AI quiz split_45-49.pdf

9 COOPERATIVE ALLIANCES A third hypothesis was that opposite-sex friendships function to provide information about the opposite sex. Given that opposite-sex friends might be more likely to have information about their own gender, men and women should perceive such information as a beneft of opposi...

9 COOPERATIVE ALLIANCES A third hypothesis was that opposite-sex friendships function to provide information about the opposite sex. Given that opposite-sex friends might be more likely to have information about their own gender, men and women should perceive such information as a beneft of opposite-sex friendship more than of same-sex friendship. If gaining knowledge about what the opposite sex prefers in a short-term or a long-term mate has helped men and women solve the many adaptive problems of human mating, for example, men and women should perceive such information as highly benefcial. Men and women did report receiving information about the opposite sex from their opposite-sex friends more often than from their same-sex friends. In same-sex friendships, women received information about the opposite sex more often than did men. This type of information appears to be a more characteristic beneft to women than to men of same-sex friendships. Moreover, men and women reported that receiving information about the opposite sex from an opposite-sex friend was more benefcial than receiving such information from a same-sex friend. In sum, the empirical tests support the contention that friendships provide information about members of the opposite sex. A fourth hypothesis was that men and women will perceive mating rivalry as a potential cost of same-sex friendship. Same-sex friends are more likely to have similar interests, personalities, and levels of attractiveness than are two same-sex individuals taken at random (Bleske-Rechek & Lighthall, 2010). Consequently, same-sex friends sometimes fnd themselves competing with each other to attract a long-term mate. As predicted, men and women both reported intrasexual rivalry over mates in their same-sex friendships, although not at high rates. Friends are even perceived as potential mate poachers (Mogilski & Wade, 2013). These fndings suggest that sexual rivalry is not restricted to interactions between same-sex strangers and enemies; hence, the novel term “frienemies.” Interestingly, men reported more frequent intrasexual rivalry in their same-sex friendships than did women. It is likely that this greater sexual rivalry stems from men’s greater desire for short-term casual sex—an interpretation that is supported by the fnding that men view short-term sexual access as an important beneft of opposite-sex friends. In sum, the results suggest that sexual rivalry does sometimes occur in same-sex friendships, especially for men, and it is perceived to be a cost of such friendships. Women and men also difer in their psychology of same-sex friendship (Vigil, 2007). Women’s friendships tend to be more intimate than men’s friendships. Women are more sensitive than men to the values and preferences of their friends. Women engage in more “relational maintenance,” such as spending more time phoning and texting. Men more than women prefer a larger number of less intimate friendships, spend less time maintaining them, and do not share as much personal information. These diferences suggest gender diferences in the evolved functions of friendship. Vigil (2007) hypothesizes that, because historically women often mated exogamously (outside of their group), they faced the adaptive problem of having to rely heavily on women who were not their kin. Close intimate friendships may have helped them to obtain a safer and more secure social environment for them and their children in the absence of close kin around. In contrast to the psychological closeness and intimacy of women’s friendships, men tend to use friendships to achieve some common goal, such as cooperative hunting, cooperative defense, or coalitional warfare. Cooperative Coalitions Humans sometimes form cooperative coalitions—alliances of more than two individuals for the purpose of collective action to achieve a particular goal. Among hunter-gatherer societies, coalitions are typically formed for goals such as hunting, food sharing, launching a raid on another group, defending against attacks from another group, and building shelters. It is reasonable to hypothesize that humans have evolved specialized psychological adaptations designed to promote cooperative coalitions. Coalitions, however, face serious problems that can undermine their emergence: defection and free-riding. An example of defection occurs during war raids among the Yanomamö of Venezuela (Chagnon, 1983). Sometimes, while a group of Yanomamö begins to approach a neighboring group for the purpose of attacking it, one or more men will claim that they have a sharp thorn 267 268 PROBLEMS OF GROUP LIVING in their foot or a stomachache and so must turn back. Another example occurs among Turkana, a nomadic society in East Africa that sometimes enacts raids to seize the cattle of others. Some Turkana raiders display cowardice by deserting the group prior to a raid (Mathew & Boyd, 2014). These defections jeopardize the success of the coalition, of course, and men who use such excuses too often get branded as cowards. An equally serious problem is that of free-riders—individuals who share in the rewards of the coalition but fail to contribute their fair share of work to the success of the coalition, even though they could have contributed their fair share. An example of free-riders would be people who always seem to be out of cash or missing a credit card when the restaurant check comes, gaining benefts of the group outing without paying their fair share of the costs. The problems of defection and free-riding are so severe that many game theory analyses in biology and economics show that cooperative coalitions will collapse as a result. Defection often becomes the evolutionarily stable strategy—a strategy that, once it predominates in a population, cannot be invaded or displaced by any other strategy (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). For cooperative coalitions to evolve, therefore, the problems of free-riders and potential defection must be solved. Evolutionists have focused on the role of punishment in solving the free-rider problem (Boyd & Richardson, 1992; Gintis, 2000; Henrich & Boyd, 2001). Cooperative coalitions can evolve, in principle, as long as free-riders are punished. Experiments show that higher levels of cooperation occur when a system is in place to punish free-riders—inficting costs on those who fail to contribute their fair share. But punishing free-riders raises another problem: Who will bear the costs of administering the punishment? Coalition members who punish free-riders incur a personal cost relative to those who refuse to punish free-riders. Thus, there must be some means of punishing those who refuse to punish the free-riders! Although the feld has not achieved a consensus about how these problems can be solved, there is mounting evidence that humans do have adaptations to punish free-riders in the context of cooperative coalitions (Price, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2002). Indeed, when stringent punishments are in place for those who fail to contribute their fair share, high levels of cooperation tend to emerge (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gachter, 2002; Kurzban, McCabe, Smith, & Wilson, 2001). One hypothesis is that an emotion called “punitive sentiment” has evolved as a solution to the free-rider problem in the evolution of cooperative coalitions—a desire to harm “slackers” in the group (Price et al., 2002). This punitive sentiment could operate in at least two ways: to motivate the individual to punish free-riders and to encourage others in the group also to punish free-riders. In principle, the punitive sentiment could have two distinct functions: (1) to increase the chance that a reluctant member of the group will contribute and (2) to damage the free-rider’s ftness relative to those who participate fully in the cooperative coalition (Price et al., 2002). Price and colleagues (2002) examined predictors of the experience of punitive sentiments in a hypothetical coalitional activity, such as willingness to be drafted if the United States went to war. The single best predictor of punitive sentiments was the degree of a person’s own participation in the cooperative coalition. The more a person was willing to participate (e.g., to be drafted for a war efort), the more that person wanted to punish those who could have participated but refused to do so (e.g., those who resisted being drafted for a war efort). In short, punitive sentiments might have evolved as a means of eliminating free-riders. Cross-cultural studies, such as of the Shuar in Ecuador, support the hypothesis that the punitive sentiment may be a human universal (Price, 2005). Punishment is especially harsh toward in-group members who have failed to cooperate when they could, even more than toward out-group members (Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004). Punitive sentiments are also directed toward Turkana individuals who show cowardice on a raid, thereby jeopardizing the success of the group’s raid to obtain cattle (Mathew & Boyd, 2014). One way to sum up this fnding is with the phrase “false friends are worse than bitter enemies” (Shinada et al., 2004, p. 379). The underlying brain mechanisms of the punitive sentiment are being discovered; while punishing noncooperators, the brain region of the dorsal striatum becomes particularly active—a brain region linked with reward and anticipated satisfaction (de Quervain et al., 2004). People experience pleasure during the act of punishing noncooperators. Even merely observing an unfair 9 COOPERATIVE ALLIANCES 269 game player (noncooperator) receiving physical pain activated reward centers, especially among the male participants (Singer et al., 2006). Activation of these reward centers was especially pronounced in participants who expressed a desire for revenge. The cliché “revenge is sweet” appears true at the level of the underlying brain reward centers. Despite the growing evidence for the evolution of a psychological mechanism of punitive sentiment, we are still left with an intriguing problem: Those who punish free-riders incur a cost. It takes time, energy, and efort to punish someone, and punishers risk retaliation from those they punish. In this sense, punishing others could be an evolutionarily altruistic act in the sense that it provides a beneft to the whole group at a cost to the actor. Indeed, this sort of “altruistic punishment” has been documented in a study of 15 diverse cultures, although cultures difer in the percentage of individuals who are willing to punish noncooperators (Henrich et al., 2006). How could this form of “altruistic punishment” possibly evolve or emerge? Two competing explanations have been proposed. The frst is what has been called cultural group selection (Boyd & Richardson, 1985; Fehr & Henrich, 2003). Cultural group selection describes a process by which certain culturally transmitted ideas, beliefs, or values spread because of the competitive advantages they provide to the social groups holding them (Henrich, personal communication, August 24, 2006). If groups competed with one another over time, and the most successful groups enforced group-altruistic norms, then cultural group selection would favor groups with the more efective norms. Through imitation or social transmission, the less successful groups could acquire the social norms of the more successful groups. Altruistic punishment that is benefcial to the group, sometimes called “strong reciprocity,” could spread in this manner (also see Hagen & Hammerstein, 2005; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006, for critiques of this explanation). An alternative explanation is that altruistic punishers receive reputational benefts from punishing (Alexander, 1987; Barclay, 2006). A reputation as a punisher of noncooperators could beneft the punisher (1) if others are less likely to cheat known altruistic punishers (perhaps due to fear of being punished themselves) or (2) if altruistic punishers are more often sought out for cooperative relationships because they are perceived as being more trustworthy than those who fail to punish noncooperators. Barclay (2006) discovered that altruistic punishers are indeed seen as more trustworthy, more group focused, and more worthy of respect than non-punishers (see Figure 9.5). The presence of an audience, even if the audience is a single witness such as the experimenter, is sufcient to increase the rates of punishing noncooperators (Kurzban, DeScioli, & O’Brian, 2007). Figure 9.5 Altruistic Punishment and Reputation Source: Barclay, P. (2006). Reputational benefts for altruistic punishment. Evolution and Human Behavior, 27, 325–344. Average ratings on a 7-point Likert scale of feelings toward punishers (dark bars) and non-punishers (light bars). Higher values represent more positive impressions. 270 PROBLEMS OF GROUP LIVING More generally, gaining social status is one of the key benefts of acquiring a reputation as someone who contributes to a cooperative group. Status serves as a “magnet” for other benefts such as enhanced desirability as an alliance partner and as a potential mate (Price & Johnson, 2011). People engage in “competitive altruism,” competing to be seen by others as great contributors to the group (Roberts, 1998) and competing for reputations as being highly generous to others in the group (Barclay, 2013). One study of a Dominican village, for example, found that helping a number of diferent individuals within the group enhances one’s prosocial reputation (Macfarlan, Quinlan, & Remiker, 2013). From one perspective, these competitive altruists are just as “self-interested” as free-riders. The key diference is that free-riders beneft themselves while imposing costs on the group; competitive altruists beneft themselves and simultaneously beneft the group to which they contribute (Price & Johnson, 2011). Language appears to have greatly increased the importance of reputation among humans, since it allows for rapid communication about other individuals and consequently may have played a key role in the evolution of high levels of group cooperation (Smith, 2010). Mathematical models have also highlighted the key role of shunning or ostracizing those who do not contribute to the group (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). Those who shun individuals who either fail to help or fail to punish those who fail to help maintain a good reputation. Interestingly, people who shun free-riders may experience little or no cost to themselves. By refusing to help free-riders, shunners save the cost they would incur by helping them, so those who punish by shunning directly beneft (Fehr, 2004). The fact that people experience intense psychological and physical pain when they are shunned suggests the existence of a co-evolved adaptation that motivates avoiding violating social norms that lead to ostracism (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). In sum, the punitive sentiment, with shunning as one key behavioral strategy, may have evolved as a consequence of reputational benefts and saved costs gained by those who punish noncooperators. Another strategy for increasing group cooperation is fostering the value of fairness. Fairness in this context means striving for an equitable beneft-to-contribution ratio (Price & Johnson, 2011). This means that those who contribute more to the group get more rewards than those who contribute less. Instilling rules and norms of fairness serve two key purposes in enhancing cooperative coalitions. First, fairness provides an incentive to contribute to the group; if high contributors did not receive benefts roughly proportional to their contribution, they might slack of and decrease their contributions. Second, fairness helps to avoid being exploited by free-riders—those who try to reap more benefts from the group without contributing their fair share to the group. The study of evolved psychological mechanisms that support cooperative coalitions is very much in its infancy. Given that group living and group-against-group competition are universal features of human society, it is likely that scientists will discover additional adaptations for cooperative coalitions. Possible adaptations include gossip as a means of social bonding and controlling free-riders (Dunbar, 2004; Knifn & Wilson, 2005), an in-group favoritism bias (Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2014), prejudice against and punishment of out-group members (Schiller et al., 2014), xenophobia (hostility to strangers), adaptations to enforce group norms, ostracizing those who violate social norms (van Vugt & van Lange, 2006), enforcing rules and norms of fairness, status and reputational benefts to those who contribute heavily to group goals, and providing rewards to those who do not free ride (Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008). Cooperative coalitions cannot emerge unless the individuals involved in them can solve key adaptive problems, including (1) the problem of coordinating individuals with partially divergent interests toward a common goal, (2) the problem of imposing group obligations on members, and (3) punishing free-riders who could cause groups to unravel (Tooby et al., 2006). It is clear that humans have evolved solutions to the adaptive problems of cooperative coalitions because worldwide, they do form cooperative coalitions—gangs, fraternities, sororities, clubs, cliques, bands, troupes, factions, political parties, hunting parties, religious sects, and war parties. People experience great pleasure by being a member of a group. They experience intense psychological pain at the threat of being excluded from a valued group. They perform group rituals, such as singing, chanting, or dancing, that function to increase commitment to 9 COOPERATIVE ALLIANCES the group and cohesion within the group (Watson-Jones & Legare, 2016; Wen, Herrmann, & Legare, 2016). People use persuasion tactics to induce individuals to align themselves to group goals. When the American president John Kennedy stirred audiences with the exhortation “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country,” he efectively activated the coalitional psychology of listeners. Summary We started this chapter by considering the problem of altruism: design features that aid the reproduction of other individuals, even though the altruist who has this feature incurs a cost. The puzzle is how such altruism could have evolved, given that it seems to go against Hamilton’s rule. One solution came from the theory of reciprocal altruism, which states that psychological mechanisms for providing benefts to nonrelatives can evolve as long as those benefts are reciprocated in the future. The most important adaptive problem the reciprocal altruist faces, however, is the threat of cheaters—people who take benefts without reciprocating at a later time. One solution to this problem emerged from a computer tournament conducted by Robert Axelrod. He discovered that tit for tat—a strategy of cooperating on the frst move but reciprocating thereafter—was highly successful. It tended to promote cooperation but also helped to solve the problem of cheating by punishing defectors immediately. Examples of reciprocal altruism occur in the animal world. Vampire bats share their blood with “friends” who were unsuccessful on any given night; at a later point, the friends reciprocate the favor, giving blood preferentially to those who have recently helped them. Among chimpanzees, reciprocal alliances form among males, among females, and among males and females. Social contract theory proposes the evolution of fve cognitive capacities in humans to solve the problem of cheaters and engage in successful social exchange. Humans must be able to recognize other individuals; remember their mutual history of interactions; communicate one’s values, desires, and needs to others; recognize the values, desires, and needs of others; and represent the costs and benefts of a large variety of items of exchange. Researchers have demonstrated that people have cheater-detection adaptations, revealed by showing a special ability to reason when logic problems are framed in the form of social contracts. People tend to be especially vigilant about searching for those who have taken benefts without paying the expected costs. In addition to adaptations to detect cheaters, evidence points to a specialized ability to detect those with genuinely altruistic sentiments. Choosing as allies those who are motivated to cooperate might be an important strategy in avoiding exposure to cheaters to begin with. In addition to kin altruism and reciprocal altruism, three other evolutionary theories have been proposed to explain altruism: indirect reciprocity, need-based transfer systems, and costly signaling. With indirect reciprocity, altruists do not beneft by gaining a return beneft from the person they helped. Rather, others who witness or hear about their generosity are more likely to provide aid to the altruists. With need-based transfer systems, people pool their risk by helping those in need—a form of social insurance that is especially important in volatile or unstable environments. With costly signaling, acts of great helping and self-sacrifce provide an honest signal to others about one’s condition and resource-holding potential because only those in excellent condition can “aford” to provide the costly signal. Costly signaling increases a person’s status and reputation, which in turn benefts the costly signaler. In sum, there are at least four ways in which altruism can evolve: kin selection (altruism toward genetic relatives), reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling. The evolution of friendship poses a special problem that is captured by the banker’s paradox: Although banks are in the business of loaning money to people who need it, the people who most need money are the worst credit risks, so banks end up loaning money to the people who 271