Globalization and International Trade PDF

IPE (week 11) 2024/11/11 Globalization Thomas Friedman “Inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-states to reach around the world further, faster, deeper an...

IPE (week 11) 2024/11/11 Globalization Thomas Friedman “Inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and nation-states to reach around the world further, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.” The process of widening, deepening, and acceleration of worldwide interconnectedness (Possible largely through trade, movement of people, financial connections, advanced technology, and diffusion of ideas) Economic globalization Integration of national economies Freer flow of goods, services, capital, and labor traded across borders Businesses, organizations, and countries operating on an international scale Economic Liberalism Adam Smith viewed that humans are rational and act in a self-interested way According to Smith, markets develop through individual, rational action For markets to function properly, they need to be free from government action, thus maximizing the use of resources and generating new wealth Minimal government intervention The Role of States States can use a variety of tools to influence domestic and international economic policy Fiscal policies Use of taxation and government spending to influence the economy To stimulate the economy, the government may increase government spending and/or reduce taxes To slow the economy, the government may decrease government spending and/or increase taxes Monetary policies Control the money supply by raising and lowering interest rates Such policies influence macroeconomic conditions such as inflation, unemployment States in a Globalized World Exchange rates also affect the economy Exchange rates: the price of currency in relation to another Exchange rates affect international economic transactions in trade, investment, etc. Appreciate In terms of a currency, to increase in value relative to other currencies E.g. When the value of a dollar increases against some other currency (i.e., a dollar can buy more euros) Foreign goods become inexpensive for Americans Depreciate In terms of a currency, to decrease in value relative to other currencies E.g., When the value of a dollar decreases against some other currency (i.e., a dollar can buy less euros) Foreign goods become expensive for Americans States in a Globalized World Exchange-Rate Regimes States in a Globalized World (1) Fixed/Pegged The government promises to hold the value of its money to that of another country's currency or to gold Gold Standard (1870-1914) Countries agreed to convert a country’s currency into a fixed amount of gold (2) Float A currency’s value is determined by the global market (based on supply and demand relative to other currencies) States in a Globalized World International monetary regimes (1870-Present) The international monetary regime: “a formal or informal arrangement shared by most countries in the world economy to govern relations among currency” The classical gold standard (1870-1914) The value of national currencies was pegged to the value of gold Provided currency stability and predictability, facilitating international trade and investment Affected by WWI and the Great Depression, it was difficult to restore monetary order The Bretton Woods monetary system (1944-1971) After WWII, the victorious countries made efforts to establish a regime of stable monetary exchange The value of the dollar was fixed to gold at $35 per ounce, and the US government guaranteed to buy dollars for gold at this rate Other countries’ currencies were exchanged at fixed rates relative to the dollar Helped to maintain currency values stable As the dollar became significantly overvalued (the dollar was no longer worth $35 per ounce of gold) President Nixon removed the US from the gold standard and allowed the dollar to float freely International monetary system since 1973 Floating exchange rates are now more commonly used for the world’s major currencies States in a Globalized World International trade is another economic driver in a globalized world Countries have comparative advantage in producing different goods Comparative advantage: country A has a lower opportunity cost for producing some goods, compared to country B Opportunity cost: the value of what is given up in order to make one product rather than another Comparative advantage =/= Absolute advantage Absolute advantage: be the most efficient producer in the world States in a Globalized World Factor Endowments One source of comparative advantage: differing factor endowments Factors: the inputs for producing things Endowment: how much you possess Land, labor, and capital Land (agriculture) Labor (unskilled labor) Capital (machinery and equipment) Hecksher-Olin model Countries export goods that require the use of factors that a country has in abundance Countries in which capital is relatively abundant and labor is relatively scarce are likely to export capital-intensive goods and import labor-intensive goods States in a Globalized World Factor Endowments Example Bangladesh Area: 148,460 sq km Population: 165.1 million CA (comparative advantage) in labor intensive goods In 2021, the major products that Bangladesh exported to Luxembourg were Knit T-shirts ($4.36M), Knit Sweaters ($4.14M), and Non- Knit Men's Suits ($3.67M) Luxembourg Area: 2,586 sq km Population: 645,400 CA in capital intensive goods In 2021, the major products that Luxembourg exported to Bangladesh: Metal Molds ($3.84M), Rubberworking Machinery ($2.65M), and Refrigerators ($703k) States in a Globalized World Protectionism (trade barriers) Protectionism: restrict imports to protect domestic industries from international competition Tariffs: a tax imposed on certain types of imported goods Non-tariff barriers to trade Quantitative restrictions (quota), regulations, subsidies The Role of Economic Institutions At the end of World War II, the Bretton Woods institutions were established to support economic liberalism These institutions are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, to a lesser extent, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now called the World Trade Organization (WTO) These institutions led to tremendous economic growth after World War II and laid the groundwork for globalization World Trade Organization (WTO) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Support of trade liberalization (reduction of tariffs and other government barriers) Nondiscrimination in trade; most-favored-nation treatment (countries give the same treatment to all members as they will give to their best trading partner) In 1995, GATT became a formal institution, renaming itself the World Trade Organization (WTO) Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, 164 member states The World Trade Organization (WTO) incorporated the general areas of GATT’s jurisdiction and expanded jurisdiction to include services and intellectual property As of November 10, 2024, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has convened 13 Ministerial Conferences since its establishment in 1995. The most recent, the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13), was held in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, from February 26 to 29, 2024. These conferences, typically occurring biennially, serve as the WTO's highest decision-making body, bringing together all member countries to discuss and negotiate global trade issues The WTO Serves as a forum for trade negotiations Shapes the expectations and practices of states regarding international trade Monitors the implementation of trade agreements Serves as a forum for resolving trade disputes Dispute Settlement Mechanism As members of the WTO, all members agree to a dispute settlement mechanism Since 1995, the WTO’s trade dispute mechanism has been widely used - members have filed more than 500 disputes When a complaint is filed by a country, the country must try to settle the issue through consultation If that fails, a panel is chosen by the WTO’s dispute settlement body to hear the case The violating country must follow a panel’s recommendations (unless overturned on appeal). If the country fails to follow, the plaintiff can take retaliatory measures (e.g., raising tariffs) Doha Development Agenda (2001) The 2001 ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar Major issue: liberalization of global agricultural trade Many of the world’s poorest countries rely on exporting basic agricultural products but have to compete against wealthier countries (the US, Europe, and Japan) that support their agricultural sectors with subsidies (financial aid by the government to a domestic industry that helps to increase competitiveness - which can take many forms including tax breaks, loans on favorable terms, or direct payments). Developing countries primarily demanded the liberalization of global agricultural trade The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that these subsidies amount to almost $300 billion each year. No important progress since 2008, as there were disagreements over agricultural subsidies and proposals to allow developing countries to temporarily increase tariffs to protect their agricultural sectors The Doha Round has made limited progress, with achievements like the 2013 Trade Facilitation Agreement, but stalled after 2017 Criticisms of the WTO Import competition According to some economists, WTO-led tariff reductions, promotion of imports, cross-border operations of MNCs, have a negative effect on jobs and wages China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 is linked to more than 3 million job losses in the US, as US firms were forced to compete with China’s cheaper imports Some argue that technological changes have primarily resulted in significant job losses (not due to competition from China) Some contend that trade with China aided the US economy by driving down prices and increasing productivity Intellectual property The WTO’s intellectual property agreement, Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) According to the WTO, patent protection is critical to expanding global trade Some experts argue that WTO rules on drug patent restrict access to medicines in developing countries Although some emerging economies, led by India and South Africa have proposed TRIPS waivers for COVID-19 vaccines and treatments, there are disagreements with some developed countries Concerns over regulation (labor or environmental issues ) Labor unions in the U.S. argue that the WTO is not doing enough to protect U.S. workers’ wages that are being undercut due to unfair labor practices in other countries (e.g., to reduce the costs of exports, some foreign countries violate basic worker ’s rights) Developing countries, however, view attempts to address labor practices/standards at the WTO as a disguised form of protectionism, fearing it restricts their competitive advantage The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund The Bretton Woods system The system was adopted at a conference of the winning states near the end of World War II (at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944) At this meeting, both the World Bank (initially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the International Monetary Fund were created The IMF was tasked with managing the global exchange rate regime and the balance of payments The World Bank would make post-war reconstruction loans to member countries The World Bank Established in New Hampshire in 1944 Headquarter: Washington DC The institution was originally created to help Europe recover from WWII. The World Bank would lend member countries postwar reconstruction loans It later turned its focus to helping the developing world, making low-interest loans (lower rates than those of commercial banks) to support development projects The World Bank Poverty alleviation efforts are focused primarily on some of the world’s poorest countries (particularly those in Africa) In 2013, the bank set a goal of ending extreme poverty (those living on $2.15 or less per day) by 2030 The World Bank stated in 2022 that the goal would not be achieved in that timeframe The bank is also involved in transnational issues, such as climate change, recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, and reconstruction in post-conflict nations The World Bank The World Bank Group is composed of 5 separate institutions The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) are often referred to as the World Bank The World Bank What do the bank’s supporters say? The bank had several successful interventions Bosnia transitioned from a war-torn, low-income economy in 1995 into an upper-middle-income country today Recently, the bank launched a number of initiatives to prevent low-income economies from collapsing during the pandemic Increase lending, defer payments on existing external debt Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the bank established a fund to aid the country’s recovery The World Bank What do the bank’s critics say? Loans come with conditions attached to them (“conditionality”) “Conditionality” refers to “the conditions that international lenders impose in return for their assistance” Typically, there are 3 key dimensions to these conditions: (1) privatization – e.g., privatization of government-owned businesses, assets, or services (telecommunications, gas, electricity service) (2) deregulation – e.g., removal or reduction of government regulation over a particular industry (3) austerity measures - reduce the size of the government’s spending. e.g., reduce spending on social services, freeze salaries of public-sector employees Some critics argue that loans have frequently been counterproductive for recipient countries and disastrous for their populations  IMF Established in New Hampshire in 1944 to manage the international monetary system Headquarter: Washington D.C It was created to establish stable exchange rates (by pegging currencies to the US dollar which in turn was pegged to the price of gold until 1971) When joining the IMF, a country is assigned a quota A quota is based on how much each member state can make financial contribution to the IMF’s resources (it reflects the size and strength of a state’s economy) The IMF uses a weighted voting system (each state has a vote equal to its quota) The US has the single largest vote (17%), states of the European Union (26%) Since IMF decisions require an 85% supermajority, the US can veto IMF decisions The G7 holds 41.25 percent of the voting power in the IMF IMF Surveillance Monitors the member countries’ financial/economic policies of member states and provides macroeconomic and financial policy advice Technical support Help low- and middle-income countries manage their economies by providing assistance and training Lending The IMF provides loans to member states Loans or bailouts are provided in exchange for meeting certain IMF conditions The conditions are intended to stabilize government finances and restore growth (known as “structural adjustment”) The conditions include balancing the budget, eliminating state subsidies, privatizing state firms, liberalizing trade, and reducing barriers to international investment and capital flows The conditions are intended not only to assume loan repayment, but also that the funds borrowed be spent in accordance with the specified economic objectives IMF There have been some successes The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 The IMF-led economic reforms helped countries impacted by the crisis recover swiftly and laid the groundwork for sustained growth In Brazil in 2002 Early recovery following the intervention allowed IMF loans to be repaid ahead of schedule According to some critics, many of the economic reforms needed by the IMF as conditions for its funding (such as fiscal austerity, high interest rates, trade liberalization, privatization) have often been counterproductive for recipient countries, harming local populations Furthermore, it has been argued that the fund’s lending terms and technical guidance are out of touch with ground- level realities In recent years, the IMF’s involvement in advanced economies has sparked criticism and prompted occasional reassessment. The stringent conditions of the Greek bailout led voters to oppose austerity measures in a referendum, though the government ultimately disregarded the results and accepted the loans. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGZzqqpySwA&t=84s IMF Much of the IMF’s work has been done in developing nations (Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, and Mexico) The 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis necessitated major bailouts in advanced eurozone nations (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) Supporters argue that the IMF is associated with economic hardship because it is called upon only in times of crisis, when countries have exhausted other financial options They claim that the IMF’s gradual adjustment programs are less disruptive than abrupt corrections, and that without its support, struggling economies would face even greater harm Assessing the IMF’s long-term success is challenging, as it's difficult to determine if its policies were worse than possible alternatives As Harvard economist Benjamin M. Friedman has argued, “We cannot reliably know whether the consequences of the IMF’s policies were worse than whatever the alternative would have been.” IMF Since the global financial crisis, the IMF has strengthened its lending capabilities with new credit lines, expanding its lending capacity to $1 trillion as of 2023. To address criticism, it has reformed lending conditions, initiated debt relief for eligible countries, and supported sustainable development goals. However, critics call for deeper reforms, including easing loan conditions, expanding climate crisis support, and addressing governance issues—such as the tradition of only European directors leading the IMF, which limits representation for emerging economies.  What are some of the major/significant roles played by international economic institutions? Why are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund controversial? Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions (Dreher & Jensen) How does the IMF set conditions for borrower countries? Are the borrower’s relationship with the US important determinants of the number of conditions that the IMF imposed? Rationale A number of scholarly works have highlighted the disproportionate influence of U.S. foreign policy on international organizations Access to IMF programs is skewed toward countries supportive of US foreign policy (Barro and Lee 2005, Tacker 1999) Closer allies of the United States have received larger loans (especially after the end of the Cold War) (Oatley 2003) After receiving the IMF loan, countries are more likely to vote with the US (and other G7 countries) in the UN General Assembly (Dreher and Sturm 2005) Other works have argued that the IMF can act as an independent actor in the international system (Vaubel 1996) Once international institutions are built, they have their own sets of preferences This study analyzes whether political relations with the US influence IMF conditionality How does the IMF set conditions? Does the IMF set conditions on the basis of economic fundamentals or in accordance with the interests of its principle stakeholders (like the US)? Answering these questions is important to gain insight into the role and impact of the IMF and to contribute to intellectual discussions on the function of international institutions in the global economy Theory Hypothesis 1: the IMF will set conditions on the basis of borrower countries’ domestic economic conditions The growth rate of real GDP, the government’s consumption, the budget deficit, the rate of monetary expansion, and the current account balance Hypothesis 2: The IMF will specify fewer conditions for countries that are closely allied with the US Countries with closer alliances with the US will have loans with looser conditions Non-allied countries will have loans with stricter conditions Theory Hypothesis 3: The IMF will set more conditions during the period prior to democratic elections Incumbent leaders have incentives to control economic policy to shape expectations of future economic prospects, thereby increasing their likelihood of winning the election Prior to an election, leaders have incentives for fiscal and monetary expansion IMF generally prescribes austerity measures that conflict with expansionist policies Prior to an election, if the IMF seeks to limit the negative impact of a financial crisis or adverse government policy, it may impose stricter conditions. Because politicians have incentives to engage in expansionist policies, the IMF may specify a more complete contract Another explanation -- the IMF may need to make a more specified and explicit contract because the election outcome is uncertain. In particular, when a newly elected government gains power, it is more likely to make drastic changes Theory Hypothesis 4: for countries closely allied with the US, the IMF will set fewer conditions during the period prior to democratic elections If the IMF reflects the power of the US, it will act strategically during sensitive times (such as prior to elections) The IMF imposes strict conditions on countries non-allied with the US The IMF imposes looser conditions on countries closely allied with the US The IMF will be cautious to avoid actions that might threaten the political survival of leaders closely aligned with the United States Data and Methods Dependent variable: the number of IMF conditions Based on an analysis of 206 IMF letters of intent from 38 countries between April 1997 and February 2003 Letter of intent: Letter from a government to the IMF outlining economic reforms it intends to carry out in relation to receiving an IMF loan. It includes a set of conditions that must be met to access the IMF’s resources The country programs analyzed included more than 22 conditions on average (p.112, table 1) Data and Methods Explanatory variables Different measures of borrower countries’ domestic economic conditions (e.g., growth rate, the amount of budget deficit) How many times did the borrower country and the US both vote “yes” or “no” on the given issue in the UN General Assembly A variable for democratic elections within the next 6 months (sample included 15 elections) The study conducts an empirical analysis from 38 countries during the period between 1997 and 2003 Results Finds support for hypothesis 1: IMF tends to impose more stringent conditionalities when the borrower’s real GDP is low Countries that are in a weak bargaining position are likely to accept more conditions. A country's ability to push its own agenda in negotiations with the IMF is weaker when a country is in more need of IMF loans Also, related is that a country’s own (direct) influence (or negotiating power) on the IMF tends to rise with its GDP (since countries with a higher GDP are more significant in the world economy) Finds support for hypothesis 2 The number of conditions imposed tends to be lower for closer allies with the US Countries that voted with the United States in the UN General Assembly tend to receive IMF loans with fewer conditions Results Hypothesis 3 Finds contradictory results Finds that prior to democratic elections, there were fewer IMF conditions This may be because The IMF staff takes into account the incumbent politicians’ concerns during the election period. If the IMF desires to reach an agreement, it would agree on terms with fewer conditionalities IMF participation is a joint decision between the IMF and the borrower country. Prior to the election, countries may be willing to sign agreements only with loose conditions Hypothesis 4 Prior to elections, IMF programs tend to include fewer conditions if a country is closer to the US in the UN General Assembly. (The effect is not strong) Conclusion Countries that voted with the US in the UN General Assembly tended to receive IMF loans with fewer conditions Overall, the study argues that the US and major contributors (G7 countries) to the IMF are likely to play a more important role This finding contrasts with other studies that report the US has not driven changes in IMF policy IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects? (Barro & Lee, 2006) RQ: Do countries benefit from access to the IMF loan programs or would countries be better off if these programs did not exist? Main argument: loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota, more professional staff at the IMF, and is more politically and economically connected to the US and major European countries They also find that (1) a higher IMF loan participation rate is likely to reduce economic growth, and (2) IMF loan participation has negative effects on democracy and the rule of law Theory Determinants of IMF loans (1) A country’s share of the quota at the IMF (the quota measures a country’s voting power at the IMF) (2) The share of nationals working as professional staff at the IMF The IMF does not allow staff to directly influence lending decisions for their home countries. However, staff are often sought out for comments on country programs. Also, having own nationals on staff can help a country gain more access to inside information and make it easier to negotiate with the IMF (3) Connections to the US During the Cold War, the IMF often supported countries (Argentina, Egypt, the Philippines) that were significant to the US for foreign policy reasons despite the lack of effective reform programs Similarity in voting patterns with the US and other Western powers (political proximity to the US) Bilateral trade linkages (economic proximity to the US) The authors expect that these three factors will positively affect the probability and size of an IMF loan The effectiveness of IMF loans They also expect greater IMF loan participation to be positively related to economic growth Variables and Data IMF lending (dependent variable) is measured by (1) whether there was an approval of a new loan (2) participation in IMF loans (how many months a country operated under an IMF loan program) (3) size of IMF loans Economic growth (dependent variable) is measured by Per capita GDP growth Based on data from 130 countries from 1975 to 2000 Key Findings Mainly finds that Dependent variable (probability and participation in IMF loans) The IMF quota share, the IMF staff share, and economic proximity to the US (measured by the volume of bilateral trade) are positively related The political connections with the US in terms of voting patterns had a weak effect Regarding the connections to European countries, only UN voting patterns (political proximity) mattered Dependent variable (loan size) The IMF quota share, the IMF staff share, UN voting and trade intensity with the US are all positively associated with loan size Regarding the connections to European countries, only the UN voting pattern (political proximity) was important  Loans are more likely to be approved and are likely to be larger when countries are more influential at the IMF. Key Findings Dependent variable (economic growth) Different from their theoretical expectations, the data implies that participation in IMF loan programs reduces economic growth Additionally, they argue that IMF loan participation has a negative effect on democracy and the rule of law Conclusion IMF loan participation has a negative effect on democracy and the rule of law A possible explanation is that an increase in foreign aid can lead to an increase in corruption by officials (foreign aid can foster rent-seeking activities by interest groups and government officials) The research ends with an important puzzle that remained unanswered If IMF loan programs are bad for the economy (at least for economic growth), why then do governments choose to participate in IMF loan programs? Some possible answers… IMF lending may be bad for the economy but good for the governments and individual politicians who arrange the lending IMF lending may lower economic growth, but have positive effects on different economic aspects IMF lending may lower growth in the short run but increase growth in the long run  https://www.dw.com/en/is-africa-better-off-without-the-imf/video- 70642481 References Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2007). Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on International Monetary Fund conditions. The Journal of Law and Economics, 50(1), 105-124. Mingst, K. A., & McKibben, H. E. (2022). Essentials of International Relations. W. W. Norton & Company. Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (2005). IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?. Journal of monetary Economics, 52(7), 1245-1269.  Week 9 Interstate War 2024.10.28  Reaction paper Instructions uploaded on LearnUs War War is an organized and deliberate political act by an established political authority that must cause 1,000 or more deaths in a 12-month period and involves at least two actors capable of harming each other (Mingst & McKibben, p.181) Types of War Interstate wars: conducted between or among states Example: World War II (1939-1945), where multiple state actors fought, including Germany, Japan, and the United States Extra-state wars: conducted between a state and an armed group that is not a state in some other party’s territory (either another state, non-incorporated territory, or territory controlled by a non-state actor) Example: war of Western NATO states against the Taliban in Afghanistan Intra-state wars (Civil wars): conducted between a state and an armed group that is not a state within its territory The Rwandan Civil War (1990–1994) Non-state wars: wars between or among non-state entities Such entities that do not meet the criteria of system membership. They also might involve nonterritorial entities or non-state armed groups that have no defined territorial base. Examples: Ansarallah (Yemen) and al-Qaeda (Arabian Peninsula), the Sinaloa Cartel (Mexico), and ethnic communities such as the Pokot and Turkana in Kenya (system membership: https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership/) How do we measure war? (Interstate war) Correlates of War (COW) dataset Interstate War dataset Sustained battles between two states with regular armed forces A minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths during a year Records interstate wars over the period of 1816-2010 Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset MID is defined as a threat, show, or use of force by one state in the international system against another state Militarized interstate disputes: interstate threats of force, display of force, use of force, war MID dataset focuses on militarized disputes, which can range from threats and displays of force to actual military engagement, but not necessarily meeting the 1,000 battle death threshold of war It captures not only wars but also lower-level conflicts Records MIDs over the period of 1816-2014 War Datasets https://ourworldindata.org/conflict-data-how-do-researchers-measure-armed-conflicts-and- their-deaths https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace?insight=relationships-between-countries-have- become-more-peaceful#all-charts Realist Interpretations (Causes of War) States exist in an anarchic system, with no overarching authority to provide security or settle disputes Only coercive authority can create laws, resolve disputes, or enforce law and order War breaks out because no authority exists to prevent it There is no legitimized authority to help peacefully resolve disputes One of the primary sources of war is territory In the conflict literature, it has been widely acknowledged that when states fight, they often tend to fight over territory Between 1816 and 1945, territorial disputes produced roughly 65% of the dyadic wars, and in the post-1945 period, an even higher percentage of 72% (Vasquez & Henehan, 2011: 184) Wars can often be attributed to the distribution of power in the international system Preventing War and Managing State Security: Realism Power balancing States are continually trying to maintain their position vis-à-vis their adversaries, thereby maintaining a balance of power and, possibly, preventing war Use of alliances to balance power both internationally and regionally US vs. Soviet Union during the Cold War India vs. Pakistan (South Asia) Preventing War and Managing State Security: Realism Deterrence Deterrence: “the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action” (Huth 1999) A threat acts as a deterrent to the degree that it persuades its opponent not to carry out the intended action due to the costs and losses that it will face A deterrence policy can be directed at averting an armed attack on a country's own territory (direct deterrence) or on the territory of another country (extended deterrence) E.g., directed deterrence (In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel has depended on its own military forces to attempt deterrence against Arab neighbors), extended deterrence (Following the end of the Korean War, the US established an alliance with South Korea against the threat of another invasion by North Korea) Preventing War and Managing State Security: Realism The predominant approach to theorizing about deterrence has entailed the use of rational choice models of decision making Rational deterrence theory focuses on how military threats can reduce the attacker’s expected utility for using force by convincing the attacker that the outcome of a military confrontation will be both costly and unsuccessful Deterrence is more likely to be successful if a defender’s deterrent threat is credible to an attacker. A threat is regarded as credible if the defender has the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an attacker in a military conflict and if the attacker believes that the defender is resolved to use military force https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1OPQSlkBGDw&t=247s Preventing War and Managing State Security: Realism Challenges in the 21st Century The rise of non-state actors decreases the possibility that deterrence will work Non-state actors do not hold territory, so a threat to destroy territory in a retaliatory strike may not be effective Willingness to use suicide terrorism undermines deterrence logic Liberal Interpretations (Causes of War) Liberals tend to focus more on the characteristics of the state and institutions Kant: democracy, interdependence, and institutions foster peace Democratic peace theory: democracies don’t fight each other but are as war prone as non-democracies Commercial peace theory: economic interdependence fosters peace States desire continued economic benefits Wars interrupt trade and block profits Liberal Interpretations (Causes of War) International institutions promote peace International institutions help build positive connections between states International institutions increase interdependence A lack of shared membership in institutions might increase the possibility of conflict as nonmembers might feel threatened by the connections forged between member states E.g., the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014 Preventing War and Managing State Security: Liberalism States’ self-interest, which lies in cooperating with others Cooperation may be institutionalized Liberals call for collective security and arms control agreements The Collective security ideal The collective benefit of peace outweighs the individual gains that might come from war (even a successful war) Aggressors must be stopped, they can be clearly detected, and they are always morally wrong Aggressors are aware ahead of time that the international community will act against them. Aggressors are, therefore, deterred States are more likely to calculate their interests collectively as shared interests (in contrast to realists, who view states as calculating their interests individually) The threat that deters potential aggression comes from the international community acting together rather than from a single more powerful state Preventing War and Managing State Security: Liberalism Arms control and disarmament Regulating arms proliferation (arms control), reducing the number of arms, and limiting the types of weapons employed (disarmament) should reduce security dilemmas Major agreements include bilateral, regional, and global treaties covering conventional, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) NewSTART (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) Face the difficulty of enforcing agreements Constructivist Interpretations (Causes of War) Identities can shape a state’s interests; can influence states’ belligerence or lack thereof Interactions can importantly shape the way one state views another state (altering perceptions of threat) Example: Canada might consider North Korea more of a threat than the United States, even though the latter has greater relative power than North Korea Ideas play a significant role in shaping identities The idea of the right to self-determination – contributes to the construction of common and conflicting identities and the outbreak of war Historically, nationalism has led to the creation of conflicting identities among nations, which has contributed to wars Preventing War and Managing State Security: Constructivism States’ identities and perceptions of adversarial relations can change when states interact Institutions can create and regulate interactions and can influence states’ perceptions of their identities and their understandings of themselves and others Norms and taboos against specific types of warfare or weaponry can develop Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997) Norms against the proliferation of nuclear weapons Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965 (Bremer, 1992) Research question Significance of the study Main findings Implications Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965 (Bremer, 1992) A core question in the study of conflict: “who fights whom?” What distinguishes the dyads (pairs of states) that go to war from those that do not? War is more likely to occur between states that are Geographically proximate Roughly equal in power Major powers Allied Undemocratic Economically advanced, and/or Militarized Why should we study dyads (pairs of states) to understand the question of who fights whom? What are some of the deficiencies of existing studies? Inappropriate unit of analysis Interstate wars arise out of the interactions between states Previous studies have focused on systemic or national levels (which are largely irrelevant to the dyadic question) Limited spatial-temporal domain Wars are comparatively rare events Narrow spatial and/or temporal domains provide a weak basis for understanding war occurrence Faulty case selection strategy Some studies only include cases that exhibit a particular outcome (e.g., dyads that go to war) without comparing them to cases where the outcome does not occur (e.g., dyads that remain at peace). By focusing only on cases with the outcome of interest, researchers may ignore critical differences that could be revealed through comparison with cases without that outcome. This approach leads to problems in identifying necessary or sufficient conditions for the outcome (like war). Without cases where the outcome does not occur, it’s harder to assess whether a factor truly influences the likelihood of that outcome. Why should we study dyads (pairs of states) to understand the question of who fights whom? What are some of the deficiencies of existing studies? Bivariate analytical methods Problem of spurious and masked associations in bivariate analysis We should take into account other factors that may explain the outcome variable (occurrence of war) Questionable measures of war Important to distinguish the initial outbreak of war and how it evolves thereafter (e.g., escalation, duration, severity) Treating these distinct aspects as interchangeable can lead to confusion and inaccurate interpretations Many empirical studies use different measures of war as the dependent variable in their analyses. However, these measures do not always align, leading to the implicit testing of different hypotheses rather than testing a single, consistent hypothesis across studies. As a result, even if studies seem to be testing the same idea, they may not be directly comparable due to the differing definitions and measures of "war" they apply. The factors mentioned above lead to a general challenge in comparing empirical studies of interstate war. Different levels of analysis, different spatial-temporal domains, different cases, different analytical methods, and different measures of war all create difficulties in assessing the relative significance of factors thought to influence the onset of war. The seven predictors of war Geographical proximity Proximity can lead to serious conflicts of interests (they may both have a stake in the same physical space or resources), interstate friction (e.g., insurgents in one country operate from the territory of a neighboring state, this situation can cause conflict) In order to provide direct evidence, analysis should be based on pairs of states Power parity Preponderance (power disparity) tends to promote peace vs. Power parity promotes peace One view suggests that states with a large power disparity are unlikely to engage in war because the weaker side would avoid a conflict it has no chance of winning. The opposing view argues that when two states are relatively equal in power, neither can be certain of victory, which deters both from initiating conflict. While numerous empirical studies have explored the link between power and war, very few have specifically focused on the dyadic level. Power status Non-dyadic evidence is quite clear that major powers are much more likely to become involved in wars than minor powers It can be convincingly argued that major powers are more likely to engage in war than smaller powers. This is largely because major powers achieve and maintain their status by pursuing an active, interventionist, and sometimes aggressive foreign policy, which leads to more frequent violent conflicts with other states. Alliance The traditional view sees alliances as temporary, strategic arrangements formed out of expediency, where states may exit if a better opportunity arises. Under this view, alliances do not necessarily reduce the likelihood of conflict between allies. The seven predictors of war Democracy Democratic peace theory should be analyzed at the dyadic level (existing studies are limited in this aspect) Development Different propositions for the relationship between economically advanced states and the likelihood of war Empirical studies directly testing these ideas, especially at the dyadic level, remain limited and inconclusive Militarization Some argue that militarization reduces the likelihood of war by deterring potential attackers, showing that the state can impose high costs in a conflict The counter-argument suggests that states heavily invested in military readiness are more likely to experience war. Militarization can foster aggressive leadership and societal beliefs that war is inevitable, potentially leading to paranoia and conflict escalation -> The author finds this argument more convincing Definitions and Measurements Interstate dyad: “any pair of states that are members of the interstate system, where system membership is defined by the standard Correlates of War rules” Correlates of War dataset Unit of analysis: interstate dyad-year Period of analysis: 1816-1965 202,778 interstate dyad-years are examined 56 interstate wars Defining war occurrence The likelihood that war will begin between two states (war onset) Measurements Geographical proximity In a given year, a dyad is either land contiguous, sea contiguous, or not contiguous Relative power Measures power difference between states (large, medium, small) Based on the Correlates of War material capabilities data set (which records the military personnel, military expenditures, iron and steel production, energy consumption, urban population, total population) Power status Each dyad coded as major-major, major-minor, or minor-minor Alliance Whether dyads are allied or not Alliances are divided into 3 types (mutual defense pacts, neutrality agreements, and ententes) Measurements Democracy Whether both are democratic, one state is democratic, or both states are undemocratic Uses measures that classify a state as democratic based on leader selection processes and constraints imposed on executive authority Development Whether both states are more advanced, one state is more advanced, or both states are less advanced Measurement based on economic and demographic dimensions of national capability Militarization Whether both states, one, or neither of the two were more militarized A state is considered more militarized if its share of global military capabilities (e.g., resources, weaponry) is higher than its share of global demographic capabilities (population). Empirical Analysis (Bivariate Analysis) How likely is a war between two states when a particular condition is present? Proximity and war The presence of land and sea contiguity significantly increases the probability of war (The war probability in contiguous dyads was 35 times higher than in non-contiguous dyads) Power differences and war Direction is as expected (Preponderance promotes peace: war is more likely in dyads with small or medium power differences than in those with large power differences), but the effect is small Power status and war Major-Major powers are the most likely to engage in a war (about 10 times larger than minor-minor dyads) Empirical Analysis (Bivariate Analysis) Alliance and war The probability of war in allied dyads is greater than that in non-allied dyads Democracy and war The likelihood of war between democracies is much smaller than between non-democracies Development and war Dyads with two advanced states are more likely to engage in war than those that contain one or fewer advanced states, but the statistical evidence is weak Militarization and war Pairs of more militarized states are more likely to engage in a war than pairs of less militarized states Empirical Analysis (Multivariate analysis) When conducting bivariate analysis, we analyzed the relationship between two variables It is rarely the case that an outcome variable will only depend on a single variable Conducts statistical analysis that examines multiple explanatory variables simultaneously (Dependent variable measured as number of war onsets) Finds that: Contiguity increases the likelihood of war Absence of democracy in a dyad increases the likelihood of war Advanced economy decreases the likelihood of war Presence of major power and power parity increases the likelihood of war Presence of an alliance within a dyad decreases the likelihood of war Militarization of both states has a very weak effect Conclusion The relative importance of the factors that affect the likelihood of war onset The conditions that characterize a dangerous dyad (in order of declining importance) presence of contiguity absence of alliance absence of more advanced economy absence of democratic polity absence of overwhelming preponderance presence of major power Implications regarding war? Implications of Bremer (1992) Focus on interaction between states Importance of dyadic level of analysis Assess the relative importance of factors that purportedly contribute to the occurrence of war Issue indivisibility and territorial claims (Mitchell & Hensel, 2005) Research question: Why are states able to strike peaceful bargains to settle some territorial disputes but not others? Main argument: Territorial issues with greater intangible salience (e.g. historical possessions, important homelands, sacred sites, identity ties) should produce more frequent and severe militarized conflict Main finding: Territorial claims with high intangible salience are more likely to experience militarized disputes and wars. Tangible and intangible issues The salience of an issue refers to ‘the degree of importance attached to that issue by the actors involved’ Issues can involve competing views on tangible objectives (e.g., control over a particular territory, the removal of a particular leader) as well as competing views on intangible objectives (e.g., influence, prestige, or ideology) Previous studies demonstrate that more tangible issues involve fewer actors, more costly, less frequent and persistent contention, and more cooperative interactions (Hensel et al. 2008) Intangible issues are likely to be more difficult to resolve Disputants have an incentive to maintain a reputation for toughness (intangible concerns for reputation and image losses) Issues that are highly intangible and indivisible are regarded as making bargaining more difficult, increasing the chances that states will use militarized forces Tangibility, intangibility, and territorial issues Territories can have tangible or physical attributes (economic, strategic values) Also, territories can have intangible or psychological values (ethnic, identity, religious values) Disputes over territory valued primarily for tangible reasons should be more amenable to peaceful settlement, because the parties should be able to locate a settlement that both would rationally prefer to war. While an oil deposit might be shared, division is far less appealing for territory containing holy sites, the graves of one’s ancestors, or one’s ethnic kinsmen Also, territory valued largely for intangible reasons is likely to result in greater image and reputation losses for state leaders who make significant concessions, which will produce rigid bargaining Because it is more difficult to reach settlement over territories with largely intangible values, they should produce more frequent and violent battles than territory valued for its tangible values Hypothesis : Territorial issues with greater intangible salience result in more frequent and severe militarized conflict than territorial issues with primarily tangible salience Variables and Measurement Spatial domain of analysis: Americas and Western Europe (191 territorial disputes) Temporal domain of analysis: 1816-2001 Dependent variable The outbreak of militarized conflicts (Whether there was a militarized conflict or not) Independent variable Salience of disputed territory Unit of analysis: dyadic territorial dispute-year Consideration of other variables (control variables) Capability disparity Joint democracy Variables and Measurement Measuring salience of territory Tangible value of territory Resource value: Territory contains valuable resources such as oil, copper, iron ore, nickel, uranium, fresh water, or fisheries Strategic location: located in important military bases or trade routes Populated area: Sustains permanent population Intangible value of territory Homeland ties: Part of the national homeland (rather than a colony or dependency) Identity ties: Has ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other identity ties to the territory Historical ties: Has previously exercised sovereignty over the territory (historical value) Can quantify what proportion of disputed territories contain resources or are located in strategic areas Territorial Pairs of State: State A (Challenger) vs. State B (Target) Salience of territory Occurrence of war Dispute Dataset (Issue Correlates of War dataset) identifier Empirical analysis Main empirical findings Territories with intangible saliences are more likely to lead to militarized conflict than territories with tangible saliences (consistent with the hypothesis) Also, the greater the power disparity, the lower the probability of militarized conflict over the territorial claim. And jointly democratic dyads are significantly less likely to experience the onset of militarized conflict Conclusion: the most dangerous contests are those that involve intangible salience, or psychological and emotional attachment to the land Questions Why is the dyadic level of analysis important for understanding interstate war? What seems to be advantages or disadvantages of the behavioral approach in the study of international relations (key strengths and limitations)? References Bremer, S. A. (1992). Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war, 1816- 1965. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(2), 309-341. Frederick, B. A., Hensel, P. R., & Macaulay, C. (2017). The issue correlates of war territorial claims data, 1816– 20011. Journal of Peace Research, 54(1), 99-108. Huth, P. K. (1999). Deterrence and international conflict: Empirical findings and theoretical debates. Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 25-48. Hensel, P. R., & Mitchell, S. M. (2005). Issue indivisibility and territorial claims. GeoJournal, 64(4), 275-285. Hensel, P. R., McLaughlin Mitchell, S., Sowers, T. E., & Thyne, C. L. (2008). Bones of contention: Comparing territorial, maritime, and river issues. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(1), 117-143. Mingst, K. A., & McKibben, H. E. (2022). Essentials of International Relations. W. W. Norton & Company. Week 10 Intrastate war 2024.11.04  Mid-term exam grades Make-up class (12/09) Reaction paper instructions available Intrastate Conflict Definition of civil war (intrastate war) Occurs between organized actors within a state In most cases, the main participants are within a state (e.g., government and one more rebel group) Conventionally, to qualify as a civil war, a conflict involves at least 1,000 battle-related deaths Lower thresholds (e.g., 25 battle-related deaths) are sometimes used  Between 1945 and 1999: - Approximately 3.33 million battle deaths occurred in the 25 interstate wars that killed at least 1,000 - Roughly 127 civil wars that that killed at least 1,000. A conservative estimate of the total number of deaths as a direct result of these conflicts is 16.2 million (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) Sources of Civil Conflict Grievance and greed Grievances State discrimination against a certain group in political participation, access to jobs, education, health care, public infrastructure etc. Repressive government policies of specific languages and cultures that can lead to vast inequalities in quality of life among groups Example) Kenya The 2008 post-election violence left 1,000 people dead and some 350,000 displaced Ethnic-based violence has deep roots in Kenya, which is fueled by grievances over land, privilege, and inequality Political elites mobilize constituencies based on ethnicity Election outcomes are often won based on ethnic calculus/alliances than political performance or national vision Greed A group's ambition to gain control over economic resources. For example, groups may seek a larger share of profits from natural resource extraction or exclusive access to jobs and government benefits Sources of Civil Conflict Civil wars can involve issues over territory Separatism: A group seeks to establish its own independent state on territory carved from an existing state South Sudan became independent from Sudan in 2011 Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 Irredentism: A group seeks to attach their territory to that of a neighboring country (usually when people of one state share ethnic/religious ties with the people in the neighboring state) Russian speakers in the eastern part of Ukraine A group may seek to seize control of the central government and establish a new one The war in Syria in 2011 – groups dissatisfied with the repressive rule of Bashar al- Assad The Emergence of Organized, Armed Opposition Most countries have dissatisfied groups that could seek control over territory, access to economic resources, replace the government etc. However, not all dissatisfied groups organize and engage in armed conflict. Grievances and greed are necessary to fuel the emergence of armed opposition groups, but they are not sufficient. How can we understand why some dissatisfied groups organize to further their interests through the threat or use of violence while others do not? The Emergence of Organized, Armed Opposition Group-level factors Individuals from the same ethnic/religious groups may have more trust in one another Easier to recruit soldiers and raise funds Country-level factors National wealth Poorer countries are likely to experience civil wars When there is a lack of economic alternatives and higher unemployment, individuals are more likely to join rebel groups Poorer countries lack resources/capacities (e.g., a strong police force) to maintain order The Emergence of Organized, Armed Opposition Type of regime Democracies are less likely to experience civil conflicts, as they tend to have political channels for peaceful participation (e.g., election, judicial systems), and resolve issues related to grievance Non-democratic regimes may be more effective in repressing rebel groups (have strong army, oppressive rule) Suggests that the likelihood of civil conflicts can be highest in countries that are neither strongly democratic nor strongly autocratic Geography and population Rebel groups tend to be weaker than the governments they are fighting In order for the rebels to survive, they must be able to effectively hide from government forces Factors such as populous regions or mountainous terrains can affect civil war The Emergence of Organized, Armed Opposition International-level factors Foreign states may intervene by sending their troops or providing arms, training, and funds to rebel groups May allow them to operate from bases in foreign neighboring countries Foreign states might intervene as they have shared interests, and goals (E.g., Russia providing support to ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine) Also, foreign states may have conflicting interests with the government, and seek to impose costs on the government by aiding the rebels https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-62069265 Trends over Time (Civil Wars) Y-axis: the number of countries with ongoing civil wars Also, shows the proportion of countries with at least one ongoing war each year The rate of outbreak of new civil wars (2.31 per year since 1945, the termination rate is 1.85 per year) The average duration of civil wars has increased from 2 years in 1947 to approximately 15 years in 1999 Fearon and Laitin (2003) RQ: What explains the prevalence of civil conflict? Why have some countries had civil wars while others have not? Between 1945 and 1999, there was a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s and 1960s Examines the conditions that lead to civil war onset Ethnic diversity, poverty, political instability, rough terrain, large populations, etc. Main Argument Ethnic or religious diversity (a source of tensions and antagonisms among groups) is a poor indicator of the probability of civil war Find little evidence that (1) ethnic or broad political grievances, (2) democracies and respect for civil liberties, (3) state discrimination against minority religions or languages are strong predictors of the probability of civil war Authors find that conditions that favor insurgencies are the main factors that explain the outbreak of civil war Ethnicity, Discrimination, and Grievances Ethnic, religious diversity is expected to increase the risk of civil war onset Deep rooted cultural differences along ethnic lines Countries with higher levels of ethnic or religious diversity are more likely to experience civil war. The idea is that greater diversity in terms of ethnic or religious groups within a country correlates with a higher risk of internal conflict. This increased risk is likely due to potential tensions and divisions among different groups, which may make a country more susceptible to civil war. The likelihood of civil war in a country with ethnic diversity should increase as the country's per capita income rises, with per capita income serving as a measure of economic modernization. Economic modernization and development enable upward social mobility but societal barriers exist for minority groups The idea here is that as a country modernizes economically, existing social and economic inequalities might worsen, particularly between cultural or ethnic groups. This modernization process could lead to increased discrimination against minority groups, who may feel excluded or disadvantaged by the changes. Consequently, these groups might respond with nationalist movements or increased contention, challenging the dominant group or state. Uses measures of ethnolinguistic, religious fractionalization, per capita income Ethnicity, Discrimination, and Grievances Political democracy should be negatively associated with the risks of civil war onset Democracy should be associated with less discrimination and repression among different cultural groups Policies that discriminate in favor of a particular language or religion should increase the risk of civil war onset in states with religious or linguistic minorities Greater income inequality should be positively associated with the risks of civil war onset Greater economic inequality is related to broad grievances that favor civil conflict Use measures such as POLITY 5 (measure of a country's political regime characteristics), Freedom House indicator etc. Ethnicity, Discrimination, and Grievances In countries where an ethnic minority makes up at least 5% of the population, an increase in ethnic diversity is associated with a higher likelihood of ethnic civil war. If a country has a sizable ethnic minority group (at least 5% of the population), greater overall ethnic diversity within the country is likely to increase the risk of a civil war driven by ethnic tensions Not all forms of diversity create the same level of risk. In some cases, a diverse society can be stable, especially if there are structures in place that promote inclusion and equality. Thus, diversity alone isn’t the whole story—what matters more is the size and influence of minority groups. In countries with high ethnic diversity but no single minority group large enough to significantly challenge the majority (e.g., multiple small minority groups with none exceeding 5% of the population), there might be less risk of large-scale ethnic conflict. These smaller groups might not have the collective power to mount a strong challenge Insurgency Insurgency: a military strategy in which small, often lightly armed bands practice guerilla warfare from rural base areas Guerilla warfare: “the use of irregular armed forces to undermine the will of an incumbent government (or its foreign support) by selectively attacking the government’s vulnerable points or personnel over a prolonged period of time; often used by weaker power” (Mingst & McKibben, 2022). Guerilla warfare is often used by the weaker side when there is inequality in terms of relative material strength between the two warring parties Engages hit-and-run attacks against military, government, and civilian targets Insurgency The conditions that favor insurgencies Insurgents tend to be weak relative to the governments they are fighting The numerical weakness of insurgents implies that the rebels must be able to hide effectively from government forces The presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, cross border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents For rough terrain, use measures such as the proportion of the country that is “mountainous” Insurgency The government’s police and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas Insurgents are better able to fight and survive if the government they are opposed to is relatively weak (bad finance, corrupt, poor intelligence, politically/bureaucratically incompetent) Government weakness or strength is measured by higher per capita income A proxy for a state’s overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities Higher per capita income countries are more likely to have terrain more “disciplined” by roads and rural society more penetrated by central administration Also, when economic alternatives are worse, it is easier for rebel groups to recruit young men to the life of a guerrilla Also, considers a host of other variables that are related to relative state and rebel strength (Hypotheses 10 a-h) Includes ‘political instability’ at the center (the central government). It may signal disorganization and weakness in the state's leadership. This instability creates an opportunity for potential rebels or insurgent groups to mobilize, seeing it as a chance to challenge the government. To measure political instability, use an indicator that shows whether a country’s Polity score changed Insurgency The authors argue that variables related to the relative strength between rebels and the state (Hypotheses 10 a-h) are not critically related to cultural differences or group grievances They argue that insurgencies can succeed under the right environmental conditions (e.g., difficult terrain, weak state control in certain areas) even if there is no broad popular support or even in relatively democratic countries. This implies that insurgents don’t always need widespread support or strong grievances among the population to thrive. Small, determined groups can operate and grow in favorable conditions (such as in remote or mountainous regions), allowing insurgency to flourish regardless of the level of democracy or civil liberties. The authors view that ethnic differences and group grievances are too common to help distinguish the countries and years that experience civil war versus those that do not Research Design Analyzes 127 civil wars in 161 countries Temporal domain: 1945-1999 Dependent variable: civil war onset Empirical analysis (key findings) Are more diverse countries more likely to experience civil war? Finds that for any level of ethnic diversity, as state capacity increases, the probability of a civil war outbreak decreases (figure 2, p.83) Multivariate analysis Ethnic and religious fractionalization is not significantly associated with civil war onset Per capita income (state strength relative to rebels) is strongly associated with the probability of civil war onset Democracy and civil liberties are not significantly associated with civil war onset Mountainous terrain is significantly related to higher rates of civil war onset Conclusion and Implications Concludes that important predictors of civil war are: Conditions that favor insurgency Government side Insurgencies are more likely in financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments (which have weak policing or inept counterinsurgency practices) Such administrative capabilities are measured by per capita income Rebel side Insurgency is favored by rough terrain Rebels with local knowledge of the population superior to the government’s These are better predictors than Ethnic and religious diversity Measures of grievances such as economic inequality Lack of democracy or civil liberties State discrimination against minority religions or languages Find little evidence that civil war is predicted by large cultural divisions or broadly held grievances Prorok (2016) Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony Bashar Assad in Syria Prorok (2016) How do rebel/state leaders affect civil war outcomes? Leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment both by the domestic audience (constituents) and wartime opponents can affect the outcome of civil war Significance of study Existing studies focus on country level or dyad level Treat rebels and state combatants as unitary actors Country or dyad level studies are limited to examining how leaders affect civil war dynamics This study relaxes the unitary actor assumption and investigates how leaders’ incentives can affect war outcomes The costs of war for the whole society =/= the costs of wars for leaders Leaders care about their own political survival, physical safety Theory Assumptions Leaders have independent preferences from their constituents (own physical safety, retain political power) Internal audiences/constituents prefer competent leaders Internal audiences have incentives to punish an incompetent leader Leader competence is evaluated by war performance Theory Punishment in civil war Rebel groups, like state leaders, have an internal organizational structure to be punished by their group/constituents (e.g., processes like elections or coups) Approximately 22% of rebel leaders are punished internally as a result of war (around 19% of state leaders are politically punished as a result of war) Punishment can mean different things for rebels and state leaders States leaders being punished by their constituents State leader being punished by wartime opponent (rebels) Rebels being punished by their constituents Rebels being punished by wartime opponents (state leaders) Theory Internal punishment Internal audiences/constituents prefer competent leaders Constituents have incentives to punish an incompetent leader Constituents have limited information when evaluating leader War performance is an important indicator for evaluating leader Failure to achieve stated goals is related to incompetence Success to achieve stated goals is related to competence What also matters in assessing competence is whether the leader is responsible or not for the ongoing civil war Leaders are regarded to be responsible when (1) They were in power when the conflict started (2) They came to power during the war and had political connections to the decision to start fighting So, when war is going badly, constituents would blame leaders who are responsible for the war Theory The Gamble for resurrection Responsible leaders Responsible leaders who started the war have greater incentives to win If they compromise with the opponent, they are likely to face internal punishment for reneging on promises made at the war’s start When they pursue a conciliatory policy with the opponent, they are likely to be viewed as incompetent by their internal audience If the probability of victory decreases, responsible leaders become increasingly assured that they will be judged incompetent by their constituents Therefore, they have the incentive to gamble for resurrection (continue the war although the probability of victory remains low). This is because the possibility of victory still remains while compromise is likely to lead to internal punishment Nonresponsible leaders lack incentives to gamble for resurrection because their risk of internal punishment for compromising with the war opponent is low Theory Opponent-based punishment Incentives to gamble for resurrection exacerbate/intensify commitment problems with the war opponent Leaders with incentives to gamble for resurrection are less able to commit to ending the war or implementing settlements (for their personal and political survival) War opponents will prefer an opponent leader who can make credible commitments to peace (i.e., nonresponsible leaders) While war opponents may not always be interested in peaceful settlement, they will prefer an opponent leader who can uphold the terms of settlement when they pursue resolution War opponents have the incentive to remove responsible leaders (and replace them with nonresponsible leaders) to facilitate termination. This means that having incentives to gamble for resurrection facilitates wartime opponent- inflicted punishment Empirical Implications H1: Combatant groups led by leaders who bear responsibility for the war are more likely to experience extreme war outcomes (total victory or a total defeat) than those with non-responsible leaders It is less costly for responsible leaders to fight than to pursue peaceful settlement (due to internal punishment & war opponent-based punishment) and have incentives to gamble for resurrection (in the hopes of winning) There is also the possibility of total defeat as the outcome of war is determined by various factors (relative strength, resolve, strategy used, etc.) Empirical Implications H2: Combatant groups with leaders who bear responsibility for the war are less likely to make concessions on central war aims than those with nonresponsible leaders If responsible leaders make concessions, they are reneging on their initial war aims and can be viewed as incompetent Research Design Analyzes 1,279 state and rebel leaders in 331 civil war dyads 758 (59.27%) are state leaders 521 (40.73%) are rebel leaders Temporal domain: 1980-2011 Research Design Dependent variable (H1) Extreme war outcomes 1 = total victory or total defeat 0 = otherwise (H2) Whether or not a leader makes concessions 1 = if the leader makes concessions on central issues at stake in the war 0 = otherwise Independent variable Leader responsibility 1 = held political power within the state or rebel organization at the start of war, or if replaced/new leaders have direct political connections to the previous leader who started the war 0 = held no political power within the state or rebel organization at the start of war, or if replaced/new leaders have no direct political ties with the previous leader who started the war Key Findings What is the key relationship in the data that the paper finds (or doesn’t find)? H1: Leader responsibility for the war significantly increases the likelihood of extreme outcomes H2: Leader responsibility significantly decreases the likelihood of concessions Key Findings Testing the Mechanism Are responsible leaders (compared to nonresponsible leaders) actually more likely to be punished when they perform poorly in war? H3: Responsible leaders should be more likely than nonresponsible leaders to face punishment when they show poor performance in war When responsible leaders perform poorly in wars, the likelihood of punishment increases by 37 percentage points Shows that it is the threat of punishment that affects leaders’ wartime decision making Testing the Mechanism Responsibility for the war increases the likelihood of punishment for poorly performing leaders by 37 percentage points and raises the likelihood of punishment for status quo performers by 17 percentage points. Leaders who perform well face a low probability of punishment, with no significant difference between those responsible for the war and those who are not.  These findings support the main hypothesis by showing that leaders responsible for the war are more vulnerable to the threat of punishment, which, in turn, influences their decisions regarding termination. Conclusion and Implications Demonstrates the importance of focusing on leaders (rather than dyad or country level factors) in understanding civil war processes Treating rebel groups and governments as unitary actors is a critical limitation in existing research Leader based factors can significantly affect the outcome, severity, and duration of civil wars Questions Based these studies (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Prorok, 2015) what kind of policy implications can be drawn? Do you find these studies persuasive? How do these studies enhance our understanding of civil war? Questions International criminal court (ICC) A permanent judicial body established by the Rome Statute (in 1998) The Court investigates, prosecutes, and tries individuals accused of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity Around 120 countries signed As of 2022, 31 cases have been brought before the court for investigation or trial  LRA leader Joseph Kony is charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, including abduction of thousands of children The court issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity References Mingst, K. A., & McKibben, H. E. (2022). Essentials of International Relations. W. W. Norton & Company. Prorok, A. K. (2016). Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1), 70–84. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24583051 Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. The American Political Science Review, 97(1), 75–90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222 International Cooperation and Law (Week 12) 2024.11.18 Important Dates Make-up class: 12/9 Final exam: 12/16 Reaction papers: 12/15 (weeks 9-12), 12/22 (weeks 13-14) Sources of International Law International law consists of a body of rules and norms regulating interactions among states, between states and Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and in more limited cases, among IGOs, states, and individuals Sources of international law: Customs—ingrained habits, usually created by groups of states or a hegemon E.g., the law of the sea Practices  customary law  codified into treaties Treaties (conventions, covenants, protocols): binding written agreements that lay out rights and obligations Governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “treaty on treaties”), adopted in 1969 More than 25,000 treaties have been created Treaties (1) Negotiation and drafting of a treaty. The “adoption” of treaty. (2) Opened for signature (3) Usually, states have to ratify treaties through their domestic processes E.g., The US signed but did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol (1997) (4) Even after ratification, treaties must enter into force for states to be legally bound by them. Once a treaty enters into force, the states that have ratified it are legally bound by its provisions E.g., Sometimes have specific requirements to enter into force: At least 55 nations had to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (1997) for it to come into effect. These nations had to be industrialized and responsible for at least 55% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions in 1990 Enforcement Mechanisms and State Compliance States are sovereign actors, and compliance with international law is clearly not absolute The U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003) violated the UN Charter Human Rights Watch gathered and examined evidence related to chemical weapons attacks in Syria spanning from 2013 to 2018. Syria’s use of chemical weapons is a violation of international law. The efforts of the UN Security Council, the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and unilateral action by individual countries to enforce the prohibition on Syria's use of chemical weapons have been largely ineffective Yet, most of the time, states do comply with international law When and why do states comply? Vertical enforcement Horizontal enforcement Self-interest Normative and ethical explanations Vertical Enforcement Vertical enforcement: a legal process whereby one actor works to constrain the actions of another actor over which it has authority in order to secure its compliance with the law Example: institutional enforcement by the European Court of Justice or the International Court of Justice (top-down) The threat of punishment motivates compliance  Vertical Enforcement The International Court of Justice (ICJ) The main judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) Established in 1945 under the UN Charter The court can rule on two types of case: “contentious cases” and “advisory proceedings” “Contentious cases”: Its role is to settle legal disputes between states (non-state actors such as individuals and businesses are not included) between the 193 UN member states The court addresses issues such as land and maritime boundaries, territorial sovereignty, diplomatic relations, the right to asylum, economic rights, etc. E.g., The case brought by South Africa against Israel (on December 29, 2022) concerning alleged genocidal acts in Gaza. Another relatively recent case involves a ruling against Myanmar (in January 2020) – ordering the country to protect its minority Rohingya population “Advisory proceedings”: The Court may give advisory opinions (not binding and are only consultative) on legal questions referred to it by UN organs The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council may request advisory opinions on “any legal question.” Other United Nations organs and specialized agencies authorized to seek advisory opinions can only do so on "legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.“ E.g., On January 20, 2023, the UN General Assembly requested the court to provide an advisory opinion on “Israeli practices impacting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” In March 2023, the General Assembly passed a resolution seeking an advisory opinion from the court on the responsibilities of states regarding climate change The Court comprises a panel of 15 judges, elected to 9-year terms by the Security Council and General Assembly. Elections occur every 3 years for one third of the seats Jurisdiction of the ICJ is not compulsory for states: States must formally agree to allow the court's jurisdiction. If a state agrees to participate in a proceeding, it is legally bound to comply with the Court’s decision. Vertical Enforcement Vertical enforcement can also occur from the bottom-up National and local courts can enforce international law Broad jurisdiction; universal jurisdiction The lack of enforcement mechanisms against sovereign states E.g., In 2012, Columbia withdrew from a treaty that bound it to the ICJ jurisdiction after an ICJ ruling that shifts some of its resource-rich waters to Nicaragua In 1986, the United States was ordered by the ICJ to reimburse Nicaragua for the mining of its ports and the training, arming, and financing of Contra rebels during the Nicaraguan civil conflict. The US simply withdrew its acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction and refused to pay the reparations. Horizontal Enforcement Horizontal enforcement: states work to elicit compliance with international law from other states Power States comply with international law because more powerful states make them Thus, it is expected that the weaker states comply Reciprocity/tit-for-tat interactions: the desire to reap the gains of cooperation will incentivize states to comply with the laws Self-Interest Compliance or lack thereof depends on whether compliance is in the interest of the states in question States benefit from participating in making the rules through treaties because that enables them to ensure the rules are in their interest States find it beneficial for them to participate in the treaties, so they join Complying leads to greater gains than non-complying (mechanism of reciprocity) Compliance or lack thereof can also depend on states’ ability (bureaucratic, managerial, or otherwise) to comply E.g., Environmental agreements – many developing countries may not have the ability to implement policies in lowering ozone-depleting emissions. International institutions can provide technical assistance and funds Normative and Ethical Explanations Constructivists and some liberals subscribe to normative explanations of compliance with international law States comply because: It is the right thing to do International law reflects universal ethics Desire to be seen positively and be respected The desire for legitimacy Democracy can be an important explanation for state compliance with international law Democracies share certain traits – representative government, civil and political rights protections, respect for the rule of law Individuals, leaders of democratic states are likely to respect these qualities at the domestic level. These qualities are also likely to be practiced at the international level (particularly when interacting with other democracies) Law of the Sea The law of the sea: a body of customs, treaties, and international agreements that governments maintain order, productivity, and peaceful relations on the sea It is considered the “constitution of the oceans” UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides guidelines for how countries use the world’s seas and their natural resources UNCLOS deals with international dispute resolution, marine scientific research, coastal state interests, naval power, maritime commerce, and the establishment of maritime zones around coastal borders UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, had 168 members by 2020 The US signed UNCLOS in 1994 but did not ratify the treaty Law of the Sea  South China Sea Disputes over Sovereignty In the northern part of the SCS, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam contest sovereignty over the Paracel Islands In the southern part of the sea, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all of the approximately 200 Spratly Islands, while Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines claim some of them. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the SCS contains about 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas The SCS is one of the world’s most heavily trafficked waterways. It is estimated that $5.3 trillion in trade passes through the region annually The SCS also contains significant fish stocks that supply the livelihoods of people across the region In 2016, an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal ruled (among other things) that China’s nine-dash line claim had “no legal basis.” China declared the ruling “null and void.” South China Sea Dispute over Freedom of the Seas The US and China disagree over what rights international law grants (i.e., how to interpret UNCLOS) China claims that, under international law, it has the right to regulate both economic activities and foreign militaries’ navigation and overflight through their EEZs According to the US, claimant countries, under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), have the right to regulate economic activities within their EEZs, but not the right to regulate navigation by military ships and overflight (by aircraft) through the EEZ. The US insists that the freedom of navigation of military vessels and aircraft is a universally accepted practice. Since 2017, the US has conducted numerous "freedom of navigation” operations to ensure free and open access to the South China Sea https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DmJKW1Xl2T0&t=229s International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements (Mitchell and Hensel, 2007) When do states comply with agreements to end their contentious issues (conflicts over territory, maritime areas, and cross-border rivers)? To what extent does the decision to involve international organizations in the settlement of contentious issues affect the prospects for compliance with any resolutions that might be reached? Argues that states are more likely to comply with agreements that are reached with the help of international institutions, especially if these settlements are reached through arbitration or adjudication When And Why Do States Comply? Vertical enforcement (top-down, bottom-up) Horizontal enforcement (power, reciprocity) Self-interest Normative and ethical explanations Different Views on the Effectiveness of International Institutions Neoliberal institutionalists International institutions do matter in international politics – help mitigate the effects of anarchy, and foster cooperation among states Can help decrease transaction costs, reduce uncertainty, increase the flow of information Realist States join international institutions and comply only when it meets their self-interests States will not cooperate when they have to compromise their security (concern for relative gains) Constructivists International institutions can be critical in socializing states and spreading norms As norms are internalized by states, their preferences and behavior can change Theory Active IO involvement in the conflict management process Active involvement: IOs help to resolve conflict directly as third parties Non-binding intervention: good offices, mediation, conciliation, fact finding Binding intervention: arbitration, adjudication (both are based on formal procedures of settlement, though the rules of arbitration are more flexible than adjudication; adjudication often involves international courts in settling disputes) Private information, commitment problems, issue indivisibilities can increase the chances of non-compliance Theory (1) Reducing states’ private information States have incentives to misrepresent their true interests in the dyadic bargaining process IOs can provide objective information about involved parties’ capabilities, resolves, and interests, thus reducing uncertainty and information asymmetries Increase the flow of unbiased information among member states → Improves the likelihood that disputants will implement an agreement Such effects should be stronger when IOs engage in binding forms of settlement (arbitration or adjudication) Legal procedures require the collection of detailed information by the judges or arbitrators Disputants may also be required to present facts Theory (2) Mitigating commitment problems Countries can be tempted to renege on an agreement IOs can help to decrease commitment problems during the process of conflict settlement IOs can be viewed as more impartial and less political than states serving as third-party mediators State leaders can use IO decisions as a “political cover” if the settlement outcome is unpopular at home or the contending parties wish to maintain cordial relations According to Walter (1997), negotiations are most likely to occur when there is a third-party involved in the settlement process Also, IOs can promise to enforce an agreement by using force, providing resources for monitoring, providing aid for compliance, or withholding IO benefits, thereby increasing the costs of noncompliance Theory (3) Increases the likelihood of compliance by increasing reputation costs for noncompliance Contending parties are likely to consider their reputation in future bargaining sit