Theory II: Unified Model of Crisis (UMC) & ICB FrameWork PDF

CHAPTER 3 Theory II: Uni ed Model of Crisis (UMC) & ICB FrameWork uni ed Model of crisis The Uni ed Model of Crisis, which is designed to create a general theory of Interstate Crisis, is based upon an integration of six partial models, for: (1) the crisis onset phase/ pre-crisis period, (2) the cris...

CHAPTER 3 Theory II: Uni ed Model of Crisis (UMC) & ICB FrameWork uni ed Model of crisis The Uni ed Model of Crisis, which is designed to create a general theory of Interstate Crisis, is based upon an integration of six partial models, for: (1) the crisis onset phase/ pre-crisis period, (2) the crisis escalation phase/crisis period, (3) the de-escalation phase/ end-crisis period, and (4) the impact phase/post-crisis period, the four phases of an interna- tional crisis and the four periods of a state’s foreign policy crisis. The UMC also builds upon two partial models of crisis—at the international (macro) and state (micro) levels of analysis. In essence, these two partial general models are necessary but insuf cient for a comprehensive analysis of crises in world politics. International crises encompass much more than the behavior of a single state in a foreign policy crisis and more than the crisis interactions among adversarial states in international crises. Thus, it was found necessary to integrate the four phase-period models and the two international and state level models into a Uni ed Model of Crisis, in order to capture the insights provided by each model and level of analysis and to explain accurately and fully the complex phenomenon of Interstate Crises. Conceptual Guidelines: Overview A system approach to knowledge in the social sciences (Bunge 1994), of which the Uni ed Model of Crisis is the ultimate expression in © The Author(s) 2018 53 M. Brecher, A Century of Crisis and Con ict in the International System, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-57156-0_3 54 M. BRECHER 2. The distinguishing trait of each phase—incipient distortion, peak distortion, accommodation, and non-crisis interaction, and of each period namely low, high, declining, and non-crisis stress—can be explained by different sets of enabling fi The concepts, international and foreign policy crisis, denote dynamic processes over time with separate phases such as onset, esca- lation, de-escalation, and impact, and their analytical counterpart at the level of a foreign policy crisis for a state such as pre-crisis, crisis, end-crisis, and post-crisis periods. fl 1. fi fi fi fi fi International Relations–World Politics, is based upon the following six conceptual guidelines. 3. The two levels of crisis, international and state, are analytically dis- tinct but generate interrelated processes, each helping to explain the other, and both levels constitute integral parts of a larger uni- ed whole, interstate crisis (Uni ed Model). 4. The four phase-period models and the two-level models capture parts of a multilayered reality. 5. An explanation of cause–effect relationships in an Interstate Crisis requires the analysis of perceptions and behavior by the participating states (crisis actors), for crises occur and evolve as a result of choices by their decision-makers. 6. A synthesis of the two levels of analysis, international and state into a uni ed model, will achieve a comprehensive explanation of interstate crisis. I turn now to one of the two major conceptual and theoretical inno- vations of the Uni ed Model, incorporating the four phases and four periods of a crisis, the two levels of analysis, the crucial variables, and the perceptions that shape decision-makers’ behavior in foreign policy cri- ses. (The concepts of Severity and Impact, along with the Severity– Impact Model, are discussed at length in Brecher, International Political Earthquakes (2008), Chaps. 6 and 7). What is the meaning of the Uni ed Model of Crisis? In essence, it is a conceptual device to explain interstate crisis as a whole. To achieve 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 55 fi fi fi fi fi fi fi that aim it builds upon the logic of a model of foreign policy crisis [state level of analysis] and of a model of international crisis [interactor level of analysis] and integrates them into a model of Interstate Crisis [sys- tem level of analysis] (UMC). Moreover, it incorporates the four phase and four period partial models—for onset, escalation, deescalation, and impact, the four phases of an international crisis, and the four periods of a foreign policy crisis such as pre-crisis, crisis, end-crisis, and post-crisis— into the Uni ed Model. Third, the empirical data to test this integrated model of Crisis are drawn from the ndings acquired in the testing of hypotheses derived from the four phase models, based upon two strands of evidence: aggregate, quantitative data on 97 years of international fi fi variables: system, interac- tor, actor, and situation attributes, acting through decision-makers’ perceptions of value threat, time pressure, and war likelihood (these concepts and their interrelationship will be clari ed in a diagram of the Uni ed Model below). cri- ses (late 1918–end 2015) and qualitative data from 29 case studies of state behavior in foreign policy crises. The concepts, international crisis and foreign policy crisis, denote dynamic processes over time. The key traits of each phase (of an interna- tional crisis) and each period (of a foreign policy crisis), namely, distortion and stress, respectively, are explained by clusters of enabling variables— system, inter-actor, actor, and situational—operating through decision- makers’ perceptions of value threat, time pressure, and probability of war (military hostilities). The two levels of analysis are distinct but interre- lated. The models of international crisis and foreign policy crisis capture segments of a complex reality. Moreover, cause–effect relationships at the international level require the prior analysis of perceptions and behavior by the crisis actors (state level). The task of integrating the two levels of analysis is demanding. However, a synthesis is the essential precondition for a valid theory of interstate crisis. Onset Phase–Pre-crisis Period: Hypotheses on Onset; Crisis Onset Model How does an interstate crisis begin? It erupts rst as a foreign policy crisis for a state through one of three kinds of trigger: a hostile act, a disruptive event, or an environmental change. The catalyst may be internal or exter- nal. It may be a verbal threat, for example, state A may issue a threat to expel B’s citizens if B persists with propaganda against A’s leaders. State A may commit a hostile political act, such as severing diplomatic relations with B. It may impose an economic embargo on B’s exports. It may take non-violent military action, such as mobilization of reserves, maneuvers, or a show of force. It may also resort to indirect violence, attacking B’s client. 56 M. BRECHER An interstate crisis may also be set in motion by one of several types of external change: the development of a new weapon or weapon system or, more generally, an innovation in military technology that affects the balance of power between adversaries; change in the con guration of the global system or the salient regional subsystem, etc. An internal verbal or physical challenge to B’s regime may occur with the support of A’s lead- ers. It may take the form of a coup d’état, assassination, act of terror or sabotage, demonstration, strike, mutiny, or revolt. It may be the fall of a government or the proclamation of a new regime or a new state. One example of a catalyst or trigger to a foreign policy crisis for a state will suf ce: an air battle between Syrian MIGs and Israeli Mirages on September 13, 1973 triggered Israel’s and Syria’s foreign policy pre- crises, which escalated to an international crisis (and war), the October- Yom Kippur Crisis-War of 1973–1974 (direct violent act). fi fi fi There is, in short, an array of triggers to a foreign policy crisis. However, in order for state B to experience a foreign policy crisis, the catalyst/trigger, whether it is an act, event, or environmental change, must be perceived by B’s decision-makers as a source of higher-than-nor- mal value threat. That perception, in turn, generates modest stress, indi- cating the beginning of B’s pre-crisis period. However, the change is not yet and may not develop into a full- edged international crisis. Stated in terms of the Uni ed Model of Crisis—see the graphic rep- resentation of this model below—the outbreak of a foreign policy crisis for a state is a de ning condition of an international crisis. It is necessary but not suf cient; that is, the pre-crisis period for a state is a prerequisite to, but not synonymous with, the onset phase of an international crisis. Whether or not B’s pre-crisis period will set an international crisis in motion depends upon its perception and response. If it ignores A’s trig- ger as posing a marginal or transitory threat—and does nothing—B’s incipient foreign policy crisis will be aborted and an international crisis will not ensue. There are many such ‘failed’ international crises in world politics since the end of World War I. More often than not, B’s deci- sion-makers will perceive a trigger from A as seriously threatening one or more basic values and will respond in accordance with the dictates of a universally shared security dilemma by states that arise from the underly- ing anarchy of the interstate system; all states must be aware of the need to prepare to engage in self-help in an environment of system anarchy. B’s preliminary response may be a verbal, political, economic, non- violent military act, or a violent act (the same categories as triggering 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 57 acts) or it may take the form of a multiple response, including or exclud- ing violence. Whatever B’s response, other than ‘do nothing’ or com- pliance with A’s hostile behavior, it will generate a reciprocal perception of threat by A’s decision-makers and with it A’s pre-crisis period. If A responds, then more-than-normal hostile interaction between A and B would follow. That, in turn, would transform a pre-crisis period for both A and B into the onset phase of an international crisis characterized by incipient distortion; that is, at that point in the A–B relationship an international crisis erupts. While this process traces the incipient link between the two levels of analysis, state level and international level, at the beginning of an inter- state crisis, what explains the change from non-crisis to pre-crisis period for the adversaries and then to the onset phase of an international cri- sis? An unambiguous, theoretically valid causal formula is not possible because interstate crises are pervasive in time and space, affecting virtu- ally all members of the global system. What is possible is to specify the cluster of enabling variables, that is, the system, inter-actor, and actor attributes whose presence makes the outbreak of an interstate crisis most likely. The more of these conditions that are present, the more likely is the jump from non-crisis to incipient foreign policy crisis for one or more adversarial states and the onset of an international crisis. Crisis Onset Model fi fi fi fl These conditions were derived from the crisis onset model: it postulates that a foreign policy crisis and later an international crisis are most likely to be catalyzed when the dispute between A and B occurs within a polycentric structure; it erupts within a subsystem of world politics; it occurs in a setting of protracted con ict; there is no or marginal power discrepancy between the adversaries; their political regimes are non-democratic or mixed; and the adversaries are geographically contiguous (Fig. 3.1). Two other puzzles about ‘crisis take-off’ merit attention in the con- text of the Uni ed Model. First, what enabling variables explain the most likely set of conditions for crisis initiation by a state? Second, if A’s action triggers B’s pre-crisis period and generates low stress for B’s decision-makers, what does the UMC indicate as the most likely pattern of coping in that initial period of an interstate crisis? The task of explaining foreign policy crisis initiation, too, takes the form of specifying the most likely conditions in which a state will trig- ger a military-security crisis for another member of the global system. According to Proposition 2, the most likely conditions are when a state fi fl is a young or newly independent entity; is militarily stronger than its adversary; has a non-democratic regime; confronts internal political, social, and/or economic instability; is geographically contiguous to its adversary; and has a large territory. Given the prevalence of low stress between–among the decision-makers of adversaries in the onset phase, their behavior (coping) during their pre-crisis period is likely to take the form of a preliminary probe of each other’s intention, capability, and resolve. Bargaining is not likely to be of the coercive diplomacy type; for the heightened probability of military hos- tilities and time pressure, the two other de ning conditions of a foreign 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 59 policy crisis are not yet or are only dimly perceived by the adversaries; and the value threat, the third de ning condition, is still modest in the onset phase. In short, the adversaries are likely to consider one or more paci c techniques of crisis management, notably negotiation or mediation. For the same reasons—low, though higher than normal, value threat, unawareness of time constraint, and the perception of war as unlikely— decision-making in the pre-crisis period of the adversaries will differ lit- tle from its non-crisis norm. Decision-makers will not exhibit a more intense search for information about the disputed issue(s) or the adversary’s intention, capability, and behavior. The processing of information will remain essentially the function of bureaucrats. And their ‘gatekeeper’ role on the type and amount of information to ow upwards to senior decision-makers will, as in non-crisis situations, have a profound effect on the latter’s [mis]perceptions and behavior in the pre-crisis period. Consultation, too, is likely to follow the non-crisis norm. Senior deci- sion-makers will become slightly more active because a new or enhanced threat is perceived, requiring some attention and response by those authorized to decide and act for a state. They will meet more frequently and seek more advice from military and civilian advisors but without a display of pressure for rapid choice. They may be open-minded about alternative ways of responding to the perceived threat, though not averse to reliance on standard operat- ing procedures (SOPs) to cope with the challenge. And the decisional forum is likely to remain a non-crisis unit, whether Cabinet, National Security Council, Politburo, Revolutionary Command Council, Standing Committee, or other institutional variants. In general, the decision process will be unhurried and largely free from dysfunctional stress. fi fi fi fi fl fl The many (29) ICB case studies of decision-making in foreign pol- icy crises alluded to earlier provide strong but not total support for the expected coping pattern in the precrisis period. There was no change in information processing in an overwhelming majority of the cases, and where change occurred it was con ned to a modest increase in informa- tion ow. Decision-makers did not perceive a need for more information and did not resort to extraordinary channels of communication. As for consultation, exceptions to the Uni ed Model’s anticipated continuation of non-crisis behavior were the USSR’s consultation with leaders of other Warsaw Pact states in the 1968 Prague Spring pre-crisis period, and the formation of an ad hoc group, the “Malvinas Team,” by Argentina’s Foreign Ministry in its 1982 Falklands/Malvinas pre-crisis period. 60 M. BRECHER Similarly, there were exceptions to an anticipated continuation of the non-crisis norm for decisional forums in the pre-crisis period—in several foreign policy crises. Change from the non-crisis norm is evi- dent in: the UK’s ‘Inner Cabinet’ in the Munich Crisis (1938); Israel’s ‘Kitchen Cabinet’ in the October-Yom Kippur Crisis-War (1973– 1974); and Syria’s ‘decision-making Committee’ in the Lebanon Civil War I crisis (1975). Finally, some alternatives were considered in several cases during the pre-crisis period, for example, Hungary in the Hungarian Uprising (1956) and India in the India/China Border Crisis (1959–1962), but the search for options in these cases was minimal. In sum, coping with pre-crisis did not differ markedly from the non-crisis norm. The fundamental reason was a perceived modest value threat and the perceived remoteness of military hostilities or time pressure for choice. In the Uni ed Model, the duration of the onset phase is postulated as exible. This phase will continue as long as the initial value threat for all crisis actors remains unchanged and decision-makers’ perceptions are free from heightened expectations of war or acute time pressure, and at the international level, as long as disruptive interaction among the crisis adversaries is modest. Thus, the duration of onset may be very brief, less than a day, or very long, many months, even longer. The number of decisions, too, is expected to vary greatly, from one to many. This will depend upon: the duration of the onset phase, the number of crisis actors at that stage, the geographic distance between the adversar- ies, the gravity of values at risk, and the extent of salience to major powers. Whatever the individual linkage, there is likely to be fewer decisions dur- ing the onset/pre-crisis period than in the escalation phase/crisis period. The key concepts that illuminate the pre-crisis period of a state’s for- eign policy crisis are trigger, stress, coping, and choice. Coping by both A and B, in fact by as many adversaries as there are in an international cri- sis, will correspond to a non-crisis norm, that is, to established routines of information processing, consultation with bureaucratic subordinates, lim- ited if any search for alternatives, assessment of options in the institutional- ized decisional forum and, more often than not, a decision that follows standard operating procedures. This mutual process of perception, coping, and choice at the state level in the pre-crisis period will generate modest distortion at the inter- actor level, in the onset phase. There may be only one action–reaction exchange; there may be many. fl fi fi 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 61 How and when does the initial phase change occur, that is, from onset to escalation? The Uni ed Model of Crisis identi es the catalyst to phase change. As evident in the gure of the UMC above, the key is a new con- stellation of system and/or inter-actor and/or actor attributes, strength- ened by some traits of the crisis itself that generate for at least one of the adversaries a perception of more acute value threat, along with an aware- ness of time pressure and a higher than normal expectation of involvement in military hostilities before the disruptive challenge is overcome. With that fundamental perceptual change, that is, a deepening of the antic- ipation of harm, the onset phase will move to more intense action and reaction that heralds the coming of the escalation phase. The actors will experience a corresponding change from pre-crisis to crisis period behavior. The termination dates for phase and period are often, but need not be, identical. And when phase/period change in an interstate crisis occurs, the coping pattern undergoes basic change as well. Escalation PhaseCrisis Period Escalation refers to a dynamic process in the evolution of an interstate crisis: it denotes a shift from one equilibrium state to another. At the interstate level, the indicators of escalation are an increase in the inten- sity and/or a change in the type of disruptive interaction between/ among adversaries, including a heightened probability of military hostili- ties. At the state level, the indicators are a perception by decision-makers of more acute value threat, awareness (or, if it existed in the pre-crisis period, greater awareness) of time constraint on choice, and unlike pre- crisis, an image of substantial increase in the perceived probability of war. How does escalation begin? As speci ed in the Figure of the Uni ed Model of Crisis above, the process from pre-crisis period to onset phase is replicated. State A may commit a hostile act against B or vice versa. It may be verbal, political, economic, non-violent military, or violent. Or the catalyst may be a disruptive event or environmental change. The tar- get may comply, that is, yield to the adversary’s demand, in which case the crisis will terminate abruptly in victory/defeat, the counterpart to ‘abortion’ in the onset phase. More likely, the target will perceive the new trigger as a step-level change in hostility and respond accordingly. The combination of A’s new trigger and B’s response, or vice versa, com- pletes the initial jump from onset phase/pre-crisis period to escalation phase/crisis period. 62 M. BRECHER fi fi fi fl fi fi Some interstate crises gestate slowly; that is, they undergo a lengthy onset phase in which the adversaries do not threaten or employ violence or engage in coercive diplomacy. This pattern operates when lesser val- ues are at stake and especially when time, though salient, is not crucial to the outcome. Other crises escalate quickly, with a short onset phase and the early threat or use of violence. This pattern tends to correlate with high values at risk such as existence, in uence, or territory. Where minor values are at stake, time pressure will be absent or minimal, and war will be perceived as unlikely, thus making escalation remote and therefore imposing no/few demands on the adversaries to abandon pre- crisis behavior. Where basic values are perceived to be under threat, a premium is placed on violence and the time for choice and action will be restricted. In sum, the duration of the onset phase will be a function of the gravity of values threatened and, to a lesser extent, the awareness of time constraints on choice. Hypotheses on Escalation Sooner or later, events or acts or both will generate for at least one state actor perceptions of more acute value threat, a heightened probability of war, and time pressure, inducing more disruptive interaction and thereby a jump to the escalation phase. The shift from onset to escalation is an integral part of the crisis process except in those cases that abort or fail to materialize. The key question in this context is under what conditions is escalation most likely to occur? These conditions are as follows: crisis occurrence within a polycentric structure, outside the dominant system, and in a protracted con ict setting: geographic proximity between the adversaries, more than two adversaries in the onset phase, and several cross-cutting issues in dispute. Although not theoretically necessary, the step-level jump from onset to escalation phase and from pre-crisis to crisis period is most likely to be catalyzed by a threat of violence or its actual use. Even if the trigger is a verbal, political or economic act it will contain an implied threat of vio- lence. By contrast, the catalyst to crisis onset will most likely involve non- violent acts, non-violent events, or non-military environmental changes. 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 63 Under what conditions is the trigger to the escalation phase/crisis period most likely to be some form of violence? And why should this be so? The enabling variables for violent escalation of an international crisis are as follows: All of the conditions for a jump from onset to escalation phase speci ed above, along with military or other types of authoritarian regime between the crisis adver- saries, power discrepancy between the crisis adversaries, and military aid by patrons to clients engaged in the crisis. As for escalation of an international crisis from no/low to severe violence, all the above conditions are relevant. The two additional ena- bling conditions are as follows: the trigger to escalation takes the form of a violent act and the target responds with equal severity or stronger violent acts. fi fl fi Why should violence be expected in the trigger to crisis escalation? Stated formally, escalation signi es a step-level jump in the pattern of hos- tility, a qualitative increase in the intensity or a change in type of dis- ruptive interaction. For that to occur the trigger must be a much more powerful inducement to change—in disruptive interaction between adversaries, in decision-makers’ perceptions of threat, time pressure, and war likelihood, and in crisis management. The most powerful catalyst to crisis escalation is violence, actual, threatened, or implied. The process of step-level change from pre-crisis to crisis period for the crisis actors and from onset to escalation phase of the international cri- sis was analyzed in 29 case studies. One illustration of this process will suf ce. The dispatch of a British naval task force to the South Atlantic on April 5, 1982 indicated to Argentina’s decision-makers a heightened probability of war with the U.K. in the near future, a visible escalation of its foreign policy crisis and the international crisis over the Falklands/ Malvinas(non-violent military act). There are many differences between onset and escalation phases and between pre-crisis and crisis periods. One is the extent of disruptive interaction: it is more intense in the escalation phase. The other is the depth and scope of perceived hostility by decisionmakers: low value threat in 64 M. BRECHER the pre-crisis period; more acute value threat reinforced by time pressure and heightened probability of war, in the crisis period. This perception, in essence a more basic anticipation of harm, points up a third difference: it generates higher stress than in the pre-crisis period. And that in turn has a profound effect on the behavior of decisionmakers in the two periods. Still another difference relates to the number of decisions in an inter- state crisis. The Uni ed Model of Crisis postulates that the number of important decisions by the adversaries is likely to be higher in the crisis period. The reason is a combination of higher stakes, emergent time salience, and greater expectation of war in the crisis period. Pre-crisis, as noted, is generally con ned to low value threat and low stress. The demands on decision-makers are proportionate to the threat-stress level. They perceive little need to make hard choices, that is, core decisions about an incipient crisis. The threat perceived in the pre-crisis period is not such as to induce an abnormal pattern of choice. Time does not impose constraints. And the perceived remoteness of military hostilities leads to an avoidance of decisions whose consequences cannot be antici- pated. The tendency therefore is to make few if any strategic or even tac- tical decisions in the pre-crisis period and onset phase lest violent options to cope with escalation of a crisis be foreclosed. fi fi fi Once a more hostile act, stressful event or disquieting environmental change triggers the threefold perception of higher threat of harm that marks the beginning of a crisis period, and the target state responds, escalation is set in motion. This phase too may be brief or lengthy. It too may be characterized by one albeit more intense action–reaction exchange or many interactions. It may be non-violent or violent, more likely the latter for reasons noted earlier. Major Powers may or may not become involved in support of a client or ally; they are more likely to do so than in the onset phase of an interstate crisis. This also applies to international organizations. According to the Uni ed Model, decision-makers will adopt more elaborate crisis management techniques during the crisis period of a for- eign policy crisis. They will engage in a more intense search for informa- tion and process it quickly at the highest level of decision-maker(s). They will broaden the scope of consultation, to draw upon the expertise of special- ists in violence and possibly include competing elites in order to enhance national unity. They may create an ad hoc decisional forum in order to expedite and enhance the ef ciency of the decision-making process. And they will embark upon a more careful search for, and consideration of, 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 65 alternatives to manage the crisis. Time becomes more salient. Military hostilities will be viewed as increasingly probable. Stress will be high. Choice is more likely to be novel, to deal with a more serious threat. Escalation also relates to coping with the challenge of a more intense crisis. In some respects, adversaries will follow the pre-crisis pattern. They will seek to uncover each other’s intention, capability and resolve, that is, to assess their ‘critical risk.’ But the emphasis of the search will shift: to the adversary’s disposition to use violence or diplomacy (or both) to achieve its objectives, to relative military capability, and to the likelihood that the adversary will stand fast on its demands, rather than compromise or yield. More important, this search and all other aspects of crisis management during the crisis period will be much more intense because of the higher stress generated by the threefold percep- tion of harm—of more acute value threat, increased time pressure, and heightened war likelihood. Crisis actors will also negotiate, directly or indirectly, and will seek support from one or more major powers, other states and international organizations. Moreover, because the stakes are higher and the risks greater than in the pre-crisis period, actors are more likely to adopt a strategy of coercive diplomacy as the basis for crisis bargaining. Bargaining will take the form of verbal and physical acts. If violence has not yet occurred, actors may mobilize reserves and/or place their armed forces on alert. They may hold visible maneuvers. They may threaten to use violence, if necessary. They may activate commitments of allies and friends to provide assistance in situations of crisis or war. And they may seek legitimacy from international organizations and law for demands that are based upon raison d’état and superior power. fi fi If violence erupts in the escalation phase, either as the trigger or in the course of bargaining, coercive diplomacy will give way to the strat- egy of force, designed to achieve victory at minimal cost—in casualties, weapons, morale, national unity, status in the international system, and the perceptions held by friends, enemies, and neutrals. The use of vio- lence as a crisis management technique is much more likely in the crisis period/escalation phase than in pre-crisis/onset, for reasons cited earlier. Whatever its scope and severity, violence will intensify disruptive interac- tion and generate higher stress for the target and, assuming reciprocal violence, for the initiator as well. In general, coping with escalation in a context of violence is more stressful than coping with precrisis or with a non-violent crisis period. 66 M. BRECHER Higher stress, the UMC contends, will also affect information process- ing. Bureaucrats will play a lesser role and senior decision-makers will become more directly involved in their crisis period than in pre-crisis. Many of the laborious and time-consuming intermediary layers will be eliminated, with more information being elevated rapidly to the top of the decision-making pyramid. The result is that senior decision-makers’ perceptions under high stress will be formed largely from their direct access to information relevant to a crisis. Sources of information will be broadened. And higher stress will create a tendency to rely on extraordi- nary and improvised channels. Consultation, too, will undergo substantial change in the crisis period– escalation phase. The cost of miscalculation and decisional errors will be higher. Military hostilities are more likely. And if they have occurred, more intense violence is expected. That too accentuates stress. Under these conditions, decision-makers are likely to broaden the consultative network and seek the views of persons outside the core decision-making group, especially when existence or some other core value is at stake, so as to maximize national unity at the peak of a crisis. For these reasons too, decision-makers will consult more frequently among themselves, deriving reassurance and con dence from more faceto-face contact. They will also rely on ad hoc forms of consultation. The search for, and consideration of, alternatives too will not be imper- vious to the higher stress of the crisis period. Because one or more basic values are perceived to be under threat, decision-makers will enlarge the scope of their search for viable options. Moreover, alternatives will be assessed with greater care. However, because of perceived time constraints on choice, decision-makers will be more concerned with the immediate than the long-term future. According to the Uni ed Model of Crisis, change will also occur in the decisional forum of crisis actors during their high-stress crisis period. The institutional unit for choice in non-crisis and pre-crisis periods will tend to give way to an ad hoc or combined ad hocinstitutional body, usu- ally small and homogeneous in composition and devoted to the political leader to whom this group provides advice about the most cost-effective path to crisis management. At the same time the members of the selected decisional unit will exhibit a greater felt need for decisive leadership. Once a decision is reached the greater will be the likelihood of a consensus. For the crisis period, too, the 29 foreign policy crises examined provide substantial evidence in support of the Uni ed Model’s postulates. There was 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 67 fi fi fi fi fi a felt need for more information in almost all cases. The crisis actors also intensi ed and diversi ed their search. The pattern of consultation too was broader in almost all cases. Ad hoc decisional forums ourished in the cri- sis period of most of the 29 crises. The evidence on alternatives provides even stronger support for expected behavior in the crisis period: options were sought and thoroughly assessed in the large majority of these crises. What produces the next phase-change in an interstate crisis? According to the Uni ed Model, as long as action–reaction behavior by the adversaries sustains the existing high level of mistrust, hostility, disruptive interaction, and stress, or as long as cost–bene t assessments by the main protagonists remain unchanged, the escalation phase will persist. However, sooner or later, an act or event will indicate a willing- ness by a crisis actor to accommodate an adversary by reducing maximal demands or offering concessions. Mutual mistrust will diminish. Signals of openness to compromise may appear. One or more of these developments portends another phase change, from escalation to deescalation. This is preceded at the actor level by a shift from the crisis period to the endcrisis period, with a winding down of overt hostility. De-escalation PhaseEnd-Crisis Period The concept, de-escalation, like escalation, has several meanings. First, it refers to the winding down of an interstate crisis, a process of accommoda- tion by the adversaries. As such, it is characterized by a decline in the per- ceptions of threat, time, and war likelihood towards their non-crisis norms and in the intensity of disruptive interaction. In this sense, de-escalation denotes phase-change and period-change, that is, at both macroand micro-levels of analysis, conceptually, like the change from onset to esca- lation and from pre-crisis to crisis. At the actor level, de-escalation has an additional meaning: it denotes a shift to a strategy of crisis behavior designed to achieve the goal of accom- modation between the con icting parties. This strategy is precisely the obverse of a strategy of force that aims at an imposed victory/defeat outcome, compared to a voluntarily arrived-at mutual compromise. An accommodative strategy, thus, is associated with a decrease in tension and perceived harm which in turn leads to less disruptive interaction and distortion in the relationship between adversaries. How does de-escalation begin? Several scenarios are possible and are evident in twentieth-century and early twenty- rst century interstate 68 M. BRECHER crises. This phase may begin when one actor achieves a decisive military victory and imposes the conditions of crisis termination. In such a case, de-escalation may take a few days to run its course. However, it may last weeks or months until a cease re, armistice, or peace agreement is framed and implemented. fi fi fi fi fl fl At the other extreme of the transition from escalation to de-escalation is a mutual signaling of a wish to terminate a crisis. This may occur in the context of a costly war of attrition in which victory is unattainable by either adversary. It may emanate from a calculus by the decision-makers of both [or all] crisis adversaries that, in game-theoretic terms, a strategy of cooperation will generate a more positive payoff than a strategy of defec- tion. Such a calculus may occur before military hostilities have erupted or during a war, with a coincidence of perceptions that continuing the war will increase one’s losses, whereas accommodation (cooperation) will increase one’s gains. If the adversaries arrive at this assessment more or less simultaneously, phase-change from escalation to de-escalation would occur abruptly and is likely to be of brief duration. If there is a time lag in the adversar- ies’ shift from a strategy of defection to one of cooperation, de-escalation may still begin—as long as the mutual perception of the relative military balance has convinced both that military victory is either impossible or too costly relative to the anticipated gains. That awareness need not be and rarely is simultaneous. One of the con icting parties may make a bid for termination. The adversary may nd the terms unacceptable or sub- optimal, in which case a bargaining process will ensue. Its intensity and duration will depend upon the parties’ assumptions of the military bal- ance before or during a war. All of these scenarios exhibit the crucial indicator of phase-change from escalation to deescalation: at least one crisis actor must perceive a decline in value threat and/or time pressure and/or war likelihood. That percep- tual shift marks the beginning of a ‘crisis downswing’ toward the pre- crisis level of perceived harm and eventually to the non-crisis norm. Stated in terms of the Uni ed Model of Crisis, phase-change is a func- tion of periodchange. And period-change, from crisis to end-crisis, begins with a decline in one or more of the perceptions of threat, time, and war likelihood and their derivative, high stress. When an actor-level crisis begins to diminish, stress declines with consequences for coping. And this in turn leads to less disruptive interaction, marking the beginning of the phase-change from escalation to de-escalation. 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 69 One illustration of the shift to the de-escalation phase will suf ce. The winding down of India’s prolonged and grave border crisis-war with China began on November 21, 1962, when the latter announced an immediate cease re and a unilateral withdrawal of forces start- ing December 1 to a point 20 km behind “the line of actual control” (verbal act). fi fl fi fl fi fi How long does the de-escalation phase last? Several variables will determine its duration. One is the number of crisis actors. All other things being equal, the fewer the crisis adversaries the less complex will be the accommodation process. Value trade-offs involving mutual concessions will be easier for the con icting parties to identify and to measure and there- fore to accept as a fair compromise. Any increment beyond a twoactor crisis game adds to the complexity of the accommodation process: the dynamics of negotiation; the ability of each party to assess multiple combi- nations of gains and losses; the communication of bids and counter-bids; the greater likelihood of misperception; mistrust of one or more adversaries’ intention regarding crisis accommodation; and the framing of a package to satisfy minimal demands and achieve mutual satisfaction. This analysis applies to an interstate crisis in which the adversaries’ relative equality of power dictates a compromise outcome. However, if crisis escalation includes war and a decisive victory/defeat outcome, the duration of de-escalation is likely to be short, only long enough for the victor to frame surrender terms for the vanquished. The duration of de-escalation will also be in uenced by the extent of major-power activity. The less involved the major powers are in an inter- state crisis, the longer will be the process of accommodation by the adversar- ies. If major powers are active militarily in support of a client, they can exert pressure in favor of a compromise outcome to a crisis; and this they will prefer so as to minimize the risk of major power confrontation and the consequent threat to stability and equilibrium in the global system. Low-level activity, verbal, political, or economic, will reduce the major powers’ leverage with clients or non-client adversaries in the accommo- dation process. Several other factors will affect the duration of the de-escalation phase. One is the geostrategic salience of an interstate crisis. The more remote it is from the vital interests of the major powers the less likely it is that they will intervene and therefore the less in uence they will exert on crisis termination. This absence, in turn, will tend to make deescalation longer. In such a case, its evolution will depend largely on 70 M. BRECHER internal dynamics between the lesser powers that are the principal crisis adversaries. The type of crisis management techniques will also affect the dura- tion of de-escalation. If a crisis escalates to war, accommodation will be more dif cult, unless one party achieves decisive military victory and can impose the terms of war termination. Moreover, the fewer the issues the shorter will be the de-escalation phase, because the quest for mutual compromise will be easier to achieve. Similarly, the less basic the perceived values at stake the less dif cult will be the framing of terms that will be mutually acceptable to the con icting parties. hyPotheses on de-escalation Under what conditions is an international crisis most likely to wind down and terminate in an agreement? This is most likely to occur when a crisis unfolds in a non-protracted con ict setting; the adversaries are relatively equal in military power; there are few adversarial actors; the major powers are less active in the crisis; the international organization is highly involved in quest of a peaceful settlement; and the adversaries rely on non-violent crisis management techniques. fi fl fl fi fl fl Earlier in this analysis, several differences between the onset phase/ pre-crisis period and the escalation phase/crisis period were noted. A simi- lar comparison can be made between the escalation phase/crisis period and the de-escalation phase/end-crisis period. The volume of disrup- tive interaction is expected to decline in the latter, as will the intensity of perceived harm on the part of one or more crisis actors. As a result, the decision-makers’ stress level will decline. And behavior will be cor- respondingly affected. Finally, the number of decisions in the end-crisis period too is expected to decline, relative to the peak stress crisis period. The 29 case studies exhibited these changes as an interstate crisis de- escalated. Disruptive interaction continued but at a distinctly lower level of intensity. This occurred because the crisis actors perceived a lower value threat and with it less stress from time pressure and/or expecta- tion of war or an adverse change in the military balance. In all of these cases, whatever the trigger and duration, there was a decline in both 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 71 perceived harm and disruptive interaction. That in turn led to less stress for decisionmakers. Whether as a result of a cease re or more formal termination of hostilities, or a military victory or even defeat or a faded outcome, the world looked less menacing to decision-makers than in the crisis period. Stated in terms of the Uni ed Model and the de nition of crisis, high stress, derived from a composite perception of harm, dimin- ished in the end-crisis period. The number of decisions in this period too is expected to decline for all of these reasons. All of the themes relating to the preceding crisis phases and periods apply to the deescalation phase/end-crisis period as well, with appro- priate changes because of declining perceptions of harm and stress. Generally, interaction between the crisis adversaries will be less intense and hostile—because there is a perception of less threat, less time pres- sure, and a decreasing probability of war. Coping mechanisms too will undergo change. The quest for informa- tion about the adversary’s intent and capability will be less intense than in the crisis period and will give way to a focus on accommodation and crisis termination; and information processing is likely to revert to the pre- crisis norm, with bureaucrats once more playing a crucial role. Moreover, the adversaries will seek support from the international organization and major powers, where possible. Adversaries will also continue to engage in bargaining, but more via verbal and political than physical acts. Consultation beyond the core decision-making group is expected to contract. The decisional forum too is likely to revert to its institutional, pre-crisis norm—since the need to elicit support from a broad section of the political public, to share the burden of dif cult decisions, has dimin- ished. The search for, as well as consideration of, alternatives will involve much less decision time because the stakes will be perceived as less impor- tant. Stress too will decline. And choice is likely to be of the standard operating procedure, routine type. fi fi fi fi Impact Phase–Post-Crisis Period Thus far, the Uni ed Model of Crisis has offered an explanation for erup- tion (onset/precrisis), crystallization (escalation/crisis), and the winding down process (de-escalation/ end-crisis), leading to crisis termination. However, the end of an interstate crisis does not mark the end of its role in the on-going ow of world politics. Crises have multiple effects—on the actors, on their relations, and on one or more international systems. 72 M. BRECHER The UMC tries to capture this post-crisis dimension by the concept of impact. Although it is treated schematically as another domain/phase of crisis, in the gure on the UMC above, impact differs from the other three phases in several respects. Its time frame is arbitrary, 20 years after cri- sis termination. It has no coping dimension. It is less precise than onset, escalation, and de-escalation, and their counterpart actor-level periods, pre-crisis, crisis, and end-crisis; that is, empirical traces of the post-crisis impact are more dif cult to discover than the evidence of a crisis proper, that is, the three earlier phases and periods. There is also less of a consen- sus on its duration and scope. Nonetheless, while recognizing these con- straints, the Uni ed Model of Crisis contends that the boundaries and content of the impact phase can be designated and its effects measured, though with somewhat less con dence than the measurement of its con- ceptual counterpart during the crisis proper, namely, severity. The concept of impact is a device to capture the consequences of an interstate crisis. At the bilateral level, the task is to discover how a cri- sis affects subsequent relations between-among the principal adversaries. Its legacy is de ned in terms of more or less distrust, hostility, and tension. And the tangible indicator is the occurrence or nonoccurrence of one or more military-security crises between the adversaries in the 20 years fol- lowing crisis termination. What determines this aspect of impact? According to the Uni ed Model, the crucial explanatory variables are outcome, both content and form, and the intensity of a crisis. The UMC postulates that, all other things being equal, a clear zero-sum victory/defeat outcome is much more likely to have a negative impact than a blurred, ambiguous outcome, in which none of the adversaries achieved all of its goals during their interstate crisis or when the status quo ante remained unchanged. Either of these outcomes, compromise or stalemate, will reduce the likeli- hood of more hostile relations after a crisis has ended. The UMC also contends that the form of outcome too has spillover effects on post-crisis relations between the adversaries. Thus a crisis that ends through agreement—a cease re, truce, or armistice in case of vio- lence, or a formal document setting down the procedure for dispute set- tlement, or even an exchange of letters of peaceful intent—is much more likely to leave a positive residue on relations between the adversaries than termination through a unilateral act, such as decisive military invasion fi fi fi fi fl fi fi fi fi 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 73 or even humiliating unilateral withdrawal or by covertly inspired regime change in the adversary. Like overall intensity—the severity of a crisis during its occurrence— the overall impact of a crisis is the product of a set of situational attrib- utes. Its indicators are types of change generated by a crisis during a 20-year period after termination. One is the extent of change in the distribution of power [power change]. This ranges, in the ascending order, along a four-point scale, from no change [point 1], if the outcome is compromise or stalemate, to change in relative power between the adversaries [point 2], to a shift in ranking within the power hierarchy [point 3], to the inclusion of a new state in, or the exclusion of a pre-existing member from, the apex of the power pyramid [point 4]. Another indicator of impact is actor change. As with power, there may be no change [point 1]. However, a crisis may affect the political regime of one or more adversaries, either their foreign policy orientation [point 2] or, more basically, the regime type, for example, a crisis-induced shift from authoritarianism to democracy or the reverse [point 3]. In rare cases a crisis may lead to the creation, elimination, or restoration of a state [point 4], as with Bangladesh as a result of the 1971 India/Pakistan crisis-war. Alliances too may undergo change as a consequence of an interstate crisis. To capture this aspect of impact another four-point scale was con- structed, ascending from no change [point 1], through an increase or decrease in cohesiveness within a pre-existing alliance [point 2], to the entry or exit of an actor into or from an alliance [point 3], to the formation or elimination of an alliance [point 4], as with the transformation of the alliance con guration as a result of the Entry into World War II Crisis of 1939 and the six-year upheaval that followed. Finally, and most dif cult to measure, interstate crises may generate changes in rules of the game, formally or informally. How to measure the impact of an interstate crisis was a crucial meth- odological problem? So too was a theoretical task, namely, to generate deductively the conditions of most likely impact on inter-actor relations and the system(s) of which they are members. To this end, the UMC postulated expectations about change at both levels of analysis, indicated the underlying logic, and framed these assumptions in a form that could be tested. 74 M. BRECHER Hypotheses on Impact Suf ce it to note the postulate relating to systemic consequences of an interstate crisis: the higher the severity of an international crisis, the greater will be its impact, high severity being expressed by fi fi fi many crisis actors, high major power activity in an interstate crisis, high geo-strategic salience, several issues in dispute, and intense violence. The broadest possible scope of crisis impact is system transformation: the systemic legacy of an international crisis is most likely to be transforming when All of the conditions speci ed above operate, and when the catalyst to crisis escalation is extreme; violence is the primary crisis management technique; the crisis is of lengthy duration; and the outcome is other than formal agreement. The impact of an interstate crisis merits attention on several grounds. Conceptually, it is an integral part of the phenomenon of Crisis viewed holistically: without this post-crisis dimension the analysis of Crisis would be incomplete. Moreover, the impact phase provides an indispensa- ble dynamic link between a speci c, time-and-space-bound disruption, an interstate crisis, and global politics writ large. Without impact, the dynamism of the Uni ed Model of Crisis is con ned to the perception- decision-behaviorinteraction ow from phase to phase and period to period, within an interstate crisis per se. Impact traces the feedback from an interstate crisis to the system, inter-actor and actor attributes of the larger environment from which a crisis originated. As such it links crisis to the array of events, acts and changes that together constitute the ow of world politics. Interstate crisis is but one of many sources of global instability and disequilibrium. Nevertheless its capacity for disruption is enormous, as evident in some of the transforming crises of the twentieth century: the 1914 Crisis, which revolutionized the structure of world politics, 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 75 destroying and creating empires and states as a result of the military upheaval, World War I, that followed; the 1939 Entry into World War II Crisis, which exceeded its predecessor in the scope of change—the replacement of multipolarity by bipolarity, with two superpowers, global decolonization amidst the decimation of empires, etc.; and the Cuban Missiles Crisis which, in the post-Cold War perspective, stabilized super- power relations in an era of rapid, potentially destructive technological change. For all of these reasons, impact is no less crucial than the other three phases of an interstate crisis—onset, escalation, and de-escalation. Finally, in policy terms, the ability to trace the post-crisis impact, espe- cially of high severity crises, can enhance the way in which political leaders and foreign policy decision-makers, sensitized to potential multiple consequences, will respond to future incipient crises among the ever- growing number of autonomous members of the global system. Such is the rationale for the inclusion of the impact phase/ post-crisis period in the Uni ed Model of Crisis. fl fi fi fi fi fi fl This model purports not only to describe and but also represent reality. Rather, like all models, it is an analytical device designed to explain reality, in this case the phenomenon of interstate crisis. What functions, then, are performed by the Uni ed Model of Crisis? In the largest sense, the UMC guided and shaped a systematic inquiry into the meaning of interstate cri- ses in the twentieth and early twenty- rst centuries. It provided the intellectual rationale for the phase-period models. It generated the logic for the inferences derived from these models. As such, it made possible the testing of theoretical expectations with the abundant evidence of interstate crises from the end of 1918 until the end of 2015, facilitating the crucial confronta- tion between theory and reality. In so doing the Uni ed Model has laid claim to being the core of a scienti c research program on crisis, con ict, and war (ICB) , for it aims to discover which logically derived propositions about crises and state behavior are falsi ed and which are supported, though formal, de nitive con rmation of the ndings remains elusive. Brecher, Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality (1993) changes in icB structure Recent Additions to Crisis-Conict Project Soon after the publication of the three-volume Crises in the Twentieth Century (1988– 1989), awareness of the scope of unanswered questions 76 M. BRECHER and unexplored dimensions of the vast world of interstate crises and con- icts led the ICB team, notably Brecher and Wilkenfeld, to persist in the quest for knowledge about vast and complex phenomena in world poli- tics. During the decade that followed we were also encouraged by newly discovered sources and valuable suggestions by colleagues and devoted research assistants. The result was many changes in the structure, frame- work, analysis, and content of ICB inquiry, which enlarged and enriched our knowledge of this challenge to humanity’s survival. Our ndings were presented in the longest and most comprehensive book in this pro- ject, A Study of Crisis (1997, 2000) [Brecher and Wilkenfeld], the culmi- nation of two decades of research on crisis, con ict, and war. First, the time span was extended: whereas our 1988–1989 books cov- ered the period 1929–1979, this volume began with cases in late 1918, just after the end of World War I, and continued to the end of 1994. [Since then, the scope of ICB data has expanded to the end of 2015] The number of cases increased by more than 50%, from 278 to 476 international crises and from 627 to 1052 foreign policy crises for indi- vidual states. Moreover, some cases were merged and others split, in light of newly discovered evidence. fl fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi There were changes too in the dataset. New variables were con- structed to tap hitherto neglected dimensions (e.g., ethnicity, media- tion). And many of the key variables (e.g., value threat, form of outcome) were checked and recoded as part of an on-going attempt Another basic change relates to the framework of analysis. While the earlier ICB version (1988) examined crises at both the international (sys- tem) and state (actor) levels, A Study of Crisis (1997, 2000) applied the Uni ed Model of Crisis, as set out in Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality (Brecher 1993) and summarized above. Thus, Part I of A Study of Crisis presented an integrated framework for the two levels of analysis. Part II speci ed the combined methodology—quantitative (aggregate data) and qualitative (comparative case study). And Part III offered comparable summaries of all the crises, interweaving the ow of events from a system perspective to the behavior of the principal actors, along with the roles of the involved major power(s) and international organization(s). Noteworthy, too, was the enlarged conceptual and substantive scope of the 1997/2000 book. While crisis remained the primary focus, much 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 77 greater attention was given to interstate protracted con icts. This change was evident in the presentation of the cases in a format designed to make a large body of knowledge more user-friendly and more relevant. All crises were classi ed into two types instead of being presented in a simple chronological sequence: those that formed part of a protracted con ict—60% of the international crises—and those that were unre- lated to a con ict. The former was grouped into 33 protracted con icts, some that have ended (e.g., France/ Germany, East/West con icts), others that are still unresolved (e.g., Arab/Israel, India/ Pakistan con- icts). A brief background commentary on a con ict was followed by a summary of each crisis within that con ict, in chronological sequence, providing a broader con ict perspective for the unfolding of related cri- ses between the same adversaries. The other 40% of the international crises were grouped by region (Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Inter-Region) and were presented chronologically. A multi- ple cross-reference system in Part III of the 1997/2000 book and the Master Table, which contained information about the key dimensions of each of the then-researched 412 international crises, were designed to ease the reader’s task. fl fl fl fi fi fl fl fi fl fl fl fl fl fl fi fl fi This book also attempted to break fresh ground in the analysis of crisis, con ict and war (Part IV). The innovation took the form of an intensive inquiry into seven enduring topics/themes in World Politics: polarity, geography, ethnicity, democracy, protracted con ict, violence, and third- party intervention—their roles and effects on the con guration of cri- ses and con icts. Most of these distinct analytical ‘cuts’ were guided by models from which hypotheses were derived and tested against the volu- minous evidence generated by the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. The objectives of these analyses were twofold: theory construc- tion, through a systematic and rigorous search for patterns of turmoil in most of the twentieth and the rst 15 years of the twentyrst century and an indirect contribution to world order, through the generation of fl fi to achieve maximal accuracy, clarity, rigor, and salience in the overall objec- tives of the inquiry. knowledge to be communicated to policymakers and the attentive public about this pervasive phenomenon in the global system. From early in the Crisis-Con ict project, Jonathan Wilkenfeld and I were convinced that no single path to knowledge is awless or even ade- quate. Competing claims to the ‘correct’ method struck us as arrogant and counter-productive. We recognized that deductive logic is capable of generating models and hypotheses to guide systematic inquiry. We were also convinced that generalizations can be derived from inductive 78 M. BRECHER research, both from comparative case studies and from aggregate data analysis through large N studies. In short, we tried to demonstrate the merit and validity of multiple paths to knowledge (a concept expounded in Brecher (1989)). Overview of Findings The approach of a new millennium coincided with the emergence of a fundamental change in the structure of the international system, the out- lines of which were just beginning to crystallize when we were writing A Study of Crisis. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union (1989–1990), the United States emerged as the dominant power in the international system, that is, the sole superpower, though other autonomous centers of decision persisted, notably China, France, Germany, Russia, and the UK. Does the fact that the international sys- tem managed the transition from bipolycentrism [bipolar in terms of power con guration, multi-power in terms of decisional autonomy by existing states] (1963–1989), to unipolycentrism [unipolar, that is, power pre-eminence of a single state since 1990, along with many auton- omous centers of decision], without an international catastrophe similar to the one that accompanied the end of multipolarity in 1945, signal maturing of the international system and its actors and institutions? It was too early to render a verdict in 1994. What is unmistakable in 2017—and was already evident in the late 1990s—is a basic change in the predominant location of international crises, namely, a shift from Europe to Africa, Asia and the Middle East beginning, gradually, after the end of World War II. Structurally, this change has been accompanied by a decline in international crises– international political earthquakes at the dominant system level and an increase within geographically and power subordinate subsystems. Moreover, neighboring crisis actors were more likely to experience and employ violence in their crises. Not surprisingly, major powers, with the widest geographic reach, were the most likely to be involved in crises far from their borders. Global reach will likely continue to be an important factor in the rest of the twenty- rst century, in light of fundamental tech- nological changes, which also affect the capability of states to wage war far from their borders. fi fl fl fi Ethnicity, too, emerged as a major international force, as evident in many high-visibility crises in the post-Cold War era. We asked: is 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 79 ethnicity’s current high pro le likely to pass once the international sys- tem and its member-states make the accommodations necessary to rec- ognize its roots and cope with its demands? Our data point to a relatively steady frequency of crises with an ethnic dimension throughout the twenty- rst century, but some of their unique characteristics bear watch- ing. Ethnicity-related crises, particularly if they occur within protracted con icts, are particularly susceptible to escalating violence, undoubt- edly attributable to the high level of perpetual hostility existing among the adversaries. These crises are also characterized by very high levels of threat perception, particularly when territorial issues are involved. And crises with an ethnic dimension are characterized by a high rate of dissatisfaction with the terms of the agreements that are often associated with their termination; that is, they are poised for subsequent and seri- ous eruptions. Here too the evidence on the central role of ethnicity was inconclusive in 1994, the end of the time frame for A Study of Crisis. It was evident, however, that international organizations have generally been more involved and more effective than the major powers as intermediaries in ethnicity crises. Just as the International Relations empirical literature has found a strong general link between democracy and peace, so too our research con rmed this link among states involved in international crises: the higher the proportion of democracies among the adversarial actors in an international crisis, the less likely it is that violence will be employed in crisis management; and when employed, the less likely it is that such violence will escalate to a high level. Left unanswered in the euphoria over the emergence of new democracies in virtually every corner of the globe are two questions. Will an international system dominated by a plurality of democracies exhibit the same peaceful tendencies that were associated with democracies when they were relatively few in number? Secondly, will democracies in process, that is, transitional democracies, be likely to play the same ‘peace’ role vis-à-vis a democratic adversary that has been discovered in the behavior of mature democracies toward democratic adversaries in situations of disputes? Much has been learned about the role of violence in international cri- ses. A bipolycentrism structure—two power centers, along with more than two centers of autonomous decisions (1963–1989)—was particu- larly susceptible to violence in both triggers and crisis management. Regions differed in terms of the extent and severity of violence. At the same time, regardless of region, contiguity was a strong predictor of 80 M. BRECHER fi fi fi fl fl violence among crisis adversaries. As noted, ethnicity, too, was a strong predictor of violence during interstate crises. Democracy among crisis adversaries dampened the tendency toward the use of violence in cri- sis management. Moreover, the more protracted a con ict in which a crisis was embedded, the more likely it was for the crisis trigger to be violent and for actors to have employed violence in crisis manage- ment. Finally, decision-maker stress, societal unrest, and power discrep- ancy among principal adversaries all contribute to the likelihood that violence in crises will escalate. What has been the role of international organizations and major powers in crisis management? While the UN Security Council has con- sistently accounted for roughly two-thirds of international organization activity, the role of the General Assembly declined during bipolycentrism, while that of the Secretary-General was enhanced. The post-Cold War unipolycentric system—one power center and several or many autonomous decision centers—provided some preliminary evidence of a rein- vigorated role for the Security Council, but not always accompanied by effectiveness. Major powers during multipolarity—several power centers and several decision centers— were far more likely to become involved in interna- tional crises than the two superpowers during bipolarity and bipolycen- trism. Indeed, a close examination of the superpowers as actors and intermediaries in international crises reveals the great care with which they interacted in the global arena: the USA and the USSR were almost never highly involved or crisis actors simultaneously in the same crisis as principal adversaries. Overall, A Study of Crisis created an analytical framework within which foreign policy crises, international crises, and protracted con icts can be examined from a comparative perspective. Although we presented a panorama of international crises in the twentieth century, we did not provide answers to all questions about crises. One goal, throughout the decades of research, has been to facilitate learning by foreign policy decision-makers as they attempt to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. For the scholarly community, the objective has been to strengthen the accumulation of knowledge in the domain of crisis and con ict, and particularly with regard to the seven key themes, noted earlier in this chapter, that served as a focus of analysis in this book. [The 1997 edition of A Study of Crisis consisted of more than 1000 pages. In 2000, the original print version was transformed into a 3 THEORY II: UNIFIED MODEL OF CRISIS (UMC) & ICB FRAMEWORK 81 300-page soft-cover book: all of Part III in the original Work, the sum- maries of every international crisis from November 1918 to the end of 1994, appeared in an innovative CD-ROM format, one of the earliest International Relations books to be presented in this form.] fl fi fl fl Aggregate data analysis, that is, in-breadth, horizontal analysis, and Case-studies, that is, in-depth, vertical analysis, have been the two pillars of the ICB Project. However, important dimensions have been added to its research program since the publication of A Study of Crisis. A new data subset on mediation in international crises has been created by Jonathan Wilkenfeld, with extensive analysis of the ndings. The phe- nomenon of ‘nearcrisis’ among states, an important segment of the Con ict domain that has been neglected until now, has been conceived and a dataset created by Patrick James. Another topic that has been the focus of wide-ranging ICB research has been the role of ‘non-state actors,’ including ethnic groups, in international crises: this addition, developed by Brecher and Ben-Yehuda, was stimulated by basic changes in the structure and actors of the international system since the turn of the millennium. When this inquiry into the Crisis-Con ict domain of world politics began, in 1975, the state was still the pre-eminent actor in the global system. Since then, the state-centric model of world politics, which held sway since the Treaty of Westphalia ended the European Thirty Years War in 1648, has been increasingly challenged by some scholars as no longer an accurate representation of global reality. A plethora of non- state actors has acquired high visibility—transnational, international, nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and sub-national. And national- ism, often in the guise of ethnicity, has re-emerged as a powerful force in the domain of crisis, con ict and war. We took note of this important development, both in updating the ICB Dataset, e.g., the speci cation of non-state actors as triggering entities, and in our analyses. This has been accomplished by applying the concepts and methods developed for the analysis of interstate crises to domestic/internal crises, focusing on ethnic minorities and other non-state actors, the intrastate level of analysis, that is, domestic (internal) crises. In sum, the ICB Project has spawned and developed several additional branches to its two core segments, quantitative and qualitative analysis of crises at the macro (interstate) level and the micro (state) level of analysis. At the same time, interstate turmoil continued unabated in the post-Cold War years: from 1990 to 1994, there were 21 international 82 M. BRECHER crises—many of which escalated to war, and from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 2004, another 33 crises among states erupted. The most violent were Gulf Crisis-War I in 1990–1991 and the interstate cum intra- state con ict that wreaked havoc in former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995. Both were followed by further violent upheavals, including the NATO- Serbia crisis-war over Kosovo in 1998–1999, Gulf Crisis-War II, which raged in Iraq in 2003, along with the war in Afghanistan since 2002. fl fi fl fl fl fl fi Other post-Cold War, high-pro le crises within unresolved interstate protracted con icts, most without violence, contained a potential for grave crises that undermined regional and global stability. Notable were the India/Pakistan Nuclear crises of 1990 and 1998 (along with their mini-war over Kargil in northern Kashmir, in 1999), and the cluster of crises over the North Korea Nuclear Weapons program since 1993–1994, along with a cluster of crises between Iran and the P5+1 major powers (France, the PRC, the UK, the USA, the USSR + Germany), supported by the UN, from 2005 until agreement was reached between the six major powers and Iran in 2014. And in 1995–early 1996, there were 8 more international crises, of which one, between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan in 1995, indicated that their protracted con- ict continues to pose a threat to stability in Northeast and Southeast Asia, with potential fallout far beyond those regions. fl In terms of the structure of the international system: despite the dis- avowal of the statecentric IR paradigm by many academics, dozens of nationalities/ethnic groups continue to seek self-determination, more precisely, the right to create an independent state, with all of the rights to statehood that the global system confers on its members. Thus, while the state is no longer the virtually exclusive actor in terms of crisis, con- ict, and war, it remains the most important actor in both the military- security and political-diplomatic issue-areas of world politics.