Lecture 2 Supplementary Notes PDF

Jurisprudence (LAW328) Lecture 2: Introduction to Metaethics (II) Supplementary Notes G.E. Moore: open & closed questions It is difficult to overstate the influence of G.E. Moore. As Garvey & Stangroom (2013) point out, ‘Metaethics is the branch of moral philosophy that concerns questions such as “...

Jurisprudence (LAW328) Lecture 2: Introduction to Metaethics (II) Supplementary Notes G.E. Moore: open & closed questions It is difficult to overstate the influence of G.E. Moore. As Garvey & Stangroom (2013) point out, ‘Metaethics is the branch of moral philosophy that concerns questions such as “Are there moral facts?”, “If there are moral facts, where do they come from?”…These sort of questions have been discussed throughout the history of philosophy…but it is only in the last hundred years, since the publication of G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica that metaethics has been considered in a systematic fashion’. Moore’s analysis of goodness employs the idea of open and closed questions. A closed question is one where no further meaningful questioning can be undertaken. For example, ‘Is a triangle a three-sided polygon?’ is a closed question because the definition of ‘triangle’ inherently includes the idea of having three sides. The question is in one sense redundant since there is no room for further meaningful debate; assuming one understands the terms employed – in this example ‘triangle’ – then the answer to the question becomes self- evident. Similarly, the question, ‘Is a bachelor an unmarried man?’ is a closed question because the definition of ‘bachelor’ encompasses the idea of an unmarried man, so the answer is obvious from the definition itself. An open question is one in which we can reasonably question the truth of a statement, even when we fully understand the terms being used. Moore claims the question ‘what is good?’1 is an open question and no answer offered in response will transform the question into a closed question. His argument may be summarised as follows. Suppose during a jurisprudence debate Mary asks, ‘What is good?’ In response, Peter answers that ‘good’ is the same as ‘pleasure’ such that asking, ‘Is X good?’ is the same as asking ‘Is X pleasurable?’ G.E. Moore’s argument is that in response to Peter’s answer, Mary could quite meaningfully inquire, ‘But is pleasure really good?’ That remains an open question and the fact that Mary’s follow-up question is meaningful (unlike the question ‘Is a bachelor an unmarried man?’) shows that ‘good’ and ‘pleasure’ are not one and the same thing. If ‘good’ and ‘pleasure’ were identical – if the proposed definition (in this example ‘pleasure’) had been a correct account of the meaning of good – then the follow-up question ‘Is pleasure really good?’ would be closed and hence redundant. The fact Mary’s follow-up question remains open demonstrates that Peter’s answer fails to capture the true essence (definition) of goodness. Thus, the open-question argument shows that defining ‘good’ in terms of any natural property (e.g. pleasure, desire, happiness, etc) always leaves room for further questioning, 1 As in ‘What is the definition of goodness?’ as opposed to ‘Provide an example of behaviour that is good’. [- 1 -] meaning that ‘good’ cannot be identical to any natural property. This suggests that moral terms like ‘good’ cannot be reduced to any naturalistic terms, because every proposed naturalistic definition leaves the question open in a way that doesn’t happen for definitions of closed concepts; in short, the concept of goodness is indefinable. We can approach Moore’s argument from a different perspective. A barren tautology2 is an analytical statement that is true by definition. For example, the statement ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ is a barren tautology. The term ‘barren’ is used because tautologies of this kind are ‘empty’ of content; such statements do not add new information or insight about the world beyond the repetition of the same idea. Similarly, barren tautologies do not tell us anything about what ought to be done; put simply, they do not provide any motivating reason to act in a certain way. The sentence ‘A triangle is a three-sided polygon’ is a barren tautology that does not assist with moral decision making or guide our behaviour in any meaningful way; it is a descriptive truth that offers no normative guidance. Let’s return to Mary’s initial question, ‘What is good?’ Again, Peter offers pleasure as the definition of good. If Peter were correct in stating ‘Good is pleasure’, then that statement would influence how we choose to act. The fact the statement has the capacity to motivate us and influence our behaviour proves the statement is not a barren tautology which, in turn, demonstrates that ‘good’ cannot mean ‘pleasure’. Indeed, Moore would argue that no matter how Peter chooses to define goodness, his answer ‘good is X’3 will always provide a motivating reason to act in a certain way which means the statement cannot be a barren tautology. The argument may be summarised as follows: P1: For any X, if good meant X, then ‘X is good’ would be a barren tautology. P2: If ‘X is good’ is a barren tautology it would not provide a motivating reason for action. P3: Either ‘X is good’ does not influence action, or good does not mean X. P4: Any X in ‘X is good’ will provide a motivating reason for action. Conclusion: Therefore, there is no X that can mean good. In other words, goodness is a simple concept that cannot be broken down into more basic components or defined in terms of other properties. To further illustrate this point, Moore draws a parallel between the concept of goodness and the colour yellow. One cannot explain yellow by breaking it down into more fundamental components; the concept resists definition that conveys what it is like to see or experience yellow.4 If Mary has never seen the colour yellow, no amount of verbal description can fully capture the concept. One can merely point to yellow objects and say, ‘This is yellow’, thereby enabling Mary to grasp the concept directly through experience. Just as ‘yellow’ is a basic, simple concept that cannot be defined in terms of anything else, so ‘goodness’ is a 2 A tautology is a statement that repeats the same idea in different words or in a redundant way; for example, ‘A square has four sides’. Tautologies are always true, but their truth comes from their structure, not because they tell us something meaningful about the world. 3 Substitute X with any definition Peter happens to offer. 4 One might retort ‘Surely a definition of yellow is possible either in terms of how yellow is created (e.g. by mixing red and green) or in terms of wavelengths of light?’ However, Moore’s argument is that no amount of scientific or theoretical explanation about how yellow is created can convey what it is like to experience yellow. Describing yellow as ‘a mixture of red and green’ only explains the physical process behind its production but it does not convey the actual subjective experience of yellow itself. For example, if Susan is unfamiliar with yellow (e.g., if she is colourblind), then explaining that yellow is ‘a mixture of red and green’ will not help her understand the unique visual quality of yellow. [- 2 -] simple quality that cannot be defined in terms of natural properties like pleasure, happiness, or desire. Just as people recognise the colour yellow through direct observation, Moore argues we intuitively recognise goodness when we encounter it. For this reason, Moore’s ethical theory is sometimes termed intuitionism. It asserts that although ‘good’ cannot be broken down into simpler concepts or defined in terms of natural properties, we nevertheless have a moral faculty that enables us to directly recognise what things or states of affairs are intrinsically good. Intrinsic goods are good in and of themselves, not because they lead to something else. Moore argued that pleasure and personal relationships, for example, could be intrinsically good, and we arrive at moral principles by identifying these intrinsically good things through careful reflection and moral intuition. Moore did not think that our recognition of goodness was purely subjective or arbitrary. He argued that we have a special moral intuition, a capacity to grasp self-evident truths about what is good. Thus, if we reflect on a state of happiness or a loving relationship, we can intuitively recognise these as things that are good in themselves, even if we cannot articulate why in simpler terms. These intuitions, in turn, guide the development of moral principles in that once we use intuition to identify what is intrinsically good, we can begin to construct moral principles that promote those intrinsic goods. For Moore, the right action is therefore the one that leads to the greatest amount of intrinsic good. The Vienna Circle & logical positivism A group of philosophers, known as the Vienna Circle, met throughout the 1920s and 30s to discuss logic, language and meaning. Friedrich Waismann (1896-1959), a member of the Circle, explained the group’s philosophy in the following terms: ‘Anyone uttering a sentence must know under what conditions he calls it true and under what conditions he calls it false. If he is unable to state these conditions, he does not know what he has said. A statement which cannot be conclusively verified cannot be verified at all. It is simply devoid of any meaning.’ This is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of logical positivism which has at its heart the verification principle. A.J. Ayer described the idea in the following terms, ‘The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.’ In other words, the meaning of a proposition purporting to express a fact is given by the method one might use to verify the truth or falsity of the fact in question. For example, we know what the proposition ‘It’s snowing’ means, because we know how to ascertain whether it is true or false; we know what experience would prove or disprove such a proposition. For its proponents, the principle’s implications are devastating; if logical positivism is correct then talk about ethics, religion, and aesthetics is quite literally meaningless since no possible experience could prove or disprove statements such as ‘God loves you’, ‘X is morally wrong’, ‘Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is beautiful’. When it comes to belief in God, Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) notes, ‘In its metaphysical use the word “God” refers to something beyond experience. The word is deliberately divested of its reference to a physical being or to a spiritual being that is immanent in the physical. And as it is not given a new meaning, it becomes meaningless.’ A.J. Ayer makes a similar argument in his book, Language, Truth and Logic: ‘The term “god” is a metaphysical term. And if “god” is a metaphysical term, then it [- 3 -] cannot even be probable that a god exists. For to say that “god exists” is to make a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true or false. And by the same criterion, no sentence which purports to describe the nature of a transcendent god can possess any literal significance.’ In this passage, Ayer is not just denying the existence of God; he is dismissing the very question of God’s existence. The argument is as follows: P1: It is meaningless to say ‘There is a God’ if we cannot empirically verify the existence of God; P2: We cannot empirically verify the existence of God; Conclusion: therefore, it is meaningless to say ‘There is a God’. Ayer advances the same argument in relation to moral statements. A moral statement to the effect that ‘X is morally wrong’ cannot be either true or false. Moral judgments merely express attitudes like desire or disapproval (‘killing is wrong’ means little more than ‘Boo to killing!’) but they are not verifiable, so it is meaningless to even argue ‘X is morally wrong’; as Ayer notes, ‘If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false.’ Thus, the statement ‘You acted wrongly in stealing the money’ actually means ‘You stole the money’; the section ‘You acted wrongly’ expresses no proposition which can be true or false; it is meaningless. Similarly, the statement ‘Stealing money is wrong’ translates into nothing! The speaker has expressed no true/false proposition; rather, the speaker has merely displayed her moral disapproval. Logical positivism builds on the ideas of David Hume (1711-1776). In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume tries to describe how ideas and knowledge operate within our minds. He argues ‘All the objects of human reason or enquiry fall naturally into two kinds, namely relations of ideas and matters of fact’. The first category – relations of ideas – captures logic and mathematics, propositions discovered purely by thinking. For example, 2+2 will always equal 4 and we do not have to check this by observing facts in the world; the truth of ‘2+2 = 4’ lies in pure reason alone.5 The second category – matters of facts – are derived from experiencing how the world operates. For example, it might seem obvious that fire burns, but this is only known through experience and Hume claims that our knowledge in this area consists of observing how the world is and then generalising from experience. This is referred to as induction. These two distinct areas of thought make up the two ‘prongs’ of what has become known as ‘Hume’s fork’. ‘Hume’s fork’ suggests that human understanding is limited to the two distinct areas outlined: relations of ideas – discovered through reason and logic alone – and matters of facts which we gleam from observing the world and experiencing how it operates. Hume argues the implications are far reaching: ‘If we take in our hand any volume – of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance – let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning about quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experiential reasoning about matters of fact and existence? No. Then throw it in the fire, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.’ In other words, for Hume sentences are only meaningful if they are either true by definition (‘relations of ideas’) or verifiable as matters of fact. Sentences that involve neither are not only ‘illusions’ but are meaningless. This idea laid the foundations of logical positivism. 5 Triangles (to borrow an earlier example) would also fall into this category. We do not have to observe every triangle in the world to make the generalisation that they have three sides. Triangles have three sides by definition and we can work out their properties using reason alone. [- 4 -] Critics of logical positivism counter that the verification principle does not satisfy its own criterion of meaningfulness. If one accepts it, then one has to say that a statement is only factual and meaningful if some sense experience or observation statement counts in its favour. But what sense experience or observation statement can count in favour of the claim that a statement is only factual and meaningful if some sense experience or observation statement makes it count in its favour? Cultural relativism Protagoras (485-415 BCE) is reported as claiming that ‘man is the measure of all things’: all knowledge is relative to the person seeking it; reality exists only in relation to our own feelings and convictions such that no person is in a position to call another mistaken. Customs of behaviour are local and relative such that behaviour abhorrent to one culture may be considered acceptable elsewhere. This observation has led some to argue that there are no objective moral truths. The customs of different societies are all that exist, and these customs cannot be termed ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ for that would imply an objective standard of right and wrong. This idea is sometimes called cultural relativism (or metaethical relativism). It asserts there is no such thing as universal truth when it comes to questions of morality; there are only various cultural moral codes such that (i) X’s moral code is merely one of many with no special status and (ii) two conflicting moral judgements may be equally correct. As Hans Kelsen (1881- 1973) notes: ‘What according to one system of morality is good may, under another system of morality, be bad…This means that the values which consist in conformity or non- conformity with an existing moral…order are relative values.’ The force of cultural relativism stems from the observation that different cultures hold different moral beliefs. However, it is easy to overstate the argument. For example, almost every moral system contains a version of the so-called golden rule: ‘Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself’ – Confucius. ‘Avoid doing what you would blame others for doing’ – Thales. ‘Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful’ – Buddha. ‘Do to others what you would have them do to you’ – Jesus. ‘Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ – Kant. The golden rule can be articulated in different ways. One version might be termed the positive variant of the rule since it tells us what to do (‘Do to others…’). The other version, what might be termed the negative variant, tells us what not to do (‘Avoid doing…’). The negative version can be understood as a form of harm-minimization; so long as X does not treat other people badly, X can act as he likes. In contrast, the positive version rules out the harmful behaviours covered by the negative variant but goes further by insisting on a form of welfare maximization – X needs to treat others well and not just avoid doing them harm. Whether this distinction amounts to anything important is a moot point; indeed, it could be argued that the golden rule is in fact a meta rule, i.e. a rule about rules. According to this argument, the golden rule asserts that X cannot have one rule for himself and another rule for y. Consistency demands that X follows the same rule(s) as he expects others to follow; however, the golden rule is silent on the content of those rules. This point is discussed in greater detail in Lecture 6 (deontology). Leaving this argument to one side, what seems clear [- 5 -] is that notwithstanding the broad spectrum of moral opinions there appears to be some consensus when it comes to the golden rule. David Hume (1711-1776) Hume famously argued, ‘In all the Sciences, our Mind, from the known Relations, investigates the unknown: But in all Decisions of Taste or external Beauty, the whole Relations are before- hand obvious to the Eye, and we thence proceed to feel a Sentiment of Complacency or Disgust, according to the Nature of the Object, and Disposition of our Organs. Euclid has fully explain'd all the Qualities of the Circle; but has not, in any Proposition, said a Word of its Beauty. The Reason is evident. The Beauty is not a Quality of the Circle. It lies not in any Part of the Line, whose Parts are all equally distant from a common Center. It is only the Effect, which that Figure operates upon the Mind, whose peculiar Fabric or Structure renders it susceptible of such Sentiments. In vain, would you look for it in the Circle, or seek it, either by your Senses or by mathematical Reasonings, in all the Properties of that Figure…’ In this passage, Hume rejects the idea that beauty is an independent measurable quality that exists objectively in the world. Instead, our experience of an object as beautiful arises from a certain emotional response, pleasure or delight, triggered by the object. Put another way, beauty exists merely in the mind that contemplates it and what we find beautiful depends on our subjective feelings and emotions. Similarly, Hume argues that moral judgments are based on human sentiment or emotion, and not objective facts.6 Vice and virtue are not qualities inherent in actions themselves but are projections of the feelings they inspire in us. Thus, when we call an action ‘good’ or ‘bad’, we are merely expressing our positive or negative emotional reaction to that action, not identifying some moral property inherent to the action itself. What then is the object of morality? Hume was sceptical about the extent of our concern for others; he wrote, ‘In general, it may be affirmed, that there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, of services or of relation to ourself. It is true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours: but this proceeds merely from sympathy, and is no proof of such a universal affection to mankind.’ Hume argued there would be no need for the rules of justice if humans were overwhelmingly benevolent and if nature could supply everything we could want. Thus, the making and keeping of promises, for example, makes possible mutually beneficial cooperation between people whose motives are actually entirely selfish: ‘Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. It is profitable for us both that I should labour with you today, and that you should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account, in expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then, I leave you to labour alone; you treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security’. 6 ‘[S]ince morals have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov’d, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.’ [- 6 -] While Hume believed morality to be subjective, he acknowledged that there is often a degree of consensus among people about what is moral.7 Many people tend to agree on certain moral principles or actions (such as helping others or condemning cruelty) because human beings generally respond in similar emotional ways to these actions. Indeed, Hume concedes there is almost universal agreement concerning the merit of temperance, sobriety and considerateness. What is it about these qualities which generates our praise? Hume argues these qualities are useful: ‘…if usefulness…be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with reference to self; it follows, that everything which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and goodwill. Here is a principle which accounts in great part for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural?’ Hume speaks of three fundamental laws of nature: ‘that of the stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises’. He notes, ‘on the strict observance of those three laws that the peace and security of human society entirely depend…Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society’. Hume’s theory was developed by Adam Smith (1723-1790). In his The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith notes, ‘How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it…That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it.’ For Smith, empathy is the ultimate basis of ethics; morality is nothing more than our natural ability to put ourselves in the position of another and so be motivated to respond. This is not an intellectual endeavour; it is an emotional response that generates a motive for altruism. In his The Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith defends the view that society is best preserved both socially and economically by self-interest; this argument is explored in Lecture 4. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) Hobbes espouses ethical egoism; this asserts that questions of moral right are to be understood in terms of what advances an agent’s egoistic interests given that humans can only be motivated by the desire to advance their own interests. According to this view, the rightness or wrongness of conduct turns on the question of whether the action is or is not in one’s interests. To illustrate this point, Hobbes employs the notions of the social contract and the state of nature. Hobbes argues that in the state of nature – a hypothetical condition where there is no government, laws, or social order – humans are driven by self-preservation and self-interest. In this chaotic state, there are no objective moral rules; the only law is survival. Hobbes argues that the state of nature leads to bellum omnium contra omnes8, where life is ‘nasty, brutish, and short.’ In such a state, everyone's self-interest would ultimately be threatened because in a lawless world others could harm at will. Hobbes argues that to escape the state of nature, individuals, motivated by self-interest, would come to realise that it is in their best interest to form a social contract that lays the 7 A similar parallel can be made in relation to beauty. Whilst Hume believes beauty to be subjective, he accepts there can be widespread agreement about certain objects or artworks being beautiful because human beings have similar senses and emotions. 8 ‘The war of all against all’. [- 7 -] foundations for a system of rules and obligations. In this contract, people agree to surrender certain freedoms (such as the unlimited freedom to do whatever one likes) in exchange for the protection of their lives and property by an authority or sovereign. Hobbes acknowledges that one could only afford to obey these rules if there was some guarantee that others would act in a similar fashion. Therefore, central to the contract is an agreement that provides a system of enforcement such that each party has a double reason for complying with the social contract: fear of punishment for violating the agreement and the expectation of benefits from keeping it given that it is in one’s long-term self-interest to adhere to the rules of the contract. Hobbes therefore advances certain moral principles as a solution to the problem of natural competition and distrust, e.g. to keep agreements, to show gratitude in return for benefits, to pardon past offences of those who repent and give assurance of not repeating their offences, to refrain from backward-looking, retributive punishment, etc. Hobbes speaks of basic moral rules which are unchangeable because the essential outlines of the human predicament do not change, i.e. humans will always seek to preserve their lives and avoid harm; in the absence of a common power, humans will always be in a state of potential conflict, where violence and insecurity dominate and therefore, the rational response to this situation – seeking peace, forming agreements, and living under a common authority – will always remain the same. Similar arguments are advanced by Bernard de Mandeville (1670-1733). In his Fable of the Bees, Mandeville argues virtue and public good are in fact based on egoism and selfishness not on benevolence and public feeling; indeed, Mandeville claims that society can be conceived as founded on the fact that everyone seeks his own interest. John Kennedy School of Law [- 8 -]