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AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100...

AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 SECTION III EMERGENCY PROCEDURES TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page Introduction........................................................................................ 3-3 Critical Action (US Air Force)....................................................................... 3-3 Critical Action (US Navy).......................................................................... 3-3 Noncritical Action................................................................................ 3-3 Definitions...................................................................................... 3-3 Crew Coordination................................................................................ 3-3 Resetting a Circuit Breaker......................................................................... 3-3 Ground Emergencies................................................................................. 3-3 Abort Start Procedure.............................................................................. 3-3 Motoring Run Procedure........................................................................... 3-4 Fire Warning on Ground........................................................................... 3-4 Emergency Engine Shutdown on the Ground........................................................... 3-4 Emergency Ground Egress.......................................................................... 3-4 Takeoff Emergencies................................................................................ 3-5 Abort........................................................................................... 3-5 Barrier Engagement............................................................................... 3-5 Aircraft Departs Prepared Surface.................................................................... 3-7 Tire Failure During Takeoff......................................................................... 3-7 Engine Failure Immediately After Takeoff (Sufficient Runway Remaining Straight Ahead)...................... 3-7 In-Flight Emergencies................................................................................ 3-7 Engine Failure During Flight........................................................................ 3-7 Airstart......................................................................................... 3-9 PMU NORM Airstart.............................................................................. 3-9 PMU OFF Airstart............................................................................... 3-15 Immediate Airstart (PMU NORM).................................................................. 3-16 3-1 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 Uncommanded Power Changes/Loss of Power/Uncommanded Propeller Feather.............................. 3-17 Compressor Stalls................................................................................ 3-19 Inadvertent Departure from Controlled Flight.......................................................... 3-19 Fire in Flight.................................................................................... 3-20 Smoke and Fume Elimination/Electrical Fire........................................................... 3-20 PMU Failure.................................................................................... 3-21 PMU Fault..................................................................................... 3-22 Chip Detector Warning............................................................................ 3-22 Oil System Malfunction or Low Oil Pressure.......................................................... 3-22 Electrical Failures................................................................................ 3-23 Avionics Failures................................................................................ 3-26 Fuel System Failures.............................................................................. 3-29 Hydraulic System Malfunctions..................................................................... 3-31 Rudder System Malfunction........................................................................ 3-31 Controllability Check (Structural Damage/Flight Control Malfunction)...................................... 3-33 OBOGS Fail Annunciator..................................................................... 3-34 OBOGS Fail Annunciator..................................................................... 3-34 OBOGS Failure/Overtemp/Physiological Symptoms................................................ 3-35 OXY CRIT Annunciator...................................................................... 3-36 BOS Fail Annunciator........................................................................ 3-37 Physiological Symptoms...................................................................... 3-37 Environmental Systems Duct Overtemp.............................................................. 3-38 Defog Valve Fails to Close in Flight................................................................. 3-38 Trim System Malfunctions......................................................................... 3-38 Flight With Shattered/Damaged Canopy.............................................................. 3-39 Canopy Unlocked................................................................................ 3-39 Cockpit Overpressurization........................................................................ 3-39 Rapid Decompression/Cockpit Pressure Altitude Exceeds 18,000 Feet.................................. 3-39 Rapid Decompression/Cockpit Pressure Altitude Exceeds 18,000 Feet.................................. 3-40 Cockpit Fails to Pressurize......................................................................... 3-40 Ejection.......................................................................................... 3-40 Controlled Ejection............................................................................... 3-41 Eject.......................................................................................... 3-45 Use of Terrain Clearance Charts..................................................................... 3-45 Post Ejection Procedures (USAF Only)............................................................... 3-45 Post Ejection Procedures (US Navy Only)............................................................. 3-47 Life Raft Operation (US Navy Only)............................................................. 3-48 Rescue (US Navy Only)....................................................................... 3-49 Landing Emergencies............................................................................... 3-49 Emergency Landing Pattern........................................................................ 3-49 Forced Landing.................................................................................. 3-49 Landing on Unprepared Surface..................................................................... 3-53 Ditching....................................................................................... 3-53 Precautionary Emergency Landing (PEL)............................................................. 3-53 Wing Flap Failure................................................................................ 3-54 Landing Gear Malfunction......................................................................... 3-54 Landing with Unsafe Gear Indications................................................................ 3-56 Landing Gear Emergency Extension................................................................. 3-56 Landing with Blown Main Tire..................................................................... 3-57 Landing without Brakes........................................................................... 3-57 Landing with Cocked Nose Wheel................................................................... 3-58 Miscellaneous Emergencies.......................................................................... 3-58 PMU OFF Ground Start........................................................................... 3-58 Annunciator Cause and Reference Table.............................................................. 3-59 Critical Action Table............................................................................. 3-59 3-2  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 INTRODUCTION Suitable Landing Area This section contains procedures to be followed in the event A suitable landing area is a hard surface runway, taxiway, or of an emergency. These procedures will ensure maximum under/overrun. Landing on an unprepared surface or ditching safety for the crew and/or aircraft until a safe landing or other is not recommended. appropriate action is accomplished. Although the procedures contained herein are considered the best available, pilots CREW COORDINATION must exercise sound judgment when confronted with an Essential steps or items which are to be checked in both emergency. cockpits, if occupied, are indicated by (BOTH) following the When an airborne emergency occurs, three basic rules apply. step. These rules should be thoroughly understood by all pilots: Maintain aircraft control. RESETTING A CIRCUIT BREAKER Analyze the situation and take proper action. The term “reset” is used to describe the action of resetting a Land as soon as conditions permit. circuit breaker that is already open. The pilot should assess the severity of the emergency, equipment lost, and the bene- fits gained prior to resetting or opening any circuit breaker. CRITICAL ACTION (US AIR FORCE) If the mission can be continued or the aircraft safely recov- Procedures appearing in CAPITAL BOLD FACE LET- ered without the affected equipment, the circuit breaker TERS are considered CRITICAL action. CRITICAL actions should not be reset. are items that must be performed immediately if the emer- gency is not to be aggravated, and injury or damage are to be avoided. These CRITICAL steps will be committed to mem- ory. If any circuit breaker is found open consult with maintenance before flight. CRITICAL ACTION (US NAVY) GROUND EMERGENCIES Items indicated with an asterisk (*) are memory items that may result in serious injury or death and/or damage to ABORT START PROCEDURE equipment if not carefully and expeditiously executed. These items shall be completed without reference to the checklist. In the AUTO start mode, if a no start is detected or if a hung Time permitting, review/complete the procedures utilizing or hot start is projected, the PMU should terminate the start the pocket checklist to ensure completeness. sequence. However, the engine start should be aborted man- ually in the following situations: NONCRITICAL ACTION ITT rate of increase appears likely to exceed 1000 °C (hot start) Those actions which contribute to an orderly sequence of events, improve the chances for emergency action to be suc- cessful, and serve as “clean-up” items. ITT appears likely to remain between 871-1000 °C for >5 seconds DEFINITIONS Normal N increase is halted (hung start) 1 No rise of ITT is evident within 10 seconds after fuel flow indications (no start) Land As Soon As Possible An emergency shall be declared and a landing accomplished BAT BUS annunciator illuminates during the start sequence at the nearest suitable landing area considering the severity of the emergency, weather conditions, field facilities, ambi- PCL is moved or the ST READY annunciator extin- guishes during the start sequence ent lighting, and command guidance. Land As Soon As Practical NOTE Emergency conditions are less urgent and, although the mis- Note and report to maintenance the degree sion is to be terminated, the degree of the emergency is such and duration of any overtemperature. that an immediate landing may not be necessary. * 1. PCL - OFF; or STARTER switch - AUTO/RESET 3-3 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 NOTE If start is initiated with PCL in the OFF posi- tion, abort by reselecting AUTO/RESET on STARTER switch is not spring-loaded from the STARTER switch. If start is initiated with MANUAL to NORM. PCL out of the OFF position, but not past the IDLE gate, abort by placing the PCL to OFF NOTE or reselecting AUTO/RESET on the Observe starter duty cycle cool-down period. STARTER switch. If the PCL is past the 5. STARTER switch - NORM IDLE gate, abort by placing the PCL to OFF. 2. Perform Motoring Run Procedure FIRE WARNING ON GROUND The primary indications of an engine fire are illumination of the FIRE and MASTER WARN annunciators. Other indica- Ifaborted a start using external power is either by the PMU, or manually aborted for tions of an engine fire are visual smoke or fire, engine indi- cations (high ITT, fluctuating or high fuel flow), and a hot, hung, or no start, do not attempt subse- notification from exterior sources such as ground crew, quent starts. tower, or another aircrew. When evidence of a fire exists during start or other ground operations, perform the Emer- Repeated PMU aborted start attempts are indicative of engine malfunction. gency Engine Shutdown On The Ground procedure and Emergency Ground Egress procedure if applicable. NOTE EMERGENCY ENGINE SHUTDOWN ON THE During ground starts, certain parameters (weak battery, high OAT, high pre-start ITT, GROUND In the event of an engine fire, prop strike, or chip light; if the high density altitude, tailwind) may cause the aircraft appears likely to depart the prepared surface; or PMU to abort a battery start attempt. Though should any other serious ground emergency occur, accom- these parameters are not directly monitored plish the following: by the PMU, they cause a rate of rise in N1 * 1. PCL - OFF and/or ITT that are indicative of an impend- ing hung or hot start. * 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL Ifabort), a battery start was aborted (PMU or manual connect external power (if available) * 3. Emergency ground egress - As required EMERGENCY GROUND EGRESS and perform Motoring Run Procedure. Sub- sequent starts may be attempted if no engine malfunctions are evident and no limits have NOTE been exceeded. In a situation requiring immediate ground egress, the ejection system has the capability MOTORING RUN PROCEDURE for 0/0 ejection. Perform this procedure after any aborted start (auto or man- If emergency egress is required on the ground (Figure 3-1), ual) during which fuel was introduced. Motor the engine to perform the following steps after the aircraft has come to a clear residual fuel and/or lower the ITT. complete stop and the engine has been shut down: 1. PCL - OFF * 1. ISS mode selector - SOLO 2. IGNITION switch - NORM 3. Propeller area - Clear 4. STARTER switch - MANUAL for 20 seconds Failure to ensure that the ISS mode selector is set to SOLO may result in the inadvertent ejection of one or both seats. * 2. Seat safety pin - Install (BOTH) 3-4  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 * 8. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF * 9. Evacuate aircraft Failure to insert both ejection seat safety pins (if occupied) before ground egress may result TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES in inadvertent activation of ejection sequence There are several factors which affect the pilot’s decision to and subsequent injury or death when per- takeoff or abort. The decision to takeoff or abort should be forming emergency ground egress. based on the following: * 3. PARKING BRAKE - As required * 4. Canopy - Open Runway length and condition, terminal weather condi- tions and area traffic. IF CANOPY CANNOT BE OPENED OR SITUATION Ifanyadequate directional control cannot be maintained or system emergency affecting safety of flight is REQUIRES RIGHT SIDE EGRESS: experienced prior to Max Abort Speed, the takeoff * 5. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH) should be aborted. * 6. CFS handle - ROTATE 90° COUNTERCLOCK- WISE AND PULL (BOTH) ABORT If it becomes necessary to abort the takeoff, concentrate on maintaining aircraft control, specifically directional control, while stopping the aircraft on the remaining runway. To Ifin the canopy fracturing system malfunctions conjunction with a canopy latch failure in abort a takeoff, accomplish the following: * 1. PCL - IDLE the locked position, ejection may be the only option remaining to exit the aircraft. Aircrew * 2. BRAKES - AS REQUIRED shall ensure shoulder straps, lap belt or See Section II for description of maximum braking. lap straps, SSK fittings, and leg restraint garters are still attached prior to pull- ing ejection handle. To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is on and visor is down prior to actuating the CFS After a stop which required maximum effort braking and if overheated brakes are sus- system. pected, do not taxi into or park in a congested Each internal CFS handle activates only the CFS charge for the respective transparency. area until brakes have had sufficient time to cool. Do not set parking brake. Both internal CFS handles must be activated in order to fracture both transparencies (if BARRIER ENGAGEMENT required). Aircrews will not call for a raised barrier in the event of an * 7. Shoulder straps, lap belt or lap straps, aborted takeoff. If a raised barrier is already up, aircrews will SSK fittings, and leg restraint garters - steer around it, to include departing the prepared surface if Release (BOTH) necessary, or ejecting before engagement. Actuate leg restraint line quick-release lever on left side of seat or use individual quick-release connectors on leg restraint garters. Significant aircraft damage can be antici- NOTE pated when engaging a raised web barrier and webbing may preclude normal canopy open- Oxygen hose, emergency oxygen hose, com- ing. munication leads, and anti-G suit hose will pull free while vacating cockpit and leg restraint lines will pull through leg restraint garter D rings if released with quick-release lever. 3-5 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 1. LIFT LOCK RELEASE LEVER 3 2 2. ROTATE HANDLE 3. OPEN CANOPY 1 RIGHT-SIDE EGRESS POSSIBLE WITH USE OF CFS TURN 90 AND PULL IF CANOPY WILL NOT OPEN, ROTATE HANDLE 90 COUNTERCLOCKWISE AND PULL PT03D 972572AB.AI Figure 3-1. Emergency Ground Egress 3-6  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 Do not sacrifice aircraft control while trou- bleshooting or lowering gear with emergency system. If contact with a lowered BAK-15 is immi- * 1. AIRSPEED - 110 KNOTS (MINIMUM) nent, discontinue braking before reaching lowered barrier, then recommence once past * 2. PCL - AS REQUIRED barrier. In the unlikely event that webbing catches on aircraft, there may be unexpected NOTE directional control problems. The pilot should select IDLE to use the increased drag of the not yet feathered pro- AIRCRAFT DEPARTS PREPARED SURFACE peller or select OFF to reduce the sink rate. If it appears likely that the aircraft will depart the prepared * 3. EMER LDG GR HANDLE - PULL surface, execute the Emergency Engine Shutdown On The (AS REQUIRED) Ground procedure. NOTE TIRE FAILURE DURING TAKEOFF With a loss of hydraulic pressure, landing IF THE DECISION IS MADE TO STOP: gear and flaps cannot be lowered by normal means. 1. Abort * 4. Flaps - As required IF TAKEOFF IS CONTINUED: 2. Gear and flaps position - Do not change IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES 3. Straight-in approach - Execute ENGINE FAILURE DURING FLIGHT In the event of an engine failure, a decision to eject, land, or airstart must be made. The altitude at which the engine fails Land on side of runway corresponding to the will determine the time available to perform the following good tire (put drag in the middle). Maintain procedures. directional control using rudder, brakes, and nose wheel steering as required. Initial indications of engine failure/flameout are: loss of power and airspeed; rapid decay in N1, torque, and ITT; and ENGINE FAILURE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TAKEOFF propeller movement towards feather due to loss of oil pres- (SUFFICIENT RUNWAY REMAINING STRAIGHT sure. Depending on airspeed, N1 will indicate 0% within AHEAD) approximately 5 seconds, even though the gas generator core may not have seized. N1 does not indicate speeds below 8%. A complete engine failure immediately after takeoff is an Torque will be indicating 0%. As the propeller moves extremely critical emergency requiring immediate action towards feather, it may still be turning (windmilling), but at and decision making by the pilot. Indications are a total loss a reduced RPM. Secondary indications include rapidly of power and a fairly rapid reduction in airspeed. A positive decreasing ITT and lower-than-normal oil pressure. nose down pitch change will be needed to maintain a safe flying airspeed. If sufficient runway remains, the best option The GEN, FUEL PX, and OIL PX annunciators will illumi- is to continue straight ahead and land. If that is not possible, nate, followed by the OBOGS FAIL annunciator and careful consideration of the recovery situation must be made. the BOS PUSH MAN switch green ON advisory. The PMU An early decision to eject may be the best option. Anticipate FAIL and CKPT ALT annunciators may illuminate. increased brake sensitivity when braking above 80 KIAS. In Sufficient hydraulic pressure may not be available to operate all cases, control the aircraft energy state through prudent the gear and flaps as the engine spools down. Gear and flaps use of altitude, airspeed, and configuration. will remain in the last selected position at the time of engine failure. Gear may indicate unsafe or in transit if operation is attempted at time of engine failure. Ifstraight insufficient runway remains to land ahead, consider immediate ejection. Initial reaction to any malfunction at low altitude should be to trade excess airspeed for altitude. Higher altitude trans- lates directly to additional terrain clearance for ejection, 3-7 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 additional glide range to reach a suitable landing, or addi- altitude gain (C) (693 feet). Therefore, a 2 G zoom from 200 tional time to achieve an airstart. KIAS and 3000 feet with a 0 to +0.5 G pushover to capture 125 KIAS glide airspeed should result in a final altitude of The pilot should zoom to eject if the engine has failed and 3693 feet. there are no suitable landing options and a restart is not war- ranted (insufficient altitude or type of failure precludes EXAMPLE 2 (airspeed 250 KIAS, Figure 3-3): Enter chart restart). The zoom to eject is accomplished by pulling up to with initial conditions of weight, altitude, and airspeed (6200 a 20° climb angle (if able) and ejecting before a sink rate lbs, 6000 feet, and 250 KIAS in the example). Trace verti- develops. Zoom to eject allows the pilot to add 200 feet of cally up from weight (A) and interpolate between the fixed altitude increase above the altitude gain noted in the zoom altitude guidelines to determine the intersection of these val- chart due to not pushing over. If the decision to eject is not ues (B). Trace back to the left hand margin to determine the immediately obvious, follow the zoom to climb procedure. altitude gain (C) (1535 feet). Therefore, a 2 G zoom from 250 KIAS and 6000 feet with a 1 to +0.5 G pushover to cap- If attempting an airstart or positioning to land, the following ture 125 KIAS glide airspeed should result in a final altitude procedures should be followed. Above 150 KIAS, initiate a of 7535 feet. zoom climb using a 2 G pull up to a 20° climb angle until approaching the desired glide airspeed (use approximately Figure 3-4 provides a tabular listing of altitude gains based 20 KIAS lead point) and then initiating a 0 to +0.5 G push- on a variety of conditions at 200 and 250 KIAS. over to capture desired glide airspeed. Below 150 KIAS, the benefits of a zoom climb are negligible. The recommended If a decision is made to land, enter the emergency landing procedure is to perform a constant altitude deceleration to pattern at high key, if possible. If high key entry is not pos- desired glide airspeed. Figure 3-2 shows low altitude zoom sible, it may be possible to intercept the pattern at a lower capability at 200 KIAS and Figure 3-3 shows low altitude altitude. Glide performance will be considerably reduced zoom capability at 250 KIAS. until the propeller is feathered. Figure 3-5 shows maximum glide information. Zoom capability at 200 knots will vary from 600 to 900 feet of altitude gained. Zoom capability at 250 knots will vary NOTE from 1170 to 1550 feet of altitude gained. The lower num- If experiencing uncommanded power bers are for light aircraft at low pressure altitudes and the changes/loss of power/uncommanded propel- higher numbers are for heavier aircraft at higher pressure ler feather or compressor stalls, refer to altitudes. The zoom to eject procedure will gain an additional appropriate procedure. 200 feet of altitude. * 1. ZOOM/GLIDE - 125 KNOTS (MINIMUM) NOTE * 2. PCL - OFF Zoom results with an engine still producing a usable torque (>6%) will be several hundred NOTE to several thousand feet higher in altitude Propeller will not feather unless the PCL is gained. fully in OFF. Each low altitude zoom capability chart depicted in Figure 3-2, Figure 3-3, and Figure * 3. INTERCEPT ELP 3-4 represents a no engine condition. Each chart assumes the pilot will not perform any action prior to actual engine failure. Ifimmediately a suitable landing surface is available, turn to intercept the nearest suitable To use the low altitude zoom charts, proceed as follows. point on the ELP. Any delay could result in EXAMPLE 1 (airspeed 200 KIAS, Figure 3-2): Enter chart insufficient gliding distance to reach a land- with initial conditions of weight, altitude, and airspeed (5800 ing surface. lbs, 3000 feet, and 200 KIAS in the example). Trace verti- cally up from weight (A) and interpolate between the fixed Do not delay decision to eject below 2000 feet AGL. altitude guidelines to determine the intersection of these val- ues (B). Trace back to the left hand margin to determine the * 4. Airstart - Attempt if warranted 3-8  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 the best glide speed of 125 KIAS. Approximately 40 seconds will be required to complete the starting sequence. The higher the altitude, and the slower the airspeed, the warmer Airstart procedure is not recommended the starting ITT peak temperature. As the start progresses, below 2000 feet AGL, as primary attention the pilot’s attention must be focused on fuel flow, ITT and should be to eject or safely recover the air- N1 throughout the starting sequence. After the start is com- craft. plete, the critical step is setting the starter switch to NORM to allow the generator to come online. NOTE Crosscheck N1 against other engine indica- tions to assess condition of engine and deter- mine if an airstart is warranted. At 125 KIAS, Consideration should be given to not attempt- an engine which has flamed out will rotate ing an airstart if on a minimum glide profile below 8% N1 and indicate 0% N1. The engine to an airfield, since repeated airstart attempts oil pressure indicator may display oil pres- will result in excessive altitude loss. sures up to 4 psi with or without the engine seized. The PMU NORM airstart is considered the primary method since it is less sensitive to the rate of PCL movement, and IF CONDITIONS DO NOT WARRANT AN AIRSTART: cooler starts can be expected at lower airspeeds. This proce- * 5. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Pull dure depends upon pilot action to correctly position the PCL and critical switches. * 6. Execute Forced Landing or Eject If the PMU FAIL annunciator is illuminated, a PMU OFF AIRSTART airstart is required. Critical steps during this starting proce- dure include setting the PMU switch to OFF and turning the Three airstart procedures are approved for this aircraft: PMU ignition switch ON. The most critical pilot action during the NORM; PMU OFF; and Immediate Airstart (PMU NORM). start is PCL movement while monitoring fuel flow, ITT and The status of the PMU dictates the type of airstart attempted. N1 acceleration. Advancing the PCL too rapidly during the All airstarts are starter assisted. start causes high ITT and may overtemp the engine. Advanc- Use this procedure if engine failure was not due to fire or ing the PCL too slowly may cause N1 to roll back with mechanical failure. Airstarts may be attempted at any alti- decreasing ITT. tude and airspeed, although airstarts have only been demon- strated at 20,000 feet MSL and below, as depicted in Figure PMU NORM AIRSTART 3-6. The PMU NORM airstart procedure will provide the least If the engine fails during flight at low altitude, an immediate complicated airstart. Refer to PMU OFF airstart if PMU ejection should be considered if sufficient altitude and air- FAIL is annunciated. speed are not available for a successful restart. If excess air- speed is available, exchange airspeed for altitude to allow more time to accomplish the AIRSTART procedures. Restart should be attempted immediately. The first action, Airstart attempts outside of the airstart enve- PCL OFF, is critical. This will feather the propeller, reduce lope may be unsuccessful or result in engine the aircraft drag and increase glide distance. Attempt a PMU overtemperature. Consideration should be NORM airstart if PMU FAIL annunciator is not illuminated. given to ensure airstarts are attempted within The PMU OFF (Manual) airstart is recommended only for the airstart envelope (125-200 KIAS for sea PMU malfunctions, since pilot workload is increased with level to 15,000 feet, or 135-200 KIAS for manually metering fuel with the PCL during the start. If the 15,001-20,000 feet). airstart is successful, useful power will be available after 40 seconds from starter engagement. 1. PCL - OFF In general, trim the aircraft to the desired airspeed and ensure sufficient altitude is available prior to the airstart. The extra drag during airstart attempts will cause a greater descent rate than 1350 to 1500 feet/minute. Approximately 1200 feet of Do not delay ejection while attempting altitude will be lost during an airstart attempt performed at airstart at low altitude if below 2000 feet AGL. 3-9 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS: AIRPLANE: T-6A ENGINE SECURED AND PROPELLER FEATHERED ENGINE: PT6A-68 LANDING GEAR UP, FLAPS UP DATE: JAN 2002 SPEED BRAKE RETRACTED DATA BASIS: FLIGHT TEST/ESTIMATED 20-DEGREE CLIMB MAINTAINED TO 145 KIAS 2 SECOND DELAY BEFORE INITIATING THE ZOOM NOTE THE LOW WEIGHT CONDITION OF 5400 LBS, USED IN THIS CHART, WAS BASED ON THE BASIC WEIGHT OF THE AIRCRAFT + 300 LBS FUEL + 1 PILOT AT 180 LBS. 1000 950 900 PRESSURE ALTITUDE - FEET 850 6000 800 ALTITUDE GAIN (FEET) 750 0 300 700 (B) 0 (C) 150 500 650 600 EXAMPLE 1 550 500 (A) 5400 5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 WEIGHT (LBS) PT00D 022437AA.AI Figure 3-2. Low Altitude Zoom Capability, 200 KIAS 3-10  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS: AIRPLANE: T-6A ENGINE SECURED AND PROPELLER FEATHERED ENGINE: PT6A-68 LANDING GEAR UP, FLAPS UP DATE: JAN 2002 SPEED BRAKE RETRACTED DATA BASIS: FLIGHT TEST/ESTIMATED 20-DEGREE CLIMB MAINTAINED TO 145 KIAS 2 SECOND DELAY BEFORE INITIATING THE ZOOM NOTE THE LOW WEIGHT CONDITION OF 5400 LBS, USED IN THIS CHART, WAS BASED ON THE BASIC WEIGHT OF THE AIRCRAFT + 300 LBS FUEL + 1 PILOT AT 180 LBS. 1800 1700 1600 ALTITUDE GAIN (FEET) PRESSURE ALTITUDE - FEET (B) (C) 6000 1500 1400 3000 1300 1500 500 1200 EXAMPLE 2 1100 1000 (A) 5400 5500 5600 5700 5800 5900 6000 6100 6200 6300 6400 6500 WEIGHT (LBS) PT00D 022438AA.AI Figure 3-3. Low Altitude Zoom Capability, 250 KIAS 3-11 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 AIRSPEED = 200 KIAS WEIGHT ALTITUDE (FEET) ---- 500 1500 3000 6000 5400 595 621 649 794 5500 608 633 660 802 5600 621 646 671 810 5700 634 658 682 818 5800 647 670 693 826 5900 660 683 703 834 6000 673 695 714 842 6100 686 708 725 850 6200 699 720 736 858 6300 712 732 747 866 6400 725 745 757 875 6500 738 757 768 883 AIRSPEED = 250 KIAS WEIGHT ALTITUDE (FEET) ---- 500 1500 3000 6000 5400 1172 1232 1297 1487 5500 1183 1243 1307 1493 5600 1195 1253 1318 1499 5700 1206 1264 1328 1505 5800 1218 1274 1338 1511 5900 1230 1285 1348 1517 6000 1241 1295 1359 1523 6100 1253 1305 1369 1529 6200 1264 1316 1379 1535 6300 1276 1326 1389 1541 6400 1288 1337 1399 1547 6500 1299 1347 1410 1552 Figure 3-4. Zoom Data 3-12  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 MAXIMUM GLIDE DISTANCE ASSOCIATED CONDITIONS: AIRLPANE : T-6A ENGINE : PT6A-68 ENGINE INOPERATIVE DATE : JUNE 1998 AIRSPEED - IAS TABULATED DATE BASIS : FLIGHT TEST CONFIGURATION / DRAG INDEX PROPELLER SETTING GLIDE SPEED~KNOTS SINK RATE~FT/MIN & GLIDE RATIO~NM/1000FT CLEAN / 0 FEATHERED 125 1350 / 2 GEAR DOWN / 20 FEATHERED 105 1500 / 1.5 FLAPS LANDING, GEAR DOWN / 80 FEATHERED 95 1850 / 1.1 CLEAN / 0 WINDMILLING 110 2350 / 1 MAXIMUM TAKE-OFF WEIGHT 6500 PRESSURE ALTITUDE ~ FEET 6000 WEIGHT ~ POUNDS 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 31,000 5000 SL 5500 5000 BASELINE 0 DRAG INDEX 20 40 60 T6A01V03 80 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 MAXIMUM GLIDE DISTANCE ~ NAUTICAL MILES 3-13 Figure 3-5. Maximum Glide AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 25,000 20,000 15,000 ALTITUDE - FEET 10,000 5000 S.L. 100 150 200 250 AIRSPEED - KIAS NOTE AIRSTART NOT RECOMMENDED BELOW 2000 FT AGL PT03D 981070AA.AI Figure 3-6. Airstart Envelope b. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Down 3. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - OFF PCL must be in OFF to feather the propeller, 4. BOOST PUMP switch - ON and ensure proper starter, ignition, boost pump, and PMU operation during airstart. Continuous operation with the BOOST PUMP switch in the ON position will cause Ensure PCL is in OFF; otherwise, fuel may damage to the engine-driven low pressure be prematurely introduced during start. fuel pump. Upon landing, notify maintenance of the duration of flight with BOOST PUMP 2. Confirm the position of the following: switch in the ON position. a. START, IGN, BOOST PUMP, and PMU circuit 5. IGNITION switch - ON breakers (left front console) - In 6. STARTER switch - AUTO/RESET 3-14  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 17. PEL - Execute PMU OFF AIRSTART If N1 does not rise within 5 seconds, discon- tinue the airstart attempt and proceed to IF If the PMU has malfunctioned (PMU FAIL annunciator illu- AIRSTART IS UNSUCCESSFUL due to minated), conduct the airstart with the PMU off. With the suspected mechanical failure. PMU off, the igniters will not automatically activate and 7. PCL - IDLE, above 13% N1 must be selected manually. It is possible to start with the bleed air inflow switch out of OFF and the boost pump switch in ARM. With the bleed air inflow switch in NORM or HI, the starting ITT may be up to Movement of the PCL above IDLE before N1 40 °C warmer than with bleed air inflow OFF. Turning the stabilizes at approximately 67% will cause an boost pump ON will ensure positive fuel pressure during the increase in fuel flow which may cause engine start. failure due to a severe ITT overtemperature. Typically, in excess of 1200 feet will be lost for each attempt. The propeller will unfeather and accelerate to oper- ating RPM approximately 20 seconds after N1 reaches 45%. Useful power will be available after 40 seconds from starter If there is no rise in ITT within 10 seconds engagement, with typical PCL advancement rate. after fuel flow indications, place the PCL to OFF and abort the start. Monitor ITT, N1, fuel flow, and other engine indica- tions. Typically, in excess of 1200 feet will be lost for Airstart attempts outside of the airstart enve- each attempt. The propeller will unfeather and acceler- lope may be unsuccessful or result in engine ate to operating RPM approximately 20 seconds after overtemperature. Consideration should be N1 reaches 45%. Useful power will be available after given to ensure airstarts are attempted within 40 seconds from starter engagement. the airstart envelope (125-200 KIAS for sea 8. Engine instruments - Monitor ITT, N1, and oil pres- level to 15,000 feet, or 135-200 KIAS for sure 15,001-20,000 feet). IF AIRSTART IS UNSUCCESSFUL: 1. PCL - OFF 9. PCL - OFF 10. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Pull 11. Execute Forced Landing or Eject Do not delay ejection while attempting air- start at low altitude if below 2000 feet AGL. IF AIRSTART IS SUCCESSFUL: 12. PCL - As required after N1 reaches IDLE RPM PCL must be in OFF to feather the propeller, and stop fuel flow; if start is attempted with- (approximately 67% N1) 13. STARTER switch - NORM out the PCL in OFF, fuel is introduced with- out ignition and a hot start will likely result 14. GEN switch - Verify ON; reset if necessary when ignition begins. Expect high amperage readings (above 30 amps) after the start. NOTE Ensure PCL is in OFF; otherwise, fuel may be prematurely introduced during start. If generator will not reset, verify the 2. PMU switch - OFF STARTER switch is in NORM. The starter will drain battery power in 10 minutes if left 3. Confirm the position of the following: in MANUAL. a. START, IGN, and BOOST PUMP circuit breakers 15. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - NORM (left front console) - In 16. OBOGS - As required b. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Down 3-15 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 4. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - OFF IF AIRSTART IS UNSUCCESSFUL: 5. BOOST PUMP switch - ON 10. PCL - OFF 11. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Pull 12. Execute Forced Landing or Eject Continuous operation with the BOOST IF AIRSTART IS SUCCESSFUL: PUMP switch in the ON position will cause 13. PCL - As required after N1 reaches IDLE RPM damage to the engine-driven low pressure (approximately 67% N1) fuel pump. Upon landing, notify maintenance of the duration of flight with BOOST PUMP 14. STARTER switch - NORM switch in the ON position. 15. GEN switch - Verify ON; reset if necessary 6. IGNITION switch - ON Expect high amperage readings (above 30 amps) after 7. STARTER switch - MANUAL the start. NOTE If generator will not reset, verify the If N1 does not rise within 5 seconds, discon- STARTER switch is in NORM. The starter tinue the airstart attempt and proceed to IF will drain battery power in 10 minutes if left AIRSTART IS UNSUCCESSFUL, due to in MANUAL. suspected mechanical failure. 16. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - NORM 8. PCL - At 13% N1 minimum, advance to obtain initial fuel flow, then slowly to IDLE 17. OBOGS - As required 18. PEL - Execute IMMEDIATE AIRSTART (PMU NORM) Movement of the PCL above IDLE before N1 The Immediate Airstart (PMU NORM) procedure should be stabilizes at approximately 67% will cause an used following engine failure at low altitude when thrust increase in fuel flow which may cause engine requirements are critical, or when time and conditions do not failure due to a severe ITT overtemperature. permit completing a full airstart procedure. If there is no rise in ITT within 10 seconds after fuel flow indications, place the PCL to Airstart attempts outside of the airstart enve- OFF and abort the start. lope may be unsuccessful or result in engine overtemperature. Consideration should be After fuel flow is indicated (75-80 pph), ITT will rise given to ensure airstarts are attempted within and peak. Continue to smoothly advance the PCL the airstart envelope (125-200 KIAS for sea while monitoring ITT, N1, fuel flow, and engine indi- level to 15,000 feet, or 135-200 KIAS for cations until IDLE is reached. 15,001-20,000 feet). 9. Engine instruments - Monitor ITT, N1, and oil pres- * 1. PCL - OFF sure The most critical pilot action during the PMU Do not delay ejection while attempting air- start at low altitude if below 2000 feet AGL. OFF start is PCL movement while monitor- ing fuel flow, ITT, and N1 acceleration. PCL must be in OFF to feather the propeller, and ensure proper starter, ignition, boost pump, and PMU operation during airstart. 3-16  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 Ensure PCL is in OFF; otherwise, fuel may Continuous operation with the BOOST be prematurely introduced during start. PUMP switch in the ON position will cause * 2. STARTER SWITCH - AUTO/RESET damage to the engine-driven low pressure fuel pump. Upon landing, notify maintenance of the duration of flight with BOOST PUMP switch in the ON position. If N1 does not rise within 5 seconds, discon- b. IGNITION switch - ON tinue the airstart attempt and proceed to IF 11. STARTER switch - NORM AIRSTART IS UNSUCCESSFUL, due to 12. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - NORM suspected mechanical failure. 13. GEN switch - Verify ON; reset if necessary * 3. PCL - IDLE, ABOVE 13% N1 Expect high amperage readings (above 30 amps) after the start. Movement of the PCL above IDLE before N1 NOTE stabilizes at approximately 67% will cause an If generator will not reset, verify the increase in fuel flow which may cause engine STARTER switch is in NORM. The starter failure due to a severe ITT overtemperature. will drain battery power in 10 minutes if left in MANUAL. 14. OBOGS - As required If there is no rise in ITT within 10 seconds UNCOMMANDED POWER CHANGES/LOSS OF after fuel flow indications, place the PCL to POWER/UNCOMMANDED PROPELLER FEATHER OFF and abort the start. This procedure should be used whenever uncommanded Monitor ITT, N1, fuel flow, and other engine indications. power changes occur or the engine fails to produce expected Typically, in excess of 1200 feet will be lost for each power. These conditions may be caused by engine rollback attempt. The propeller will unfeather and accelerate to oper- due to PMU scheduling (based on actual or faulty inputs to ating RPM approximately 20 seconds after N1 reaches 45%. the PMU), oil/engine/fuel system contamination, a propeller Useful power will be available after 40 seconds from starter dump solenoid failure, or loss of oil pressure to the propeller engagement. pitch control mechanism from a momentary contact between * 4. Engine instruments - Monitor ITT, N1, and oil pres- the oil transfer sleeve and the propeller shaft (a “prop-sleeve sure touchdown”). IF AIRSTART IS UNSUCCESSFUL: The most apparent indication of a rollback will be an uncom- * 5. PCL - OFF manded reduction in power/thrust. If the PMU remains on line, secondary indications may include any or all of the fol- * 6. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Pull lowing: lower than expected fuel flow, uncommanded * 7. Execute Forced Landing or Eject decrease in N1, and high raw ITT (RITT) on the alternate engine data display. If the PMU does not remain on line, IF AIRSTART IS SUCCESSFUL: anticipate a step change in engine power as the fuel metering * 8. PCL - As required after N1 reaches IDLE RPM unit reverts to the nominal condition for manual control. (approximately 67% N1) Oil/engine/fuel system contamination may have similar * 9. PEL - Execute symptoms to engine rollback. In addition, the engine may 10. Confirm the position of the following: experience power surges or uncontrollable high power. a. BOOST PUMP switch - ON A loss of thrust caused by uncommanded propeller feather- ing may be the result of an errant electrical signal to the feather dump solenoid causing reduction in oil pressure to the propeller pitch control mechanism. In the case of an errant electrical signal, opening the PROP SYS circuit 3-17 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 breaker will remove power from the feather dump solenoid and allow oil pressure to return, which brings the propeller out of a fully feathered state in 15-20 seconds. It also safe- guards against future electrical problems that could cause the There is a potential for ITT limits to be exceeded if the PMU switch is turned OFF solenoid valve to open. Indications of propeller feathering with ITT ≥820 °C. will be a rapid reduction in propeller RPM (NP) accompa- nied by high torque, an increase in propeller noise, a notice- able loss of thrust, and possibly engine/airframe vibrations. Ground idle will not be available during land- ing rollout and taxi. Plan for increased land- The PMU FAIL and PMU STATUS annunciators will illu- ing distances due to higher IDLE N1 minate if the PMU drops off line. If the PMU remains on (approximately 67%). line, it will continue to provide protection against over- * 3. PROP SYS CIRCUIT BREAKER (left front con- torque. sole) - PULL, IF NP STABLE BELOW 40% During a prop-sleeve touchdown, the propeller moves toward feather due to a temporary loss of oil pressure to the NOTE propeller pitch control mechanism. This malfunction mani- fests itself with fluctuations in NP, torque increasing, thrust With constant airspeed and torque, RPM can be considered stable if below 40% with no decreasing, and engine vibrations. These fluctuations may be upward change for a 3-second period. erratic but should be temporary (usually less than 20 sec- onds), and may be accompanied by a CHIP detector warn- ing. If propeller RPM is lower than normal, the thrust Ifswitching the N indicator is displaying dashes, P the PMU to NORM and back OFF produced will be lower than normal for the torque displayed. will reset the PMU and should restore the NP If the rate of change of the propeller RPM, due to a rapid indication. Propeller feathering of the propeller, exceeds the PMU sensor validity check limit, the PMU will assume a sensor failure has should come out of feather within occurred. The PMU will switch to manual mode and dashes 15-20 seconds. will be displayed for the RPM and torque values. If the * 4. PCL - As required dashes were caused by an RPM rate limit exceedence, turn- ing the PMU switch back to NORM then OFF should restore the displays. If the dashes are the result of a faulty sensor and not a rate exceedence, cycling the PMU switch will have no If rate of descent (indicated on the VSI while affect and the dashes will remain. The PMU normally con- stabilized at 125 KIAS with gear, flaps, and trols the propeller through the propeller interface unit (PIU), speed brake retracted and 4 to 6% torque) is which modulates oil flow and pressure to the propeller pitch greater than 1500 ft/min, increase torque as control mechanism through the oil transfer sleeve. With necessary (up to 131%) to achieve approxi- PMU OFF, oil pressure and volume output to the propeller mately 1350 to 1500 ft/min rate of descent. If pitch control are increased. This additional capacity in the engine power is insufficient to produce a rate manual mode may be sufficient to overcome a localized of descent less than 1500 ft/min, set PCL to reduction in oil pressure caused by the propsleeve touch- OFF. down and to restore propeller control. * 1. PCL - MID RANGE NOTE NOTE The pilot should consider moving the PCL through the full range of motion to determine Mid range is a physical PCL angle that approximates the midway position between power available. IDLE and MAX. IF POWER IS SUFFICIENT FOR CONTINUED FLIGHT: AbestPCLchance position above IDLE will provide the for the engine to recover. * 5. PEL - Execute IF POWER IS INSUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE PEL: A mid-range PCL position will minimize the potential of engine overtorque and/or over- If loss of thrust is the result of uncommanded propeller feather and the engine remains within operational limits (ITT temperature when the PMU is turned OFF. and torque), it is possible for the propeller to eventually * 2. PMU SWITCH - OFF 3-18  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 unfeather and restore useful power. An operating engine will * 3. PCL - Slowly advance (as required) provide power to accessories functions such as OBOGS, DEFOG, pressurization, and hydraulic equipment. Consider IF POWER IS SUFFICIENT FOR CONTINUED FLIGHT: leaving the engine running while monitoring descent rate. * 4. PEL - Execute IF POWER IS INSUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE PEL: * 5. PCL - OFF Consideration should be given to leaving the engine operating with PCL at mid range. * 6. PROP SYS circuit breaker - Reset, as required When the engine is so underpowered that high rates of descent occur, any delay in shut- ting down the engine to feather the propeller may result in insufficient altitude to reach a With the PROP SYS circuit breaker pulled suitable landing site. and the PMU switch OFF, the feather dump solenoid will not be powered. The propeller * 6. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Pull will feather at a slower rate as oil pressure * 7. Execute Forced Landing or Eject decreases and the feathering spring takes effect. Glide performance will be consider- INADVERTENT DEPARTURE FROM CONTROLLED ably reduced and it may not be possible to FLIGHT intercept or fly the emergency landing pat- tern. It is possible to depart controlled flight as a result of improper or overly aggressive control inputs near stall, * 7. PCL - OFF mechanical failures, atmospheric conditions, or a combina- * 8. FIREWALL SHUTOFF handle - Pull tion thereof. Power setting has a strong influence on induc- * 9. Execute Forced Landing or Eject ing or recovering from out of control conditions for the aircraft. Reducing power immediately may allow the aircraft COMPRESSOR STALLS to recover with no other pilot intervention or action. If the out of control condition is allowed to progress, departure Compressor stalls may be initially identified by abnormal characteristics can be highly oscillatory and disorienting. It engine noise, increasing ITT, and decreasing N1 and torque, is crucial the pilot neutralize controls. If an inadvertent possibly followed by fluctuations in these indications. Audi- departure from controlled flight is encountered, accomplish ble indications, which may include loud bangs, backfires, or the following steps, allowing time for the power and controls engine sputtering, represent a major difference between a to take effect. stall and an uncommanded power change/loss of power/ * 1. PCL - IDLE uncommanded propeller feather, and may aid in diagnosing the malfunction. Flames and/or smoke may also be visible * 2. CONTROLS - NEUTRAL from the exhaust stacks. Compressor stalls may be caused by damaged or degraded compressor/turbine blades, disrupted airflow into the engine, or compressor bleed valve malfunc- tions and therefore may occur during either engine accelera- Improperly positioning the control stick/ele- tion or deceleration. Severe compressor stalls may cause vator aft of the neutral position may signifi- engine damage and/or flameout. cantly delay or prevent the aircraft from * 1. PCL - Slowly retard below stall threshold recovering from an OCF/spin which could * 2. DEFOG switch - ON result in loss of aircraft and/or crew. NOTE NOTE Setting the DEFOG switch to ON automati- Cycling of control positions or applying anti- cally selects high bleed air inflow and will spin controls prematurely can aggravate air- alleviate back pressure on the engine com- craft motion and significantly delay recovery. pressor. * 3. ALTITUDE - CHECK 3-19 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 Recommended minimum altitude for ejection is 6000 feet AGL. Aindication fire warning light with no accompanying is not a confirmed fire. Do not shut * 4. Recover from unusual attitude down an engine for an unconfirmed fire. High engine compartment temperatures resulting from a bleed air leak may cause illu- mination of the fire warning light. Reducing Power-on and inverted departures or spins the PCL setting towards IDLE will decrease will result in high loads on the engine and the amount of bleed air and possibly extin- torque shaft. If an inverted or power-on guish the fire warning light; however, departure is encountered, land as soon as con- advancing the PCL might be required to ditions permit. The pilot should suspect pos- intercept the ELP. Regardless of reducing or sible engine damage and may experience advancing the PCL, continue to investigate unusual engine operation accompanied by for indications confirming an engine fire. low oil pressure or CHIP annunciator illumi- nation. In all cases of inverted or power-on Ifingthesystem fire cannot be confirmed, the fire warn- may be at fault and should be departures, the engine shall be inspected by qualified maintenance personnel after flight. tested as conditions permit. If only one fire loop annunciator is illuminated (top or bot- FIRE IN FLIGHT tom half only), a false fire indication may exist if the other loop tests good. Illumination of the FIRE and MASTER WARN annuncia- tors indicates the possibility of fire in the engine compart- SMOKE AND FUME ELIMINATION/ELECTRICAL ment. Pending confirmation of an engine fire, initiate PEL FIRE procedures with the intention of landing as soon as possible. This procedure may be used in the event of smoke or fumes IF FIRE IS CONFIRMED: as a result of an electrical fire or contamination from the ECS system. Illumination of the fire warning light accom- panied by one or more of the following indi- Under varying conditions of fire and/or cations is confirmation of an engine fire: smoke where aircraft control is jeopardized, smoke; flames; engine vibration; unusual the pilot has the option of actuating CFS or sounds; high ITT; and fluctuating oil pres- ejecting. sure, oil temperature, or hydraulic pressure. * 1. OBOGS - CHECK (BOTH) * 1. PCL - OFF a. OBOGS supply lever - ON * 2. FIREWALL SHUTOFF HANDLE - PULL b. OBOGS concentration lever - MAX IF FIRE IS EXTINGUISHED: c. OBOGS pressure lever - EMERGENCY * 3. Forced Landing - Execute 2. Descent below 10,000 ft MSL - Initiate (as required) IF FIRE DOES NOT EXTINGUISH OR FORCED LAND- 3. PRESSURIZATION switch - RAM/DUMP ING IS IMPRACTICAL: * 4. Eject (BOTH) NOTE IF FIRE IS NOT CONFIRMED: Selecting RAM/DUMP does not shut off bleed air inflow. Defog * 5. PEL - Execute is turned off when RAM/DUMP is selected. 4. BLEED AIR INFLOW switch - OFF 3-20  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 IF SMOKE/FIRE PERSISTS: the faulty component has been isolated, fur- 5. BAT, GEN, and AUX BAT switches - OFF ther restoration of electrical power is not rec- ommended. 9. Land as soon as possible NOTE OBOGS will be inoperative once the main battery is depleted or with battery failure. With the battery and generator off, the land- ing gear must be extended using the emer- NOTE gency landing gear extension system. The standby attitude indicator will provide accurate indications for at least 9 minutes PMU FAILURE after a loss of all electrical power. Use this procedure if the PMU becomes inoperative and a Atto night/IMC, consideration should be given turning the AUX BAT on for standby reset is desired. Indications include simultaneous illumina- tion of PMU FAIL and PMU STATUS annunciators, as well as a possible step change in engine power as the fuel man- instrument lights. agement unit reverts to the nominal setting for manual con- Ifsource a faulty component can be identified as the of smoke and fumes, turn defective trol. Automatic control of torque, ITT, and N1 is lost and must be manually controlled. Propeller governing, including unit off or pull respective circuit breaker. Cir- overspeed protection, will be provided by the mechanical cuit breakers for items on the hot battery bus overspeed governor. are not accessible in flight. If the PMU FAIL annunciator illuminates, accomplish the 6. CFS handle safety pin - Remove (BOTH) following: 7. CFS - Rotate 90° counter clockwise and pull (if neces- 1. PCL - Minimum practical for flight sary) 2. PMU switch - OFF To prevent injury, ensure oxygen mask is on Before resetting PMU or switching PMU to and visor is down prior to actuating the CFS OFF, set power at lowest practical setting in system. order to minimize power shift. IF SMOKE/FIRE CEASES: NOTE 8. Restore electrical power - As required Ifmanded PMU failure is accompanied by uncom- power changes other than anticipated NOTE step changes, do not reset PMU. Refer to If IMC penetration is required or if UHF Uncommanded Power Changes/Loss of communication is desired, turn the auxiliary Power/Uncommanded Propeller Feather pro- battery on. Standby instruments and lighting, cedure. fire detection (FIRE 1 only), and UHF radio (tuning through backup UHF control unit) The pilot should consider moving the PCL through the full range of motion to determine will be powered for approximately 30 min- power available. utes. Landing gear must be extended by emergency means. The flap lever is powered TO RESET PMU: through the hot battery bus and should func- 3. IGN, START, and PMU circuit breakers tion as long as the main battery has not (left front console) - Check and reset if necessary depleted. With normal flap extension and a loss of power to the battery bus, flaps will 4. PMU switch - NORM (Attempt second reset if neces- retract. Gear and flap indicators, as well as sary) exterior lighting, will not be powered. Unless 3-21 AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 CHIP DETECTOR WARNING Illumination of the CHIP annunciator indicates possible If the above actions do not clear the annunci- metal contamination in the engine oil supply. If the contam- ator(s), the pilot(s) should be aware that auto- ination is severe, the engine may fail with little or no further matic torque, ITT, and N1 limiting will not be warning. When the CHIP annunciator illuminates, accom- available. plish the following: IF PMU RESET IS UNSUCCESSFUL: * 1. PCL - Minimum necessary to intercept ELP; avoid unnecessary PCL movements 5. PMU switch - OFF 6. Land as soon as practical Higher power settings may aggravate the existing condition. Ground idle will not be available during land- * 2. PEL - Execute ing rollout and taxi. Plan for increased land- ing distances due to higher IDLE N1 OIL SYSTEM MALFUNCTION OR LOW OIL (approximately 67%). PRESSURE PMU FAULT NOTE Illumination of the PMU STATUS annunciator, with the PMU FAIL annunciator extinguished, is indicative of a sys- Use this procedure for any of the following: red OIL PX annunciator illuminated, amber tem fault recorded by the PMU. The PMU will remain on OIL PX annunciator illuminated, oil pressure line and continue to function. fluctuations, oil temperature out of limits, or ON GROUND: visibly confirmed leaking oil from the air- craft. NOTE Ifpressure OIL PX annunciator illuminates and oil indicates 80 °C checklist. NOTE 1. EDM circuit breakers Record any fault messages to assist mainte- nance in troubleshooting failure. (left/right front console) - Check; reset if open IF TOTAL EDM FAILURE: The VHF communications, VOR navigation, and DME units may remain tuned to the last 2. Land as soon as possible used frequency, but should be used only if the audio identifiers are properly received. 3-28  AIR FORCE TO 1T-6A-1 NAVY NAVAIR A1-T6AAA-NFM-100 Loss of ICS/Audio FUEL SYSTEM FAILURE