Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy PDF

RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-1 and correction. This revision renders the French edition specially...

RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-1 and correction. This revision renders the French edition specially valuable. Where it seems desirable an alternative reading from the French is given in square brackets. Meditations On First Philosophy —Elizabeth S. Haldane TO THE MOST WISE AND ILLUSTRIOUS THE DEAN AND DOCTORS OF THE SACRED René Descartes FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN PARIS. 1641 The motive which induces me to present to you this Treatise is so Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996. This file is of the 1911 excellent, and, when you become acquainted with its design, I am edition of The Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge convinced that you will also have so excellent a motive for taking it University Press), translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane. under your protection, that I feel that I cannot do better, in order to render it in some sort acceptable to you, than in a few words to state what I have set myself to do. Prefatory Note To The Meditations. I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by The first edition of the Meditations was published in Latin by Michael philosophical rather than theological argument. For although it is quite Soly of Paris “at the Sign of the Phoenix” in 1641 cum Privilegio et enough for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the Approbatione Doctorum. The Royal “privilege” was indeed given, but human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it the “approbation” seems to have been of a most indefinite kind. The certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any reason of the book being published in France and not in Holland, where religion, indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to Descartes was living in a charming country house at Endegeest near begin with, we prove these two facts by means of the natural reason. Leiden, was apparently his fear that the Dutch ministers might in some And inasmuch as often in this life greater rewards are offered for vice way lay hold of it. His friend, Pere Mersenne, took charge of its than for virtue, few people would prefer the right to the useful, were publication in Paris and wrote to him about any difficulties that they restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another occurred in the course of its progress through the press. The second life; and although it is absolutely true that we must believe that there is edition was however published at Amsterdam in 1642 by Louis Elzevir, a God, because we are so taught in the Holy Scriptures, and, on the and this edition was accompanied by the now completed “Objections other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scriptures because they come and Replies.”1 The edition from which the present translation is made is from God (the reason of this is, that, faith being a gift of God, He who the second just mentioned, and is that adopted by MM. Adam and gives the grace to cause us to believe other things can likewise give it to Tannery as the more correct, for reasons that they state in detail in the cause us to believe that He exists), we nevertheless could not place this preface to their edition. The work was translated into French by the argument before infidels, who might accuse us of reasoning in a circle. Duc de Luynes in 1642 and Descartes considered the translation so And, in truth, I have noticed that you, along with all the theologians, did excellent that he had it published some years later. Clerselier, to not only affirm that the existence of God may be proved by the natural complete matters, had the “Objections” also published in French with reason, but also that it may be inferred from the Holy Scriptures, that the “Replies,” and this, like the other, was subject to Descartes’ revision knowledge about Him is much clearer than that which we have of many created things, and, as a matter of fact, is so easy to acquire, that those 1 Published separately.  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-2 who have it not are culpable in their ignorance. This indeed appears make trial of it in the present matter. from the Wisdom of Solomon, chapter xiii., where it is said “How be it Now all that I could accomplish in the matter is contained in this they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that Treatise. Not that I have here drawn together all the different reasons they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather which might be brought forward to serve as proofs of this subject: for find out the Lord thereof?” and in Romans, chapter i., it is said that that never seemed to be necessary excepting when there was no one they are “without excuse”; and again in the same place, by these words single proof that was certain. But I have treated the first and principal “that which may be known of God is manifest in them,” it seems as ones in such a manner that I can venture to bring them forward as very through we were shown that all that which can be known of God may evident and very certain demonstrations. And more than that, I will say be made manifest by means which are not derived from anywhere but that these proofs are such that I do not think that there is any way open from ourselves, and from the simple consideration of the nature of our to the human mind by which it can ever succeed in discovering better. minds. Hence I thought it not beside my purpose to inquire how this is For the importance of the subject, and the glory of God to which all this so, and how God may be more easily and certainly known than the relates, constrain me to speak here somewhat more freely of myself than things of the world. is my habit. Nevertheless, whatever certainty and evidence I find in my And as regards the soul, although many have considered that it is reasons, I cannot persuade myself that all the world is capable of not easy to know its nature, and some have even dared to say that understanding them. Still, just as in Geometry there are many human reasons have convinced us that it would perish with the body, demonstrations that have been left to us by Archimedes, by Apollonius, and that faith alone could believe the contrary, nevertheless, inasmuch by Pappus, and others, which are accepted by everyone as perfectly as the Lateran Council held under Leo X (in the eighth session) certain and evident (because they clearly contain nothing which, condemns these tenets, and as Leo expressly ordains Christian considered by itself, is not very easy to understand, and as all through philosophers to refute their arguments and to employ all their powers in that which follows has an exact connection with, and dependence on making known the truth, I have ventured in this treatise to undertake the that which precedes), nevertheless, because they are somewhat lengthy, same task. and demand a mind wholly devoted tot heir consideration, they are only More than that, I am aware that the principal reason which causes taken in and understood by a very limited number of persons. many impious persons not to desire to believe that there is a God, and Similarly, although I judge that those of which I here make use are that the human soul is distinct from the body, is that they declare that equal to, or even surpass in certainty and evidence, the demonstrations hitherto no one has been able to demonstrate these two facts; and of Geometry, I yet apprehend that they cannot be adequately understood although I am not of their opinion but, on the contrary, hold that the by many, both because they are also a little lengthy and dependent the greater part of the reasons which have been brought forward concerning one on the other, and principally because they demand a mind wholly these two questions by so many great men are, when they are rightly free of prejudices, and one which can be easily detached from the understood, equal to so many demonstrations, and that it is almost affairs of the senses. And, truth to say, there are not so many in the impossible to invent new ones, it is yet in my opinion the case that world who are fitted for metaphysical speculations as there are for those nothing more useful can be accomplished in philosophy than once for of Geometry. And more than that; there is still this difference, that in all to seek with care for the best of these reasons, and to set them forth Geometry, since each one is persuaded that nothing must be advanced in so clear and exact a manner, that it will henceforth be evident to of which there is not a certain demonstration, those who are not entirely everybody that they are veritable demonstrations. And, finally, adepts more frequently err in approving what is false, in order to give inasmuch as it was desired that I should undertake this task by many the impression that they understand it, than in refuting the true. But the who were aware that I had cultivated a certain Method for the case is different in philosophy where everyone believes that all is resolution of difficulties of every kind in the Sciences—a method which problematical, and few give themselves to the search after truth; and the it is true is not novel, since there is nothing more ancient than the truth, greater number, in their desire to acquire a reputation for boldness of but of which they were aware that I had made use successfully enough in other matters of difficulty—I have thought that it was my duty also to 2  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-3 thought, arrogantly combat the most important of truths2. disorders produced by the doubt of them]4. But it would not become That is why, whatever force there may be in my reasonings, seeing me to say more in consideration of the cause of God and religion to they belong to philosophy, I cannot hope that they will have much those who have always been the most worthy supports of the Catholic effect on the minds of men, unless you extend to them your protection. Church. But the estimation in which your Company is universally held is so great, and the name of SORBONNE carries with it so much authority, that, next to the Sacred Councils, never has such deference been paid to the Preface to the Reader. judgment of any Body, not only in what concerns the faith, but also in what regards human philosophy as well: everyone indeed believes that I have already slightly touched on these two questions of God and the it is not possible to discover elsewhere more perspicacity and solidity, human soul in the Discourse on the Method of rightly conducting the or more integrity and wisdom in pronouncing judgment. For this reason Reason and seeking truth in the Sciences, published in French in the I have no doubt that if you deign to take the trouble in the first place of year 1637. Not that I had the design of treating these with any correcting this work (for being conscious not only of my infirmity, but thoroughness, but only so to speak in passing, and in order to ascertain also of my ignorance, I should not dare to state that it was free from by the judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on. For errors), and then, after adding to it these things that are lacking to it, these questions have always appeared to me to be of such importance completing those which are imperfect, and yourselves taking the trouble that I judged it suitable to speak of them more than once; and the road to give a more ample explanation of those things which have need of it, which I follow in the explanation of them is so little trodden, and so far or at least making me aware of the defects so that I may apply myself to removed from the ordinary path, that I did not judge it to be expedient remedy them;3 when this is done and when finally the reasonings by to set it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be which I prove that there is a God, and that the human soul differs from read by everyone, in case the feebler minds should believe that it was the body, shall be carried to that point of perspicuity to which I am sure permitted to them to attempt to follow the same path. they can be carried in order that they may be esteemed as perfectly But, having in this Discourse on Method begged all those who have exact demonstrations, if you deign to authorize your approbation and to found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to do me the render public testimony to their truth and certainty, I do not doubt, I favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it, nothing worthy of say, that henceforward all the errors and false opinions which have ever remark has been objected to in them beyond two matters: to these two I existed regarding these two questions will soon be effaced from the wish here to reply in a few words before undertaking their more minds of men. For the truth itself will easily cause all men of mind and detailed discussion. learning to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause The first objection is that it does not follow from the fact that the the atheists, who are usually more arrogant than learned or judicious, to human mind reflecting on itself does not perceive itself to be other than rid themselves of their spirit of contradiction or lead them possibly a thing that thinks, that its nature or its essence consists only in its being themselves to defend the reasonings which they find being received as a thing that thinks, in the sense that this word only excludes all other demonstrations by all persons of consideration, lest they appear not to things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature of the soul. understand them. And, finally, all others will easily yield to such a To this objection I reply that it was not my intention in that place to mass of evidence, and there will be none who dares to doubt the exclude these in accordance with the order that looks to the truth of the existence of God and the real and true distinction between the human matter (as to which I was not then dealing), but only in accordance with soul and the body. It is for you now in your singular wisdom to judge the order of my thought [perception]; thus my meaning was that so far of the importance of the establishment of such beliefs [you who see the as I was aware, I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my essence, excepting that I was a thing that thinks, or a thing that has in itself the 2 The French version is followed here. 4 When it is thought desirable to insert additional readings from the French 3 The French version is followed here. version this will be indicated by the use of square brackets.  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-4 faculty of thinking. But I shall show hereafter how from the fact that I seriously with me, and who can detach their minds from affairs of know no other thing which pertains to my essence, it follows that there sense, and deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice. I is no other thing which really does belong to it. know too well that such men exist in a very small number. But for The second objection is that it does not follow from the fact that I those who, without caring to comprehend the order and connections of have in myself the idea of something more perfect than I am, that this my reasonings, form their criticisms on detached portions arbitrarily idea is more perfect than I, and much less that what is represented by selected, as is the custom with many, these, I say, will not obtain much this idea exists. But I reply that in this term idea there is here profit from reading this Treatise. And although they perhaps in several something equivocal, for it may either be taken materially, as an act of parts find occasion of cavilling, they can for all their pains make no my understanding, and in this sense it cannot be said that it is more objection which is urgent or deserving of reply. perfect than I; or it may be taken objectively, as the thing which is And inasmuch as I make no promise to others to satisfy them at represented by this act, which, although we do not suppose it to exist once, and as I do not presume so much on my own powers as to believe outside of my understanding, may, none the less, be more perfect than I, myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause difficulty to anyone, I because of its essence. And in following out this Treatise I shall show shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by more fully how, from the sole fact that I have in myself the idea of a which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident thing more perfect than myself, it follows that this thing truly exists. knowledge of the truth, in order to see if, by the same reasons which In addition to these two objections I have also seen two fairly persuaded me, I can also persuade others. And, after that, I shall reply lengthy works on this subject, which, however, did not so much impugn to the objections which have been made to me by persons of genius and my reasonings as my conclusions, and this by arguments drawn from learning to whom I have sent my Meditations for examination, before the ordinary atheistic sources. But, because such arguments cannot submitting them to the press. For they have made so many objections make any impression on the minds of those who really understand my and these so different, that I venture to promise that it will be difficult reasonings, and as the judgments of many are so feeble and irrational for anyone to bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have that they very often allow themselves to be persuaded by the opinions not been already touched upon. This is why I beg those who read these which they have first formed, however false and far removed from Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they have given reason they may be, rather than by a true and solid but subsequently themselves the trouble to read all the objections as well as the replies received refutation of these opinions, I do not desire to reply here to which I have made to them.5 their criticisms in case of being first of all obliged to state them. I shall only say in general that all that is said by the atheist against the existence of God, always depends either on the fact that we ascribe to Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations. God affections which are human, or that we attribute so much strength and wisdom to our minds that we even have the presumption to desire In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which we may, to determine and understand that which God can and ought to do. In generally speaking, doubt about all things and especially about material this way all that they allege will cause us no difficulty, provided only things, at least so long as we have no other foundations for the sciences we remember that we must consider our minds as things which are than those which we have hitherto possessed. But although the utility finite and limited, and God as a Being who is incomprehensible and of a Doubt which is so general does not at first appear, it is at the same infinite. time very great, inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of prejudice, Now that I have once for all recognized and acknowledged the and sets out for us a very simple way by which the mind may detach opinions of men, I at once begin to treat of God and the Human soul, 5 Between the Praefatio ad Lectorem and the Synopsis, the Paris Edition (1st and at the same time to treat of the whole of the First Philosophy, Edition) interpolates an Index which is not found in the Amsterdam Edition without however expecting any praise from the vulgar and without the (2nd Edition). Since Descartes did not reproduce it, he was doubtless not hope that my book will have many readers. On the contrary, I should its author. Mersenne probably composed it himself, adjusting it to the never advise anyone to read it excepting those who desire to meditate paging of the first Edition. (Note in Adam and Tannery’s Edition.) 4  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-5 itself from the senses; and finally it makes it impossible for us ever to after death, as also because the premises from which the immortality of doubt those things which we have once discovered to be true. the soul may be deduced depend on an elucidation of a complete system In the second Meditation, mind, which making use of the liberty of Physics. This would mean to establish in the first place that all which pertains to it, takes for granted that all those things of whose substances generally—that is to say all things which cannot exist existence it has the least doubt, are non-existent, recognizes that it is without being created by God—are in their nature incorruptible, and however absolutely impossible that it does not itself exist. This point is that they can never cease to exist unless God, in denying to them his likewise of the greatest moment, inasmuch as by this means a concurrence, reduce them to nought; and secondly that body, regarded distinction is easily drawn between the things which pertain to mind— generally, is a substance, which is the reason why it also cannot perish, that is to say to the intellectual nature—and those which pertain to but that the human body, inasmuch as it differs from other bodies, is body. composed only of a certain configuration of members and of other But because it may be that some expect from me in this place a similar accidents, while the human mind is not similarly composed of statement of the reasons establishing the immortality of the soul, I feel any accidents, but is a pure substance. For although all the accidents of that I should here make known to them that having aimed at writing mind be changed, although, for instance, it think certain things, will nothing in all this Treatise of which I do not possess very exact others, perceive others, etc., despite all this it does not emerge from demonstrations, I am obliged to follow a similar order to that made use these changes another mind: the human body on the other hand of by the geometers, which is to begin by putting forward as premises becomes a different thing from the sole fact that the figure or form of all those things upon which the proposition that we seek depends, any of its portions is found to be changed. From this it follows that the before coming to any conclusion regarding it. Now the first and human body may indeed easily enough perish, but the mind [or soul of principal matter which is requisite for thoroughly understanding the man (I make no distinction between them)] is owing to its nature immortality of the soul is to form the clearest possible conception of it, immortal. and one which will be entirely distinct from all the conceptions which In the third Meditation it seems to me that I have explained at we may have of body; and in this Meditation this has been done. In sufficient length the principal argument of which I make use in order to addition to this it is requisite that we may be assured that all the things prove the existence of God. But none the less, because I did not wish in which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in that place to make use of any comparisons derived from corporeal which we think them; and this could not be proved previously to the things, so as to withdraw as much as I could the minds of readers from Fourth Mediation. Further we must have a distinct conception of the senses, there may perhaps have remained many obscurities which, corporeal nature, which is given partly in this Second, and partly in the however, will, I hope, be entirely removed by the Replies which I have Fifth and Sixth Meditations. And finally we should conclude from all made to the Objections which have been set before me. Amongst this, that those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as being others there is, for example, this one, “How the idea in us of a being diverse substances, as we regard mind and body to be, are really supremely perfect possesses so much objective reality [that is to say substances essentially distinct one from the other; and this is the participates by representation in so many degrees of being and conclusion of the Sixth Meditation. This is further confirmed in this perfection] that it necessarily proceeds from a cause which is absolutely same Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting perfect.” This is illustrated in these Replies by the comparison of a in so far as it is divisible, while the mind cannot be conceived of very perfect machine, the idea of which is found in the mind of some excepting as indivisible. For we are not able to conceive of the half of a workman. For as the objective contrivance of this idea must have some mind as we can do of the smallest of all bodies; so that we see that not cause, i.e. either the science of the workman or that of some other from only are their natures different but even in some respects contrary to whom he has received the idea, it is similarly impossible that the idea of one another. I have not however dealt further with this matter in this God which is in us should not have God himself as its cause. treatise, both because what I have said is sufficient to show clearly In the fourth Meditation it is shown that all these things which we enough that the extinction of the mind does not follow from the very clearly and distinctly perceive are true, and at the same time it is corruption of the body, and also to give men the hope of another life explained in what the nature of error or falsity consists. This must of  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-6 necessity be known both for the confirmation of the preceding truths and for the better comprehension of those that follow. (But it must meanwhile be remarked that I do not in any way there treat of sin--that MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY is to say, of the error which is committed in the pursuit of good and IN WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF GOD evil, but only of that which arises in the deciding between the true and the false. And I do not intend to speak of matters pertaining to the Faith AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MIND or the conduct of life, but only of those which concern speculative AND BODY ARE DEMONSTRATED.8 truths, and which may be known by the sole aid of the light of nature.) In the fifth Meditation corporeal nature generally is explained, and in addition to this the existence of God is demonstrated by a new proof Meditation I. Of the things which may be brought within the sphere in which there may possibly be certain difficulties also, but the solution of the doubtful. of these will be seen in the Replies to the Objections. And further I show in what sense it is true to say that the certainty of geometrical It is now some years since I detected how many were the false demonstrations is itself dependent on the knowledge of God. beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as true, and how Finally in the Sixth I distinguish the action of the understanding6 doubtful was everything I had since constructed on this basis; and from from that of the imagination;7 the marks by which this distinction is that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to made are described. I here show that the mind of man is really distinct rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and from the body, and at the same time that the two are so closely joined commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish together that they form, so to speak, a single thing. All the errors which any firm and permanent structure in the sciences. But as this enterprise proceed from the senses are then surveyed, while the means of avoiding appeared to be a very great one, I waited until I had attained an age so them are demonstrated, and finally all the reasons from which we may mature that I could not hope that at any later date I should be better deduce the existence of material things are set forth. Not that I judge fitted to execute my design. This reason caused me to delay so long them to be very useful in establishing that which they prove, to wit, that that I should feel that I was doing wrong were I to occupy in there is in truth a world, that men possess bodies, and other such things deliberation the time that yet remains to me for action. To-day, then, which never have been doubted by anyone of sense; but because in since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered my considering these closely we come to see that they are neither so strong mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no passions] and nor so evident as those arguments which lead us to the knowledge of since I have procured for myself an assured leisure in a peaceable our mind and of God; so that these last must be the most certain and retirement, I shall at last seriously and freely address myself to the most evident facts which can fall within the cognizance of the human general upheaval of all my former opinions. mind. And this is the whole matter that I have tried to prove in these Now for this object it is not necessary that I should show that all of Meditations, for which reason I here omit to speak of many other these are false—I shall perhaps never arrive at this end. But inasmuch questions which I dealt incidentally in this discussion. as reason already persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to me manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole. And for that end it will not be requisite that I should examine each in particular, which would be an endless undertaking; for owing to the fact that the destruction of the foundations 8 In place of this long title at the head of the page the first Edition had 6 intellectio. immediately after the Synopsis, and on the same page 7, simply “First 7 imaginatio. Meditation.” (Adam’s Edition.) 6  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-7 of necessity brings with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice, I shall e.g. that we open our eyes, shake our head, extend our hands, and so on, only in the first place attack those principles upon which all my former are but false delusions; and let us reflect that possibly neither our hands opinions rested. nor our whole body are such as they appear to us to be. At the same All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and time we must at least confess that the things which are represented to us certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses; but in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is formed as the counterparts of something real and true, and that in this wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been way those general things at least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole deceived. body, are not imaginary things, but things really existent. For, as a But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us matter of fact, painters, even when they study with the greatest skill to concerning things which are hardly perceptible, or very far away, there represent sirens and satyrs by forms the most strange and extraordinary, are yet many others to be met with as to which we cannot reasonably cannot give them natures which are entirely new, but merely make a have any doubt, although we recognize them by their means. For certain medley of the members of different animals; or if their example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a imagination is extravagant enough to invent something so novel that dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and other similar matters. nothing similar has ever before been seen, and that then their work And how could I deny that these hands and this body are mine, were it represents a thing purely fictitious and absolutely false, it is certain all not perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, the same that the colours of which this is composed are necessarily whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of real. And for the same reason, although these general things, to wit, [a black bile, that they constantly assure us that they think they are kings body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are when they are really quite poor, or that they are clothed in purple when bound at the same time to confess that there are at least some other they are really without covering, or who imagine that they have an objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true; earthenware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are made of glass. and of these just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these But they are mad, and I should not be any the less insane were I to images of things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or follow examples so extravagant. false and fantastic, are formed. At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, and consequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams its extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magnitude representing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable and number, as also the place in which they are, the time which things, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How measures their duration, and so on. often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found That is possibly why our reasoning is not unjust when we conclude myself in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the from this that Physics, Astronomy, Medicine and all other sciences fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed! At this moment it which have as their end the consideration of composite things, are very does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I am looking at dubious and uncertain; but that Arithmetic, Geometry and other this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are what happens in sleep does not appear so clear nor so distinct as does actually existent or not, contain some measure of certainty and an all this. But in thinking over this I remind myself that on many element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and in three together always form five, and the square can never have more dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness apparent can be suspected of any falsity [or uncertainty]. from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such Nevertheless I have long had fixed in my mind the belief that an that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now dream. all-powerful God existed by whom I have been created such as I am. Now let us assume that we are asleep and that all these particulars, But how do I know that He has not brought it to pass that there is no  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-8 earth, no heaven, no extended body, no magnitude, no place, and that pretend that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary, until at nevertheless [I possess the perceptions of all these things and that] they last, having thus balanced my former prejudices with my latter [so that seem to me to exist just exactly as I now see them? And, besides, as I they cannot divert my opinions more to one side than to the other], my sometimes imagine that others deceive themselves in the things which judgment will no longer be dominated by bad usage or turned away they think they know best, how do I know that I am not deceived every from the right knowledge of the truth. For I am assured that there can time that I add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge of be neither peril nor error in this course, and that I cannot at present things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined? But possibly yield too much to distrust, since I am not considering the question of God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be action, but only of knowledge. supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have I shall then suppose, not that God who is supremely good and the made me such that I constantly deceive myself, it would also appear to fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful, be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be sometimes deceived, has employed his whole energies in deceiving me; I shall consider that and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this. the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external There may indeed be those who would prefer to deny the existence things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has of a God so powerful, rather than believe that all other things are availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider uncertain. But let us not oppose them for the present, and grant that all myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, that is here said of a God is a fable; nevertheless in whatever way they yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things; I shall remain suppose that I have arrived at the state of being that I have reached— obstinately attached to this idea, and if by this means it is not in my whether they attribute it to fate or to accident, or make out that it is by a power to arrive at the knowledge of any truth, I may at least do what is continual succession of antecedents, or by some other method—since to in my power [i.e. suspend my judgment], and with firm purpose avoid err and deceive oneself is a defect, it is clear that the greater will be the giving credence to any false thing, or being imposed upon by this arch probability of my being so imperfect as to deceive myself ever, as is the deceiver, however powerful and deceptive he may be. But this task is a Author to whom they assign my origin the less powerful. To these laborious one, and insensibly a certain lassitude leads me into the reasons I have certainly nothing to reply, but at the end I feel course of my ordinary life. And just as a captive who in sleep enjoys an constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly imaginary liberty, when he begins to suspect that his liberty is but a believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that dream, fears to awaken, and conspires with these agreeable illusions not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons that the deception may be prolonged, so insensibly of my own accord I which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I fall back into my former opinions, and I dread awakening from this ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these slumber, lest the laborious wakefulness which would follow the opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at tranquillity of this repose should have to be spent not in daylight, but in any certainty [in the sciences]. the excessive darkness of the difficulties which have just been But it is not sufficient to have made these remarks, we must also be discussed. careful to keep them in mind. For these ancient and commonly held opinions still revert frequently to my mind, long and familiar custom having given them the right to occupy my mind against my inclination Meditation II Of the Nature of the Human Mind; and that it is more and rendered them almost masters of my belief; nor will I ever lose the easily known than the Body. habit of deferring to them or of placing my confidence in them, so long as I consider them as they really are, i.e. opinions in some measure The Meditation of yesterday filled my mind with so many doubts doubtful, as I have just shown, and at the same time highly probable, so that it is no longer in my power to forget them. And yet I do not see in that there is much more reason to believe in than to deny them. That is what manner I can resolve them; and, just as if I had all of a sudden why I consider that I shall not be acting amiss, if, taking of set purpose fallen into very deep water, I am so disconcerted that I can neither make a contrary belief, I allow myself to be deceived, and for a certain time 8  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-9 certain of setting my feet on the bottom, nor can I swim and so support that I am; and hence I must be careful to see that I do not imprudently myself on the surface. I shall nevertheless make an effort and follow take some other object in place of myself, and thus that I do not go anew the same path as that on which I yesterday entered, i.e. I shall astray in respect of this knowledge that I hold to be the most certain and proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be most evident of all that I have formerly learned. That is why I shall supposed to exist, just as if I had discovered that it was absolutely false; now consider anew what I believed myself to be before I embarked and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something upon these last reflections; and of my former opinions I shall withdraw which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned all that might even in a small degree be invalidated by the reasons for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain. Archimedes, which I have just brought forward, in order that there may be nothing at in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place, and all left beyond what is absolutely certain and indubitable. transport it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed What then did I formerly believe myself to be? Undoubtedly I and immoveable; in the same way I shall have the right to conceive high believed myself to be a man. But what is a man? Shall I say a hopes if I am happy enough to discover one thing only which is certain reasonable animal? Certainly not; for then I should have to inquire and indubitable. what an animal is, and what is reasonable; and thus from a single I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade question I should insensibly fall into an infinitude of others more myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory difficult; and I should not wish to waste the little time and leisure represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that remaining to me in trying to unravel subtleties like these. But I shall body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my rather stop here to consider the thoughts which of themselves spring up mind. What, then, can be esteemed as true? Perhaps nothing at all, in my mind, and which were not inspired by anything beyond my own unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain. nature alone when I applied myself to the consideration of my being. In But how can I know there is not something different from those the first place, then, I considered myself as having a face, hands, arms, things that I have just considered, of which one cannot have the and all that system of members composed on bones and flesh as seen in slightest doubt? Is there not some God, or some other being by a corpse which I designated by the name of body. In addition to this I whatever name we call it, who puts these reflections into my mind? considered that I was nourished, that I walked, that I felt, and that I That is not necessary, for is it not possible that I am capable of thought, and I referred all these actions to the soul: but I did not stop to producing them myself? I myself, am I not at least something? But I consider what the soul was, or if I did stop, I imagined that it was have already denied that I had senses and body. Yet I hesitate, for what something extremely rare and subtle like a wind, a flame, or an ether, follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and senses that I cannot which was spread throughout my grosser parts. As to body I had no exist without these? But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all manner of doubt about its nature, but thought I had a very clear the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, knowledge of it; and if I had desired to explain it according to the nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? notions that I had then formed of it, I should have described it thus: By Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of the body I understand all that which can be defined by a certain figure: something [or merely because I thought of something]. But there is something which can be confined in a certain place, and which can fill a some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever given space in such a way that every other body will be excluded from employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also it; which can be perceived either by touch, or by sight, or by hearing, or if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can by taste, or by smell: which can be moved in many ways not, in truth, never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So by itself, but by something which is foreign to it, by which it is touched that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we [and from which it receives impressions]: for to have the power of self- must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, movement, as also of feeling or of thinking, I did not consider to is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally appertain to the nature of body: on the contrary, I was rather astonished conceive it. to find that faculties similar to them existed in some bodies. But I do not yet know clearly enough what I am, I who am certain But what am I, now that I suppose that there is a certain genius  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-10 which is extremely powerful, and, if I may say so, malicious, who corporeal thing. But I already know for certain that I am, and that it employs all his powers in deceiving me? Can I affirm that I possess the may be that all these images, and, speaking generally, all things that least of all those things which I have just said pertain to the nature of relate to the nature of body are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. For body? I pause to consider, I revolve all these things in my mind, and I this reason I see clearly that I have as little reason to say, “I shall find none of which I can say that it pertains to me. It would be tedious stimulate my imagination in order to know more distinctly what I am,” to stop to enumerate them. Let us pass to the attributes of soul and see than if I were to say, “I am now awake, and I perceive somewhat that is if there is any one which is in me? What of nutrition or walking [the real and true: but because I do not yet perceive it distinctly enough, I first mentioned]? But if it is so that I have no body it is also true that I shall go to sleep of express purpose, so that my dreams may represent can neither walk nor take nourishment. Another attribute is sensation. the perception with greatest truth and evidence.” And, thus, I know for But one cannot feel without body, and besides I have thought I certain that nothing of all that I can understand by means of my perceived many things during sleep that I recognized in my waking imagination belongs to this knowledge which I have of myself, and that moments as not having been experienced at all. What of thinking? I it is necessary to recall the mind from this mode of thought with the find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot utmost diligence in order that it may be able to know its own nature be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? with perfect distinctness. Just when I think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist. I do not now thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, admit anything which is not necessarily true: to speak accurately I am denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or a soul, or an Certainly it is no small matter if all these things pertain to my understanding, or a reason, which are terms whose significance was nature. But why should they not so pertain? Am I not that being who formerly unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing and really exist; now doubts nearly everything, who nevertheless understands certain but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks. things, who affirms that one only is true, who denies all the others, who And what more? I shall exercise my imagination [in order to see if desires to know more, is averse from being deceived, who imagines I am not something more]. I am not a collection of members which we many things, sometimes indeed despite his will, and who perceives call the human body: I am not a subtle air distributed through these many likewise, as by the intervention of the bodily organs? Is there members, I am not a wind, a fire, a vapour, a breath, nor anything at all nothing in all this which is as true as it is certain that I exist, even which I can imagine or conceive; because I have assumed that all these though I should always sleep and though he who has given me being were nothing. Without changing that supposition I find that I only employed all his ingenuity in deceiving me? Is there likewise any one leave myself certain of the fact that I am somewhat. But perhaps it is of these attributes which can be distinguished from my thought, or true that these same things which I supposed were non-existent because which might be said to be separated from myself? For it is so evident they are unknown to me, are really not different from the self which I of itself that it is I who doubts, who understands, and who desires, that know. I am not sure about this, I shall not dispute about it now; I can there is no reason here to add anything to explain it. And I have only give judgment on things that are known to me. I know that I exist, certainly the power of imagining likewise; for although it may happen and I inquire what I am, I whom I know to exist. But it is very certain (as I formerly supposed) that none of the things which I imagine are that the knowledge of my existence taken in its precise significance true, nevertheless this power of imagining does not cease to be really in does not depend on things whose existence is not yet known to me; use, and it forms part of my thought. Finally, I am the same who feels, consequently it does not depend on those which I can feign in that is to say, who perceives certain things, as by the organs of sense, imagination. And indeed the very term feign in imagination9 proves to since in truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said that me my error, for I really do this if I image myself a something, since to these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so; still it imagine is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That cannot be false; properly speaking it is 9 Or “form an image” (effingo). 10  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-11 what is in me called feeling;10 and used in this precise sense that is no particular whiteness, nor that figure, nor that sound, but simply a body other thing than thinking. which a little while before appeared to me as perceptible under these From this time I begin to know what I am with a little more forms, and which is now perceptible under others. But what, precisely, clearness and distinction than before; but nevertheless it still seems to is it that I imagine when I form such conceptions? Let us attentively me, and I cannot prevent myself from thinking, that corporeal things, consider this, and, abstracting from all that does not belong to the wax, whose images are framed by thought, which are tested by the senses, are let us see what remains. Certainly nothing remains excepting a certain much more distinctly known than that obscure part of me which does extended thing which is flexible and movable. But what is the meaning not come under the imagination. Although really it is very strange to of flexible and movable? Is it not that I imagine that this piece of wax say that I know and understand more distinctly these things whose being round is capable of becoming square and of passing from a existence seems to me dubious, which are unknown to me, and which square to a triangular figure? No, certainly it is not that, since I imagine do not belong to me, than others of the truth of which I am convinced, it admits of an infinitude of similar changes, and I nevertheless do not which are known to me and which pertain to my real nature, in a word, know how to compass the infinitude by my imagination, and than myself. But I see clearly how the case stands: my mind loves to consequently this conception which I have of the wax is not brought wander, and cannot yet suffer itself to be retained within the just limits about by the faculty of imagination. What now is this extension? Is it of truth. Very good, let us once more give it the freest rein, so that, not also unknown? For it becomes greater when the wax is melted, when afterwards we seize the proper occasion for pulling up, it may the greater when it is boiled, and greater still when the heat increases; and I more easily be regulated and controlled. should not conceive [clearly] according to truth what wax is, if I did not Let us begin by considering the commonest matters, those which think that even this piece that we are considering is capable of receiving we believe to be the most distinctly comprehended, to wit, the bodies more variations in extension than I have ever imagined. We must then which we touch and see; not indeed bodies in general, for these general grant that I could not even understand through the imagination what this ideas are usually a little more confused, but let us consider one body in piece of wax is, and that it is my mind11 alone which perceives it. I say particular. Let us take, for example, this piece of wax: it has been this piece of wax in particular, for as to wax in general it is yet clearer. taken quite freshly from the hive, and it has not yet lost the sweetness of But what is this piece of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the honey which it contains; it still retains somewhat of the odour of the the [understanding or] mind? It is certainly the same that I see, touch, flowers from which it has been culled; its colour, its figure, its size are imagine, and finally it is the same which I have always believed it to be apparent; it is hard, cold, easily handled, and if you strike it with the from the beginning. But what must particularly be observed is that its finger, it will emit a sound. Finally all the things which are requisite to perception is neither an act of vision, nor of touch, nor of imagination, cause us distinctly to recognize a body, are met with in it. But notice and has never been such although it may have appeared formerly to be that while I speak and approach the fire what remained of the taste is so, but only an intuition12 of the mind, which may be imperfect and exhaled, the smell evaporates, the colour alters, the figure is destroyed, confused as it was formerly, or clear and distinct as it is at present, the size increases, it becomes liquid, it heats, scarcely can one handle it, according as my attention is more or less directed to the elements which and when one strikes it, no sound is emitted. Does the same wax are found in it, and of which it is composed. remain after this change? We must confess that it remains; none would Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I consider [the judge otherwise. What then did I know so distinctly in this piece of great feebleness of mind] and its proneness to fall [insensibly] into wax? It could certainly be nothing of all that the senses brought to my error; for although without giving expression to my thought I consider notice, since all these things which fall under taste, smell, sight, touch, all this in my own mind, words often impede me and I am almost and hearing, are found to be changed, and yet the same wax remains. deceived by the terms of ordinary language. For we say that we see the Perhaps it was what I now think, viz. that this wax was not that same wax, if it is present, and not that we simply judge that it is the sweetness of honey, nor that agreeable scent of flowers, nor that 11 entendement F., mens L. 10 Sentire. 12 inspectio.  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-12 same from its having the same colour and figure. From this I should what I have here remarked of wax may be applied to all other things conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision and not simply by the which are external to me [and which are met with outside of me]. And intuition of the mind; unless by chance I remember that, when looking further, if the [notion or] perception of wax has seemed to me clearer from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do and more distinct, not only after the sight or the touch, but also after not see them, but infer that what I see is men, just as I say that I see many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me, with how wax. And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which much more [evidence] and distinctness must it be said that I now know may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge these to be men. And myself, since all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax, similarly solely by the faculty of judgment which rests in my mind, I or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of the nature of my comprehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes. mind! And there are so many other things in the mind itself which may A man who makes it his aim to raise his knowledge above the contribute to the elucidation of its nature, that those which depend on common should be ashamed to derive the occasion for doubting from body such as these just mentioned, hardly merit being taken into the forms of speech invented by the vulgar; I prefer to pass on and account. consider whether I had a more evident and perfect conception of what But finally here I am, having insensibly reverted to the point I the wax was when I first perceived it, and when I believed I knew it by desired, for, since it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not means of the external senses or at least by the common sense 13 as it is properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, called, that is to say by the imaginative faculty, or whether my present but by the understanding only, and since they are not known from the conception is clearer now that I have most carefully examined what it fact that they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood, is, and in what way it can be known. It would certainly be absurd to I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than doubt as to this. For what was there in this first perception which was my mind. But because it is difficult to rid oneself so promptly of an distinct? What was there which might not as well have been perceived opinion to which one was accustomed for so long, it will be well that I by any of the animals? But when I distinguish the wax from its external should halt a little at this point, so that by the length of my meditation I forms, and when, just as if I had taken from it its vestments, I consider may more deeply imprint on my memory this new knowledge. it quite naked, it is certain that although some error may still be found in my judgment, I can nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind. Meditation III. Of God: that He exists. But finally what shall I say of this mind, that is, of myself, for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything but mind? What then, I I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall call away all my who seem to perceive this piece of wax so distinctly, do I not know senses, I shall efface even from my thoughts all the images of corporeal myself, not only with much more truth and certainty, but also with much things, or at least (for that is hardly possible) I shall esteem them as more distinctness and clearness? For if I judge that the wax is or exists vain and false; and thus holding converse only with myself and from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that I considering my own nature, I shall try little by little to reach a better am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself. I am a what I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a with which to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or (for I no few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, longer take account of the distinction) when I think I see, that I myself that desires, that also imagines and perceives; for as I remarked before, who think am nought. So if I judge that the wax exists from the fact although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at that I touch it, the same thing will follow, to wit, that I am; and if I all apart from me and in themselves, I am nevertheless assured that judge that my imagination, or some other cause, whatever it is, these modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations, persuades me that the wax exists, I shall still conclude the same. And inasmuch only as they are modes of thought, certainly reside [and are met with] in me. 13 sensus communis. And in the little that I have just said, I think I have summed up all 12  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-13 that I really know, or at least all that hitherto I was aware that I knew. evidence. And, on the other hand, always when I direct my attention to In order to try to extend my knowledge further, I shall now look around things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am so more carefully and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as other things which I have not hitherto perceived. I am certain that I am these: Let who will deceive me, He can never cause me to be nothing a thing which thinks; but do I not then likewise know what is requisite while I think that I am, or some day cause it to be true to say that I have to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledge there never been, it being true now to say that I am, or that two and three is nothing that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I see a manifest perception of that which I state, which would not indeed suffice to contradiction. And, certainly, since I have no reason to believe that assure me that what I say is true, if it could ever happen that a thing there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied myself which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false; and that there is a God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on this accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical. But in order that all things which I perceive14 very clearly and very distinctly are to be able altogether to remove it, I must inquire whether there is a God true. as soon as the occasion presents itself; and if I find that there is a God, I At the same time I have before received and admitted many things must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for without a to be very certain and manifest, which yet I afterwards recognized as knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of being dubious. What then were these things? They were the earth, sky, anything. stars and all other objects which I apprehended by means of the senses. And in order that I may have an opportunity of inquiring into this in But what did I clearly [and distinctly] perceive in them? Nothing more an orderly way [without interrupting the order of meditation which I than that the ideas or thoughts of these things were presented to my have proposed to myself, and which is little by little to pass from the mind. And not even now do I deny that these ideas are met with in me. notions which I find first of all in my mind to those which I shall later But there was yet another thing which I affirmed, and which, owing to on discover in it] it is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts the habit which I had formed of believing it, I thought I perceived very into certain kinds, and that I should consider in which of these kinds clearly, although in truth I did not perceive it at all, to wit, that there there is, properly speaking, truth or error to be found. Of my thoughts were objects outside of me from which these ideas proceeded, and to some are, so to speak, images of the things, and to these alone is the which they were entirely similar. And it was in this that I erred, or, if title “idea” properly applied; examples are my thought of a man or of a perchance my judgment was correct, this was not due to any knowledge chimera, of heaven, of an angel, or [even] of God. But other thoughts arising from my perception. possess other forms as well. For example in willing, fearing, But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of approving, denying, though I always perceive something as the subject arithmetic or geometry into consideration, e.g. that two and three of the action of my mind,15 yet by this action I always add something together made five, and other things of the sort, were not these present else to the idea16 which I have of that thing; and of the thoughts of this to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true? kind some are called volitions or affections, and others judgments. Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature they cannot properly speaking be false; for whether I imagine a goat or that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one that the other. We me most manifest. But every time that this preconceived opinion of the must not fear likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections, sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am for although I may desire evil things, or even things that never existed, constrained to confess that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best 15 The French version is followed here as being more explicit. In it “action de mon esprit” replaces “mea cogitatio.” 14 Percipio, F. nous concevons. 16 In the Latin version “similitudinem.”  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-14 it is not the less true that I desire them. Thus there remains no more from falsehood, which can teach me that what this light shows me to be than the judgments which we make, in which I must take the greatest true is not really true, and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy. care not to deceive myself. But the principal error and the commonest But as far as [apparently] natural impulses are concerned, I have which we may meet with in them, consists in my judging that the ideas frequently remarked, when I had to make active choice between virtue which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are and vice, that they often enough led me to the part that was worse; and outside me; for without doubt if I considered the ideas only as certain this is why I do not see any reason for following them in what regards modes of my thoughts, without trying to relate them to anything truth and error. beyond, they could scarcely give me material for error. And as to the other reason, which is that these ideas must proceed But among these ideas, some appear to me to be innate, some from objects outside me, since they do not depend on my will, I do not adventitious, and others to be formed [or invented] by myself; for, as I find it any the more convincing. For just as these impulses of which I have the power of understanding what is called a thing, or a truth, or a have spoken are found in me, notwithstanding that they do not always thought, it appears to me that I hold this power from no other source concur with my will, so perhaps there is in me some faculty fitted to than my own nature. But if I now hear some sound, if I see the sun, or produce these ideas without the assistance of any external things, even feel heat, I have hitherto judged that these sensations proceeded from though it is not yet known by me; just as, apparently, they have hitherto certain things that exist outside of me; and finally it appears to me that always been found in me during sleep without the aid of any external sirens, hippogryphs, and the like, are formed out of my own mind. But objects. again I may possibly persuade myself that all these ideas are of the And finally, though they did proceed from objects different from nature of those which I term adventitious, or else that they are all myself, it is not a necessary consequence that they should resemble innate, or all fictitious: for I have not yet clearly discovered their true these. On the contrary, I have noticed that in many cases there was a origin. great difference between the object and its idea. I find, for example, And my principal task in this place is to consider, in respect to two completely diverse ideas of the sun in my mind; the one derives its those ideas which appear to me to proceed from certain objects that are origin from the senses, and should be placed in the category of outside me, what are the reasons which cause me to think them similar adventitious ideas; according to this idea the sun seems to be extremely to these objects. It seems indeed in the first place that I am taught this small; but the other is derived from astronomical reasonings, i.e. is lesson by nature; and, secondly, I experience in myself that these ideas elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else it is formed do not depend on my will nor therefore on myself—for they often by me in some other manner; in accordance with it the sun appears to be present themselves to my mind in spite of my will. Just now, for several times greater than the earth. These two ideas cannot, indeed, instance, whether I will or whether I do not will, I feel heat, and thus I both resemble the same sun, and reason makes me believe that the one persuade myself that this feeling, or at least this idea of heat, is which seems to have originated directly from the sun itself, is the one produced in me by something which is different from me, i.e. by the which is most dissimilar to it. heat of the fire near which I sit. And nothing seems to me more All this causes me to believe that until the present time it has not obvious than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather than been by a judgment that was certain [or premeditated], but only by a anything else upon me. sort of blind impulse that I believed that things existed outside of, and Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently strong different from me, which, by the organs of my senses, or by some other and convincing. When I say that I am so instructed by nature, I merely method whatever it might be, conveyed these ideas or images to me mean a certain spontaneous inclination which impels me to believe in [and imprinted on me their similitudes]. this connection, and not a natural light which makes me recognize that But there is yet another method of inquiring whether any of the it is true. But these two things are very different; for I cannot doubt that objects of which I have ideas within me exist outside of me. If ideas are which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for example, only taken as certain modes of thought, I recognize amongst them no it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt, or other facts of the difference or inequality, and all appear to proceed from me in the same same kind. And I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth manner; but when we consider them as images, one representing one 14  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-15 thing and the other another, it is clear that they are very different one derived from nought; but however imperfect may be this mode of being from the other. There is no doubt that those which represent to me by which a thing is objectively [or by representation] in the substances are something more, and contain so to speak more objective understanding by its idea, we cannot certainly say that this mode of reality within them [that is to say, by representation participate in a being is nothing, nor consequently, that the idea derives its origin from higher degree of being or perfection] than those that simply represent nothing. modes or accidents; and that idea again by which I understand a Nor must I imagine that, since the reality that I consider in these supreme God, eternal, infinite, [immutable], omniscient, omnipotent, ideas is only objective, it is not essential that this reality should be and Creator of all things which are outside of Himself, has certainly formally in the causes of my ideas, but that it is sufficient that it should more objective reality in itself than those ideas by which finite be found objectively. For just as this mode of objective existence substances are represented. pertains to ideas by their proper nature, so does the mode of formal Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as existence pertain to the causes of those ideas (this is at least true of the much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. For, pray, first and principal) by the nature peculiar to them. And although it may whence can the effect derive its reality, if not from its cause? And in be the case that one idea gives birth to another idea, that cannot what way can this cause communicate this reality to it, unless it continue to be so indefinitely; for in the end we must reach an idea possessed it in itself? And from this it follows, not only that something whose cause shall be so to speak an archetype, in which the whole cannot proceed from nothing, but likewise that what is more perfect— reality [or perfection] which is so to speak objectively [or by that is to say, which has more reality within itself—cannot proceed from representation] in these ideas is contained formally [and really]. Thus the less perfect. And this is not only evidently true of those effects the light of nature causes me to know clearly that the ideas in me are which possess actual or formal reality, but also of the ideas in which we like [pictures or] images which can, in truth, easily fall short of the consider merely what is termed objective reality. To take an example, perfection of the objects from which they have been derived, but which the stone which has not yet existed not only cannot now commence to can never contain anything greater or more perfect. be unless it has been produced by something which possesses within And the longer and the more carefully that I investigate these itself, either formally or eminently, all that enters into the composition matters, the more clearly and distinctly do I recognize their truth. But of the stone [i.e. it must possess the same things or other more excellent what am I to conclude from it all in the end? It is this, that if the things than those which exist in the stone] and heat can only be objective reality of any one of my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to produced in a subject in which it did not previously exist by a cause that make me recognize that it is not in me either formally or eminently, and is of an order [degree or kind] at least as perfect as heat, and so in all that consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it, it follows of other cases. But further, the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in necessity that I am not alone in the world, but that there is another being me unless it has been placed within me by some cause which possesses which exists, or which is the cause of this idea. On the other hand, had within it at least as much reality as that which I conceive to exist in the no such an idea existed in me, I should have had no sufficient argument heat or the stone. For although this cause does not transmit anything of to convince me of the existence of any being beyond myself; for I have its actual or formal reality to my idea, we must not for that reason made very careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time imagine that it is necessarily a less real cause; we must remember that have been able to find no other ground. [since every idea is a work of the mind] its nature is such that it But of my ideas, beyond that which represents me to myself, as to demands of itself no other formal reality than that which it borrows which there can here be no difficulty, there is another which represents from my thought, of which it is only a mode [i.e. a manner or way of a God, and there are others representing corporeal and inanimate things, thinking]. But in order that an idea should contain some one certain others angels, others animals, and others again which represent to me objective reality rather than another, it must without doubt derive it men similar to myself. from some cause in which there is at least as much formal reality as this As regards the ideas which represent to me other men or animals, idea contains of objective reality. For if we imagine that something is or angels, I can however easily conceive that they might be formed by found in an idea which is not found in the cause, it must then have been an admixture of the other ideas which I have of myself, of corporeal  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-16 things, and of God, even although there were apart from me neither men number, and such like. For [even] when I think that a stone is a nor animals, nor angels, in all the world. substance, or at least a thing capable of existing of itself, and that I am a And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects, I do not recognize substance also, although I conceive that I am a thing that thinks and not in them anything so great or so excellent that they might not have one that is extended, and that the stone on the other hand is an extended possibly proceeded from myself; for if I consider them more closely, thing which does not think, and that thus there is a notable difference and examine them individually, as I yesterday examined the idea of between the two conceptions—they seem, nevertheless, to agree in this, wax, I find that there is very little in them which I perceive clearly and that both represent substances. In the same way, when I perceive that I distinctly. Magnitude or extension in length, breadth, or depth, I do so now exist and further recollect that I have in former times existed, and perceive; also figure which results from a termination of this extension, when I remember that I have various thoughts of which I can recognize the situation which bodies of different figure preserve in relation to one the number, I acquire ideas of duration and number which I can another, and movement or change of situation; to which we may also afterwards transfer to any object that I please. But as to all the other add substance, duration and number. As to other things such as light, qualities of which the ideas of corporeal things are composed, to wit, colours, sounds, scents, tastes, heat, cold and the other tactile qualities, extension, figure, situation and motion, it is true that they are not they are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion that I do formally in me, since I am only a thing that thinks; but because they are not even know if they are true or false, i.e. whether the ideas which I merely certain modes of substance [and so to speak the vestments under form of these qualities are actually the ideas of real objects or not [or which corporeal substance appears to us] and because I myself am also whether they only represent chimeras which cannot exist in fact]. For a substance, it would seem that they might be contained in me although I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that falsity, eminently. properly speaking, or formal falsity, can be met with, a certain material Hence there remains only the idea of God, concerning which we falsity may nevertheless be found in ideas, i.e. when these ideas must consider whether it is something which cannot have proceeded represent what is nothing as though it were something. For example, from me myself. By the name God I understand a substance that is the ideas which I have of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinct infinite [eternal, immutable], independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, that by their means I cannot tell whether cold is merely a privation of and by which I myself and everything else, if anything else does exist, heat, or heat a privation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or have been created. Now all these characteristics are such that the more are not such. And inasmuch as [since ideas resemble images] there diligently I attend to them, the less do they appear capable of cannot be any ideas which do not appear to represent some things, if it proceeding from me alone; hence, from what has been already said, we is correct to say that cold is merely a privation of heat, the idea which must conclude that God necessarily exists. represents it to me as something real and positive will not be For although the idea of substance is within me owing to the fact improperly termed false, and the same holds good of other similar that I am substance, nevertheless I should not have the idea of an ideas. infinite substance—since I am finite—if it had not proceeded from To these it is certainly not necessary that I should attribute any some substance which was veritably infinite. author other than myself. For if they are false, i.e. if they represent Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite by a true things which do not exist, the light of nature shows me that they issue idea, but only by the negation of the finite, just as I perceive repose and from nought, that is to say, that they are only in me so far as something darkness by the negation of movement and of light; for, on the contrary, is lacking to the perfection of my nature. But if they are true, I see that there is manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to me that I cannot finite, and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the even clearly distinguish the thing represented from non-being, I do not infinite earlier then the finite—to wit, the notion of God before that of see any reason why they should not be produced by myself. myself. For how would it be possible that I should know that I doubt As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of corporeal things, and desire, that is to say, that something is lacking to me, and that I am some of them seem as though I might have derived them from the idea not quite perfect, unless I had within me some idea of a Being more which I possess of myself, as those which I have of substance, duration, perfect than myself, in comparison with which I should recognize the 16  RENE DESCARTES MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1-17 deficiencies of my nature? [but in whom all is present really and actually]; for it is an infallible And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps materially false token of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases little by little. and that consequently I can derive it from nought [i.e. that possibly it and further, although my knowledge grows more and more, exists in me because I am imperfect], as I have just said is the case with nevertheless I do not for that reason believe that it can ever be actually ideas of heat, cold and other such things; for, on the contrary, as this infinite, since it can never reach a point so high that it will be unable to idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective attain to any greater increase. But I understand God to be actually reality than any other, there can be none which is of itself more true, nor infinite, so that He can add nothing to His supreme perfection. And any in which there can be less suspicion of falsehood. The idea, I say, finally I perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot be produced of this Being who is absolutely perfect and infinite, is entirely true; for by a being that exists potentially only, which properly speaking is although, perhaps, we can imagine that such a Being does not exist, we nothing, but only by a being which is formal or actual. cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents nothing real to me, To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I have just said which by as I have said of the idea of cold. This idea is also very clear and the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desires to think distinct; since all that I conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and attentively on the subject; but when I slightly relax my attention, my the true, and of what conveys some perfection, is in its entirety mind, finding its vision somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by contained in this idea. And this does not ceas