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A History of Political Thought Plato to Marx SECOND EDITION SUBRATA MUKHERJEE Former Professor and Head Department of Political Science University of Delhi and SUSHILA RAMASWAMY Associate Professor Department of Political Science Jesus and Mary College, New Delhi New Delhi-110001 2011 To the memory of Prof. George H. Sabine Contents Preface..................................................................................................................... ix Preface to the First Edition.................................................................................. xi 1. WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY?.................................................. 1–53 Changing Context of Words and Its Implication for Political Theory...................................................................................... 8 Key Theoretical Concepts in Political Theory................................... 10 Intellectual Influences Responsible for the Decline of Political Theory.................................................................................... 12 Behaviouralism.......................................................................................... 17 Criticism of Behaviouralism.................................................................. 19 Is Political Theory Dead?....................................................................... 21 Revival of Political Theory.................................................................... 25 Berlin’s Views on Political Theory...................................................... 31 Wolin’s Defence of the Classical Political Tradition....................... 33 Kuhn’s Seminal Contribution................................................................ 35 Post-behaviouralism and Neobehaviouralism................................... 37 Why is the Classical Tradition Important?........................................ 37 How to Study the Classics.................................................................... 41 Limitations of the Classical Tradition................................................. 45 Conclusion.................................................................................................. 51 2. PLATO................................................................................................ 54–100 Life Sketch.................................................................................................. 55 Plato’s Corpus........................................................................................... 57 Context of the Republic........................................................................... 58 Philosopher Ruler..................................................................................... 65 Justice........................................................................................................... 72 Education.................................................................................................... 80 v vi Contents Community of Wives and Property.................................................... 86 Regeneration of the Ideal....................................................................... 89 Plato’s Second-best State........................................................................ 90 Is Plato a Forerunner of Modern Totalitarianism, or the First Fascist?............................................................................. 92 Conclusion.................................................................................................. 96 3. ARISTOTLE..................................................................................... 101–147 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 102 Aristotle’s Corpus................................................................................... 104 Critique of Plato..................................................................................... 107 Conception of Human Nature and State......................................... 115 Nature of Happiness or Eudaimonia................................................ 118 Household (Slaves, Women and Property)..................................... 122 Rule of Law and Constitution............................................................ 131 Conclusion................................................................................................ 143 4. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI........................................................ 148–179 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 150 Renaissance and Its Impact................................................................. 153 Machiavelli’s Political Theory............................................................. 155 Science of Statecraft............................................................................... 164 Conclusion................................................................................................ 175 5. THOMAS HOBBES....................................................................... 180–206 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 182 Developments in Science and Their Influence on Hobbes......... 184 Hobbes’ Political Philosophy............................................................... 187 Human Nature........................................................................................ 188 Women and the Gender Question..................................................... 202 Conclusion................................................................................................ 203 6. JOHN LOCKE................................................................................. 207–234 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 210 Locke and the Glorious Revolution................................................... 212 Locke’s Political Theory........................................................................ 216 Conclusion................................................................................................ 232 7. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.................................................... 235–263 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 237 Enlightenment.......................................................................................... 238 Rousseau’s Political Philosophy.......................................................... 240 Analysis of Inequality........................................................................... 242 Institution of Private Property............................................................ 243 Contents vii Civil Society............................................................................................. 245 General Will and Individual Freedom............................................. 247 Role of the Legislator............................................................................ 253 Critique of Liberal Representative Government............................ 253 Federation of Nations for World Peace............................................ 255 Women and Family............................................................................... 258 Conclusion................................................................................................ 261 8. IMMANUEL KANT...................................................................... 264–286 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 266 Political Ideas........................................................................................... 269 Philosophy of History........................................................................... 275 Notion of Perpetual Peace and Cosmopolitanism......................... 278 Kant and Hegel....................................................................................... 283 Conclusion................................................................................................ 285 9. EDMUND BURKE......................................................................... 287–309 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 288 French Revolution and England......................................................... 290 Political Ideas........................................................................................... 291 Criticism of the French Revolution................................................... 293 Critique of Natural Rights and Contract......................................... 294 Limits of Reason..................................................................................... 297 Citizenship and Democracy................................................................. 299 Representation and Pitkin’s Analysis................................................ 300 Religion and Toleration........................................................................ 301 The Actual Revolutionary Process and Burke................................ 302 The Burke-Paine Debate....................................................................... 303 Conclusion................................................................................................ 306 10. JEREMY BENTHAM..................................................................... 310–342 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 311 Meaning of Utilitarianism.................................................................... 317 The Modern State................................................................................... 324 Economic Ideas....................................................................................... 329 Notion of Liberty, Rights and Law................................................... 331 Women and Gender Equality............................................................. 335 As a Humanist........................................................................................ 338 Conclusion................................................................................................ 340 11. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT..................................................... 343–372 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 344 Price and the Suffrage Question........................................................ 346 Wollstonecraft and Contemporary Feminists.................................. 353 Conclusion................................................................................................ 368 viii Contents 12. GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL........................... 373–405 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 375 Importance of Reason............................................................................ 376 Philosophy of History........................................................................... 377 Philosophy of Right............................................................................... 385 Dialectics................................................................................................... 399 Popper’s Critique.................................................................................... 400 Conclusion................................................................................................ 402 13. JOHN STUART MILL.................................................................. 406–434 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 407 Critique of Utilitarianism..................................................................... 409 Defence of Individual Freedom and Individuality........................ 411 Equality within the Family and between the Sexes..................... 416 Democracy and Representative Government.................................. 424 Economy and State................................................................................ 426 On India.................................................................................................... 430 Conclusion................................................................................................ 431 14. KARL MARX.................................................................................. 435–477 Life Sketch................................................................................................ 438 Marx as a Poet........................................................................................ 440 Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation............................................................... 441 Dialectics................................................................................................... 443 Materialism and History....................................................................... 444 Economic Determinism......................................................................... 446 Class Struggle and Social Change..................................................... 448 Analysis of Capitalism.......................................................................... 449 Assessment of Marx’s Predictions...................................................... 452 Analysis of the State............................................................................. 454 Dictatorship of the Proletariat............................................................ 457 Revisionism, Russian Revolution and Dictatorship of the Proletariat..................................................................................... 463 Inadequacies in the Marxist Theory of the State.......................... 465 Women and the Gender Question..................................................... 467 The Asiatic Mode of Production........................................................ 468 On India.................................................................................................... 471 Conclusion................................................................................................ 472 Appendix: John Rawls—Revival of the Classical Tradition......... 479–509 Bibliography.............................................................................................. 511–526 References................................................................................................... 527–547 Author Index.............................................................................................. 549–557 Subject Index............................................................................................. 559–563 Preface This book now in its second edition was first published in 1999, and since then has seen several reprints. We thought that it is appropriate to revise the book incorporating the topics added in the revised course curriculum. The new edition contains two new chapters on Mary Wollstonecraft and Immanuel Kant and an Appendix on John Rawls, who is credited for reviving the normative classical tradition in political theory in the postSecond World War in the twentieth century. The views of some of recent commentators like Carole Pateman have also been incorporated. Our students have been greatly helpful in bringing to our notice the portions that need greater clarity and elaboration and we would like to thank them all. Subrata Mukherjee Sushila Ramaswamy Preface to the First Edition Political theory is one of the core areas of Political Science. Many argue that the entire edifice of the discipline is based on it as no comprehension of any other area in any meaningful manner is possible without an understanding of political theory. In recent years, along with the traditional emphasis on Western political theory, there has been growing interest in non-European sources of political theory. Confucianism and ancient Indian political tradition with special reference to Kautilya are increasingly getting more recognition. Added to this is a renaissance in political theory in the West as there are more participants in the debate today than at any other time in history. Today nobody talks of the death or decline of political theory though there is a realization, as observed by Walzer, that political theory is some kind of alienated politics since participants in the debate have marginal or perhaps no impact on policy makers or the process of policy making except for the Neo- Conservatives in the United States. This, however, does not diminish the utility of political theory as an academic discipline, for, it is not confined to dealing with contemporary problems of localized nature, but with a wider canvas since it debates and deliberates the definition of a good social order. As Sabine wrote long ago, political theory develops as part of politics, and just as there is no concluding chapter to politics, so there is no concluding chapter to political theory. With the collapse of totalitarian communism and authoritarianism, both right wing and left wing, the debate regarding good social order is conducted within the paradigms of liberalism and social democracy. The increasing consensus on fundamental issues has made it possible for greater universal recognition of concepts like the rule of law, constitutionalism and civil society. For comprehending the intricacies of contemporary political theory, the starting point is the Classical tradition. In understanding the hoary tradition of political theory, a dissection and continual reinterpretation of the classics in political theory is an important exercise. Ever since Plato raised the question of “What is justice” in the Republic, the debate about the nature and meaning of good and just order continues. The classical tradition that began with Plato ended with Hegel who was the starting point xii Preface to the First Edition of the last classical thinker Marx. After Hegel, began a period of refinement and clarification, as indicated by MacIntyre, a trend that continues till today. Nowhere is this more evident than the fact both Rawls and Nozick acknowledge that they were refining and updating Kant and Locke, respectively. Even in the writings of Habermas the imprint of Kant is noticeable. This book examines in detail the fascinating evolution of the history of political thought—rich and diverse—through the works of eleven seminal political thinkers who form the classical tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, Bentham, Hegel, J.S. Mill and Marx). It has also an introductory chapter on political theory. In understanding the works of these thinkers, it should be noted that each thinker was responding to the specific questions of his time while at the same time addressing the perennial issues of political discourse like power, distribution of advantages in situations of scarcity and conflicting claims, the art and science of leadership, the factors of stability, change and conservation, the relationship between ethics, politics and economics, and the role of women in society. We should also take note of the clear manifestations of localism and Eurocentrism in some of the later classical thinkers. The book also critically dissects recent interpretations by Arendt, Ashcraft, Berlin, Macpherson, Miliband, Oakeshott, Pateman, Pitkin, Pocock, Popper and Skinner. While the conclusions of this book and any errors or discrepancies that may have crept into it can be attributed to us, this endeavour, which is the outcome of considerable research, has benefited from the notable contributions of many people. The greatest indebtedness is to George H. Sabine, to whose memory this book is dedicated, for being the most important inspiration and guide. In addition, we have learnt a lot from other important theorists like Sir Isaiah Berlin, Sir Karl R. Popper, Hannah F. Pitkin, Giovanni Sartori and Sheldon Wolin. We would never have ventured, into this exciting arena of political theory but for the constant encouragement and support we received from (late) Prof. Frank Thakurdas who taught us the most important ingredient to political theorizing, namely, to have one’s own view and the capacity to defend it intelligently and with conviction. We are indebted to Prof. Milton Fisk, Prof. Barbara Goodwin, Prof. David McLellan and Prof. Jon Quah for their continual help and appreciation. We would also like to thank our students and colleagues, Mr. H.C. Jain, Librarian, University of Delhi, South Campus, Ms. Madhu Maini, Librarian, Jesus and Mary College, the librarian and the staff of the American Center, the British Council, Indian Council of World Affairs at Sapru House, Indian Institute of Public Administration, Max Mueller Bhavan, and the Central library at the University of Delhi. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the editorial and production team of PHI Learning, the Publishers, for doing a splendid and painstaking job in bringing out this book. Subrata Mukherjee Sushila Ramaswamy 1 What is Political Theory? The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.... The power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.... It is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous (Key nes 1936: 383–384). So long as rational curiosity exists—a desire for justification and explanation in terms of motives and reasons, and not only of causes or functional correlations or statistical probabilities—political theory will not wholly perish from the earth, however many of its rivals, such as sociology , philosophical analy sis, social psy chology , political science, economics, jurisprudence, semantics, may claim to have dispelled its imaginary realm (Berlin 1980: 172). The object of science is to show things happen, and why, in the nexus of cause and effect, they do happen.... what I mean is simply that it is not the function of science to pass ethical judgment.... The political theorist, on the other hand, is essentially concerned with the discussion of what ought to be. His judgments are at bottom value judgments (Cobban 1953: 335). Political theory is a personal endeavour to understand and experience the present political reality and also to evolve a mechanism in order to transcend the present imperfect society leading to perfection and a more just order. This includes a study of the evolution, nature, composition, need and purpose of the governmental apparatus, and also an understanding of human perception and nature, and its relationship with the larger community. The golden age of political theory is from Plato (428/27–347 BC) to George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (AD 1770–1831). Political theory is one of the core areas in political science. It is only recently that political theory has emerged as an academic discipline. Prior 1 to this, those engaged in the enterprise styled themselves as philosophers or scientists. A distinction is made between political theory and political philosophy, political theory and political science. This differentiation arose because of the rise of modern science, which brought about a general shift in intellectual perceptions. Political science tries to provide plausible generalizations and laws about politics and political behaviour. Political theory reflects upon political phenomenon and actual political behaviour by subjecting them to philosophical or ethical criteria. It considers the question of the best political order, which is part of a larger and a more fundamental question, namely the ideal form of life that an individual should lead within a larger community. No political theory eulogizes a Robinson Crusoe. In the process of answering immediate and local questions, it addresses perennial issues, which is why a study of the great books is imperative. These books contain the quintessence of eternal knowledge, and are an inheritance not of any one culture, place, people or time, but of entire humankind. Political theory is the most appropriate term to employ in designating that intellectual tradition which affirms the possibility of transcending the sphere of immediate practical concerns and “viewing” man’s societal existence from a critical perspective (Germino 1967: 7). There is no tension between political theory and political science, for, they differ in terms of their boundaries and jurisdiction, but not in their aim. Political theory supplies ideas, concepts and theories for purpose of analysis, description, explanation and criticism, which in turn are incorporated in political science. Political theory was political science in the full sense, and there could be no science without theory. Just as we may speak of theory as either the activity of theorizing or the recorded results of the theorizing, so political theory may legitimately and accurately be used as sy nony mous with political science (Germino ibid: 7). Some commentators distinguish between the terms political theory, political thought, political philosophy and political ideology though many treat these terms interchangeably. Political philosophy provides general answers to general questions to concepts and theories such as: justice, right, the distinction between is and ought, and the larger issues of politics. Political philosophy is part of normative political theory, for it attempts to establish the interrelationships between concepts. It would not be wrong to say that every political philosopher is a theorist, though not every political theorist is a political philosopher. Political philosophy is a complex activity which is best understood by analy zing the many way s that the acknowledged masters have practised it. No single philosopher and no one historical age can be said to have defined it conclusively, any more than any one painter or school of painting has practised all that we mean by painting (Wolin 1960: 2). There is an intimate and ongoing relationship between political philosophy and philosophy. The credit for it goes to Plato for whom the good of the individual was inextricably linked with that of the community. Subsequent well-known philosophers have “contributed generously to the main stock of our political ideas, but they have given the political theorist many of his methods of analysis and criteria of judgment” (Wolin ibid: 2). The difference between philosophy and political philosophy is not with regard to method or mood: it relates to the subject matter. While philosophy attempts to understand, as Wolin says, “truths publicly arrived at and publicly demonstrable” (Wolin ibid: 4), political theorists try to explain the meaning of ‘political’ and its relationship with the public sphere. Political theorists since Aristotle (384–322 BC) have tried to find answer to what constitutes the political, rather than being interested in political practices or their applications. When Aristotle argued that an individual needs, and can find fulfilment only through, a political community, he was emphasizing on the commonness of the political space, that political rule is … concerned with those general interests shared by all the members of the community ; that political authority is distinguished from other forms of authority in that it speaks in the name of a society considered in its common quality ; that membership in a political society is a token of a life of common involvements; and that the order that political authority presides over is one that should extend throughout the length and breadth of society as a whole (Wolin ibid: 10). This view has been reiterated in recent times by Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) and Michael Joseph Oakeshott (1901–1990). They saw political life as a distinctive form of human organization with special value, a place for freedom, honour and full human development. They were concerned with the autonomy of the political, safeguarding it particularly from the onslaughts of social and economic issues. Remarkably similar to this view was that of Easton, for whom politics meant an authoritative allocation of values. The subject matter of political theory was linked to a quest for a proper and legitimate form and scope of politics as a practical activity. Equally important is the demarcation between the public sphere and personal space. While it has been traditionally contended that political theory is about the public domain, recent writings by feminists have questioned this focus. The issue was on the agenda ever since Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797), followed by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), spoke of subjugation in the private domain, insular to the ideals of freedom, equality and justice that dominate the public sphere. But it has not been until recently that debates about this form of ‘slavery ’, and its entwinement with the public and the private have touched the centre of political theory. Indeed, recent debates have been broadened to include questions about the patriarchal construction of the central categories of political thought; the political meaning of sexual difference; the relation between the intimate, familial and domestic, and the economy and state; and the interconnections among nature, reason, politics and the sexes (Held 1991: 7–8). Traditionally, a political theorist understood and analyzed the political as implying the limits of state action. The idea of the modern state, sovereign internally and externally, with supreme jurisdiction over its territorial space, was the subject matter of normative political theory and of political analysis in social sciences. However, with globalization brought about by a global economy, transportation and communication, development of intergovernmental and quasi-supranational institutions, regional and international organizations, and growth of complex intricate interrelationships between states and societies, the fate and future of the nation-state is increasingly becoming a focus of enquiry. The fact is that: Issues like religion, or prices, or race are not by nature a priori either political or non-political. They are made or become political in certain times and places. And that means, in those times and places they are lifted out of unplanned drift and placed on the political agenda as conscious collective concerns (Pitkin 1973: 523–24). Political thought is the thought of the whole community. This includes the writings and speeches of the articulate sections, like professional politicians, political commentators, social reformers and ordinary persons of a community. Thought can be in the form of political treatises, scholarly articles, speeches, government policies and decisions, and poems and prose that express the anguish of people. Thought is time bound. In short, political thought includes theories that attempt to explain political behaviour, values to evaluate it and methods to control it. One notable example of inclusion of the normative perspective in a political document is the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which spoke of ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’. Similarly, the Preamble to the Constitution of India has been considered by Barker as the best possible articulation of a collective desire of an entire nation. Political theory, unlike thought, refers to the speculation by a single individual usually articulated in treatise(s) as models of explanation. It consists of the theories of institutions, including those of the state, of law, of representation and of election. The mode of enquiry is comparative and explanatory. Political theory attempts to explain the attitudes and actions arising from ordinary political life and to generalize about them in a particular context: thus political theory is concerned about/with the relationships between concepts and circumstances. Political Philosophy attempts to resolve or to understand conflicts between political theories which might appear equally acceptable in given circumstances (Crick 1973: 5). Political ideology is a systematic and all-embracing doctrine which attempts to give a complete and universally applicable theory of human nature and society, with a detailed programme of attaining it. John Locke (1632–1704) has often been described as the father of modern ideologies. Marxism is a classic example of an ideology summed up in the statement that the purpose of philosophy is to change and not merely interpret the world. All political ideology is political philosophy though the reverse is not true. The twentieth century has seen many ideologies like Fascism, Nazism, Communism and Liberalism. A distinctive trait of political ideology is its dogmatism which, unlike political philosophy, precludes and discourages critical appraisal because of its aim of realizing the perfect society. Political ideology, according to Germino and Sabine, is a negation of political theory. An ideology is of recent origin, and under the influence of positivism, is based on subjective, unverifiable value preferences. Germino distinguishes between a political theorist and a publicist in that while the former has a profound understanding of issues, the latter is concerned with the immediate questions. By this distinction, Germino considers Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712– 1778) and Hegel as theorists, but their contemporaries Phaleas, Giles, Botero, Filmer, Condorcet and de Maistre as publicists. The gap between a theorist and a publicist is wide and divergent, differing “fundamentally in orientation, scope, emphasis, tone and terminological sophistication” (Germino 1967: 14). In this context, Germino rejects Mannheim’s thesis of sociology of knowledge, which contended that belief structures have a social origin, and that social science knowledge is dependent on the class origin of a theorist, thereby precluding objectivity. While the data offered by the “sociology of knowledge” are of obvious relevance in explaining the thinking of some propagandists for mass movements they are of scant significance in helping us understand a Plato or Hegel (Germino ibid: 13–14). Furthermore, Germino, like Plato, also distinguishes between mere opinion, and knowledge, the latter being the starting point of a political theorist. Every political theorist plays a dual role, that of a scientist and a philosopher. The way he would delineate the roles would depend on one’s temperament and interests. Only by combining the two roles can he make worthwhile contributions to human knowledge. The scientific component of a theory can appear coherent and significant if the author has a preconceived notion of the aims of political life. The philosophical basis is revealed in the manner in which reality is depicted (Hacker 1961: 2–3). Political theory is dispassionate and disinterested. As science it will describe political reality without try ing to pass judgement on what is being depicted either implicitly or explicitly. As philosophy, it will prescribe rules of conduct which will secure the good life for all of society and not simply for certain individuals or classes. The theorist, in theory, will not himself have a personal interest in the political arrangements of any one country or class or party. Devoid of such an interest, his vision of reality and his image of the good life will not be clouded, nor will his theory be special pleading.... The intention of ideology is to justify a particular sy stem of power in society. The ideologue is an interested party : his interest may be to defend things as they are, or to criticize the status quo in the hope that a new distribution of power will come into being …. Rather than disinterested prescription we have rationalization.... Rather than dispassionate description we have a distorted picture of reality (Hacker ibid: 4–5). Political Theory as the History of Political Thought Courses in political theory normally offer detailed and elaborate study of books or particular political philosophies from Plato to contemporary times, from a historical perspective. These books are studied for their normative statements about the desirability of certain types of institutions, governments and laws, which are generally accompanied by rational arguments. The classics are portrayed as timeless in quality, permanent in relevance and universal in their significance. The Classical tradition demonstrates a great deal of unity in style and manner of argument, which is why it constitutes a common school of enquiry. However, in spite of this intrinsic unity, the classics offer divergent interpretations of politics, and this makes their study useful for understanding contemporary politics. Political Theory as Technique of Analysis When Aristotle remarked that the individual is a political animal, he indicated the primacy of politics and the fact that political thinking takes place at various levels and in a variety of ways. The ‘political’, in such a view, became not only all-pervasive, but also the highest kind of activity. Politics symbolizes a collective public life, wherein people create institutions that regulate their common life. It also denotes the importance of political activity, which was described by the famous Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) as an activity par excellence. Common-sense questions and political opinions merit an answer, for instance: Are individuals equal? Should the state be more important than the individual? How does one justify violence employed by the state? Is there an inherent tension between freedom and equality? Is the minority justified in dictating terms to the majority and vice versa? Our responses to these statements often reflect what ought to be the case, rather than what is the case. At stake here is a choice between values and ideals. By exercising one’s preferences, one also (unknowingly) subscribes to a political ideology which means that answers to questions will vary not only according to individual opinion, but also depending on one’s value preferences. It is because of this basic reason that political theory has to be a part of an open society for, amongst us there would always be liberals and conservatives. Training in political theory helps us to answer the aforesaid questions logically, speculatively and critically. Political theory is, quite simply, man’s attempts to consciously understand and solve the problems of his group life and organization.... [It] is the disciplined investigation of political problems... not only to show what a political practice is, but also to show what it means. In showing what a practice means, or what it ought to mean, political theory can alter what it is (Sabine 1973: 3–5). Political theory had been used to either defend or question the status quo. Taking into cognizance the facts and details, it explains and describes politics in abstract and general terms that allow space for critical imagination. As a discipline, political theory aims to describe, explain, justify or criticize the existing institutional arrangements and power equations in society. Some commentators like Goodwin (1993: 265–266) emphasize the centrality of the power paradigm whereas others like Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) downgrade it, comparing it to money in modern societies. Recent important works by John Rawls (1921–2002) and Robert Nozick (1924–2002) do not emphasize ‘power’ at all. It is interesting that Rawls emphasizes a wellordered society, identifying justice, stability and efficiency as its main ingredients, without any attempt to speak about the distribution of power. Political Theory as Conceptual Clarification Political theory helps to understand the concepts and terms used in a political argument and analysis. For instance, the meaning of freedom, equality, democracy, justice, rights, etc. These terms are frequently used not only in daily conversation, but also in discourse of political theory. An understanding of these terms is important for it helps us to know the way they have been employed, distinguish between their definitions and their usage in a structure of argument. Many, like Weldon (1953), stress the need to scrutinize concepts in ordinary pre-theoretical language. An analysis of concepts also reveals the ideological commitment of a speaker or/and writer. A liberal defines freedom as implying choice and absence of restraints, while a socialist links freedom with equality. A liberal defines a state as an instrument of human welfare, while for a socialist a state is an instrument of oppression, domination and class privileges. Conceptual clarification is definitely possible but cannot be neutral. Those engaged in it overtly or covertly subscribe to value preference, and in this sense their task is not different from the authors of classics in political theory. Political Theory as Formal Model Building This perception, particularly popular in the United States, looks to political theory as an exercise in devising formal models of political processes, similar to the ones in theoretical economics. These models serve two purposes. First, they are explanatory, offering systematically the factors on which political processes are based. Second, they are normative, for they try to show the consequences that would accrue from following a certain rule. A good example of such an exercise is Antony Downs’ (1957) theory of electoral competition which viewed the voters as trying to gain maximum utility from an election result, and parties as teams trying to maximize their probability of winning. Downs then showed how parties, in order to win, devise ideological stances. Another important model is Kenneth Arrow’s (1963) impossibility theorem, which stated that, among other things, where a democratic choice had to be made between more than two alternatives, the outcome would very likely be arbitrary, influenced by the procedure employed to exercise the choice. Josef Schumpeter’s (1976) elitist theory of democracy was based on the assumption that a human being takes his economic life more seriously than the political one. Political Theory as Theoretical Political Science The emergence of political science in the twentieth century has led some political scientists to look upon political theory as a mere theoretical branch of the discipline. An attempt is made to integrate empirical observations with a systematic explanation of one’s everyday experiences in the world. This view dispenses with the normative content of traditional political theory. Though mere explanation of political phenomena is possible, grounding it in empiricism would not be adequate. Any attempt to formulate a political theory free of normative elements would inherently fail. This is because any explanation of political events would mean an interpretation of the intentions and motives of the participants, and such an interpretation would bring forth normative issues. CHANGING CONTEXT OF WORDS AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR POLITICAL THEORY Like ideas even words are to be contextualized. This proposition, Raymond Williams (1958) defends by contextualizing five words in the English language, i.e. industry, democracy, class, art and culture. In the context of these words the last few decades of the eighteenth century and the first fifty years of the nineteenth century is of crucial significance. All these words which were a part of the English vocabulary were used for a long time but acquired a new and significant meaning at this aforesaid period. Williams argues that this change in words can be described some kind of a map which reflects a larger change in life and thought and the subsequent changes in language itself. With drastic changes in the life itself in all its significant manifestations—social, political and economic— and the altered relationships of institutions and activities led to this sea change in the meaning and contextualization of words. In the context of the industrial revolution, the word industry which was associated with particular human character meaning individual attributes became a description of a collective word for manufacturing and productive process. The earlier use continues even today but ever since Smith changed the context of the word industry the latter use is more common. Democracy which had a Greek origin, meaning government by the people, came into the English language at the time of the American and French Revolutions as ‘it was not until the French Revolution that democracy ceased to be a mere literary word and became part of the political vocabulary’ (ibid: 14). The present use of the term democracy till the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, was equated with mob-rule and was supposed to be both dangerous and subversive. But the connotation totally changes with the struggle, as expressed by Williams, as ‘democratic representation’. The word class in the modern sense begins around 1740. Before this time, class had a connotation of describing division of a group in school and college taken from logic and philosophy. But towards the end of the eighteenth century, class in the modern social sense came into use with expressions like higher class, middle class and a middling class. The phrase working class comes into use around 1815 and upper class in 1820s. The important phrases like class prejudices, class legislation, class consciousness, class conflict and class war followed this early trend and the phrase upper middle class was first used in the 1890s and the lower middle class only in the twentieth century. Art also reflected this process of change. Originally it meant an individual skill but subsequently it came to refer to an institution meaning ’activities of a certain kind’ (ibid: 15). Earlier art was any kind of human skill but in the new context it meant a specialized category of imaginative or creative arts. Similarly culture which was understood as “tending of natural growth” changed to something which is “doing in itself” i.e. “a general state or habit of the mind linked to human perfection, intellectual development within the entirety of society within a larger framework of general category of arts” (ibid: 15). Later it encompassed the entirety of all arts and culture came to mean the whole society including the material, the intellectual and the spiritual. Williams considers this changing connotation of culture is of striking importance as the change reflects the change in the other key words of industry, democracy and class. The importance for political theory in this changed contextualization is twofold: (a) the changes in society connotes total alteration in the meaning of some key words and (b) the change reflects the new personal and social relationships that inevitability came out of the significant changes in this period of quick change. This means that the new idea of culture not only came as a response to the new industrial society but also to a new social and political phenomenon called democracy. Apart from this total transformation of older words a lot of new words emerged to describe the new situation like ideology, intellectual, rationalism, scientist, humanitarian, utilitarian, romanticism, atomistic, bureaucracy, capitalism, collectivism, commercialism, communism, doctrinaire, equalitarian, liberalism, masses, medieval, medievalism, primitivism, proletariat, socialism, unemployment, cranks, highbrow, isms and pretensions. KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL THEORY A reader getting introduced to political theory for the first time may think it sufficient to study the institutions rather than abstract concepts, in order to understand the character and nature of society. While a study of institutions is possible, one realizes that institutional arrangements vary from society to society because they are based on divergent sets of ideas. This realization takes us to the heart of the matter as to what is more important—reality or ideas, fact or concept. Do ideas reflect reality, or is reality based on ideas? It may be difficult to find satisfactory answers to these perennial questions that would satisfy everybody. However, in trying to define them, one comes across categorizations and labels that become useful tools in analysis. For instance, an idealist like Plato would contend that there exist some permanent immutable ideas to which reality should approximate. On the contrary, there are those like Locke, who believe that concepts are derived from our observation of the material reality, and are called materialist or realist. Usually, though not always, a materialist approach is empirical and inductive in nature. An inductive method of reasoning means that general statements are derived from observing particular facts. It is the opposite of the deductive form of reasoning, in which the conclusion of an argument is validly inferred from some premises. A descriptive theory is one that describes reality and constructs explanations on the facts collected. In contrast, an evaluative theory analyzes ideas with reference to other concepts and values. The opposition between descriptive and evaluative theory is reflected in a distinction made between facts and values. Facts are empirically verifiable, while values are not as they cannot be substantiated. Deontology is ethical theory which considers certain moral duties as self-evident and absolutely binding, irrespective of the consequences. As opposed to this is teleology or consequemialism, which believes that the rightness or wrongness of actions is determined by their good or bad consequences. It also holds that events can be explained, and evaluation is possible only by considering the ends towards which they are directed. The Kantian, and in recent times, Rawlsian theory, is deontological. Classical utilitarianism is teleological. An important distinction is made between normative and empirical theory. A normative political theory is prescriptive, for it sets standards or forms of conduct and does not describe facts or events. Normative statements include words like ought, should a nd must. An empirical social scientist would observe reality and experience, and then construct a general theory based on a plethora of facts and data. It does not accept a priori knowledge. Closely related to empiricism is pragmatism, a philosophical theory associated with the American philosophers C.S. Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey (1859–1952), which holds that beliefs have a meaning and justification because of their practical results. It also accepts the fact that the subject of knowledge is not merely a recipient of sensation, but also an active inquirer. Some see experience as intelligible in isolation, without any reference to the nature of its object, or to the circumstances of its subject. This implies that there is no need to explain the social condition of an experience. Such a view was implied in David Hume’s (1711–1776) theory of the relation between idea and impression, and Bertrand Arthur William Russell’s (1872–1970) Logical Atomism. Experience and fulfilment of desires as the basis of human nature is articulated by utilitarianism, which judges human actions in terms of the pleasures promoted/increased and the pain caused/decreased. As opposed to empiricism, rationalism contends that the world can be known through the power of reason, and reason can correct experiences delivered by the senses. Rationalism had its origins in Plato, but it is popularly associated with modem theorists beginning with Rene Descartes (1596– 1650), culminating in the German academic philosophy of the Enlightenment. The exponents of rationalism were Baruch (or Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646– 1716). Rationalism was criticized by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) but re-emerged in the writings of Hegel. Max Weber (1864–1920) understood rationalism in the sense of preferred legal-rational authority over others—traditional and charismatic. Rationalism used by J.S. Mill meant search for rational solutions other than prejudices, and scientific explanations other than mysticism. It also means favouring clear and explicit solutions based on principles. Rationalism has been regarded as a political vice by theorists like Oakeshott, who pointed out that a rationalist mind is skeptical of any authority other than reason, dismissing tradition, custom, habit and group experience as irrelevant. A distinction is also made between subjective or personal/individual and objective or impersonal/impartial. Rousseau spoke of the general will promoting objective good of the community. Another term, relativism, connotes that values and principles do not have universal or timeless validity and that, there is no absolute criterion of truth. Values are valid within a social group or an individual person or an age. It is commonly associated with historicism, which has two meanings. In the late nineteenth century it meant uniqueness of all historical phenomena, and that each age should be interpreted in terms of its own ideas and principles. The second meaning, associated with Sir Karl Popper (1902–1994) means belief in large-scale laws of historical development, on the basis of which predictions could be made. INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLINE OF POLITICAL THEORY Since the time of Hegel, political theory faced its challenge of ideology and positivism. When Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1883) proclaimed that his intention was not to interpret to the world but to change it, he obliterated the distinction between theory and practice. He produced an anti-theory, offering to humankind the most radical form of messianic and ideological thinking (Germino 1967: 57). For Marx, reality had to be comprehended in practical productive activity. Theory lost its critical dimension, for it was described as the tool of the privileged class. This makes Marx an ideologist, and not a political theorist. Ideology, as defined by Antonio Louis Claude Graf Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), meant the science of deciphering the origin of ideas. He held that all thoughts were reflected and determined by sense-experience, as the world of sensation is the only reality. He also pointed out that a truly scientific study of human beings would help in exposing illusions and abstractions which had no roots in reality. All forms of abstract thought, including religion and philosophy, had to be discarded. He rejected all kinds of critical enquiry. Positivism The positivization of the social sciences mainly came out of the tremendous influences of Isidore Auguste Marie Francois Comte (1798–1857), who has been regarded as the father of positivism. Determined to formulate a new master-science of human beings which he described as ‘sociology’, he asserted that only sense-experience was real. Metaphysical, ethical and theological theories had no use. Positivism emphasized precision, constructive power and relativism. In this context, political theory did not convey any meaning. Positivism contends that analytical statements about the physical or social world fall into three categories. First, such statements can be useful tautologies, meaning repeating the same things through different words, and purely definitional statements that give specific meaning to a particular concept or phenomenon. Second, statements are to be empirically tested by observation to assess their truth or falsity. Third, statements that did not fall into the aforesaid categories and lacked analytic content had to be dropped. In short, the positivists understood meaningful analysis as possible only through useful tautologies and empirical statements. This precluded metaphysics, theology, aesthetics and ethics, for they merely introduced obscurity into the process of enquiry. Positivism aimed to be “value free” or “ethically neutral”, patterning itself on the natural sciences in deciding about the right and wrong of issues. Empiricism believed that observation and experience as sources of knowledge were central to the many shades of positivism. Comte integrated this assumption with two more ideas. First, he reviewed the development of the sciences with a view to ascertaining the thesis of unity among the sciences, natural and social, whereby they could be integrated into a single system of knowledge. Second, with the idea of a unified science, he founded sociology in the belief that scientific knowledge offered the requisite clues for control over both nature and society. With the help of these three tools of analysis —empiricism, unity of science and control—positivism in the nineteenth century focused itself on society in general, in the hope of overcoming the existing malaise and realizing a better future. Logical Positivism A revitalized form of positivism appeared in the form of logical positivism, espoused by the Vienna Circle consisting of mathematicians, philosophers and scientists in the 1920s and 1930s. Members of this group included Moritz Sclick (1882–1936), Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), Otto von Neurath (1882–1945), Victor Kraf and Herbert Feigl (1902–1988). Those who were associated with it were Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) and Popper. Wittgenstein provided an intellectual link between the circle and the school of linguistic philosophy that thrived in Oxford and other English universities in the twenties and thirties of this century. Logical positivists reject traditional metaphysics’ cognitive status. For them, scientific propositions are of two kinds: analytic or synthetic. An analytic statement is logical or mathematical in nature. It is synthetic when a “proposition adds something to the meaning of a given term”. Verifiability is the criterion for synthetic or substantive and factual statements suggesting that a synthetic statement had meaning only if it was capable of empirical verification. Lack of empirical verification means that a statement cannot be proved to be true or false, and so is meaningless. From this standpoint, traditional political theory is rejected as unverifiable and meaningless. Logical positivists espouse a more radical form of empiricism— phenomenalism—restricting experience of sensations as the basis of science. They insist on logical analysis and aim to unify the sciences on the premise that experience supplied the subject of all science, and logic the formal language to link descriptions of experiences and formulate laws and theories. The impact of logical positivism on political thought was twofold. First, by its principle of verification, it viewed politics as metaphysical, beyond science, essentially non-rational and arbitrary. Science, on the contrary, would instruct us as to what would happen rather than what should happen. This distinguished them from the positivists who attempted to make politics scientific. Second, to be scientific meant adopting those aspects of science that logical positivism identified as science. It considered physics as a paradigm of a unified science and that science proceeds inductively from observations to laws. Poppers Method An amendment to the principle of verification was suggested by Popper with his principle of falsification, which he used to solve the problem of induction, popular ever since Francis Bacon (1561–1626) invented it, known as “Hume’s problem”. Popper’s seminal achievement was to work out a reasonable solution to the problem of induction (Magee 1984). Hume was the first to raise doubts about the inductive method. He convincingly argued that no number of singular observations, however large and foolproof could really lead to a scientifically satisfactory general statement. For instance, if one particular A was exactly the same as another B, it was not logically defensible that all As would be Bs. Even if a very large sample was taken to arrive at a definite conclusion, it would merely remain a psychological fact and not a logical one. This was true of predictions as well, as past experience did not imply that the same would continue to happen in future. It was an inherent limitation of observation, as it was not possible to observe future events. The propensity to accept the validity of the inductive method emerged more from our psychological conditioning rather than from logic. Hume concluded that non-scientific law really had a rationally secure foundation. Following Hume, Popper rejected the traditional view of science and replaced it with another, by pointing out the logical asymmetry between verification and falsification. This meant that no number of cases of A that brought B could really establish that all As were Bs. Such universal notions were unprovable and disprovable. By the principle of falsification, a theory continued to hold until it was falsified, and therefore falsification, and not verification, was the more suitable method for scientific enquiry. All knowledge was provisional, based on hypotheses. Such formulations had to be continuously scrutinized by negative instances of falsification. Knowledge, developed in a process of conjectures and refutations, open to searching and uncompromising tests. Arguments were always tentative and could be criticized for their validity. The basis of falsification was “common-sense realism” and indeterminism, essential for proper functioning of a critical method. Theory formulation was rigorous in Popper’s method, as it had to withstand refutation. Refutation of existing knowledge led to the emergence of new problems, and possibly a subsequent solution which advanced knowledge. The challenge was to go beyond the existing evidence that enabled one to face a new situation. The implication for this was that a theory, whether true or false, would lead to more accumulation of knowledge by new discoveries and inventions, and thus result in better theories. Scientific discoveries were mostly accidental. All knowledge was incomplete and provisional. What is considered to be the truth today may be falsified tomorrow? But the new paradigm could also be provisional and might be refuted again, and because of this no theory could claim finality. At best, it could claim that it was better than the preceding theory. Science as a body of well-established facts was incorrect, as in scientific enquiry nothing was permanently established, and as such nothing was unalterable. Accuracy was also provisional, as all measurements, both of time and space, could be within a certain level. Quest for knowledge was a consequence of the problems faced and attempts made to solve them. Exactness is an illusion, and there is no point in trying to get it. However, this does not mean that since we cannot get a final answer to anything, humankind cannot make progress as the quest for a greater degree of accuracy expands the horizon of our knowledge. Advancement is always possible, but whether we have reached the goal or not would always be open to question. Popper put this argument with reference to two of the greatest scientists, Newton and Einstein. The latter’s theory of relativity superseded Newtonian laws of gravitation. Popper established the conjectural nature of scientific knowledge. He contended that no theory could be relied upon as the final truth. At best, one could say that it was supported by every observation so far, and was more precise in terms of prediction than the available alternative, but it was still possible to replace it with a better theory. He denied the traditional assertion that scientists were looking for the maximum degree of probability, given the evidence. On the contrary, statements that carried with them the maximum possible information, which in all probability might be false, were required. Since they were highly falsifiable, they were also highly testable. For Popper, falsification in whole or in part, was the anticipated fate of all hypotheses. Therefore, one had to seek criticism, for the bigger the fault, the greater was the prospect for improvement. On the basis of this paradigm, he attacked the theories of Plato, Hegel and Marx. Popper’s arguments were very similar to those of the theory of relative truth of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948). Gandhi, like Popper, conceded that it was practically impossible to know the truth, though all of us were its seekers. At best, one knew one’s version of it. Gandhi, like Popper, was opposed to any form of dogmatism and determinism. Linguistic Philosophy Linguistic philosophy was also critical of traditional political theory. Most of the linguistic philosophers agreed with the logical positivists that metaphysical statements are value judgments, which have emotive and not cognitive value. Philosophy was described as “second-order study” devoted to conceptual enquiry. Though linguistic philosophy resembled that of the Vienna Circle, it was more open towards metaphysical experiences due to the influence of Wittgenstein. The latter’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) contended that there might be truths that could not be expressed through the language of sense-experience. Weldon pointed out that the function of political philosophy was not to provide new information about politics and its conclusions, as they had no bearing on the decisions of practical politicians. Moreover, philosophers must refrain from suggesting reforms. Linguistic philosophy dismissed political/philosophical thought as a misconceived enquiry, for it took up the wrong questions. Weldon’s thesis about the lack of influence of political thinkers on politicians can be challenged by pointing to the enormous influence Locke exerted on the makers of the American constitution, President Clinton’s reference to Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), the inspiration Gandhi derived from John Ruskin (1819–1900), Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) and Count Leo Nikolayevish Tolstoy (1828–1910) and late Prime Minister Nehru’s indebtedness to Fabian collectivism. Weber played a crucial role in exposing the limitations within positivism. He conceded the “value related” nature of social science enquiry. The human mind does not randomly observe reality. It makes a conscious choice depending on one’s interest. He repeatedly stressed that although science was related to values, it could not validate them. An empirical science can teach no one what he ought to do, but only what he can do, and under certain circumstances, what he wants to do. The validation of values is an affair of faith, and besides this perhaps a task of speculative thinking about life, the world, and its meaning, but certainly never an object of a science that is based on experience (Weber 1958: 54–55). The later decades of the nineteenth century till the end of the Second World War were a bleak period for political theory (Germino 1967). However, this observation ignored the contributions of Bernard Bosanquet (1848– 1923), Antonio Gramsci (1871–1937), Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882) and Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse (1864–1929). The challenges posed by positivism and ideology were largely countered by Soren Kierkagaard (1813–1855), Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), Benedetto Croce (1870–1940), Max Scheler (1874–1928), Robert Michels (1876–1936), Karl Theodore Jaspers (1883–1969), and the theorists of the Frankfurt School. With the emergence of political science as a professional discipline, since 1903 political theory was one of the sub-fields. In the 1920s, Merriam and the University of Chicago School played a key role in attempting to make political science more scientific. Methods and concepts from other fields such as psychology and sociology were incorporated in order to make political science quantitative, an approach stressed by Merriam and Wallas. In the 1920s, despite the increasing use of scientism, there was not much schism between empirical scientific theory and study of the history of ideas. The two were seen as complementary. Science was used for practical reform and further rational public policy. BEHAVIOURALISM Though the full import of the behavioural revolution became clear in the 1950s, the roots of the movement emerged in the early years of this century. It reaffirmed many of the basic ideas of American political science, though it brought about a significant change in the research programmes within the discipline. In the process, it represented a conservative revolution (Gunnell 1987: 388). Behaviouralism, as articulated by Easton, tries to organize research in political science on the model of the natural sciences. It emphasizes the need to develop a pure science of politics, giving a new orientation to research and theory-building exercises within the discipline. In the process, it rejects political theory as a merely chronological and intellectual history of ideas, with no practical relevance in comprehending contemporary political reality. Throughout the fifties, those who were committed to evaluative an prescriptive analysis and study of the classical tradition, perceived scientism of behaviouralism as a threat to political theory. The behaviouralists, on the contrary, claimed that normative political theory was a serious hindrance to scientific research. It was from these debates that many of the subsequent images of political theory —whether as a world-historical activity concerned with criticism and restructuring of political life or as a mode of cognitive science—would emerge (Gunnell ibid: 388). Behaviouralism remained the dominant theme even in the sixties in the United States. It focused on the simple question: Why do people behave the way they do? It differed from other social sciences by its insistence that: (a) observable behaviour both at the level of an individual and a group was the basic unit for analysis, and (b) that it was possible to empirically test any explanation of that behaviour. It rejected a priori reasoning about human beings and society, and preferred factual and statistical enquiries. It believed that experience alone could be the basis of knowledge. Within this framework, behaviouralists analyzed the reasons for mass political participation in democratic countries, elite behaviour in the contexts of leadership and decision making processes, and activities of non-state actors in the international arena, like the multinational corporations, terrorist groups and supranational organizations. The Behavioural movement, which came into prominence in the 1950s and 1960s, had its philosophical origins in the writings of Comte in the nineteenth century, and in the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s. Behaviouralism did not accept all the philosophical arguments of the positivists. At a time when behaviouralism was gaining wide currency, many social scientists subjected positivism to a critical scrutiny, though behaviouralism was strongly influenced by positivism. A behaviouralist, like a positivist, will ascertain the correctness of an explanatory theory. He will evaluate explanatory theories in three ways: internal consistency, consistency with respect to other theories that seek to explain related phenomena, and capacity to generate empirical predictions that can be tested against observation. Only empirical testing can decide between competing theories. It is the stress on empirical observation and testing that characterize the behavioural approach. A behaviouralist systematically compiles all the relevant facts, quantitative and qualitative, for an evaluation of a theoretical statement. Furthermore, behavioural analysis asserts that all scientific theories and/or explanations must in principle be capable of being falsified. This reflects behaviouralism’s commitment to Popper’s revision of traditional positivism, whereby he (a) substituted the principle of falsification for that of verification, and (b) simultaneously identified falsification as the criterion for deciding a scientific from a non-scientific theory. A scientific theory will generate empirical predictions which are capable of being falsified. If they do not do so, they are sophisticated tautologies, elegant and detailed, but unable to explain anything meaningfully. Behaviouralists emphasize that a theory should explain something and should be capable of being tested against observation. In the strict sense, positivists and behaviouralists would rule out normative theories, as they do not contain empirical and definitional statements, for there can be no room for moral arguments which form the core of normative theory. For instance, Lasswell and Kaplan, writing on the classics in political theory, concluded: A rough classification of a sample of 300 sentences from each of the following y ielded these proportions of political philosophy (demand statements and valuation) to political science (statements of facts and empirical hy potheses): Aristotle’s Politics, 25 to 75; Rousseau’s Social Contract, 45 to 55.... Machiavelli’s Prince, by contrast, consisted entirely (in the sample) of statements of political science in the present sense (Lasswell and Kaplan 1952: 118). However, this assumption has been severely criticized by Germino by contending that: Political theory is neither reductionist, behavioural science nor opinionated ideology. It is the critical study of the principles of right order in human social existence (Germino 1967: 6). Brecht observes: Research upon research can be done, and statement can be piled upon statement, on what Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and a hundred others of the great philosophers have thought about values and about what science can do regarding them. There is no end of delight for the scholar, and no end of discovery or rediscovery of deep observations, penetrating arguments, appealing speculations. No relativity need tune down our statements about what others said and what their theories were. Yet what we are dealing with is history— history of ideas, and history of science; it is not science unless we accept their ideas as still scientifically valid today ; and if we do so, it is our responsibility to say how through the old ideas, and through which of them the present crisis in theory can be overcome. Otherwise we merely ignore the problem in a particularly sophisticated manner (Brecht 1965: 11–12). Furthermore, Germino argues that this exercise also has a scientific basis, with roots in internal human experience. It can also be tested and verified. It is based on the Heraclitan doctrine of deep knowing in contrast to much knowing. Sabine also echoed this view. Germino’s emphasis, like M.N. Roy’s (1887–1954) position in radical humanism, is on the centrality of human experience, which includes the ethical, metaphysical and theological dimensions. Any other method for such an enquiry is inadequate, as the basis of political theory-building is experiential, and not strictly experimental. Gandhi’s use of the inner voice to defend an action would meet the approval of this kind of argument. The major tenets of the behavioural credo include the following: 1. Regularities, or uniformities in political behaviour, which can be expressed in generalizations or theory. 2. Verification, or the testing of the validity of such generalizations or theories. 3. Techniques for seeking and interpreting data. 4. Quantification and measurement in the recording of data. 5. Values, as distinguished between propositions, relating to ethical evaluation and those relating to empirical explanation. 6. Systematization of research. 7. Pure science, or the seeking of understanding and explanation of behaviour, before utilization of the knowledge for solution of societal problems. 8. Integration of political research with that of other social sciences (Easton 1965: 7). CRITICISM OF BEHAVIOURALISM Behaviouralism, like positivism, has been criticized for its mindless empiricism. Both Hempel and Popper reject the ‘narrow inductivist view’ of scientific enquiry, whereby they argued that a proper enquiry was possible only if relevant facts were supported by clear minimum theoretical expectations. They dismiss enquiries based on the idea of ‘all the facts up to now’ as irrelevant, for mere fact-gathering could never accomplish much,... “for a collection of all the facts would have to await the end of the world, so to speak; and even all the facts up to now cannot be collected since there are an infinite number and variety of them” (Hempel 1966: 11). Though positivism tried to move away from a narrow, inductivist approach in the 1950s, the scholars working within the behavioural tradition during the same time still remained committed to the inductive method in research. Their emphasis on data, and consequently downgrading of theory, led to two undesirable tendencies within the behavioural persuasion. The first was a tendency to stress on what could be easily measured, rather than what might be theoretically important. The second was a tendency to concentrate on phenomena that were readily observable, rather than study the covert and profound structural factors that contribute to change and stability within the political system. Behaviouralism proclaimed to offer a “value free” and “scientific” theory steering clear of ethical and political bias. They considered a theory good if it was consistent with observation. The shortcomings of behaviouralism, as enumerated by Easton (1997: 15), include the following: 1. A tendency where behaviouralism pursued fundamental rather than applied knowledge, to distance itself from immediate political reality, and neglect the special responsibilities of an intellectual. 2. A conception of scientific method that seemed to direct attention away from human actors and their choices, and towards the conditions that influence and constrain action, resulting, it was claimed, in a subjectless, non-humane discipline, one in which human intentions and purposes played little creative part. 3. The naive assumption that behavioural political science alone was free of ideological presuppositions that might shape its substantive concerns, and its conception of its own methods of inquiry. 4. The uncritical acceptance of a pristine, positivist interpretation of the nature of science, despite much criticism that had already gained credibility even among many of those favourable to the continued use of the scientific method in the pursuit of social understanding. 5. The entrapment in a degree of professionalization that increasingly hampered communication not only with the general public, but even with other disciplines that were no less specialized. 6. An apparent indifference to the resulting fragmentation of knowledge, even in the face of the need for the use of this knowledge to solve whole social problems that, by their nature, are undifferentiated as to discipline. 7. An acknowledged inability to deal with value concerns, to describe the nature of the good society, with the denigration of values to a non-scientific, and therefore, non-confirmable status. Much of this criticism of behaviouralism were made by critics who felt that the movement was ill-conceived and flawed in its conception. They contended that it was not possible to establish regularities in human behaviour, which made it difficult to explain it through the methods of science. According to Germino the meaning of behaviouralism had become elusive. There were many differences within behaviouralism; it was not a monolithic group. Many who were self-styled behaviouralists did not agree with Lasswell for the need to establish a closed society that could be scientifically controlled. They were reticient about the scientific method and began to regard classical political theory appreciatively. Conformity with behaviouralism in the strictest sense would only lead to a closed society, unless there were two changes: One a rejection of rigid reductionism and scientism which may lead to the second, namely a rescue of political theory and restoring it to its former glory. Germino charged behaviouralists like Cobban, Easton and Waldo for their inability to separate normative political theory from political and ideological doctrines and Utopian constructions. He clarified that in criticizing behaviouralism, he was not against empirical research, for the great masters like Aristotle, Machiavelli and Mosca undertook such an approach. What I object to is the tendency among the advocates of a so-called scientific as opposed to a philosophical political science to decapitate political science and to argue that only propositions purporting to refer to or describe ‘empirical’—sensorially observable—facts may be considered part of political science. The neglect of critical standards in terms of which we order and evaluate our data is the principal defect of the new or behavourialist political science. This neglect often leads to the adoption of uncritical standards which do not hold up at all well to theoretical reflection. The rebirth of political theory would not lead to the neglect of empirical research... but to the correction of claims that such studies constitute the whole of political science. Such a rebirth would focus again on the need for elaborating criteria in order to evaluate political behaviour, the importance of paradigm, the crucial question of the highest good and best society for man as man, the dilution of the paradigm for concrete historical conditions, etc. (Germino 1967: 192–93). IS POLITICAL THEORY DEAD? In the middle of the twentieth century, many observers were ready to write an obituary on political theory. Some spoke of its decline (Cobban 1953 and 1960a; Easton 1953). Others proclaimed its death (Laslett 1957; Dahl 1958). One referred to political theory being in the doghouse (Riemer 1962: 1). The major reason for such a dismal view was that the classical tradition in political theory was by and large loaded with value judgements beyond the control of empirical testing. The criticism of normative theory came from the logical positivists in the 1930s, and subsequently from behaviouralists. Easton contends that since political theory is concerned with some kind of historical form, it had lost its constructive role. Political theory as practised by William Dunning, Charles H. McIlwain and George Holland Sabine had declined into “historicism”, for it dissuaded students from a serious study of value theory. In the past, theory was a vehicle whereby articulate and intelligent individuals convey ed their thoughts on actual direction of affairs and offered for serious consideration some ideas about the desirable course of events. In this way they revealed to us the full meaning of their moral frame of reference. Today, however, the kind of historical interpretation with which we are familiar in the study of political theory has driven from the latter its only unique function, that of constructively approaching a valuational frame of reference,.... In the past, theory was approached as an intellectual activity whereby the student could learn how he was to go about exploring the knowable consequences and, through them, the ultimate premises of his own moral outlook.... Scrutiny of the works by American political theorists reveals that their authors have been motivated less by an interest in communicating such knowledge than in retailing information about the meaning, internal consistency , and historical development of past political values (Easton 1953: 234–35). Dunning, in his three volumes entitled A History of Political Theories (1902) set the tone for research in political theory. His training as a historian enabled him to approach political theory primarily as offering problems of historical change, and sought to unfold the role of political ideas in this process. As a result political theory, for Dunning, becomes a historical account of the conditions and consequences of political ideas. He seeks to uncover the cultural and political conceptions of an age and to isolate the influences of these ideas, in turn, on the social conditions (Easton ibid: 238). Easton calls Dunning a historicist, for he deflected political theory from moral consideration and consciously avoided dealing with moral issues in a purely historical context. Dunning perceived political theory as essentially historical as it involved research into issues that arose from observation of political facts and practices. He confined his study to the legal rather than the ethical dimensions of political life, though subsequently his students broadened it to encompass empirical theories of political activity. He regarded moral views as products of caprice, dogmas without justification, hence not worthy of analysis or interpretation. He also neglected the meaning and logical consistency of ideas. McIlwain’s The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) used historical research, for he considered political ideas as an effect rather than an influential interacting part of social activity. Being virtual ciphers in the changing patterns of actual life, ideas can have meaning only as a part of a history of theories in which ideas may condition subsequent ideas, but in which they leave no impact upon action (Easton ibid: 241). The title of McIlwain’s work revealed the historical nature of his study. It tried to show the evolution of ideas in the West on the premise that ideas had a history. It considered ideas as justifying behaviour, though they might influence political activity, in the sense that ideas motivated individuals to act. The influence of ideas was exclusively confined to the domain of ideas. McIlwain felt that the history of ideas had a sense of continuity, which was why it made sense to trace its evolution. Unlike Dunning, who regarded ideas as contributing causally to the process of history, McIlwain focused on the historical contexts from which an idea emerged. … political theory is here construed as a branch of the sociology of knowledge, which deals primarily with the circumstances shaping knowledge as it has varied over time. The task of the political theorist is to show the way in which a social milieu molds and shapes political thought. It is concerned with the exclusively empirical task of uncovering the determinants of ideology (Easton ibid: 244). Unlike Dunning, McIlwain’s work showed respect for moral issues, since a theory was more than mere propositions rooted in observation. He preferred an inclusive history of theory that paid attention to a political idea which justified political practices and institutions. The moral defence was important, for he was particularly concerned with the way human beings defined good political life. The impression that McIlwain’s work gave was that moral issues were worth discussing and endorsing. In spite of the special role he assigned to ideas, he was a historicist, as he was not strongly influenced by moral judgements, the reason being, that he regarded moral standards as unprovable. He contended that in the past, some of the most important assertions remained unproved, because by nature they were unprovable. This made values a matter of personal opinion, representing an emotional response to experience. He believed that moral judgements were subjective and relative, for it was important to affirm one’s moral premises. However, that did not deter him from grappling with one of the issues of moral relativism, namely that if all moral beliefs were results of individual life experiences, then could one claim his belief to be better than that of others? Such an argument would only render discussion of values meaningless, for each could set forth his values, which were as good as those of others. In that case only a historical approach was useful to understanding moral problems. McIlwain would not agree to this reasoning, for he believed in the superiority of his own moral outlook. But the fact that he did not go beyond the historical analysis proved that his historicism, in practice, indicates the firm grip that this interpretation of the consequences of moral relativism has upon his study of political theory.... The fact that McIlwain confines himself to historicism, however, indicates that he has not availed himself of this alternative conception of the meaning of moral relativism (Easton ibid: 248). Sabine’s A History of Political Theory (1937) singularly influenced studies in political theory more than any other book. Like Dunning and McIlwain, Sabine considered the historical study of theory as an appropriate approach to the subject matter. The impression that one got from the book and from a description of his method was “that a historical study of theory provides its own self- evident justification” (Easton ibid: 249). Sabine combined the approaches of both Dunning and McIlwain. Like the former, he believed that political thought was a part of the political process which interacted and influenced social action. With the latter, he thought it was necessary to describe and analyze moral judgements in each theory. Sabine considered moral judgements as determining factors in history and not merely rationalizations of an activity. Moral judgements were not inferior to factual propositions, as Dunning contended. Though Sabine reiterated Dunning in his interpretation of the relation between ideas and action, he differed from the latter in his conception of the nature of the history of political theory, by his emphasis on the role of ethical judgements. For Sabine, every political theory could be scrutinized from two points of view: as social philosophy, and as ideology. As ideology, theories were psychological phenomena, precluding truth or falsity. Theories were beliefs, ‘events in people’s minds and factors in their conduct’ (Sabine 1939: 6–7), irrespective of their validity or verifiability. Theories played an influential role in history, and therefore the task of a historian was to ascertain the extent to which these theories helped in shaping the course of history. A theory had to be examined for its meaning, rather than for its impact on human actions. Viewed in this perspective, a theory comprised two kinds of propositions: factual and moral. Sabine focused on factual rather than moral statements, for the latter precluded descriptions of truth or falsity. He regarded values as reflecting human preferences for ‘some social and physical fact’. They were not deducible from facts, nor could they be reduced to facts. They were not rationally discovered, as they were expressions of emotions. Since political theory advanced some statements of preference, value judgements formed the core of its theory and explained the reason for its existence. The moral element characterized political theory, which was why it was primarily a moral enterprise. In spite of factual propositions within a theory, a political theory on the whole can hardly be true in depicting a particular episode or period. Easton then examines the reasons for the decline of political theory into historicism. First and foremost is the tendency among political scientists to conform to the moral propositions of their age, leading to a loss of the constructive approach. The emphasis is to uncover and reveal one’s values, which implies that there is no longer the need to enquire into the merit of these moral values but merely understand their ‘origins, development and social impact’ (Easton 1953: 257). History is used to endorse existing values. Second, moral relativism is responsible for the attention this theory receives with history. The vital fact about this meaning of relativism is that the description of the conditions surrounding the emergence of moral preference does not by itself necessarily imply any opinion about the merit or demerit of these preferences. It does not demonstrate values to be either equal or unequal in worth. It merely indicates that they are equal in their origins, in the sense that they are each a product of historical circumstances. If we wished, we could of course compare them with regard to other qualities such as their moral worth. This would however be a separate and independent task. To do so we would need first to establish an acceptable moral standard in terms of which vary ing preferences could be compared. But barring agreement on such a standard, two differing value judgments can be said to be neither better nor worse when each stands by the side of the other. They just differ and are incommensurable until some third standard of comparison is adopted (Easton ibid: 261–62). Third, beginning from the latter half of the nineteenth century and till the early part of the twentieth century, there was beyond doubt considerable agreement on values in Western Europe. Sharp differences on ethical questions got diffused. With greater unity in moral perceptions, value theorists focussed more on the history of moral ideas. REVIVAL OF POLITICAL THEORY In the 1930s, political theory remained a study of the history of ideas, particularly with the purpose of defending liberal democratic theory in opposition to totalitarian Communism, Fascism and Nazism. The aims and direction given by Merriam were furthered by Lasswell, who tried to establish a scientific political theory with the eventual purpose of controlling human behaviour. Unlike the classical tradition, scientific political theory would describe rather than prescribe. Political theory in the traditional sense was alive in the works of Arendt, Theodore Adorno (1903–1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), Leo Strauss (1899–1973), Oakeshott, Bertrand de Jouvenal and Eric Vogelin (1901–1985). Their views were diametrically opposite to the broad ideas within American political science, namely its commitment to liberal democracy, faith in science and a faith in historical progress. They also rejected political messianism and utopianism in politics. Arendt’s main focus was on the uniqueness and responsibility of the individual human being with which she initiated her criticism of behaviouralism. She contended that the behavioural search for uniformities in human nature would only contribute towards stereotyping the human being. In The Human Condition (1958), she observed: The unfortunate truth about behaviorism and the validity of its “laws” is that the more people there are, the more likely they are to behave and the less likely to tolerate nonbehaviour. Statistically, this will be shown in the leveling out of fluctuation. In reality, deeds will have less and less chance to stem the tide of behavior, and events will more and more lose their significance, that is, their capacity to illuminate historical time. Statistical uniformity is by no means a harmless scientific idea; it is no longer the secret political ideal of a society which, entirely submerged in the routine of every day living, is at peace with the scientific outlook inherent in its very existence (Arendt 1959: 40). Arendt rejected the idea of hidden and anonymous forces in history. Like other leading figures in the revival of political theory, she also pointed to the essential incompatibility between ideology and political theory. She was aware of the loss of human experience in the modern world and desired a need to recover a sense of dignity and responsible freedom in human action, seeing it as a basis for the revival of political theory. Through the example of Eichmann, the transportation expert manning the trains to the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz, a “perfectly normal man”, she illustrated the difference between responsible action and efficient automatic behaviour. Oakeshott’s main theoretical achievement was his philosophical analysis of experience, which attempted to resurrect the multidimensionality that was denied to experience by positivism and ideology. Oakeshott understood experience to be a concrete whole with different kinds of “modes”. The modes constituted “arrests” in experience, and only from the perspective of philosophy whose purpose was to identify each mode and define its relationship with other aspects of experience. In Experience and its Modes (1933), he identified four principal modes of, or arrests in, experience: history, science, practice and poetry. Science concerned itself with measurement and quantification, history with the past, practice with an act of desiring and obtaining, and poetry with imagination and contemplation. Oakeshott did not define philosophy, other than indicating it to be an activity undertaken in discoursing upon experience and its modes. When philosophizing, one left the tight model islands of incomplete experience and charted the “open sea of experience”. He conceded that philosophy could not serve as a guide for practical life for it was not “clear-sighted, not for those who are fashioned for thought and the arduous of thought, who can lead the world. Great achievements are accomplished in the mental fog of practical experience. What is farthest from our needs is that kings should be philosophers” (Oakeshott 1933: 320-21). Philosophy served truth. It was not determined by its historical setting. Though its place and time was important, the key question remained: could it maintain what it asserted? Oakeshott did not distinguish between subject and object, fact and value. He distrusted any accepted route or pattern which explained his skepticism of rationalism, with its efforts at systematization and categorization. The process of politics and the very basis of rationalist enquiry were incompatible and mutually exclusive. He rejected the contention that philosophy could learn from the methods of science. The understanding of politics as an empirical activity is, then, inadequate because it fails to reveal a concrete manner of activity at all. And it has the incidental defect of seeming to encourage the thoughtless to pu

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