Module 5: The Self PDF
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This module explores different views of the self, from an essentialist perspective to a social constructionist one. It examines the self as a developmental, cognitive, and interpersonal construction, along with the role of cultural factors. The module also delves into self-theories and the impact of social comparison and reflected appraisals on how we perceive ourselves.
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MODULE 5: THE SELF LEARNING OUTCOMES By the end of this module, including assessments, activities, and readings, students should be able to do the following: Distinguish between the self as actor, self as agent, and self as author Recognize how self-theories can distort memories fo...
MODULE 5: THE SELF LEARNING OUTCOMES By the end of this module, including assessments, activities, and readings, students should be able to do the following: Distinguish between the self as actor, self as agent, and self as author Recognize how self-theories can distort memories for one’s past self Recognize that people’s self-insights are fallible because they are unaware of the unconscious processes that determine their feelings, beliefs, and behaviour Identify interpersonal influences on self-perception, such as social comparisons and reflected appraisals CORE CONCEPTS Adaptive unconscious Self-theories Self-schemas Working self-concept Self-esteem Narcissism Self-discrepancies Public self-consciousness Private self-consciousness Spotlight effect Illusion of transparency Self-perception theory Overjustification Insufficient justification Misattribution of arousal Above-average effect Dunning-Kruger effect Social comparisons Upward comparisons Downward comparisons Temporal comparisons Reflected appraisals (aka the “looking glass” self) Interdependent self Independent self Self-theories Entity theory Incremental theory MODULE CONTENT Additional resources embedded within the materials are listed below the Module Content links. It is best to follow the flow and order laid out within the Module Content, rather than doing the readings or watching the videos separately (before or after going through the module). This module contains one or more articles in Course Reserves. Course Reserves can be accessed using the Library Resources widget on the Course Home page. Download the readings now. 5a. Overview: Different Views of the Self 5b. The Self as a Developmental Construction 5c. The Self as a Cognitive Construction: Contents of the Self-concept 5d. The Self as a Cognitive Construction: Self-awareness 5e. The Self as a Cognitive Construction: Self-perception and the limits of introspective insight Including this resource: Michael Gazzaniga - The Interpreter. [YouTube]. (~80 mins.) 5f. The Self as a Cognitive Construction: The self-enhancement motive Including these resources: Major-General's Song from The Pirates of Penzance - live and with lyrics!. [YouTube]. (~4mins.) Why incompetent people think they're amazing - David Dunning [TED] ( 2 i ) [TED]. (~2 mins.) 5g. The Self as a Cognitive Construction: The self-verification motive Including this resource: David Carr and "The Night of the Gun". [New York Times]. (~3 mins.) 5h. The Self as an Interpersonal Construction: Reflected appraisals, impression management, and self-monitoring 5i. The self as an interpersonal construction: Social comparisons and social identities 5j. The self as a cultural construction Including this resource: Dr. Jean Twenge (full interview). [YouTube]. (~16 mins.) Download Print Activity Details You have viewed this topic Last Visited Oct 1, 2024 9:50 AM 5a OVERVIEW: DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE SELF THE ESSENTIALIST VS. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW Of the many topics that psychologists study perhaps none is more freighted with significance than the self. A wide variety of cultural messages emphasize that we should strive for self-fulfillment, self- realization, self-awareness, and self-actualization. These messages signal that the self is at the core of many people’s definitions of a meaningful life, at least in modern, individualist cultures. But what is this self that all of these messages refer to? Essentialist View of The Self Our commonsense intuitions take an essentialist view of the self. According to this essentialist view a person has a “true self” that represents the essence of who they are. This essential, true self encompasses the person’s core dispositions and values. It represents the focal point of the person’s experience and is the locus of responsibility for the person’s decisions and actions. According to this essentialist view, a person’s true self has a number of key properties. 1) It is an essential core of who the person is that remains constant and unchanging across contexts, even as that person’s outward behaviours or emotions may change across contexts. 2) It is a single, unitary entity. In other words, a person can have only one self, not multiple distinct selves. 3) A person can know their self in a direct, intimate way through conscious introspection. In other words, we believe that people can look inward and gain valid information about what they think and feel and the reasons behind their actions. The commonsense intuition that the self represents some natural, unitary, knowable essence of the person in many ways resembles what some cultural traditions refer to as the person’s soul and what previous generations of psychologists referred to as the ego. Social Psychology Challenges the Essentialist View However, psychological theory and research challenges the assumption that there is an essential property of our brains and minds that could be called a self. As social neuroscientist Lisa Feldman Barrett (2017) writes, The fiction of the self… is that you have some enduring essence that makes you who you are. You do not. — (Barrett, 2017, pp. 191-192). There is No Essential or Distinct Brain Network for the Self Indeed, neuroscience research has not identified any distinct network of brain structures that is exclusively devoted to processing information about the self. The areas of the brain that are activated when we reflect on the self also tend to activate when we engage in other types of mental processing, such as thinking about other people. This neuroscience evidence suggests that the self may not be some special essential property of our brains and minds. The Self is not Constant or Unchanging Furthermore, rather than being some stable, unchanging essence, the self that a person experiences and expresses tends to shift, sometimes in quite fundamental ways, depending on the particular social context the person is in. Your self-perception when you interact with your parents may be quite different from your self-perception when you interact with your friends or with your co-workers. This tendency for our experience of self to adapt to the social situation was noted by the philosopher William James when he wrote, “A man has as many social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups.” The Self we Express can Shift Across Contexts. For example, the self we express with family or at work, may not be the self we express when we are with our close friends. Pollyana Ventura/E+/ Getty Images (left); FG Trade/E+/Getty Images (right) People do not Necessarily Have Accurate Introspective Awareness of Self Finally, social psychological research challenges the notion that people have accurate introspective access into their own thoughts and feelings and the causes of their behaviour. Indeed, research shows that when people are questioned about their thoughts and feelings or are asked to explain the causes of their behaviour they tend to guess the answers to these questions based on their observations of their behaviour and the context. For example, in a classic experiment, White, Fishbein, and Rutsein (1981) manipulated whether or not heterosexual male participants were highly physically aroused by randomly assigning these participants to run on a treadmill for 2 minutes (high arousal condition) or just 15 seconds (low arousal condition). Afterwards, these participants viewed a videotape of the same physically attractive female confederate and rated how romantically interested they were in her. The results showed that the men in the high arousal condition reported that they were more romantically interested in this attractive confederate than the men in the low arousal condition. Apparently, the men in the high arousal condition misattributed the residual physical arousal that they felt from their strenuous exercise to romantic interest. This is just one example of many studies that show that people are prone to misidentify the true causes of their own feelings, thoughts, and behaviours. Social Constructivist View of the Self Rather than being some fixed, inherent essence, the self appears to be a flexible social construction. Lisa Feldman Barrett (2017) suggests that the self is a concept that we actively construct in each new specific situation we encounter as we draw on relevant beliefs and attitudes about ourselves to adapt to the demands and opportunities of each situation. Different components of our self-concept are thus activated depending on their relevance to particular social contexts. As Feldman Barrett puts it “your self is constructed anew in every moment” (Barrett, 2017, p. 192) as you activate self-relevant beliefs, attitudes, and goals to face the demands of various situations that you encounter. So, rather than being a unitary essence that we carry with us in some unchanging way across situations, the self appears to be a flexible social construction that is adapted to particular situations and contexts. In this module we will unpack what it means to conceptualize the self as a social construction, in contrast to the commonsense essentialist view of the self. In particular, we will explore a variety of different perspectives on the social construction of the self. 1) First, we will examine the self as a developmental construction, exploring how different layers of self-knowledge develop over the lifespan as a person develops a sense of themselves first as an actor, then as an agent, and finally as an author of their own life story. 2) Second, we will examine the self-concept as a cognitive construction, exploring how self-perception processes, self-schemata, and psychological biases influence people’s interpretations of their own actions and experiences. 3) Third, we will examine the self as an interpersonal construction, exploring how feedback from other people and social comparisons with others shape out thoughts and feelings about ourselves. 4) Finally, we will examine the self as a cultural construction, exploring how cultural traditions and practices determine the structure of our self-concepts and the functions of our expression of self in social situations. 5b THE SELF AS A DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRUCTION THE THREE TYPES OF SELF-KNOWING The social-personality psychologist Dan McAdams (2019) proposed a rich model of how a person's self-knowledge develops across stages of the lifespan. Drawing on the ideas of the philosopher and psychologist William James, McAdams notes that when a person reflects on their self the self is both the subject and the object of thought. The subject who experiences these self-reflections is referred to as the “I,” while the self who is the object of these self-reflections is referred to as the “Me.” McAdams notes that when the “I” reflects on the “Me” the person may gain insight into: 1) the self-as-actor, 2) self-as-agent, or 3) the self-as- story. McAdams defines the distinctive contents of these three types of self-knowledge and he explores how they emerge during different stages of the life course. When the “I” Reflects on the “Me” The Self is Inherently Reflexive. The self reflects back on itself. It is the I (the knower) and the Me (what the knower knows). skynesher/E+/Getty Images In the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, the ancient Greeks inscribed the words: “Know thyself.” For at least 2,500 years, and probably longer, human beings have pondered the meaning of the ancient aphorism. Over the past century, psychological scientists have joined the effort. They have formulated many theories and tested countless hypotheses that speak to the central question of human selfhood: How does a person know who he or she is? The ancient Greeks seemed to realize that the self is inherently reflexive —it reflects back on itself. In the disarmingly simple idea made famous by the great psychologist William James (1892/1963), the self is what happens when “I” reflects back upon “Me.” The self is both the I and the Me—it is the knower, and it is what the knower knows when the knower reflects upon itself. When you look back at yourself, what do you see? When you look inside, what do you find? Moreover, when you try to change your self in some way, what is it that you are trying to change? The philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) describes the self as a reflexive project. In modern life, Taylor agues, we often try to manage, discipline, refine, improve, or develop the self. We work on our selves, as we might work on any other interesting project. But what exactly is it that we work on? Imagine for a moment that you have decided to improve yourself. You might, say, start working out to improve your appearance. Or you might decide to be nicer to your mother, in order to improve that important social role. Or maybe the problem is at work—you need to find a better job or go back to school to prepare for a different career. Perhaps you just need to work harder. Or get organized. Or recommit yourself to religion. Or maybe the key is to begin thinking about your whole life story in a completely different way, in a way that you hope will bring you more happiness, fulfillment, peace, or excitement. Although there are many different ways you might reflect upon and try to improve the self, it turns out that many, if not most, of them fall roughly into three broad psychological categories (McAdams & Cox, 2010). The “I” may encounter the “Me” as: 1) a social actor, 2) a motivated agent, or 3) an autobiographical author. The Self as Social Actor The Self as Social Actor. Shakespeare wrote “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players”, but being a ‘player’ or an actor in our everyday social life is a very important role. izusek/E+/Getty Images Shakespeare tapped into a deep truth about human nature when he famously wrote, “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players.” He was wrong about the “merely,” however, for there is nothing more important for human adaptation than the manner in which we perform our roles as actors in the everyday theatre of social life. What Shakespeare may have sensed but could not have fully understood is that human beings evolved to live in social groups. Beginning with Darwin (1872/1965) and running through contemporary conceptions of human evolution, scientists have portrayed human nature as profoundly social (Wilson, 2012). For a few million years, Homo sapiens and their evolutionary forerunners have survived and flourished by virtue of their ability to live and work together in complex social groups, cooperating with each other to solve problems and overcome threats and competing with each other in the face of limited resources. As social animals, human beings strive to get along and get ahead in the presence of each other (Hogan, 1982). Evolution has prepared us to care deeply about social acceptance and social status, for those unfortunate individuals who do not get along well in social groups or who fail to attain a requisite status among their peers have typically been severely compromised when it comes to survival and reproduction. It makes consummate evolutionary sense, therefore, that the human “I" should apprehend the "Me" first and foremost as a social actor. Development of the Self as Social Actor For human beings, the sense of the self as a social actor begins to emerge around the age of 18 months. Numerous studies have shown that by the time they reach their second birthday most toddlers recognize themselves in mirrors and other reflecting devices (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Rochat, 2003). What they see is an embodied actor who moves through space and time. Many children begin to use words such as “me” and “mine” in the second year of life, suggesting that the “I” now has linguistic labels that can be applied reflexively to itself: I call myself “me.” Around the same time, children also begin to express social emotions such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, and pride (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). These emotions tell the social actor how well he or she is performing in the group. When I do things that win the approval of others, I feel proud of myself. When I fail in the presence of others, I may feel embarrassment or shame. When I violate a social rule, I may experience guilt, which may motivate me to make amends. Many of the classic psychological theories of human selfhood point to the second year of life as a key developmental period. For example, Freud (1923/1961) and his followers in the psychoanalytic tradition traced the emergence of an autonomous ego back to the second year. Freud used the term “ego” (in German das Ich, which also translates into “the I”) to refer to an executive self in the personality. Erikson (1963) argued that experiences of trust and interpersonal attachment in the first year of life help to consolidate the autonomy of the ego in the second. Coming from a more sociological perspective, Mead (1934) suggested that “the I” comes to know the “Me” through reflection, which may begin quite literally with mirrors but later involves the reflected appraisals of others. I come to know who I am as a social actor, Mead argued, by noting how other people in my social world react to my performances. In the development of the self as a social actor, other people function like mirrors—they reflect who I am back to me. Development of the Self as Social Actor. FamVeld/iStock/Getty Images; FatCamera/E+/Getty Images; StockPlanets/E+/Getty Images; Deagreez/iStock/Getty Images Research has shown that when young children begin to make attributions about themselves, they start simple (Harter, 2006). At age 4, Jessica knows that she has dark hair, knows that she lives in a white house, and describes herself to others in terms of simple behavioral traits. She may say that she is “nice,” or “helpful,” or that she is “a good girl most of the time.” By the time, she hits fifth grade (age 10), Jessica sees herself in more complex ways, attributing traits to the self, such as “honest,” “moody,” “outgoing,” “shy,” “hard-working,” “smart,” “good at math but not gym class,” or “nice except when I am around my annoying brother.” By late childhood and early adolescence, the personality traits that people attribute to themselves, as well as those attributed to them by others, tend to correlate with each other in ways that conform to a well-established taxonomy of five broad trait domains, repeatedly derived in studies of adult personality and often called the Big Five: (1) extraversion, (2) neuroticism, (3) agreeableness, (4) conscientiousness, and (5) openness to experience (Roberts, Wood, & Caspi, 2008). By late childhood, moreover, self-conceptions will likely also include important social roles: “I am a good student,” “I am the oldest daughter,” or “I am a good friend to Sarah.” Traits and Roles of the Self as Social Actor Traits and roles, and variations on these notions, are the main currency of the self as social actor (McAdams & Cox, 2010). Trait terms capture perceived consistencies in social performance. They convey what I reflexively perceive to be my overall acting style, based in part on how I think others see me as an actor in many different social situations. Roles capture the quality, as I perceive it, of important structured relationships in my life. Taken together, traits and roles make up the main features of my social reputation , as I apprehend it in my own mind (Hogan, 1982). If you have ever tried hard to change yourself, you may have taken aim at your social reputation, targeting your central traits or your social roles. Maybe you woke up one day and decided that you must become a more optimistic and emotionally upbeat person. Taking into consideration the reflected appraisals of others, you realized that even your friends seem to avoid you because you bring them down. In addition, it feels bad to feel so bad all the time: Wouldn’t it be better to feel good, to have more energy and hope? In the language of traits, you have decided to “work on” your “neuroticism.” Or maybe instead, your problem is the trait of “conscientiousness”: You are undisciplined and don’t work hard enough, so you resolve to make changes in that area. Self-improvement efforts such as these—aimed at changing one’s traits to become a more effective social actor—are sometimes successful, but they are very hard—kind of like dieting. Research suggests that broad traits tend to be stubborn, resistant to change, even with the aid of psychotherapy. However, people often have more success working directly on their social roles. To become a more effective social actor, you may want to take aim at the important roles you play in life. What can I do to become a better son or daughter? How can I find new and meaningful roles to perform at work, or in my family, or among my friends, or in my church and community? By doing concrete things that enrich your performances in important social roles, you may begin to see yourself in a new light, and others will notice the change, too. Social actors hold the potential to transform their performances across the human life course. Each time you walk out on stage, you have a chance to start anew. The Self as Motivated Agent with Goals and Values Whether we are talking literally about the theatrical stage or more figuratively, as I do in this module, about the everyday social environment for human behavior, observers can never fully know what is in the actor’s head, no matter how closely they watch. We can see actors act, but we cannot know for sure what they want or what they value, unless they tell us straightaway. As a social actor, a person may come across as friendly and compassionate, or cynical and mean- spirited, but in neither case can we infer their motivations from their traits or their roles. What does the friendly person want? What is the cynical father trying to achieve? Many broad psychological theories of the self-prioritize the motivational qualities of human behavior—the inner needs, wants, desires, goals, values, plans, programs, fears, and aversions that seem to give behavior its direction and purpose (Bandura, 1989; Deci & Ryan, 1991; Markus & Nurius, 1986). These kinds of theories explicitly conceive of the self as a motivated agent. Development of the Self as Motivated Agent To be an agent is to act with direction and purpose, to move forward into the future in pursuit of self-chosen and valued goals. In a sense, human beings are agents even as infants, for babies can surely act in goal-directed ways. By age 1 year, moreover, infants show a strong preference for observing and imitating the goal-directed, intentional behavior of others, rather than random behaviors (Woodward, 2009). Still, it is one thing to act in goal-directed ways; it is quite another for the I to know itself (the Me) as an intentional and purposeful force who moves forward in life in pursuit of self-chosen goals, values, and other desired end states. In order to do so, the person must first realize that people indeed have desires and goals in their minds and that these inner desires and goals motivate (initiate, energize, put into motion) their behavior. According to a strong line of research in developmental psychology, attaining this kind of understanding means acquiring a theory of mind (Wellman, 1993), which occurs for most children by the age of 4. Once a child understands that other people’s behavior is often motivated by inner desires and goals, it is a small step to apprehend the self in similar terms. Development of the Motivated Agent. Description (/sites/courses/PSYCH- 253/media/transcripts/module-5/description-development-motivated-agent.aspx) © Course Author and University of Waterloo Building on theory of mind and other cognitive and social developments, children begin to construct the self as a motivated agent in the elementary school years, layered over their still-developing sense of themselves as social actors. Theory and research on what developmental psychologists call the age 5-to-7 shift converge to suggest that children become more planful, intentional, and systematic in their pursuit of valued goals during this time (Sameroff & Haith, 1996). Schooling reinforces the shift in that teachers and curricula place increasing demands on students to work hard, adhere to schedules, focus on goals, and achieve success in particular, well-defined task domains. Their relative success in achieving their most cherished goals, furthermore, goes a long way in determining children’s self-esteem (Robins, Tracy, & Trzesniewski, 2008). Motivated agents feel good about themselves to the extent they believe that they are making good progress in achieving their goals and advancing their most important values. Goals and values become even more important for the self in adolescence, as teenagers begin to confront what Erikson (1963) famously termed the developmental challenge of identity. For adolescents and young adults, establishing a psychologically efficacious identity involves exploring different options with respect to life goals, values, vocations, and intimate relationships and eventually committing to a motivational and ideological agenda for adult life—an integrated and realistic sense of what I want and value in life and how I plan to achieve it (Kroger & Marcia, 2011). Committing oneself to an integrated suite of life goals and values is perhaps the greatest achievement for the self as motivated agent. Establishing an adult identity has implications, as well, for how a person moves through life as a social actor, entailing new role commitments and, perhaps, a changing understanding of one’s basic dispositional traits. According to Erikson, however, identity achievement is always provisional, for adults continue to work on their identities as they move into midlife and beyond, often relinquishing old goals in favor of new ones, investing themselves in new projects and making new plans, exploring new relationships, and shifting their priorities in response to changing life circumstances (Freund & Riediger, 2006; Josselson, 1996). There is a sense whereby any time you try to change yourself, you are assuming the role of a motivated agent. After all, to strive to change something is inherently what an agent does. However, what particular feature of selfhood you try to change may correspond to your self as actor, agent, or author, or some combination. When you try to change your traits or roles, you take aim at the social actor. By contrast, when you try to change your values or life goals, you are focusing on yourself as a motivated agent. Adolescence and young adulthood are periods in the human life course when many of us focus attention on our values and life goals. Perhaps you grew up as a traditional Catholic, but now in college you believe that the values inculcated in your childhood no longer function so well for you. You no longer believe in the central tenets of the Catholic Church, say, and are now working to replace your old values with new ones. Or maybe you still want to be Catholic, but you feel that your new take on faith requires a different kind of personal ideology. In the realm of the motivated agent, moreover, changing values can influence life goals. If your new value system prioritizes alleviating the suffering of others, you may decide to pursue a degree in social work, or to become a public interest lawyer, or to live a simpler life that prioritizes people over material wealth. A great deal of the identity work we do in adolescence and young adulthood is about values and goals, as we strive to articulate a personal vision or dream for what we hope to accomplish in the future. The Self as Autobiographical Author Even as the “I” continues to develop a sense of the “Me” as both a social actor and a motivated agent, a third standpoint for selfhood gradually emerges in the adolescent and early-adult years. The third perspective is a response to Erikson’s (1963) challenge of identity. According to Erikson, developing an identity involves more than the exploration of and commitment to life goals and values (the self as motivated agent), and more than committing to new roles and re- evaluating old traits (the self as social actor). It also involves achieving a sense of temporal continuity in life—a reflexive understanding of how I have come to be the person I am becoming, or put differently, how my past self has developed into my present self, and how my present self will, in turn, develop into an envisioned future self. In his analysis of identity formation in the life of the 15th-century Protestant reformer Martin Luther, Erikson (1958) describes the culmination of a young adult’s search for identity in this way: "To be adult means among other things to see one’s own life in continuous perspective, both in retrospect and prospect. By accepting some definition of who he is, usually on the basis of a function in an economy, a place in the sequence of generations, and a status in the structure of society, the adult is able to selectively reconstruct his past in such a way that, step for step, it seems to have planned him, or better, he seems to have planned it. In this sense, psychologically we do choose our parents, our family history, and the history of our kings, heroes, and gods. By making them our own, we maneuver ourselves into the inner position of proprietors, of creators." — (Erikson, 1958, pp. 111–112) In this rich passage, Erikson intimates that the development of a mature identity in young adulthood involves the I’s ability to construct a retrospective and prospective story about the Me (McAdams, 1985). In their efforts to find a meaningful identity for life, young men and women begin “to selectively reconstruct” their past, as Erikson wrote, and imagine their future to create an integrative life story, or what psychologists today often call a narrative identity. A narrative identity is an internalized and evolving story of the self that reconstructs the past and anticipates the future in such a way as to provide a person’s life with some degree of unity, meaning, and purpose over time (McAdams, 2008; McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007). The self typically becomes an autobiographical author in the early-adult years, a way of being that is layered over the motivated agent, which is layered over the social actor. In order to provide life with the sense of temporal continuity and deep meaning that Erikson believed identity should confer, we must author a personalized life story that integrates our understanding of who we once were, who we are today, and who we may become in the future. The story helps to explain, for the author and for the author’s world, why the social actor does what it does and why the motivated agent wants what it wants, and how the person as a whole has developed over time, from the past’s reconstructed beginning to the future’s imagined ending. Development of the Self as Autobiographical Author By the time they are 5 or 6 years of age, children can tell well-formed stories about personal events in their lives (Fivush, 2011). By the end of childhood, they usually have a good sense of what a typical biography contains and how it is sequenced, from birth to death (Thomsen & Bernsten, 2008). But it is not until adolescence, research shows, that human beings express advanced storytelling skills and what psychologists call autobiographical reasoning (Habermas & Bluck, 2000; McLean & Fournier, 2008). In autobiographical reasoning, a narrator is able to derive substantive conclusions about the self from analyzing his or her own personal experiences. Adolescents may develop the ability to string together events into causal chains and inductively derive general themes about life from a sequence of chapters and scenes (Habermas & de Silveira, 2008). For example, a 16-year-old may be able to explain to herself and to others how childhood experiences in her family have shaped her vocation in life. Her parents were divorced when she was 5 years old, the teenager recalls, and this caused a great deal of stress in her family. Her mother often seemed anxious and depressed, but she (the now-teenager when she was a little girl—the story’s protagonist) often tried to cheer her mother up, and her efforts seemed to work. In more recent years, the teenager notes that her friends often come to her with their boyfriend problems. She seems to be very adept at giving advice about love and relationships, which stems, the teenager now believes, from her early experiences with her mother. Carrying this causal narrative forward, the teenager now thinks that she would like to be a marriage counselor when she grows up. Development of the Autobiographical Author. Description (/sites/courses/PSYCH- 253/media/transcripts/module-5/description-development-autobiographical-author.aspx) © Course Author and University of Waterloo Unlike children, then, adolescents can tell a full and convincing story about an entire human life, or at least a prominent line of causation within a full life, explaining continuity and change in the story’s protagonist over time. Once the cognitive skills are in place, young people seek interpersonal opportunities to share and refine their developing sense of themselves as storytellers (the I) who tell stories about themselves (the Me). Adolescents and young adults author a narrative sense of the self by telling stories about their experiences to other people, monitoring the feedback they receive from the tellings, editing their stories in light of the feedback, gaining new experiences and telling stories about those, and on and on, as selves create stories that, in turn, create new selves (McLean et al., 2007). Gradually, in fits and starts, through conversation and introspection, the I develops a convincing and coherent narrative about the Me. Research on the Self as Autobiographical Author Contemporary research on the self as autobiographical author emphasizes the strong effect of culture on narrative identity (Hammack, 2008). Culture provides a menu of favored plot lines, themes, and character types for the construction of self-defining life stories. Autobiographical authors sample selectively from the cultural menu, appropriating ideas that seem to resonate well with their own life experiences. As such, life stories reflect the culture, wherein they are situated as much as they reflect the authorial efforts of the autobiographical I. As one example of the tight link between culture and narrative identity, McAdams (2013) and others (e.g., Kleinfeld, 2012) have highlighted the prominence of redemptive narratives in American culture. Epitomized in such iconic cultural ideals as the American dream, Horatio Alger stories, and narratives of Christian atonement, redemptive stories track the move from suffering to an enhanced status or state, while scripting the development of a chosen protagonist who journeys forth into a dangerous and unredeemed world (McAdams, 2013). Hollywood movies often celebrate redemptive quests. Americans are exposed to similar narrative messages in self-help books, 12-step programs, Sunday sermons, and in the rhetoric of political campaigns. Over the past two decades, the world’s most influential spokesperson for the power of redemption in human lives may be Oprah Winfrey, who tells her own story of overcoming childhood adversity while encouraging others, through her media outlets and philanthropy, to tell similar kinds of stories for their own lives (McAdams, 2013). Research has demonstrated that American adults who enjoy high levels of mental health and civic engagement tend to construct their lives as narratives of redemption, tracking the move from sin to salvation, rags to riches, oppression to liberation, or sickness/abuse to health/recovery (McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001; Walker & Frimer, 2007). In American society, these kinds of stories are often seen to be inspirational. At the same time, McAdams (2011, 2013) has pointed to shortcomings and limitations in the redemptive stories that many Americans tell, which mirror cultural biases and stereotypes in American culture and heritage. McAdams has argued that redemptive stories support happiness and societal engagement for some Americans, but the same stories can encourage moral righteousness and a naïve expectation that suffering will always be redeemed. For better and sometimes for worse, Americans seem to love stories of personal redemption and often aim to assimilate their autobiographical memories and aspirations to a redemptive form. Nonetheless, these same stories may not work so well in cultures that espouse different values and narrative ideals (Hammack, 2008). It is important to remember that every culture offers its own storehouse of favored narrative forms. It is also essential to know that no single narrative form captures all that is good (or bad) about a culture. In American society, the redemptive narrative is but one of many different kinds of stories that people commonly employ to make sense of their lives. TRY AND APPLY This activity asks you to integrate and apply the concepts you have learned in this module to you and your life. A similar question may appear on the quiz, so taking the time to record and save your answer to this question on your computer now will help you prepare for the quiz. What is your story? What kind of a narrative are you working on? The following activity guides you through a reflection on your own personal narrative. 1 Write out a version of your autobiographical narrative, starting in the past and how it’s led to your present. 2 Then write down what you imagine your future may be like. What is the story you want to tell? 3 What threads of continuity, change, and meaning do you discern in your narrative? 4 While redemption narratives are common in Western cultures, this is not the only narrative ideal. For instance, some individuals in non- Western collectivist cultures align their personal narratives and identity with a collective narrative, placing one’s life events in the context of events/experiences in that culture. Does your autobiographical narrative seem to reflect one of these narrative ideals? 5 How do you think this narrative guides your choices/decisions or vice versa? For many people, the most dramatic and fulfilling efforts to change the self happen when the I works hard, as an autobiographical author, to construct and, ultimately, to tell a new story about the Me. Storytelling may be the most powerful form of self-transformation that human beings have ever invented. Changing one’s life story is at the heart of many forms of psychotherapy and counseling, as well as religious conversions, vocational epiphanies, and other dramatic transformations of the self that people often celebrate as turning points in their lives (Adler, 2012). Storytelling is often at the heart of the little changes, too, minor edits in the self that we make as we move through daily life, as we live and experience life, and as we later tell it to ourselves and to others. CONCLUSION For human beings, selves begin as social actors, but they eventually become motivated agents and autobiographical authors, too. The I first sees itself as an embodied actor in social space; with development, however, it comes to appreciate itself also as a forward-looking source of self-determined goals and values, and later yet, as a storyteller of personal experience, oriented to the reconstructed past and the imagined future. To “know thyself” in mature adulthood, then, is to do three things: 1) to apprehend and to perform with social approval my self-ascribed traits and roles, 2) to pursue with vigor and (ideally) success my most valued goals and plans, and 3) to construct a story about life that conveys, with vividness and cultural resonance, how I became the person I am becoming, integrating my past as I remember it, my present as I am experiencing it, and my future as I hope it to be. CHECK AND REFLECT Answer the following question to test your understanding of key concepts, get feedback on your learning, and help you prepare for the end of module quiz. According to McAdams, which of the following aspects of the self tends to emerge the latest in the individual’s psychological development, beginning approximately in late adolescence/early adulthood? The individual’s characteristic pattern of social engagement and adjustment to social roles ⅃ The individual’s development of a coherent narrative account of self-defining experiences The individual’s commitment to a core set of values and defining goals A and B emerge at about the same time in late adolescence/early adulthood A and C emerge at about the same time in late adolescence/early adulthood A and C emerge at about the same time in late adolescence/early adulthood Correct. According to McAdams, the development of theory of mind is most relevant to which of the following layers of the self? The self as actor ⅃ The self as agent The self as author Correct. REFERENCES Adler, J. M. (2012). Living into the story: Agency and coherence in a longitudinal study of narrative identity development and mental health over the course of psychotherapy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 367–389. Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social-cognitive theory. American Psychologist, 44, 1175–1184. Darwin, C. (1872/1965). The expression of emotions in man and animals. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In R. Dienstbier & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 38, pp. 237–288). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Erikson, E. H. (1963). Childhood and society (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Norton. Erikson, E. H. (1958). Young man Luther. New York, NY: Norton. Fivush, R. (2011). The development of autobiographical memory. In S. T. Fiske, D. L. Schacter, & S. E. Taylor (Eds.), Annual review of psychology (Vol. 62, pp. 559–582). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, Inc. 5c THE SELF AS A COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION: CONTENTS OF THE SELF-CONCEPT THE SELF IS A COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION Just as you construct cognitive representations of concrete objects, such as a chair, abstract concepts, such as freedom, and particular individuals, such as your best friend, you also construct cognitive representations of yourself. These cognitive representations of yourself constitute your self-concept, and they include a variety of types of information. Two broad categories of self-knowledge are semantic self- knowledge and episodic self-knowledge. Semantic self-knowledge refers to general facts about yourself, such as knowing that you are a University of Waterloo student, knowing where you were born, and knowing your hair colour. Episodic self-knowledge refers to knowledge about specific events in your life such as knowing what you and your mother discussed in your most recent conversation, knowing what happened in your first class at the University of Waterloo, or knowing the details of where and when you met your best friend. Semantic vs. Episodic Self Knowledge. In the Semantic Self-Knowledge example, the person recalls facts they about themself, "I am a university student, I run track, I am the middle child in a family of 4 kids…”. In the Episodic Self-Knowledge example, the person recalls the first event or episode of their day, “I remember talking to my mom this morning”. © University of Waterloo In the following section we will explore some of the insights that social psychologists have gained into how we construct these cognitive representations of semantic and episodic self-knowledge and what role these cognitive representations play in defining our sense of self and shaping our social behaviour. SELF-SCHEMATA The self-concept is a knowledge representation that contains knowledge about us, including our beliefs about our personality traits, physical characteristics, abilities, values, goals, and roles, as well as the knowledge that we exist as individuals. The self-concept is organized into a variety of different cognitive aspects of the self, known as self-schemata. An individual can have self-schemata about their interests, their appearance, their skills at sports and other activities, and many other aspects. In turn, these self-schemas direct and inform their processing of self-relevant information (Harter, 1999). These self-schemata can be studied using the methods that we would use to study any other cognitive representation. One approach is to investigate how we attend to and remember things that relate to the self. Indeed, because the self-concept is the most important of all our schemata, it has an extraordinary degree of influence on our thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Have you ever been at a party where there was a lot of noise and bustle, and yet you were surprised to discover that you could easily hear your own name being mentioned in the background? Because our own name is such an important part of our self-concept, and because we value it highly, it is highly accessible. We are very alert for, and react quickly to, the mention of our own name. Enhanced Memory for the Self-schema Other research has found that information related to the self-schema is better remembered than information that is unrelated to it, and that information related to the self can also be processed very quickly (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004). In one classic study that demonstrated the importance of the self-schema, Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) conducted an experiment to assess how college students recalled information that they had learned under different processing conditions. All the participants were presented with the same list of 40 adjectives to process, but through the use of random assignment, the participants were given one of four different sets of instructions about how to process the adjectives. Participants assigned to the structural task condition were asked to judge whether the word was printed in uppercase or lowercase letters. Participants in the phonemic task condition were asked whether the word rhymed with another given word. In the semantic task condition, the participants were asked if the word was a synonym of another word. And in the self-reference task condition, participants indicated whether the given adjective was or was not true of themselves. After completing the specified task, each participant was asked to recall as many adjectives as he or she could remember. Rogers and his colleagues hypothesized that different types of processing would have different effects on memory. As you can see in figure titled The Self-Reference Effect, the students in the self-reference task condition recalled significantly more adjectives than did students in any other condition. The Self-Reference Effect. This graph shows incremental increases in memory performance (proportion correct) across the different learning tasks. Memory performance increases from the structural task (lowest), to the phonemic task, to the semantic task, with the self- reference task resulting the best memory performance. Description (/sites/courses/PSYCH- 253/media/transcripts/module-5/description-self-reference-effect.aspx) Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) The chart shows the proportion of adjectives that students were able to recall under each of four learning conditions. The same words were recalled significantly better when they were processed in relation to the self than when they were processed in other ways. The finding that information that is processed in relationship to the self is particularly well remembered, known as the self-reference effect , is powerful evidence that the self-concept helps us organize and remember information. The next time you are studying, you might try relating the material to your own experiences—the self-reference effect suggests that doing so will help you better remember the information. TRY AND APPLY This activity asks you to integrate and apply the concepts you have learned in this module to a real world scenario or something that is personal to you and your life. Completing this activity will strengthen your understanding and memory for this concept. I encourage you to leverage the self-reference effect as a mnemonic strategy that you can use to help recall information that you learn in this and other courses. You can apply this strategy by relating each new concept that you learn to relevant examples from your own life. For example, if I was trying to learn the concepts of semantic self- knowledge and episodic self-knowledge I might generate relevant examples of self-knowledge that fit each of these respective concepts. So, as examples of semantic self-knowledge I would use general facts about myself such as that I was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania, I like to read history books, and I am a social psychologist. Then for examples of episodic self-knowledge I would use specific memories of events such as recalling my wedding day or the day my parents and sister dropped me off at Cornell University for my freshman orientation. Now, you can try practicing the self-reference mnemonic with some of the concepts we have reviewed in the module thus far. Give it a try! 1 Identify key concepts: Use the self-reference effect to recall the distinctions between the self-as-actor, self-as-agent, and self-as- author concepts that we reviewed in the previous section. 2 Identify how the concept relates to you: Think of a trait or role that reflects what you are like as an actor, think of a goal or value that represents what you are like as a motivated agent, and think of a self- defining story that represents what you are like as an author. 3 Practice recalling key concepts and their meanings: After you have generated a personal example of each layer of self-knowledge reflect on how these different characteristics of your self convey different things about who you are as a person. You may find that generating these personalized examples will help you to recall the key distinctions between these concepts. CONTENTS OF THE SPONTANEOUS SELF-CONCEPT The specific content of our self-concept powerfully affects the way that we process information relating to ourselves. But how can we measure that specific content? One way is by using self-report tests. One of these is a deceptively simple fill-in-the-blank measure that has been widely used by many scientists to get a picture of the self-concept (Rees & Nicholson, 1994). All of the 20 items in the measure are exactly the same, but the person is asked to fill in a different response for each statement. This self-report measure, known as the Twenty Statements Test (TST ) , can reveal a lot about a person because it is designed to measure the most accessible—and thus the most important—parts of a person’s self-concept. Although each person has a unique self-concept, we can identify some characteristics that are common across the responses given by different people on the measure. Physical characteristics are an important component of the self-concept, and they are mentioned by many people when they describe themselves. If you’ve been concerned lately that you’ve not been keeping up with your fitness goals, you might write, “I am out of shape.” If you think you’re particularly good looking (“I am attractive”), or if you think you’re too short to pursue your dream of being a basketball star (“I am too short”), those things might have been reflected in your responses. Our physical characteristics are important to our self-concept because we realize that other people often use them to judge us, as we discussed in the module on person perception. People often list the physical characteristics that make them different from others (e.g., redheads are more likely to mention their hair colour than brunettes because the former is more rare than the latter), in part because they understand that these characteristics are salient and thus likely to be used by others when judging them (McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978). A second aspect of the self-concept relating to personal characteristics is made up of personality traits —the specific and stable personality characteristics that describe an individual (“I am friendly,” “I am shy,” “I am persistent”). These individual differences are important determinants of behavior, and this aspect of the self-concept varies among people. The remainder of the self-concept reflects its more external, social components ; for example, memberships in the social groups that we belong to and care about. Common responses for this component may include “I am an artist,” “I am Jewish,” and “I am a mother, sister, daughter.” As we will see in later modules, group memberships form an important part of the self-concept because they provide us with our social identity —the sense of our self that involves our memberships in social groups. TRY AND APPLY This activity asks you to integrate and apply the concepts you have learned in this module to a real world scenario or something that is personal to you and your life. Completing this activity will strengthen your understanding and memory for this concept. Please note: the fields in this representation are for informative purposes only, and are not fillable. Use a piece of paper or record this in your notes. Try the Twenty Statements Test for yourself, filling in the blank 20 times 1 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 2 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 3 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 4 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 5 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 6 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 7 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 8 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 9 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 10 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 11 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 12 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 13 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 14 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 15 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 16 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 17 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 18 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 19 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ 20 I am (please fill in the blank) _________________________________ Now, look through your twenty statements about yourself and identify which statements reflect: physical attributes, personality traits, and social components and/or group identity. THE WORKING SELF-CONCEPT AND SITUATIONAL ACCESSIBILITY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE Individuals have far too much information about themselves for it all to be activated at the same moment. Instead, the activation of self- knowledge tends to be selective, depending on what information is relevant to the particular situation an individual is facing at any given moment. This idea that only a selective subset of information about the self is activated at any given moment is known as the working self- concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987). A person’s full self-concept is all of the information about themselves that is potentially accessible; whereas, a person’s working self-concept is the subset of the potentially accessible information about themselves that a person actually accesses at any particular moment. For example, when Scott is playing basketball his self-as-athlete schema is likely to be activated. While his head is in the game, he is likely to be thinking about aspects of himself that are relevant to the context of playing basketball, such as his assessments of his strengths and weaknesses in various basketball skills, and his perceptions of his relationships to the other members on his team. However, Scott’s self-as-student schema will likely not be as accessible when he is playing basketball. His knowledge of his various academic strengths and weaknesses and his scholarly interests are not likely to come readily to mind while his head is in the game. However, when the game ends and Scott’s mind turns to the midterm he has to take the next morning, his self-as-student schema is likely to spring to mind and his self-as-athlete schema is likely to recede from attention. Working self-Concept. A subset of potentially accessible information about the self that more readily comes to mind in particular contexts. © University of Waterloo Research on Working Self-Concept: We Identify with What is Unique about Us Compelling evidence that the working self-concept depends on what information about the self is salient in a particular situation was found in a fascinating series of studies that measured how schoolchildren chose to describe themselves when they were surveyed in their classrooms. Social psychologists William McGuire and Alice Padawer-Singer (1976) hypothesized that characteristics of the self that are distinctive and make one stand out from other people in a social situation are more likely to be accessible than characteristics of the self that are shared in common with many of the other people in the situation. To test this hypothesis a researcher visited grade school classrooms and asked children to “tell us about yourself” and then gave them 7 minutes to write down whatever came to mind in response to this simple prompt. The results significantly supported McGuire and Padawer-Singer’s hypothesis that children would be more likely to think about an aspect of themselves if it was relatively distinctive than if it was relatively common in their classroom. For example, 30% of the children who were more than 6 months older or more than 6 months younger than the typical age in their classroom mentioned their age in their spontaneous descriptions, but only 19% of the children who were close to the typical age of their classmates mentioned their age. The researchers also examined mentions of sex depending on whether the individual was a member of the majority or minority sex in a given classroom. In approximately half of the classrooms, males were the majority sex and in the other half females were the majority. The results showed that 26% of the children who belonged to the minority sex but only 11% of the children who belonged to the majority sex within a given classroom mentioned their sex in their spontaneous self-descriptions (McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976). These results showing that children were more likely to think about personal characteristics that made them stand out relative to others in the setting also support the more general premise of the working self- concept that a person will activate different information about themselves depending on whatever particular situational prompts they are responding to. In other words, the person who we think we are at any given time seems to depend on the social environment that we are in. The Role of Working Self-concepts The working self-concept functions to ensure that individuals activate information about themselves that is relevant to coping with whatever immediate situation they are facing. This allows the individual to align their self-concept with whatever goals they are pursuing in a particular situation. There is even evidence that people may actively inhibit information about themselves that might distract from or interfere with a particular goal that they are pursuing in a given situation (Shah, Friedman & Kruglanski, 2002). For example, if a person views their social goals as interfering with the achievement of their academic goals then when the goals connected with their academic self-schema are activated the goals associated with the social self-schema will actually be inhibited, making those interfering goals harder to bring to mind. In this way, our ability to selectively activate or inhibit relevant self-knowledge allows us to adaptively adjust to the demands of the particular situation. SELF-COMPLEXITY AND SELF-CONCEPT CLARITY As we have seen, the self-concept is a rich and complex social representation of who we are, encompassing both our internal characteristics and our social roles. In addition to our thoughts about who we are right now, the self-concept also includes thoughts about our past self—our experiences, accomplishments, and failures—and about our future self—our hopes, plans, goals, and possibilities (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004). The multidimensional nature of our self-concept means that we need to consider not just each component in isolation, but also their interactions with each other and their overall structure. Two particularly important structural aspects of our self- concept are complexity and clarity. Individual Differences in Self-complexity Although every human being has a complex self-concept, there are nevertheless individual differences in self-complexity, the extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking about themselves (Linville, 1987; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Some selves are more complex than others, and these individual differences can be important in determining psychological outcomes. Having a complex self means that we have a lot of different ways of thinking about ourselves. For example, imagine a woman whose self- concept contains the social identities of student, girlfriend, daughter, psychology student, and tennis player and who has encountered a wide variety of life experiences. Social psychologists would say that she has high self-complexity. On the other hand, a man who perceives himself primarily as either a student or as a member of the basketball team and who has had a relatively narrow range of life experiences would be said to have low self-complexity. For those with high self-complexity, the various aspects of the self are separate, as the positive and negative thoughts about a particular self-aspect do not spill over into thoughts about other aspects. Self-complexity. The extent to which individuals have many different and relatively independent ways of thinking about themselves. Those with high self-complexity can see themselves as many things, while those with low self-complexity identify themselves in a singular way. © University of Waterloo Research has found that compared with people low in self-complexity, those higher in self-complexity tend to experience more positive outcomes, including higher levels of self-esteem (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002), lower levels of stress and illness (Kalthoff & Neimeyer, 1993), and a greater tolerance for frustration (Gramzow, Sedikides, Panter, & Insko, 2000). The benefits of self-complexity occur because the various domains of the self help to buffer us against negative events and enjoy the positive events that we experience. For people low in self-complexity, negative outcomes in relation to one aspect of the self tend to have a big impact on their self-esteem. For example, if the only thing that Maria cares about is getting into medical school, she may be devastated if she fails to make it. On the other hand, Marty, is also passionate about medical school but he has a more complex self-concept because he is also highly invested in other goals and personal projects such as his volunteer work and his musical interests. These other valued aspects of his self-concept may equip Marty to better adjust to the blow of failing to make it to medical school because he can turn to these other interests. Although having high self-complexity seems useful overall, it does not seem to help everyone equally in their response to all events (Rafaeli- Mor & Steinberg, 2002). The positive effects of self-complexity are stronger for people who have other positive aspects of the self as well. This buffering effect is stronger for people with high self-esteem, whose self-complexity involves positive rather than negative characteristics (Koch & Shepperd, 2004), and for people who feel that they have control over their outcomes (McConnell et al., 2005). Self-concept Clarity Just as we may differ in the complexity of our self-concept, so we may also differ in its clarity. Self-concept clarity is the extent to which one’s self-concept is clearly and consistently defined (Campbell, 1990). Theoretically, the concepts of complexity and clarity are independent of each other—a person could have either a more or less complex self- concept that is either well-defined and consistent, or ill-defined and inconsistent. As has been found with self-complexity, higher self-concept clarity is positively related to self-esteem (Campbell et al., 1996). Why might this be? Perhaps people with higher self-esteem tend to have a more well- defined and stable view of their positive qualities, whereas those with lower self-esteem show more inconsistency and instability in their self- concept, which is then more vulnerable to being negatively affected by challenging situations. Consistent with this assertion, self-concept clarity appears to mediate the relationship between stress and well-being (Ritchie et al., 2011). Also, having a clear and stable view of ourselves can help us in our relationships. Lewandowski, Nardine, and Raines (2010) found a positive correlation between clarity and relationship satisfaction, as well as a significant increase in reported satisfaction following an experimental manipulation of participants’ self-concept clarity. Greater clarity may promote relationship satisfaction in a number of ways. As Lewandowski and colleagues (2010) argue, when we have a clear self-concept, we may be better able to consistently communicate who we are and what we want to our partner, which will promote greater understanding and satisfaction. Also, perhaps when we feel clearer about who we are, then we feel less of a threat to our self-concept and autonomy when we find ourselves having to make compromises in our close relationships. CHECK AND REFLECT Answer the following questions to test your understanding of key concepts, get feedback on your learning, and help you prepare for the end of module quiz. Suppose that Jasmine and Juan each fill out the 20-statements test once at the start of the term and then again eight weeks later. On both occasions the majority of the 20 traits on Juan’s list focus on his engineering interests and goals. By contrast, Jasmine’s list at the beginning of the term include a diverse mix of her family roles, habits, tastes, and interests. When Jasmine completes the measure again at the end of the term almost all of the items she lists is different from what she listed at the beginning of the term and some of the items on the second list seem to contradict qualities that she listed on the first list. For example, at the beginning of the term Jasmine wrote that she was an extravert but then on the second list she wrote that she was an introvert. Which of the following would be a valid interpretation of Juan and Jasmine’s responses to the twenty-statements test? Both Juan and Jasmine appear to be high in self-complexity. Both Juan and Jasmine appear to be low in self-complexity. Juan appears to be high in self-complexity, but Jasmine appears to be low in self-complexity. ⅃ Jasmine appears to be high in self-complexity, but Juan appears to be low in self-complexity. Correct. Which of the following would be a valid interpretation of Juan and Jasmine’s responses to the twenty-statements test? Both Juan and Jasmine appear to be high in self-clarity. Both Juan and Jasmine appear to be low in self-clarity. ⅃ Juan appears to be high in self-clarity, but Jasmine appears to be low in self-clarity. Jasmine appears to be high in self-clarity, but Juan appears to be low in self-clarity. 5d THE SELF AS A COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTION: SELF-AWAR SELF-RECOGNITION Self-recognition is not distinctly a human ability. Some (although few) non-humans have a basic sense of self. Experiments that have observed this use recognition of the self in a mirror as a measure of self-recognition. SerrNovik/iStock/Getty Images (girl); GlobalP/iStock/Getty Images (chimp) Some nonhuman animals, including chimpanzees, orangutans, and perhaps dolphins, have at least a rudimentary sense of self (Boysen & Himes, 1999). We know this because of some interesting experiments that have been done with animals. In one study (Gallup, 1970), researchers painted a red dot on the forehead of anesthetized chimpanzees and then placed the animals in a cage with a mirror. When the chimps woke up and looked in the mirror, they touched the dot on their faces, not the dot on the faces in the mirror. This action suggests that the chimps understood that they were looking at themselves and not at other animals, and thus we can assume that they are able to realize that they exist as individuals. Most other animals, including dogs, cats, and monkeys, never realize that it is themselves they see in a mirror. Infants who have similar red dots painted on their foreheads recognize themselves in a mirror in the same way that chimps do, and they do this by about 18 months of age (Asendorpf, Warkentin, & Baudonnière, 1996; Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). The child’s knowledge about the self continues to develop as the child grows. By two years of age, the infant becomes aware of his or her gender as a boy or a girl. At age four, the child’s self-descriptions are likely to be based on physical features, such as hair color, and by about age six, the child is able to understand basic emotions and the concepts of traits, being able to make statements such as “I am a nice person” (Harter, 1998). By the time children are in grade school, they have learned that they are unique individuals, and they can think about and analyze their own behavior. They also begin to show awareness of the social situation— they understand that other people are looking at and judging them the same way that they are looking at and judging others (Doherty, 2009). SELF-AWARENESS AND THE COGNITIVE ACCESSIBILITY OF SELF- KNOWLEDGE Like any other schema, the self-concept can vary in its current cognitive accessibility. Self-awareness refers to the extent to which we are currently fixing our attention on our own self-concept. When our self- concept becomes highly accessible because of our concerns about being observed and potentially judged by others, we experience the publicly induced self-awareness known as self-consciousness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Rochat, 2009). Perhaps you can remember times when your self-awareness was increased and you became self-conscious—for instance, when you were giving a presentation and you were perhaps painfully aware that everyone was looking at you, or when you did something in public that embarrassed you. Emotions such as anxiety and embarrassment occur in large part because the self-concept becomes highly accessible, and they serve as a signal to monitor and perhaps change our behavior. Inter-Individual Differences in Cognitive Accessibility of Self- concept Not all aspects of our self-concept are equally accessible at all times, and these long-term differences in the accessibility of the different self- schemata help create inter-individual differences (differences between individuals) in terms of, for instance, our current concerns and interests. You may know some people for whom the physical appearance component of the self-concept is highly accessible. They check their hair every time they see a mirror, worry whether their clothes are making them look good, and do a lot of shopping—for themselves, of course. Other people are more focused on their social group memberships— they tend to think about things in terms of their role as Muslims or Christians, for example, or as members of an intramural tennis or basketball team. Intra-Individual Differences in Cognitive Accessibility In addition to variation in long-term accessibility, sometimes we experience intra-individual differences or shifts in the accessibility of the self and its various components within an individual by components of the self becoming temporarily more accessible through priming, for instance. Recall that priming a person’s exposure to a stimulus or event activates relevant concepts in their memory which means that these activated concepts will be more readily applied when that person encounters subsequent stimuli or events. Self-knowledge can be primed through any activities that cause us to become more self-aware such as when we are facing a mirror, when a TV camera is focused on us, when we are speaking in front of an audience, or when we are listening to our own tape-recorded voice (Kernis & Grannemann, 1988). When the knowledge contained in the self-schema becomes more accessible, it also becomes more likely to be used in information processing and to influence our behavior. Influencing Honesty Through Self-awareness Beaman, Klentz, Diener, and Svanum (1979) conducted a field experiment to see if self-awareness would influence children’s honesty. The researchers expected that most children viewed stealing as wrong but that they would be more likely to act on this belief when they were more self-aware. They conducted this experiment on Halloween in homes within the city of Seattle, Washington. At particular houses, children who were trick-or-treating were greeted by one of the experimenters, shown a large bowl of candy, and were told to take only one piece each. The researchers unobtrusively watched each child to see how many pieces he or she actually took. In some of the houses there was a large mirror behind the candy bowl; in other houses, there was no mirror. Out of the 363 children who were observed in the study, 19% disobeyed instructions and took more than one piece of candy. However, the children who were in front of a mirror were significantly less likely to steal (14.4%) than were those who did not see a mirror (28.5%). Increased Self-awareness Improves Honesty. Results of Beaman, Klentz, Diener, and Svanum (1979). © Course Author and University of Waterloo These results suggest that the mirror activated the children’s self- awareness, which reminded them of their belief about the importance of being honest. Other research has shown that being self-aware has a powerful influence on other behaviors as well. For instance, people are more likely to stay on a diet, eat better food, and act more morally overall when they are self-aware (Baumeister, Zell, & Tice, 2007; Heatherton, Polivy, Herman, & Baumeister, 1993). What this means is that when you are trying to stick to a diet, study harder, or engage in other difficult behaviors, you should try to focus on yourself and the importance of the goals you have set. DEINDIVIDUATION AND THE LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS Example of Deindividuation. Ku Klux Klan riot. FBI (1927). Social psychologists are interested in studying self-awareness because it has such an important influence on behavior. People become more likely to violate acceptable, mainstream social norms when, for example, they put on a Halloween mask or engage in other behaviors that hide their identities. For example, the members of the militant white supremacist organization the Ku Klux Klan wear white robes and hats when they meet and when they engage in their racist behavior. And when people are in large crowds, such as in a mass demonstration or a riot, they may become so much a part of the group that they experience deindividuation —the loss of individual self-awareness and individual accountability in groups (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952; Zimbardo, 1969) and become more attuned to themselves as group members and to the specific social norms of the particular situation (Reicher & Stott, 2011). Deindividuation and Rioting Rioting occurs when civilians engage in violent public disturbances. The targets of these disturbances can be people in authority, other civilians, or property. The triggers for riots are varied, including everything from the aftermath of sporting events, to the killing of a civilian by law enforcement officers, to commodity shortages, to political oppression. Both civilians and law enforcement personnel are frequently seriously injured or killed during riots, and the damage to public property can be considerable. Social psychologists, like many other academics, have long been interested in the forces that shape rioting behavior. One of the earliest and most influential perspectives on rioting was offered by French sociologist, Gustav Le Bon (1841–1931). In his book The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, Le Bon (1895) described the transformation of the individual in the crowd. According to Le Bon, the forces of anonymity, suggestibility, and contagion combine to change a collection of individuals into a “psychological crowd.” Under this view, the individuals then become submerged in the crowd, lose self-control, and engage in antisocial behaviors. Some of the early social psychological accounts of rioting focused in particular on the concept of deindividuation as a way of trying to account for the forces that Le Bon described. Festinger et al. (1952), for instance, argued that members of large groups do not pay attention to other people as individuals and do not feel that their own behavior is being scrutinized. Under this view, being unidentified and thereby unaccountable has the psychological consequence of reducing inner restraints and increasing behavior that is usually repressed, such as that often seen in riots. Situational Normative Behaviour a Factor in Understanding Rioting Extending these ideas, Zimbardo (1969) argued that deindividuation involved feelings of reduced self-observation, which then bring about antinormative and disinhibited behavior. In support of this position, he found that participants engaged in more antisocial behavior when their identity was made anonymous by wearing Ku Klux Klan uniforms. However, in the context of rioting, these perspectives, which focus on behaviors that are antinormative (e.g., aggressive behavior is typically antinormative), neglect the possibility that they might actually be normative in the particular situation. For example, during some riots, antisocial behavior can be viewed as a normative response to injustice or oppression. Consistent with this assertion, Johnson and Downing (1979) found that when participants were able to mask their identities by wearing nursing uniforms, their deindividuated state actually led them to show more prosocial behavior than when their identities were visible to others. In other words, if the group situation is associated with more prosocial norms, deindividuation can actually increase these behaviors, and therefore does not inevitably lead to antisocial conduct. Building on these findings, researchers have developed more contemporary accounts of deindividuation and rioting. One particularly important approach has been the Social Identity Model of Deindividuation effects (or SIDE model), developed by Reicher, Spears, and Postmes (1995). This perspective argues that being in a deindividuated state can actually reinforce group salience and conformity to specific group norms in the current situation. According to this model, deindividuation does not, then, lead to a loss of identity per se. Instead, people take on a more collective identity. Seen in this way, rioting behavior is more about the conscious adoption of behaviors reflecting collective identity than the abdication of personal identity and responsibility outlined in the earlier perspectives on deindividuation. In support of the SIDE model, although crowd behavior during riots might seem mindless, antinormative, and disinhibited to the outside observer, to those taking part it is often perceived as rational, normative, and subject to well-defined limits (Reicher, 1987). For instance, when law enforcement officers are the target of rioters, then any targeting of other civilians by rioters is often condemned and policed by the group members themselves (Reicher & Stott, 2011). Indeed, as Fogelson (1971) concluded in his analysis of rioting in the United States in the 1960s, restraint and selectivity, as opposed to mindless and indiscriminate violence, were among the most crucial features of the riots. Seeing rioting in this way, as a rational, normative response, Reicher and Stott (2011) describe it as being caused by a number of interlocking factors, including a sense of illegitimacy or grievance, a lack of alternatives to confrontation, the formation of a shared identity, and a sense of confidence in collective power. Recommendations for Controlling Rioting Viewing deindividuation as a force that causes people to increase their sense of collective identity and then to express that identity in meaningful ways leads to some important recommendations for controlling rioting more effectively, including that: Labeling rioters as “mindless,” “thugs,” and so on will not address the underlying causes of riots. Indiscriminate or disproportionate use of force by police will often lead to an escalation of rioting behavior. Law enforcement personnel should allow legitimate and legal protest behaviors to occur during riots, and only illegal and inappropriate behaviors should be targeted. Police officers should communicate their intentions to crowds before using force. Tellingly, in analyses of the policing of high-risk rioting situations, when police follow these guidelines, riots are often prevented altogether, or at least de-escalated relatively quickly (Reicher & Stott, 2011). Thus, the social psychological research on deindividuation has not only helped us to refine our understanding of this concept, but has also led us to better understand the social dynamics of rioting behavior. Ultimately, this increased understanding has helped to put more effective strategies in place for reducing the risks to people and property that riots bring. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SELF-AWARENESS Two aspects of individual differences in self-awareness have been found to be important, and they relate to self-concern and other-concern , respectively (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009). Private Self-consciousness. franckreporter/E+/Getty Images Private self-consciousness refers to the tendency to introspect about our inner thoughts and feelings. People who are high in private self-consciousness tend to think about themselves a lot and agree with statements such as “I’m always trying to figure myself out” and “I am generally attentive to my inner feelings.” People who are high on private self-consciousness are likely to base their behavior on their own inner beliefs and values—they let their inner thoughts and feelings guide their actions—and they may be particularly likely to strive to succeed on dimensions that allow them to demonstrate their own personal accomplishments (Lalwani et al., 2009). Public self-consciousness, in contrast, refers to the tendency to focus on our outer public image and to be particularly aware of the extent to which we are meeting the standards set by others. Those high in public self-consciousness agree with statements such as “I’m concerned about what other people think of me,” “Before I leave my house, I check how I look,” and “I care a lot about how I present myself to others.” These are the people who check their hair in a mirror they pass and spend a lot of time getting ready in the morning; they are more likely to let the opinions of others (rather than their own opinions) guide their behaviors and are particularly concerned with making good impressions on others. Public Self-consciousness. Patrik Giardino/Stone/Getty Images COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ARISING FROM AWARENESS OF SELF- DISCREPANCIES There are clearly individual differences in the degree to and manner in which we tend to be aware of ourselves. In general, though, we all experience heightened moments of self-awareness from time to time. Self-awareness Theory and Self-discrepancy Theory According to self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), when we focus our attention on ourselves, we tend to compare our current behavior against our internal standards. Sometimes when we make these comparisons, we realize that we are not currently measuring up. In these cases, self-discrepancy theory states that when we perceive a discrepancy between our actual and ideal selves, this is distressing to us (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987). In contrast, on the occasions when self-awareness leads us to comparisons where we feel that we are being congruent with our standards, then self-awareness can produce positive affect (Greenberg & Musham, 1981). Tying these ideas from the two theories together, Philips and Silvia (2005) found that people felt significantly more distressed when exposed to self-discrepancies while sitting in front of a mirror. In contrast, those not sitting in front of a mirror, and presumably experiencing lower self-awareness, were not significantly emotionally affected by perceived self-discrepancies. Simply put, the more self-aware we are in a given situation, the more pain we feel when we are not living up to our ideals. Distraction from Dissonance. Research shows that when people experience cognitive dissonance they are more likely to seek out distraction behaviour, such as watching TV. PhotoTalk/E+/Getty Images In part, the stress arising from perceived self-discrepancy relates to a sense of cognitive dissonance , which is the discomfort that occurs when we respond in ways that we see as inconsistent. In these cases, we may realign our current state to be closer to our ideals, or shift our ideals to be closer to our current state, both of which will help reduce our sense of dissonance. Another potential response to feelings of self- discrepancy is to try to reduce the state of self-awareness that gave rise to these feelings by distracting oneself by focusing on other things. For example, Moskalenko and Heine (2002) manipulated whether a sample of undergraduate participants received negative or positive feedback about their performance on an intelligence tests. Moskalenko and Heine (2002) created dissonance for the participants who received false negative feedback about their performance on the intelligence test, because this feedback likely felt inconsistent from their internal sense of how they performed. After the participants received their feedback they were then seated in front of a television to watch a video for a task that would allegedly involve analyzing other people’s nonverbal behaviour. However, when the experimenter started the video tape instead of a video of people it showed a nature scene. The experimenter said that this was the wrong videotape and they left the room allegedly to get the correct tape. The nature video was left playing on the television while the experimenter was out of the room so that the researchers could observe the participant through a one-way mirror and record how much time they seemed to spend attending to the video even though it was irrelevant to their task. The researchers hypothesized that the participants who received the negative feedback would be motivated to distract from focusing on themselves by focusing instead on the nature video. Consistent with this prediction the results showed that participants who were given false negative feedback subsequently focused significantly more on the nature video compared to participants who received positive feedback. Self-affirmation Theory There are certain situations, however, where these common dissonance- reduction strategies may not be realistic options to pursue. For example, if someone who has generally negative attitudes toward drug use nevertheless becomes addicted to a particular substance, it will often not be easy to quit the habit, to reframe the evidence regarding the drug’s negative effects, or to reduce self-awareness. In such cases, self-affirmation theory suggests that people will try to reduce the threat to their self-concept posed by feelings of self-discrepancy by focusing on and affirming their worth in another domain, unrelated to the issue at hand. For instance, the person who has become addicted to an illegal substance may choose to focus on healthy eating and exercise regimes instead as a way of reducing the dissonance created by the drug use. Buliding Avatars as Self-affirmation Creating Avatars and the Ideal Self. Another strategy used when people feel their current self does not match their ideal. MMOs (n.d.). Still another option to pursue when we feel that our current self is not matching up to our ideal self is to seek out opportunities to get closer to our ideal selves. One method of doing this can be in online environments. Massive multiplayer online (MMO) gaming, for instance, offers people the chance to interact with others in a virtual world, using graphical alter egos, or avatars, to represent themselves. The role of the self-concept in influencing people’s choice of avatars is only just beginning to be researched, but some evidence suggests that gamers design avatars that are closer to their ideal than their actual selves. For example, a study of avatars used in one popular MMO role-play game indicated that players rated their avatars as having more favorable attributes than their own self-ratings, particularly if they had lower self- esteem (Bessiere, Seay, & Keisler, 2007). They also rated their avatars as more similar to their ideal selves than they themselves were. The authors of this study concluded that these online environments allow players to explore their ideal selves, freed from the constraints of the physical world. Social Networking as Self-affirmation There are also emerging findings exploring the role of self-awareness and self-affirmation in relation to behaviors on social networking sites. Gonzales and Hancock (2011) conducted an experiment showing that individuals became more self-aware after viewing and updating their Facebook profiles, and in turn reported higher self-esteem than participants assigned to an offline, control condition. The increased self- awareness that can come from Facebook activity may not always have beneficial effects, however. Chiou and Lee (2013) conducted two experiments indicating that when individuals put personal photos and wall postings onto their Facebook accounts, they show increased self- awareness, but subsequently decreased ability to take other people’s perspectives. Perhaps sometimes we can have too much self-awareness and focus to the detriment of our abilities to understand others. Toma and Hancock (2013) investigated the role of self-affirmation in Facebook usage and found that users viewed their profiles in self-affirming ways, which enhanced their self-worth. They were also more likely to look at their Facebook profiles after receiving threats to their self-concept, doing so in an attempt to use self-affirmation to restore their self- esteem. It seems, then, that the dynamics of self-awareness and affirmation are quite similar in our online and offline behaviors. OVERESTIMATING HOW CLOSELY AND ACCURATELY OTHERS VIEW US Although the self-concept is one of our most important cognitive representations, and although people (particularly those high in self- consciousness) are aware of their self and how they are seen by others, this does not mean that people are always thinking about themselves. In fact, people do not generally focus on their self-concept any more than they focus on the other things and other people in their environments (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982). On the other hand, self-awareness is more powerful for the person experiencing it than it is for others who are looking on, and the fact that self-concept is so highly accessible frequently leads people to overestimate the extent to which other people are focusing on them (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). Although you may be highly self-conscious about something you’ve done in a particular situation, that does not mean that others are necessarily paying all that much attention to you. Research by Thomas Gilovich and colleagues (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000) found that people who were interacting with others thought that other people were paying much more attention to them than those other people reported actually doing. The Spotlight Effect This bias to overestimate how many people notice and remember us in social situations has been dubbed the spotlight effect. In a particularly colourful demonstration of the spotlight effect, Gilovich et al. (2000) recruited groups of Cornell University undergraduates to take part in an experiment. One of these participants was randomly selected and pulled aside to receive special instructions. Specifically, this individual was asked to put on an embarrassing t-shirt and then join the other participants in a room where they were engaging in an experimental task. The embarrassing t-shirt was a shirt that had a picture of Barry Manilow, a soft rock singer who most Cornell students in a pre-test said they would be very embarrassed to be associated with. Afterwards the student who wore the embarrassing t-shirt was asked to estimate what percentage of the group recognized the image on their t-shirt and the members of the group were surveyed to measure how many of them actually noticed the image on the target participant’s t-shirt. The participant who wore the t-shirt estimated that nearly half of the members of the group noticed their t-shirt; whereas, less that 25% of the observers actually noticed the t-shirt. This shows that when we are embarrassed about personal characteristics and behaviours we overestimate how salient these embarrassing things will be to other people who are observing us. Knowing about the spotlight effect may help you to avoid kicking yourself if you happen to do something embarrassing at a party or give the wrong answer in a class discussion. When this sort of thing happens reminding yourself about the spotlight effect may help you to recognize that the other people who were present likely won’t have noticed or remembered the embarrassing incident nearly as much as you do. Knowing about the spotlight effect may also encourage you to be a bit bolder in social settings because it will help you realize that if you venture to say or do something that turns out to be a blunder, most other people won’t notice and remember it as much as you might fear they would. Age-related Differences in Spotlight Effect There is also some diversity in this spotlight effect related to age. Teenagers are particularly likely to be highly self-conscious, often believing that others are watching them (Goossens, Beyers, Emmen, & van Aken, 2002). Because teens think so much about themselves, they are particularly likely to believe that others must be thinking about them, too (Rycek, Stuhr, McDermott, Benker, & Swartz, 1998). Viewed in this light, it is perhaps not surprising that t