History Of European Integration I 2024-2025 PDF

European Integration History of European Integration I Peter Bursens Departement Politieke Wetenschappen Universiteit Antwerpen 2024- 2025 Integration versus functioning of the EU History of European Integration: Questions: - wha...

European Integration History of European Integration I Peter Bursens Departement Politieke Wetenschappen Universiteit Antwerpen 2024- 2025 Integration versus functioning of the EU History of European Integration: Questions: - what is the degree of integration? - why do sovereign states integrate? Theory: - theories from International Relations / European integration (functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, …) Functioning of the EU / EU as a political system / EU governance Questions: - how does EU decision-making work? - who determines policy contents? Theory: - theories from comparative politics (institutionalism, policy networks, multi-level governance, …) 1945-1957: first steps towards integration federalists vs. intergovernmentalists The ‘European Movement’: plea for a Federal Europe 1923: Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi: ‘Pan Europea’ 1929: Aristide Briand: League of Nations speech 1944: Altiero Spinelli: ‘Draft Declaration of the European Resistance’ Jean Monnet: key player of the European federalists The competing intergovernmental perspective 1946: Winston Churchill: ‘Zurich speech’ The European Congress in The Hague (1948): victory of the intergovernmentalist view on European integration 1949: Council of Europe: limited output, except in the field of Human Rights (European Declaration HR, European Court of HR) 1945-1957: first steps towards integration US Involvement Post WW II: devastating situation in Western Europe motivates the US to get involved: Economic restoration through the Marshall Plan Organisation of European Cooperation and Development (OECD) Start of the Cold War brings US military presence in Western Europe Greece – 1947; NATO - 1949 The Marshall Plan opens the issue of German rehabilitation: how to reconcile the recovery of the German economy with the economic development and military security of France? 1945-1957: first steps towards integration France, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman France reluctantly sees the uncontrolled economic recovery of Germany. Jean Monnet (a top civil servant) persuades Robert Schuman (the French Minister of Foreign Affairs) to radically change the French position towards becoming a supporter of the creation of a supranational organisation to manage the economic sectors of coal and steel. Monnet’s idea was that the integration of the coal and steel sectors would eventually lead to the integration of the whole economy (cf. spill-over logic of the functional perspective) Schuman’s proposal is supported by Adenauer (BRD) en Acheson / Truman (US) 1945-1957: first steps towards integration The Schuman Declaration and the ECSC Schuman-Declaration (9 May 1950): proposal to establish a supranational organisation comprising France and Germany and an invitation to the Benelux and Italy to join the initiative. The UK was not invited, because France feared that a British rejection of the supranational nature would endanger the integration process. April 1951: signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Augustus 1952: foundation of the ECSC Structure and policy of the ECSC: Creation of a High Authority, a Court of Justice, a Council of Ministers and a Common Assembly creation of a common market for coal and steel and common control over production, price-setting and competition 1945-1957: first steps towards integration Failed attempt to establish a European Defence Community Pleven-plan (1950) a European Defence Community (EDC) aiming to remilitarise West-Germany under control of other West European states Negotiations between the 6 member states of the ECSC (1951-1952) May 1952: signing of the EDC Treaty Failed ratification of the EDC Treaty in the French Assemblée (1954), under pressure of Charles De Gaulle. Alternative and successful attempt to remilitarise: West-Germany (BRD) becomes NATO-member in 1955. 1945-1957: first steps towards integration foundation of EEC and EURATOM Monnet’s spill-over logic adds a new sector to the integration: atomic energy. Messina 1955: ECSC Foreign Affairs Ministers commission a report of Paul Henri Spaak discussing further steps in the integration process Venice 1956: ‘Report Spaak’ proposes to establish two new organisations: (one for atomic energy and one for a common market): start of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) All ECSC member states support the idea, although France initially rejects the common market idea (reasons: overseas territories, agriculture, national industries)  1945-1957: first steps towards integration foundation of EEC and EURATOM Negotiations among the 6 ECSC member states lead to: The Treaties of Rome (1957) the EURATOM-Treaty the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) Ratification of both treaties in 1957 New institutions effective in 1958 The High Authority becomes the European Commission more competencies for the Council of Ministers The Common Assembly and the Court of Justice remain unchanged Brussels becomes the ‘Capital of Europe’ 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics De Gaulle’s European policy 1958: start of France’s ‘Fifth Republic’, Charles De Gaulle becomes president of France De Gaulle was a supporter of economic integration: devaluation and economic reform prepare France for the European customs union, thus making the customs union possible plea for a Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to support and co-finance the reform of the French agriculture sector UK’s reaction to the establishment of EURATOM and EEC: the foundation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 Members: UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Finland Strengthening of the German – French Axis, based upon the excellent personal relationship between Konrad Adenauer and Charles De Gaulle French-German Friendship Treaty (‘Elysée-Treaty’, 1963) 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics De Gaulle’s European policy De Gaulle aims to incorporate supranational economic integration in a broader intergovernmental political and military cooperation Ultimate aim: to establish a ‘European Europe’, starring France as the undisputed political leader Fouchet-plan (1960 - 1962): proposal to establish intergovernmental cooperation in the field of foreign and defence policies. German support: German – French axis, opportunity for rehabilitation Rejected by the other EEC member states: too intergovernmental 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics Evolution of the EEC Elaboration of the EEC institutional structure: European Commission: Hallstein becomes first president, development of the administration Council of Ministers: secretariat based in Brussels, establishment of the COREPER Court of Justice: start of influential case-law Common Assembly: first plenary meetings Development of the EEC’s policy content: Customs Union: abolishment of internal tariffs, common external tariff External Policies: GATT-negotiations, Yaoundé-convention Competition, Transport, Energy, Social Affairs: very slow progress CAP: progress thanks to a common understanding between the European Commission and Charles De Gaulle 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics The ‘Empty Chair’ crisis Dispute between the European Commission and France with respect to the financing of the Common Agriculture Policy: The proposal of the European Commission: ‘Own resources’ for the EEC More powers for the European Commission and the Common Assembly at the expense of the member states Majority Voting to replace unanimity Unacceptable for France: too much loss of sovereignty France leaves the negotiations and refuses to participate in the meetings of the Council of Ministers: the ‘empty chair’ crisis (1965). Other member states refuse to give in 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics The ‘Empty Chair’ crisis France eventually shows up again (1966) and accepts a compromise: interim financing of the CAP postponement of the ‘own resources’ issue the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ (‘agreement to disagree’) Voting by qualified majority becomes possible. However, unanimity can be invoked whenever a member state perceives its national vital interests are at stake. Result: EEC can get back to work, but intergovernmentalism is reinforced The intergovernmental method becomes even more crucial Decision-making procedures are slowed down The ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ 1. ‘When issues very important to one or more member countries are at stake, the members of the Council will try, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all members of the Council, while respecting their mutual interests, and those of the Community.’ 2. ‘The French delegation considers that, when very important issues are at stake, discussions must be continued until unanimous agreement is reached.’ 3. The six delegations note that there is a divergence of views on what should be done in the event of a failure to reach complete agreement.’ 4. However, they consider that this divergence does not prevent the Community’s work being resumed in accordance with the normal procedure.’ 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics the UK’s membership application The UK applies a first time for EEC membership in 1961 Commonwealth and EFTA show worse economic figures than EEC UK is deeply divided with respect to EC membership Prime Minister Macmillan was an Atlanticist and received President Kennedy’s support for EC membership application Very difficult negotiations De Gaulle distrusted the UK-US ties discussions with respect to agriculture, Commonwealth and EFTA Nassau-agreement between UK and US: US missiles in the UK De Gaulle vetoes British membership in 1963 1958-1969: De Gaulle dominates European politics the UK’s membership application The UK applies a second time for EC membership in 1967 EFTA is still performing economically worse than the EC still deep divisions within the UK with respect to EC membership De Gaulle reacts much faster and declares that the UK is politically and economically not ready for EC membership May ’68 revolt forces De Gaulle to resign in 1969 the EEC slowly recovers from years of stagnation Fusion Treaty (1965): EEC plus ECSC = European Community (EC) Successful negotiations of the GATT’s Kennedy-round 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism new ‘relance’ in The Hague German Prime Minister Willy Brandt makes Germany more politically assertive (‘Ostpolitik’). Germany starts performing very well economically. Brandt supports British EC accession. President Pompidou balances between the inheritance of De Gaulle and the aim to give France a more central position in the European debate. France starts performing less well economically. Pompidou becomes a supporter of British EC accession to ensure an antidote for German economic hegemony. 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism new ‘relance’ in The Hague The Summit of The Hague (1969) brings optimism Completion of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) (financing) Foreign Policy Cooperation (Davignon) Monetary Policy Cooperation (Werner) British accession negotiations as from 1970 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism results of ‘The Hague’ Own resources for the EC: all import tariffs and maximum 1% of VAT revenues ! no consideration of the net payer status of future member UK ! European Parliament receives limited powers over the budget Report Davignon (1970): European Political Cooperation (EPC), outside the existing EC institutional structure Report Werner (1970): ambitious plan to establish an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within 10 years. Take-off of new accession negotiations 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism first enlargement UK Heath applies for EC membership in 1970 Still deeply divided political elites within the UK Negotiations (1970-1971) mainly discuss agricultural and financial issues French referendum accepts UK accession in 1972 UK ratification of the accession treaty in 1972 Norway Referendum rejects accession (53.5% against): agriculture, fisheries, oil Denmark Referendum accepts accession (63% in favour), but much scepticism Ireland Referendum accepts accession (83% in favour), start of a success story UK, Ireland and Denmark become EC member states in 1973 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism economic and political crisis End of the Bretton Woods agreements (1971) brings Europe in a recession and increases the necessity for European monetary coordination: creation of the currency ‘snake’ (1972) and a call for an EMU (1972) Oil crisis (1973) worsens the economic crisis, making forecasts to establish a common monetary and energy policy very gloomy EC – US tension: oil crisis and Israeli - Arab conflict French – German tensions: Ostpolitik British – German tensions: European Fund for Regional Development (EFRD) Pompidou, Heath, Brandt disappear, Giscard d’Estaing, Schmidt and Wilson rise to power 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism British re-negotiations Prime Minister Wilson (Labour) wants to renegotiate the conditions of British membership Giscard opposes, Schmidt supports the demand The UK seeks to renegotiate more issues (CAP, Commonwealth relations) Paris Summit (1974) Agreement with respect to the EFRD European Commission is asked to investigate a UK correction mechanism Dublin Summit (1975): agreement with respect to the mechanism UK Referendum accepts the Dublin compromise Political consequence: the UK becomes an ‘awkward’ partner 1969-1979: from Euro-optimism to Euro-pessimism French - German axis Excellent personal relationship between Schmidt en Giscard d’Estaing Mutual agreement to institutionalise EC Summits: birth of the European Council / direct EP-elections as compromise). European Council meetings don’t succeed in revitalising the EC EMU-plans frozen (1975) European Commission is not functioning well slow and difficult decision-making within the Council of Ministers rejection of the Tindemans-report (1976) and the ‘Three Wise Men’ report Example multiple choice question Why could one say that the Schuman Plan should NOT have been named that way? o Because it was largely inspired by Spinelli's and Rossi's manifesto that called for a 'European Federation' o Because it clearly reflected Mitrany's ideas on functionalism o Because Schuman, although he presented the plan, did not support the plan o Because it was drawn up by a planning committee headed by Jean Monnet Example multiple choice question Why could one say that the Schuman Plan should NOT have been named that way? o Because it was largely inspired by Spinelli's and Rossi's manifesto that called for a 'European Federation' o Because it clearly reflected Mitrany's ideas on functionalism o Because Schuman, although he presented the plan, did not support the plan o Because it was drawn up by a planning committee headed by Jean Monnet