ From formal definitions and protections of property rights, to norms, traditions, and conventions governing access to opportunities Political institutions ○ From formal definitions on how power is obtained, used, and controlled, and by whom, to informal definitions on how authoritative decisions are made (and not only at the state level) Social institutions ○ Includes cultural and/or religious (ie. collective) patterns of behavior New institutionalisms: Core features Institutions as contextually embedded Institutions as embodying values and power ○ Shaping ideas, interests, beliefs, and incentive structures ○ Acemoglu and Robinson (2012): Nations fail to develop due to extractive economic institutions supported by extractive political institutions New institutionalisms: Dilemmas What is an institution anyway? Institutional rules are: ○ Specific to a particular political or governmental setting ○ Recognized by actors (if not always adhered to) ○ Collective (rather than personal) in their effect ○ Subject to some sort of third-party enforcement (formal or informal) New institutionalisms: Dilemmas Accounting for institutional genesis and change ○ Intentional design ○ Accident ○ Evolution New institutionalisms: Dilemmas Compatibility among the “new institutionalisms” ○ Emphasis on modes of institutional constraint Rules Practices Narratives  WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIET ORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIE Strong-Arming, Weak Steering: Central-Local Relations in the Philippines in the Era of the Pandemic PH at the height of COVID-19 Government effectiveness can be measured via the capacity of national and local governments to coordinate toward an effective crisis response Patterns of interaction ○ National and local/subnational governments have high capacity and coordination ○ Only the national or local/subnational has high capacity/coordination and compensates for the other’s weakness ○ Both have low capacity and weak coordination PH at the height of COVID-19 Central government should play a critical role in coordinating an effective pandemic response PH sets up the IATF-EID ○ Duterte: “I am ordering all [local government units]... to stand down and to abide by the directives of the IATF…and those issued by the Office of the President” PH at the height of COVID-19 Result: Critical agencies were unable to deliver ○ Lack of capacity at the “center” led the IATF to cede much of its decision-making powers to the LGUs who then also had to compensate for the sluggish and ineffective national response Notable LGUs were those with relatively large income and resources, had good coordination with national agencies, better administrative capacity, and partnerships with civil society ○ These notable LGUs were exceptions to the norm PH at the height of COVID-19 Subnational responses to public health imperatives are hampered by major structural deficiencies. ○ Unclear direction from the center ○ Limited resources, lack of good management skills, the dominance of patronage politics, corruption, and other problems ○ Some parts of the Philippines are in the middle or in the deleterious extreme (local compensates for weak center; both national and local are lacking). PH at the height of COVID-19 Fukuyama’s elements for an effective pandemic response: ○ Competent states, skillful leadership, and a government people listen to and trust. Under Duterte, the PH was under a populist president that did not appreciate the virtues of an effective bureaucracy but is also oriented towards a reliance on coercive measures. Duterte’s securitized pandemic response ○ “Strong-arming” tactics which helped conceal the basic deficiencies of the national agencies – and Alternative model of governance Francesco Kjellberg: The autonomous local government model is becoming increasingly obsolete and must be replaced with an “integrational model” more suited to the dynamics of central-local relations. ○ Autonomous model: clear separation between national/local ○ Integrative model: accentuates integration between the national/local and underscores the need for close cooperation among different levels of government Alternative model of governance After emphasizing that local governments need to be conceived as “part of a larger, more encompassing political and administrative body,” Kjellberg highlights the virtues of advancing national goals through what he calls “central steering.” ○ “[W]hile the general goals of public activity will remain the realm of national government, the definition of the means to be adopted would more explicitly become the function of local authorities.” Despotic vs infrastructural power Mann: Despotic power is power that state elites exercise over civil society groups, not as part of routine or institutionalized procedures but rather at the mere “whim” of the leader ○ “Power by the state elite itself over civil society” Despotic vs infrastructural power Mann: Infrastructural power is “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement political decisions throughout the realm.” ○ Power through rather than power over, with a focus on the state rather than the “state elite.” ○ The state can “centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its own infrastructure” Central steering in the PH The bureaucracy historically exhibits weak capacity, and is furthermore imbued with strong patrimonial characteristics. The historical sequencing of the emergence of representative institutions relative to development of the bureaucracy tilts the political system very decidedly – from the national level to local levels – toward a strong focus on patronage. Central steering in the PH The PH national government does provide central steering in many spheres, but its mechanisms are often thoroughly infused with political and/or electoral considerations. The logic of a patrimonial and patronage-oriented polity frequently undermines the integrity of the bureaucracy. This is exacerbated by the presence of a charismatic populist leader oriented to strong-arm tactics against those who have crossed his path (Duterte). The PH’s pandemic response As President Duterte already exerted substantial control over local power structures, COVID-19 created potent opportunities and justification for him to ramp up his politics of fear. Weak Steering: Central Largesse but Major Flaws in Resource Distribution Strong Arming: Intimidation and Coercive Regulation of Local Governments The PH’s pandemic response Weak Steering: Central Largesse but Major Flaws in Resource Distribution ○ Social Amelioration Program (SAP) distribution ○ Vaccination Procurement and Rollout Strong Arming: Intimidation and Coercive Regulation of Local Governments ○ Show Cause Orders Weaponized ○ Securitization of the Pandemic ○ Withholding Funds from Barangays in Support of a Reinvigorated Anti-Communist Counterinsurgency Campaign ○ Continued Killings of Mayors and Local Politicians Recommendations moving forward The goal of building more effective units of local government depends critically on changing the incentive structure faced by the politicians that run them. Strengthen the national government bureaucracy at the regional level. Building up stronger administrative capacity at the local level is an absolute – and too often ignored – requirement for ensuring the success of devolution. K IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY Thanks! Do you have any questions? CREDITS: This presentation template was created by Slidesgo, including icons by Flaticon and infographics & images by Freepik Please keep this slide for attribution K IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY — WORK IN SOCIETY