Martin Lecture Notes on CBN in the Vietnam War 2023-2024 PDF

Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) The Use and Non-use of CBN Weapons in the Vietnam War (Forthcoming work:, please do not cite or quote, unless doing so in coursework for this module. Note that presentation includes quotes and material from Martin 2016 which is not always refere...

Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) The Use and Non-use of CBN Weapons in the Vietnam War (Forthcoming work:, please do not cite or quote, unless doing so in coursework for this module. Note that presentation includes quotes and material from Martin 2016 which is not always referenced due to space constraints.) Dr Susan Martin BA WMD in IP 2023/24 1 Rest of Term Today: Use and Non-use of CBN in the Vietnam War, plus practice essay questions 1 December: Limited Nuclear War 1950s-1970s, plus practice exam questions 8 December: Questions, Review, Conclusion Term One Exam: 11 December, 13:00-15:00, King’s Bldg K1.28 2 Term Two New classroom: Waterloo FWB 2.46 (On 16 Feb, we are in Waterloo FWB 3.146.) Teaching for Term Two starts on Friday 12 January 12 Jan: CBN at the End of the Cold War (We will pick up the use of CW in the Iran Iraq War here) 3 1 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Abbreviations CW: chemical weapons BW: Biological Weapons NW: Nuclear Weapons MACV: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam COMUSMACV: commanding general of MACV CINCPAC: Commander in Chief, Pacific Command JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff CJCS: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff COFRAM: controlled fragmentation weapons (see https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/97810031091436/fragmentation-weapons) 4 Overview of use and non-use of CBN Different types of weapons were potentially available for use, but only some were used: These weapons were used These weapons were not used Anti-plant chemical Anti-plant biological Irritant (non-lethal) anti-personnel chemical (‘tear gas’, e.g. CS) Incapacitating (non-lethal) antipersonnel chemical (e.g. BZ) Incapacitating (non-lethal) antipersonnel biological Lethal anti-personnel chemical (e.g. mustard, nerve agents) Lethal anti-personnel biological Nuclear Weapons 5 Chemical agents used: ‘Rainbow’ Herbicides Herbicides containing 2,4,5-T that was contaminated with dioxin: Agent Orange accounted for about 64% of total herbicide procured by US for use in Vietnam Orange I from 1965-1970, Orange II after 1968 Argent Green, 1961-1965 Agent Pink, 1961-1965 Other herbicides used: Agent Blue, 1964-1971, contained arsenic Agent White, 1966-1971, contains picloram, persistent in soil 6 2 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Chemical agents used: Irritant agents DM (Adamsite): a WWI era agent that causes vomiting; was the most toxic of anti-personnel agents used in Vietnam by the US. (Use discontinued in summer of 1965.) CN (Mace): eventually mostly replaced by CS, which was both more potent and less toxic. CS: most used; three formulations with different persistencies: CS, CS1 and CS2. 7 What best explains the use and nonuse of CBN weapons by the United States in Vietnam? How can we best understand US decisions about use? 8 Theoretical Perspectives: Structural Realism Key claim of structural realism is that the nature of the international system constrains state behavior and influences international outcomes. Anarchy makes security scarce, constrains states to rely on themselves (self-help), and makes relative power important-because of the potential for a state to use its relative power to harm other states. Structural realism is not a theory of foreign policy, but structural constraints can influence foreign policy (as can other factors—at the system, state and individual level of analysis) For questions about the use and non-use of weapons, a structural realist analysis thus expects decisions about weapons policy to be largely based on a consequentialist logic of decision making; it also highlights the role of military utility. [WHY?] 9 3 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Use and non-use in Vietnam: Military Utility (Martin 2016, 322) Military utility and consequentialist logic that drove US decisions about use and non-use. US decision-makers evaluated the consequences of use, weighing military utility against political costs. For anti-plant and irritant agents, concluded that utility outweighed the political costs and used them accordingly. For biological, lethal chemical and nuclear weapons, the lack of military utility within the tactical and strategic context of the Vietnam War meant that these weapons were not used. 10 Theoretical Perspectives: Constructivism Focuses on role of ideas and beliefs in shaping identities, interests and actions, including those of states Process of social construction Interests are shaped by identities, not by structures Identities shaped by ideational factors—culture, relations, science, normative beliefs, etc., with identities emerging (or being constructed) by social interaction in the world. Thus, Interaction, networking, and communication shape the way actors think and behave. >>> Explain IR by focussing on ideas and identities of state leaders, as that helps to explain the actions taken by states 11 Constructivism: Four propositions 1. World is what you believe it is – in words of Wendt, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ 2. States operate with a global civil society, and it helps facilitates elite learning and socialization, providing the communication networks through which elites develop ideas and identities that shape state policy, and gives shape to the character of anarchy 3. Normative change is a major way in which world politics evolves from era to era (and this change tends to be progressive) 4. State elites exist within and are influenced by strategic culture that shapes foreign policy choices. (Grieco, Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2018) 12 4 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Decision-Making Logics (March and Olsen) Logic of appropriateness: action shaped by rules relevant to current situation and given role or identity; role of social norms in determining ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ action. (Rules institutionalised in social practice.) Logic of consequences: action dictated by assessment of consequences of alternative courses of action; by cost-benefit analysis. 13 Tannenwald (1999) from Week One ‘The development of a normative prohibition against nuclear weapons’ is an essential part of the explanation for why ‘nuclear weapons have remained unused’ since 1945 (434); ‘the taboo is a necessary element in explaining the historical pattern of non-use’ (435). Should see taboo talk: Where taboo enters decision-making through a logic of consequences, as a ‘cost’ Where the taboo enters decision making through a logic of appropriateness (non-cost-benefit reasoning), ‘along the lines of ‘this is simply wrong’ (440) 14 Norms works through both As Tannenwald explains: Norms work through both the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness (2007,50). “The logic of consequences refers to the instrumental operation of a norm. Actors comply with norms because doing so helps them get what they want. The logic of appropriateness refers to a more internalized or substantive operation of a norm – actors internalize roles and rules as scripts to which they conform because they understand the behavior to be good, desirable and ‘right.’” (2007, 50). 15 5 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Tannenwald and the use/non-use of weapons Tannenwald 2006: ‘Had US leaders held no normative inhibitions about using nuclear weapons…it is likely that military plans for their use would have received more serious consideration given the American – and conceivably even Vietnamese – lives such use could have saved’ (719). Tannenwald (2007): ‘Of all cases of Cold War conflict in which the United States could have used nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War provides one of the strongest “tests” of a nuclear taboo. In Vietnam, the United States chose to lose a humiliating and destructive war against a small, nonnuclear adversary while all its nuclear weapons remained on the shelf’ (190). 16 Tannenwald, 3 (2007, 239-240) Taboo and escalatory risks not entirely independent: ‘The existence of a weapons taboo helps to shape judgments of what constitutes “escalation” on the battlefield. If national leaders had simply viewed tactical nuclear weapons as “just another weapon,” the latter’s escalatory effect would have been judged quite differently, as would the psychological impact of their use.’ ‘The taboo, by helping to define what constituted escalation in the first place, contributed to heightening decisionmakers’ perception of such risks during the war.’ Also, taboo is ‘operating with more powerful, widespread effects’ in Vietnam, becoming ‘more taken for granted.’ 17 Use and non-use in Vietnam: Norms (Martin 2016, 322) Norms and Appropriateness Logic: Use of lethal CBW recognised as wrong. Use of irritant and anti-plant agents justified not by reference to the fact that the US had not ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but by an argument the use of anti-plant and irritant agents fell outside the Geneva Protocol. >> US argued that it abided by the norms governing chemical and biological weapons, and in retrospect we can see that debates over the US position contributed to a strengthening of the norm against their use. As Tannenwald argues, US recognised an emerging taboo on nuclear weapons and its decision not to use nuclear weapons contributed to the further development of that taboo.’ 18 6 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Material versus social factors? The division between realism and constructivism is often portrayed as a disagreement about the role of material versus social/ideational factors. I think this gets realism wrong—structural realism recognises that social and ideational factors matter (after all, anarchy is itself social—as defined in structural realism, it is about the organisation of units). For realism, ‘social factors’—norms, laws of war, etc. are included in the analysis of consequences that would follow from the use of a weapon, through their role as a generator of political costs (or benefits). 19 Norms versus Military Utility In discussions of norms and taboos., the ‘ultimate’ development of a norm/taboo occurs when it is unthinking and taken for granted (Tannenwald 2007,33-34). But if ‘taken-for-grantedness’ is ultimate measure of a norm’s development and impact, behavior is no longer influenced by both consequences and norms—if use of a weapon is no longer ‘thinkable’ than costs and benefits of use are not calculated. [Possible that calculations of costs and benefits can also become routine and taken for granted—e.g. that may be what makes a conventional weapon conventional, that we no longer feel the need to calculate general costs and benefits of use, although tactical calculations will still be made.] 20 ‘Norms’ and ‘Military Utility’ are both Material and Social Norms are not simply ‘social’ and ‘military utility’ is not an ‘objective’ characteristic of a weapon that is determined solely by material characteristics. Both “norms” and “military utility” are a composite of material and social facts: For example, negative norms surrounding weapons typically stem from the material, destructive effects of a weapon—cannot disassociate the social content of a norm from the material characteristics of a weapon. The same is true for “military utility.” The STS literature argues that the evaluation of a weapon (or any technology) is an inherently social (and material) process—this is seen clearly in the debates over the utility of anti-plant agents in Vietnam. 21 7 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Realism: Both norms and military utility have important effects through consequential reasoning. Realism recognises the unique role that military power plays in the anarchic international system. When it comes to the consequential reasoning employed by decision makers about the use or non-use of weapons, structural realism expects that the anarchic nature of the international system will constrain decision makers to emphasise military utility. This does not mean that military utility is the only thing that matters in decisions about the use of force, but it does mean that arguments about military utility can trump arguments about other kinds of consequences. But, not every argument about miliary utility wins…and military utility is a complicated concept…. 22 Martin, forthcoming: Hypotheses and Framework Consequentialist decision making, with weighing of benefits and costs (Realism, constraint of anarchy): The use of weapons entails both political and military effects, and those effects can be both positive (benefits) and negative (costs). Importance of military utility (whether military benefits> military costs), due to constraint of anarchy. But political effects important too, and are a key part of decisions about whether or not to use a weapon: Norms, by setting some weapons apart from others, can influence decision–making process; Political costs generated by social factors can also ‘raise the bar’ for use, requiring more utility for use to be in the interest of states. 23 Military costs and benefits: Military utility Importance of comparative military utility: does a weapon provide a new or enhanced capability compared to alternatives? Different levels of utility: Technical: does a weapon have the desired technical effects, does it ‘work’ in a technical sense? Tactical: Will the use the weapon contribute to tactical aims on the battlefield? Strategic: Will the use of a weapon contribute to strategic aims? 24 8 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Use: Potential Political Benefits Potential political benefits of use (domestic and international): Success tactically or strategically can boost support for war, leader, etc. Demonstration of technical prowess, gain status/prestige. Demonstration of commitment and resolve (different audiences: adversary, domestic public, allies). 25 Use: Potential Political Costs Domestic (generated by actual or perceived violation of norms, law, agreements, values): Domestic criticism by rival parties or factions, media, elites, popular protest; Undermining of support for governing party/regime; Undermining of domestic support for the war/conflict. International (generated by actual or perceived violation of norms, law, agreements, values): Criticism in international fora (generated by actual or perceived violation of norms, law, agreements, values); Criticism by/weakening of support from allies; Setting of precedent for use of weapon and/or encouraging proliferation. Pressure for nuclear disarmament. 26 Non-Use: Potential Political Costs Domestic (generated by prospective or actual loses?): Domestic criticism by rival parties or factions, media, elites (lack of resolve); Undermining of support for governing party/regime; Undermining of domestic support for the war/conflict (if seen as unwinnable, wasteful). International (generated by prospective or actual loses?): Criticism by/weakening of support from allies (lack of resolve); Possible spur to proliferation (allies increasing own defences). 27 9 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Non-use: Potential Political Benefits Potential political benefits of non-use (domestic and international): Demonstration of humanitarian values Uphold international law and/or treaty commitments, if there is law/commitment regarding non-use of weapon Precedent of non-use may facilitate non-use of weapon by others as well as non-proliferation of the weapon 28 The Use of Antiplant Agents Focus here on Kennedy’s decisions regarding the use of antiplant agents from both defoliation (e.g. 1961) and crop destruction 29 The use of anti-plant chemical antiplant weapons Discussed as early as 1961—search for new technologies for Vietnam, part of effort to avoid committing US troops 1961 November—Kennedy approves limited trial for defoliation but not for crop destruction, with specific plans to be authorised in Washington. October 1962—Kennedy authorises trial crop destruction operations w approval in DC 1962 November—authority to approve specific defoliation operations delegated to US leaders in Saigon 1964—authorisation of crop destruction operations delegated to Saigon in 1964 30 10 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Use of anti-pant agents Once the President delegated approval authority for anti- plant operations to Saigon, the use of these agents generally expanded and retracted in line with the overall American effort in Vietnam. The use of anti-plant agents reached a peak in 1968 and then decreased with the US drawdown. From 1961 to 1971 almost 77 million litres of herbicides were sprayed from aircraft over 2,631,297 hectares (Stellman et al) Other events:: 1968 President Thieu requested defoliation be confined to remote areas; 1969 publication of the finding that Agent Orange posed a danger to human health. 31 Role of Consequentialist logic Example: November 1961 decision made by President Kennedy Memo from Department of Defense: The ‘basic problem is to weigh the political/military effects of the program within Vietnam, along with the possibility of adverse reactions by nations outside Vietnam.’ Two possibilities: ‘One was not to use any anti-plant chemicals ‘wholly on the grounds of net adverse local reaction, and particularly of worldwide disapproval’. [This was left to the Department of State to judge] 32 Role of Consequentialist logic Example: November 1961 decision made by President Kennedy, 2 Memo from Department of Defense, cont.: The second possibility ‘‘was ‘to go ahead with a selective and carefully controlled program’ with the clearance of key routes, proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D and the border areas until we have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation.’ As stated in the memo, ‘the Department of Defense is inclined toward the latter decision.’ 33 11 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Role of Consequentialist logic Example: November 1961 decision made by President Kennedy, 3 Memo from Department of State: Did not challenge consequentialist logic. Instead, Secretary of State Rusk argued that the military benefits outweighed the political costs and agreed with Gilpatric’s recommendations. He acknowledged that there would be an ‘intense Communist “germ warfare” campaign’. However, Rusk did not give this much weight, as he was ‘satisfied that successful plant-killing operations in Vietnam, carefully coordinated with and incidental to larger operations, can be of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the Viet Cong.’ >>both DOD and DOS employ logic of consequences 34 Role of Appropriateness logics Example: US reconsidered the use of anti-plant weapons for crop destruction in November 1962 Edward Murrow, the Director of the US Information Agency, argued that ‘we have a tradition in this country of not using food as a weapon of war’; he added that ‘chemical and biological warfare are subjects which arouse emotional reactions at least as intense as those aroused by nuclear warfare’. 35 Role of Appropriateness logics, 2 But in his opening paragraph to the memo Murrow argued that: ‘If we will win Vietnam with defoliants, but lose without them, then we must use them. If we will probably win with defoliants and probably lose without them, then also we must use them. If we might win with defoliants, and might win without them, then we had better consider the implications before undertaking the project proposed.’ 36 12 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Impact of norm on decision-making process: In an August 1961 memo to Deputy National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, Robert Johnson that: “a question currently under consideration which may need eventual Presidential consideration is the use of BW or CW (I’m not sure which) in Vietnam….This is obviously a subject that would warrant Presidential consideration because of the very important international political as well as possible moral considerations involved.” 37 Role of Military Utility Example: 1962 letter from William Truehart, Deputy Chief of Mission in Vietnam, to the Director to the Vietnam Task force, about Ambassador Notling’s position on area bombing and crop destruction: ‘Given the fairly desperate position we find ourselves in in Vietnam, he [Ambassador Nolting] wants to be very sure of his ground before rejecting any weapon which might help to win the war, and he is understandably reluctant to draw conclusions on vital questions on the basis of a priori reasoning – which is about all we have to go on at this point.’ 38 Non-use of incapicitant and lethal CW 39 13 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Explaining the non-use of incapicitant and lethal CW 1. Capability: Did the US have the ability to use incapicitant and lethal chemical weapons? 2. Military utility: What was the understanding of the military utility of these weapons in Vietnam--would their use have advanced US tactical or strategic goals? Possible danger of escalation? 3. Political costs: What was the understanding of the possible political costs of use? 4. Were appropriateness arguments made? 40 Use of irritant and lethal CW was discussed In 1961, when the Kennedy administration was searching for a technological substitute for ground forces in Vietnam: ‘From the point of view of political acceptability, incapacitating agents are probably to be preferred to lethal agents, but on the basis of technical feasibility, only the latter may be possible.’ 41 Discussion, use of irritant and lethal CW, 2 March 1964: Westmoreland [Deputy Commander of US forces in Vietnam] requested authority to use the chemical incapacitant BZ from Admiral Sharp. Sharp’s reply was short and succinct: “I do not concur in use of BZ in RVN at this time.” Sharp does not provide his reasons, but in the same message he requests that Westmoreland prepare two plans for the introduction of CS (an irritant agent) in the RVN. 42 14 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Discussion use of other CW, 1968 Khe Sanh North Vietnam (20,000 troops) attacks American/SV position (6,000 troops) 2 February President Johnson called CJCS General Wheeler to ask about US reinforcement Wheeler consults with Westmoreland; reports that “the use of tactical nuclear weapons should not be required in the present situation in view of the authority to use COFRAM. However, should the situation in the DMZ area change dramatically, we should be prepared to introduce weapons of greater effectiveness against massed forces. Under such circumstances…either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment." 43 Discussion, use of irritant and lethal CW, 3 March 1968 (Tet Offensive and the urban fighting in Hue) Admiral Sharp (CINCPAC) asks Westmoreland (COMUSMACV) about ‘the desirability of seeking research and development support to provide improved non-lethal weapons and means for delivery.’ Sharp argues that irritant and non-lethal chemical incapacitating weapons might be a ‘logical choice’ to ‘quickly overpower the VC and at the same time minimize the hazard to the civilians and their property.’ He recognizes the “political implications and public distaste for chemical munitions” but argues that “the present situation exemplifies a situation in which area, non-lethal incapacitating weapons could provide a definite advantage.” 44 Discussion, use of irritant and lethal CW, 3 March 1968 (Tet Offensive and the urban fighting in Hue), cont. Westmoreland replies: Agrees with Sharp But goes further: Recommends ‘that we be provided with munitions which are currently standard or are in the later stages of development. ‘ He notes that ‘’the Army has a standard[chemical] incapacitating agent BZ, which can be employed in an air delivered cluster,’ and the ‘incapacitating [biological] agent UC [identify agent staph] which could be delivered by aerial spray technique’ is in development. But not recommending immediate use: need adequate supply ‘to demonstrate humane characteristic’; possible ‘pyschopolitical reaction’ creates ‘need for a program of public orientation.’ 45 15 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Capability: Chemical Incapacitants As Westmoreland notes, BZ was in US stockpile Primary route respiratory, but can be absorbed through skin—not sure if its use would require full protective gear. Had munitions stockpiled and stored in military depots. 46 Capability: lethal agents US had lethal chemical which it saw as having technical effectiveness and it had lethal chemical weapons available to use: Non-use of lethal chemical weapons is not explained by lack of weapons to use. US had stocks of sarin (produced in the 1950s), it produced VX from 1961-1968, and it had stocks of mustard both in bulk and in filled munitions. Various munitions developed, produced, filled and stockpiled included artillery shells, rockets, land mines, bombs (including cluster bombs), and spray tanks. 47 Capability to wage chemical warfare, 2 However: Weapons need to fully assimilated into the military organisation, from logistics to doctrine. With anti-personnel weapons, need protection for one’s own forces. For mustard and nerve agents, this required more than the masks required for the use of irritant agents. >>While US had lethal CW to use, it is not clear that it was fully prepared to use lethal chemical weapons in Vietnam. Both in 1961 and again in 1960, some in government judged US as ‘unprepared’ to fight on a CB battlefield. 48 16 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Military costs and benefits: Incapicitant agents Potentially a more potent but still humane weapon for guerrilla war; Large area weapon—argued to be useful where difficult to find and locate the enemy. JCS thought they could be ‘highly desirable weapons in a variety of limited war situations.’ One of the challenges of limited and especially guerrilla was the likely mingling of combatants and civilians; incapacitating agents like irritant agents potentially offered the ability to attack the enemy while avoiding civilian deaths. But BZ was not a great agent: wide range of variable effects, long onset time, and inefficiency of existing munitions Like all chemical agents, it could cause death in some circumstances. 49 Military Utility of Lethal CW in Vietnam Large area weapon.—useful where difficult to find and locate the enemy. However, indiscriminate, and in a ccounter-insurgency conflict; use of lethal chemical weapons within South Vietnam itself would make no sense, would not win hearts and minds but instead would alienate the South Vietnamese. Also possibility of unexpected spread (wind). Vietnam’s tropical climate would have made wearing of full body chemical protective gear unbearable. ? Risk of escalation? 50 Potential political costs Potential costs were clear from example of the false allegations that the US used biological weapons in the Vietnam War. Also clear from reaction to use of anti-plant and irritant agents in Vietnam (although opposition to use of irritants reduced/eliminated when able to frame it as ‘humane’). Costs seem to likely to increase as move up scale of effects/lethality. 51 17 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Political costs of chemical incapicitants in Vietnam One of arguments for why irritant agents not covered by 1925 Geneva Protocol and why they were acceptable is that they were used domestically (e.g. riot control.) This was not the case for chemical incapicitants. Use of incapicitant CW could have undermined US justification for use of anti-plant and irritant agents and exposed US to wide-spread international and domestic condemnation. US response to this criticism would have been that incapacitants were ‘humane’ and helped to avoid civilian deaths. 52 Political costs of lethal CW in Vietnam Clear international norms against use of lethal chemical weapons, as seen in 1925 Geneva Protocol. As with incapacitants, US use of lethal CW would have undermined US justification for use of anti-plant and irritant agents and exposed US to wide-spread international and domestic condemnation. US claimed/was trying to fight war in line with laws of war, particularly in regard to limiting harm to civilians. But lethal chemical weapons are indiscriminate and use either in South or North Vietnam would have killed civilians. 53 Appropriateness arguments on CW? Argument about ‘humane’ nature of chemical irritant and incapicitant weapons was attempt to use norm to justify use of these weapons. Norms against use of chemical weapons did not prevent use of anti-plant or irritant chemical weapons and did not stop discussion of possible use of incapacitants. US developed and stockpiled all these types of chemical weapons. Use of lethal chemical weapons barely discussed—but was this because of internalisation of norm (appropriateness logic) or because so obvious that little tactical and strategic utility in Vietnam? 54 18 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Non-use of nuclear weapons 55 Context and discussion (non-use NW) Precedent of non-use at Dien Bien Phu and in Korea. Early on (1961) discussion of inability to win conventional war, also that if there was Chinese invasion in response to Laos a decision about nuclear use would be needed. Us of nuclear weapons in limited war not ruled out. Was raised by others--reported that in 1964 Senator Barry Goldwater in his campaign for president discussed the possible use of nuclear weapons to defoliate the trees over jungle, trails and to destroy bridges, roads and railroads in North Vietnam.(https://www.nytimes.com/1964/05/26/archives/news-analysisvietnamese-lifelines-goldwaters-advocacy-of.html) Johnson emphasised this in his campaign (https://thebulletin.org/virtual-tour/president-lyndon-b-johnson-and-the-daisy-girl-nuclearwar-commercial/) 56 Context and discussion (non-use NW), 3 First Chinese nuclear test in 1964 1966:JASON report – response to some ‘loose talk’ about use 1968: Khe Sanh US was concerned throughout the Vietnam War about reaction of both China and the Soviet Union. A key US aim was to avoid a broader war, which might lead to risk of nuclear escalation. >>> Have not found a single suggestion by central US policymakers that what was at stake in Vietnam was worth a nuclear war. 57 19 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Some consideration of use by military 1968 Khe Sanh Possibility of use of tactical nuclear weapons was raised by Westmoreland in context of Khe Sanh Some thinking about this occurs Westmoreland thought small tactical nukes could be used with few civilian casualties. Johnson alarmed to learn Westmoreland exploring use of nuclear weapons and shuts it down 58 Political costs of nuclear use were recognised For example: 1966 March: CIA report: ‘Use of nuclear weapons by the US in the Vietnam war would be one of the most important events of modem history. World reactions would be affected to some extent by the circumstances in which the US resorted to their use, and the targets attacked. But almost independent of these factors would be a widespread and fundamental revulsion that the US bad broken the 20-year taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.’ 59 The report continues…. ‘Their use in Vietnam, regardless of the circumstances, would send a wave of fear and anger through most of the informed world. The general feeling would be that, once the taboo had been broken, there would remain no effective barrier to expanded use of such weapons. People would fear that the Communists would respond in kind if they had, or could acquire, a nuclear capability. Behind all this would lie a fear that the use of nuclear weapons might lead to a general nuclear war endangering the world at large.’ ? ‘taboo’ here result of norm or fear of escalation to all-out nuclear war? 60 20 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Military utility of nuclear use was also questioned Strategic utility—risk of broadening war, of escalation to strategic nuclear war, of retaliation Tactical utility: 1966 JASON report Response to ‘loose talk’ around Pentagon about use of tactical nuclear weapons to interdict Ho Chi Minh Trail. JASON Report argued it would require a huge number of weapons (3000 TNW per year); that ‘such an attack would eventually result in a stalemate, “with the enemy forces retiring into the forests and the US nuclear bombardment running into the law of diminishing returns”’ Concluded that the military advantages of unilateral use of nuclear weapons “are not overwhelming enough to ensure termination of the war, and they are therefore heavily outweighed by the disadvantages of eventual bilateral use.” 61 For more on JASON report see Nautilus Institute, ‘Essentially Annihilated’ at https://nautilus.org/essentially‐annihilated/ (source of quotes on previous slide) F. J. Dyson, R. Gomer, S. Weinberg, S.C. Wright, Study S266: Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia (Institute for Defense Analyses, JASON Division, March 1967). Note you can download the JASON report from the Nautilus site (https://nautilus.org/essentially-annihilated/essentiallyannihilated/) 62 Possibility of escalation Halberstam in the Best and the Brightest reports that: “Daniel Ellsberg discussed the subject of nuclear weapons with McNamara during a luncheon meeting; later he would remember the Secretary’s passion on the subject. He was against using tactical nuclear weapons (‘They’re the same thing, there’s no difference,’ he said, ‘once you use them, you use everything else, You can’t keep them limited, You'll destroy Europe, everything’.” As early as 1961 one of possible outcomes of US intervention discussed is that ‘Moscow comes to aid of Hanoi and Peiping, supplying all necessary equipment including limited supply of air deliverable nuclear weapons to retaliate in kind against US use—outcome stalemate with great destruction on all sides.’ 63 21 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Questions: Tannenwald One way that Tannenwald frames her analysis is with statement that the US accepted the loss of the Vietnam war without using nuclear (and by extension, bio and some chemical) weapons. But this framing implies that the use of these weapons could somehow have been used to win the war. But this is not established. Would any of the ‘unused’ weapons have allowed the US to win the war? And after all, the US could have kept on fighting conventionally—--more conventional bombs could have been dropped, more US forces could have been sent. The failure of the US to do those things (and to end its participation in the Vietnam War) does not suggest the development of a taboo around conventional weapons or the fighting of conventional wars. 64 Questions: Tannenwald, 2 The fact that the use of these weapons was not widely discussed is not necessarily evidence for the role of norms, of internalisation of norms/taboos and appropriateness logics. Such a lack of discussion ould also be caused by internalisation of cost/benefit logic, if calculations so clear that it one did not need to keep re-doing calculations. Political costs were not seen as intrinsic to weapons and as unalterable—they were seen as dependent upon circumstances of use and as manipulable (reducible). Focus on deterrence does not adequately capture role of military utility in US decision-making. 65 Bottom line: I argue that: Consequentialist, not appropriateness logics doinated decision-making. Emphasis on miliary utility. Norms/taboos mattered—they had important effects on decisions—on process by which decisions were made (requiring involvement of the president and --by generating political costs--requiring calculation of costs and benefits). And because of the potential political costs, they raised the barrier to use, requiring larger benefits to justify use. Decision –makers thought that the effect of potential political costs could be minimised, saw them ‘manipulable’ and not intrinsic. 66 22 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Broader Policy 25 November 1969 Nixon announces: US offensive biological weapons program terminated; Affirmed a US policy of no-first-use for lethal chemical and incapacitating weapons. 10 April 1972: the Biological Weapons Convention is open for signature (it comes into force on 26 March 1975) 67 Additional Cases A few slides on crop destruction and on use of irritant agents—see assigned article for more information 68 Crop destruction In April 1962, the Department of State advised the US Embassy in Saigon that that the ‘primary consideration of any crop destruction program is to ensure that it will not result in US and GVN [Government of Vietnam] absorbing adverse propaganda criticism and adverse local reaction without achieving any commensurate military advantage’. 69 23 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Crop destruction 2 ‘The President’s staff then informed the State and the Defense Departments that the President should not receive a request to supply chemicals to the GVN for crop destruction until there was evidence for both technical and tactical effectiveness. ‘Specifically, the President required “a thorough discussion of all of the factors can be assembled, including: 1) scientific assurance based upon extensive testing that the herbicides are completely effective [and] 2) a selection of targets based upon sound intelligence, which would justify the conclusion that crop destruction will produce sufficiently valuable military results to justify the political cost.”’ 70 The decision to end the use of chemical anti-plant weapons in Vietnam 1968—President Thieu of South Vietnam requests that the use of defoliation is confined to remote areas. 1969 November—US Sec of Defense Packard restricts the use of Agent Orange to areas remote from populations. 1970 April: Defense Department suspends use of Agent Orange completely, when three federal agencies impose limits on its use domestically. 1970 June 22 - American usage of antiplant agents in Vietnam is halted, except for around the perimeter of US installations, etc. 71 The Use of Irritant Agents Focus here on use in 1965 ‘Extra’ slides on an additional case of use, see assigned article as well 72 24 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) The use of irritant chemical weapons: lead up 1956: French left some irritant agents behind when they withdraw from Indochina 1960: change in US policy: presidential authorisation not required for use of irritant agents US routinely issuing irritant agents to some troops and allies; South Vietnam begins to receive in 1962 1963: Full-scale troop test of CS in US, part of effort of US military to explore utility of irritant agents 1963: irritant agents used by South Vietnamese troops for domestic riot control purposes (Buddhist Crisis) 1964 November: South Vietnamese troops use against rioters 73 Lead up, irritant weapons cont. 1964 (early): MACV examining potential for irritant and incapacitating weapons in counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam 1964: MACV then requests authority for tactical employment of irritant and incapacitating agents from CINCPAC. Only irritant weapons approved. Recommended ‘initial use of CS gas be conducted by the Vietnamese, for Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces already possessed the capability to initiate such use and therefore heavy US involvement would not be necessary’. 1964 (late): First use in combat in operations that aimed to rescue American prisoners of war (POWs) Further operations in December 74 Reaction to Use A story by Peter Arnett on use of ‘chemical weapons’ in Vietnam sparked domestic and international protest. Washington policymakers scramble to discover what had happened and defend use—argue that not using chemical weapons but tear gas, ‘better to cry than die’, ‘can order from Sears Robuck (a department store)’ But US temporarily suspends use. 75 25 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Role of Appropriateness logics Example: In March 1965, Michael Stewart, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, criticised the US use of irritant agents in Vietnam and implied that it was inappropriate when he called on the ‘US Government in determining the military measures it took to pay “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.”’ This irritated President Johnson but did not prompt a reappraisal of US policy. 76 Role of appropriateness logics: Example of argument for use of irritant agents as a ‘humanitarian’ weapon September 1965 operation led by Lt Col. Leon Utter makes unauthorised use of irritant weapons in a situation where civilians were intermingled with combatants. Portrayed as humanitarian use, to save lives of civilians Claim that Utter, new to Vietnam, had not been aware authorization for use of these weapons had been withdrawn (and he is cleared in investigation) >>>Attitudes change 77 New York Times changes sides Editorial on 24 March 1965 titled ‘Gas (nonlethal) in Vietnam’: ‘Gas is a wretched means to achieve even the most valid ends.’ versus Editorial on 11 September 1965 titled ‘Using tear gas in Vietnam’, argues that ‘nonlethal riot-control gases can be far more humane and will cause far fewer casualties than many of the weapons now being used in Vietnam.’ 78 26 Martin, lecture BAWMD in IP 2223 (Martin, forthcoming) Use resumes After the “Utter incident” use of irritant agents resumed and continued until the end of the war. But only of CN and CS. DM (Adamsite) was excluded from the re- confirmation of the authority for use. As a nausea gas that had been used in World War I, the judgment was apparently that it was (or was too close to) being a “chemical warfare agent” rather than a “tear gas.” 79 Understanding of political costs In these cases, US decision makers understood political costs as manipulable 80 27