Martin BA WMD CBN Legality Morality Stigma slides 2023-2024 PDF

2/15/2024 CBN Morality, Legality and Stigma: The Ottawa Treaty and the TPNW DIFFERENT ROOM: FWB 3.146 Dr Susan Martin BA WMD in IP 2023-24 1 SSPP Student Wellbeing Need wellbeing support? Lucy Barron SSPP Wellbeing Officer We are your first point of contact if you have any concerns or worries that m...

2/15/2024 CBN Morality, Legality and Stigma: The Ottawa Treaty and the TPNW DIFFERENT ROOM: FWB 3.146 Dr Susan Martin BA WMD in IP 2023-24 1 SSPP Student Wellbeing Need wellbeing support? Lucy Barron SSPP Wellbeing Officer We are your first point of contact if you have any concerns or worries that may be impacting your ability to study. We offer a supportive environment where we will listen and provide advice. If needed, we can signpost you to specialist services that will be able to support you further. Our webpage: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/wellbeing Rebecca Lee SSPP Wellbeing Officer Book an appointment with Rebecca Book an appointment with Lucy 2 1 2/15/2024 REST OF TERM 23/2 Reading Week 20-24 February. No class, no office hours. 1/3 8/3 15/3 Arms Control and Use/Non-use: Syria (FWB 2.46) New Technologies, the Return of Major Power Competition, and New Questions about Limited Nuclear War (FWB 2.46) Dr Strangelove/nuclear strategy discussion (FWB 2.46) 22/3 Conclusion and Review (Practice for exam) (FWB 2.46) Exam Period 29/4-31/5 3 Key questions What is the impact of stigma (morality, legality) on state behaviour in regard to the acquisition and use of weapons and on arms control and disarmament? How do international norms and stigma operate—how do they affect state behaviour, if they do? Through what ‘causal mechanisms’ do they operate? What is the role of civil society, non-state actors, and public opinion? What can we learn by comparing the Landmine Treaty, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)? (Next week we will look at the CWC; we can also think about the BWC and the NPT here). 4 2 2/15/2024 Overview I. Review--Decision making logics (March and Olsen) II. Role of norms and taboos III. Enforcement? IV. Overview of the Mine Ban Treaty V. Overview of the TPNW VI. Discussion: Does the example of the Mine Ban Treaty provide a reason to believe that the TPNW will succeed in advancing nuclear disarmament? Why or why not? 5 March and Olsen on logics of action/decision making (James G March and Johan P Olsen 1984; 1998; 2012) -- ‘basic logic of action by which human behaviour is interpreted’ (1998, 949) --how actors (individuals, states) make decisions/how we explain the behaviour of individuals and states March and Olsen identify two logics that they see as playing a role in decision-making: a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness 6 3 2/15/2024 The Logic of Consequences (James G March and Johan P Olsen 1984; 1998; 2012) Actions/decisions are explained by reference to the calculation of risks, costs and benefits of different possible courses of action, with choice of option that best serves interests. ‘Action is driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior preferences’ (1998, 949); ‘Those who see actions as driven by expectations of consequences imagine that human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise’ (1998, 949). 7 The Logic of Consequences, 2 (James G March and Johan P Olsen 1984; 1998; 2012) The logic of consequences understands decision making as deliberate process, where the ‘inputs’ into that process are: a) the decision maker’s interests and preferences, including preferences regarding future consequences, as well as resources; b) knowledge (guesses) about future consequences of possible current actions. Based on interests, but interests are assumed and exogenous to the explanation of the choice/behaviour. Example: ‘behaviour of the [economic] market is a consequence of interlocking choices by individuals and firms, each acting in terms of expectations and preferences manifested at those levels.’ 8 4 2/15/2024 The Logic of Appropriateness (James G March and Johan P Olsen 1984; 1998; 2012; 2013)  ‘Action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and senses of identity’ (1998, 949).  Action as rule-based and ‘rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate’ (2012).  ‘Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations’ (1998, 951).  Action as ‘the fulfilment of roles and duties; …. political actors associate certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropriateness. What is appropriate for a particular person in a particular situation is defined by the political and social system and transmitted through socialization.’ (1984, 741)  Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions. ‘Embedded in a social collectivity, [actors] do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation’ (2013, 478). 9 The Logic of Appropriateness, 2 (James G March and Johan P Olsen, 2012) ‘The core intuition is that humans maintain a repertoire of roles and identities, each providing rules of appropriate behaviour in situations for which they are relevant. Following rules of a role or an identity is a relatively complicated cognitive process involving thoughtful reasoning behaviour; but the processes of reasoning are not primarily connected to the anticipation of future consequences’ (2012). ‘Appropriateness need not attend to consequences, but it involves cognitive and ethical dimensions, targets and aspirations. As a cognitive matter, appropriate action is action that is essential to a particular conception of self. As an ethical matter, appropriate action is action that is virtuous’ (2012). Rules and situations are not necessarily unambiguous: ‘It is necessary to understand the processes through which rules are translated into actual behaviours and the factors that may strengthen or weaken the relation between rules and actions…How do actors cope with impediments to learning and resolve ambiguities and conflicts of what the situation is and what experience is relevant; what the relevant role, identity and rule are and what they mean, and what the appropriate match and action are?’ (2012). 10 5 2/15/2024 The Logic of Consequences, The Logic of Appropriateness (James G March and Johan P Olsen, 2012) Logic of Consequences: ‘Actions are “explained” by identifying consequential reasons for them.’ ‘Foreign policy is “explained” by providing an interpretation of the outcomes expected from it.’ ‘Behaviour…is influenced by providing consequential incentives.’ Logic of Appropriateness: ‘We “explain” behaviour by determining the identities that are evoked and the meaning given to a situation.’ ‘We “explain” foreign policy as the application of rules associated with particular identities to particular situations.’ ‘We influence behaviour by providing interpretations of the self and of the situation.’ The difference between these two logics is not rationality—it is not that one is rational and one is not Application: How would you use the logic of appropriateness to explain: A student’s choice of modules?  A state’s decision to use or not use chemical weapons? 11 The Logic of Consequences, The Logic of Appropriateness, 2 (James G March and Johan P Olsen 1984; 1998; 2012) Relationship between the two logics (2012): Not mutually exclusive ‘Any particular action probably involves some elements of each. Political actors are constituted both by their interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in their identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, and the relationship between the two is often subtle’ (emphasis added). 12 6 2/15/2024 LOGICS APPLIED TO USE VERSUS CONTROL Hopefully fairly clear by now how these can be used to explain the use and non-use of weapons (for more go back to, e.g., analyses of Vietnam by Tannenwald and by Martin) But these logics are also intermingled in and shape attempts to control weapons And they also have implications for questions of compliance and enforcement of agreements An emphasis on consequentialist logics will put a stronger emphasis on deterring and enforcing compliance, and on punishing non-compliance—on manipulating consequences >>>if use of a weapon has been prohibited, need to ensure that use of weapon will result in consequences that outweigh the use. An emphasis on appropriateness logics does not lead to a disregard of compliance, but focuses less on deterring and punishing compliance than on continuing to stigmatise use of the weapon and to reinforce the norm (and associated socially constructed understanding of the weapons and of identities/roles) that prohibit and discourage use. And again, these two approaches to compliance are not mutually exclusive and are usually combined (though they can also be in tension, especially in practice). 13 14 7 2/15/2024 Anti-Personnel Land Mines 15 Chronology of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) https://www.apminebanconvention.org/en/the-convention/histor y-andtext/histor y/; https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/apmbc ‘Ottawa process’ launched by Canada after failure of the 1995 review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to adopt ‘far-reaching’ prohibitions on anti-personnel (AP) land mines. Two NGOs, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the International Committee of the Red Cross, work in partnership with a core group of states. 1996-97: Series of international conferences. 1996 November Austria circulates ‘Austrian draft text’; circulated to all after UNGA resolution passed 1996 December UNGA resolution (115 co-sponsors, 155 votes for, 10 abstentions) called upon all countries to conclude a new international agreement totally prohibiting antipersonnel mines "as soon as possible.“ 1997 September: Text is adopted by 89 states at conclusion of Oslo Diplomatic Conference on a Total Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines 1997 December: Treaty opened for signature 16 8 2/15/2024 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction of 1997 (also known as Ottawa Treaty, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty or Mine Ban Treaty) Opened for Signature: 3 December 1997 Entry into Force: 1 March 1999 State Parties: 164 Non-State Parties: 33 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Egypt, Federated States of Micronesia, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, DPRK, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands*, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, United Arab , Emirates, US, Uzbekistan, Vietnam 17 Mine Ban Treaty: Key Provisions Article 1: General obligations 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances: a) To use anti-personnel mines; b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, antipersonnel mines; c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. Article 2: Definitions Article 3: Exceptions (can keep some for training, can transfer for destruction) 18 9 2/15/2024 Mine Ban Treaty: Key Provisions, 2 Article 4: Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Article 5: Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas 1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. 2. Identification, marking, monitoring and protection of mined areas until destruction 3.-6. Extensions to destruction deadlines 19 Mine Ban Treaty: Key Provisions, 2 Article 6: International cooperation and assistance Article 7: Transparency Measures Article 8: Facilitation and clarification of compliance Article 9: National implementation measures Article 10: Settlement of disputes Article 11: Meetings of the State Parties Article 12: Review Conferences Article 13: Amendments Article 14: Costs ……. Article 19: Reservations (none allowed) Article 20: Duration and withdrawal (unlimited; withdrawal with 6 months notice but not during armed conflict N 20 10 2/15/2024 Recent allegations of use By Ukraine—a State Party, in 2022; President of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention states that it will use established procedures to seek clarification of allegations (3 February 2023). Ukraine also reported to be investigating. By Russia, a non-State Party (report by Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2022) Landmine Monitor 2022 says this has been confirmed. By Myanmar, a non-State Party (report by Amnesty International 20 July 2022); Landmine Monitor 2023 reports this use has been continuous since first report in 1999. Landmine Monitory 2022 reports use by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, and Myanmar Landmine Monitory 2023 reports use by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) in the Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Tunisia, wit new use attributed to NSAGs in or bordering the Sahel region in Africa, 21 Implementation: Stockpile destruction and mines retained http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3389440/landmine-monitor2023_web.pdf States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. 94 State parties declared completion of stockpile; 67 declared never possessed. Tuvalu needs to provide report.  States Parties Ukraine and Greece possess a combined total of approximately 3.6 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed. Both countries are in violation of the treaty, as both have missed their deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles.  No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by either Greece or Ukraine during 2021. A total of 66 States Parties have reported that they retain a combined total of more than 130,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes; two retain more than Bangladesh and Finland, retrain more than 12,000 mines, while another 23 retain more than 1,000 mines each. 22 11 2/15/2024 Non-party stockpiles Landmine Monitor, 2023, p.26 23 Implementation: Clearance http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3389440/landmine-monitor2023_web.pdf 31 State Parties have reported completion of clearance (from 2022 Landmine Monitor) States Parties reported clearance of at least 219.3km² of contaminated land and the destruction of more tha169,276 antipersonnel mines. Cambodia and Croatia reported the largest total clearance of mined areas in 2022 (and in 2021), clearing a combined total of more than 128.6km2 and destroying more than 14,815 antipersonnel mines. Twenty States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations before or no later than 2025, while 13 States Parties have deadlines after 2025. Six are not reporting. Very few appear on track to meet these deadlines. Eritrea remains in violation of the treaty by virtue of its failure to meet its clearance deadline and submit an extension request. 24 12 2/15/2024 Implementation: Victim Assistance http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3389440/landmine-monitor2023_web.pdf ‘In 2022, healthcare and rehabilitation activities remained under-funded and faced increasing and multiple challenges in many countries including in accessibility, coordination, expertise, and supply of materials. ‘Several States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims in need of assistance experienced massive disruption—and in some cases damage and destruction—to their healthcare systems in 2022, including Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. ‘Despite progress in integrating physical rehabilitation into national healthcare systems in some states, improving the sustainability of services, Monitor findings indicate that rehabilitation has not been a priority in many affected States Parties. ‘Major gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for mine and ERW survivors in many of the States Parties where livelihood support was most needed.’ 25 Ongoing problems: Production http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3389440/landmine-monitor2023_web.pdf The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.  In 2022, US aligned its policy with that of the MBT --but Trump reversed course once and could do so again if elected again (various sources). The most likely states to be actively producing antipersonnel mines are India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia. Russia has developed and produced new antipersonnel mines, with markings indicating their manufacture in 2019 and 2021. (2022 Landmine Monitor) The first of 700,000 of a new type of antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military in India in December 2021. (2022 Landmine Monitor) 26 13 2/15/2024 Ongoing problems: Casualties http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3389440/landmine-monitor2023_web.pdf ‘In 2022, at least 4,710 casualties of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded (1,661 killed and 3,015 injured). The survival status was unknown for 34 casualties.’  ‘Civilians made up 85% of all recorded casualties, where the military or civilian status was known (4,341).’  ‘Children accounted for half (49%, or 1,171) of civilian casualties where the age was recorded.’ Casualties in 2022 were identified in 49 states and two other areas, of which 37 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Non-signatory Syria recorded the highest number of annual casualties (834) for the third year in a row. Ukraine, a state party, recorded the second highest total (608). Yemen (State Party) and Myanmar (non state Party) each recorded more than 500 casualties in 2022. 27 Ongoing problems: Contamination http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3389440/landmine-monitor2023_web.pdf At least 60 states and other areas known or suspected to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines. This includes 33 States Parties that with current clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and five other areas. An additional seven States Parties need to provide information regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the CAR, Mali, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Venezuela. N 28 14 2/15/2024 How do Bower and Price explain the MBT? What is their central argument? What role do they see for norms? What role do they see for a logic of appropriateness and/or a logic of consequence? What evidence do they provide? Are you convinced, and why/why not? 29 Twists and Turns—e.g. US policy 2004: George W Bush Administration announced US would not join  The US rejected argument that landmines are inherently indiscriminate and instead claimed right for proportionate and discriminate use; looked for technological fix and identified persistence as the problem (Bower and Price, 151). 2014: Obama administration announced intention to ‘eventually’ join, banned production and acquisition of AP mines, and reserved use for Korean peninsula 2020: Trump administration allowed production and deployment anywhere 2022: Biden administration returned to 2014 position:  United States ‘will not develop, produce, or acquire anti-personnel landmines, not export or transfer anti-personnel landmines except when necessary for activities related to mine destruction or removal and for the purpose of destruction. They will not use anti-personnel landmines outside the Korean Peninsula, they will not assist, encourage, or induce anyone outside the context of the Korean Peninsula to engage in activity that would be prohibited by the Ottawa Convention, and undertake to destroy anti-personnel landmines and their stockpiles not required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.  ‘We will continue to pursue materiel and operational solutions that would be compliant with and ultimately allow the United States to accede to the Ottawa Convention, while we at the same ensure our ability to meet our alliance commitments.’ 34 15 2/15/2024 35 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/ https://www.icanw.org/tpnw_full_text Opened for Signature: 20 September 2017 Entry into Force: 22 January 2021 State Parties: 70 Signed but not ratified: 23 Total: 93 States who have not joined include all NWS, NATO members, and countries that fall under the US nuclear umbrella in Asia 36 16 2/15/2024 TPNW: Key Provisions (paraphrased) https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw Video: https://youtu.be/DuR4TojNwnA Article 1: Prohibitions Cover development, testing, production, manufactures, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, as well as use or threats of use, as well as stationing, installing or deployment of nuclear weapons/nuclear explosive devices on territory, etc. Article 2: Declarations Of prohibited activities prior to entry into force or currently. Article 3: Safeguards If Article 4 does not apply, must at a minimum maintain or conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Article 4: Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 37 TPNW: Key Provisions (paraphrased), 2 https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw Video: https://youtu.be/DuR4TojNwnA Article 4: Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons State parties that owned, possessed or controlled NW after 7 July 2017 and eliminated their nuclear weapons programs and facilities prior to EIF shall cooperate with competent international authority to verify… Each state party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons shall immediately remove them from operation status and destroy them ASAP but not later than a deadline to be determined …with legally binding, time-bound plan for verified and irreversible elimination of that State party’s nuclear weapons program… ‘The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear- weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.’ 38 17 2/15/2024 TPNW: Key Provisions (paraphrased), 3 https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw Video: https://youtu.be/DuR4TojNwnA Article 5: National implementation Article 6: Victim assistance and environmental remediation Article 7: International cooperation and assistance Article 11: Settlement of disputes (about interpretation or application of treaty) Article 12: Universality…. Article 17: Duration and Withdrawal  Right of withdrawal with 12 months notice as long as not involved in armed conflict 39 Jadoon 2021, ‘The Security Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Key arguments? (May just need to reference in debate) 40 18 2/15/2024 41 Debate : Does the example of the Mine Ban Treaty provide a reason to believe that the TPNW will succeed in advancing nuclear disarmament? Why or why not? Group A to argue: Yes, the example of the Mine Ban Treaty does provide a reason to believe that the TPNW will succeed in advancing nuclear disarmament. Group A = Noel, Joaquin, Connor, Tanmaya, Clara, Juliette, Benjamin Group B to argue: No, the example of the Mine Ban Treaty does not provide a reason to believe that the TPNW will succeed in advancing nuclear disarmament. Group B = Clement, Rayyaana, Hiro, Spenser, Isabelle, Klaudia, 42 19 2/15/2024 Reminder: National Student Survey How do I complete the NSS? The NSS opens at King's on 15 January 2024 You will start receiving an email from Ipsos in the week beginning 15th January inviting you to complete the survey. Just click the link in the email. Or you can complete the survey at any time by the NSS website www.thestudentsurvey.com Check your emails for updates on NSS. Ipsos will email, text and even call you to remind you to complete the survey. Once you have completed the survey, Ipsos will stop contacting you. The survey is open until Sunday 30 April 2023. But remember. To enter the prize draw, you must enter before 29 February 2024. Prize winners will be notified by 8 March. 43 20