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ETHICS-MODULE-3-LECTURE-NATURAL-LAW.docx

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**ETHICS (Soc. Sci. 12)** **Placement:** 1^st^ Year, 1^st^ Semester **Course Credits:** 3 Units **MODULE 3** **[NATURAL LAW]** **Learning Objectives:** After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 1. Recognize how Thomas Aquinas made use of ancient Greek concepts to provide a ratio...

**ETHICS (Soc. Sci. 12)** **Placement:** 1^st^ Year, 1^st^ Semester **Course Credits:** 3 Units **MODULE 3** **[NATURAL LAW]** **Learning Objectives:** After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 1. Recognize how Thomas Aquinas made use of ancient Greek concepts to provide a rational grounding to an ethical theory based on the Christian faith. 2. Identify the natural law distinction from, but also in relation to, the other types of law mentioned by Aquinas: eternal law, human law, and divine law; and 3. Apply the precepts of the natural law to contemporary moral concerns. **Learning Contents:** **INTRODUCTION** In October 2016, newspapers reported that Pantaleon Alvarez, Speaker of the House of Representatives, was intending to draft a bill which would amend the country's Family Code, thereby allowing for the legalization of same-sex unions. This would result in the possibility of two men together or two women together being identified as a couple with rights guaranteed and protected by law. However, as one newspaper report revealed, even before anything could be formally proposed, other fellow legislators had already expressed to the media their refusal to support any such initiative. The reasons given in the news article vary, ranging from the opinion that seeing two men kiss is unsightly, to the statement that there is something "irregular" about belonging to the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender (LGBT) community, and to the judgement that two people of the same sex being together is *unnatural.* We are used to hearing people justify done something by making the appeal that what they maintain is what is "natural", and therefore acceptable. Likewise, people would judge something as unacceptable on the basis that it is supposedly "unnatural." Thus, we are no longer surprised when we hear people condemn and label many different things as "unnatural": maybe receiving blood transfusions, eating meat, or, as our news report shows, engaging in sexual relations that one might consider deviant. We also realize that sometimes we might find ourselves astonished or perplexed as to what different people might consider "unnatural." In order to proceed, it is therefore necessary to ask: "what do the words natural and unnatural mean?" Sometimes, the word "natural" seems to be used to refer to some kind of intuition that a person has, one which is so apparently true to him that it is unquestioned. For example, a woman may claim that it is simply "unnatural" to eat any kind of insect, and what this means is that she personally finds herself averse to the idea of doing so. In other instances, the word is used to try to justify a certain way of behaving by seeing its likeness somewhere in the natural world. For example, a man might claim that it is okay for him to have more than one sexual partner, since, in a pride of lions, the alpha male gets to mate with all the she-lions. In yet other instances, the word "natural" is used as an appeal to something instinctual without it being directed by reason. For example, a man may deem it all right if he were to urinate just anywhere because after all he sees it as "natural" function of humans. Lastly, we also easily find people using the word "natural" to refer to what seems common to them given their particular environment. For instance, a Filipina may suppose that eating three full meals of rice and *ulam*every day is "natural" because everyone she knows behaves that way. Given these varied meanings of the term "natural" we need to find a more solid and nuanced way to understand the term. In this chapter, we will explore how Thomas Aquinas provides this, emphasizing the capacity for reason as what is essential in our human nature. This understanding of human nature anchored on our capacity for reason will become the basis of the natural law theory, a theory which will provide us a unique way of determining the moral status of our actions. **THOMAS AQUINAS** *Hailed as a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church, Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican friar who was the preeminent intellectual figure of the scholastic period of the Middle Ages, contributing to the doctrine of the faith more than any other figure of his time. His Summa Theologiae, Aquinas's magnum opus, is voluminous work that comprehensively discusses many significant points in Christian theology. He was canonized in 1323.* There have been various thinkers and systems of thought emerging throughout history that could be said to present a natural law theory. Among them, the one we will be focusing on is the medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas. It has to be recognized, however, that this natural law theory is part of a larger discussion, which is his moral theory taken as a whole. This moral theory, in turn, is part of a larger project, which is Aquinas's vision of the Christian faith. {INSERT VIDEO} (video uploaded in a separate file) **THE CONTEXT OF THE CHRISTIAN THEORY** The fundamental truth maintained and elaborated by Aquinas in all his works is the promise right at the center of the Christian faith: *that we are created by God in order ultimately return to Him.* The structure of his magnus opus *Summa Theologiae*follows the trajectory of this story. There are three parts to this voluminous work. In the first part, Aquinas speaks of God, and although we acknowledge that our limited human intellect cannot fully grasp Him, we nevertheless are able to say something concerning His goodness, His might, and His creative power. Recognizing then that we are created by God, we move on to the second part, which deals with man or the dynamic of human life. This is characterized by our pursuit of happiness, which we should realize rests ultimately not on any particular good thing that is created by God, but in the highest good which is God Himself. Our striving for this ultimate happiness, while important, will not in itself bring us to this blessed state. In other words, salvation is only possible through the presence of God's grace and that grace has become perfectly incarnate in the person of Jesus. Thus, the third part focuses on Jesus as our Savior. Given that our concern here is the question of ethics, it would seem clear that what would be of greatest interest to us is the second part or the section of this story that centers on human life and its striving toward God. However, bringing up the notion that living a good life leads us to God could easily be misunderstood as a simple exhortation to obey certain rules as given to us through Church doctrines or by following certain passages lifted randomly from sacred Scriptures. In other words, we may fall into danger of the divine command theory. Instead, we should hope to find that there is much greater complexity, but also coherence, to the ethics of Aquinas. **THE CONTEXT OF AQUINAS'S ETHICS** A full consideration of Aquinas's ethics would require us to explore his discussion of other matters, such as how, in our pursuit of happiness, we direct our actions toward specific ends. We might explore how emotions -- "the passions" -- are involved in this process, and therefore require a proper order if they are to properly contribute to a good life. We might explore how our actions are related to certain dispositions (often referred to as "habits") in a dynamic way since our actions both arise from our habits and at the same time reinforce them. We might explore his discussion of how we develop either good or bad habits with a good disposition leading us toward making moral choices, thereby contributing to our moral virtue, and a bad disposition inclining us toward making immoral choices, bringing us to vice. The Christian life, therefore, is about developing the capacities given to us by God into a disposition of virtue inclined toward the good. Aquinas also puts forward that there is within us a conscience that directs our moral thinking. This does not refer to some simple intuition or gut feeling. For Aquinas, there is a sense of right and wrong in us that we are obliged to obey. However, he also adds that this sense of right and wrong must be informed, guided, and ultimately grounded in an objective basis for morality. So, we are called to heed the voice of conscience and enjoined to develop and maintain a life of virtue. However, these both require content, so we need something more. We need a basis for our conscience to be properly informed, and we need a clearer guidepost on whether certain decisions we make lead us toward virtue or vice. Being told that one should heed one's conscience or that one should try to be virtuous, does very little to guide people as to what specifically should be done in a given situation. Thus, there is a need for clearer basis of ethics, a ground that will more concretely direct our sense of what is right and wrong. For Aquinas, this would be the natural law. **THE ESSENCE AND VARIETIES OF LAW** **ESSENCE** As rational beings, we have a free will. Through our capacity for reason, we are able to judge between possibilities and to choose to direct our actions in one way or the other. Our actions are directed toward attaining ends or goods that we desire. We work on a project to complete it. We study in order to learn. My mother bakes in order to come up with some cookies. Maybe my brother practices playing guitar in order to get better at it. It can also be as simple as the fact that I play basketball because I enjoy doing so. These are goods, and we act in a certain way to pursue them, so goods are sometimes referred to as the ends of actions. There are many possible desirable ends or goods, and we act in such ways as to pursue them. However, just because we think that a certain end is good and is therefore desirable does not necessarily mean it is indeed good. It is possible to first suppose that something is good only to realize later that doing so was a mistake. This is why it is important for reason to be always part of the process. Acts are rightly directed toward their ends by reason. But this does not simply mean that through reason we can figure out how to pursue something that we already had thoughtlessly supposed to be good for us. In thinking about what is good for us, it is also quite possible that we end up thinking exclusively of our own good. Aquinas reminds us that this will not do; we cannot simply act in pursuit of our own ends or good without any regard for other people's ends or good. We are not isolated beings, but beings who belong to a community. Since we belong to a community, we have to consider what is good for the community as well as our own good. This can be called the *common good.* What exactly the common good is might not always be easy to determine as there are many variables to consider, such as the particular community we are thinking of or the particular ends that the community is pursuing. But that need not occupy us right now. What is of greater significance for us here is the recognition that, since we must consider not just our own good but also that of others, we cannot act in just any which way; there would have to be some kind of measure to our acts. It is good for us to not simply be free to act in whatever way we like. We should recognize the proper measure or the limits in our actions that would allow us to direct our acts in such a way that we can pursue ends, both our own and also that of others, together. The determination of the proper measure of our acts can be referred to as *law.* Using a simple example, we can think of traffic rules. A motorist cannot just drive in any way he likes but must respect traffic rules. These rules seem to measure or place a limit on his driving, for example, by placing a maximum speed he can travel on a particular road. Such a limit or such a rule is something good, for both him and for others as it helps prevent motor accidents. As Aquinas puts it, the law must regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. A law, therefore, is concerned with the common good. In a way, making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public person who has care for the common good or is tasked with the concern for the good of the community or of the whole people. Consider some of these examples. On a modest scale, imagine a student organization of twenty members. Together, all the members decide that it would be best if they were to meet on Friday afternoons or that they all had to contribute for lunch in their meetings. On a larger scale, a teacher who is in charge of a class of forty students has to put some rules in place so that things will go smoothly. Perhaps, she would maintain that students may not just walk in and out of the classroom and that they are not supposed to chatter loudly with their seatmates. The teacher imposes these rules not on a whim, but for the good of the class. On a still larger scale, city officials put up ordinances concerning, for example, garbage collection, traffic schemes, or zoning to control building sites. Ideally speaking, these all are done in view of what would be best for the community. It is also necessary for rules or laws to be communicated to the people involved in order to enforce them and to better ensure compliance. This is referred to as *promulgation.* In an ideal sense, without considering the reality that sometimes rules are not properly thought out or seem to favor select persons or groups rather than the common good, we can speak of law as a form of restriction and direction of human actions in such a way that the common good is promoted. Aquinas's own summary of this point is worth citing: "The definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated." Now, in thinking about community, what if we thought more grandly, not just a small group, a class, a city, or even a country? What if we think of vast community which is the entire universe and everything in it, or in other words, all of being? Is there Someone in charge of this community, guiding all toward their common good and directing all with His wisdom? **VARIETIES** We have noted earlier how God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all beings. By saying this, we do not only recognize God as the source of these beings, but also acknowledge the way they have been created and the way they could return to Him, which is the work of His divine reason itself. This includes the proper measure governing the acts of these beings. Aquinas writes: "He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law." This line involves the assertion that the divine wisdom that directs each being toward its proper end can be called the *eternal law.* Eternal law refers to what God wills for creation, how each participant in it is intended to return to Him. Given our limitations, we cannot grasp the fullness of the eternal law. Nevertheless, it is not completely opaque to us. We must recognize that first, we are part of the eternal law, and second, we participate in it in a special way. All things partake in the eternal law, meaning, all beings are already created by God in a certain way intended to return to Him. Thus, we can find in them the very imprint of the rule and measure by the acts by which they are guided. These can be determined in the very inclinations that they possess, directing their acts towards their proper ends. Therefore, irrational creatures (e.g., plants and animals) are participating in the eternal law, although we could hardly say that they are in any way "conscious" of this law. Aquinas notes that we cannot speak of them as obeying the law, except by way of similitude, which is to say that they do not think of the law or chose to obey it, but are simply, through the instinctual following of their nature, complying with the law that God has for them. More appropriately, these creatures are moved by divine providence. On the other hand, human being's participation is different. The human being, as rational, participates more fully and perfectly in the law given the capacity for reason. The unique imprint upon us, upon our human nature by God, is the capacity to think about what is good and what is evil, and to choose and direct ourselves appropriately. So, Aquinas writes: "Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law." Therefore, by looking at our human nature, at the natural inclinations given to us by God, we can determine the rule and measure that should be directing our acts. These are the precepts of the natural law. However, let us mention two more kinds of law provided by Aquinas. Aquinas points out that while reflecting on our human nature will provide us the precepts of the natural law, these are quite general and would have to be made more specific, and at the same time more concrete in the actual operation of human acts. For this reason, there is also *human law.* Human law refers to all instances wherein human beings construct and enforce laws in their communities. Given the larger picture of Aquinas's view, one would have a basis for assessing the validity or invalidity of a human law: whether or not it conforms to the natural law. Insofar as human law goes against what nature inclines us toward, it is not properly speaking a law -- the ideal sense of directing us to the common good -- but instead is unjust and can be called a matter of violence. Finally, Aquinas asks us to recall that there is a certain form of happiness that is proportionate to our human nature, which we can obtain by means of our natural principles. However, there is also another, more complete, happiness that surpasses human's nature, a supernatural happiness that can be obtained through the power of God alone. To direct us toward our supernatural end, we had been given further instructions in the form of *divine law.* This term, often confused with eternal law, refers specifically to the instances where we have precepts or instructions that come from divine revelation. For example, we have what is handed down to us in the sacred Scriptures (e.g., the Ten Commandments in the book of Exodus in the Old Testament or Jesus's injunction to love one's neighbor in the Gospels). While this is necessary for Aquinas as he sees our end as the blessed return to God, it is not our concern here insofar as, given that our concern is ethics, one need not rely on the divine law in order to be moral. Of interest then about this natural law theory of Aquinas is that while it is clearly rooted in a Christian vision, it grounds as sense of morality not on that faith but on human nature. Aquinas writes: "So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less... Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law..." The statement is remarkable claim: anyone, coming from any religious tradition, just by looking at the nature that she shares with her fellow human beings, would be able to determine what is ethical. The complication one may have over an overly religious presentation is dispelled when we recognize the universal scope that Aquinas envisions. **NATURAL LAW** We now turn to the specifics concerning the natural law. **The Natural Law** *Summa Theologiae 1-2, Question 94, Article 2* Thomas Aquinas *Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of contrary, hence it is all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals," such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.* **In Common with Other Beings** In reading Aquinas, we have to consider how we, human beings, are both unique and at the same time participating in the community of the rest of creation. Our presence in the rest of creation does not only mean that we interact with creatures that are not human, but that there is also in our nature something that shares in the nature of other beings. Aquinas thus identifies first that there is in our nature, common with all other beings, a desire to preserve one's own being. A *makahiya*leaf folds inward and protects itself when touched. A cat cowers and then tries to run away when it feels threatened. Similarly, human beings have that natural inclination to preserve their being. For this reason, Aquinas tells us that it is according to the natural law to preserve human life. We can thus say that it would be a violation of the natural law, and therefore unethical to take the life of another. Murder, for instance, would be a clear example of a violation of the natural law. On a more controversial note, it seems that taking one's life would be unacceptable, even in the form of physician-assisted suicide. On a more positive note, we can confidently posit that acts that promote the continuation of life are be lauded as ethical because they are in line with the natural law. **In Common with Other Animals** Aquinas then goes on to say that there is in our human nature, common with other animals, a desire that has to do with sexual intercourse and the care of one's offspring. As a matter of fact, animals periodically engage in sexual intercourse at a specific time of "heat" and this could result in offspring. In human beings, too, that natural inclination to engage in the sexual act and to reproduce exists. The intrinsic connection between the sexual act and fecundity gives rise to a number of notions of what is acceptable and unacceptable in varying degrees of contentiousness. An ethical issue that is hotly contested in some parts of the world is whether abortion is acceptable. From the stance of the natural law, the act of preventing the emergence of new life would be considered unacceptable. Not so controversial, perhaps, would be the claims that we could more easily make about how it is good to care for the young, to make sure that they are properly fed, sheltered, and educated. On the other hand, it is bad to abuse the young, to force children into hard labor or to deprive them of basic needs or otherwise abuse them in physical or emotional way. With regard to the sexual act, the moral judgments get more volatile. This argument seems to provide ground for rejecting various forms of contraception since these allow for the sexual act to take place but inhibit procreation. This also seems to justify the claim that any form of the sexual act that could not leaf to offspring must be considered deviant. One of these is the homosexual act. To explain, Aquinas writes: "...certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus, contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime." The question can be raised as to whether all animals "naturally" engage in heterosexual (rather than unisexual or homosexual) intercourse as Aquinas (with the much more rudimentary scientific knowledge of his time) believed. Another question is whether there must be a necessary connection between the act of sexual intercourse and procreation. **UNIQUELY HUMAN** After the first two inclinations, Aquinas presents a third reason which states that we have an inclination to good according to the nature of our reason. With this, we have a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. It is of interest that this is followed by matters of both an epistemic and social concern. The examples given to us of what would be in line with this inclination are to shun ignorance and to avoid offending those people with whom one lives. We could surmise on this basis that acts of deception or fraud would be unacceptable to Aquinas. This, as mentioned, is surmise because this is not something we are told directly by Thomas. In fact, a characteristic of the text which may be frustrating to anyone trying to read Aquinas is that he does not go into great detail here enumerating what specific acts would be clearly ethical or unethical. Instead, he gave certain general guideposts: the epistemic concern, which is that we know we pursue the truth, and the social concern, which is that we know we live in relation to others. The question of what particular acts would be in line with these or not is something that we have to determine for ourselves through the use of reason. Let us elaborate on this further. First, we had been presented with these three inclinations as bases for moral valuation. In light of this, we know that preserving the self is good. Contrary to common misconception, the sexual inclination and the sexual act are considered good things, not something to be deplored or dismissed. However, reason is not only another inclination that we have in par with the others. Instead, reason is the defining part of human nature. Thomas tells us that there is a priority among the powers of our soul, with the intellectual directing and commanding our sensitive and nutritive capacities. What this amount to is the need to recognize that while our other inclinations are good, as they are in our nature, what it means to be human is, precisely to exercise our reason in our consideration of how the whole self should be comported toward the good. I cannot simply say, "Sex is natural," if what I mean by that is that I could just engage in the act in any way I like without thought or care. Instead, we are enjoined to make full use of our reason and determine when the performance of our natural inclinations is appropriate. Second, recognizing how being rational is what is proper to man, the apparent vagueness of the third inclination that Aquinas mentions is counter-balanced by the recognition that he is not interested in providing precepts that one would simply, unthinkingly, follow. To say that human being is rational is to recognize that we should take up the burden of thinking carefully how a particular act may or may not be a violation of our nature. It is to take the trouble to think carefully about how our acts would either contribute to, or detract from, the common good. For this reason, in making human laws, additions that are not all problematic for the natural law are possible. At first glance, it may seem like there is nothing "natural" about obeying traffic rules or paying taxes. However, if it has been decided that these contribute to the common good, then they could, in fact, be proper extensions of the natural law. As Aquinas puts it, nothing hinders a change in the natural law by way of addition, since our reason has found and can find many things that benefit individual and communal human life.

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natural law Thomas Aquinas ethics
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