Rational Actors and National Interests PDF

2 Rational Actors and National Interests In This Chapter National Interests Rationality and Nuclear Decision Rational Decision Making and Making...

2 Rational Actors and National Interests In This Chapter National Interests Rationality and Nuclear Decision Rational Decision Making and Making Realism Poliheuristic Theory Assessing Rationality Major Cases Explored Barack Obama’s response to Donald Trump’s response to Bashar Assad’s use of chemical Bashar Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria, 2013 weapons in Syria, 2017 Xi Jinping and Chinese national US-Soviet nuclear weapons rela- interests tionship and US nuclear weapons Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision strategy, 2018 making leading to the 1967 North Korean leader Kim Jong Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Un and the rational first use of nuclear weapons O n August 31, 2013, US president Barack Obama stood before televi- sion cameras and announced that his administration had determined that the Syrian regime had used chemical weapons in Damascus. Obama declared this “an assault on human dignity” and “a serious danger” to the national security of the United States. Because of this, Obama had “decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets” to “hold the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemi- cal weapons, deter this kind of behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it 15 Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 15 5/30/18 2:08 PM  16 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests out.”1 The US military had assets in place for such an action, but because the United States was the “world’s oldest constitutional democracy,” Obama was seeking congressional authorization for the use of force. As members of the US Congress went to their favorite media outlets to debate the use of military force, US diplomats set out to discuss the next steps with allies. The British Parliament had voted against taking military action before Obama’s announcement, but the French government apparently was ready to act with the United States. Before the US Congress formally took up the authorization—within two weeks of Obama’s threat—the Russian gov- ernment announced that it had reached an agreement with the Assad gov- ernment about the removal and destruction of its chemical weapons stocks. Within days, the US and Russian governments had developed a plan for tak- ing inventory of, removing, and destroying the weapons, a plan endorsed by the United Nations Security Council at the end of the month. By the start of October 2013, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other UN inspectors arrived in Syria to implement the plan. Obama then asked Congress to postpone any formal discussions regarding the use of military force. In the short term, Obama had succeeded in getting Assad to agree to the international inspection and removal of his chemical weapons stocks without having to fire a shot or launch a cruise missile. Russia, a steadfast defender of the Assad regime, negotiated the agreement and assisted in its implemen- tation, against its earlier insistence that there was no truth to the claims that chemical weapons had been used. Yet “the near unanimous verdict among observers is that this episode was a failure.”2 Critics pointed to a terrible deci- sion-making process, while others said the president had undermined Ameri- can resolve. The French foreign minister later claimed that Obama’s failure to carry through with the threat to use force was “a turning point, not only for the crisis in the Middle East, but also for Ukraine, Crimea and the world.”3 American students in my undergraduate courses—even some Obama support- ers—saw the episode as a moment when the president flinched and Russia seemed to take the lead on Syria. What this case provides is both an example of what is called rational decision making (as will be explained shortly) and an illustration of how experts and everyday people really do not like rational decision making (which also will be explained shortly). National Interests Our model in this chapter is the rational decision-making model. This model is associated with the realist worldview that conceptualizes the state as a uni- tary actor pursuing long-term national interests. In this view, states are only distinguishable by the relative power they hold, not by their internal charac- teristics. Government type, history, economics, and the qualities of the indi- Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 16 5/30/18 2:08 PM  National Interests 17 viduals holding political leadership positions hold no importance in and of themselves to the analyst. The decisions taken by the leaders of the state are seen as the decisions of the state. This conflation of leader and state is possible because of the key assumption that all leaders will act in ways consistent with the long-term, persistent national interests of the country. Since the national interests do not change, changes in leadership are inconsequential. For example, consider China and Xi Jinping. There have been five sig- nificant leaders of the People’s Republic of China since 1949: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. In October 2017 at a meeting of China’s Communist Party, Xi’s name and philosophy were writ- ten into the constitution, suggesting that Xi had become a leader on par with Mao and Deng. Despite this elevation, Jeffrey Bader cautions that observers should resist the temptation to view the evolution of China in the last few years primarily as the product of the vision and imagination of an aggressive leader. Most of the actions and trends that worry observers have been present for some time: the military build-up, the assertive behavior in the South and East China Sea, the growing gravitational pull of China’s economy, and the political repression and denial of basic rights to its citizens. There are questions that deserve attention about how Xi is steering China. But the larger questions about China’s direction both pre-date and will post-date Xi’s tenure.4 Bader argues that China’s material wealth and capacities have changed, giv- ing China—under any leader—more international status and options, but persistent long-term Chinese national ambivalence toward the international order shapes the policies of all its leaders, making the general outlines of Chi- nese foreign policy predictable. A classic statement regarding leaders and persistent national interests in the study of foreign policy comes from Hans Morgenthau, one of the most significant post–World War II international scholars in the realist tradition. In the statement below, note how the assumption binding leaders and national interests creates a simple model for the analyst to employ: We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman—past, present or future—has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other states- men; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinter- ested observers, we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself. Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 17 5/30/18 2:08 PM  18 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests The concept of national interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoreti- cal understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astound- ing continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational contin- uum, by and large consistent with itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of succes- sive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.5 The “concern with motives” or “ideological preferences” entails examin- ing the characteristics of individuals or groups of individuals, or even examin- ing the political dynamics within a country, pursuits that have no merit in the realist view. Morgenthau does allow that, in rare cases, psychological disorders in an individual leader or the emotions of mass democratic politics may cause national decisions that are out of line with national interests. Morgenthau might tell us that when we study most foreign policy decisions, we should fol- low the old advice given to fledgling doctors in medical school: when you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras. When you see a foreign policy decision, think rational decision making and national interests, not idiosyncrasy, not individual leadership differences, not domestic political calculations. The stan- dard expectation is the one upon which to base your diagnosis or explanation. Although Morgenthau claims the stated goal is to impose “intellectual discipline upon the observer,” it is also the case that this model makes the analyst’s task easier. Rather than collecting evidence about particular national leaders, the analyst can collect evidence on the long-term national interests of the country and conduct some “armchair theorizing” about the policies of any given leader. This means the analyst does not need to go to a foreign capital and study any particular leader; the analyst can just impose the rigor of national interests atop her or him. This is, of course, a useful way to think about a country with secretive leadership and a closed society. Foreign policy scholars cannot gain up-close data on Kim Jong Un (or his advisors), but that data would be unnecessary in a study based on understanding the long-term national interests of North Korea. It is important to note here that individuals do have different traits and personalities, but “large national transformations are more often the product of historical forces than the writ of one powerful leader,” as Bader reminds us.6 Some analysts in this tradition, like Michael McGinnis, prefer to eschew the use of the word individual in favor of regime, precisely because regime takes our focus away from personalities. McGinnis argues that “any individual who attains a position of major foreign policy responsibility will have been social- Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 18 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Rational Decision Making and Realism 19 ized through education and processes of political selection to pursue some set of common goals. Individuals differ in their perception of the national interest but role expectations reinforce a sense of common interests.”7 Thus, individ- uals lose their individuality! For McGinnis, political culture and socialization matter, but not in a way that requires the study of such. Instead, culture and socialization produce regularities among the individuals who rise to national office, eliminating individual differences and any need to study those differ- ences. Further, McGinnis’s working assumption is that “changes in foreign policy goals attributed to changes in individual leaders or ruling coalitions can be interpreted as random (but not necessarily insignificant) fluctuations around a common ‘regime interest,’ which is based on domestic support structures and geopolitical concerns which act as the primary sources of conti- nuity in foreign policy interests.”8 Regime interest can be read here as national interests. The term national interests is used expansively by leaders seeking to justify various policies, but in the realist framework, national interests refer to persistent, long-term val- ues associated with the entire country and identifiable over the course of the country’s history. These interests do not change, although the means for pursuing them may. George Kennan, the former US diplomat who famously warned about Soviet expansionism, explains that long-term national interests include ensuring the “military security” of the country, the “integrity of its political life, and the well-being of its people.”9 Rational Decision Making and Realism In promoting and protecting the national interests, the regime or leadership operates as a rational actor. The rational actor model has its roots in basic decision-making theory. Decision making is defined as the “act of choosing among available alternatives about which uncertainty exists.”10 One of the first systematic discussions of the decision-making model in political science is from Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin.11 In their general deci- sion-making model, they set out the following details: Since states are unitary actors, the decisions and actions of the ultimate decision makers can be con- sidered the same as the decisions and actions of the state. Since all states are said to pursue national interests, all states make decisions in the same way. State decision making can be portrayed as a process in which the ultimate decision makers examine the internal and external environments, define the situation at hand, consider alternate courses of action, and then select the course of action that is best suited to the pursuit of national interests. The actions are “planful”—that is, the result of strategic problem solving—and are embedded in an action-reaction cycle. Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 19 5/30/18 2:08 PM  20 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests This decision-making model has often been imagined as a “black box.” We cannot see inside the box, and have no need to, since all black boxes (countries/regimes/leaders) work the same way. In modern decision theory, the rational decision problem is reduced to a simple matter of selecting among a set of given alter- natives, each of which has a given set of consequences: the agent selects the alternative whose consequences are preferred in terms of the agent’s utility function which ranks each set of consequences in order of preference.12 In other words, information about the problem at hand, possible courses of action, possible reactions, and estimates of the costs and the likely success for the different courses of action are entered into the box. Inside the box, a basic economic utility calculation is made: which choice of action best maximizes national goals and minimizes costs? A decision then results or comes out of the box. The environment reacts to the decision/action, and the reaction becomes part of a new set of factors that are entered into the box again. Of course, decision makers do not live in a perfect world and so do not have before them all the relevant information upon which to make the best decision. Given the imperfect nature of the available information, leaders make the best possible choice or even select the first option that satisfies the minimal requirements of a good choice. The rational actor model does not require perfect information but recognizes instead that “rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specific constraints.”13 Herbert Simon called this bounded rationality, or rational decision making within limits.14 In terms of the daily affairs of state, bounded rationality may not be a major detriment to sound decision making since leaders have a chance to reconsider their choices in light of the steady flow of feedback. This feedback qualifies the next choices to be made, and the reaction of other actors can be anticipated and possible counterreactions planned in advance of actual feed- back. The interactive nature of decision making (where country A’s choices are dependent on country B’s choices and vice versa) is explored in game theory. Rationality is not just bounded by the limitations of humans as decision makers but by the environment in which multiple other actors are present and acting. How does the decision maker anticipate what other actors might do? This realist foundation of the rational actor model contains assumptions about the environment and other actors that help decision makers keep their focus. As already noted, realists assume that all states are unitary actors who make cost-benefit calculations about alternative courses of action. All states make such calculations, and all states are motivated to promote and secure their interests through the acquisition and use of power. Furthermore, states Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 20 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Assessing Rationality 21 act in an international environment characterized by anarchy, or the lack of an overarching legal authority. Although some realists conceptualize states as power driven and aggressive, others explain that because the international system is anarchic, states make power-driven, short-term choices. This is the basic difference between classical realists (states are naturally aggressive) and neorealists (states are aggressive because of the dictates of anarchy).15 Whether one starts with the view that all states are motivated to arm themselves and acquire more power (classical realism) or that states must arm themselves because the international environment requires it (neoreal- ism), all realists see states locked in an unavoidable situation called a security dilemma. Glenn Snyder explains the security dilemma in this way: The term is generally used to denote the self-defeating aspect of the quest for security in an anarchic system. The theory says that even when no state has any desire to attack others, none can be sure that others’ intentions are peaceful, or will remain so; hence each must accumulate power for defense. Since no state can know that the power accumulation of others is defensively motivated only, each must assume that it might be intended for attack. Con- sequently, each party’s power increments are matched by the oth- ers, and all wind up with no more security than when the vicious cycle began, along with the costs incurred in having acquired and having to maintain their power.16 Because of anarchy, states are motivated to amass power and rely upon only themselves for protection. Because all states are so motivated and thus are locked into action-reaction cycles, conflict is the distinguishing character- istic of international politics. The rational actor constantly seeks to increase its power in reaction to these “realities.” Because the rational actor is engaged in a game of many iterations (or steps), the rational actor may seek short-term gains through risky foreign policy behavior in order to secure long-term goals and power. For many realists, no state should be content with the status quo given the dynamics of international politics. Because of the circular logic of realism, discontent with the status quo drives states into unending security dilemmas that can only be “won” through short-term gains. Decision making in such circumstances can be understood as choosing between less-than-opti- mal alternatives and settling for the best of the worst, rather than the best of the best as envisioned by the rational actor model. This will be discussed later in this chapter when we examine nuclear deterrence and Kim Jong Un. Assessing Rationality In chapter 4 we will put leaders into decision-making units and expand our analysis, but it is necessary to remind the reader that the term regime helps Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 21 5/30/18 2:08 PM  22 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests us keep the focus off actual individuals and on regime decision making. Zeev Maoz proposes that the nature of rationality changes when we make the con- ceptual move from the individual to the regime or group. Individual ratio- nality is what is described above. But “group-level rationality” suggests “at least” three kinds of rationality to Maoz.17 First, there is “procedural ratio- nality” in which the group process approximates the identification of options, ranking of preferences, consideration of costs and benefits, and so on. The point is that the group follows a rational process in its search for the best pol- icy choice. Second is “outcome rationality” or the “extent to which group decisions yield favorable outcomes.” Here the decision “is judged in terms of its outcome, not on the basis of how it was made.”18 Third is “preferen- tial rationality,” which is the “extent to which the group decision faithfully reflects the preferences of its members.”19 Ben Mor’s analysis of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision making leading to the 1967 war with Israel demonstrates procedural ratio- nality in Mor’s telling, and even preferential rationality up to a certain point, but not outcome rationality.20 Some background is in order. In 1956, Nasser sought to nationalize the Suez Canal. The canal, opened in 1865, was British built and British and French run. It was the principal maritime route between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, via the Red Sea, and was a strong revenue generator. Nasser did succeed in nationalizing the Suez Canal, but only after a war with Israel in which Israel—with the collusion of the British and French—managed to quickly capture the Sinai Peninsula. The end of the 1956 war saw the placement of the first official United Nations peacekeeping operation (the United Nations Emergency Force or UNEF) in Sinai to main- tain a cease-fire between Egypt and Israel. Despite the recovery of Suez, the quick Egyptian losses to Israel in the war and the agreement to station foreign troops on Egyptian soil were great humiliations to Nasser and to Egypt. According to Mor, Nasser wanted to undo the humiliations of 1956 and regain Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, especially vis-à-vis Israel, but without having to engage Israel in a war. Toward these goals, Nasser undertook a series of steps in May 1967—steps that could be interpreted as provocative in Israeli eyes. In Egyptian eyes, the steps showed strong resolve and “faithfully reflected the preferences” of the Egyptians. First, Nasser ordered the Egyp- tian army into the Sinai Peninsula. Second, he ordered UNEF to withdraw from the Sinai. Third, he ordered the blockading of the Straits of Tiran. The Straits of Tiran sit at the end of the Sinai Peninsula where the Gulf of Aqaba meets the Red Sea, roughly parallel to the Gulf of Suez. Blocking the Straits of Tiran effectively cut Israel off from direct access to the Red Sea via the Gulf of Aqaba. Nasser then signed a defense pact with Jordan on May 30. To borrow Maoz’s term, Nasser’s decision-making process showed clear procedural rationality. Mor explains the rationality behind what he calls Nas- ser’s escalation–de-escalation strategy: First, Nasser assumed that Israel was Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 22 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Assessing Rationality 23 content with the status quo and would not initiate war with Egypt. Nasser could make a move and await the Israelis’ reaction. As long as the Israelis made no negative countermove such as issuing a warning, initiating diplo- matic discussions, or mobilizing troops, Nasser was free to continue to the next step. As soon as the Israelis signaled that Egypt had approached a “red line,” Nasser would order a de-escalation. This escalation–de-escalation strat- egy was supremely rational: Nasser would calculate his moves based on the feedback from the environment, allowing Egypt to achieve relative gains against Israel without engaging Israel in war. This rational decision-making process, which demonstrated great Egyp- tian resolve, provoked Israel into launching a preemptive war against Egypt. Israel had stated previously that any closing or attempted closing of the Straits of Tiran would be an act of war. In May 1967, Israel did not respond at the exact moment that Egypt blocked the straits, but the time frame for the whole series of steps was very small—a single month. Within days of blocking the straits, Nasser signed the defense pact with Jordan. Having seen enough and with its own security on the line, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt on June 6, beginning the Six-Day War. The outcome was not what Nasser expected or wanted. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war changed the map of the Mid- dle East in ways that are still literally fought over today. Egypt lost territory to Israel in the war, as did Syria and Jordan (including the Old City of Jerusalem, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank). Egypt was not able to claim Arab lead- ership, and Nasser attempted to resign from the presidency over the failure. The case of Obama’s decision making regarding Assad’s use of chemical weapons is an example of outcome rationality, but apparently not procedural or preferential rationality. This case was mentioned at the start of the chapter. The Obama administration preferred to limit US involvement in the Syrian war before all else. This preference is a first-order goal, like Nasser’s prefer- ence to avoid war with Israel in the example above. Obama’s statement on August 31, 2013, also indicated other interests and goals: the United States, all states, and the international system itself are all safer when actors honor the prohibition on chemical weapons use. Toward the ends of defending that safer world and punishing those who would imperil it, Obama stated that the United States would take limited military action toward three goals: to “hold the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons, deter this kind of behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it out.” We can list the goals this way, with the top preference ranked first: Goal 1: Limit US involvement in the Syrian conflict Goal 2a: Hold the Assad regime accountable for using chemical weapons Goal 2b: Deter the use of chemical weapons by all actors Goal 2c: Degrade the Assad regime’s capacity to use chemical weapons in the future Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 23 5/30/18 2:08 PM  24 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests Goals 2a, 2b, and 2c we assume to have equal value, but all have less value than Goal 1. Once the administration confirmed that Assad had used chemical weap- ons on August 21, 2013, Obama then announced that he had ordered a lim- ited military intervention aimed at achieving the second-order goals above. Goal 1 remained prioritized at all times. The president then asked Congress to authorize the use of force, but he did not ask Congress to convene right away, leaving time for public deliberations to occur. Within nine days, the Russians announced a deal with the Assad regime. On September 12, the Syrian gov- ernment announced that it would give up its chemical weapons and accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention. On September 14, American and Russian officials reached an agreement on how to catalog, remove, and destroy the Assad regime’s chemical weapons stockpile. The deal thus achieved Goals 2b and 2c, as well as Goal 1. Goal 2a could be achieved in any future war crimes proceedings at the International Criminal Court or some similar tribunal. The United States did not launch a single missile, and it achieved three out of four goals, including the top-tier goal. The whole episode is a clear illustration of outcome rationality. The decision yielded the desired outcomes. What the episode did not do for many observers is follow intentional procedural rationality. Derek Chollet, Obama’s assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, concedes that the episode was criticized as “amateurish improvisation” for its process. Chollet cautions, “This line of judgement reveals a deep—and misguided—conviction in Washington foreign policy circles that a policy must be perfectly articulated in order to be suc- cessful—that, in a sense, the means matter more than the ends.”21 Chollet goes on to say that the redline episode “accomplished everything it set out to do—in fact, it surpassed our expectations.” It was, to him, a case of coer- cive diplomacy, of “using the threat of force to achieve an outcome military power itself could not even accomplish.” In a most elemental rational choice scenario, three out of four goals were achieved, with some other state—Rus- sia—using its diplomatic energy and putting its reputation on the line if Assad were to back out of the deal. If the decision was so rational, why did the French foreign minister say the United States had put the Western world in peril by not launching mil- itary retaliation for the chemical weapons use? Why did opposition media in the United States hail the strength of Russia and heap condemnation on the president for his alleged weakness? Why is it that achieving outcome rational- ity causes process proponents and political opponents to cry failure? Whereas Obama’s preferences might have been satisfied with the achievement of three out of four goals, his preferences did not stand alone. No decision maker is the only party to any given political event; others’ preferences can be superim- posed on what appears to be in the most fundamental sense a foreign policy success. Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 24 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Rationality and Nuclear Decision Making 25 This discussion—of three kinds of rationality and various others judging a decision based on their own preferences—suggests some weaknesses in the rational decision-making model. Would the critics have been willing to con- gratulate Obama on his “success” if he had carried through with the military action—because it would have signaled strong resolve—even if intervention resulted in a protracted military engagement in Syria, like that in Iraq and Afghanistan? George W. Bush demonstrated great resolve when ordering the invasion of Iraq but poor decision making in terms of process and particularly outcome. As it turned out, the Assad regime had not disclosed all its chemical weap- ons. It carried out subsequent chemical weapon attacks—two in 2014 and two in 2016 while Obama was still president. After Donald Trump became US president, the Assad regime used chemical weapons again in early April 2017. Two days later, the US military launched a Tomahawk missile attack on the suspected launch sites. After that, Russia started vetoing every UN Secu- rity Council resolution attempting to hold the Assad regime accountable for violations of previous commitments. The strong action by the Trump admin- istration did not stop or degrade the Assad regime’s capacity to use chemical weapons, and international inspections stopped because of Russia’s repeated vetoes. In April 2018, another round of chemical attacks was followed by another round of missile strikes. Future scholars may be able to investigate whether Trump’s decision-making procedure was rational, but the outcome cannot be judged a success and is unlikely to have been anyone’s preference. Rationality and Nuclear Decision Making We have been discussing the rational actor model and its basis in the interna- tional relations grand theory called realism. Leaders act as utility maximizers in pursuit of national interests defined foremost in terms of power. There are, though, variations in realist thought that lead to different predicted foreign policy behaviors. Classical realists believe that states are self-interested, power seeking, and predatory by nature, but neorealists believe that the anarchic structure of the international system requires states to act in self-interested, predatory ways. Defensive neorealists believe that states may be satisfied with the status quo and are inclined only to respond to materialized or actual threats to power and security. Offensive neorealists, conversely, believe that states must always be looking for opportunities to gain power and must remain vigilant about potential threats. In this scenario, major powers are driven to become hegemonic even in times of relative safety and security because other major powers are also seeking to become hegemonic. Indeed, the notion of relative safety and security is misleading because states are in constant com- petition. We will see this view expressed in the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy in chapter 8. In a world populated by states guided Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 25 5/30/18 2:08 PM  26 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests by offensive neorealism, every state has incentive to acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons; in a world of defensive neorealist states, most states have no reason to seek nuclear arms. Realist assumptions about the motivations of states can lead to some peculiar decisions that might not meet a commonplace understanding of what is rational. As stated earlier in this chapter, decision making in a realist world involves choosing between less-than-optimal alternatives and settling for the best of the worst, rather than the best of the best as envisioned by the ratio- nal actor model. Nowhere is this more obvious than in hypothetical decision making about using nuclear weapons. Realism, with its emphasis on rational choice, was the dominant grand theory of international relations throughout much of the twentieth century. Its dominance was at its peak at the close of World War II and the start of the Cold War. Realism dictated that the United States needed to pursue greater military might than the Soviet Union—indeed the United States needed to pursue global domination—lest the world be dominated by the Soviet Union. As the Cold War deepened and both the Americans and Soviets devel- oped massive nuclear weapons capabilities, the two countries achieved a bal- ance of nuclear power that former British prime minister Winston Churchill called a “balance of terror.” This odious balance rested on the assumption that the nuclear arsenals of both sides were sufficient to ensure that a first nuclear attack by either side could be absorbed and matched with nuclear retaliation. The rational choice of any leader confronting a nuclear foe of similar strength would be to avoid any action that might be punishable with a nuclear reac- tion. In a situation in which both parties to a conflict possess nuclear arsenals of more or less similar size and destructive power, we hypothesize that both understand that aggression by either would likely result in unacceptable costs for both. Each side is deterred from using nuclear weapons, and the situa- tion is one of mutual, “mature,” stable nuclear deterrence. The possibility of mutual assured destruction (MAD) should deter both sides from even nonnuclear military confrontation. Given the understood costs of a nuclear war, rational leaders should not entertain the idea of using nuclear weapons in a conflict. Realists propose that nuclear weapons are not for fighting war but for deterring war. Indeed, Ken- neth Waltz declares that a world of nuclear-armed states would be a more stable and peaceful one because of mutual nuclear deterrence.22 However, the real world does not always cooperate with hypotheticals. For example, US president Ronald Reagan was a committed realist in his approach to foreign affairs, and he was committed to the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy. He was not convinced that a nuclear “holocaust” was inevitable if either side in the Cold War initiated war with the other. Instead, Reagan urged his military planners to think about what the United States needed in order to engage the Soviet Union in nuclear war and win. The Strategic Defense Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 26 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Rationality and Nuclear Decision Making 27 Initiative was one tool to use for potentially winning a nuclear war. There is no way to understand the Reagan desire for a winnable nuclear war-fighting strategy outside a realist framework. In 2018, the US Pentagon drafted a new nuclear weapons strategy that would expand the range of circumstances under which the United States would use nuclear weapons. The New York Times reported that the new strat- egy would threaten nuclear retaliation for “attacks on the U.S., allied, or part- ner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabili- ties.”23 The interpretation of this is that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons to counter devastating cyberattacks. Among the concerns prompting this revised strategy was that an enemy could disable or otherwise interfere with computer launch and warning systems. The timing of this strat- egy revision is ironic given the false alarms of incoming North Korean missiles in both Hawaii and Japan in early 2018. The nuclear threat in the revised US strategy paper is not new: the United States has long threatened to use nuclear weapons first, but in a “rational,” limited way. What is rational when it comes to thinking about nuclear weap- ons? Much of the analytical work on nuclear strategy builds on game theory. Game theory borrows from mathematical reasoning and the formal study of logic in order to develop mathematical models of the strategies adopted in the “games” of foreign policy, such as crisis and noncrisis negotiations, alliance formation, arms racing, and nuclear weapons use. James Dougherty and Rob- ert Pfaltzgraff explain: Game theorists say... : If people in a certain situation wish to win—that is, to accomplish an objective that the other party seeks to deny them—we can sort out the intellectual processes by which they calculate or reach decisions concerning what kind of action is most likely to be advantageous to them, assuming they believe their opponents also to be rational calculators like themselves, equally interested in second-guessing and trying to outwit the opponent.24 All games contain common features: every player seeks to “win,” self-in- terest governs the behavior of players in the game, players perceive that differ- ent moves are associated with different rewards or payoffs, and all the choices made in the game are interactive. Some games are zero-sum in that when one player wins, the other loses. Zero-sum games reflect the most distilled version of realism: when your country increases its power, it is only because my country has lost power. In other games, the results are non-zero-sum, or mixed, in that players can register relative wins or gains over other players. One of the most frequently discussed mixed-motive games is that of the prisoners’ dilemma. In this game, players attempt to “win,” but the inter- Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 27 5/30/18 2:08 PM  28 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests active choices they make leave each in a position of achieving only the best of the worst situation, rather than the best possible situation for themselves as individuals. All the basic realist assumptions are in place in this game: actors are self-interested or selfish, actors have no reason to trust other actors because there is no ultimate authority to enforce justice, and actors are pre- sented choices that involve limited information on different alternatives and their consequences. Karen Mingst describes the standard setup of this game: The prisoners’ dilemma is the story of two prisoners, each being interrogated separately for an alleged crime. The interrogator tells each prisoner that if one of them confesses and the other does not, the one who confessed will go free and the one who kept silent will get a long prison term. If both confess, both will get some- what reduced prison terms. If neither confesses, both will receive short prison terms based on lack of evidence.25 Faced with this dilemma, both prisoners confess. Both confess because each assumes that the other—acting in self-interest only—will confess. Although neither “wins” by being set completely free, neither “loses” to the other by drawing the harsher penalty. The prisoners do not achieve the best solution— no jail time—but they achieve the best of the worst: a shorter sentence and parity. Parity—ending up in the same bad situation with one’s opponent, even in terms of mutual punishment—is preferred over sacrifice in a realist, self- help system. The prisoners’ dilemma illustrates the most fundamental realist problem: because no action occurs in a vacuum but instead is part of a series of inter- actions with other actors, actors can rarely obtain absolute security, freedom, superiority, or whatever they seek to achieve over others. Instead, actors can only hope to obtain relative security or relative freedom or relative superior- ity, and so forth. In the realist model, actors acknowledge this reality but still make choices that would, only under ideal circumstances, earn them the best possible result. Akin to the prisoners’ dilemma is the realist security dilemma. As we have discussed, the security dilemma is the result of choices a state makes to secure itself against sometimes unspecified but predictable outside threats. Although the initial step is only taken in self-defense, other states perceive the defen- sive step with suspicion and fear, and they must react to it. Ultimately, the states caught in this cycle find their environment to be more dangerous and more threatening than ever. Realists acknowledge that this dilemma is real and unfortunate, but also inevitable as a result of conflict in the international system. The prisoners’ dilemma framework applies to decisions about using nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence tells us that each side recognizes that it is more rational not to initiate an attack with nuclear weapons because of the Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 28 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Rationality and Nuclear Decision Making 29 expected result, a counter nuclear attack. However, in competitive relation- ships as always exist in the realist world, “winning” (that is, dominating the opponent) is the best possible result and “losing” is the worst. In between winning and losing is parity with the opponent. Using the basic prisoners’ dilemma setup, the rational choice of either side in a confrontation between nuclear foes is to attack the other side first. If you attack first and your oppo- nent does nothing, you win. However, since your opponent is also a rational actor, it also will pursue a “win” and attack. Both sides attack with nuclear weapons and both sides suffer nuclear war, but they both break even with each other! The best possible solution is not possible; the best of the worst— mutual nuclear war—is both possible and rational. Now we should think about North Korea and Kim Jong Un. In 2017, North Korea demonstrated that it had the missile capability necessary to hit the United States, and many other countries. North Korea also had nuclear weapons. If North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is an irrational and hostile lunatic who possesses nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, then Japan, South Korea, the United States, and many other countries have an immediate security interest in eliminating his regime. If Kim Jong Un is better understood as a rational actor, then Japan, South Korea, the United States, and many other countries still have an immediate security interest in eliminating his regime given the logics discussed above. More, as a rational actor, Kim Jong Un might assess that others will judge North Korea to be a major security threat, and therefore he would have a rational incentive “to use a nuclear bomb first,”26 according to nuclear strategy expert Vipin Narang. As we have discussed, by the logic of nuclear deterrence, states refrain from using nuclear weapons because of the promise of massive retaliation in kind. This means that a state seeking to avoid “national suicide” would not use nuclear weapons. Narang proposes instead that Kim Jong Un is “brutally rational” and that Kim should be expected to “use nuclear weapons first in a way that increases his chances of survival.” The immediate threat to Kim is American military assets, specifically bombers, stationed at the US base in Guam and at other bases in Asia. Kim lacks the conventional means to elim- inate the bomber threat, but a small-scale nuclear attack on US bombers, say in Guam, would eliminate the most immediate security threat to North Korea and raise the stakes so high that the United States would probably not respond in any significant way. The majority of North Korean nuclear weap- ons and missiles would still be available for use after this first attack, and these would still threaten US cities. This continued threat should deter the United States from retaliating at all for the first attack. Using the logic of “asymmetric escalation,” Narang argues, “Kim may surmise that if he doesn’t use nuclear weapons first, he is certain to lose; if he does, he may have a fighting chance of surviving.” As North Korea’s nuclear threat to others increases, others have reason to use force preventively to stop a future North Korean nuclear attack. Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 29 5/30/18 2:08 PM  30 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests Realizing this, Narang concludes, the rational North Korean decision maker faces a “use-it-or-lose-it” dilemma. The same logic prior to World War I led European powers to believe that “they all had to mobilize military forces first or risk massive conventional defeat. The calculation for North Korea is the same today, except with nuclear weapons.”27 It is an odd logic that proposes that the potential risk of “national sui- cide” is smaller than the potential benefits of signaling resolve by using a nuclear weapon first. This logic is where we must go when we follow the rational actor path set before us by realists. In an asymmetrical game, instead of rational actors being deterred by the threat of unacceptable punishment, the weaker power may be able to “disarm” the stronger power by deciding that the rational choice is to strike first. Poliheuristic Theory The systematic study of perceptions and misperceptions—like those that might occur in a “game” of nuclear tit-for-tat—is part of the cognitive approach to understanding why individuals decide what they decide. This approach is the topic of the next chapter. Typically, foreign policy scholars propose that the rational actor and cognitive models are incompatible. Some scholars have argued that the approaches are not necessarily incompatible but only focus on different subjects. As Jerel Rosati explains, “Those who emphasize rational- ity tend to focus on ‘preferences’ and ‘outcomes,’ while cognitive perspectives tend to focus on ‘beliefs’ and ‘process,’ as well as where ‘preferences come from’ and ‘how preferences are established’ among policymakers.”28 Of course, the reason rational actor scholars focus on “preferences” and “outcomes” is that they believe they understand the “process” in decision making: inputs, cost-benefit calculation, outputs, feedback, and so on. To return to the ideas of Morgenthau presented at the start of this chapter, when you see a foreign pol- icy decision, think rational choice. The decision to focus on outcomes versus process results from a bias that says we already understand the process. A relatively new approach to studying foreign policy at the individual level contends that the rational actor and cognitive approaches are compatible and, as well, that process is important. This approach is poliheuristic (PH) the- ory. Scholars who use PH theory explain that all decisions involve a two-step process. In the first step, leaders “simplify the decision problem by the use of cognitive short-cuts.” These shortcuts involve discarding some alternatives outright.29 What helps decision makers discard some alternatives in this first step? Alex Mintz, David Brulé, and others in this research program explain that domestic political survival is always the guiding principle. Thus, faced with a foreign policy problem, leaders rule out any course of action that might have bad consequences for them in domestic politics.30 Then, the remaining alternatives are evaluated in the second step by using the “analytical calcula- Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 30 5/30/18 2:08 PM  Poliheuristic Theory 31 tions” of rational choice.31 PH scholars contend that this process describes the decision making of leaders “regardless of their nationality or ideological position” and regardless of the type of government they lead.32 As we will see in the next chapter, this use of the term cognitive shortcuts is not in line with standard usage. Indeed, rather than combine rational choice and cognition in a two-step process, PH scholars just change our focus from national interests to regime interests and borrow the idea of “shortcuts” from cognitive scholars. PH theorists say that instead of selecting among alternative foreign policy actions that serve the national interests, decision makers first select among foreign policy actions that serve their own domestic political needs or that will help them survive politically. The promotion and protection of interests is still what drives decision makers in this theory, whether in the first step or the second. Rational calculations about domestic political survival drive the first step (the discarding of unacceptable courses of action), and then rational calculations are made in the second step. PH theory may not bridge the gap between theories of the rational actor and individual cognition, but it does provide an example of how scholar- ship works to continually refine our understandings of our subject matter. In the next chapter, our subject matter is cognition and foreign policy decision making. For Discussion 1. Explain why it is not necessary 4. Compare and contrast the to know personal information nuclear relationships between about decision makers to make the United States and the Soviet use of the rational decision-mak- Union during the Cold War ing model. and between the United States 2. Assess the rationality of Gamal and North Korea at the start of Abdel Nasser’s decision making 2018. in the month leading up to the 5. Using the prisoners’ dilemma, 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War explain how nuclear decision using the concepts of proce- making always leads to a security dural, outcome, and preferential dilemma. rationality. 6. Using realist ideas, explain why 3. Assess the rationality of Barack it would be rational for Kim Obama’s decision making in the Jong Un of North Korea to use Syrian chemical weapons case nuclear weapons first against the using the concepts of proce- United States. dural, outcome, and preferential rationality. Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 31 5/30/18 2:08 PM  32 Chapter 2: Rational Actors and National Interests Key Words regime preferential rationality crisis escalation–de-escalation strategy rational decision making coercive diplomacy realism defensive neorealism national interests offensive neorealism regime interests nuclear deterrence bounded rationality mutual assured destruction (MAD) anarchy game theory neorealism negotiations security dilemma zero-sum game deterrence prisoners’ dilemma group-level rationality poliheuristic (PH) theory procedural rationality domestic political survival outcome rationality Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively.indd 32 5/30/18 2:08 PM