Comparative Politics Class Notes PDF

Comparative Politics PROFESSOR GUILLERMO TORAL BBA BIR YEAR 3 SEMESTER Course information Midterm (20%) - Session 15 Final Exam (40%) - Session 30 - Exams cover...

Comparative Politics PROFESSOR GUILLERMO TORAL BBA BIR YEAR 3 SEMESTER Course information Midterm (20%) - Session 15 Final Exam (40%) - Session 30 - Exams cover all sessions and all readings up until that session (the final exam covers the whole semester) - Closed book, on blackboard, multiple choice, no backtracking Quizzes and exercises (20%) - Quizzes are individual, unannounced, closed-book, on Blackboard, multiple choice, no backtracking - Exercises are in groups - Lowest student quiz score when calculating final grades - Between 3-5 quizzes Research Design (20%) - Short write-up, but significant background research and thinking - 2-3 pages - Done in pairs, due early October - Are certain types of political parties better for governing? - Are male dictators more likely to succeed? Session 2 - 3 →The Approach and Methods of Comparative Politics Things that are not true about science - political or otherwise - Science proves things definitively and leads to a certain truth - Doing science requires experimentally manipulating treatments - Value-neutral researchers do science - Science is just a way to make biased claims appear legitimate - Scientific progress depends on individual, extraordinary studies - or scientists Features of good (political) science: Overview - Clear theory - Testable hypothesis - Rigorous methodology - Transparency - Ethical standards - Social relevance Theoretical clarity (1) A theory is a proposition or set of propositions about the relationship between variables, providing an internally consistent logic to explain (political) phenomena, and which can be subjected to empirical testing through observation or experimentation. Good theories: - Have some generality - Are phrased independently of the empirical cases used to build or test them - Specify any relevant mechanisms (or channels through which variables are connected) - Specify any relevant scope conditions (or where/ when it should apply) What kinds of propositions or arguments are there? Normative - implications for what should be and for values Descriptive - implications for organizing and summarising reality Predictive - implications for forecasting Casual - implications for explaining cause-and-effect relationships and manipulating outcomes Comparative politics typically engages casual, predictive, and/or descriptive arguments What theoretical perspectives or paradigms are most common when talking about politics? Institutionalism: focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behaviour ○ Two-party systems are more aggressive than multi-pàrty systems Interests: focus on individuals' strategic calculations (for maximising utility) and their aggregation. ○ Middle-class workers tend to vote more for Trump because his talking points align with their goals  Ideas: focus on how ideas, ideologies, and culture shape behaviour ○ People who are more pro-choice tend to vote more right or toward Kamala Harris Individuals: focus on how specific peoplemand in particular leaders shape outcomes ○ Sanchez is X type of leader and that is why the Spanish government is focused on Y International environment: focus on how global pressures shape domestic politics By training our ability to identify and assess arguments from different perspectives, we can become better at critiquing others and at building our own theories about politics. Testable hypothesis (2) A hypothesis is specific and testable based on a theory. It allows us to evaluate the validity of the theory systematically. Good hypotheses: Are logically derived or deducted from the theory/argument Are precise Can be subject to empirical testing - aka are falsifiable Are testable with different observations from those who used to build the theory Are non-trivial, or are surprising in the same way Rigorous methodology (3) A research design is a strategy for answering a research question using empirical evidence. We broadly refer to that strategy as the study’s methodology or methods. Good research designs: `produce internally valid conclusions (i.e., results we observe are driven by the variables we claim drive them)  Gives us a sense of the uncertainty around those conclusions (e.g. a confidence interval around a quantitative estimate) Have some degree of external validity (i.e. allow us to draw conclusions that can be generalised to samples or settings other than the one we study) Key elements of a research design - A set of cases - A comparison (treatment group vs control group; Trumpies vs Harris voters) - A strategy for making inferences (casual/descriptive/predictive) - A strategy for measuring uncertainty around such inferences - A rationale (and supporting evidence) for why the methods we use get at the key quantity of interest. How can we make credible inferences? If we want to learn more about the effect of X (treatment) on Y (outcome), typically looking at the level of Y among units with high vs low levels of X will not be a valid strategy. Social and political variables are typically correlated with many other variables Particularly challenging for credible inferences are variables correlated with both the outcome and the treatment, aka cofounders. Moreover, it may be that the outcome we are interested in is also a cause of the treatment of the cause we are about - this is called reverse causality. We typically want to argue that a relationship between X and Y holds ceteris paribus (all other things being equal). How can we say that credibly? The main threats to credible causal claims (defined for the exam) How to make ceteris paribus comparisons? Methods that can be used to get ceteris paribus  Process tracing Controlled case comparisons Statistical models with controls Quasi-experiemnts Experiments - most credible Types of data that can be used include: Ethnography Interviews Case studies Surveys Admin data Satellite imagery Experiments: The gold standard to make causal inference - Experiments randomly assign an intervention (aka treatment) whose impact on one or several outcomes of interest we want to evaluate. - In the experiment, individuals (people, households, firms) assigned to different groups are comparable because they were formed by lottery - Therefore, any difference we observe between the treatment and control groups after the intervention must be caused by it - Experiments therefore ensure there are no cofounders and no reverse causality Transparency (4) Transparently reporting on the methodology, from data collection to analysis, is a central component of good science. Why transparency matters:  It allows others to assess the validity of the methods and to identify biases or limitations of the research Is also allows others to reproduce the study (with the same data) or try and replicate it It also allows the scientific community to reuse that data for other purposes Open science is at the centre of good science Open educational resources Open methodology Open data Open source Open peer review Open access Ethical Standards (5) Political science needs to be subject to high ethical standards - otherwise, significant harm to individuals/communities can ensured. Key ethical risks in comparative politics: Variables of interest are often very sensitive and/or consequential (identity, racism, order, democracy) Variables of interest can often not be experimented on ethically (partisanship, electoral system) Key principles of ethical research with human subjects (in PS, medicine, etc.) Informed consent Privacy and confidentiality Minimisation of harm Justice and fairness Respect for autonomy Prior review and approval Social relevance (6) Science should contribute back to society, directly or indirectly. Tasks for which comparative political research can be useful: ○ Designing institutions ○ Improving policy outcomes ○ Making forecasts ○ Promoting or resisting changes Audiences for whom comparative politics may be useful: ○ Government leaders ○ Political consultants ○ Political commentators ○ Policy-makers ○ Businesspeople and firms ○ Civil society organisations Group assignment on BB: Questions to think through & respond  What is the author’s core argument? And the key hypotheses? Is the argument descriptive, predictive, causal, or normative? What is at stake? What are some implications of the argument? In their theory, what are the key variables, and how are they related? What is the author’s research design? The research design utilised a field experiment to investigate the effects of political connections and formal contracts on the exchange. To create a realistic trading environment, a legal, formal-sector business was established in Senegal, where employees offered a phone credit service through door-to-door sales in selected municipal districts. The experiment employed a factorial design, randomising whether employees signaled their political connections and whether formal contracts were offered. This partial equilibrium approach aimed to isolate and understand the impact of these factors on exchange while controlling for other variables. An online survey was conducted several days after the transactions to measure buyers' political connections. The use of a real economic environment and panel data enabled a rare causal estimation of the influence of political connections and formal contracts on exchange, accounting for political asymmetries in the trading dyad. As part of the research design, the author established and registered a formal business in Senegal to create a realistic trading environment for the field experiment. The business, Porte-à-Porte Sénégal (PAPS), was officially registered in 2016 through APIX, Senegal’s primary investment promotion agency. This process involved obtaining a unique business identification number (NINEA), ensuring the business was formally recognised and operational. PAPS was chosen to offer discounted mobile phone credits, a common practice in Senegal, allowing for the manipulation of seller moral hazard in a familiar context. The choice of mobile credit was strategic due to high local demand and the opportunity to test varying dimensions of moral hazard, such as product quality and delivery reliability. By formalising the business and conducting transactions in a real economic environment, the study was able to accurately assess the impact of political connections and formal contracts on exchange behaviour, while adhering to ethical considerations and minimising disruption to existing economic activities. Are the findings or conclusions credible? Are the author’s findings relevant/useful? Are the methods transparently documented? If so, how? Can you think of ethical issues in the research? Are they addressed? How? Session 4 - 5 →The Nature, Formation, and Development of States Weber's idea of the state - Political organisations will always safeguard their territorial area. - The monopoly of force comes from the state and is legitimate. Key ingredients of Weber’s concept of the state - Territoriality - Continuity - Its own administrative staff - Threat and actual use of physical force - Nonvoluntary nature - Successful claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence → No state has a full monopoly of violence, but they needs to be successful with it How do states matter? For Political Outputs For Political Behaviours and Identities Fixed geographic boundaries and territorial New legitimisation of authority and power sovereignty Revenue raising Displacement of kinship, ethnic, and religious sources of authority Mobilising populations for warfare National identity Resshapong individual social life Hegemony in politics and culture Boosting development (economic growth, Trust in government education, rule of law, healthcare) Political conflicts organised within the boundaries of the state (partisanship, elections) How do states emerge and develop? Hobbes’ theory of the state - The state of nature - The sovereign - Absolutism Coordination problems and their solutions - The state of nature can be seen as a low-level equilibrium resulting from a coordination problem: - Everybody would be better off if all abstained from stealing/killing each other  - But doing so unilaterally (without others changing their behaviour as well) makes one worse off - So without a formal or informal institution that ensures coordination, it is rational for individuals to choose to stay in the state of nature - From this perspective, the state acts as a coordination device: - Through the state, individuals get out of the state of nature and can lead longer and more productive lives. - Through coercion and violence, the state raises the costs of free riding. Sovereignty in Hobbes - The social contract in Hobbes involves transferring natural rights to the sovereign and authorising an absolute exercise of power by them. - For Hobbes, a regime is legitimate if it can protect those who have consented to it - and not depending on how it came to be or what institutions it uses - In Hobbes’ theory of the state, subjects are politically obliged to obey, unless the sovereign does not protect them Tilly’s theory of the state - Tilly wants to explain variation in state building, as a function of capital coercion's accumulation and concentration of capital and coercion. - He sees national states as a (contingent) political invention between the tribute-taking empires and the city-states, taking place in Europe over a long historical period in the Middle Ages. - What sets national states apart for Tilly is that they got heavily invested not just in extraction and war-making, but also in protection and adjudication. Tilly on state-building as war-making “War and preparation for war involved rulers in extracting the means of war from others who held the essential resources – men, arms, supplies, or money to buy  them – and were reluctant to surrender them without strong pressure or compensation.” In those bargains, states grew to provide protection, adjudicate conflicts, and facilitate production – as a means to improve their extractive capacity “War made the state, and the state made war” Tilly on states as mafias “If protection rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as our largest examples of organized crime.” “At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.” Predatory vs contractual views of the origins of states Hobbes’ theory of the state, together with those of other philosophers like Locke or Rousseau, is contractual or contractarian – it puts the idea of the social contract (and thus individuals’ agreement) at the center Tilly’s theory of the state, by contrast, is predatory – he sees states as emerging not from a social contract but rather asymmetric relations of power between rulers and subjects. Tilly and other scholars in the predatory view of the state are more preoccupied with describing how states emerge, rather than legitimizing their existence (descriptive versus normative). Therefore, empirical analyses are more important. A typology of theories about state building, depending on what they emphasize Revenue-seeking rulers: relationships between the state and resource holders Inter-state conflict: military and political conflicts among rulers Intra-state conflict: relationships between societal actors (e.g. landed versus urban elite) Ideas: e.g., nationalism, liberalism, developmentalism Geography: physical, economic, political, ethnic, etc. CONGO CASE STUDY Can we observe the bargains that Tilly theorized? A recent study of “stationary bandits and taxation in Eastern Congo” provides empirical evidence in support of predatory theories of state-building By carefully measuring the behaviour of bandits at the mining sites and their corresponding villages, the author can see how they change in response to their incentives and ability to extract resources For causal inference, this study uses exogenous variation in the prices of coltan and gold to study the emergence of stationary bandits (taxation, protection), and their effects on welfare Background: Rebel groups and mining in Congo Background: Changes to the price of coltan and gold Results: Effect of changes in minerals’ price on coercion, extraction, and protection Results: Effect of stationary bandits on welfare Summary of key results in the Congo bandits study In response to the rise in the price of coltan, armed actors built monopolies of violence, created illegal customs to tax mining output, and provided protection in the coltan mines In response to the rise in the price of gold (which miners can easily conceal) stationary bandits emerge in the villages of miners. Having a stationary bandit with a mission that encompasses the population's well-being (popular militia, Congolese army actors) increased household welfare  Gold shocks intensified militia functions, including work permits, more sophisticated tax systems, and fiscal and judicial administration. Coltan shocks had the opposite effect. State capacity is a multi-dimensional concept Coercive capacity: ○ Production and enforcement of the order ○ For example, peace for day-to-day business, an effective court system deterring crime Extractive capacity: ○ Production and relations between the state and producers ○ For example, income tax (vs trade tax) Coordination capacity: ○ Ability to organize for collective action ○ For example, a unified market with secure property rights Compliance capacity: ○ Actors’ acceptance and co-production of order ○ For example, a successful vaccination campaign How can we measure state capacity? Output-based definitions and measures, for example: ○ GDP per capita ○ Infant mortality Input-based definitions and measures: ○ Taxation ○ Bureaucratic quality or professionalization Legibility-based definitions and measures: ○ State presence and transformation of its geography – physical and human ○ Information gathering and processing Legibility Legibility is the breadth, depth, and standardization of the state’s knowledge about its citizens and their activities From this perspective, state capacity requires making local actors and practices legible to the state (i.e., visible and actionable in a rational or standardized manner) Legibility is central, not just to extraction but also to coordination and compliance Empirical measures of legibility include the existence of censuses or cadasters, the strength of statistical agencies, and the quality of government data Census data quality as a measure of legibility Census data quality predicts taxation Census data quality predicts public goods What is a regression? Regression is a type of analysis to estimate how one or multiple variables (e.g., education, gender, wealth) relate to one variable of interest (e.g., vote choice) Regression is different from but intimately related to, correlation Regression is not causation (but it can get us there in certain circumstances) There are many types of regression, the most common one being linear regression (aka OLS, for ordinary least squares) Different types of regression require different assumptions for us to "buy" the estimates we get What are the key pieces of information in a regression table, and where do we find them? (1) Dependent variable (y): The variable that the researcher is trying to explain (typically at the top of the table or column) Independent variable(s) (e.g. X1): The variables that the researcher is using to explain the dependent variable (typically row names) Coefficient (e.g. ): The estimate of the association between a given independent variable and the dependent variable (main number in the cells of the table) N: number of observations that went into the model. Typically toward the bottom of the table Standard error: The estimate of how certain we can be about the size of a given coefficient (typically under the coefficient, in brackets). Standard errors can be corrected through dierent procedures (typically informed at the bottom of the table), for example, through clustering. p-value: The probability of obtaining an estimate so extreme if the effect was actually zero (typically, tables use stars by the coefficients to represent whether the p-value is under a certain threshold, and a legend below, e.g.,?p < 0.05, ? ? p < 0.01, ? ? ? p < 0.001). If the p-value is below the threshold (and therefore, there are stars), we tend to believe the estimate, and we say it is “statistically significant” (because we conclude the association is so strong that it is unlikely to be due to mere chance) Where do regression coefficients come from? OLS regression coefficients come from minimizing the sum of squared residuals, where the residual or error is the distance between a given observation’s value on X and its predicted value for the outcome,ˆY. Calculating OLS coefficients comes down to an optimization problem. There are formulas one can use to estimate them. In practice, we simply run code in software like R or Stata, telling the program what the dependent variable and the independent variables are. Do regression coefficients estimate causal effects? Generally speaking no, regression coefficients do not necessarily measure causal effects Most often, they just measure associations – how variation in one variable is associated with variation in the outcome, holding all other controls constant Unless we have an experiment or something approximating an experiment, we need to worry about confounders  But when we do have a randomized experiment or a research design credibly approximating an experiment (i.e., a quasi-experiment) regression coefficients are valid estimates of causal effects Exercise: Interpreting regressions Case: Fighting organized crime in Latin America Organized crime is a major challenge - in Latin America and elsewhere Some of these organizations resemble proto-states “In informal urban areas throughout the developing world, and even in some US and UK neighborhoods, tens if not hundreds of millions of people live under some form of criminal governance. For them, states’ claims of a monopoly on the use of force ring hollow; for many issues, a local criminal organization is the relevant authority. Yet the state is far from absent: residentsmaypay taxes, vote, and even inform on gangs as punishment for abusive behavior.” Taking stock of what we saw today What are states? How do states emerge and develop? Why do states vary in their capacity, and how can they boost it? Workshop and exercise: Interpreting regression tables Case: Organized crime in Latin American cities Read on how to analyse regression tables → for the exam Session 6 - 7 → Authoritarianism, types, and survival State building: Tilly & Hobbes Topics What is authoritarianism? How can we classify authoritarian regimes? What are the key factors for authoritarian survival? Exercise: How can democratisation in Russia be promoted? What is authoritarianism? State building and authoritarianism: Hobbes In Hobbes’ theory of the state, the ruler is an absolutist sovereign In his view, the ruler holds power on his own The ruler’s authority is unconstrained There is full security (except in the international arena) State building and authoritarianism: Tilly For Tilly, states develop authoritarian or at least violent Limited government, concessions, and public service delivery emerge out of processes of state-building Rulers’ self-interest (and in particular their need for extraction and self-preservation) drives those processes State building and authoritarianism: Olson For Olson, anarchy or the absence of the state can be seen as roving bandits doing uncoordinated and competitive theft. Anarchy destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Olson sees dictatorship as a stationary bandit: a ruler who monopolises and rationalises the in the form of taxes. It is in the dictator’s self-interest to provide peaceful order and public goods to increase production. State building and authoritarianism: Bates Bates sees political order as an equilibrium in which rulers (aka “specialists in violence”) choose to protect the creation of wealth rather than prey upon it, and when private citizens choose to set weapons aside and devote their time to production (and leisure) State failure correlates with ethnic diversity, natural resources, democratisation, and poverty – because they affect the calculations of the ruler  For Bates, political order thus depends on the interplay between the level of public revenues, the rewards from predation, and the ruler’s rate of discount How can we define authoritarian regimes? “Regimes that have no turnover in the power of the executive”(Lindstaet 2020) Neither anarchy (as in Olson’s roving bandit) nor democracy Olson’s stationary bandit Absence of free and fair elections in which multiple parties compete for office Absence of elections and no key freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression, of association) “No independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts” (Svolik 2012) Key limitations of existing definitions Definition by opposition to democracy More defined attributes only in the subcategories Proliferation of typologies Excessive focus on elections? Excessive focus on state-level authoritarianism How can we classify authoritarian regimes? Totalitarian vs not totalitarian Personalist vs single-party vs military vs monarchical authoritarianism Closed vs electoral authoritarian regimes (hybrid, or competitive) More vs less competitive authoritarian regimes Typologies of authoritarian rule How do different types of dictatorships fare in terms of survival and performance? Selectorate theory Size of the selectorate (S) Size of the winning coalition (W) The ratio W/S - the loyalty norm Predictions from selectorate theory on the performance of political regimes What kind of theory is selectorate theory? Institutionalism: focus on how formal or informal institutions shape outcomes and behaviour Interests: focus on individuals’ strategic calculations (for maximising utility) and their aggregation Ideas: focus on how ideas, ideologies and culture shape behaviour and outcomes Individuals: focus on how specific people and in particular leaders shape outcomes International environment: focus on how global pressures shape domestic politics What are the key factors for authoritarian survival? Data on Authoritarian Survival The problem of authoritarian control Dictators face threats from the population over which they rule Two key tools at the disposal of the regime: repression and cooptation Cooptation can take place through handouts (rents, jobs) or institutions Repression is a double-edged sword because it empowers the security forces The guardianship dilemma A military strong enough to protect the regime against mass unrest and foreign threats is also strong enough to overthrow it through a coup Military leaders can use this leverage to demand rents and policy concessions How can dictators address this dilemma? The power-sharing dilemma Broadening elite incorporation mitigates prospects for outsider rebellions (by either elites excluded from power or the masses), but it raises the risk of insider coups There needs to be more than the distribution of rents to solve this dilemma. Why? ○ Because dictators cannot credibly commit to sustaining rents. How can dictators address this dilemma? Authoritarian survival conditional on legislatures Why do dictatorships often have formal and (sometimes) competitive institutions? Institutions such as parties and legislatures help authoritarian regimes solve the power-sharing dilemma Central to the solution is information: these institutions provide members of the support coalition information about the regime and enable them to influence decisions Another key aspect is credible commitments: these institutions may enable members of the support coalition to hold the ruler accountable The power-sharing dilemma Power-sharing is a double-edged sword because of the countervailing commitment and threat-enhancing effects Under what conditions is power sharing more likely to emerge and to last? ○ Challenger credibility ○ Challenger willing to accept the deal and not act against the ruler  ○ Ruler's willingness to accept the constraints and lost rents Why do dictators often organise elections? To build legitimacy ○ External: make foreign actors happier ○ Internal: signal to the population prospects of change To deter & minimise challenges from within ○ Share the spoils with groups with power ○ (At least when the opposition is strong) signal that opposition is futile – reduce risk of violent removal To weaken challengers ○ By setting the rules of the game, divide structures of contestation ○ Allowing some to play, foster fragmentation & competition To gather precious information ○ Identify the loyal and the disloyal ○ Measure competence and support for local party cadres Session 8 - 9 → Democracy, Democratisation & Survival Democracy, democratisation and survival Important authors: Schumpeter, Dahl, Przeworski Topics What is democracy Unpacking measures of democracy How do democracies emerge? How to democracies erode? We often refer to very different notions of democracy Democracy as direct participation Democracy as representation Democracy as a rule of the majority Democracy as fairness Democracy as empowerment Democracy as the rule of law Democracy as good governance Democracy as equity Democracy is an essentially contested concept Essentially contested concepts are “concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.” (Gallie 1956) When it comes to democracy… ○ Disputes over its meaning are everywhere ○ Those disputes are politically meaningful (e.g., for legitimacy)  ○ “Democracy”, however, defined, is used as an appraising category ○ The term is used to describe a complex reality ○ The concept is open and its (collective) meaning evolves through competition The political science approach to conceptualising democracy Efforts at clarifying what democracy is, relatively independent from the normative commitment to it Still, efat conceptualising democracy has important implications about how politics is, how it should be, and/or what kinds of policies (e.g., constitutional arrangements) we should have There are two big families of approaches to conceptualising Democracy: ○ Procedural definitions: focus on formal or informal processes, how elites get to and exercise power ○ Substantive definitions: focus more on equity, social rights, fundamental freedoms, etc. Three key authors in the procedural tradition: Schumpeter, Dahl, and Przeworski Substantive definitions often emphasise rights, government accountability, and citizens’ agency Schumpeter: Democracy as elite competition Schumpeter argues against the idea of “government by the people” (normative vs descriptive) Democracy is an institutional arrangement in which individuals acquire the power to decide using a competitive struggle for people’s votes. The key function of voters is to produce a government From his perspective, the political boss or party broker is central to democratic politics Dahl: Democracy versus polyarchy Democracy is “the continuing complete or almost complete responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” Democracy for Dahl is an ideal type, rather than an empirical reality Under democracy, citizens must have the ability: ○ to formulate their preferences ○ to signify preferences by individual and collective action  ○ to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government without discrimination. Two-dimensional space leads to 4 regime types: ○ Level of public contestation ○ Level of inclusion Polyarchy is the existing regimes combining high inclusiveness and competitiveness Przeworski: Democracy as uncertainty “Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections.” Uncertainty is central: the outcomes of competition are not known ex-ante A key puzzle then is, why do parties accept defeat and go to the opposition? Democracy gives parties longer time horizons: ○ Conflicts are never resolved definitively ○ There’s a prospect of getting back into office in the future ○ Political parties and their nature as coercive organisations are key Measuring democracy: Why it matters Whether a country is democratic or not, or how it is moving in a scale of democracy, sometimes influences policy decisions by governments, international organisations, and non-state actors like firms Monitoring the quality of democracy across space and time can aid democracy promotion efforts Efforts at measuring democracy, or at ellucidating how different measures work, can be helpful to clarify our own concepts of democracy Measuring democracy: Why it is hard Democracy is an essentially contested concept Even if we agree on a concept of democracy, it is necessarily multi-dimensional Important dimensions like political competition, fundamental rights, or the rule of law are themselves necessarily hard to measure We lack clear aggregation rules for collapsing different indicators into a single measure of democracy (e.g., what weight should each component have?) Measuring democracy: How it is done Different measurement strategies reflect different concepts of democracy, rely on different data sources, have different coverages (of countries and years), and use different aggregating methods, and even different goals of the measurement exercise (e.g., detecting small changes versus classifying countries in broad categories) The most important measures include ○ Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) ○ Freedom House (FH) ○ Polity (Polity) ○ Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index (EIU) ○ Regimes of the world ○ Bertelsmann Stiung’s Transformation Index How do democracies emerge? Acemoglu and Robinson: A theory of regime change They theorize society as split between elites and citizens (against vs pro redistribution) Democratisation as enfranchisement and thus an increase in redistribution. It happens when citizens, with a revolutionary potential, get democracy as a way to lock in their power through formal institutions Whether there is democratisation (and whether it is stable) depends on civil society (costs of collective action and repression); economic shocks and crises (affecting economic power, coups); wealth inequality (affects probability of revolution, and the elite’s fear of democracy); types of wealth (e.g., land is not mobile) Back to Dahl’s theory of the polyarchy Central in Dahl are the costs of tolerating and repressing dissent For Dahl, the key to transitions to democracy is to not open inclusiveness and expand competitiveness at the same time By opening competitiveness first, elites can get used to competing in a safer environment, before they are forced to compete in a more inclusive one This is consistent with the experience of England and other early adopters, where the franchise was progressively expanded Theorising the emergence of democracy, from different perspectives Major families of explanations about the origins of democracy Modernization theories: robust economic conditions drive democratization Civic culture theories: citizen beliefs and attitudes drive democratization Dissent theories: elites’ ability to express and process dissent, to build and unbuild consensus drive democratization Economic bargaining theories: bargaining across (and violence among) organized economic interests; or certain economic endowments drive democratization Group-based theories: ethnic and religious groups drive democratization Challenges to explain the drivers of democratization Drivers of emergence may not coincide with drivers of survival ○ Key implication: We may need different theories for emergence and survival The threat of confounders: any potential cause is likely correlated with variables that also correlate with democracy ○ Key implication: We will need to address confounders (e.g., experiments, quasi-experiments, controls...) The threat of reverse causality: democracy can have a direct effect on many of its potential drivers (e.g., the economy, ideas) ○ Key implication: Research designs should address reverse causality Different factors may matter differently at different places/moments (i.e., different routes from democracy to dictatorship) ○ Key implication: Theories may need scope conditions or bounds on their application Waves of democratization and reversal Democratic backsliding: The concept  Democratic backsliding has been defined as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy” (Bermeo 2016) Backsliding is at the core of contemporary debates about democracy because we see many cases of backsliding around the globe, including in wealthy countries that used to be considered consolidated democracies Nowadays we see fewer military coups and less executive coups (“auto-golpes”) Nowadays we see less election-day fraud But we see more strategic harassment and disqualification of opposition leaders We also see more acts of executive self-aggrandizement Key take-aways on changes in democratic backsliding The shape of democratic backsliding has changed, and looks very dierently now than it did during the Cold War Nowadays, episodes of backsliding may be less dramatic, violent, or sudden – but they can still lead to meaningful changes in a country’s political regime and fundamental freedoms  Identifying backsliding (and resisting it) is harder when it is more gradual and happens in a more limited set of institutions Wanna-be authoritarian leaders likely know that, and adjust their strategies accordingly The role of elites in promoting and resisting backsliding Autocratic leaders can emerge in ways that make them appear manageable – e.g., a populist outsider Gatekeepers are key – parties can purge, incorporate, or militate against autocratic challengers & their supporters Democracy is often undone progressively – gradual escalation of actions and reactions Law and culture are key tools in protecting democracy, and in weakening autocracy Key insights Political science seeks to understand democracy with at least some independence from normative considerations. The concepts advanced by Schumpeter, Dahl, and Przeworski all provide insight into what democracy is There are many approaches to measuring democracy – they throw different scores or classifications of countries because their conceptual, measurement, and aggregation strategy dier. The emergence and erosion of democracy can be theorized from different perspectives, but as usual with (political) science we have got to subject our theories to empirical testing Rigorously testing theories about democracy is hard but not impossible Session 10 - 11 → Parliamentarism and Presidentialism Review on concepts of democracy Schumpeter - competition among elites Dahl - contestation and inclusiveness (and responsiveness) - polyarchy Przeworski - Turnover How do we organise democracy? There are several ways of organising representative democracy to ensure competition among elites, contestation and inclusiveness, and party turnover. We call these schemas for organising democratic forms of government ○ Parliamentary democracy ○ Presidential democracy ○ Semi-presidential democracy Different forms of government shape competition and contestation, access to executive power and political turnover in fundamentally different ways.  Democratic politics therefore take different dynamics in different forms of government Key topics Fundamental differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism Beyond fundamentals: Dependencies in practice Consequences for political and economic development Fundamental differences Make sure not to confuse Political regime (and subtypes of dictatorships) Form of government (parliamentary vs presidential vs semi-presidential) Monarchical vs republican nature of the head of state Unicameral vs bicameral legislature In general, be careful not to be misled by official titles (e.g. heads of government in Spain and Italy are called “Presidents”, even though these are parliamentary systems) Classifying forms of government Responsible - the elected official can dissolve the assembly Key terms on forms of government Head of state: highest representative of a state, who may be referred to by a variety of titles Head of government: leader of the administration of the state (may or may not coincide with the head of state), who may also be referred to by a variety of titles Legislative responsibility: a situation in which a legislative majority has the constitutional power to remove a government from office without cause. Key terms on the government formation process A formateur is the person designated to form the government in a parliamentary democracy and is often the head of government designate.  A vote of no confidence is initiated by the legislature in parliamentary or semi-presidential systems – the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority An Investiture Vote is a formal vote in a parliamentary system that is used to confirm the appointment of the head of government, typically the prime minister, and their cabinet. This vote usually takes place after an election or when a new prime minister is proposed. The purpose of the investiture vote is to show that the nominated prime minister has the confidence of the majority of the members in the parliament to form and lead the government. A constructive vote of no confidence must indicate who will replace the government if the vote succeeds A vote of confidence is initiated by the government in a parliamentary system – the government must resign if it fails to obtain a legislative majority. An impeachment is a constitutional process through which a head of state or government can be charged with wrongdoing and potentially removed from office in a presidential or semi-presidential system by a legislature acting similarly to a court Fundamental differences “The essence of pure parliamentarism is mutual dependence. [...] The essence of pure presidentialism is mutual independence.” (Stepan & Skach 1993) Presidentialism is often referred to as “separation of powers”, whereas parliamentarism is sometimes referred to as “fusion of powers” True or False If a country has a president, it is a presidential system. False: A country can have a president but still operate under a parliamentary system. In parliamentary systems (e.g., Germany or India), the president often serves as the ceremonial head of state, while the prime minister is the head of government. In presidential systems, there are no coalition governments. False: Although coalition governments are more common in parliamentary systems, they can occur in presidential systems, particularly in the legislature if no single party has a majority, which can influence executive-legislative relations. In a parliamentary system, if a party wins the election but does not have a majority of the seats in the legislature, it needs to build a coalition government. True: In parliamentary systems, a party needs to have the confidence of the majority in the legislature to govern. If no single party has a majority, the leading party often forms a coalition with other parties to achieve this majority. In a parliamentary system, prime ministers build coalitions with the minimum number of seats needed to get a majority of votes. True: Prime ministers typically form coalitions with the smallest number of additional parties needed to reach a majority, ensuring more stable governance with fewer conflicting interests. In a democracy, elections happen under a fixed schedule. False: While many democracies have fixed election schedules (e.g., the U.S.), others (especially parliamentary systems) may call elections earlier or later depending on circumstances such as a vote of no confidence or dissolution of parliament (e.g., the UK or Canada). Beyond fundamentals: Dependencies in practice Leader turnover through action in the legislature UK - Johnson (distrust within the party) Spain - Rajoy (members of his party betrayed him) Brazil - Rousseff (impeachment) Legistaltive coalitions: UK, Spain & Brazil The non-alignment of Spanish opposition parties means a lower threat to the government parties (PSOE and Sumar). Beyond the simple separation-vs-fusion-of-powers view Heads of government in both parliamentarism and presidentialism need to build and sustain legislative coalitions for their survival (or at least their legislative success) Depending on the party system, which in turn depends on the electoral system, we may see coalition governments –and coalitional dynamics– in both parliamentarism and presidentialism The dynamics of coalitions differ systematically however because heads of government in parliamentary systems depend more directly on having a legislative majority The strength of parties as organizations, and internal competition within the parties can reshape the dynamics of both parliamentarism and presidentialism Breakdown of legislative power A legislature is a governing body responsible for making, amending, and passing laws. It represents the citizens and has oversight over the executive branch. Legislatures can vary in structure and power depending on the system of government. Examples: 1. In Presidential Democracies: ○ United States: The Congress (made up of the Senate and the House of Representatives) is the legislature. It is separate from the President, who is the head of the executive branch. 2. In Parliamentary Democracies: ○ United Kingdom: The Parliament (composed of the House of Commons and the House of Lords) is the legislature. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are part of the Parliament and are accountable to it. Presidentiary system (US): Citizens ↓ (Vote for) ↓ ↓ President →→→→→→→ Legislature (Congress) (Head of ↘ ↗ State & Checks and Balances Head of ↗ ↘ Government) →→→→→→→ (House of Representatives & Senate) Parliamentary system (UK): Citizens ↓ (Vote for) ↓ Legislature (Parliament) (Lower House) ↓ ↓ ↓ Majority Party/Coalition ↓ ↓ Chooses ↓ Prime Minister (Head of Government) ↓ ↓ Forms ↓ Cabinet Breakdown of How Legislatures and Executives are Chosen in Presidential and Parliamentary Systems: Presidential Democracies: Example: United States 1. President: ○ Who Votes: Citizens directly vote for the President. ○ How They Get to Their Position: The candidate who wins the majority of the electoral votes (or popular vote, depending on the country) becomes the President. The President serves as both the head of state and the head of government. 2. Legislature (Congress): ○ House of Representatives: Who Votes: Citizens in each congressional district. How They Get to Their Position: Representatives are elected directly by citizens within their district for a fixed term (e.g., 2 years in the U.S.). ○ Senate: Who Votes: Citizens in each state. How They Get to Their Position: Senators are elected directly by citizens of each state for a fixed term (e.g., 6 years in the U.S., with staggered elections). 3. Relationship:  ○ The President is separate from the legislature. While they may propose laws, the President does not vote in the legislature and can only sign or veto bills passed by Congress. Parliamentary Democracies: Example: United Kingdom, India 1. Head of State (Monarch/President): ○ Who Votes: In many parliamentary systems, the head of state (like a monarch) is not elected. In systems with a ceremonial president, they might be elected by the parliament or a special electoral body, not by the public. 2. Head of Government (Prime Minister): ○ Who Votes: Citizens vote for members of parliament (MPs), not directly for the Prime Minister. ○ How They Get to Their Position: The leader of the party (or coalition) with the majority in the lower house of parliament is typically appointed as Prime Minister by the head of state. 3. Legislature (Parliament): ○ Lower House (e.g., House of Commons in the UK): Who Votes: Citizens in each electoral constituency vote for their MP. How They Get to Their Position: MPs are directly elected by citizens in their constituencies for a fixed term. ○ Upper House (e.g., House of Lords in the UK, Rajya Sabha in India): Who Votes: Members are usually not directly elected by the public. They may be appointed, elected by state legislatures, or hold their position by heredity or nomination, depending on the country. 4. Relationship: ○ The Prime Minister and their Cabinet are part of the parliament and are directly accountable to it. They can be removed by a vote of no confidence if they lose the support of the majority in the lower house. Legislative coalition building from the perspective of selectorate theory Size of the selectorate (S) Size of the winning coalition (W) The ratio W/S - the loyalty norm Cabinet types A single-party majority government comprises a single party that controls a majority of the legislative seats. A minimal winning coalition (MWC) is one in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority. A single-party minority government comprises a single party that does not command a majority of the legislative seats. A minority coalition government comprises multiple governmental parties that do not together command a majority of the legislative seats.  A surplus majority government comprises more parties than are strictly necessary to control a majority of the legislative seats. Government formation can get long in parliamentary systems Depends largely on the fragmentation of the legislature Also depends on inter- and intra-party competition A key role for party bosses (cf. Schumpeter, Przeworski)+ Consequences for political and economic development Which form of government is data We can use different criteria to assess forms of government, or other aspects of a political system: Government accountability: clarity of responsibility, electoral accountability, certainty in the political process Political stability: cabinet stability, democratic backsliding, democratic survival Economic performance: economic growth, inflation, human development corruption... As usual with institutional choices, there are important trade-os to consider The perils of presidentialism (Linz 1990) In presidentialism, the head of government has a “strong claim to democratic, even plebiscitarian, legitimacy”, and there may be clashes in claims of democratic legitimacy between the executive and the legislative powers Parliamentarism allows to deal with conflicts by going back to the polls (votes of no confidence, snap elections), which may serve as an escape valve for tensions in the political system. By having a fixed electoral schedule, presidentalist systems do not have that escape valve and may see political conflicts across branches of powers escalate more easily. By using fixed terms, presidentalism enhances a view of politics as demarcated by discrete periods, “leaving no room for the continuous readjustments that events may demand.” Presidentalism operates in the logic of winner-takes-all politics and thus tends to make politics a zero-sum game. In presidentalism, the head of government is more likely to feel they are the representative of “the people”. This may lead to authoritarian temptations when clashes with the legislature emerge. A more recent take on the perils of presidentialism Despite the advantages, there are also problems with parliamentary democracies More “distance” between voters and the government Less clarity of responsibility Coalition politics can undermine people’s interest in, or the legitimacy of, the system Many government turnovers are not decided in elections Less reliance on competitive dynamics Less reliance on strict checks and balances Government transitions can get (very) long and are more uncertain Wrap-up Fundamental differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism Beyond fundamentals: Dependencies in practice Consequences for political and economic development Next reading Comparative politics - chapter 11 Foundations of comparative politics - chapter 10 Session 12 - 13 → Elections and Electoral Systems Why electoral systems matter Competitive elections are fundamental for democracy (although remember, many authoritarian governments also use elections!) How should votes be translated to decisions on who should be in office, be it executive or legislative office? The answer is far from obvious: ○ No system is unambiguously better – there are trade-os ○ Different electoral systems produce systematically different outcomes for who is in office, how governments work, and what kind of accountability we obtain ○ Accordingly, we often see political battles around the design of electoral systems Electoral systems: Key levers and how they matter Electoral systems The electoral system is the set of rules that structure how votes are cast at an election and how they are then converted into the allocation of offices Legislative, executive, and sometimes even judiciary and bureaucratic offices can be allocated through elections. Electoral systems are best thought of as a combined choice from multiple choice sets, or along different dimensions Key dimensions of variation in electoral systems Direct vs indirect Electoral formula Quota or divisor District magnitude Ballot structure Electoral threshold List openness Franchise Direct vs indirect elections While we typically think of elections as direct, many important political offices are allocated through indirect elections The head of government in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems The head of state in countries like India, Germany, Pakistan, and Estonia The President of the United States Members of the upper house in countries like France, India, Morocco, South Africa Some legislative offices are not even elected, rather they are designated – e.g. members of the upper house in Germany, and some members of the upper house in Spain Electoral formula The term electoral formula refers to how votes are converted into offices. Majority representation systems elect the candidates with the most votes. ○ Plurality (not necessary to reach 50%) ○ An absolute majority (necessary to reach 50% + 1) – implemented with a runoff, or with an alternative vote ○ There are modified versions of the run system, e.g. Argentina holds no second round if the first candidate has 45% OR 40% and >10 point margin ○ Votes are wasted in an MR system because fewer votes are being reflected in the elected Proportional representation (PR) systems distribute votes approximately in proportion to votes ○ PR systems often use majoritarian corrections – e.g., the D’Hondt method ○ Benefits include: Wanting people to feel represented In a country with many minorities, you don’t want them to feel excluded If you are too proportional, the legislature is very divided and often does not last, it also fuels corruption Mixed systems combine majority and PR principles Important to know the difference between majority representation and proportional representation PR quota systems PR systems employ quotas or divisors to allocate seats to parties  Quota systems distribute seats based on quotas A quota is the “price” in votes a party must pay for a seat in a district General quota formula: Q = V / (M + n) ○ V is the number of votes in the district ○ M is the magnitude of the district (number of seats) ○ n is a modifier of the quota Different quota systems dier by n: ○ Hare: n = 0 ○ Hagenbach-Bischo: n = 1 ○ Imperiali: n = 2 ○ Reinforced Imperiali: n = 3 The first distribution of seats based on quotas A second distribution of seats based on the remainder PR divisor systems PR systems employ quotas or divisors to allocate seats to parties Divisor systems divide the number of votes won by a party by a series of numbers or divisors to obtain quotients. Seats are then allocated to which parties have the highest quotients. Different divisor systems differ in the sequence by which they divide total votes (these are subtypes) ○ D’Hondt: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, … ○ Sainte-Lagüe: 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, … ○ Imperiali: 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3,... District magnitude District magnitude refers to the number of candidates to be elected (or seats to be distributed) in a given constituency Key distinction: single-member vs multi-member districts Single-member districts are winner-takes-all, which has both disadvantages (e.g. misrepresentation, votes waste) and advantages (clarity of responsibility, constituency service, some moderation) Multi-member districts, typical of PR systems, can be from nationwide to relatively small (e.g., town or province) District magnitude is the more direct lever to make PR systems more or less proportional District Magnitude explained District magnitude is simply the number of seats or positions that a district (or voting area) elects. This can be: Single-member district: Only one candidate is elected. Whoever gets the most votes wins. This has pros (clear accountability, focus on local issues) and cons (many votes end up not counting toward representation, potential misrepresentation). Multi-member district: Multiple candidates are elected, so several seats are available. This setup is common in proportional representation (PR) systems and can range in size from a town to a whole country. Why district magnitude matters: In PR systems, the number of seats per district directly affects how proportional the results are. More seats per district generally lead to more accurate representation of voter preferences across parties. Ballot structure Ballot structure refers to how the ballot is presented to voters Key distinction: categorical vs ordinal ballots. Categorical ballots ask voters to choose simply Ordinal ballots allow voters to rank their choices ○ Can be cognitively cumbersome for voters ○ May take significantly longer to count Electoral threshold The electoral threshold refers to the minimum performance a party needs to reach to participate in the distribution of seats Key distinction: natural vs explicit electoral thresholds. A natural threshold applies when no explicit threshold applies, and equals 1 divided by the number of seats to be distributed Many countries establish higher explicit electoral thresholds Explicit thresholds constrain the representation of smaller political parties ○ This constrains the diversity of views represented in the legislature ○ Limits the fragmentation of parliament and the party system ○ In that way, explicit thresholds contribute to making government formation easier and coalition politics less complicated List openness Electoral systems using open lists allow voters to select or rank candidates from within party lists Key distinction: closed-party list systems and open-party list systems Open list systems give more choice to voters, but they also weaken party organisations and promote open factionalism through within-party competition. Free party lists allow voters to choose candidates from different parties Key distinction: 1. Closed-party list systems: Voters can only choose a party, not specific candidates. The party decides which of its candidates will take any seats won. This strengthens party control. 2. Open-party list systems: Voters can select or rank individual candidates from the party's list. This gives voters more say, but it can reduce party control and lead to competition between candidates from the same party. Free party lists go even further, allowing voters to pick candidates from different parties, giving the most flexibility to voters. Franchise Democracies nowadays typically allow all citizens aged 18+ to vote Historically, the franchise used to be severely restricted by class and gender Nowadays, minors (16-17) and immigrants are sometimes included in the franchise, for all or at least some lower-level elections Citizens who do not reside in the country are sometimes excluded from the franchise Countries also vary on whether they use compulsory voting or not, with wide variation in how they implement that analysing a regression table - State if it is positive or negative - State if it is significant or not  - Look at dependent or independent variables Evaluating electoral systems: Which one’s better? Key trade-offs to consider More vs less direct relationship between voters and their representatives More vs less accuracy in the representation of voter preferences Less vs more clarity of responsibility More vs less complexity of voting and counting – and the transparency and (mis-)trust that may follow More voter choice and internal democracy versus weaker party organisations and factionalism More vs less fragmentation of party systems and legislatures – with its potential correlates on cabinet stability Electoral systems are tremendously consequential Party system fragmentation ○ Duverger’s law: first-past-the-post single-member systems lead to a 2-party system ○ More proportional PR systems with lower thresholds lead to a larger number of parties getting representation Strength of political parties Stability of political parties How people vote – “strategic” vs “sincere” voting Whether people vote – PR systems tend to have higher turnout Representation of women and minorities Evaluating the consequences of electoral systems is hard Reforms of electoral systems are rare, and not randomized Many variables may confound relationships between a given aspect of an electoral system (independent variable) and outcomes (or dependent variables) of interest (e.g., cabinet stability, party strength, representation of women) There is also a major problem of reverse causality since electoral systems are chosen by political elites (typically in bargains at the moment of independence, transition to democracy, or major reforms), so the outcome may have a causal effect on the independent variable Can we learn scientifically in this setup? ○ Randomisation is not possible, and we cannot possibly control for all confounders ○ But we can make progress with quasi-experimental designs Learning about the consequences of electoral systems: Quasi-experimental design and evidence on Spain In Spain, the electoral law establishes that: ○ Municipalities with over 250 residents elect city councillors by closed-list PR (using the d’Hondt divisor system)  ○ Municipalities with 250 residents or less elect city councillors by open list plurality-at-large (each voter chooses 4 candidates from any list, and the ones with the most votes are elected) ○ The number of city councillors to elect is 5 in municipalities with up to 250 residents, and 7 in those with 251-1000 residents By comparing what happens in municipalities right above and below the population threshold at 250, we can learn about the effect of closed lists on outcomes of interest Revise on studies - Congo miners - Spanish electoral system quasi-experiment - Correlation on presidential systems - How dictators end Things to note for the exam: Important authors: Schumpeter, Dahl, Przeworski State building: Tilly & Hobbes, Olson Plurality vs absolute majority PR vs majoritarian systems District magnitude Thresholds Compulsory voting Referendums Democracy - Schumpeter, Dahl, Przeworski → know the key ideas - Tilly, Hobbes and Olson → state building - Weber → “webarian” Important authors Democracy: Schumpeter, Dahl, Przewworski State building: Tilly, Hobbes & Olson Theory of the State: Weber Regression tables → looking at (independent variable) → looking at regression 1, which statement it correct? → looking at regression 1, what is the regression coefficient? → looking at regression 1 is it causal, yes, no, we cannot tell - Positive or negative  - It is significant? - Find the independent variable - What is the regression coefficient - Standard error → the higher, the more uncertain we are - Understand causality There will be questions on confounders - Something that affects both - Experiments solve for confounders (i think) Reverse causality → the thing we want to explain affects the independent variable Why are there no experiments on presidential systems affecting economic growth? - You cannot assign randomness to the countries, you can’t make a subset of countries randomly Presidential vs parliamentary systems Head of state vs head of government (head of the executive branch) Vote of no confidence vs impeachment