Perceived Fairness and Public Acceptability of Carbon Pricing: A Review (PDF)

Climate Policy ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tcpo20 Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature Sara Maestre-Andrés , Stefan Drews & Jeroen van den Bergh To cite this article: Sara Maestre-Andrés , Stefan Drews & Jeroen van den Bergh (2019) Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature, Climate Policy, 19:9, 1186-1204, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2019.1639490 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1639490 Published online: 10 Jul 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1940 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 20 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tcpo20 CLIMATE POLICY 2019, VOL. 19, NO. 9, 1186–1204 https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1639490 SYNTHESIS ARTICLE Perceived fairness and public acceptability of carbon pricing: a review of the literature a Sara Maestre-Andrés , Stefan Drewsa and Jeroen van den Bergha,b,c a Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain; bICREA, Barcelona, Spain; cSchool of Business and Economics & Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY While carbon pricing is widely seen as a crucial element of climate policy and has been Received 22 February 2019 implemented in many countries, it also has met with strong resistance. We provide a Accepted 29 June 2019 comprehensive overview of public perceptions of the fairness of carbon pricing and KEYWORDS how these aﬀect policy acceptability. To this end, we review evidence from Carbon tax; cap-and-trade; empirical studies on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural equity; public perception; aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade. In addition, we examine preferences for climate policy; policy support particular redistributive and other uses of revenues generated by carbon pricing and their role in instrument acceptability. Our results indicate a high concern over distributional eﬀects, particularly in relation to policy impacts on poor people, in turn reducing policy acceptability. In addition, people show little trust in the capacities of governments to put the revenues of carbon pricing to good use. Somewhat surprisingly, most studies do not indicate clear public preferences for using revenues to ensure fairer policy outcomes, notably by reducing its regressive eﬀects. Instead, many people prefer using revenues for ‘environmental projects’ of various kinds. We end by providing recommendations for improving public acceptability of carbon pricing. One suggestion to increase policy acceptability is combining the redistribution of revenue to vulnerable groups with the funding for environmental projects, such as on renewable energy. Key policy insights. If people perceive carbon pricing instruments as fair, this increases policy acceptability and support.. People’s satisfaction with information provided by the government about the policy instrument increases acceptability.. While people express high concern over uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer using carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects instead of compensation for inequitable outcomes.. Recent studies ﬁnd that people’s preferences shift to using revenues for making policy fairer if they better understand the functioning of carbon pricing, notably that relatively high prices of CO2-intensive goods and services reduce their consumption.. Combining the redistribution of revenue to support both vulnerable groups and environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems to most increase policy acceptability. 1. Introduction With the entry into force of the 2015 Paris Agreement state leaders have accepted that climate change poses a serious threat to the biosphere and human welfare. However, the majority of nationally determined CONTACT Sara Maestre-Andrés [email protected], [email protected] Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, UAB Campus, Bellaterra 08193, Spain © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group CLIMATE POLICY 1187 contributions (NDCs) submitted under the Paris Agreement are not matched by suﬃciently eﬀective national policies (Victor et al., 2017). Many economists, environmental scientists and politicians have called for economy-wide carbon pricing, whether in the form of a tax or emissions trading, as a cornerstone of an eﬀective climate policy package to implement the Paris Agreement. The main reason is that carbon pricing increases relative prices of high- versus low-carbon goods and services, in theory resulting in an eﬀective as well as eﬃcient way of reducing CO2 emissions (Aldy, Krupnick, Newell, Parry, & Pizer, 2010; Baranzini et al., 2017; Nordhaus, 2010). In particular, all prices in the economy should reﬂect direct and indirect CO2 emissions generated during the entire production cycle of associated products and services. In other words, carbon pricing represents a systemic policy aﬀecting all carbon-based decisions in the economy, both discouraging high- carbon practices by consumers and producers and stimulating cleaner energy production. Moreover, carbon prices do not draw on government budgets but generate revenues that can be used for funding public invest- ments in climate innovation and adaptation, or for compensating any inequitable eﬀects (High-level Commis- sion on Carbon Prices, 2017). Despite such arguments in favour, and over 50 carbon pricing schemes implemented or planned around the world (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018), the instrument still meets considerable public and political resistance. Low public acceptability inﬂuenced the cancellation of a carbon pricing scheme in 2014 in Australia (Crowley, 2017), the rejection of ballot initiatives in 2016 and 2018 to impose a carbon tax in Washington State (Carattini, Kall- bekken, & Orlov, 2019) or the popular protests in France at the end of 2018 which led to the suspension of a carbon tax for six months (Willsher, 2018). Perceived (un)fairness of carbon pricing has been found to be signiﬁ- cantly correlated with its (low) public acceptability1 (Clayton, 2018; Dreyer & Walker, 2013; Hammar & Jagers, 2007). We assume that carbon pricing fairness relates to individuals’ perceptions arising from a judgment process regarding the policy instrument (Grasso, 2007). Accounting for people’s opinions and public acceptabil- ity of climate change policies is important as these aﬀect political choices (Anderson, Böhmelt, & Ward, 2017; Dresner, Dunne, Clinch, & Beuermann, 2006). The lack of acceptability2 is also one reason why most existing carbon pricing schemes are weak, that is, they exhibit relatively low price levels. Almost half (46%) of emissions covered by carbon pricing are priced at less than US$10/tCO2e (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018). This is substan- tially lower than the price level thought to be consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature target, which according to the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, should be at least US$40–80/tCO2 by 2020 and US$50–100/tCO2 by 2030 (High-level Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017). Moreover, some research suggests that increasing people’s perceived fairness in the context of a CO2 car tax can diminish scepticism about the eﬀectiveness of the policy (Bolderdijk, Steg, Woerdman, Frieswijk, & De Groot, 2017). Taken together, unravelling fairness perceptions related to carbon pricing can contribute to an improved design of planned and existing carbon pricing schemes so as to make them more consistent with the targets of the Paris Agreement. Here we examine which aspects of perceived fairness have been addressed in studies and how they aﬀect policy acceptability. This assessment involves collecting concerns raised by the general public and sometimes speciﬁc stakeholders, such as policy-makers and business representatives. Our analytical framework, shown in Figure 1, is derived from ﬁndings of the fairness literature applied to carbon pricing and the related issue of environmental taxation (Dreyer & Walker, 2013; Kim, Schmöcker, Fujii, & Noland, 2013). It describes that people’s judgement of fairness is inﬂuenced by perceptions of individual (fairness to me) and collective (fairness to others) consequences of the policy, as well as its design and procedural aspects. One dimension of perceived fairness related to individual consequences can be interpreted as: are the consequences to the self (‘me’) fair or unfair. Such perceived personal consequences include expected higher economic costs for the individual (Kall- bekken & Saelen, 2011) and less personal freedom because of regulatory constraints (Baron & Jurney, 1993). Per- ceived collective consequences of carbon pricing, i.e. fairness to others or everyone, include distributional eﬀects. Examples are disproportional costs for households that are poor or live in remote areas (Clayton, 2018; Jagers & Hammar, 2009), due to them spending a relatively large share of their disposable income on carbon-intensive goods and services like home heating, with the latter being relatively car and thus petrol dependent. Carbon pricing without complementary measures or speciﬁed uses of its revenues tends to be regressive (Baranzini, Goldemberg, & Speck, 2000; Grainger & Kolstad, 2010), notwithstanding that some research suggests that it might be progressive or neutral in certain low- and medium-income countries (Dorband, Jakob, Kalkuhl, & Steckel, 2019). 1188 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. Figure 1. Relationships between fairness aspects and public acceptability of carbon pricing. The arrows and boxes in the ﬁgure refer only to the mechanisms analysed in the study. With regard to underlying perceptions of procedural fairness, we considered a wide range of aspects, based on a deﬁnition of procedural fairness as: the proper adherence to the rules relevant to a procedure and, by extension, as the correct application of such rules to all cases which are alike within the terms of the rules (formal or informal, explicit or implicit) which are consistently applied to all indi- viduals. (Hay, 1995, p. 501) Hence, for instance, people’s low trust in politicians using revenues generated by carbon pricing in a proper way is an aspect included in this category. The reason is that when people express lack of trust that the government will keep its promises about revenue use, it refers to a disregard of a relevant procedural rule, that is, keep your promises. We have also included ‘distrust in government’ as a relevant procedural aspect. When people express lack of trust in politicians because, for instance, they promote carbon pricing in order to generate additional governmental funds rather than mitigate climate change, it refers to a relevant procedural rule, that is, adhere to the presumed goal of the policy which is to mitigate climate change. Studies further indicate that certain allocations of the revenues generated by carbon pricing can change people’s perceptions of the fairness of the policy because, for instance, they ameliorate regressive impacts. Con- sequently, the level of acceptability depends on how carbon pricing revenues are used (Carattini, Baranzini, Thal- mann, Varone, & Vöhringer, 2017; Jagers, Martinsson, & Matti, 2018; Klenert et al., 2018). In particular, we will review here evidence from empirical studies to get a more systematic understanding of whether using revenues from carbon pricing in order to make the policy fairer contributes to more policy acceptability than other uses. We have included both carbon taxes and tradable permit (cap and trade) schemes. Carbon taxes apply a duty to goods and services in accordance with their carbon content. Cap and trade schemes set a limit on CO2 emis- sions and distribute CO2 permits among emitters accordingly. These permits can be bought and sold by com- panies or consumers in a market. To regulate emissions from individuals, a tradable permit scheme could either be implemented upstream, i.e. amongst fuel producers, or downstream, i.e. amongst individual consumers. There are very few studies dealing with people’s perceptions of fairness of upstream tradable permit schemes because their impacts are diﬃcult to perceive. However, there are some studies dealing with people’s opinions over downstream schemes known as personal carbon allowances. Previous literature reviews have been undertaken regarding climate policy support in general (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016) and carbon pricing in particular (Carattini, Carvalho, & Fankhauser, 2018; Klenert et al., 2018). Our paper diﬀers from these because our review focuses more thoroughly on how individuals judge personal, distributional and procedural aspects of carbon taxes and cap-and-trade and their perceived fairness; whereas others covered many more factors inﬂuencing public policy support. CLIMATE POLICY 1189 Figure 1 illustrates connections between the fairness aspects discussed, the perceived fairness of carbon pricing and acceptability. It accounts for people recognizing carbon pricing to involve personal, distributional and procedural aspects, which jointly aﬀect people’s perceived overall fairness of carbon pricing as pointed out in the literature (analysed in Section 3.1). In turn, this perception inﬂuences acceptability of the instrument, which is addressed in Section 3.2. An innovative element of this review is the attention given to the use of carbon pricing revenues and how this aﬀects perceived fairness and acceptability (addressed in Section 4). This involves two channels. The ﬁrst one corresponds mostly to revenue uses (e.g. redistributive) that aﬀect people’s perceptions of personal consequences, distributional eﬀects and procedural aspects of carbon pricing and, consequently, inﬂuence people’s perception of fairness and policy acceptability. The second channel refers to environmental and other uses of revenues that aﬀect policy acceptability without being mediated by fairness. This review should be regarded as an exploratory attempt to address the relevance of fair- ness in explaining people’s acceptability of carbon pricing. Thus, we shed light on people’s perceptions of per- sonal, distributional and procedural aspects that inﬂuence people’s perceived fairness and thereby have a signiﬁcant role in policy acceptability. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the procedure used to select primary studies to be reviewed. Section 3 systematically reports ﬁndings of the review regarding the impact of carbon pricing on policy acceptability through perceptions as discussed in relation to Figure 1. Section 4 analyses whether people prefer uses of carbon pricing revenues that make the policy fairer. Section 5 discusses potential reasons that explain why people show high concern over distributional eﬀects of carbon pricing but do not rank highly revenue uses aimed at making the policy fairer. Section 6 provides conclusions and recommendations for improving the acceptability of carbon pricing proposals. 2. Literature search and method of analysis An extensive literature search of studies dealing with people’s opinion on carbon pricing schemes with a focus on perceived fairness was conducted using the academic database ‘Scopus’. We aimed at covering a wide range of ﬁelds, from economics to psychology and political science. To this end, a variety of search terms were used: (accepta* OR view OR attitude OR opinion OR preference) AND (‘carbon pric*’ OR ‘carbon trad*’ OR ‘carbon tax’ OR ‘ecological tax reform’ OR ‘cap and trade’ OR ‘energy tax’ OR ‘environmental tax’ OR ‘climate tax’ OR ‘permit trad*’ OR ‘emission trad*’ OR fee OR dividend) AND (equity OR fairness OR ‘recycling revenue’ OR ‘distribut*’ OR equality OR social OR poverty OR rebate OR earmark OR justice). We further included in the sample relevant studies cited in the reference list of papers found through Scopus. Studies were included if they: (i) involved analysis of primary empirical data and (ii) made explicit reference to carbon pricing or (iii) addressed other pricing instruments (e.g. fuel taxes) in the context of climate change. Note that the third criterion means that we did not include more general studies of environmental taxes or road pricing. While possibly not exhaustive, this procedure ensures a comprehensive coverage of the literature. A total of 43 empirical studies were identiﬁed, among which 37 deal with carbon taxes and similar schemes (such as environmental tax reform), three studies with cap and trade schemes and three studies with both schemes together. We extracted the following information from each study: authors; journal and year of pub- lication; location of the study (country); research objective; method; year of data collection; sample size and representativeness; type of stakeholder questioned; discipline or research area to which the study belongs; characteristics of the carbon pricing instrument; whether or not carbon pricing was implemented in the con- sidered country at the time of the study; people’s perceptions of personal consequences, distributional eﬀects and procedural aspects; and eﬀects of these on people’s acceptability of carbon pricing; preferences for uses of revenues and their eﬀects on fairness and policy acceptability. Most studies were published after 2006 with only three studies as exceptions. In terms of representativeness of the studies, 18 of the 29 quantitative studies reported that they were representative of the scale at which the study was conducted: three of them at the city level and the others at the whole country or state level. Our results show that English-speaking countries are overrepresented in the sample of studies analysed. Most studies were undertaken in the USA (10 papers; 18% of the whole sample of studies), followed by the UK 1190 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. Figure 2. Countries where carbon pricing studies were conducted. (eight papers, 14%), and Australia and Sweden with six papers (11%) undertaken in each country (see Figure 2). Moreover, almost all countries except Australia, India and South Africa are North American or European. In order to analyse personal, distributional and procedural aspects associated with carbon pricing as per- ceived by respondents in primary studies, we identify excerpts from the articles reviewed related to concerns expressed by respondents about carbon pricing. We cluster the excerpts that expressed identical or similar aspects of carbon pricing and systematically coded them in order to establish diﬀerent types of personal, dis- tributional or procedural concerns. We counted the number of papers that reported each concern. Note that all opinions reported belong to the general public, except when a concrete group of stakeholders is speciﬁed, which mainly corresponds to business representatives and decision-makers. The broad spectrum of studies we wanted to include, and the diversity of methodological approaches they used, generated challenges in terms of data analysis and comparability. Most studies did not ask people to list their perceived personal, dis- tributional and procedural concerns but rather the researchers evaluated people’s perceptions of policy impacts presented to them. Thus, our results should be understood in terms of which perceived personal, distributional and procedural concerns are more or less frequently addressed in the literature and people’s opinion regarding them. With the aim of assessing the eﬀects of perceptions on acceptability of the policy instrument, we counted the number of papers that found a relationship between respondents’ perceptions and acceptability of the policy instrument. We distinguish between results from qualitative (interviews and focus groups) and quantitat- ive (questionnaire survey) studies while also adding nuances for each as they cover diﬀerent types of data. For example, the quantitative studies report the statistical signiﬁcance of the relationship between perceived eﬀects and policy acceptability. To assess people’s preferences for diﬀerent uses of revenues, we used the available information on how people rank them. Next, we assessed whether those uses that can potentially make the policy fairer are also the ones most preferred. Finally, we examined the inﬂuence of the use of revenues on instrument acceptability by counting the number of papers that found a relationship between these two variables. 3. Fairness and acceptability of carbon pricing 3.1. Perceived personal consequences, distributional eﬀects and procedural aspects The articles reviewed identiﬁed a variety of perceived personal consequences, distributional eﬀects and pro- cedural aspects of carbon pricing. Table 1 provides a list of these eﬀects and aspects that appeared in more than one study along with how many studies mentioned each instance. CLIMATE POLICY 1191 Table 1. Perceived aspects of carbon pricing, ordered by frequency in primary studies. Number of studies Perceived personal eﬀects Higher energy prices and less purchasing power 13 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006; Harwatt, Tight, Bristow, & Gühnemann, 2011α; Kallbekken & Saelen, 2011; Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013α; Lo et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2008; O’Connor, Bord, Yarnal, & Wiefek, 2002) Loss of jobs 5 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch et al., 2006; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; O’Connor et al., 2002) Less comfort and well-being 4 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Baron & Jurney, 1993; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Harwatt et al., 2011) Limits freedom of choice 4 (Baron & Jurney, 1993; Harwatt et al., 2011; Owen et al., 2008; O’Connor et al., 2002α,β) Voluntary behaviour punished rather than appreciated 3 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Klok et al., 2006) Perceived distributional eﬀects Impacts on poor households (fuel poverty) 14 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Clinch et al., 2006; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006; Harwatt et al., 2011; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Kallbekken & Saelen, 2011; Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015; Klok et al., 2006α; Lo, 2013; Lo et al., 2013; Owen et al., 2008β) Policy burden unevenly distributed between ﬁrms and 11 (Baron & Jurney, 1993; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Brannlund & Persson, 2012; households or among the latter Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006; Harwatt et al., 2011β; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013; Owen et al., 2008β) Policy burden unevenly distributed among provinces, 5 (Brannlund & Persson, 2012; Carson et al., 2010; Klok et al., 2006; Lachapelle et al., states or countries 2012; Lo, 2013) Impacts on rural households 4 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017α; Harwatt et al., 2011; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Owen et al., 2008) Impacts on the elderly and people in need of care 4 (Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Owen et al., 2008β) Exemptions and privileges given to some sectors 4 (Carson et al., 2010; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006) Initial distribution of permits 2 (Bristow et al., 2010α; Harwatt et al., 2011α) Perceived procedural aspects Distrust in government 12 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006; Hammar & Jagers, 2006; Hsu et al., 2008; Klok et al., 2006α; Lo, 2013; Lo et al., 2013α; Owen et al., 2008) Distrust in good use of revenues of carbon pricing 9 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Clinch et al., 2006; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2008; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015) Dissatisfaction with governmental information 7 (Baranzini et al., 2014; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; provision about the policy Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Klok et al., 2006; Lo, 2013) Insuﬃcient consultation of social partners 3 (Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Klok et al., 2006) Distrust in markets 2 (Lo et al., 2013α; Owen et al., 2008α) Notes: Most studies deal only with carbon taxes, except for the ones indicated by: α Deals with cap-and-trade scheme. β Deals with both carbon tax and cap-and-trade scheme. 3.1.1. Perceived personal eﬀects The most mentioned personal consequence of carbon pricing in the reviewed studies is that it may imply higher energy prices and less purchasing power.3 This eﬀect was reported in 13 studies. For instance, Carattini et al. (2017) ﬁnd that an argument widely used by the opponents of carbon taxes in Switzerland was that higher carbon tax rates would increase the consumer price of energy. Respondents in Kaplowitz and McCright (2015) referred to structural constraints that citizens face, such as the lack of alternatives to driving as one argument against a gasoline tax which would generate unacceptable additional expenditures. Among these studies, six of them addressed the reduction of purchasing power. For instance, many Swiss respondents (67% of a sample of 338 individuals) in Baranzini and Carattini (2017) were concerned about a reduction in consumption and pur- chasing power due to the implementation of a carbon tax. The loss of jobs as a potential impact of carbon pricing was mentioned in ﬁve studies. Irish and UK citizens participating in focus groups undertaken by Clinch et al. (2006) stated that the implementation of an environmental tax reform could lead to job losses in 1192 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. their countries. Four studies reported a concern for less comfort and well-being as a consequence of carbon pricing instruments. Beuermann and Santarius (2006) reported that German respondents were worried about the implications of an environmental tax reform on their daily lives, particularly regarding the maintenance of their living standards, due to an increase in fuel prices. Four studies indicate that carbon pricing limits freedom of choice. For instance, Owen, Edgar, Prince, and Doble (2008) found that some UK participants in focus groups expressed considerable reluctance to the idea of imposing limits on individual carbon emissions. People were concerned about the government exerting inﬂuence over how they live and what they consume. Three studies mention voluntary behaviour punished rather than appreciated. This eﬀect relates to ‘motivational crowding-out’ which denotes that carbon pricing weakens people’s intrinsic motivations and decreases their voluntary eﬀorts to reduce carbon emissions (Frey & Jegen, 2001). This eﬀect links to fairness perceptions in the sense that some people feel they are unfairly ‘punished’ by a carbon tax because they already undertook voluntary ‘climate action’ (e.g. Baranzini, Caliskan, & Carattini, 2014). That is, they would have to incur an extra cost due to the tax, no matter whether they have already undertaken voluntary climate action. 3.1.2. Perceived distributional eﬀects The distributional impacts of carbon pricing that received most attention, namely in 14 studies, were impacts on poor households. Respondents in Beuermann and Santarius (2006), Clinch and Dunne (2006) and Kallbek- ken and Aasen (2010) expressed the concern that when people have few low-carbon options available, a carbon tax aﬀects poor households harder than wealthier ones. Unlike the latter, the former suﬀer a relatively high cost or are even forced to refrain from consuming the taxed good or service. Clinch and Dunne (2006) reported that, at the time of their study, Ireland had one of the highest fuel poverty rates in Europe. This may have contributed to respondents worrying that implementing an environmental tax reform might hinder access to heating fuel for many households, particularly for those outside the tax system and thus unable to beneﬁt from a reduction in labour taxes. Among business representatives interviewed, only those in Ireland expressed concern about eﬀects on poor households whereas those from Denmark, France, Germany and the UK did not pay much attention to poverty worsening as a result of environmental tax reform (Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006). Eleven studies referred to a policy burden unevenly distributed between ﬁrms and households or among the latter. Some of these identiﬁed concerns about the regressive nature of the instrument in a general way. For instance, in Baron and Jurney (1993), most individuals thought that a gasoline tax to combat global warming would unfairly distribute the costs of change. Other studies considered it unfair that the burden of the policy is ultimately passed onto consumers through the increase in prices of CO2-intensive products (Clinch & Dunne, 2006). Some people alleged that companies would be able to write oﬀ most of the policy burden in a way that the ordinary tax payer would not. Respondents in other studies, such as Owen et al. (2008), focused on the implications for high-income people and argued that they will be able to aﬀord whatever level of taxation is imposed on them, generating an unfair situation with respect to low-income households. Respondents in ﬁve studies expressed concerns over the implications of the policy burden unevenly distributed among provinces, states or countries. There are two diﬀerent scales, between and within countries. In the ﬁrst case, Brannlund and Persson (2012) reported that Swedish respondents preferred a reduction of CO2 emissions taking place at the European level (EU) rather than only at the scale of Sweden in order to share the burden of reducing emissions. They also found that Swedish people appear to be equally concerned about the social and geographical distribution of the policy burden. With regards to uneven distribution within the same country, Lachapelle, Borick, and Rabe (2012) show that a majority of Americans (59%) and Canadians (62%) do not appear to worry much about fairness implications due to an uneven distribution of the policy burden among the state and the provincial levels because they reject the idea that action taken by their respective state/pro- vince should be conditional upon the actions of others. Four studies showed that people are concerned about impacts on rural households. Respondents in Baranzini et al. (2014) suggested this, as there are fewer possibilities of substitution between private and public transportation in the countryside than in urban areas. Next, participants in four studies mentioned impacts on the elderly and people in need of care because they probably need to spend more time at home and have higher expenditure of fuel for heating their homes. For instance, Dresner, Jackson, and Gilbert (2006) reported this concern among UK respondents. Four studies CLIMATE POLICY 1193 identify concern about exemptions and privileges given to some sectors. Some participants in the study in Dresner, Jackson, et al. (2006) criticized the Climate Change Levy in the UK for avoiding taxation of the coal industry. Carson, Louviere, and Wei (2010) found that a small majority (53.7%) of Australian respondents was in favour of not giving special treatment to energy intensive sectors. Not surprisingly perhaps, business representatives expressed a completely diﬀerent opinion, highlighting the positive eﬀect of exemptions on ﬁrms’ competitive- ness and criticized carbon taxes (Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Klok, Larsen, Dahl, & Hansen, 2006). The initial distribution of permits has been identiﬁed as one of the main determinants of distributional impacts of tradable permits. For instance, Bristow, Wardman, Zanni, and Chintakayala (2010) analysed the preferred dis- tribution of permit allocation from a potential personal carbon trading scheme among UK residents. The pre- ferred option was the one based on an equal allocation to all with extra permits for those with greater needs, for example, living in rural areas, with poor housing or having any disability. On the contrary, the most unacceptable allocation was the one whereby permits were allocated to adults based on a Government assessment of needs. A study by Hammar and Jagers (2007) analysed people’s perception of the distribution of the burden of redu- cing CO2 from private car transportation taking into account three distributional principles (equity, needs-based and equality). It found that most respondents (75%) perceived as fair that people who pollute the most decrease their emissions more than others, in line with what they call an ‘equity principle’. Fewer respondents (54%) judged as fair that people who need their cars the least, e.g. who have good access to public transportation, should decrease their emissions more than others, in line with a so-called ‘needs-based principle’. Less than half of the respondents (48%) judged as fair that everybody should decrease their emissions at the same rate, e.g. by 10%, in line with what they call an ‘equality principle’. 3.1.3. Perceived procedural aspects The procedural aspect of carbon pricing that created most concern among respondents was distrust in the gov- ernment, mentioned in 12 studies by a signiﬁcant amount of respondents. Such distrust appears to take various forms. For instance, in a study on Sweden, Hammar and Jagers (2006) showed that 64% of a sample of 1270 respondents expressed a low level of trust in politics in general terms. A study on Ireland by Clinch and Dunne (2006) reported distrust in the capacity of the government to implement an environmental tax reform. In addition, Beuermann and Santarius (2006) found that distrust of German respondents in the govern- ment was motivated by the insuﬃcient information about carbon pricing provided by the administration. A related procedural aspect, identiﬁed by nine studies, relates to distrust in the government for the use of carbon pricing revenues. These indicated a lack of trust that the government would keep its promises about revenue use (e.g. lowering labour taxes) or guaranteeing revenue neutrality (see e.g. Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Hsu, Walters, & Purgas, 2008). Seven studies reported dissatisfaction with governmental information provision about the policy. For instance, Kallbekken and Aasen (2010) found for Norway that one-third of respondents thought providing information about policy instruments such as taxes is necessary to make them understandable. Moreover, respondents in Klok et al. (2006) declared that the government should provide information about whether CO2 reduction objec- tives had been met. Similarly, both business representatives and the general public from Germany expressed their concerns about making environmental tax reform more transparent (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006). Respondents from three studies referred to the insuﬃcient consultation of social partners in designing and imple- menting carbon pricing. Deroubaix and Lévèque (2006) showed that controversies about environmental tax reform in France emerged due to a very small number of protagonists taking part in key decisions concerning its design, a process characterized by conﬁdential negotiations with energy-intensive industries’ representatives and exclusion of unions and NGOs. Respondents in two studies expressed distrust in market mechanisms to deal with CO2 reduction. For instance, Lo, Alexander, Proctor, and Ryan (2013) found that the possibility of cheating and market manipulation was deemed to be the biggest concern surrounding emission trading schemes by respondents. Only one study, for the UK, compared people’s perceptions of the three policy instruments – carbon tax, per- sonal carbon trading and upstream carbon trading (Owen et al., 2008). Some participants in the focus groups thought that (downstream) personal carbon trading is a more equitable approach than either (upstream) 1194 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. emissions trading or a carbon tax. However, the latter two instruments were considered as being easier to implement. 3.2. Inﬂuence of perceptions on policy acceptability Now we move to the next step in our analysis, which is guided by the question whether perceived fairness of carbon pricing aﬀects public acceptability of it. Table 2 presents a summary of our ﬁndings. 3.2.1. Inﬂuence of perceived personal eﬀects on acceptability Several perceived personal consequences were found to have an eﬀect on policy acceptability (see Table 2). Here we explain the eﬀects found in more than one study. Seven quantitative studies and one qualitative study reported that higher energy prices and less purchasing power decreased acceptability of carbon pricing. For instance, Baranzini and Carattini (2017) found that aﬃrming that carbon taxes are an issue for purchasing power is linked with about 15% lower probability of accepting the instrument. In the case of the qualitative study, respondents giving importance to individual economic interests were less inclined to vote positively for carbon pricing (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006). Three studies found that perceptions of potential loss of jobs due to carbon pricing negatively inﬂuenced acceptability, although two of them were not signiﬁcant (Bar- anzini & Carattini, 2017; Carattini et al., 2017). Another relevant eﬀect positively inﬂuencing people’s acceptabil- ity of carbon pricing found in two studies was the perception that the policy does not limit freedom of choice. 3.2.2. Inﬂuence of perceived distributional eﬀects on acceptability With respect to distributional eﬀects, four studies found that a neutral cost distribution, that is, all citizens pay the same share of income, increases policy acceptability. This is illustrated by two studies in which a change from a regressive cost distribution (all citizens pay the same amount) to a neutral one aﬀected positively the accep- tance of the policy. Similarly, Baranzini and Carattini (2014) found that some people would accept a tax if it was proportional to income and consumption, therefore based on the situation of each household. Meanwhile, Hammar and Jagers (2007) assessed perceived fairness based on people’s preference for one of the three dis- tributional principles for distributing the burden of carbon taxation on private car transportation. They found that what they call the ‘equality principle’ seems most important in increasing acceptability of a higher carbon tax, that is, everybody should decrease their emissions the same, e.g. by 10%. The perception that the instrument could be regressive was found to inﬂuence its rejection in two quantitative studies and another qualitative study, although it was also found to not signiﬁcantly aﬀect acceptability in Baranzini and Carattini (2017). The progressive distribution of the costs of the instrument determined people’s acceptability of carbon pricing in three studies. As an example, Hammar and Jagers (2007) revealed that policy acceptability increased if those who should decrease their emissions the most are those who needed their cars the least, e.g. who had access to public transportation. This distribution of the policy costs followed what the authors called a ‘needs-based principle’. People who accepted the carbon tax in Dreyer and Walker (2013) and Dreyer, Walker, McCoy, and Teisl (2015) had a higher belief in ensuring that large industries are subject to a carbon price than those who did not. 3.2.3. Inﬂuence of perceived procedural aspects on acceptability Concerning procedural aspects, four quantitative studies and four qualitative ones found that policy acceptabil- ity increases when people are satisﬁed with governmental information provision about the policy. Two of them (Klok et al., 2006; Lo et al., 2013) showed that this is particularly the case when the information emphasizes the eﬀectiveness of the policy instrument. Nevertheless, another study found that having information about the instrument did not aﬀect acceptability signiﬁcantly (Rhodes, Axsen, & Jaccard, 2014). Trust in the government was reported in four quantitative studies and three qualitative studies as increasing the probability of accept- ability of carbon pricing. Hammar and Jagers (2006) further reported a strong role of trust showing that motor- ists who trust their politicians were no more likely to resist CO2 tax increases than high-trusting persons with no access to a car. On the contrary, low-trusting people with access to a car were the group found to be most strongly against an increased CO2 tax. CLIMATE POLICY 1195 Table 2. Inﬂuence of fairness perceptions on people’s policy acceptability. Inﬂuence on Fairness perceptions Signiﬁcant eﬀect Non-signiﬁcant eﬀectγ acceptability Personal eﬀects Higher energy prices and less 8 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Beuermann & Santarius, n/a − purchasing power 2006*; Brannlund & Persson, 2012; De Groot & Schuitema, 2012; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015; Kallbekken & Saelen, 2011; Kotchen, Turk, & Leiserowitz, 2017; O’Connor et al., 2002) Loss of jobs 1 (O’Connor et al., 2002) 2 (Baranzini & Carattini, – 2017; Carattini et al., 2017) Policy does not limit freedom of 2 (Baron & Jurney, 1993; O’Connor et al., 2002) n/a + choice Less comfort or well-being 1 (De Groot & Schuitema, 2012) 1 (Baranzini & Carattini, − 2017) Voluntary behaviour punished n/a 1 (Baranzini & Carattini, − rather than appreciated 2017) Distributional eﬀects Neutral cost distribution (all citizens 4 (Baranzini et al., 2014*; Brannlund & Persson, 2012; n/a + pay the same share of income) Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015; Hammar & Jagers, 2007) Regressive incidence (all citizens 3 (Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch et al., 2006*; Kallbekken & 1 (Baranzini & Carattini, – pay the same amount; eﬀects on Saelen, 2011) 2017) the poor) Progressive incidence (higher- 3 (Brannlund & Persson, 2012; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, n/a + income citizens pay a larger share 2015; Hammar & Jagers, 2007) of income) Assuring that large industries are 2 (Dreyer et al., 2015; Dreyer & Walker, 2013) n/a + subject to a carbon price Expected cooperation in energy 1 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017) n/a + conservation’s eﬀort from fellow- citizens Exemptions and privileges given to 1 (Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006*) n/a − some sectors Policy burden unevenly distributed 1 (Brannlund & Persson, 2012) n/a − among provinces, states or countries Policy burden shared among 1 (Brannlund & Persson, 2012) n/a + provinces, states or countries Responsibility for future 1 (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006*) n/a + generations Impacts on rural households n/a 1 (Baranzini & Carattini, – 2017) Procedural aspects Satisfaction with governmental 8 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Beuermann & Santarius, 1 (Rhodes et al., 2014) + information provision about the 2006*; Carattini et al., 2017; Carson et al., 2010; Dresner, policy Dunne, et al., 2006*; Hsu et al., 2008; Klok et al., 2006*; Lo et al., 2013α,*) Trust in government 7 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Dresner, Jackson, et al., n/a + 2006*; Hammar & Jagers, 2006; Jagers, Löfgren, & Stripple, 2010α; Kallbekken & Saelen, 2011; Lo et al., 2013α,*; Owen et al., 2008α,*) Limited understanding of the policy 1 (Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006*) n/a – Overall fairness 6 (Clayton, 2018; Clinch & Dunne, 2006*; Dreyer et al., 1 (Baron & Jurney, 1993) + 2015; Dreyer & Walker, 2013; Jagers et al., 2010α; Jagers et al., 2018) γ Non-signiﬁcant, relating to a quantitative study. *Qualitative study (all other studies are quantitative). α Deals with cap-and-trade scheme. 3.2.4. Inﬂuence of perceived overall fairness on acceptability Five quantitative studies and one qualitative study found that perceived overall fairness positively aﬀects public acceptability of carbon pricing. For instance, Dreyer et al. (2015) and Dreyer and Walker (2013) measured per- ceived overall fairness of a carbon tax that held industries responsible for emissions they release and included a 1196 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. compensation package for households indirectly impacted. The latter study found not only that individuals who reported higher levels of perceived fairness were more likely to ﬁnd the policy acceptable but also that for a one- unit increase in the levels of perceived fairness, an individual was about two and a half times more likely to support the policy. Only one study from the sample showed no signiﬁcant relationship between perceived fair- ness and acceptability or support for the instrument (Baron & Jurney, 1993). 4. Fair revenue recycling and acceptability of carbon pricing 4.1. People’s preferences for use of carbon pricing revenues A unique feature of carbon pricing is that it generates revenues that can be used for various purposes, with potential consequences for equity, the environment and political support. Information regarding how people feel about diﬀerent revenue uses can arguably improve political decisions about these by knowing which uses can count on more public support and can therefore increase overall political acceptability and feasibility. For this reason, we shed light on the preferred uses of revenues by the general public that received attention in the studies reviewed. We focussed on whether people prefer uses of revenues that ameliorate the regressive eﬀects of carbon pricing. We therefore distinguished between three main types of uses of the revenues: environ- mental, redistributive and other type of uses. Environmental uses refers to funding projects that reduce CO2 emissions or fund low-carbon energy sources; redistributive uses denote achieving a less regressive outcome; and other uses cover the reduction of existing taxes or inclusion in the general government budget. The most preferred use of revenues was found to be funding environmental projects, as reported in ﬁfteen studies (Table 3). The preference for using the revenues for environmental purposes depended on the kind of project proposed, where funding research and development of renewable energies was the ‘environmental project’ most mentioned, whereas purchasing foreign carbon credits received the lowest preference in Carattini et al. (2017). Admittedly, most studies did not properly specify the concrete environmental allocation of the rev- enues to have an accurate assessment of people’s preferences. For instance, they used general terms such as ‘environmental earmarking’ or ‘environmental projects’ without it always being clear what this entailed. Even studies that referred to renewable energy projects were unclear as governments do not tend to fund directly such public projects, but at best subsidize innovation or adoption of private environmental projects such as on renewable energy. Another revenue-use option within the environmental uses preferred in two studies was funding technological innovation and energy eﬃciency, such as grants for residential insulation or subsidies for energy-eﬃcient innovations. This option was the most popular among business representatives (Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Dresner, Dunne et al., 2006) who claimed that they needed technology grants and ﬁnancial support to ensure improvements in energy eﬃciency. Some business representatives, though, regarded using revenues for investment subsidies as unfair for punishing companies that already undertook energy eﬃciency eﬀorts voluntarily and rewarding ones that did not (Klok et al., 2006). Several revenue-use options dealing with redistribution in order to obtain a less regressive outcome were identiﬁed in the studies. Redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups such as low income households and the elderly is purposely designed to be progressive by providing lower-income households with a higher amount of the tax revenue. The elderly are separately mentioned as they are especially vulnerable to low temperatures and therefore to higher energy prices. It was found to be the most preferred option in three studies and the second one in three other studies. Equal share of revenue given to each taxpayer was the second preferred option in two studies and the third option in one study. It is considered progressive because ﬁxed amounts of compensation account for a greater proportion of income in low-income households. Moreover, since low-income households tend to spend less, in absolute terms, on energy consumption than high-income house- holds, then the former will receive more through the monetary transfer than the cost increase they suﬀer (Chir- oleu-Assouline & Fodha, 2014; Klenert & Mattauch, 2016). Within other type of uses, recycling revenue through reducing existing taxes, which is known as environ- mental tax reform, is considered the preferred option and the second best option by two studies each. However, reducing existing taxes did not receive much support from the general public, and was found to be the least favoured option in seven studies. There are mainly three reasons that can explain this opposition. CLIMATE POLICY 1197 Table 3. People’s preferences for use of revenues reported in more than one study Third preferred Use of revenues Most preferred option Second most preferred option option Least preferred option Environmental Environmental projects 15* 3 (Carson et al., 2010; Klok 2 (Carattini et al., et al., 2006; Rotaris, 2017) 2017; Clinch & Dunne, 2006) Funding technological 2 (Clinch & Dunne, 2006; 1 (Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2 (Clinch et al., innovation and energy Klok et al., 2006) 2006) 2006; Hsu et al., eﬃciency 2008) Redistributive Redistributing revenue 3 (Carattini et al., 2017; 3 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; 3 (Baranzini et al., to vulnerable groups Carson et al., 2010; Clinch & Dunne, 2006; Gevrek 2014; Klok et al., (low-income Saelen & Kallbekken, & Uyduranoglu, 2015) 2006; Rotaris, households, elderly) 2011) 2017) Equal share of revenue 2 (Carattini et al., 2017; 1 (Lachapelle et al., given to each taxpayer Carattini et al., 2019) 2012) Other Environmental tax 2 (Hsu et al., 2008 for 2 (Clinch et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2 (Beuermann & 7 (Carattini et al., 2017; Clinch & reform (reducing income tax reduction; 2008 for goods and services Santarius, 2006; Dunne, 2006; Dresner, Jackson, existing taxes) Leiserowitz et al., 2013 tax reduction) Carattini et al., et al., 2006; Kallbekken & for income and payroll 2019) Aasen, 2010; Klok et al., 2006; taxes) 2 diﬀerent taxes in Kotchen et al., 2017; Lachapelle et al., 2012) Tax rebate 5 (Amdur, Rabe, & Borick, 2014; 1 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017) Baranzini et al., 2014; Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015; Lachapelle et al., 2012; Leiserowitz et al., 2013) Finance public transport 1 (Kaplowitz & McCright, 2 (Clinch et al., 2006; Dresner, 2015) Jackson, et al., 2006) Deﬁcit reduction 2 (Amdur et al., 1 (Kotchen et al., 2017) 2014; Kotchen et al., 2017) General government 5 (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; budget Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015; Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010; Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015; Rotaris, 2017) *Amdur et al. (2014), Baranzini et al. (2014), Baranzini and Carattini (2017), Beuermann and Santarius (2006), Carattini et al. (2019), Carattini et al. (2017), Clinch et al. (2006), Deroubaix and Lévèque (2006), Dresner, Dunne, et al. (2006), Dresner, Jackson, et al. (2006), Gevrek and Uydura- noglu (2015), Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), Kotchen et al. (2017), Lachapelle et al. (2012), Saelen and Kallbekken (2011). Firstly, people do not trust that the government will actually do as promised. Dresner, Jackson, et al. (2006) found that people ‘did not believe that other taxes would be reduced in reality or that the money would be spent on what was promised.’ Secondly, people are sceptical about the idea of a double dividend of environ- mental tax reform (Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006; Klok et al., 2006). Double dividend refers to recycling carbon pricing revenues by reducing distortionary taxes (e.g. labour taxes, income taxes), which may have positive impacts on economic growth, employment, or technological development (Bovenberg & van der Ploeg, 1994). Some studies recognize the diﬃculty of achieving a double dividend due to the complex interactions between carbon pricing policies and the ﬁscal system (see Goulder (2013) for a detailed identiﬁcation of the necessary conditions). Thirdly, people question the environmental eﬀectiveness of shifting the tax because if people have the same amount of money at the end, there is no incentive to reduce consumption of taxed-pro- ducts (Clinch & Dunne, 2006). In this sense, people appear to have little appreciation that the relative cost of goods and services would change as a consequence of a tax shift. Tax rebates received support as the second most preferred option in ﬁve studies. Baranzini et al. (2014) report that people preferred it because it could be a way to reward those companies and households reducing their energy demand. Financing public transport was the most preferred option in one study but the least in another. Finally, the uses that received least support were government deﬁcit reduction and revenues going into the general budget. 1198 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. Only one study showed explicitly the extent to which diﬀerent uses of revenues aﬀect people’s perception of fairness of the instrument. Jagers et al. (2018) analysed the eﬀects of two diﬀerent uses of CO2 tax revenues in a proposal to increase this tax in Sweden, a general cut in income tax for all Swedes and an individual tax rebate only to those paying the CO2 tax. The study reported that the fairness rating increases from the option without any compensation to the option for equal compensation through a general cut in income tax and further increases with an individual tax rebate. However, neither equal nor individual compensation have any notice- able eﬀect on policy support. Our results show that options that use the revenues generated by carbon pricing to make the policy fairer – redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups or equal share of revenue given to each taxpayer – were preferred in certain studies whereas environmental uses of revenues tended to be more preferred overall. 4.2. Inﬂuence of people’s preferences for revenue use on carbon tax acceptability We now analyse whether particular uses of revenues from carbon pricing as discussed in Section 4.1 aﬀect its public acceptability. An overview of the results is given in Table 4. In general, the level of acceptability increases when revenues are recycled in some way, rather than going to the general government budget. For instance, Baranzini and Carattini (2017) found that acceptability increased to 64% of a sample in Switzerland when rev- enues were recycled according to people’s preferred recycling option, which was 15% more than without ear- marking. However, 36% of the sample considered that earmarking revenues were not suﬃcient for them to accept the carbon tax. Earmarking for environmental projects, in particular renewable energy development, aﬀected positively people’s acceptability of carbon pricing in four quantitative studies and in four qualitative papers. Nevertheless, it decreased acceptability in one study (Carattini et al., 2017). One explanation for the discordant result found by Table 4. Eﬀects of people’s preferences for revenue use on policy acceptability. Direction of Use of revenues Signiﬁcant eﬀect Non-signiﬁcantγ inﬂuence Environmental Environmental projects 8 (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Beuermann & Santarius, 2006*; + Clinch et al., 2006*; Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006*; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006*; Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015; Rotaris, 2017; Saelen & Kallbekken, 2011) 1 (Carattini et al., 2017) – Funding technological innovation 2 (Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2008*) 1 (Bristow et al., 2010) + and energy eﬃciency Redistributive Redistributing revenue to vulnerable 4 (Carattini et al., 2017; Carson et al., 2010; Gevrek & 1 (Baranzini & + groups (low-income households, Uyduranoglu, 2015; Saelen & Kallbekken, 2011) Carattini, 2017) elderly) Equal share of revenue given to each 1 (Carattini et al., 2017) 1 (Bristow et al., 2010) + taxpayer Other Environmental tax reform (reducing 1 (Hsu et al., 2008) + existing taxes) 4 (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006*; Clinch et al., 2006*; 2 (Bristow et al., 2010; - Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006*; Jagers et al., 2018) Carattini et al., 2017) Tax rebate 1 (Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015) + 1 (Jagers et al., 2018) – Funding public transportation 3 (Bristow et al., 2010; Dresner, Jackson, et al., 2006*; + Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015) Mitigate negative impacts of climate 1 (Rotaris, 2017) + change Fund improvements to infrastructure 1 (Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015) + (roads, bridges …) General budget 1 (Bristow et al., 2010) - γ Non-signiﬁcant, relating to a quantitative study. *Qualitative study (all other studies are quantitative). CLIMATE POLICY 1199 Carattini et al. (2017) could be the low public support for a somewhat unusual revenue use, namely purchasing foreign carbon credits. Funding technological innovation and energy eﬃciency was found to positively aﬀect people’s policy acceptability in three studies, although one of them was non-signiﬁcant. With regards to revenue-use options that make carbon pricing less regressive, we found that redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups and an equal share of revenue given to each taxpayer increased people’s acceptabil- ity in ﬁve studies (one non-signiﬁcant) in case of the former and two studies in case of the latter (one non-sig- niﬁcant). Within other types of revenue uses, an environmental tax reform (reducing existing taxes) was found to aﬀect negatively the acceptability of the instrument in six studies. However, two of them had a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect (Bristow et al., 2010; Carattini et al., 2017). Signiﬁcant eﬀects were found for a proposal for an environ- mental tax reform to reduce labour costs in general terms (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006; Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006; Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006) and a general cut in income tax for all Swedes (Jagers et al., 2018). However, another study found that reducing taxes on income as well as goods and services positively aﬀected people’s acceptability of carbon pricing (Hsu et al., 2008). If we look closer at preferences among diﬀerent types of stakeholders, studies found that implementing an environmental tax reform and using the revenues for giving grants to industry increased carbon pricing acceptability among business representatives (Klok et al., 2006). On the contrary, Deroubaix and Lévèque (2006) found that using carbon pricing revenues to reduce existing taxes decreased business representatives’ acceptability of carbon pricing. Using the revenues for refunding citizens through a tax rebate showed contradictory results. One study (Kaplowitz & McCright, 2015) found that policy acceptability increased among Americans when the extra revenue was refunded equally to American families via a tax rebate. In contrast, a study by Jagers et al. (2018) showed that an individual compensatory scheme directing tax rebates only to those paying the CO2 tax decreased policy support among Swedish citizens. Funding public transportation positively inﬂuenced people’s acceptability of carbon pricing in three studies. 5. Discussion Our review has shed light on perceived personal consequences, distributional eﬀects and procedural aspects that co-determine perceived fairness, which in turn aﬀects policy acceptability. It further shows that people’s perceived fairness of carbon pricing positively aﬀects its acceptability. We have found that people expressed high concern over the uneven distribution of the policy burden, with a particular focus on poor people. Furthermore, the perception that the instrument can be regressive reduced people’s acceptability of the policy whereas a neutral and progressive distribution of the policy costs increased instrument acceptability. Somewhat surprisingly, people did not show a clear preference for using the revenues generated by the carbon pricing scheme in ways that make the policy fairer by reducing its regressive eﬀects. Instead, funding renewable energy projects was most often the preferred option. Several factors might explain this. Firstly, results showed that many people are sceptical that taxation will change behaviour much on its own. This scepticism possibly underlies the ﬁnding that people think revenues should be used to reinforce emissions reduction by allocating them to relevant environmental projects. Baranzini et al. (2014) found that people con- sidered that if the revenues are used for something diﬀerent than environmental purposes, then the govern- ment would lose its credibility regarding how urgent addressing climate change is. Secondly, people seemed to confuse regulatory taxes aimed at changing behaviour (from high- to low- carbon consumption or production) with taxes aimed at generating public revenues. Consequently, they seemed to incorrectly confuse the main purpose of environmental taxes with the second type, i.e. raising rev- enues and thus considered it logical to use these revenues for environmental purposes. Some hope for public understanding of this diﬀerence comes from Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), who found that more than half of their participants understood the principal purpose of environmental taxes as regulating and reducing emis- sions. This suggests people are able to understand regulatory taxation and that information explaining the purpose of carbon taxes can create broader support for them. However, Kallbekken, Kroll, and Cherry (2011) found no evidence that providing information about the functioning of Pigouvian (regulatory) taxes reduces tax aversion. 1200 S. MAESTRE-ANDRÉS ET AL. Thirdly, a generally low preference for revenue uses to decrease regressive eﬀects of carbon pricing might be due to a lack of either awareness or trust that carbon pricing with appropriate revenue recycling is progressive or fair. According to Carattini et al. (2017), making distributional eﬀects salient increased people’s preference for progressive designs of carbon taxes – through payments for low-income households or by an equal share of revenue given to everyone. A fourth explanation, illustrated by Baranzini et al. (2014), is that, despite being con- cerned about the regressive impacts of carbon pricing, some people did not consider redistributing revenue to low-income households a viable option due to its large administrative burden. Having said all this, it should be noted that redistributing revenue to low-income households was still the second most favourite revenue use option, and signiﬁcantly increased people’s acceptability of carbon pricing. The preference for redistributive uses of the revenue is linked to the socioeconomic characteristics of people surveyed. For instance, Carattini et al. (2017) found that low-income households showed a marked preference for progressive designs. Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015) provided similar evidence in this regard. This suggests that individual socioeconomic characteristics inﬂuence people’s concerns about distributional and procedural eﬀects. Future research could look more systematically into the relationship between diﬀerences in socioeco- nomic characteristics and fairness perceptions, as well as the links between perceived personal and distribu- tional eﬀects, and how all this in turn aﬀects policy acceptability. Procedural aspects seem to play a greater role in determining the preference for revenue uses than distribu- tional eﬀects, especially regarding environmental earmarking. Some studies linked people favouring environ- mental earmarking with distrust in governments, as earmarking constrains policymaking and thus functions as a credible commitment device (Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006). Procedural aspects can explain the low prefer- ence for environmental tax reform (lowering other taxes) mainly because people do not trust that the govern- ment will actually keep its promise. It is widely accepted that all countries, in particular large CO2 emitters, need to reinforce their climate policy in order to fulﬁl the Paris Agreement. Carbon pricing is a recommended policy for that goal. However, a lack of public acceptability can jeopardize its eﬀective implementation and stability. Paying atten- tion to policy acceptability and designing carbon pricing schemes that can count on people’s support is thus necessary to ensure policy roll out. The eﬀects of carbon pricing on personal circumstances, distributional eﬀects and procedural aspects as well as its perceived fairness should be carefully analysed in each speciﬁc case as they will depend on the precise design of the carbon pricing scheme. Recent French protests against the implementation of a carbon tax illustrate the urgency and need for better understanding of the reasons why people accept carbon pricing schemes or not. The French case demonstrates that people’s per- ceptions of fairness of the policy instrument are complex and depend on a broad set of contextual factors. For instance, lack of trust in government and the implementation of other regressive policies by French President Macron - such as the simultaneous cancellation of a wealth tax - likely had considerable inﬂuence on the popular rejection of the tax. 6. Conclusions We reviewed the role of perceived fairness in studies addressing people’s acceptability of carbon pricing. A main ﬁnding is that peoplés perception of carbon pricing as fair strengthens its policy acceptability. The review indi- cated that fairness perceptions cover personal consequences, distributional eﬀects and procedural aspects. Our results reveal further that higher energy prices and reduction of purchasing power are the personal con- sequences mentioned most often, whereas impacts on poor households and uneven distribution of the policy burden between ﬁrms and households or among the latter are the most perceived distributional eﬀects. Distrust in government and over the good use of revenues generated by the carbon pricing instrument were frequently mentioned concerns related to procedural aspects of the policy. Our results showed that expected higher energy prices, less purchasing power and a regressive incidence of the policy decrease policy acceptability. Several procedural aspects increase carbon pricing acceptability, such as people’s satisfaction with governmen- tal information provision about the policy, and people trusting their government. Our review indicates that although people express high concern over the uneven distribution of the policy burden, they often prefer to use carbon pricing revenues for environmental projects rather than inequity CLIMATE POLICY 1201 compensation. In addition, it should be noted that redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups still comes out as the second most favourite revenue use option, which signiﬁcantly increases people’s acceptability of carbon pricing. Although our results are mostly from North American and European countries, several general policy insights can be provided in order to increase public acceptability through making carbon pricing fairer. Carbon pricing needs to be implemented as a complementary instrument to other policies, in particular ones that ensure the development of products and services that are less CO2-intensive. A common concern expressed regarding pro- cedural aspects was that insuﬃcient information is provided by governments about carbon taxation and the use of revenues. Hence, providing more information could be a relatively cheap and eﬀective way to increase public acceptability. Moreover, it would likely improve people’s trust in government, which was the main concern expressed about procedural aspects. Preferences for using the revenues to make the policy progressive may strengthen in the future, particularly in countries that suﬀer considerable (or rising) socioeconomic inequality. In this sense, our results suggest that a combination of redistributing revenue to vulnerable groups and funding environmental projects, such as on renewable energy, seems the best option to explore in the future in order to signiﬁcantly increase policy accept- ability. In fact, an analysis of the various countries that had implemented carbon pricing schemes by 2013 revealed that almost none of them combine these two revenue uses (Carl & Fedor, 2016). New carbon pricing schemes have been implemented recently, which allows for further research to compare our ﬁndings regarding public acceptability of carbon pricing recycling options against how revenue is recycled in more recently implemented carbon pricing schemes. Future research is also needed regarding public policy acceptability in low- and middle-income countries, given that carbon pricing policies are spreading there as well. Moreover, further exploring public preferences for diﬀerent types of environmental projects in which to invest revenues is necessary, because the nature of, and realistic prospects for, such projects are not very clear. For example, renewable energy projects tend to garner much support but are often undertaken by private partners rather than the public sector. Public support in this case could take the form of innovation or adoption subsidies, which might, however, trigger diﬀerent public responses in terms of fairness perceptions and policy acceptance than the more general notion of ‘funding environmental projects’. We encourage future work to test and reﬁne proposed frameworks for carbon pricing, taking systematically into account all the relationships described. Notes 1. The literature we review here uses diﬀerent terms to refer to similar concepts, such as policy acceptance, acceptability and support. These are not always clearly deﬁned or distinguished. For this reason, we abstain from making a sharp distinction between them as well. For an in-depth discussion of the concepts, see Kyselá, Scasný, and Zverinová (2019). 2. Factors other than perceived fairness aﬀect public acceptability of climate policy, such as negative eﬀects on international competitiveness and exports, or more generally on the economy and employment. 3. 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