Ethics - A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy PDF

ETHICS A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy By Right Rev. Msgr. PAUL J. GLENN, Ph.D., S.T.D. PRESIDENT OF COLLEGE-SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, COLUMBUS, 0. B. HERDER BOOK CO. 15 & 17 SOUTH BROADWAY, ST. LOUIS, MO. AND 33 QUEEN SQUARE, LONDON, W.C. 1949 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Printed in U. S. A, NIHIL OBSTAT Joseph A. Weigand, Censor Deputatus IMPRIMATUR * Jacobus Joseph, Episcopus Columbensis Copyright 1930 BY B. HERDER BOOK CO. Twenty-first Impression Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton and New York The best and most faithful of friends, THE REVEREND THOMAS B. LAPPAN AND THE REVEREND FRANCIS M. McCARTER This little book is affectionately dedicated PREFACE This manual in Ethics is intended for class use. It was written, as nearly as could be done, in strict ac cordance with a set of rules which the author framed for himself at the outset, and which, he feels, are pedagogically sound. These rules are the following: 1. Be clear. You are not writing for experts. Make the scope and plan of the book evident to the least gifted student. Present a logical and adequate division of the matter to be studied. Use a direct style and sim ple diction. 2. In complex matters, state the essential doctrine in the plainest manner, and leave the rest to the teacher. In matters easy to grasp, some prolixity is permissible. z. Employ an abundance of illustrations to relieve the strain of abstract reasoning, and to impress prin ciples distinctly upon mind and memory. 4. Be reasonably complete, but make the book one that can be handily mastered in a single school year. If, then, there appears to be a lack of balance, or in adequacy of treatment, in the following pages, the critic will find the explanation of such matters in the programme that ruled the writing of the book. The vi PREFACE author feels that it is a good programme; and his ex perience in the classroom gives him great confidence in the hope. The programme itself is not a gratuitous set of regulations thrown together to guide the writer in executing an unalterable determination to turn out a new statement of old doctrine: on the contrary, the four rules express what is felt as a summary of real needs in the matter of a new text in Ethics. It is hoped that this manual will do good service for many young collegians who have the privilege of tak ing up the interesting and very important study of Christian Ethics. P.J. G. CONTENTS PAGE Preface................................................................... v Introduction....................................................... ix PART FIRST GENERAL ETHICS CHAPTER I. Human Acts -........................................................3 Art. 1. The Human Act in Itself... 3 Art. 2. The Voluntariness of Human Acts 13 Art. 3. The Modifiers of Human Acts. 25 II. The Ends of Human Acts............................ 48 Art. 1. Ends in General............................. 48 Art. 2. The Ultimate End of Human Acts 56 III. The Norms of Human Acts.... 71 Art. 1. Law............................................... 72 Art. 2. Conscience......................................... 83 IV. The Morality of Human Acts... 97 Art. 1. Morality and Its Norm... 97 Art. 2. The Determinants of Morality. 102 V. The Properties and Consequences of Human Acts........................................ 120 Art. 1. The Properties of Human Acts. 121 Art. 2. The Consequences of Human Acts 126 vii viii CONTENTS PART SECOND SPECIAL ETHICS BOOK FIRST—INDIVIDUAL ETHICS CHAPTER PAGE I. Rights and Duties........................................ 135 Art. 1. Rights................................... 135 Art. 2. Duties................................... 142 II. Man’s Duty Towards God iZi Art. 1. Religion............................. IZi Art. 2. Worship............................. 164 III. Man’s Personal Office............................170 Art. 1. Duties of ManTowards His Soul 170 Art. 2. Duties of Man Towards His Body 174 IV. Man’s Duty Towards His Neighbor.. 183 Art. 1. Duties of Charity............................. 183 Art. 2. Duties of Justice............................. 190 BOOK SECOND---- SOCIAL ETHICS I.The Family.................................................. 226 Art. 1. Society............................................. 226 Art. 2. Marriage....................................... 232 Art. 3. Rights and Duties of Parents.. 242 II. The State, Man’s Work, and the Church................................................... 255 Art. 1. The State....................................... 255 Art. 2. Man’s Work................................. 264 Art. 3. The Church................................. 277 III. The World-Family of Nations... 285 Art. 1. International Law........................... 285 Art. 2. Peace and War........................... 289 INTRODUCTION I. Definition 2. Object z. Importance 4. Division I. DEFINITION Ethics is the practical science of the morality of human conduct. a) Ethics is a science. A science is a relatively complete and systematically arranged body of con nected data together with the causes or reasons by which these data are known to be true. Ethics squares with this definition, for it is a complete and systematically arranged body of data which relate to the morality of human conduct; and it presents the reasons which show these data to be true. Ethics is therefore a science. b) Ethics is a practical science. If the data of a science directly imply rules or directions for thought or action, the science is called practical. If the data of a science enrich the mind without directly imply ing rules or directions, the science is called specula tive. A speculative science presents truths that are to be known; a practical science presents truths that are to be acted upon. A speculative science enlarges our knowledge and enhances our cultural equipment; a lx X INTRODUCTION practical science gives us knowledge with definite guidance. Now the science of Ethics presents data which directly imply and indicate directions for human conduct. Ethics is therefore a practical science. c) Ethics is a science of human conduct. By hu man conduct we mean only such human activity as is deliberate and free. A deliberate and free act, an act performed with advertence and motive, an act de termined (i. e., chosen and given existence) by the free will, is called a human act. Acts performed by human beings without advertence, or without the ex ercise of free choice, are called acts of man, but they are not human acts in the technical sense of that ex pression which is here employed. Ethics treats of hu man acts; human acts make human conduct: Ethics is therefore a science of human conduct. d) Ethics is the science of the morality of human conduct. Human conduct is free, knowing, deliberate human activity. Such activity is either in agreement or disagreement with the dictates of reason. Now the relation (agreement or disagreement) of human activity with the dictates of reason is called morality. Ethics studies human activity to determine what it must be to stand in harmony with the dictates of reason. Hence, Ethics deals with the morality of hu man conduct. e) The name Ethics is derived from the Greek word ethos, which means "a characteristic way of INTRODUCTION xi acting.” Now the characteristic mark of human con duct is found in the free and deliberate use of the will: in a word, this characteristic is found in human acts. Thus we perceive that the name Ethics is suit ably employed to designate the science of human acts, of human conduct.—The Latin word mos (stem: mor-) is the equivalent of the Greek ethos. Hence we understand why Ethics is sometimes called Moral Science or Moral Philosophy, 2, OBJECT Every science has a Material Object and a Formal Object, The Material Object is the subject-matter of the science: the thing, or things, with which the science deals. The Material Object of Ethics is human acts, that is to say, human conduct. The Formal Object of a science is the special way, aim, or point of view that the science employs in studying or dealing with its Material Object. Now Ethics studies human acts (its Material Object) to discover what these must be in order to agree with the dictates of reason. Hence the special aim and point of view of Ethics is the right morality, or rec titude, of human acts. We assert, then, that the For mal Object of Ethics is the rectitude of human acts, 3. IMPORTANCE Ethics employs the marvellous faculty of human reason upon the supremely important question of xii INTRODUCTION what an upright life is and must be. It is therefore a noble and important science. Ethics furnishes the norm by which relations among men (juridical, political, professional, social) are regulated. It shows what such relations must be, and indicates the reasons that require them to be so. Thus, Ethics is fundamental to the sciences of Law, Medicine, Political Economy, Sociology, etc. It is, in consequence of this fact, a very important science. The principles of Ethics are in perfect harmony with the morality of Christianity, and this fact ap peals to many minds when employed as a means of approach to the demonstration of the truth of the Catholic Religion. Hence, Ethics has a large signifi cance for the Catholic apologist—that is to say, for every educated Catholic. Faulty ethical theories, as well as the lack of defi nite ethical principles, have been and are still the cause of great disorders in the political and social world. This fact is apparent in such things as Bol shevism, Nihilism, Socialism, Birth Control, Eu genics, Companionate Marriage. Sound Ethics sup plies the scientific knowledge which evidences the unworthiness and unreason of such things. Ethics is therefore a science deserving of careful study. 4. DIVISION Ethics has two major parts, viz., General Ethics and Special Ethics. INTRODUCTION xiii General Ethics presents truths about human acts, and from these truths deduces the general principles of morality. Special Ethics is applied Ethics. It applies the prin ciples of General Ethics in different departments of human activity, individual and social. The following scheme presents the plan upon which the present study of Ethics is developed: I. GENERAL ETHICS ' as regards God ' Individual as regards self Ethics as regards fel low men II. SPECIAL ETHICS - " in the family in the state Social in the world Ethics (Internation al Ethics) Following this scheme, we divide the present trea tise into two Parts (viz., General Ethics, and Special Ethics). Part First is divided into Chapters, Part Second is divided into two Books (which deal re spectively with Individual Ethics and Social Ethics), and the Books are divided into Chapters, The Chap ters are divided into convenient Articles. PART I GENERAL ETHICS The following sentence should be memorized, for it ex plains the sequence of this entire Part: Human acts, directed to their last end by law applied by conscience, are moral acts, and as such are imputable to the agent, and beget in him habits of action. Notice how the sentence serves as a key to the arrange ment of the Chapters into which this Part is divided: Chapter First defines human acts and clas sifies them. It analyzes human acts to Human acts.. discover their constituent elements, and considers the things that may modify them or make them less human. The Chapter is called “Human Acts." Chapter Second discusses the ends of human activity. It defines and classifies directed to ends in general. It determines the last end their last end. of human acts, and shows that this exists as an objective thing towards which man tends, and that it is attainable. The Chapter is entitled, “The Ends of Human Acts." Chapter Third discusses the existence and character of the rules of action by which by law applied human acts are directed to their last end, by conscience. viz., Law and Conscience. In particular, The Eternal Law, The Natural Law, and Positive Law are studied. The Chapter is entitled, “The Norms of Human Acts." Chapter Fourth deals with morality. It explains the intrinsic good or evil of human acts, and the extrinsic factors that influence or determine the morality of are moral acts such acts. Certain false doctrines in the matter of objective morality are refuted. Subjective morality (i. e., the relation of human acts to the individual conscience) is studied. The Chapter is entitled, "The Morality of Human Acts.” Chapter Fifth discusses the properties of are imputable human acts, viz., imputability, merit, de to the agent merit. It also studies the consequences of and beget human acts, viz., the habits called Virtues habits and Vices. The Chapter is entitled, "The Properties and Consequences of Human Acts.” This Part, viz., General Ethics, is thus divided into the following five Chapters: Chapter I. Human Acts Chapter II. The Ends of Human Acts Chapter HI. The Norms of Human Acts Chapter IV. The Morality of Human Acts Chapter V. The Properties and Consequences of Human Acts CHAPTER I HUMAN ACTS This Chapter studies the human act itself, defines it, classifies its varieties, discerns its essential elements, and discusses the things that may modify the human act and make it less human. The Chapter is conveniently divided into the following Articles: Article i. The Human Act in Itself Article 2. The Voluntariness of Human Acts Article 3. The Modifiers of Human Acts Article 1. The Human Act in Itself a) Definition b) Classification c) Constituents a) DEFINITION OF THE HUMAN ACT A human act is an act which proceeds from the de liberate free will of man. In a wide sense, the term human act means any sort of activity, internal or external, bodily or spiritual, performed by a human being. Ethics, however, em ploys the term in a stricter sense, and calls human only those acts that are proper to man as man. Now man is an animal, and he has many activities in com mon with brutes. Thus, man feels, hears, sees, em 4 ETHICS ploys the senses of taste and smell, is influenced by bodily tendencies or appetites. But man is more than animal; he is rational, that is to say, he has under standing and free will. Hence it is only the act that proceeds from the knowing and freely willing human being that has the full character of a human act. Such an act alone is proper to man as man. And therefore Ethics understands by human acts only those acts that proceed from a deliberate (i. e., advertent, knowing) and freely willing human being. Man’s animal acts of sensation (i. e., use of the senses) and appetition (i. e., bodily tendencies), as well as acts that man performs indeliberately or with out advertence and the exercise of free choice, are called acts of man. Thus, such acts as are effected in sleep, in delirium, in the state of unconsciousness; acts done abstractedly or with complete inadvertence; acts performed in infancy; acts due to infirmity of mind or the weakness of senility—all these are acts of man, but they are not human acts. It is to be noticed that acts which are in themselves acts of man may sometimes become human acts by the advertence and consent of the human agent (and by agent is meant the one who does or performs an act). Thus, if I hear words of blasphemy as I walk along the street, my act of hearing is an act of man; but the act becomes a human act if I deliberately pay atten tion and listen. Again, my eyes may fall upon an in decent sight, or upon a page of obscene reading mat HUMAN ACTS 5 ter. The act of seeing, and even of reading and under standing the words, is an act of man; but it becomes a human act the moment I deliberately consent to look or to read. Ethics is not concerned with acts of man, but only with human acts. Human acts are moral acts, as we shall see later on. For human acts man is responsible, and they are imputed to him as worthy of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. Human acts tend to repeat themselves and to form habits. Habits coalesce into what we call a man’s character. Thus we find veri fied the dictum of Ethics: "A man is what his human acts make him.” b) CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS Human acts may be classified under the following heads: i. Their complete or adequate cause; and ii. Their relation to the dictates of reason. i. The Adequate Cause of Human Acts.—While all human acts have their source in man’s free rational nature, there are some acts that begin and are per fected in the will itself, and the rest begin in the mil and are perfected by other faculties under control of the will. Thus, some human acts find their adequate cause in the will alone (always remembering that we speak of the will of advertent, knowing man, i. e., of the deliberate will) ; and these are called elicited acts. Other human acts do not find their adequate cause in the simple will-act, but are perfected by the action 6 ETHICS of mental or bodily powers under the control of the will, or, so to speak, under orders from the will; and these acts are called commanded acts. To illustrate: I intend to go to my room and study. My intention is a simple will-act, begun and completed in the will. It is therefore an elicited act. But to carry out the in tention, commanded acts, of body and mind, must be exercised. Thus, I walk to my room, turn on the light, sit at my desk, take down a book, turn to the lesson, bend my eyes upon the page. All these bodily acts are (if done advertently) human acts, commanded, so to speak, by the will for carrying out its intention. Now I start to study: I control the imagination, keeping out distracting fancies; I focus my mind upon the matter to be understood. These internal mental acts are also acts commanded by the will. Under the head of “Adequate Cause” we therefore consider: (A) Elicited Acts (B) Commanded Acts (A) Elicited Acts are the following: (a) Wish: the simple love of anything; the first tendency of the will towards a thing, whether this thing be realizable or not. Every human act begins with the wish to act. Wish is exemplified in the will- act which enables one truthfully to say: “I wish it would rain“I do so long to see you“I should like to go to Europe next summer.” HUMAN ACTS 7 (b) Intention: the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regarded as realizable, whether the thing is actually done or not. We find intention ex pressed in the following sentences: "I am going to Europe next summer"The cause is in my will; I will not come: that is enough to satisfy the Senate.”— Intention is distinguished as actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative intention. We shall study these de grees of intention in the Article on the Voluntariness of Human Acts. (c) Consent: the acceptance by the will of the means necessary to carry out intention. Consent is a further intention of doing what is necessary to realize the first or main intention. Thus, if I intend to go to Europe, I consent to the necessary preparation for the journey. I cannot really intend a thing honestly unless I con sent to the means of carrying it out or realizing it. If I make an Act of Contrition, I make an intention (usually called a resolution of amendment). Now I am not honest in my act, if I do not consent to avoid the near occasions of sin; for these are necessarily to be avoided if the intention is to be realized. Here we see justified the ancient saying: "He that wills (intends) a thing, wills (consents to) the means required to ac complish it” (d) Election: the selection by the will of the precise means to be employed (consented to) in carrying out an intention. Thus, while I may go to Europe either by ship or by airplane, I cannot go by both simults- 8 ETHICS neously, but musLgled or select one of the means. By eledion I choose to sail on a certain day, from a certain port, etc. (e) Use: the employment by the will of powers (of body, mind, or both) to carry out its intention by the means elected. Thus, if I intend to goto a neighbor ing town, and elect to walk thither, I exercise the will- act of use by putting my body in motion. True, the movement itself is a commanded act, but the com manding, the putting to employment of bodily action, is the elicited will-act of use. (f) Fruition: the enjoyment of a thing willed and done; the will’s act of satisfaction in intention ful filled. Of the elicited acts listed, three appertain to the objective thing willed, and three to the means of ac complishing it. Suppose the thing willed is a trip to Europe. Then: I wish..... I intend >a trip to Europe I enjoy when accomplished. I consent to... the means required I elect......................... to make the trip I use my faculties on (B) Commanded Acts are: (a) Internal: acts done by internal mental powers under command of the will. Examples: effort to re HUMAN ACTS g member; conscious reasoning; neMng oneself to meet an issue; effort to control anger; deliberate use of the imagination in visualizing a scene. (b) External: acts effected by bodily powers under command of the will. Examples: deliberate walking, eating, writing, speaking. Such acts as walking and eating are very often acts of man, but they become human acts when done with advertence and intention. (c) Mixed: acts that involve the employment of bodily powers and mental powers. Example: study, which involves use of intellect, and use of eyes in read ing the lesson. Of course, all human acts are internal inasmuch as all originate in the will which elicits or commands them. Again, all external acts are mixed inasmuch as the outer activity which perfects them is but the ex pression and fulfillment of the interior act of will. But, for sake of simplicity, we call those human acts ex ternal which are perfected or completed by the ex terior powers of body; and we call mixed only those acts which involve the use of bodily powers as well as internal powers distinct from the will. ii. The Relation of Human Acts to Reason.—Hu man acts are either in agreement or in disagreement with the dictates of reason, and this relation (agree ment or disagreement) with reason constitutes their morality. The subject of the Morality of Human Acts IO ETHICS is to be dealt with ^detail in a later Chapter, but pass ing mention of the matter is required here for the proper classification of human acts. On the score of their morality, or relation to reason, human acts are: (a) Good, when they are in harmony with the dic tates of right reason; (b) Evil, when they are in opposition to these dic tates ; (c) Indifferent, when they stand in no positive re lation to the dictates of reason. Indifferent human acts exist in theory, but not as a matter of practical experience. A human act that is indifferent in itself becomes good or evil according to the circumstances which affect its performance, especially the end in view (or motive or purpose) of the agent. c) CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT In order that an act be human, it must possess three essential qualities: it must be knowing, free, and vol untary. Hence we list the essential elements, or con stituents, of the human act as: i. Knowledge; ii. Free- dom; iii. Voluntariness. i. Knowledge.—A human act proceeds from the de liberate will; it requires deliberation. Now "deliber ation" does not mean quiet, slow, painstaking action. It means merely advertence, or knowledge in intellect of what one is about and what this means. An act may be done in the twinkling of an eye, and still be deliber ate. Consider an illustration: A hunter flushes game; HUMAN ACTS ii the birds rise; the hunter whips up his gun and fires. The act of firing is the work of a split second, and yet it is a deliberate act. The hunter adverts to what he is doing, and, so adverting, wills and does it. In a word, the hunter knows what he is doing. His knowl edge makes the act deliberate. For the purposes of Ethics, then, deliberation means knowledge. Now, a human act is by definition a deliberate act; that is, it is a knowing act. No human act is possible without knowledge. The will cannot act in the dark, for the will is a "blind" faculty in itself. It cannot choose unless it "see" to choose, and the light, the power to see, is af forded by intellectual knowledge. I cannot will to go to the island of Mauritius unless I know that there is such an island. I cannot choose to eat oranges or not to eat oranges, if I have never seen nor heard of or anges. I cannot will to play the sacbut if I know of no such musical instrument. I cannot will to love and serve God if I do not know God. Knowledge, then, is an essential element of the human act. ii. Freedom.—A human act is an act determined (elicited or commanded) by the will and by nothing else. It is an act, therefore, that is under control of the will, an act that the will can do or leave undone. Such an act is called a free act. Thus every human act must be free. In other words, freedom is an essential element of the human act. 12 ETHICS iii. Voluntariness.—The Latin word for will is vol untas, and from this word we derive the English terms, voluntary and voluntariness. To say, therefore, that a human act must be voluntary, or must have voluntari ness, is simply to say that it must be a will-act. This we already know by the very definition of the human act. Voluntariness is.the formal essential quality of the human act, and for it to be present, there must or dinarily be both knowledge and freedom in the agent. Hence the term voluntary act is synonymous with human act. In the next Article we treat of the volun tariness of human acts in some detail. To illustrate the place of the constituents just con sidered in a particular human act, the following ex ample is proposed: A Catholic is aware that to-day is Sunday and that he has the obligation of hearing Mass {knowledge}. He is free to attend Mass or to stay away—not, indeed, free from duty in the matter, but physically free to perform the duty or leave it unper formed (freedom). He wills to do his duty and to hear Mass (voluntariness). SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE We have defined human act, and have contrasted it with act of man. We have noticed in passing that the human act stands related to the dictates of reason, and is, in consequence, a moral act. We have classified human acts as elicited and com HUMAN ACTS 13 manded acts, and have viewed them in their moral aspect as good, evil, and indifferent acts. We have seen that the human act is essentially the product of the will (voluntary act) acting with native freedom in the light of intellectual knowledge. Article 2. The Voluntariness of Human Acts a) Kinds or Degrees of Voluntariness b) Indirect Voluntariness a) KINDS OR DEGREES OF VOLUNTARINESS i. Perfect and Imperfect.—Perfect voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent (i. e., the doer, performer, actor) fully knows and fully intends the act. Imperfect voluntariness is present when there is some defect in the agent’s knowledge, intention, or in both. Thus, a deliberate lie is a perfectly voluntary act; while a lie of exaggeration in a lively narrative, in which the narrator, full of the story, adverts only partly, or in passing, to the fact that he may be stretch ing matters a little, is a human act imperfectly volun tary. ii. Simple and Conditional.—Simple voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether the agent likes or dislikes doing it. Conditional voluntariness is present in the agent’s wish to do something other than that which he is actually doing, but doing with repug nance or dislike. Example: The commander of a dis tressed vessel lightens cargo by throwing valuable 14 ETHICS merchandise overboard. He wills to do it, and does it, and the act is simply voluntary. Still, he dislikes doing it, and would not do it if there were any other way of escaping shipwreck. He wishes to keep the goods, but the wish is an inefficacious will-act, for, as a matter of fact, he does not keep the goods, but throws them away. In this inefficacious will-act, there is conditional voluntariness. Inasmuch as the inefficacious will-act influences the efficacious act, the latter is said to be involuntary. Hence, the act of throwing away valu able goods is simply voluntary and conditionally in voluntary. iii. Direct and Indirect.—Direct voluntariness is present in a human act willed in itself. Indirect volun tariness is present in that human act which is the fore seen result (or a result that could and should have been foreseen) of another act directly willed. Exam ple : A man kills a rabbit for dinner. He directly wills the act of killing as a means to an end to be achieved, viz., the dinner. He also directly wills the dinner as the end to be achieved by this means. We have direct voluntariness in each aspect of the act. Now suppose the rabbit was a tame animal that had played about the man’s grounds and had given his children pleasure. The man knows that by killing the rabbit he will de prive his children of pleasure and cause them sorrow. This, indeed, he does not directly will, but, inasmuch as this is the foreseen consequence of his directly willed act, he wills it indirectly, or in its cause. In other HUMAN ACTS 15 words, he directly wills the cause of his children’s sor row, and thus indirectly wills the sorrow itself. A human act that is directly willed is called voluntary in se (i. e., in itself), while a human act that is in directly willed is called voluntary in causa (i. e., in its cause). Indirect voluntariness is a subject of first impor tance, and we shall study it in detail in the second sec tion of this present Article. iv. Positive and Negative,—Positive voluntariness is present in a human act of doing, performing. Nega tive voluntariness is present in a human act of omit ting, refraining from doing. Examples: A Catholic goes to Mass on Sunday (positive voluntariness). A Catholic deliberately misses Mass on Sunday (nega tive voluntariness).—Of course, when a person omits an act, he must really be doing something positive. But the special positive thing that he does is not of the essence of the omission as such. Thus, the man who remains away from Mass on Sunday omits a duty; but, while remaining away from Mass, he must really be doing something—lying abed, reading the morning paper, walking about, playing a game, eat ing his breakfast, or doing any one of an indefinite number of possible things. But the point is that no special and particular positive act, or series of acts, enters into the essence of the omission, for this con sists simply in willing not to do an act. v. Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative,— i6 ETHICS Actual voluntariness (or actual intention) is present in a human act willed here and now. Virtual volun tariness (or virtual intention) is present in a human act done as a result of (or in virtue of) a formerly elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now forgotten. Habitual voluntariness (or habit ual intention) is present in a human act done in har mony with, but not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual intention. Interpretative volun tariness (or interpretative intention) is that volun tariness which, in the judgment of prudence and com mon-sense, would be actually present if opportunity or ability for it were given. Examples : (a) A man makes the morning offering. He ac tually, here and now, intends to live for God, and to serve Him in all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day. The act of offering is an actual intention; it is a will-act in which there is actual voluntariness. (b) A man makes the morning offering, but during the day he completely forgets it. Nevertheless his day is without sin which would contradict his pious in tention, and we say that the power or virtue of the in tention endures, and that, as a result of the intention, all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day are really done for God. The man takes breakfast, goes to work, attends to business duties, spends time in recreation, etc. In all these acts he has no actual ("here and now” ) intention of doing them for God, but he has the virtual intention of so doing them. Hence all the acts that the HUMAN ACTS i7 man performs throughout the day—even those that are in themselves acts of man—are human acts of service by reason of their virtual voluntariness. (c) A man makes the actual intention of becoming a Catholic. Years pass, and he does not carry out the intention; neither does he revoke it. He is taken sud denly ill, and lies unconscious at death’s door. A priest administers Baptism. Here the act of receiving the sacrament is in agreement with the actual intention once made and unrevoked, and the man is said to have a habitual intention for that act. The act, however, is not the result of the original actual intention, for the virtue or power of that intention cannot reasonably be presumed to endure throughout a long period of neg lect and unfulfillment. For, if one makes an intention of doing a thing, and fails to do it throughout years of continuous opportunity for its accomplishment, it is obvious that the virtue or power of the original in tention is null. Still, as long as the original intention is not revoked, it remains with its author, and is worn, so to speak, like a forgotten portion of his dress or habit, powerless actively to produce a result, but re maining as the mark or symbol of an attitude of mind. It is a mark of habitual voluntariness. (d) A person known to be unbaptized is unconscious and in danger of death. No knowledge is available of his habitual inclination or disinclination for the act of receiving the sacrament of Baptism. The sacrament is nevertheless administered. Here the act of receiving 18 ETHICS the sacrament is prudently presumed to be in line with the will of the recipient, so that, if he could but know its great value, he would certainly wish to receive it. Thus is his will interpreted by sound common-sense. In the act of receiving the sacrament the man is said to have an interpretative intention. Such an intention, then, is an intention that may be prudently presumed, not indeed as present, but as an intention that would be present if proper knowledge and freedom were available to him in whom it is presumed.—Similarly, infants are baptized, and the receiving of the sacra ment is in them a human act,*by reason of interpreta tive voluntariness.—Again, the small boy who has literally to be carried to school and kept there against his will, has an interpretative intention of going to school. For parents and teachers know that, if the lad could but realize the value of schooling, he would cer tainly will to attend. b) INDIRECT VOLUNTARINESS Indirect voluntariness, or voluntariness in cause, is present in that human act which is an effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed. We have not yet made a detailed study of the moral character of human acts nor of their consequent im putability. But we have seen that human acts are acts under the free control of the will. It is clear that, since the will controls such acts, the will is responsible for them. In other words, human acts are imputable (as HUMAN ACTS 19 worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment) to their author. Now the moment we bring together the matters of indirect voluntariness and imputability, two supremely important ethical questions present themselves. The questions are : i. When is the agent {doer, actor, performer) re sponsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed ? ii. When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, which has two effects, one good, one evil? i. The First Question: When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?—The agent is responsible for such an effect when three con ditions are fulfilled, viz.: (1) The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way. (2) The agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect. (3) The agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the evil effect. This is an ethical principle of great moment. Let the student apply it in the following cases: (a) Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he will drink to excess, and will use blasphemous language, which will scandalize those that hear it. He declares, and truly enough, that he hates intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of blasphemy and scandal. Never theless he drinks liquor, and the foreseen evils occur. 20 ETHICS How far is Michael responsible for these evil effects ? When does he incur their guilt? (b) John says, "If I go to the meeting and hear Jones say sharp things about our party, I know I’ll lose my head and reveal some very damaging facts about Jones’ career that I alone know.” John goes to the meeting; the evil of detraction follows. Determine John’s responsibility, and the moment at which his guilt is imputed to him. (c) Mary knows that by persistent company keeping with a non-Catholic she will encourage the weak-willed Jane to a similar course and to the con sequent danger of an invalid marriage; for Jane idolizes Mary and imitates her in every way. Mary believes, foolishly but sincerely, that she herself is in no danger, but she is keenly aware of the danger in which Jane is placed through her example. Neverthe less she persists. Jane imitates, and eventually com mits the sin of an attempted marriage outside the Church. How far is Mary to blame? Why? (d) Thomas has been repeatedly warned by pru dent persons against attendance at a secular university, and he has been shown that he will there encounter grave dangers to his faith. He declares, in foolish pride, that nothing can shake his faith. He attends the university, gradually loses his fervor, and becomes but a nominal Catholic. At what time does his lapse be come imputable to him? Why? (e) Timothy goes to bed on Saturday night, forget HUMAN ACTS 21 ting to set the alarm. Before falling asleep he recalls the omission, but he does not rise to adjust the clock. He knows that he is a very heavy sleeper, and that he will probably not awake in time for Mass on Sun day. This is precisely what happens. When does Tim othy incur the guilt of missing Mass? Why? (f) The same Timothy deliberately neglects the clock on another Saturday night. But, contrary to all his experience, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday morning, and he attends very devoutly. Does Timothy have any fault in the matter ? Why ? (g) Again, Timothy deliberately neglects to set the alarm on Saturday night. Again, by an almost miracu lous repetition of the unexpected, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday. But, he reasons, since he has already missed Mass in cause, there is now no obliga tion incumbent upon him of attending. He stays at home and does not hear Mass. —Here Timothy was altogether wrong. He willed an evil in cause, and his will-act stopped there. Through no merit of his own, the cause failed to function as a cause, and he awoke in time for Mass. Now, by a new and direct will-act he wills to miss Mass. Here is a new evil, directly willed. In the foregoing cases we see that the agent is bound to avoid the cause of the evil effect, and his obligation arises from the very fact that the effect is evil. Why, then, did we list three conditions for the imputability 22 ETHICS of evil willed in cause? Why not simply say that two conditions are requisite for such imputability, viz., that the agent he able to foresee the evil effect, and that he be free to avoid the cause ? Is not the fact that the effect is evil always a prohibition obliging the agent to refrain from the cause of that evil? Not always. Sometimes there is a good effect as well as an evil effect proceeding from a single cause. This brings us to the second question: ii. The Second Question: When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good, one evil ? —One may perform such an act when three conditions are fulfilled, viz^, (i) The evil effect must not precede the good effect. (2) There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. (3) The intention of the agent must be honest, that is, the agent must directly intend the good effect and merely permit the evil effect as a re grettable incident or "side issue.” To explain these conditions in detail: The evil effect must not precede the good effect. If the evil effect comes ahead of the good effect, then it is a means of achieving the good effect, and is directly willed as such a means. Now it is a fundamental prin ciple of Ethics—a clear dictate of sound reason—that evil may never be willed directly, whether it be a means or an end to be achieved. We cannot do evil that good may come of it. The end does not justify the means. HUMAN ACTS 2Z There is no good, however great, that can justify the direct willing of evil, however slight. If a lie—even a "harmless" lie—will save a life—even an innocent life—that lie may not be told. Notice well that the principle here discussed requires that the evil effect do not precede the good effect; we do not say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect must either precede the evil or occur simulta neously with it. There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. If this condition be not ful filled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all, and the act is prohibited in view of its evil effect. The sufficiency of the reason must be determined by the nature, circumstances, and importance of the act in question, and by the proportion this reason bears to the gravity of the evil effect. The intention of the agent must be honest. If the agent really wills the evil effect, there is no possibility of the act being permissible. Direct willing of evil, as we have seen, is always against reason, and hence against the principles of Ethics. But, unless the agent directly wills the good effect, he is really willing the evil effect—else he has no adequate motive for per forming the act at all. Let the student consider the following cases in the light of the principle just explained: (a) The general of an army storms an enemy city. He foresees that many non-combatants will be killed. 24 ETHICS Yet to take the city will be a big step towards winning a just war. Is the general’s act allowable? Notice the two effects here: that taking of the city as a step towards ending the war with victory for the just cause —a good effect; and the killing of non-combatants— an evil effect. (b) The general of an army knows that by laying waste the farms of the enemy’s country, he will se riously inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of supplies. At the present time the enemy is well supplied, but destruction of the crops will destroy future supplies. Such destruction will mean present starvation to many a farmer and his family, but ul timately it will help win a just war. May the general lay waste the farm-lands ? (c) In view of your answer to the foregoing ques tion, would you justify or condemn the havoc wrought by Sherman in his march to the sea? (d) A doctor can save a mother’s life by destroying that of her child. May he do so? Why not? (e) A child’s life can be saved by destroying the life of the mother. May this be done? Why not? (f) A patient is dying in awful agony. Medical re lief there is none. Life cannot last beyond a few hours at most. May a drug be administered to bring death quietly and quickly? Why not? (g) A student of very frail health has been prom ised a lucrative position upon graduation. He needs the situation to support his aged and impoverished par HUMAN ACTS 25 ents. He knows he must study hard, else he will fail in his examinations, lose his degree, and, in conse quence, will not secure the promised position. Still, he is aware that earnest study may seriously impair his health. May he study hard and run the risk of per manent infirmity ? SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE In this Article we have studied the subject of voluntariness in human acts. We have distinguished voluntariness as perfect and imperfect; simple and conditional ; direct and indirect; positive and nega tive ; actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. We gave special study to the subject of indirect volunta riness, stating and exemplifying two important ethi cal principles, viz., 1. the Principle of Imputability of Evil Indirectly Willed, and 2. the Principle of Imputability of a Twofold Effect. Article 3. The Modifiers of Human Acts a) Ignorance b) Concupiscence c) Fear d) Violence e) Habit By the modifiers of human acts we mean the things that may affect human acts in the essential qualities of knowledge, freedom, voluntariness, and so make them less perfectly human. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act, and consequently diminish the responsibility of the agent. There are five modifiers of human acts that call for 26 ETHICS detailed study, viz., ignorance, concupiscence, fear, violence, habit. a) IGNORANCE Ignorance is the absence of knowledge—and, for our purpose here, it may be defined as the absence of intellectual knowledge in man. Ignorance is thus a negation of knowledge; it is a negative thing. But when it is absence of knowledge that ought to be pres ent, the ignorance is not merely negative, but privative. Thus, ignorance of the higher mathematics in a struc tural-steel worker is merely negative; but such igno rance is privative in the architect or engineer who designs steel structures such as bridges and the frame work of buildings. Again, ignorance of Catholic belief and practice is negative in a Hottentot, but privative in a Catholic collegian. Ignorance has, indeed, a positive aspect when it con sists not merely in the absence of knowledge, but in the presence of what is falsely supposed to be knowledge. Thus, if I see a stranger in the street, and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his iden tity is merely negative. But if I am misled by poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger, and judge him to be a well-known acquaintance, my state of mind is positive towards him: I have what I judge to be positive knowledge of his identity. Such positive ig norance is called mistake or error. We are to consider ignorance in its effect upon hu HUMAN ACTS 27 man acts. Before stating the ethical principles which our study will justify, we shall make a preliminary study of ignorance itself, considering it in three ways, viz., i. in its object, i. e., in the thing of which a person may be ignorant; ii. in its subject, i. e., in the person in whom ignorance exists; iii. in its result, i. e., with reference to the acts that are performed in ignorance. i. Ignorance in its Object. —The thing of which a a person may be ignorant is a matter of law, fact, or penalty. (a) Ignorance of Law is the ignorance of the exist ence of a duty, rule, or regulation. Examples: A motorist drives at the rate of forty miles an hour, not knowing that the local speed-limit is twenty miles an hour. A hunter shoots game in early October, unaware that the game-laws forbid such an act. A young Fresh man leaves the campus during noon-recess, not know ing that his action is a violation of the college rules. (b) Ignorance of Fact is ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act as forbidden. Examples: A motorist knows the speed-limit, but unknowingly violates it because of an inaccurate speedometer. A hunter knows the game-laws, but reads his calendar amiss, and kills game one day before the season opens. A freshman knows that he must not leave the campus, but goes out of bounds through misinformation about the extent of the college property. —Thus ignorance of fact is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing comes under the prohibition of a known law. 28 ETHICS (c) Ignorance of Penalty is lack of knowledge of the precise sanction (i. e., an inducement sufficient to make reasonable men obey the law) affixed to the law. Examples: A motorist knowingly violates the speed law, not knowing that, in that particular locality, the set punishment for such an offense is a short prison term, in lieu of which no amount of money will be ac cepted. A hunter violates the game-laws, believing that, if apprehended, he will be merely fined, whereas the established penalty for his offense is the revoca tion of the license to hunt. A freshman wilfully leaves the campus, thinking that he will escape with an ad monition not to do so again, whereas the fixed penalty for his offense is the suspension of all student privileges for a period of two weeks. ii. Ignorance in its Subject.—In the person in whom it exists, ignorance (of law, fact, or penalty) is either vincible or invincible. (a) Vincible Ignorance (i. e., conquerable igno rance; ignorance that can and should be supplanted by knowledge) is ignorance that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. Such ignorance is, there fore, due to lack of proper diligence on the part of the ignorant person, and is his fault. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, culpable ignorance. There are de grees of vincible ignorance: If it be the result of total, or nearly total, lack of effort to dispel it, it is called crass (or supine) ignorance. If some effort worthy the name, but not persevering and whole-hearted ef HUMAN ACTS 29 fort, be unsuccessfully employed to dispel it, the ig norance is simply vincible. If positive effort is made to retain it, the ignorance is called affected. To illus trate : A freshman who has been in college a month and does not know the college rules of order, is in the state of vincible ignorance in the matter. If he has made no effort, or scarcely any, to know the rules, his ignorance is crass or supine. If he has positively avoided learning the rules so that he may have a ready excuse for faults, and may be able to say when taken in violation of order, "I did not know the rule,” his ignorance is affected. If he has made some inquiries about the rules, or has tried once or twice, without success, to procure a copy of the rule-book, his igno rance is simply vincible. (b) Invincible Ignorance is ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence cannot dispel. This sort of ig norance is attributable to one of two causes, viz.: either the person in whom the ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his lack of knowledge, or the person who realizes his ignorance finds ineffective his effort to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is never the fault of the person, in whom it exists, and it is rightly called inculpable ignorance. Invincible igno rance has two degrees, viz.: If no human effort can dispel it, it is physically invincible. If such effort as good and prudent men would expend to dispel it— taking into account the character and importance of the matter about which ignorance exists—is found 30 ETHICS to be ineffective, the ignorance is called morally in vincible.1 To illustrate: A Catholic eats meat, wholly unaware that the day is Friday. Here his ignorance is invincible—even though in itself it could be easily dispelled by asking the nearest person for the day of the week—and even physically invincible, because no effort can be used with effect where there is no realiza tion whatever that effort is needed. A further illus tration : A man is seeking for a seventeenth century pamphlet to which he finds himself constantly re ferred in learned books on the subject of economics. After months and months of searching through* libra ries and following elusive clues, the man discovers that there is only one copy of the pamphlet in existence ; that this copy is in the library of a recluse who resides in a foreign country, far across the sea; and that, although one may be permitted to read it, the pamphlet may neither be borrowed nor copied. The man is in the state of invincible ignorance with regard to the contents of the pamphlet. His ignorance is not phys ically invincible, for he could make a voyage to the land of the recluse, and study the pamphlet in the lat ter’s library. Still, this course would involve difficul ties and inconveniences out of all proportion to the 1 The word morally has no direct relation jn the present use to morality, but to characteristic action of men. Thus, ignor ance is morally invincible when such effort as would be truly characteristic of good and prudent men in the circumstances, is found powerless to dispel it. In common language, ignorance is morally invincible when it would be extremely difficult to dispel it. HUMAN ACTS 3i importance of the matter about which ignorance ex ists. We say, therefore, that the man’s ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet is morally invincible. iii. Ignorance in its Result.—Here we consider ig norance (of fact, law, or penalty) with reference to acts performed while ignorance exists. (a) Antecedent Ignorance is that which precedes all consent of the will. A man, wholly unaware that to-day is a holyday of obligation, misses Mass. He would certainly not miss Mass if he were conscious of his obligation. His ignorance is antecedent to his act of missing Mass, and we say that the act is done through or in consequence of ignorance. Antecedent ignorance does not differ from invincible ignorance. (b) Concomitant Ignorance is that ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act that would have been performed even if the ignorance did not exist. A nom inal Catholic misses Mass, not aware that the day is a holyday. Yet, even had he known, he would have missed Mass. His act of missing Mass does not come from ignorance, but happens in company with his ig norance, and we call the ignorance concomitant. An act done in concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary. (c) Consequent ignorance is that which follows upon an act of the will. The will may directly affect it, or supinely neglect to dispel it. Thus, consequent ignorance does not differ from vincible ignorance. A careless Catholic suspects that the day is a holyday but deliberately refrains from making sure, and does 32 ETHICS not attend Mass. If he positively avoids knowledge in the matter, his (affected) ignorance is directly willed; if he fails to acquire knowledge through sheer carelessness, his (crass or supine) ignorance is indi rectly willed. We may sum up the classification of ignorance in the following scheme: of law in its object---- of fact of penalty "simply vincible 'vincible- crass or supine affected ignorance J in its subject— - ( morally I invincible—-j ,. „ [physically [antecedent in its result—- concomitant rjirectly willed consequent—1. L [ indirectly willed The ethical principles which emerge from our study of ignorance as a modifier of human acts are the following: first principle: Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act. Voluntariness, as we have seen, depends upon knowledge and freedom. Freedom, in its turn, depends HUMAN ACTS 33 upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, then, voluntariness depends upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible ignorance is an inevitable absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, in so far as it proceeds from invincible ignorance, lacks voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not imputable to the agent. —To illustrate: A good Catholic, wholly inadvertent to the fact that the day is Friday, eats meat. In so far as the act is an act of eating meat, it may be both voluntary and free; but in so far as the act is an act of violation of the law of abstinence, it is neither voluntary nor free. The act of eating meat, in so far as it is a violation of the law of abstinence, comes from invincible ignorance, and is therefore not a human act for which the agent is responsible. —A further illustration: A Catholic child uses very evil language, totally unaware that such language is sinful. Later in life, the child realizes the sinfulness of foul speech, and carefully avoids it. The child also begins to worry about the past. Yet such worry is unjustified, for the past evil was committed in invincible igno rance, and therefore it lacked voluntariness, was not a human act, and is not imputable to the child. second principle: Vincible ignorance does not de stroy the voluntariness of an act. Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lack of knowl edge. On the contrary, it supposes knowledge in the agent of his own lack of knowledge and of his duty 34 ETHICS of dispelling ignorance. Hence, the agent has knowl edge which bears indirectly upon the act which he performs in ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a human act im putable to the agent.—To illustrate: A careless Catholic suspects that the day is Friday, but fails, through sheer negligence, to make certain; and he eats meat. Now, while the agent does lack knowledge that the day is Friday, he has knowledge of his own ignorant state of mind and of his obligation to acquire knowledge. Failing to make proper effort to dispel his ignorance, he wills to keep his ignorance. But his ignorance is, in some sense, the cause of his violation of the law of abstinence. Hence, he wills this violation in cause. His act has indirect voluntariness, and is a human act for which he is responsible. third principle: Vincible ignorance lessens the vol untariness of an act. While vincible ignorance does not destroy the vol untariness of an act, it lessens voluntariness, makes the act- less human, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The agent knows that he is in ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, none the less, he lacks direct and perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while possessing volun tariness, does not possess direct and perfect voluntari ness. Voluntariness is, therefore, impaired or lessened. HUMAN ACTS 35 fourth principle: Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way increases voluntar iness. Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which it implies, it is still a lack of knowledge, direct and perfect, and, in so far, it les sens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds from it. On the other hand, affected ignorance, being delib erately fostered to serve as an excuse for sin against a law, shows the strength of the will’s determination to persist in such sins. It is thus said to increase the voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately, to in dicate an increased voluntariness in the act that comes from it. b) CONCUPISCENCE The term concupiscence is often used to signify the frailty, or proneness to evil, which is consequent in human nature upon original sin. Ethics does not em ploy the term in this sense. Here concupiscence means those bodily appetites or tendencies which are called the passions, and which are enumerated as follows: love, hatred; joy, grief; desire, aversion or horror; hope, despair; courage or daring, fear; and anger. We treat here of the passions in general. In the next section of the present Article we shall study in partic ular the passion of fear. 36 ETHICS The passions are called antecedent when they spring into action unstimulated by any act of the will; that is, when they arise antecedently to the will-act. They are called consequent when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs them up or fosters them. To illustrate: the feel ing of joy that arises upon the suddenly revealed view of a splendid landscape; the anger that surges in re sentment of unjust and offensive treatment; the first feeling of the attractiveness of a suddenly presented fancy or thought, good or evil; the leaping desire for revenge for an unexpected act of cruelty; the first feel ing of hatred that comes with the thought or sight of a bitter enemy; the shrinking in aversion from an un pleasant task; the urge to "give up” in despair in the face of crowding difficulties—all these are examples of antecedent concupiscence or passion. These move ments or bodily appetites become consequent when they receive the approval of the rational will. Thus, the passion of anger that arises antecedently when one is insulted, becomes consequent when the feeling is de liberately retained. Thus, the first movement of pleas ure (love, joy) in an unwholesome thought or fancy, becomes consequent when the will consents to retain that thought or fancy. Antecedent concupiscence is an act of man, and not a human act. It is therefore a non-voluntary act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent concu piscence, however, is the fault of the agent, for it is willed, either directly or indirectly, that is, either in HUMAN ACTS 37 itself or in cause. The agent is, in consequence, respon sible for it. But what of the acts that come from concupiscence? We state the ethical principles in the matter: first principle: Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act. Some ethicians use “voluntariness” to mean will force, vehemence or intensity of will-act. These as sert that concupiscence increases the voluntariness of an act, and they are right, for concupiscence gives a strong urge to action, and the act that comes from it is more vehement and intense by reason of the concu piscence. But we do not use the word voluntariness in the sense of will-force, or will-intensity; we use the term to indicate the human character of an act, the essence of a human act. We keep human act and vol untary act as synonyms. We say that antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that comes from it. Volunta riness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Ante cedent concupiscence disturbs the mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm judgment of the mind upon the moral qualities of an act; hence it impairs the knowledge necessary for perfect volunta riness. Again, antecedent concupiscence is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus it lessens the full and prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfectly voluntary act; hence it impairs free 38 ETHICS dom. Therefore, on the score of both knowledge and freedom, antecedent concupiscence lessens the volun tariness of an act, and, in consequence, diminishes the responsibility of the agent. second principle: Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupisence, they are not destroyed; and the agent’s responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. A man may sin, and sin gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion. Still, his sin is less grave than it would be if com mitted dispassionately and, so to speak, "in cold blood.” To illustrate: Jones, under the influence of antecedent anger, strikes Smith and injures him ser iously. While the voluntariness of this act is lessened by antecedent concupiscence, and while Jones is less responsible than he would be if he struck the blow in cold deliberation, still the act is truly voluntary, and Jones is responsible for it. The reason is that Jones, while upset and disturbed by strong passion, is still master of his acts; he knows what he is doing, ancf does it freely. Passion may make the control of his acts more or less difficult, but it does not make such control impossible. If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of the agent’s acts impos sible, then the agent is temporarily insane, and his acts are not human acts, but acts of man. Here, how HUMAN ACTS 39 ever, we speak only of human acts as influenced by antecedent concupiscence. third principle: Consequent concupiscence, how ever great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act. Consequent concupiscence is willed, directly or in directly. Hence the acts that proceed from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect. To il lustrate: Jones wishes to be revenged on Morris. He plans the act of revenge. He broods upon his wrongs in order to stir himself up, to nerve himself to action. He attacks Morris and injures him seri ously. Here we have direct voluntariness through out. Jones directly wills the act of revenge, and directly wills the anger as a means to the accom plishment of that act. Now, even if he be insane with rage at the moment of performing the act, he is none the less doing what he directly willed to do, and his concupiscence cannot affect the full volunta riness of that act. Again: Smith broods upon wrongs suffered at the hands of Jenkins. He foresees (or can and should foresee) that if he continues to nurse his anger, he will probably be stirred to acts of violence against the person of Jenkins. Nevertheless he con tinues to brood. He becomes wild with passion, seeks out Jenkins, and seriously injures him. Here the an ger was directly willed, and the act of violence was willed in cause with the anger, and in itself at the mo 40 ETHICS ment of attack. Even if Smith’s passion was so vehe ment as to overwhelm his rational control of his acts, —even if, that is to say, the attack itself did not pro ceed from Smith as a human act,—it was neverthe less willed in cause, and has its proper voluntariness as such: an indirect voluntariness which is in no wise diminished by concupiscence. c) fear Fear is one of the passions, and is included under the general denotation of the term concupiscence, but it is usual to give it special mention in Ethics, be cause it is a very common passion, and we should know in detail its relation to the morality of acts, and because it has a characteristic distinctive among the passions, viz?., that it usually (when it is the cause of an act) induces the will to do what it would not do otherwise. We may, however, present the ethical doc trine on the subject of fear in very short space. Fear is the shrinking back of the mind from dan ger. More accurately, it is the agitation of mind (ranging from slight disturbance to actual panic) brought about by the apprehension of impending evil. Actions may proceed from fear as their cause, or may be done with fear as an accompanying circum stance. Thus, a soldier who runs to shelter from a dangerous position acts from fear, while his bolder companion who stays at his post may be affected with HUMAN ACTS 4i fear, but it is obviously not this fear that keeps him in the position; on the contrary, he remains in spite of fear. The ethical principle in this matter is: principle: An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary. The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding from fear, not an act performed with or in fear. A person may have full and unconditioned voluntariness in that which is performed with fear, as, for example, a thief, full bent upon taking valuables from a house at night, proceeds with fear that he may be apprehended; but he does not commit burglary through or from fear. An act performed from fear, however great, is simply voluntary. Of course, we speak of a human act done from or through fear. If fear is so great as to make the agent momentarily insane, the act done from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an act of man and not a human act. But as long as the agent has the use of reason, his acts performed from fear are simply voluntary. For the agent effectively chooses to perform such an act rather than undergo that of which he is afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and effectively chooses it. But the act is also regularly involuntary inasmuch as the agent would not perform it in other circumstances; were 42 ETHICS it not for the presence of an evil feared, the act would not be performed. To illustrate: A man denies his faith to escape torture and death. His denial comes from fear. Hence, according to our principle, the act is simply voluntary, and the man is responsible for the sin of apostasy. Still, since the man would not have denied his faith except for the influence of fear, we discern a conditional involuntariness in his act which renders it less sinful (though it still remains a very grave sin) than it would be were it done in cold deliberation, apart from the influence of fear. The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not ex cuse an evil act which springs from it. Fear does pre sent a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts. Still, the influence of fear makes an act less perfectly human in character, although never to such an extent that the agent is enabled to act hu manly and still escape responsibility for his act. The positive ("statute") law of Church and State usually provides that an act done from grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent to perform an act that is against his will, is an invalid act or one that may be invalidated. Even though such an act is simply voluntary, it would not be for the common good to allow an act ex torted by fear to stand as valid and binding. Thus, a man who is required to sign a contract at the point of a gun, or under threat of blackmail, would not be bound, in positive law, to fulfil the contract. HUMAN ACTS 43 d) VIOLENCE Violence or coaction is external force applied by a free cause (i. e., by a cause with free will; by man) for the purpose of compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will. Thus, the martyrs suf fered violence when they were dragged to the altars of idols in the effort to make them offer sacrifice to false gods. Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not controlled by the body. Still, the will has the command of bodily action, and since this command is limited or de stroyed for the moment by violence, the will is said to be indirectly affected by violence. Hence, if the will does not exert its command to make the bodily mem bers offer due resistance to violence, it concurs, in so far as such resistance is lacking, in the act done un der violence. principle: Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent. e) HABIT By habit Ethics understands operative habit{ which is a lasting readiness and facility, born of fre^ quently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner., Thus, a man who has always endeavored to speak 44 ETHICS the truth, has a habit of truthfulness, and it goes against his habit—"against the grain”—to lie. Such a man finds it necessary to make a distinct effort in order to utter a deliberate falsehood. Again, a man who has the habit of lying, finds it very easy to fal sify or evade the truth, and it is difficult for him to tell the truth when a lie would prove convenient. Again, a man who has the habit of cursing finds pro fane words slipping from him with great ease and readiness, while it requires a special watchfulness on his part to avoid uttering them. principle: Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure. Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts done from what is called force of habit. Even if such acts be in them selves acts of man, the habit itself, so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to overcome it, is willed as a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence are hu man acts. To illustrate: John has the bad habit of using profane language. He is conscious of this fault. Being conscious of it, he has knowledge of it; and he is free to determine upon overcoming it, or to allow it to endure. Hence, both knowledge and freedom are present, and there is nothing to balk HUMAN ACTS 45 voluntariness. John is therefore responsible for the bad habit as such, and, since it is the cause of the profane words—many of which are uttered without advertence—he is responsible in cause or indirectly for each profane utterance. Now, if John determines to overcome his evil habit, he disowns it; he wills not to utter profane speech. But "He that wills the end wills the means to that end.” Hence, John, to be honest in his will to reform, must consent to cease less watchfulness over his tongue. While his good intention endures, and while his watchfulness con tinues, the profane utterances that "slip out” are acts of man and not human acts, since their cause is no longer willed; and hence they are not imputable to John. But the moment John ceases to be watchful, that moment he consents indirectly to let the habit continue, and his evil words become again imputable, even if they slip from him unnoticed. SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE In this lengthy Article we have studied the modi fiers of human acts, and have endeavored to deter mine their general influence upon human acts. We have studied the following principles, learning how and why each is valid: I. Regarding ignorance i. Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntari ness of an act. 46 ETHICS ii. Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. hi. Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act. iv. Affected ignorance in one way lessens the voluntariness and in another way increases it. 2..Regarding concupiscence i. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the volun tariness of an act. ii. Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act. hi. Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act. 3. Regarding fear An act done from fear, however great, is sim ply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary. 4. Regarding violence Acts elicited by the will are not subject to vio lence ; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent. HUMAN ACTS 47 Z. Regarding habit Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure. CHAPTER II THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS A human act is always performed for an end. This Chapter discusses ends in general, and the ultimate end of human acts in particular. The Chapter is accordingly divided into the following Articles: Article i. Ends in General Article 2. The Ultimate End of Human Acts Article 1. Ends in General a) Definition b) Classification a) DEFINITION OF END An end is both a termination and a goal. In other words, an end is that which completes or finishes a thing, and it is that for which the thing is finished. A sculptor has reached the end of his work on a statue when the last bit of marble has been chipped away; and he has reached the end in another sense, inasmuch as the finished statue is the goal he set out to attain when he started the work. By an end we mean the end of an activity. We do not speak of end in the sense of boundary, or edge, or rim, or side of a bodily object, but as the termination and goal of ac~ 48 THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 49 tivity. In the example given, the work of the sculp tor, the activity of making the statue (both in itself, and as coming from interior plan and purpose) is the activity considered. Every activity tends toward an end. A tree tends to grow to full stature, maturity, and fruitfulness: and this is the end of its activity of growth. A hungry dog seizing a bit of beef evinces an activity of in stinct for the meat as a good thing to have, as an end to be achieved. Even lifeless things have activi ties proper to their nature, and these tend toward ends by reason of what we call natural laws. Thus, fire tends to burn, bodies tend to fall toward the center of the earth, bodies at rest tend to remain at rest, bodies in motion tend to remain in motion of the same direction and velocity. Every activity tends toward an end; and thus every activity is a tendency. Now, every tendency may be called an appetite, or more properly, appe tency. When appetency exists without any sort of knowledge—as in plants and lifeless things—it is called natural appetency, in a special limited, and technical sense of the term “natural.” When appe tency comes of knowledge, it is of two kinds, just as knowledge itself is of two kinds. Appetency which is stirred into action by sensation (i. e., by knowl edge acquired by the senses) is called sense-appetency or sensual appetite. We have an example of such ap petency in the hungry dog seizing meat. Appetency 50 ETHICS which is stirred into action by intellectual knowledge is called the will or rational appetency. We have an example of such appetency in the act of the sculptor described above. The sculptor knows the statue to be desirable (for one or many reasons: it may bring fame, or money; it may express devotion to art; it may express love of the personage represented, and so on), and he wills to make it. We have already learned in our study of Human Acts that the will springs into action only when intellectual knowledge presents something desirable, satisfactory, or simply good, to be achieved by action. Every will-act, that is, every human act, is the expression of rational ap petency or will: it is an act directed to an end known as desirable, that is to say, as good to attain. In Ethics we speak of the ends of human acts. Here, then, the end is that which is apprehended as good, as desirable, and which attracts the human agent to the performance of the act. It is the agent’s motive and reason for acting. It causes the agent to act, and, in so far, the end is the fined cause of a human act—a cause called final, from the Latin word finis, which means end. The agent is the effi cient cause of his acts, for it is he that effects or per forms them; but he would not effect them were he not attracted by the end or final cause. No human act can exist, therefore, without a final cause, that is to say, without an end apprehended by the agent as de THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 5i sirable or good enough to attract the agent to action and to serve as his motive in the act. The end or final cause of human acts must be ap prehended as good. Evil cannot be willed as such or for its own sake. Evil is done only when it assumes the aspect of good, as something that will bring satis faction or will lead to it. This does not mean that a sinner thinks he is acting virtuously when he com mits a sin. On the contrary, he knows that the sin is morally evil and that he is responsible for it. But the point is that the sin to which he consents is appre hended as something that willl bring present satis faction, or will lead to it, and this is judged by the agent as a greater good than that which is required by the moral law which forbids the sin. Notice that it is as a greater good that the sin is chosen. Of course, the agent’s judgment in the matter is not sound; his sin will not lead to ultimate happiness or satisfaction, but inasmuch as it is a judgment of the sin as good, it explains what is meant by the state ment that evil is not chosen as such, nor for its own sake, but only when it assumes the aspect of good. In our sense, good is that which answers tendency or desire. To define end: An end is a termination and goal of activity. In a human act the end is the final cause, viz., that on account of which, or to attain which, the act is performed, and which is, in consequence, 52 ETHICS apprehended as a good sufficiently desirable to motiv ate the agent in performing the act. b) CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS Here we distinguish: i. The end of the act, and the end of the agent; ii. Proximate and remote ends; iii. Intermediate and ultimate ends. i. The end of the act is the end toward which the act of its own nature tends. Thus, the act of giving food and shelter to destitute persons tends of its nature toward the relief of distress, and we say that the relief of distress is the end of the act.—The end of the agent is the end which the agent intends to achieve by his act. Thus, the act of giving food and shelter to destitute persons may be performed by the agent to increase his merit before God, or as an act of impetration to obtain a grace or favor, or as an act of penance for sins committed. Again, the agent may perform the act in order to have it noticed by others, so that he may gain the reputation of a bene ficent person. Again, the act may be performed by an agent who merely wishes to relieve distress. In the last case, the end of the agent coincides with the end of the act. In the other cases, the end of the agent is different from the end of the act. When we speak of the end in Ethics, we usually mean the end of the agent. ii. The proximate end is the end intended as the THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 53 immediate outcome of an act. The remote end is that which the agent wishes to achieve later on, and to ward the attainment of which he employs the present act as a means. Thus a politician who gives money to the poor, wishes his good deed to be recorded in the newspapers: his proximate end is favorable public ity. However, he does not desire publicity for its own sake, but for the votes it will gain him in the coming elections; and he wishes for votes as a means to office. Thus, while publicity is his proximate end, votes and election to office are remote ends. iii. An end, whether proximate or remote, is willed either for its own sake or as a means to an end more remote. If it is willed for its own sake, it is a last or ultimate end, and if it is willed as a means to a further end, it is an intermediate end. To illus trate : A man gives money to the poor. He gives the money to gain favorable notice in the newspapers (proximate and intermediate end); he wills public ity as a means to votes (remote and intermediate end) ; he wills votes as a means to election (remote and intermediate end) ; he wills election for the promi nence, power, and wealth which the office will give him (remote and ultimate end). This example shows us a chain or series of ends; and, since the ultimate end of the series is not the general or unconditioned end of the man’s whole life and all its human acts, but ulti mate only in relation to the present series of ends, the ultimate end of the series is called an end relatively 54 ETHICS ultimate. Now, there must also be an end which is un conditionally and unlimitedly the ultimate end of all human acts; and this we call the absolutely ultimate end. We shall discuss this end in the next Article. We notice here that it is the ultimate end which gives meaning to the intermediate ends that lead to it. The intermediate ends are subordinated to the ultimate end, just as the steps of a stairway are subordinated to the top step. And as a man who wishes to reach the top of a stairway must take many intermediate steps before reaching the top, but would not take any of them except to reach the top, so in a series of ends, the agent must attain intermediate ends before achieving the ultimate end, but he would not try to attain any of them except on account of the ultimate end. Thus, we repeat, the ultimate end of a series of ends gives meaning and motive to the whole series. An ultimate end is both objective and subjective. The objective ultimate end is that thing, that object, which, in last analysis, motivates a human act. The subjective last end is the possession of the objective end and the satisfaction or happiness that is appre hended as belonging to that possession. Thus, the politicians’s last end (in the series of ends which we studied above) is a political office with its power, prominence, and good wages. This is the objective ultimate end. The subjective ultimate end which the agent seeks to achieve is the possession of the office THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 55 and what it will bring. In other words, the ob ject sought is office; and the subjective desire of the agent (the acting subject) is satisfaction in the pos session of the office. SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE In this article we have discussed the meaning of end, and have described it and defined it. We have seen that an end is always the object of appetency, and we have discovered that the rational appetency of man is his will. Since the will is necessarily exer cised in every human act, it follows that every human act comes from appetency, or tendency toward an end: and thus every human act is performed on ac count of an end. We have called the end of human acts their final cause. We have seen that the end of human acts is always sought because it is desirable, satisfactory, or good; and that evil as such is never the end of human acts. We have classified the ends of human acts, dis tinguishing the end of the act and the end of the agent, the proximate and remote ends of human acts, and the intermediate and ultimate ends of such acts. We have indicated the fact that there is one abso lutely ^ultimate end of human action. We have dis tinguished the ultimate end as objective and sub jective. 56 ETHICS Article 2. The Ultimate End of Human Acts a) The Objective Ultimate End b) The Subjective Ultimate End The ultimate end of human acts is that which, in the last analysis, serves as a sufficient reason and mo tive for the acts. This end, considered as an objective thing toward the attainment of which the acts are directed, is the objective ultimate end of human acts. The possession of this objective end and the happi ness which the agent seeks in that possession, is the subjective ultimate end of human acts. We have seen that a human act is always done on account of an end, and an ultimate end. We now assert that all human acts are performed for a single absolutely ultimate end. a) THE OBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS A human act is a deliberate and knowing act; it is an act performed by the knowing agent who wills to perform it. And why does he will to perform it? Be cause he has a motive, a reason, a final cause suffi ciently attractive to induce him to perform it. And this reason, motive, or final cause amounts to this: it appears good to the agent to perform the act and attain its end. Even when the human act is difficult or undesirable in itself, it becomes desirable in view of a further end to which it is directed as a means. Thus, a man freely consenting to a serious operation, THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 57 wills the operation, and his will-act is a human act. But the operation is not willed for itself, but in view of relief from affliction or in the hope of prolonging life, and in this aspect it is desirable and good, no matter how dangerous and fearsome it may be in itself. Now, it may be that the man who submits to the dangerous operation is a poor man; it may be that the prospect of prolonged life which the opera tion affords is also the prospect of a hard and even destitute life; it may be that the life to which the patient looks forward is a life inevitably filled with woes and miseries. And yet he wants it, he wills it as an end. Why? Because he apprehends life with all its hardships as a greater good than the loss of life. Again, the suicide (supposing him sane when he per forms his horrible act) destroys life by a human act. He does so because he apprehends the cessation of life as a greater good than the continuance of life with its miseries. Thus it clearly appears that human acts are always done for an end apprehended as good, and as the greater good when there is question of sacrificing one thing in view of another. More: the driving power back of human acts viewed all together—or, more accurately, the power of attraction that calls human acts into being—is not only the good, or the greater good, but the greatest good, the absolutely illimitable, all-inclusive, and all perfect good. This is the summum bonum, which, con sidered in itself, we call the absolutely ultimate ob 58 ETHICS jective end of human acts. It will not be difficult to prove this assertion. Man seeks happiness. Whether he seeks it in riches, in pleasures, in power, in prominence, in honors at tained, or even in license and sin, the fact remains that what he is seeking is that which will please him, that which will satisfy his wants and desires, that, in one word, which will make him happy. This quest of happiness is a tendency of man’s very nature of which he finds it utterly impossible to free himself. Man is free in his choice of objects in which he hopes to find happiness, and we call this the freedom of the will, or the freedom of choice; but man is not free to seek unhappiness for its own sake. Even the "cantankerous" individual who does mean things in a mean way, and hurts himself in doing them, and, so to speak, cuts off his nose to spite his face, is never theless doing what he wants to do, and in the achiev ing of that want he apprehends some satisfaction; otherwise, there could be no conceivable motive for the acts, and motive there must be, for the acts exist. Now, there is an object towards which the whole tendency of human action is ever directed; an object that will satisfy all tendency, fill up all capacity for desire, leave nothing further that can be the end of human acts. And this we call the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. We may define this end as that object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 59 capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to tend as towards an end. This absolutely ultimate objective end must be one, must be a single object. For consider: this end is so perfect a good that nothing beyond it can be de sired. Therefore, it must be the infinite good. Nothing finite could meet the requirements of such an end. The greatest happiness thinkable, short of the pos session of the infinite good, is imperfect and fleeting. The largest fortune might still be larger; the se renest peace of life must quickly give place to care or be lost in death; the highest honors man may achieve leave other honors still unwon. And over all human achievements, over the bliss of abounding health and the rapture of the presence of loved ones, over fame attained and glory worthily won, over ambition fulfilled and high hope realized—over all that is finite hangs a cloud, a menace, a threat that is certainly to be fulfilled: all must pass—and soon! Hence all finite good is imperfect, if only that it will not last always. But it is imperfect also in scope, in extent. A finite thing is, by its very definition, a thing with limits. Can any limited thing satisfy in fullest measure of perfection the unlimited desires of man? No, for these pass all bounds; there is no line that can be drawn to mark the limit of the possibility of desire. Only the infinite good can be the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. And there can 6o ETHICS be but one infinite object. For an infinite object con tains all possible perfection, and there is, so to speak, no perfection left over for another object to pos sess. Hence we rightly maintain that the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts is one. Now the infinite good is God. Ethics must leave to the philosophical science of Theodicy (i. e., Natural Theology) the proof of the existence of the one God, infinitely perfect, creator, conserver, and ruler of the universe, the efficient and final cause of all. Ethics assumes the existence and attributes of God as proved. We assert that the infinite good is God; that God is the only object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any pos sibility, continue to tend as towards an end. Hence we see that St. Augustine enunciated a solid philo sophical truth, and not a mere pious sentiment, when he wrote: "O God, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee." But, you object, there is such a thing as sin, and such a thing as sinful desire. Does the sinner tend in his human act of sin toward God? Is sinful desire to find perfect fulfillment in the possession of the All-Perfect? Of course, the sinner does not tend towards God, nor is sinful desire as such satisfied with possession of the All-Perfect—to say so would be foulest blasphemy. Yet the sinner, in his human THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS 61 act of sin, does not exhibit a tendency away from what is apprehended as good; on the contrary, the very sin is a tendency toward that which is, through perversion of reason, adjudged as good, as satisfying. The sinner knows that his act is evil; but passion in vites, immediate satisfaction is promised, the fleeting pleasure of his act is ready

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