Pluralism PDF

Pluralism examines the relation between pluralism and other accounts that heed the existence of social Carla Yumatle difference, namely monism, relativis...

Pluralism examines the relation between pluralism and other accounts that heed the existence of social Carla Yumatle difference, namely monism, relativism, skepticism, and subjectivism. The section on An Approximation to the Concept types of pluralism that follows looks inside the boundaries of pluralism and maps out Pluralism is an interpretation of social diver- three alternative kinds: cultural, political, and sity. It can be rendered as a cultural, political, philosophical pluralism. Then the section on or philosophical stance. In any of these pluralism and political doctrines analyzes versions, pluralism offers an account of social the relation between philosophical pluralism interaction understood as an interplay of and two political doctrines, liberalism and conflicting and competing positions that radical democracy. The concluding remarks cannot be seamlessly reduced to one another, canvass two vital and longstanding (though as ranked in one single order permanently, or yet unanswered) questions undergirding the reduced to a single institutional arrangement. debates about pluralism: Can we prove the Any kind of pluralism (cultural, political, or existence of pluralism? And, if so, is pluralism philosophical) presupposes at the very least an a good thing? empirical thesis about irreducible diversity. Social diversity, from the pluralist perspective, Pluralism and Its Relatives does not go away. Yet each of these kinds of pluralism pivots around different types of Like pluralism, many other currents of thought conflict – including ethical values, social or have also provided an interpretation of social cultural practices, epistemological worldviews diversity. Monism, relativism, skepticism, and and/or political interests – and each accounts subjectivism are philosophical positions that for these clashes from a different angle and stem, similarly, from an awareness of value with different implications. Whereas cultural diversity. Pluralism can dovetail or overlap and political pluralisms articulate the social with these alternative philosophical stances difference that stems from habits, beliefs, or and has often been conflated with them. What interests, philosophical pluralism goes further is new about pluralism? What does pluralism and adds an interpretation of the origin, add to the understanding of social diversity character, and experience of value heteroge- that is absent from any of these other accounts neity. It offers a full account of the anatomy of of value difference? An examination of the normative difference, of its awareness, and of relation between pluralism and adjacent posi- its impact on social agency. These three kinds tions should highlight the distinctive tenets of of pluralism are not necessarily mutually pluralism, that is, the concomitant significance exclusive. Philosophical pluralism always entails that pluralism attaches to social diversity. Let’s the acknowledgment of empirical diversity at begin with the view that pluralism opposes, the heart of cultural and political pluralism. namely monism. Cultural and political pluralism, in turn, may or may not sprawl into a philosophical thesis. Pluralism versus monism Before exploring the differences within Monism, also called absolutism (Kekes 2000: the pluralism family, it is necessary to draw 47–65) or unitarianism (Connolly 2005: 1–10, the boundaries of pluralism vis-à-vis other 41), stands for the existence of an ultimate competing philosophical views of social diver- value, dominant currency, goal, or standard sity. With this in mind, the next section that sits atop the hierarchy and facilitates a The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0771 2 rational ranking among the various competing cognates (for instance, Barry 2001: 133). social preferences, goals, values, or practices According to relativism, cultural diversity under consideration. The supreme good or begets a contingent understanding of the truth standard of monistic theories serves as a of moral judgments, and thus moral delibera- clear-cut and decisive benchmark of normative tion cannot ever be universally, rationally, and and social evaluation and it is the most basic objectively justified. value that explains the worth of all other rele- Pluralism departs from this view in two con- vant goods. Monistic theories are systematic sequential aspects: its account of culture and of and complete. its role; and its conception of incommensura- The structural organization of monistic bility. Regarding the role of culture, pluralism views has important implications for the kind acknowledges that social diversity precludes of rational deliberation that they admit. If there universal, conclusive, permanent, and complete is a “dominant end” (Rawls 1999: 480–91)– rational decisions regarding values, interests, or that is, one ultimate end at which all human beliefs. In this sense, pluralism and relativism action aims, an end to which all of our ends are concur. However, pluralism, unlike relativism, subordinated, an overarching aim for the sake does not attach ultimate normative authority of which all our other ends are pursued – then to cultures. Culture, in the pluralistic view, does it is in principle possible to arrive at a not stand as the final source of appeal for nor- rational decision with no normative residue or mative assessment. Nor do cultures delineate the loss. Teleological theories (roughly, theories central normative space around which value that hold that everything has an end that decisions need to be attained. From a pluralistic determines the most accomplished condition perspective, cultural diversity is either a socio- thereof) are often monistic. Thus consequen- logical fact or a manifestation of a deeper tialism, utilitarianism, and perfectionism, all philosophical view about value diversity. In amenable to a teleological structure, are clear either case, culture by itself is not necessarily the examples of theories that lend themselves to a final instance of a normative warrant. In other monistic kind of ethical deliberation. Pluralistic words, culture does not determine the province theories, on the contrary, lack this overarching of pluralism in its scope or justification. criterion of evaluation, which bears important Second, the most distinctive trait of plu- consequences for the type of normative delib- ralism is the idea of incommensurability (more eration that is suitable to them. about this idea below), which departs from the Hence, if, according to monism, social same notion usually associated with relativism. diversity provides the parts of a puzzle that Relativism involves normative disruptions eventually come together neatly and without among cultures, a discontinuity that implies residue in a normative amalgam, for pluralism, incommensurability among them. That is, social diversity offers the unalloyed elements since moral judgments make reference to the that are never constitutive of a single overall cultures in which they emerge and the latter in system that embraces them all. turn are untranslatable into each other, it is not possible to assess the relative worth of Pluralism versus relativism conflicting judgments – moral judgments and Moral relativism can be a normative or a meta- their corresponding cultures are incommensu- ethical position. Pluralism is usually conflated rable. This idea diverges from the one that is with the metaethical version of relativism, the backbone of pluralism. For the pluralist, the that is, with an account of the rightness and notion of incommensurability is not attached wrongness of moral judgments that attaches to or hemmed in by cultures. Rather incom- normative warrant to different cultural and mensurability is an attribute that applies to the historical contexts. Indeed, some thinkers have character of values themselves, regardless of claimed that pluralism and relativism are cultural boundaries. So, whereas for relativism  3 incommensurability pertains to (sub)cultural crossculturally. The idea of normative residue provinces, for pluralism incommensurability and loss, however, is concomitant to the pluralist cuts across cultural borders and applies to the notion of incommensurability. To claim that universe of values that are significant to human values are incommensurable necessitates the experience. William Connolly (2005: 41–2) idea that any normative decision entails a loss. alludes to this point when he argues that rela- Thus relativism takes culture as a source and tivism understands culture concentrically, ultimate instance of appeal in moral argumen- whereas pluralism is attentive to connections tation. Pluralism, alternatively, is a thesis about that exceed and disrupt the concentric image the diverse, conflicting, and incommensurable of culture. Hence, as a philosophical view, character of ethical experience. Although this pluralism is an account of the incommensura- latter position sets constraints upon normative bility of values rather than cultures. justification (it cannot, for instance, admit the Moreover, the key notion of incommensura- form of rational deliberation proper of monistic bility, central to the debates around relativism, views), it is nonetheless inconclusive about presupposes necessarily the idea of incompara- which kind of rational deliberation is possible. bility. To say, in the relativist mood, that cultures Unlike relativism, however, pluralism does are incommensurable with one another is not preclude the rational justification of our tantamount to claiming that the rightness or normative views. Although the pluralist’s wrongness of moral judgments that originate notion of incommensurability sets limits to the in different cultures cannot be compared across kind of normative deliberation that it can them. There is no point in engaging in moral incorporate, unlike relativism, pluralism is not disagreement from distinct cultural vantage hemmed in by the impossibility of a rational points, since the lack of an encompassing justification of ethical assessment. background renders the disagreement unintel- Pluralists differ vastly, however, over the ligible. Indeed, from a relativistic point of view kind of normative rationality that is possible there is no disagreement at all. Alternatively, under this worldview. Isaiah Berlin, for in- under the pluralist umbrella, incommensura- stance, maintains a cognitivist position, bility may or may not involve incomparability meaning that moral claims are truth-assess- (more on this below). For the pluralist, to claim able. He argues that, in holding moral beliefs that values are incommensurable among them- and in engaging in moral argument, we seek selves does not mean that an ordinal normative evidence for our opinions. We can alter other arrangement among them is unattainable. people’s attitudes and behavior through Although the pluralist is precluded from rational moral argument – and not, as the non- offering a sealed, absolute, reductive normative cognitivist would hold, because moral claims standpoint, she can offer a tentative, provi- express emotions (emotivism) or because they sional, and transitory value stance that orders serve as universalizable commands (prescrip- competing, conflicting, and, more importantly, tivism). Not only does Berlin treat moral claims incommensurable values in an ordinal way. as assertions that carry truth values, but he also Hence, whereas pluralists can settle (if only holds that some of them have the truth value temporarily) for an evaluative arrangement “true.” Hence, unlike some antirealists who among incommensurables, relativists cannot embrace an “error theory” (Mackie 1977: order incommensurable cultures in any way. 35–49), conceding that moral claims have truth Finally, according to relativism, moral judg- values while denying that any of them is true, ments that emanate from different cultures are Berlin holds a cognitivist stance and asserts untranslatable into each other. Hence the that some of the moral claims are true. endorsement of one culture over another does The kind of rationality that Berlin embraces not entail any form of normative loss, since as the proper mode of practical reasoning it is not possible to translate or compare involves the use of imaginative insight – what 4 he calls the “sense of reality,” without which self-knowledge, that is, on a careful attempt to “the bones of the past remain dry and lifeless” ascertain which one in a diverse set of ends (Berlin 1997a: 69). This faculty plays a pivotal matters most to us. We should use what he calls role in Berlin’s thought; for it alone, granted a “deliberative rationality” (1999: 365–72), a pro- generic human character, allows delving into cess that allows us to reflect carefully, under the past and across cultures to carry on a favorable conditions, in light of all the relevant rational assessment of values without being facts available to us. For him, there is no swayed by the commands of formal, empirical, formal procedure that will routinely select the or universalizable thinking. For him, the prac- rational course of action. Likewise, John Kekes tical reasoning that can wrestle with the open (2000: 66–80) avoids formal kinds of norma- character of our experience and yet guide our tive thinking as well, arguing that a reasoned intuitions is a sense of reality – a historical choice among conflicting “modes of reflection” sense that eludes any perpetual rule-thinking (modes that are usually called worldviews) about that reality that can never be left too far does not presuppose a general reason to deter- behind. The sense of reality is an inscrutable mine the superiority of one of them over the capacity – not because it is lofty, mysterious, or others, which prevents rational normative obscure, but for the opposite reason, that it assessment to be fettered to universal thinking. penetrates too deeply into our experience. At Some other pluralists put special emphasis times, Berlin (1980: 116) calls it “judgment” on the assessment of one’s particular circum- and fleshes it out as the empirical knack of stances. According to William Connolly (1995) weaving together independent concepts and and Chantal Mouffe (1993), “critical respon- general presuppositions. At others, he describes siveness” and “self-assertion” are, respectively, it as “our capacity for understanding the habits the right pluralist critical attitudes over of thought and action that are embodied in rationalism and ethical systematization. As human attitudes and behavior … what is called Connolly argues, this form of thinking is not knowledge of life” (1980: 128). The sense of on a par with relativism, which asserts that the history is an indefinable perception, an imagi- justification of a substantive stance rests on native insight capable of delving into and com- cultural context, habituation, or personal municating a form of life. In Berlin’s words, “To preference and should be assessed within that try to analyze and clearly describe what goes normative framework. on when we understand in this sense is impos- In short, pluralism may require a specific sible” (1997b: 24). This skill is a form of prac- kind of contextualized, historical form of prac- tical reasoning that sets Berlin’s pluralism apart tical reason. It forgoes absoluteness in the from both relativism and realism. realm of justification. A particular case is not For many other pluralists, too, imagination always an instance of a general, universal prin- acquires a primary role in normative thinking. ciple of rationality. This form of normative Stuart Hampshire (1989: 60–3) leans toward thinking sets it apart from both monism and relativist thinking when he argues that, unlike relativism. Unlike monistic views, it can never rational thinking, which is a pattern of thought yield universal, everlasting conclusions. Unlike potentially common to the species, imagina- relativism, it makes room for meaningful nor- tion is a pattern of thought that is tied to a mative assessment among incommensurable particular language and culture. For him, the views. If, according to relativism, social diver- justice or injustice, rightness or wrongness of sity begets a culture-centric view with dividing actions and practices cannot be assessed except walls that thwart the idea of ethical disagree- in relation to particular cultural norms. ment, for pluralism it yields instead a value- John Rawls claims that formal principles centric perspective that cuts across cultures play a limited role in determining moral and does not necessarily result in a disrupted choices. Rational choice must often rest on normative understanding.  5 Pluralism versus skepticism our emotions. Morality, according to the subjec- Skepticism is a philosophical outlook that tivist, is an articulation of our feelings. Reason, requires the unending suspension of judgment by itself, cannot propel us to act morally; only on any relevant matter, on the grounds of a emotions do. According to this view, there is no permanent uncertainty of our beliefs. Pluralism, universal moral truth, but judgments that vary in acknowledging the existence of ineliminable in accordance with our feelings and emotions of diversity and the impossibility of a final rational acceptance or rejection of the issue in question. ranking of values, interests, or beliefs, comes All that we have when it comes to acting morally close to a skeptical view. Yet value irreducibility are expressions of our emotions and sentiments and incommensurability, two of the hallmarks of – what is right or wrong is informed by how we pluralist reasoning, do not lead necessarily to the feel about it, whether we approve or disapprove suspension of judgment in ethics or in politics. it, or whether we encourage or discourage it Nicolas Rescher (1993: 80) argues that pluralism (Stevenson 1944; Smith 1976; Hume 1978). and skepticism part ways on precisely that Pluralism casts doubts on the possibility of particular point. He holds that skepticism is a accounting for our normative experience from view that asserts that no one position is ever fully the perspective of rational, universal abstract justified. Consequently, from the skeptic’s per- thinking. In this sense, it belittles the role and spective, one should suspend judgment alto- scope of formal reasoning in value assessments. gether if one wants to avoid error. Alternatively, Unlike subjectivism, however, it does not Rescher asserts, pluralism does not claim that prioritize feelings over reason. As mentioned any position is never justified; nor does it hold above, pluralist thinkers embrace alternative that the existence of mutually valid alternatives forms of practical rationality, usually accompa- commits us to the suspension of judgment. nied by empathetic and imaginative capacities. Pluralism, according to Rescher, entails not the Yet practical reason plays a formidable role in absence of commitment in the face of equally the pluralistic outlook, something that one viable alternatives, but the possibility of sticking cannot assert for many versions of emotivism. to one of them and of rationally justifying that Moreover, whereas subjectivism (or emotivism) decision. Unlike skepticism, pluralism does not is a position about the nature of moral judg- presuppose that no position is ever fully justified; ments, pluralism (in particular philosophical it claims instead that multiple positions can be pluralism) is a view about the nature and rationally justified. Whereas skepticism claims character of what normative judgments are that we can never be fully certain of the truth of about, namely values. In short, if social diver- our beliefs, pluralism holds that many outlooks sity, according to the subjectivist perspective, can be rationally defended. According to skepti- evinces the emotional character of both moral cism, the lack of epistemological certainty motivation and ethical judgments, for pluralism brackets the possibility of true beliefs. it indicates the limits of formal reasoning in Alternatively, from the pluralist point of view, the normative understanding, but it does not dilute absence of one single overriding normative truth reason altogether. leads to various equally warranted alternatives. Hence, if the existence of social diversity gives Types of Pluralism rise to epistemological abstinence in the case of Inside the pluralist family different types of skepticism, it brings along warranted difference pluralism coexist and various thinkers have in the case of pluralism. offered alternative classifications of pluralist Pluralism versus subjectivism strands. John Kekes (2000: 4), for instance, claims that pluralism can be Subjectivism (known also as emotivism in a late, more sophisticated version thereof) holds that ontological, having to do with the ultimate moral judgments are simply the expression of constituents of reality; epistemological, 6 concerning the standards of reasonable belief; diversity. From Protagoras (Plato 1992) to axiological, pertaining to the values that Michel de Montaigne (1973) to Max Weber make lives good; anthropological, regarding (Gerth & Mills 1946), all have acknowledged the cultural forms that human lives may take; the relevance of cultural diversity. Cultural plu- or political, advocating arrangements that ralism is a sociological view about the existence recognize the legitimacy of many conceptions of heterogeneity in practices, beliefs, and value of a good life. systems, which may or may not turn into a Nicholas Rescher (1993: 99) offers six dimen- philosophical position about the nature of sions (conceptual, substantive, logical, method- values and our experience of them. ological, ontological, and evaluative Some thinkers admit to the existence of disagreement) on the basis of which we can cat- cultural pluralism and integrate it into a egorize possible forms of pluralism. Likewise, political arrangement and a philosophical Kirstie McClure organizes the pluralist debate theory about justice but abstain from asserting around three successive “generations” in anything conclusive about the fundamentally political pluralism – the Anglo-American plu- pluralistic nature of values or their impact on ralism of the beginning of the twentieth century, social agency. That is, cultural pluralism does the pluralism of Robert Dahl and others in the not necessarily involve a metaethical view 1950s and 1960s, and a current poststructuralist about the irreducibly plural character of values. pluralism that challenges the state as the pri- This is the path taken by John Rawls (1996) in mary focus of political agency and struggle, in a Political Liberalism, which presupposes the way in which the previous two generations did existence of “reasonable pluralism,” a sociolog- not (McClure 1992; Schlosberg 2006; Dryzek, ical account of disagreement in contemporary Honig, & Phillips 2006: 142–60). liberal democracies. The recognition of the This entry organizes the various pluralist centrality of cultural pluralism in present-day approaches around a threefold classification: societies induced Rawls to rethink the confla- cultural, political, and philosophical. Each of tion of a comprehensive good based on the these three forms of pluralism is not necessarily paramount value of moral autonomy and the an exclusionary stance. Cultural and political conception of justice that regulates the basic pluralism may or may not entail a philosophical political institutions in pluralistic contempo- standpoint, but they can certainly be embraced rary social orders. Yet his sociological plu- together, as they very often are. Philosophical ralism does not presuppose a view about the pluralism, on the other hand, implies an plural structure of normative experience, but endorsement of incommensurable cultural and simply a recognition of ethical and cultural political heterogeneity. Indeed, philosophical heterogeneity and of its impact on the justifica- pluralism is a viewpoint that begins with the tion of a just political order (see also Larmore empirical fact of social plurality assumed by 1996: 152–74). both cultural and political pluralisms, but it Some other theorists have integrated cultural accounts for that fact in a way that includes some pluralism into a philosophical view about broader interpretation of the character of values, modernity and the rational limits of ultimate our epistemological capacities, or our historical decisions about value. Max Weber’s “polytheism and political makeup. I will describe each of of values” (Gerth & Mills 1946: 77–156, 323–62) these three forms of pluralism one by one. offers an account of irreconcilable and incom- mensurable conflict among values. His poly- Cultural pluralism theism points to the fact that each of the value From a cultural or sociological point of view, spheres that characterize modernity (religion, pluralism refers to the fact that cultures are art, sexuality, economy, science, and politics) expressions of a variety of values, practices, and is organized on excluding ultimate criteria beliefs. Cultural variations yield in turn ethical that cannot be translated into other spheres.  7 Each field is justified on grounds of irreconcil- presuppose the empirical recognition of cultural able ultimate values, and thus modernity brings pluralism. Some moral philosophers, the univer- along the impossibility of a definitive, objective, salists, have argued that cultural pluralism is not scientific solution regarding the purpose and inimical to the possibility of finding universal meaning of a worthwhile life. Ultimate weltan- moral truths, while others, the relativists, believe schauungs clash and ultimate choices have to be that cultural pluralism is evidence of both made. In Weber’s words, “the ultimately pos- normative and metaethical relativism. sible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and Chandra Kukathas, for instance, argues that hence their struggle can never be brought to a cultural diversity “does not preclude the possi- final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to make a bility of moral criticism or of developing decisive choice” (Gerth & Mills 1946: 152). universal moral standards. Nor does it make it Starting from cultural pluralism, Weber derives impossible to compare moral values or to a philosophical view about human experience acquire moral knowledge” (Kukathas 1994: 2). in the context of modernity that seeps across the Cultural pluralism, for Kukathas, does not raise ethical life, the purpose of scientific knowl- a problem for moral theory, as there are edge, and politics. fundamental commitments and shared beliefs The Weberian themes of pluralism, sphere among cultures that make moral argumenta- fragmentation, domination, and the insidious tion possible. Likewise, Alan Gewirth (1994: effects of technical knowledge upon power 25) examines the argument that positive moral- relations are further pursued in Michael ities challenge the existence of one normative Walzer’s work on pluralism (1983), which morality that applies universally, and he con- construes a theory of justice on the basis of cludes that cultural pluralism is not epistemi- the idea of “complex equality,” articulated in cally relevant to rational moral knowledge. democratic principles with communitarian Moral philosophers David Wong (1984) and roots. Spheres of justice are autonomous, Hilbert Harman (1975, 1978, 1985) stand at embodying their own internal principles that the opposite end of the debate. They both argue regulate their relevant social good (wealth, that cultural pluralism spawns relativism. power, health, and so on). Justice, in pluralist Harman believes that whether someone is societies of this sort, requires that one’s posi- wrong in doing something always depends on tion regarding one social good – say, power – an understanding or agreement of the does not “dominate” one’s position regarding a particular culture in question and not on basic different social good – say, health. Thus cultural moral demands that apply to everyone. pluralism is accompanied by a theory of justice with a philosophical understanding of the Political pluralism character of values, namely that the shared If the focus of cultural pluralism is empirical understanding of the value of a social good diversity manifested in values, practices, and determines its proper distribution. beliefs, the core concern of pluralism in political Cultural pluralism has also been the building science lies in the organizational and institu- block of discussions on ethical theory. In tional articulation of competing individual and particular, some thinkers have focused on group interests. Like cultural pluralism, political whether its existence chips away at the scope of pluralism may or may not presuppose a rational normative argumentation. In other philosophical view about the plural character of words, the debate has centered on whether values and its impact on human agency. cultural heterogeneity sets limits to the pos- Drawing upon the view of William James sibility of moral knowledge. Relativism and (1976 , 1977 ), the first wave of universalism, two clashing philosophical views pluralists in political science attacked the uni- about the rightness and wrongness of our moral tary source of state power on grounds of both judgments and the possibility of moral truth, an empirical and a philosophical view about 8 value diversity. They challenged the sover- more nuanced view. They thus acknowledge eignty, monopoly, and unity of the state as the the relative power leverage of different groups sole representative of the plurality of interests. and the unique, commanding position of the Starting at the beginning of the twentieth state in shaping and inducing preferences century, political scientists such as Arthur among competing groups (Schlosberg 1999; Bentley (1908), Ernest Barker (1957 ), Eisfeld 2006; McFarland 2004, 2007). Harold Laski (1917), and Mary Parker Follett (1918) offered a view of politics as a conflict Philosophical pluralism among plural interests emanating from both Philosophical pluralism does more than the state and private associations, all consid- simply admit the permanent existence of ered to be at the same level. social variety (either political or cultural); it A second wave of pluralism in politics took moors empirical diversity to a philosophical place in the late 1950s and early 1960s and view about the character of values and the focused almost exclusively on the institutional experience, knowledge, and awareness we design for the aggregation of conflicting have of them. According to philosophical plu- interests. More particularly, the concern of its ralism, cultural, moral, and political diversity representatives was the “political processes” is an unavoidable and permanent byproduct by which plural interests could be accommo- of the character of the values that comprise dated among different associations. Theirs it, of our limited epistemological capacity, or was an empirical rather than philosophical of the historical and political construction view about competing positions aggregated in of human experience. Hence, from the a variety of associations (including the state), philosophical point of view of pluralism, intended to provide an alternative explana- social diversity is explained by either or both tion to C. Wright Mills’ power elite view of of the following theses: American politics (Mills 2000 ). Robert Dahl, for instance, claimed that power was a. Value pluralism maintains that the character dispersed among many interest groups that of values is plural, conflicting, incommen- tended to balance their relative bargaining surable, incomplete, (in)comparable, and position (Dahl 1961; see also Truman, 1951; nonreductive. Value pluralism can also Almond & Powell 1978). involve an epistemological stance that An important backlash emerged against this asserts that the knowledge, experience, and latter version of political pluralism. Critics awareness of values are always limited, objected that it presupposed a naively dis- open, and incomplete. torted conception of the state, overlooked b. Radical pluralism highlights the forms of political contestation, and actually constructed, historical, and political tenor consolidated an unequal, differential power of our experience and identity, which is among conflicting groups. Moreover, they all always varying, limited, constraining, and rejected the reduction of pluralism to compe- exclusionary. tition among individual and group interests (Schattschneider 1960; Connolly 1969; Wolff, a. Value pluralism. Let’s characterize each of Moore, & Marcuse 1969). the value dimensions entailed in value plu- The most recent representatives of plu- ralism. Incommensurability refers to the lack of ralism in political science still claim that a single standard that can accurately measure politics is the “process” by which the state trade-offs among all items under consideration. (and, in some versions, the global order) More specifically, in the normative realm, responds and channels the plurality of material incommensurability points to the impossibility and ideal interests. Yet they have also incorpo- of subsuming all values under an exclusionary rated previous criticisms and have advanced a ethical standard that applies to all contexts and  9 for all times. One single common currency or The immense, contradictory, and varying criterion cannot gauge, translate, exchange, flow of human life renders it irreducible and and cardinally order the universe of human unaccountable from the perspective of one values permanently. Trade-offs of values always single outlook. We cannot pursue all those imply loss. One can assess in any given situation values that we consider worthwhile, and this that a normative arrangement is to be preferred impossibility comes not so much from the con- over another. We could prioritize, say, courage straints of space, time, and social scarcity, but over strict compliance or rule-following at mainly from the fact that no one worldview can any given point, but this evaluation is always consistently encompass all those values at once. tentative, contextualized, partial, and incom- Value irreducibility imposes, necessarily, plete. In short, the rejection of one and only normative incompleteness on any vision of life. one discerning parameter to measure all This is why Isaiah Berlin refuses to accept instances of a set is a central piece in the sealed and utopian systems of thought that account of value incommensurability. This purportedly solve value conflicts in favor of tenet, in turn, implies conflict, antireduction- moral and political clarity and certainty (Berlin ism, and incompleteness. 1980: 77). Berlin denies the possibility that all Conflict points to the plural, exclusionary, ethical questions have one and only one correct and fragmented composition of values (Nagel answer, that there is a path toward attaining 2012: 128–41). Perfect liberty cannot coexist one single truth, and that all ethical truths with complete equality; pure modesty cannot must be compatible with each other – he simply persist with superlative overachievement, nor distrusts the search for universal certainty in could it make sense without the contrasting the form of a self-contained system of thought. comparison of the wide range of competing “One of the intellectual phenomena which values. This exclusionary character of values is made the greatest impact on me,” he says, “was unavoidable not only in the banal sense that we the universal search by philosophers for abso- cannot have everything we want, but in the lute certainty, for answers which could not be more fundamental understanding that values doubted, for total intellectual security. This acquire their full meaning in a contrastive from the very beginning appeared to me to be manner, against the entire arch of normativity – an illusory quest” (Berlin 2000: 4). Likewise, we cannot make sense of values and their Stuart Hampshire argues that there is no ideal experience without their opposites and their of humanity that embraces all virtues in one exclusions. Indeed, trying to tame this frag- unique narrative. There is no such thing – a mented and exclusionary character of values by single picture of human perfection – but insisting on rational coherence contradicts the individual capacity to shape one’s own human experience (Hampshire 1989: 12). experience on the basis of one’s imagination A further necessary corollary of incommen- (Hampshire 1989: 115). surability is the irreducibility of values. Values According to many pluralists, philosophical cannot be collapsed into one another or views that defend a systematic and complete exchanged seamlessly with each other – or with order of things usually attach to reason a pri- a paramount value sitting atop the hierarchical mordial role in the understanding of ethical structure. Nor are the conceptions of the good life. Once non-rule-abiding faculties – such as that embrace them interchangeable (Hampshire imagination and memory (Hampshire), sense 1989: 118). Values are conflicting, plural, and of reality (Berlin), and truthfulness (Williams: incommensurable, and they cannot for that see Williams 2002) – are allowed an equally reason be translated into or reduced to one important and shared place in normative another without a residue. One principle, one thinking, the ordering of reasons in a systematic value, one goal, one worldview can never whole turns out to be always provisional. account for the totality of human experience. As Hampshire puts it, “The openness of the 10 imagination, coming from the uncontrolled of all of these, some ultimate ends can be interactions of unconscious memory, always integrated with one another, if only tempo- leaves a margin of the unplanned and the unex- rarily. Insofar as men and women are endowed pected” (Hampshire 1989: 133). This is what he with imagination, they can conceive of a value tellingly calls “the inexhaustibility of descrip- system different from theirs as meaningful. tion”: any moral situation that we face “has an They can see other human beings engaging in inexhaustible set of discriminable features over different practices, make sense of those values, and above those which I explicitly notice at understand and communicate them – because the time because they are of immediate interest they share in the experience of being a person. to me” (Hampshire 1983: 106). Multiplicity, Fueled by opposing comprehensive views, preconscious memories that feed our decisions, persons disagree, object, antagonize, and go to the condensed character of the thinking that war; and yet they can recognize the others’ is difficult to reconstruct as a neat collection forms of life as a human pursuit. “That is why of arguments or conclusive supports of the pluralism is not relativism – the multiple values decision – all these amount to the inexhaust- are objective, part of the essence of humanity ibility of description (Hampshire 1983: 108). rather than arbitrary creations of men’s This ethical openness is, then, inescapable subjective fancies” (Berlin 2000: 12). and involuntary. Dogmatic, authoritarian, and Incomparability relates to the notions of totalitarian perspectives are equally incomplete “translatability” and “interpretability,” which as tolerant views, if not more. Value underde- appear only intermittently in the literature termination and openness are not first-order on philosophical pluralism but more often in normative stances. They cannot be redressed discussions about relativism. The analysis of even asymptotically, by including more values translatability alludes to the existence of a into a set. Inconclusiveness is an intrinsic trait “conceptual scheme” and its implications for of the anatomy of values – understood either moral argumentation. Davidson’s (1984) idea as moral entities independent of us or as of untranslatability entails both incommensu- historical constructions. It derives from the rability and incomparability. In rejecting the constraints and exclusions dictated by the logic notion of “conceptual scheme relativism,” he of values and by the restrictions that any objects to the thought that some other cultures outlook of life entails. may have relied on conceptual schemes that are Philosophers (both in favor of and against incommensurable (that is, incomparable) with value pluralism) have parted ways on the idea of ours. According to Davidson, the idea of an incomparability. Some thinkers use incompara- untranslatable language or of incommensu- bility and incommensurability interchangeably rable systems of belief lacks justification. The (Raz 1986: 321–66); some argue that incommen- point, defended by many relativists, that one surability entails incomparability (MacIntyre cannot translate diverse cultural languages and 1988: 370–1); others claim that incommensura- variant points of view actually is, for Davidson, bility requires comparability (Davidson 1984; proof that there is no such thing as a conceptual Chang 1997: 1–34; Berlin 2000: 13); while others scheme detached from experience and that maintain that there is not a necessary relation- there is indeed “a common coordinate system” ship between them. that allows us to make that precise point. According to Isaiah Berlin, for instance, Davidson objects to the position that our rela- practical reason works on the grounds that tion to the world presupposes a distinction bet- comparisons can be made between incommen- ween a “conceptual scheme” and an “empirical surables. For him, moral matters can be ratio- content.” For him, there is no rationale in dis- nally assessed, moral judgments can be true or tinguishing between a subjective viewpoint false, discussion about values and forms of life given by language and an empirical component is imperative and inescapable, and, as a result provided by the world. Our attitudes and  11 dispositions are always already related to the Hence the realm of value is the realm defined world, to an extent that makes the idea of a by our humanity, a conceptual scheme that we conceptual scheme (and, a fortiori, the idea of cannot help but recognize if we are to act in conceptual relativism) idle. accordance with the idea of a person as we Philosophical pluralism and the value plu- conceive of it today; we understand the limits ralist thesis that we have been examining can of our humanity through the web of these find their origins not so much in the anatomy categories. According to Berlin, this categorial of values themselves as in the way we get to framework is a central and less varying feature understand and relate to our surroundings. of our historical experience that makes com- We approach the normative world through a munication possible; widespread and stable conceptual scheme that is itself comprised of ways in which we think, decide, perceive, and values that are incommensurable, fragmented, judge (Berlin 1980: 164). These concepts and and conflicting. Philosophical pluralism, in categories are then unavoidable: without them this case, results more from the constraints of we would lack the equipment to understand practical reason than from the fragmented, ourselves. Because outside them we cannot exclusionary, and incommensurable character grasp the meaning of human actions, they are of values – understood as independent entities binding and imposing; and in consequence or as historical constructions. In this epistemo- they turn out to be semipermanent, or consid- logical twist of value pluralism, values com- erably more stable than other features of the pose a mental scheme that constitutes us and empirical world, thus providing an objective shapes our ethical orientation. basis for argumentation among persons. Many pluralists endorse both the value- b. Radical pluralism. Value pluralism is a posi- based and the epistemological theses about tion about the character and logic of values. It pluralism simultaneously. John Kekes, for is a thesis about their incommensurable, example, argues that pluralism applies to conflicting, irreducible traits. This account of “modes of reflection,” that is, ways of under- the anatomy of values can go hand in hand standing the significance of facts (Kekes 2000: either with a metaethical position called 66–79), and he also states that it relates to the “moral realism” or with a historical apprecia- nature of values (Kekes 1993: 9). Berlin, too, tion of the unfolding of human experience. As endorses a form of epistemological pluralism an appendix to moral realism, value pluralism along with the value pluralism described above. states that values are in a certain way – plural After taking the cultural pulse of human action and conflicting; that they exist out there; and across the ages, Berlin concludes that we can that they are therefore commanding and outline a semipermanent depiction of what it imposing. Thomas Nagel, Charles Taylor, means to be a person – what he calls the human Charles Larmore, John Gray, and George semblance – which enables rational argumen- Crowder among others see value pluralism tation among different views. Although open, this way (Gray 1995: 118; 1996: 72; 2000: 6; undecided, and loose, this conception is com- Dworkin, Lilla, & Silvers 2001: 106, 113, 117; posed of multiple and permanent concepts and Crowder 2002: 3). categories that have sprung from and orga- Yet value pluralism does not need to be part nized human experience. Because of its and parcel of a moral realist position. The incom- enduring nature, this cluster of categories mensurable, conflicting, irreducible, and incom- makes rational argumentation possible, plete character of values can be reclaimed as a providing a common formal condition from historical, social, and political construction. For which to assess questions of value. Because of instance, some believe that Isaiah Berlin, Stuart its open nature, it lays the basis for antireduc- Hampshire, and Bernard Williams see value plu- tionism and lends support to pluralism in the ralism as a historical product rather than as a normative domain. moral realist spinoff. It is precisely the political 12 and historical thrust of values, human agency, proper heirs of pluralism, among them liber- and identity that is the core of a more far-reaching, alism, radical democracy, pragmatism, and poststucturalist version of pluralism, called here conservatism. For instance, John Kekes puts “radical pluralism.” History and politics over contextual thinking and pluralism together in a universal morality, power over choice, political way that dodges relativism and prioritizes con- agency over the autonomous self, and exclusion servatism (Kekes 1998). Pluralism is always over diversity are some of the planks of a radical understood in the context of a particular tradi- pluralism that attaches a more dramatic twist to tion (1998: 62–7), and this, according to Kekes, the philosophical understanding of social diver- links pluralism to a conservative politics. For sity than the moral realist version of value plu- him, practical reasoning under pluralism must ralism does. be contextualist, and an appeal to context is an Subjectivity and agency, on this view, are vul- appeal to tradition. nerable to endless and interminable transfigura- Other thinkers, such as Richard Rorty, tion – not as an act of individual choice or have made a case for the reinforcing relation- self-creation, but as a constant interplay between ship between pluralism and pragmatism. subjugation and domination on the one hand Rorty’s pragmatism – which articulates an and, on the other, appropriation of the political “antirepresentationalist” view of truth and contingency that shapes us but never completely beliefs, “antifoundationalism” in knowledge, congeals us (Butler 2006). Radical pluralism “antiessentialism” of reason, and a Darwinian transforms the boundaries of political agency, understanding of human beings – stretches disbanding the contours of the modern and across his liberal political theory that liberal understanding of the subject as a bearer of embraces a philosophical pluralism (Rorty rights. Kirstie McClure argues that pluralism 1989, 1991, 2007). Against this view, some reconstitutes political identity and agency as well other pragmatists have claimed that although as “questions about the character, scope and consistent with each other pragmatism and potential sites of political action” (McClure 1992: pluralism are incompatible, for the strong 110). Radical pluralism incorporates the value ontological commitments of pluralism demands of political pluralism in that it displaces fly in the face of pragmatic assumptions the state as the exclusive locus of politics, and it (Talisse & Aikin 2005a, 2005b; for a reply, see adds a strong philosophical layer to the under- Misak 2005). standing of social diversity by showing how plu- The most prominent association, defended ralism both results from the imprints of power and attacked with equal vehemence, has been and affects political subjectivity. The multiple that between pluralism and liberalism. In the identities of the political subject can be con- remainder of this section I will discuss the rela- tested, as they are “contingently constructed and tionship between pluralism and the two most reconstructed through the reiteration of cultural consequential political doctrines in present-day codes and through participation in the social society: liberalism and radical democracy. practices through which these codes are enacted in daily life” (McClure 1992: 123). Radical plu- Pluralism and liberalism ralism does not fragment the social but claims Opponents and defendants of the association that the relational identities are contingently and between pluralism and liberalism have equally pragmatically constructed (Mouffe 1993: 7). cast doubt on the character of the connection at stake between them. Much has been written in dissecting the kind of link that could mean- Pluralism and Political Doctrines ingfully relate them both – by way of searching The kind of politics that pluralism opens the into historical, conceptual, and logical connec- way for has been the subject of heated debate. tions (Crowder 1994). The supporters of liberal Different doctrines have been defended as the pluralism, too, face trouble in nailing down the  13 specifics of the association. Berlin himself does liberalism are rival doctrines precisely because not clear much of the ground when he claims the former challenges the universal ambition of that “Pluralism and liberalism are not the same liberal morality. or even overlapping concepts … I believe in Crowder also opposes the compatibility bet- both liberalism and pluralism, but they are not ween liberalism and pluralism that springs logically connected” (Berlin & Jahanbegloo from cherishing choice. He rebuffs the 1991: 44). argument (which he attributes to Berlin) that, Many scholars have read and criticized the if values conflict and are plural and incommen- relationship of pluralism and liberalism as one surable, then we must value the freedom to of the philosophical foundations that focus on choose: “His [Berlin’s] more explicit argument the idea of choice. Following this reading, is that pluralism gives us a reason to value George Crowder and Jonathan Riley advocate choice” (Crowder 2002: 78; see also 81–2). significantly reformulated proposals to make Crowder, however, objects to this argument as the justificatory relationship work. Others, like an instance of the naturalistic fallacy. From the John Gray and John Kekes, believe that value fact that people must make hard choices, pluralism signals a dead end for the liberal Crowder claims, it does not follow that we project. must value such choices or the freedom to George Crowder, John Gray, John Kekes, make them: “[from the fact] that something is and Michael Sandel argue that, if all values are unavoidable it does not follow that it is desir- equally ultimate, then freedom of choice able” (Crowder 2003: 5; see also Crowder cannot enjoy a privileged status (Sandel 1984; 2002: 298). Kekes 1993; Gray 1996, 2000). If pluralism It is unclear, however, whether supporters brings about an argument in favor of value of the affinity between liberalism and plu- indeterminacy, then choice cannot come out ralism rest their case on the idea that choice on top of all other values. Gray, in particular, takes precedence over anything else, let alone emphasizes that proponents of the association on the worth of choice. Rather, advocates of between pluralism and liberalism like Isaiah the bolstering connection between pluralism Berlin value the capacity to choose above and liberalism seem to argue that, if pluralism anything else; he believes, however, that, holds, then choice needs to be exercised. In granted the truth of value pluralism, choice other words, they believe that sheltering the and its cognate idea of negative freedom cannot capacity to choose should stand in virtue of take precedence over everything else. “To hold its being the precondition for experiencing a that only liberal ways of life are valuable,” pluralist world. Choice would not make an claims Gray, “or that they are always more action necessarily more valuable, in the same valuable than illiberal ways of life, is to ascribe way in which breathing does not make our to freedom of choice a pre-eminent value that life more worthwhile. The modern awareness is undefended and implausible – especially if of value pluralism has brought a compelling the truth of value-pluralism is assumed” (Gray case against its suppression – but how we 1996: 152; see also 160–1 and Gray 1995: 114). choose, when we choose, and whether we Against Berlin, Gray argues that negative choose are not part of the case for its protec- liberty can be only one good among many tion. For choice to be treasured in the sense (Gray 2000: 32). Indeed Gray’s suggestion that, that Crowder’s argument assumes, it has to be granted the truth of pluralism, no value what- linked to higher virtues or powers that turn soever can come before others ushers the end choices into worthy outcomes. But choices, of any grounded substantive moral or political according to some of the supporters of reasoning of universal scope. He sentences the liberal pluralism, are necessary, yet not neces- liberal project to death on the grounds of its sarily valuable. “One chooses as one chooses,” unattainable universality. Value pluralism and states Berlin, “neither life can objectively 14 be called superior to the other. It is a matter and ferrets out the discursive, constructed of what one wants to do and be” (Berlin character of the moral presuppositions of and Jahanbegloo 1991: 45). Herein would lie liberal pluralism, namely rationalism, individ- the difference between acknowledging the ualism, and universalism (Mouffe 1993: 7). necessity of choice and valuing choice. More Radical pluralism is the normative consequence generally, the critics of the central role of of understanding that social objectivity is con- choice in the association between liberalism structed through acts of power (Laclau & and pluralism seem to be calling into question Mouffe 2001). Hence, according to this view, the preconditions of pluralism (choice) in the any social objectivity entails acts of exclusion. name of pluralism. We moved away from an empirical description of pluralism to a philosophical one, which sees Pluralism and radical democracy values as political (rather than moral) con- The viability of a sustainable relationship between structions and as carriers of the same exclusion pluralism and liberalism has been attacked that gives birth to them. from other fronts as well. Champions of radical Radical democracy sees politics as entailing pluralism believe that a contested, antagonistic ineradicable conflict, which cannot be democracy, rather than liberal politics, emerges eliminated by reasoned consensus. According as its buttressing companion (Mouffe 1993: 8). In to the radical democrats, proponents of extending the idea of political agency of the social liberalism and deliberative democracy alike subject across the board (the family, the street, overdo the consensual, rational aspect of the church, the economy, sexuality, and so on), politics while underplaying its more unsavory the political is constantly redefined and resigni- effects. For the radical pluralist, these views of fied (McClure 1992). Hence, unlike liberal politics limp along in denying its conflictual pluralism – which, according to the radical view, dimension. Consent does not do away with tames differences by relegating them to the remnants – remnants of inclusion and coer- private realm – the radical account of pluralism cion, remnants of agreement, remnants of beckons a democratic politics that continually emotions and social dispositions, remnants of contests those assumed boundaries. Radical rational justification, remnants of reasoned pluralism gnaws away at the idea of the modern disagreement and antagonism. Take these subject, on which liberalism stands; and it remainders of exclusion away, as any political embraces a more contesting democratic politics, theory that puts rational agreement as the which redraws identity as an intersubjective source of political justification does, and we construction constrained by power relations of are left without the political. exclusion. At the opposite end of liberal individu- Radical democrats claim that pluralism, alism, radical pluralism takes identity to be a rightly understood, challenges all the political collective and relational process (Mouffe 1993; and ethical boundaries that liberalism sets in Connolly 1995). place – from the idea of moral and political The politics that derives from radical agency to the public and private divide to the pluralism is more antagonistic than the one boundaries that circumscribe the mechanisms allowed by any other kind of pluralism (Mouffe of power. Pluralism generates indelible marks of 1993: 127). The radical view claims to take plu- exclusion and domination that remain hidden ralism seriously, wrestling with the exclusions and always unrecognized under the liberal view. that it produces and wearing down the ideas of According to radical democrats, in the name of neutrality, secularism, and rational consensus pluralism, liberals agree on impartial proce- characteristic of the liberal politics that dove- dures that shadow the arresting aspects of plu- tails with other forms of pluralism (Connolly ralism. Bonnie Honig advances this view when 1995: xiii; 2005: 38–67). Radical pluralism she objects to the overemphasis of the voluntary deepens the democratic character of politics aspect of politics and the state-centered vision of  15 the political in liberalism, in particular in Rawls’s experience. It is a “sense of one’s own singularity” work. She claims: that arises from the fact that each of us has had different experiences (1989: 115). Rawls problematically disempowers citizens by Human experience speaks to the truth of plu- reconciling them without remainder to the juridical authority of the state … Rawlsian ralism in yet another way, which I would refer to rationalism is not a benign and agreeable means as “the insufficiency of reason.” A nonpluralistic to institutionalize a private realm pluralism but world would eventually come together in a a betrayal of a deeper (more disagreeable?) plu- seamless way. Trade-offs, transactions, and sub- ralism that mires these liberals in a politics they stitutions of values would have attached a mea- never quite celebrate, though neither do they surable significance that would serve as the basis condemn it tout court. (Honig 1993: 159) of any rational decision-making. Yet reason has proven to be incapable of organizing our norma- The Truth and Goodness of Pluralism tive experience that way. Once again, Hampshire Two additional open questions are largely pre- makes this point nicely. He holds that originally supposed in the longstanding discussion on morality appears in our experience as a conflict pluralism: Is pluralism true? And, if so, is plu- of claims, and that reason alone is never sufficient ralism a good thing? As part of the closing to justify a decision in a moral conflict: “our remarks, I will canvass tentative answers to divided, and comparatively open, nature these seminal questions. requires one to choose, without sufficient reason, between irreconcilable dispositions and Can we prove the truth of pluralism? contrary claims…” (Hampshire 1983: 118). The Berlin, Hampshire, and Williams see pluralism incompleteness derived from the uniqueness of as historically grounded. For them, the historical individual experience, the boundaries of imagi- growth of human experience evinces the nation, and the insufficiency of reason all existential relevance and ineluctability of plu- speak to the persistency of value conflict and ralism. Hampshire in particular moors pluralism incommensurability. to human experience and memory. Each person, Some other thinkers, alternatively, have he argues, has her own history, which makes tethered the existence of pluralism to our individuality an inescapable condition in human epistemological capacity. John Kekes, for experience (Hampshire 1989: 119). The unique- instance, makes the case that “the history ness of our history, reiterated by the pervasive- of metaphysics, epistemology, morality, and ness of memory, which propels us to live a life cultures is a history of competing attempts almost in metaphors, makes the idea of singu- at the imposition of rival hierarchies, and larity an unavoidable tenet of human life (1989: the failure of all such attempts provides ample 121). That singularity and that individuality are support for pluralism” (Kekes 2000: 69). For always ungraspable, irreproducible, and unsys- him, “modes of reflection” are plural because tematized, all of which becomes palpable at the they are irreducibly different. He believes that moment of death and love. At the moment of “no mode of reflection can share the signifi- death, Hampshire claims, because the sense of cance that another mode of reflection attrib- loss cannot ever be recovered by reproducing the utes to the facts” (2000: 71). In the same vein, individuality of the person who passed away. At the “radical empiricism” of William James sug- the moment of love, because sexual love is the gests that inevitably each of us experiences dif- desire to know and take possession of someone ferent things differently (1976: 14–15). else’s individuality – we want to embrace and know that individual consciousness – “through Is pluralism good? the body that expresses that consciousness” Assuming that these and other cases in favor of (1989: 123–5). Pluralism, in this view, is tied to the existence of pluralism hold true, we could individuality, an inescapable tenet of human wonder whether that is something we should 16 celebrate. Recently a Harvard geneticist has assessment of how to rejigger and navigate claimed that scientists could make a Nean- through indetermination, heterogeneity, and derthal clone baby if they had an “extremely incompleteness. Sentencing that more diversity adventurous female human” (Church & Regis is a social good that should be unconditionally 2012: 11; see also the interview with Church, aspired to signals the knell of pluralism, it Spiegel Online International 2013) as a belies its spirit. For this reasoning incorporates surrogate. If we are true pluralists and pluralism diversity in a monistic way: it embraces plu- is good, we should welcome this expansion of rality at the expense of plurality, it puts a clo- diversity. Should we? sure to the open question that pluralism can If pluralism is good, then, it seems, more never leave too far behind, that is, which kind diversity should always be good – and good per of value decisions we should make in confront- se. Yet this conclusion may rush things a bit too ing inescapable difference. The monistic plu- much. Two interrelated issues undergird this ralist turns diversity into the paramount goal claim. First, the question of whether pluralism is that trumps anything else and presumably good; and, second, the question of whether, if makes it the proxy for normative arrange- that were the case, more of that good would ments. In this account, diversity becomes a always be better. The answer to the former commodity rather than an inescapable human question should lay the grounds for the latter, for condition. It evades the existential state of it matters why pluralism could be deemed an uncertainty ushered in by pluralism in favor of intrinsic good in order to discern whether, how, an instrumental view of social diversity. and to what extent that good should be pursued. This way of assimilating diversity not only From the philosophical perspective, plu- flies against the spirit of pluralism but is also ralism entails an irreducible, open-ended inconsistent with its letter. For the ultimate exercise in practical reason. In any of its ver- lesson of a pluralist outlook is that any social sions (value, epistemological, or radical), order affords a scarce and constraining norma- philosophical pluralism yields necessarily ten- tive space that sets limits to how much diver- tative and inconclusive ethical decisions. From sity it can spawn. From a pluralistic perspective, this perspective, pluralism opens the possi- the idea of an indefinite aggrandizement of bility of a permanent rewriting of normative diversity is empirically impossible and concep- dispositions. Alternatively, settling the issue by tually meaningless – as meaningless as the determining that expanding social diversity is aspiration to permanently squelch it. always good turns the open question on which In short, pluralism holds that social diversity pluralism depends into a closed one. In other and the disagreement that grows from it are words, to claim, in the name of pluralism, that unending. The attempt to permanently quench more social diversity is a good in itself, that it difference misrepresents and distorts human should therefore be pursued and, ipso facto, experience. Values have percolated throughout maximized goes against the pluralist spirit. It human history in a way that renders them irre- gives a closure to the most fundamental ducible, our worldviews are always limited, and question on which pluralism stands, namely our agency is political and thus exclusionary what to make of the unsettled condition more than voluntaristic – whatever the specific attached to a normative orientation to life that spin and explanation, philosophical pluralism wrestles with the inextricability and inescap- acknowledges that social diversity is part of ability of difference. Hence that way of con- living a human life. We cannot escape that fronting the permanently mutable character of condition by adopting an unqualifiedly favor- social and political existence runs afoul of the able inclination toward promoting diversity. pluralist spirit. Endorsing pluralism does not enforce upon us An important aspect of the pluralist orienta- an indiscriminating willingness to churn out tion to life consists precisely in the contingent more social diversity – always. Hence, opposing  17 the Neanderthal experiment does not, for that SEE ALSO: Absolutism; Agonistic Democracy; reason only, commit us against pluralism. Berlin, Isaiah (1909–98); Connolly, William E. Rather, pluralism commits us to the inescapable (1938–); Consequentialism; Conservatism; Liberal place of making value decisions about the Democracy ; Liberalism; Liberal Theory ; Mouffe, difference that confronts us. Chantal (1943–); Poststructuralism; Pragmatism; Rawls, John (1921–2002); Relativism; Pluralism embraces heterogeneity but does Utilitarianism; Weber, Max (1864–1920) not push for its maximization. Can pluralism stand for anything good even when it does not promote it? It is conceivable to be a staunch References pluralist who admits of normative underdeter- Almond, G. A. and Powell, G. B. (1978) mination as an inescapable aspect of leading a Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy, life, and yet believes that this is a regrettable 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown. hallmark of human experience. A rueful plu- Barker, E. (1957 ) “ The Discredited State.” ralist. Most pluralists, however, seem to cherish In E. Barker, Church, State, and Education. rather than surrender to pluralism. If so, what Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, is there to like about it? A favorable view of plu- pp. 151–70. ralism should draw attention to the fact that Barry, B. (2001) Culture and Equality: pluralism makes life interesting – a project, not An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. a given. It confronts us and meets us always in Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bentley, A. F. (1908). The Process of Government: a place of searching and questioning, a place of A Study of Social Pressures. Chicago, partial and incomplete understanding, a place University of Chicago Press. of creation and appropriation rather than of Berlin, I. (1980) Concepts and Categories. Oxford: finitude, standardization, and consistency. Oxford University Press. What is good about that? It puts a specific Berlin, I. (1997a) The Crooked Timber of Humanity: form of normative deliberation at the core of Chapters in the History of Ideas. Princeton, NJ: human experience. Insofar as ethical evalua- Princeton University Press. tion cannot be reduced to one single goal set Berlin, I. (1997b) The Sense of Reality: Studies in for us beforehand, or to any calculation of the Ideas and Their History. New York: Farrar, Straus most efficient means to achieve one over- and Giroux. arching value, pluralism is an antidote to Berlin, I. (2000) The Power of Ideas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. instrumental rationality, a reminder that value Berlin, I. and Jahanbegloo, R. (1991) Conversations decisions will never escape us and that we are with Isaiah Berlin. New York: Scribner’s. bound to normatively orient ourselves unceas- Butler, J. (2006) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the ingly. Pluralism hurls us into the inescapability Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. and inconclusiveness of ethical repositioning. Chang, R. (1997) Incommensurability, It brings value back in – value indetermination Incomparability, and Practical Reason. over efficiency and optimization. It keeps open, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. and on the surface, questions about meaning Church, G. M. and E. Regis (2012) Regenesis: and understanding. It reminds us that ques- How Synthetic Biology Will Reinvent Nature tions about where we go, how we do it, and why and Ourselves. New York: Basic Books. will forever haunt us, and it points to the insuf- Connolly, W. E. (1969) The Bias of Pluralism. New York: Atherton Press. ficiency of reason to fully guide us in solving Connolly, W. E. (1995) The Ethos of those problems. As Joseph Raz has put it: Pluralization. Minneapolis: University “Incommensurability speaks not of what does of Minnesota Press. escape reason but of what must elude it” (Raz Connolly, W. E. (2005) Pluralism. Durham, NC: 1986: 334). Pluralism is an infusion of value in Duke University Press. our lives, an interminable quest for ethical ori- Crowder, G. (1994) “Pluralism and Liberalism,” entation. It is a secular form of enchantment. Political Studies, 42, 293–305. 18 Crowder, G. (2002) Liberalism and Value Pluralism. (Eds.), Morality, Reason, and Truth: New Essays New York: Continuum. on the Foundations of Ethics. Totowa, NJ: Crowder, G. (2003) “Pluralism, Relativism and Rowman & Allanheld, pp. 27–47. Liberalism in Isaiah Berlin.” Unpublished Honig, B. (1993) Political Theory and the Displacement manuscript, Hobart, University of Tasmania, of Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 1–21. Hume, D. (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature. Dahl, R. A. (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and New York: Oxford University Press. Power in an American City. New Haven, CT: James, W. (1976 ) Essays in Radical Empiricism. Yale University Press. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Davidson, D. (1984) “On the Very Idea of a James, W. (1977 ) A Pluralistic Universe. Conceptual Scheme.” In D. Davidson, Inquiries New York: Longmans, Green. into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford Kekes, J. (1993) The Morality of Pluralism. University Press, pp. 183–98. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dryzek, J. S., Honig, B., and Phillips, A. (2006) The Kekes, J. (1998) A Case for Conservatism. Ithaca, Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. New York: NY: Cornell University Press. Oxford University Press. Kekes, J. (2000) Pluralism in Philosophy: Changing Dworkin, R. W., Lilla, M., and Silvers, R. (2001) the Subject. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin. New York: Kukathas, C. (1994) “Explaining Moral Variety.” In New York Review Books. E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (Eds.), Eisfeld, R. (2006) Pluralism: Developments in the Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge. New Theory and Practice of Democracy. Opladen and York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–21. Farmington Hills, MI: Barbara Budrich. Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Follett, M. P. (1918) The New State: Group Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Organization, the Solution of Popular Politics. New York: Verso. Government. New York: Longmans, Green. Larmore, C. E. (1996) The Morals of Modernity. Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. W. (1946) From Max New York: Cambridge University Press. Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge & Laski, H. J. (1917) Studies in the Problem of Kegan Paul. Sovereignty. New Haven, CT: Yale University Gewirth, A. (1994) “Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant Press. to Moral Knowledge?” In E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, MacIntyre, A. C. (1988) Whose Justice? Which Jr., and J. Paul (Eds.), Cultural Pluralism and Rationality? Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Moral Knowledge, New York: Cambridge Dame Press. University Press, pp. 22–43. Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Gray, J. (1995) “Agonistic Liberalism.” Social Wrong. New York: Penguin. Philosophy and Policy, 12 (1), 111–35. McClure, K. (1992) “On the Subject of Rights: Gray, J. (1996) Isaiah Berlin. Princeton, NJ: Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity.” In Princeton University Press. C. Mouffe (Ed.), Dimensions of Radical Gray, J. (2000) Two Faces of Liberalism. New York: Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. New Press. London: Verso, pp. 108–25. Hampshire, S. (1983) Morality and Conflict. Oxford: McFarland, A. S. (2004) Neopluralism: The Blackwell. Evolution of Political Process Theory. Lawrence: Hampshire, S. (1989) Innocence and Experience. University Press of Kansas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McFarland, A. S. (2007) “Neopluralism,” Annual Harman, G. (1975) “Moral Relativism Defended,” Review of Political Science, 10, 45–66. Philosophical Review, 84 (1), 3–22. Mills, C. W. (2000 ) The Power Elite. New Harman, G. (1978) “What Is Moral Relativism?” York: Oxford University Press. In A. Goldman and J. Kim (Eds.), Values and Misak, C. (2005) “Pragmatism and Pluralism,” Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt. 41 (1), 129–35. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, pp. 143–61. Montaigne, M. de. (1973) “Of Custom, and Harman, G. (1985) “Is There a Single True Not Easily Changing an Accepted Law.” Morality?” In D. Copp and D. Zimmerman In D. M. Frame (Ed. and Trans.), Complete  19 Essays of Montaigne. Stanford, CA: Stanford Talisse, R. and Aikin, S. (2005b) “Why Pragmatists University Press, pp. 77–89. Cannot Be Pluralists,” Transactions of the Charles Mouffe, C. (1993) The Return of the Political. S. Peirce Society, 41 (1), 101–18. London: Verso. Truman, D. B. (1951) The Governmental Process: Nagel, T. (2012) Mortal Questions. New York: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press. Knopf. Plato. (1992) Theaetetus, ed. M. Burnyeat and Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of B. Williams, trans. M. J. Levett. Indianapolis, Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books. IN: Hackett. Williams, B. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An Rawls, J. (1996) Political Liberalism. New York: Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Columbia University Press. University Press. Rawls, J. (1999) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Wong, D. B. (1984) Moral Relativity. Berkeley : MA: Harvard University Press. University of California Press. Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Further Reading Rescher, N. (1993) Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus. Oxford and New York: Oxford Baghramian, M. and Ingram, A. (2000) Pluralism: University Press. The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity. New Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. York: Routledge. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bellamy, R. (1999) Liberalism and Pluralism: Rorty, R. (1991) Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Towards a Politics of Compromise. London: New York: Cambridge University Press. Routledge. Rorty, R. (2007) Philosophy as Cultural Politics. New Berlin, I. and Williams, B. (1994) “Pluralism and York: Cambridge University Press. Liberalism: A Reply,” Political Studies, 41, Sandel, M. J. (1984) Liberalism and Its Critics. New 306–9. York: New York University Press. Galston, W. A. (2002) Liberal Pluralism: The Schattschneider, E. E. (1960) The Semisovereign Implications of Value Pluralism for Political People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Theory and Practice. New York: Cambridge New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. University Press. Schlosberg, D. (1999) Environmental Justice and Hsiao, K.-c. (1927) Political Pluralism: A Study in the New Pluralism: The Challenge of Difference Contemporary Political Theory. London and for Environmentalism. New York: Oxford New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & University Press. Company. Schlosberg, D. (2006) “The Pluralist Imagination.” Mouffe, C. (1999) “Deliberative Democracy or In J. S. Dryzek, B. Honig, and A. Phillips (Eds.), Agonistic Pluralism?” Social Research, The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. New 66 (3), 745–58. York: Oxford University Press, pp. 142–60. Riley, J. (2002) “Defending Cultural Pluralism: Within Smith, A. (1976) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Liberal Limits,” Political Theory, 30 (1), 68–96. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics. Williams, B. (1979) “Conflicts of Values.” Spiegel Online International (2013) “Interview with In A. Ryan (Ed.), The Idea of Freedom: Essays George Church: Can Neanderthals Be Brought in Honour of Isaiah Berlin. Oxford: Oxford Back from the Dead?” http://www.spiegel.de/ University Press, pp. 221–32. international/zeitgeist/george-church-explains- Williams, B. (2005) “Pluralism, Community and how-dna-will-be-construction-material-of-the- Left Wittgensteinianism.” In G. Hawthorn future-a-877634.html (accessed January 11, 2014). (Ed.), In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism Stevenson, C. L. (1944) Ethics and Language. New and Moralism in Political Argument. Princeton, Haven, CT: Yale University Press. NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 29–39. Talisse, R. and Aikin, S. (2005a) “Still Searching for Wolff, R. P., Moore, B., and Marcuse, H. (1969) a Pragmatic Pluralism,” Transactions of the A Critique of Pure Tolerance. Boston: Beacon Charles S. Peirce Society, 41 (1), 145–60. Press, London: Jonathan Cape.