Challenges to the Nuclear Revolution and Norms 2425 pre-lecture.pdf

3/7/2024 Challenges to the Nuclear Revolution & to Norms Dr Susan Martin BA WMD 2023/24 1 Upcoming sessions Session 19: Dr Strangelove and Nuclear Strategy Session 20: Review and Practice Term 3: Review session: 25 April, 11am-1pm, S2.30 Exam date should be announced on 13 March Note: Office hours i...

3/7/2024 Challenges to the Nuclear Revolution & to Norms Dr Susan Martin BA WMD 2023/24 1 Upcoming sessions Session 19: Dr Strangelove and Nuclear Strategy Session 20: Review and Practice Term 3: Review session: 25 April, 11am-1pm, S2.30 Exam date should be announced on 13 March Note: Office hours in Term 3 are by appointment only; please make an appointment for Tuesday through the ‘book me’ app or email for an appointment at another time. (No drop-in office hours on Fridays.) 2 1 3/7/2024 Outline I. Emerging Technologies and Challenges to the Nuclear Revolution (Lieber and Press) a) Quick overview of the argument (many important details are not covered; you still need to read it!) b) How would nuclear revolution theorists respond? II. Public Opinion on the Use of Nuclear Weapons a) The Argument b) The Method c) How does—or does--this challenge arguments about the norms on the use/nonuse of weapons? III. What do you think about possibility of nuclear use today? 3 Vocab/Concept check  Deterrence  First-strike versus second- (retaliatory) strike  Counter-force versus counter-value strikes  Pre-emptive versus preventive 4 2 3/7/2024 Technological changes: Lieber and Press (Spring 2017), ‘The New Era of Counterforce’ The Argument: Lieber and Press argue that: Nuclear weapons have not transformed international politics—security competition, arms racing, etc. still occur, because there is always a possibility that ‘survivable’ nuclear forces will become vulnerable in the future—and in fact, we see this vulnerability emerging today. The dominance of ‘deterrence by punishment’ is not guaranteed for all time. 5 The argument made by Lieber and Press, cont. Survivability of retaliatory forces is essential for deterrence and fundamental to nuclear revolution Three basic approaches to ensuring survivability: Hardening, concealment and redundancy.  Increased accuracy is overcoming hardening, lessening survivability (and in theory allowing low-casualty counterforce attacks).  The revolution in remote sensing is overcoming concealment, lessening survivability.  Need for redundancy is increasing, creating pressure to maintain/increase arsenal size.  Variety of technologies involved: guidance systems, sensors, data processing, communication, artificial intelligence and other products of computer revolution >>>Much more difficult today to ensure that your nuclear force is survivable, although the most powerful countries will be able to counter this trend 6 3 3/7/2024 So what? Why is this argument important? 7 Low Casualty Counterforce They argue that these same technologies are making possible low casualty, counterforce strikes: ‘In the past, the main impediment to low-casualty nuclear counterforce strikes has been radioactive fallout. Targeters would have had to rely on ground bursts to maximize destructive effects against hardened facilities such as silos and storage sites. Detonations close to the ground have a major drawback, however: debris is sucked up into the fireball, where it mixes with radioactive material, spreading radiation wherever it settles. Although the other effects of nuclear detonations (e.g., blast and fire) can have large-scale consequences for civilians, in many circumstances those effects can be minimized. If a strike produces fallout, however, the consequences are potentially vast and difficult to predict.’ (Lieber and Press, 2017, 28). 8 4 3/7/2024 Low Casualty Counterforce: So what? 9 Technological changes: Accuracy  Advances in accuracy threaten the ability of states to use hardening to protect their nuclear assets from a first strike. The more ‘hardened’ a target, the more accurate it needs to be hit in order to have a good probability of destroying it.  ‘In 1985 a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had only about a 54 percent chance of destroying a missile silo hardened to withstand 3,000 pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure.’  ‘In 2017 that figure exceeds 74 percent. The improvement in submarine-launched weapons is starker: from 9 percent to 80 percent (using the larger-yield W88 warhead).’ ‘However,…despite vast improvements in missile accuracy, the weapons still are not effective enough to be employed individually against hardened targets. Even modern ballistic missiles are expected to miss or fail 20–30 percent of the time.’ 10 5 3/7/2024 Technological Changes: Accuracy and Fratricide  When you need to launch more than one warhead at a single target in order to increase the probability that the target will be destroyed, fratricide can occur.  Fratricide refers to a situation where the effects of one of your warheads interferes with the operation of other warheads.  Fratricide has two separate causes. It can be due to  direct effects of nuclear detonations (radiation, hear and overpressure)—incoming weapons need to be separated by 3-5 seconds or to  indirect effects of nuclear detonations– if an incoming warhead misses the target (when it detonates outside of the lethal radius or LR), a dust cloud develops 6-8 seconds after denotation and takes approximately 20 minutes to dissipate. >>> This means that ‘multiple warheads could be aimed at a single target if they were separated by at least 3–5 seconds (to avoid interfering with each other); yet, all inbound warheads had to arrive within 6– 8 seconds of the first (before the dust cloud formed). As a result, assigning more than two weapons to each target would produce only marginal gains: if the first one resulted in a miss, the target would likely be shielded when the third or fourth warhead arrived’ (22). Lieber and Press argue that changes in accuracy mean that both causes of fratricide are less of a problem, because the increased accuracy means that missiles will no longer miss their target and that means that dust clouds impacting follow-on missiles are less of a worry. 11 Technological change: Remote Sensing Improvements in remote sensing technology is undermining the ability of states to conceal their nuclear forces and assets (pp. 32ff): 1. More diverse sensor platforms (e.g. underwater drones, autonomous sensors); 2. Sensors collect a widening array of signals using growing techniques; 3. Increasingly, persistent observation is possible (as opposed to ‘snapshots’); 4. Resolution is steadily improving; 5. Increasing data transmission speed so data gets to analysts quickly (almost in real time) >>>Press and Lieber argue that together these improvements allow an increased ability to track both SSBNs (nuclear powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles) and mobile landbased missiles 12 6 3/7/2024 Technological change: Remote Sensing, cont. Lieber and Press (p.36) argue that submarine vulnerability is not new—that this was a focus of Cold War competition: 1. ‘Previous advances in remote sensing greatly increased the vulnerability of deployed submarines.’ 2. ‘Escaping vulnerability was no easy task.’ 3. ‘The Cold War ASW competition demonstrates that the deployment of ballistic missile submarines neither ended the Cold War nuclear competition nor negated hopes on either side of attaining military superiority.’ And advanced surveillance systems (e.g. radar satellites and remotely piloted aircraft) can make a small nuclear arsenal (e.g. North Korea) vulnerable—though they note the effectiveness of sensing systems depends on ‘characteristics of the target country—for example, its size, location, topography, and defences’ (37). 13 Implications for nuclear policy, according to Lieber and Press  If arsenals are becoming more vulnerable, all else being equal, NWS will need larger and diverse arsenals to maintain deterrence  (Further) reductions in nuclear arsenals may not be wise  Should states (especially the US) continue to develop improved counter-force capabilities?  14 7 3/7/2024 15 How do you get this possibility for a counterforce capability? By increasing yield of missile warheads—although they later argue that low yield options will become possible as accuracy increases further, and that conventional options may be possible, too (Lieber and Press 2017, 27ff); By using more than one missile to attack each missile you want to destroy.  What does a counterforce capability mean for crisis stability?  What does it mean for arms race stability?  Is it inevitable? Are there any possibilities that can address risks? 16 8 3/7/2024 Limits to Press and Lieber argument ‘To be clear, nuclear arsenals around the world are not becoming equally vulnerable to attack. >> Countries that have considerable resources can buck these trends and keep their forces survivable, albeit with considerable cost and effort. >>Other countries, however—especially those facing wealthy, technologically advanced adversaries—will find it increasingly difficult to secure their arsenals, as guidance systems, sensors, data processing, communication, artificial intelligence, and a host of other products of the computer revolution continue to improve.’ (10) 17 Questions……. What does it take to deter? How certain does a retaliatory strike need to be and how much damage does it need to do in order to deter? What do Lieber and Press assume/argue about this? What are the implications of the Lieber and Press argument for general stability, crisis stability, and limited nuclear war—among the various groupings of nuclear states? Do you agree with the interpretation Lieber and Press provide of nuclear revolution arguments? Why or why not? How convincing, and why, do you find their argument? Given arguments about limited nuclear war from Term One, do you think limited nuclear war is more feasible today, given the arguments made by Lieber and Press? 18 9 3/7/2024 For more: Lieber, Keir A. Daryl Grayson Press. The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020. See also: Green, Brendan Rittenhouse. The Revolution That Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 19 New technologies Note: There are other technologies that may be affecting general and crisis stability as well as deterrence:  Ballistic Missile Defense  Counter Space Weapons Strategic Conventional Weapons Prompt Global Strike –Fast, precise conventional weapons  Importance of precision? Closer you can get to a target, less firepower you need to blow it up  Hypersonic [New: speed + manoeuvrability] (can carry nuclear warheads as well) Can take out targets quickly, especially important if the targets are mobile or otherwise time critical Can evade missile and air defences  Others (e.g. drones, cyber) 20 10 3/7/2024 21 Public Opinion on the Use of Weapons A variety of ‘survey experiments’ have been conducted on public attitudes towards the use of nuclear (and other kinds of) weapons. These survey experiments generally involve:  some background information;  a particular scenario in which the weapons might be used;  questions that ask for the participant’s judgement about whether the weapon (or which weapon) should be used;  questions that gather further information on the participant’s thinking about the scenario, as well demographic information and more general beliefs. Some of these surveys have shown that people in the US and elsewhere think that nuclear weapons should be used in some circumstances, which has been interpreted by some scholars as a challenge to the idea that there is a ‘nuclear taboo.’ 22 11 3/7/2024 So What? Think back to last week, and the readings by Bower & Price and by Sauer & Reveraert. What is the argument about how international norms/weapons taboos come to exist?  When such norms/taboos exist, how do they influence the foreign policy behaviour of states?  23 Dill et al (2022), ‘Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel’  Cross-national survey in four democratic NWS (to address criticism of previous studies that US public is an outlier in its willingness to use nuclear weapons).  Scenario:  News story reports that a Libya-based terrorist organisation based in Daraya is planning a CW attack on buses in the capital city of the country being surveyed.  Residents of Daraya are presented as non-combatants (news story states that they had provided no material aid or recruits to the terrorists)  The news story also reports that political leaders are choosing between two potential military options to pre-empt the attack, a nuclear option and a conventional option. 24 12 3/7/2024 Dill et al (2022), experimental design  Four treatment groups plus control group—e.g. survey participants are assigned to one of four groups that read a slightly different news story, or to a control group who does not read a news story  The four treatment groups:  All treatment groups are told the attack will be carried out with a pilotless cruise missile (so no soldiers are at risk).  All are told that if nothing is done, the terrorist attack will carry out the attack, estimated to kill 3,000 civilians in the capital city of those reading the news story.  Treatment groups vary:  In estimated effectiveness of the nuclear and the conventional strike;  In the estimated number of Libyan civilians killed. Experiment set up to investigate strength of nuclear taboo, importance of military effectiveness, military effectiveness vs non-combatant immunity, and the strength of the non-combatant immunity norm 25 Dill et al (2022), Experimental Design, cont. Treatment groups one and two vary the effectiveness of the weapon. Treatment Group One: effectiveness of the nuclear and conventional strike are identical—each has a 90% probability of destroying the terrorist facility and preventing the terrorist attack; estimated that both types of strikes will unintentionally kill 2,700 Libyan civilians (fewer civilians than will be killed by the terrorist attack) Treatment Group Two: Nuclear strike has 90% probability of destroying the terrorist facility and preventing the terrorist attack; conventional strike has only a 45% probability of doing so. estimated that both types of strikes will unintentionally kill 2,700 Libyan civilians (fewer civilians than will be killed by the terrorist attack). * This is what we did as a class. Treatment group three weighs non-combatant immunity (foreign civilian deaths) against effectiveness. Treatment Group Three: Same effectiveness as Two (90% nuclear, 45% conventional) but the nuclear strike is estimated to unintentionally kill100,000 Libyan civilian, while the conventional strike is estimated to unintentionally kill 2,700. Treatment group four tests strength of non-combatant immunity norm. Treatment Group Four: Effectiveness 90% for both nuclear and conventional; Libyan civilian deaths estimated at 2,700 for both; however, in this news story target is ‘facility and surrounding civilian population’ and told that attacks will ‘send a strong message to terrorist sympathizers everywhere to reject ideologies of terror.’ Respondents then asked which of the two military options they would choose if they had to choose. 26 13 3/7/2024 Dill et al, Results, averaging over four countries: 12% of respondents prefer nuclear strike to conventional when of equal effectiveness.  When nuclear strike more effective (90% to 45%), 56% prefer nuclear strike. (Only in UK did a majority not prefer this, with 48% choosing the nuclear option.) >>evidence of consequential reasoning  When increased effectiveness of nuclear strike came with increased civilian causalities, those choosing it declined to 30%. >>also consequentialist, weighing effectiveness against civilian casualties  Internalisation of Non-combatant immunity norm: When the civilian deaths in Libya were described as intentional, there was 4.7% increase in respondents whose first choice was not to strike at all—but when disaggregating across countries, this seems to be most limited to UK (see p.21) 27 Dill et al, Conclusions US is not exceptional when it comes to attitudes about nuclear use and noncombatant immunity:  ‘Respondents’ attitudes across conditions and for all outcome variables (nuclear preference, nuclear ethics, and no-strike preference) follow largely a consequentialist logic, with little evidence that large portions of the public in any country have internalized or consider salient categorical norms against nuclear use or deliberately targeting civilians’ (22).  ‘After controlling for…individual-level variables, the nuclear preferences of the US population are statistically indistinguishable from those of British citizens. France and Israel remain more likely to preferer nuclear weapons than the UK….’ (28). Choices are driven more by consequences than by appropriateness (internalised norms):  ‘The nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945 has likely been driven by consequentialist calculations about the prospects for retaliation, the relative effectiveness of nuclear weapons compared to conventional weapons, and a fear about setting a dangerous precedent’ (30). >>> To prevent nuclear use in the future, focus less on taboos and more on ‘educating the public on the consequences of nuclear use, including the ‘possibility that nuclear use against adversaries will create a precedent that will increase the likelihood of future nuclear attacks on themselves and their compatriots’ (31). 28 14 3/7/2024 Class Survey Experiment 2023-24 N=8 Question 1 Strongly prefer the conventional strike: 2/8 (25%) Somewhat prefer the conventional strike: 3/8 (38%) Somewhat prefer the nuclear strike 2/8 (25%) Strongly prefer the nuclear strike 1/8 (11%) Question 5: Regardless of which option you preferred, how ethical or unethical do you think it would be if the UK decided to conduct the nuclear strike in this situation? Highly unethical: 2/8 (25%) Somewhat unethical 2/8 (25%) Neither ethical nor unethical: 1/8 (110%) Somewhat ethical: 3/8 (38%) Question 2: In your own words, please briefly describe the single most important reason for your choice of the nuclear or the conventional strike in question 1. Responses include: Considering the inevitable death of 2,700 Libyan citizens, I believe that it makes the most sense to opt for the strike that has the highest chance of eliminating the threat. The UK should not play a role in normalising the use of nuclear weapons on a sovereign state. It may set a precedent for future use. I do not believe that nuclear weapons have a use case in counterterrorism operations. Note that no one argued that use of nuclear weapons was unacceptable or simply ‘wrong’. 29 Class Survey Experiment 2022-23 N=5 Question 2: In your own words, please briefly describe the single most important reason for your choice of the nuclear or the conventional strike in question 1. Responses: Somewhat prefer the conventional strike: Greater chances of success for the same human causalities 2/5 (40%) Although it is true that in the short-term, both strikes will leave the same amount of Libyan casualties, nuclear strike will have a lasting Somewhat prefer the nuclear strike impact on Libya. For instance, nuclear contamination : 2/5 (40%) Recognising the UK government's responsibility to protect its citizens Question 5: Regardless of which option you and at the same time the Libyan citizens being killed inevitably, the preferred, how ethical or unethical do you option should be most capable to destroy the enemy. think it would be if the UK decided to Using nuclear weapons pre-emptively would be short-sighted, conduct the nuclear strike in this situation? impulsive, and irresponsible. By using NW, the UK’s standing and reputation in the world would instantaneously change for the worse. Question 1 Strongly prefer the conventional strike: 1/5 (20%) Highly unethical: 3/5 (60%) Neither ethical nor unethical: 2/5 (40%) Nuclear Weapons shouldn't really be an option here. It sets a dangerous precedent of nuclear strikes. It risks diplomatic isolation and punishment. Radiation. 30 15 3/7/2024 Critics-- Carpenter, Montgomery and Nylen (2022) Framing effects Through the information provided in the preface and elsewhere, in the wording of the questions, etc.  What information is provided and what information is not?  Is international law (or norms) even mentioned? The omission of any mention of the law of armed conflicts may prime the respondents to think that such law is irrelevant or nonexistent (p.915, see Carpenter and Montgomery 2020 on ‘priming by omission’).  See also Carpenter and Montgomery, ‘The Stopping Power of Norms’ (2020) and the response by Sagan and Valentino, ‘Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power? A Debate’ (2020). 31 Critics– cont. Constructing, and not just measuring, public opinion Carpenter et al (2022) find that these sorts of ‘survey experiments may themselves be affecting public sensitivity to these norms—or even Americans’ understanding of the content of the norms themselves. We show that being invited to express a preference regarding war crimes in survey settings has a negative impact on Americans’ understanding of US legal and ethical obligations in war and that reporting previous findings can inflate support for war crimes.’  ‘Survey questions, depending on how they are worded and framed, may not simply measure the impact of international law and norms on public opinion but themselves may also affect public sensitivity to these laws—or even citizens’ understanding of the content of the laws themselves’ (913).  Citing Barabas and Jerit 2010, 238, Carpenter et all 2022 argue that ‘the act of expressing an opinion in a survey may be a more powerful socializing device than reading a newspaper, viewing a public service ad, hearing a political speech, or reading an NGO report’.  32 16 3/7/2024 Questions  What does all of this mean for whether and how norms affect state behaviour?  For arguments about the nuclear and chemical weapons taboos, or the Land Mine Ban and the TPNW? 33 For more, see for example: Bowen, Tyler Michael A. Goldfien, and Matthew H. Graham (2023), ‘Public Opinion and Nuclear Use: Evidence from Factorial Experiment,’ The Journal of Politics 2023 85:1, 345-350 Haworth, Alida R. , Scott D. Sagan & Benjamin A. Valentino (2019), ‘What do Americans really think about conflict with nuclear North Korea? The answer is both reassuring and disturbing’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:4, 179-186. Post, Abigail S. and Todd S. Sechser (2022), ‘Public Opinion, Cues, and the Use of Nuclear Weapons,’ Working Paper, http://abigailpost.com/docs/post_sechser_normsnuclearweapons.pdf Sagan, Scott D. Benjamin A. Valentino (2017), ‘Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants’, International Security, 42 (1): 41–79. Sagan, Scott D. & Valentino, Benjamin & Carpenter, Charli & Montgomery, Alexander. (2020), ‘Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power? A Debate’, International Security, 45, 170-186. 34 17 3/7/2024 Where does this leave us? By the end of last term, you were well-grounded to nuclear revolution and nuclear taboo arguments, both of which imply a low-likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. We’d seen conflicts where nuclear weapons were not used, as well as some conflicts that saw the use of chemical (and one case of the use of ) biological weapons. This term we’ve examined changes to international order, nuclear postures of regional nuclear states, the further use of chemical weapons despite the Chemical Weapons Convention, non-state actors, arguments about technological challenges to the nuclear revolution, etc. So, where does leave us on the big questions: nuclear weapons as deterrents or as warfighting weapons, the role of international norms (and consequentialist versus appropriateness logics), the promise (or lack of it) of arms control and disarmament, the dangers of proliferation…..? 35 What is the role of CBN weapons in the current era of international politics? Do you think it differs or will differ from the past, and if so, why? 36 18 3/7/2024 CBO, ‘U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives,’ Jan 2023 37 19