Democracy - Janaki Srinivasan PDF

# Chapter 7: Democracy ## Janaki Srinivasan ### Chapter Outline - Introduction - 107 - The Concept - 107 - Direct Participatory Democracy - 109 - Liberal Democracy - 111 - Objections to Democracy - 116 - Perspectives on Democracy - 118 - Key Debates in Democratic Theory - 124 - Conclusion - 128 - P...

# Chapter 7: Democracy ## Janaki Srinivasan ### Chapter Outline - Introduction - 107 - The Concept - 107 - Direct Participatory Democracy - 109 - Liberal Democracy - 111 - Objections to Democracy - 116 - Perspectives on Democracy - 118 - Key Debates in Democratic Theory - 124 - Conclusion - 128 - Points for Discussion - 128 ## Introduction The concept of democracy is at the center of fierce debates in political theory, as well as in commonplace discussions on politics. This chapter examines the ways in which democracy has been conceptualized, defended, and critiqued. It discusses the evolution of democracy as a concept, the various criticisms leveled against the concept, followed by perspectives and debates in contemporary democratic theory. It concludes with some of the key debates which characterize democratic theory today. Consider situations in your everyday life where you are part of a group, and decisions have to be made for the group as a whole. For example, is it a group of friends deciding if they should watch a movie, or a family deciding where to go for a vacation? Suppose that, among a group of ten friends, seven want to see a movie, but three want to go for an art exhibition. What should the group decide to do? Consider another situation where a university class has been asked by their teacher to arrive at a convenient date for having a class debate. In this class of thirty, everyone is agreed on a date except for five students. However, these five have important and unavoidable reasons why that particular date is not convenient for them. What should the class do? Should it go by the decision of the majority? But doing so will deprive those five students from the chance to take part in the debate. Would that be a fair decision? Now, suppose the class has to decide on the topic of the debate. The number of opinions and suggestions made increase manifold, and decision making becomes that much more difficult. In all such situations of collective existence, there is a constant need to arrive at common decisions. Who takes these decisions, and how? How do we judge whether these decisions are fair or the best possible? The idea of democracy provides one basis for making such judgements. *A democratic decision is one that takes into account and reflects the wishes of the people who come under the purview of that decision*. Moreover, there are, of course, other ways to make decisions. A father can decide where the family will go for a vacation without taking the opinion of other family members, or a teacher can give no choice to the students on the topic or the date for the class debate. However, advocates of democracy argue that a decision-making procedure which reflects a commitment of taking into equal consideration the preferences of members of the concerned group/s is a legitimate one. *Democracy is, thus, both a method to arrive at collective decisions and a set of values and behavior with which people approach decision making*. ## The Concept How should a political community then arrive at collective decisions? In other words, who should rule? What should be the principle guiding *government formation*, and what are the institutional arrangements required for this purpose? *Democracy* is now the universally accepted answer to this question. The charge of being called 'undemocratic' is taken seriously now. However, this positive value accorded to democracy is recent in history. For a long time, it was associated with ‘mob-rule' and inefficient governments. The term democracy translates as 'rule by the people.' Who are the 'people', and how do they rule? What matters? To what extent? Through what institutions? To secure which goals? Is this a desirable arrangement? There are varied views on the nature, purpose, extent, effectiveness, and desirability of democratic rule, as well as varied critiques on the practice of functioning democracies. Indeed, democracy is often called an 'adjectival concept' because of the endless number of 'types' or 'models' into which democracies are classified. For example, liberal, social, people's, direct and indirect, radical, associational, deliberative, strong and weak, procedural and substantive, pluralist and elitist; the list goes on. Before we examine some of these debates, let us briefly discuss the concept, and look at the various theories and types in the light of their differences and areas of consensus. At the heart of all democratic theories is the concept of *popular power*. According to Anthony Arblaster (1994), it refers to a situation where power and authority ultimately rest with the people. A democratic government is contrasted with an authoritarian one where decisions are imposed on the people and exercised without their consent. Democracy ensures the accountability of those holding power to the people who are the ultimate source of that power. It is the consent of the people which makes government authority legitimate. How is this consent to be given? This question of consent immediately connects with that of participation. How much participation is desirable? In a *direct democracy*, there is a high degree of participation, as citizens collectively decide, often through mass meetings, on almost all major issues. In effect, people rule themselves. This form of democracy is associated with the classical Athenian model. In India, the gram sabha is such an institution of direct democracy, as are a number of devices like referendum, initiative, and recall practised in contemporary societies. In contrast, in an *indirect* or *representative democracy*, government functions through representatives who are chosen through popular elections. These representatives provide a link between the governments, and the people. Elections allow the people to control the action of the representatives, and prevent abuse of power. *Liberal democracy* is a representative form of government. While these two methods are seen in opposition to each other, we shall see in the last section how contemporary debates on the question of participation seek to combine the two. Democracy refers to a government based on political equality. That is, consent is required of all the individuals who form part of the political community. It is informed by the belief that all people are equally capable of, and have a stake in, making collective decisions that shape their lives. In a democracy, no one person's opinion or interest is of more value than the other. Therefore, the principle of ‘one person one vote.' It is based on the idea of the equal moral worth of all individuals, and against the exclusion of anyone from the political process. Thus, it is against hierarchy and inherited privileges, and discrimination. Today, when we say 'the people' we usually refer to all adult citizens in a polity. This was not always so, and a long struggle was waged by hitherto excluded groups demanding the *right of suffrage*. From being initially restricted to the property-owning *white* men in Europe and America, eventually educated *men*, working-class *white* men, *black* men and *women* (in that order) were subsequently recognized as full citizens with the right to vote, and contest elections. Meanwhile, in the colonies of Asia and Africa, democratic struggles took on a specifically *anti-colonial* character and the peoples of colonies like India claimed the *right of self-government* as a people In a *democracy*, it is assumed that there will be a diversity of opinions and interests on almost every matter of common concern. Indeed, this diversity is seen as its main strength, and it calls for tolerance for all shades of opinion. A democratic society is also called an 'open society' where there is space for all voices, however unpopular or conventional they may be, to be heard. This requires a range of political freedoms, like freedom of expression, association, and movement among others, which are protected by the state. People must have access to *information*, and be able to protest and freely *criticize* the government and others in order to make informed uncoerced choices, and intervene in the decision-making process. Thus, the practice of *democracy* is unthinkable without *rights*. But do these freedoms by themselves ensure that all voices are in fact heard, and heard equally? Equal distribution of *political power*, however, does not mean that everyone manages to have equal influence on the decision-making process. Is it the same for an influential industrialist and a poor farmer, or a slum-dwelling labourer to have the right to vote? Do they have equal influence on policy making? For *democracy* to be effective, then those factors which discriminate against sections of people and hinder their effective intervention in collective decision making *need* to be addressed. The presence of *structures of power* that are sources of inequality in a society are an impediment *to democracy*. *Equality*, thus, is a condition of *democracy*, and democratic societies are expected to devise arrangements which further equality. What is the nature of a *democratic decision*? There has been much debate on this. As a *conflict-resolution model*, *democracy* is often identified with *majority rule*, and this raises the problem of oppression of minorities. On the other hand, democracies are expected to arrive at a *consensus*. However, in plural and complex societies that are also unequal, *consensus* is difficult to achieve. We will see in the last section how these very *issues* of equality, participation, representation, and *diversity* pose important questions and are the concerns of contemporary democratic theory. Before that, we will now examine the two main models of democratic practice, namely, the direct participatory *model* and the liberal democratic models. Later, we examine some of the major critiques of democratic practice. ## Direct Participatory Democracy The most celebrated form of direct participatory *democracy* was the one practised in the Athenian city-state of ancient Greece during the 5th and 4th centuries BC. Athenians prided themselves on the 'happy versatility' of citizens, and their ability to perform all tasks of *governance*. This meant enacting, implementing and adjudicating of laws. They met in open assemblies, to debate and deliberate on all matters and shared magisterial and judicial offices. All major decisions were made by the assembly to which all citizens belonged. Citizens were also meant to sit on juries and adjudicate on disputes. Offices were filled by either election or draw of lots, and no officer was to enjoy perpetual tenure. The idea was to ensure that at least the short-term offices went to as many people as possible. What is remarkable in this model is that it ensured a high level of *political accountability* and *political activity* of the citizen. Indeed, *citizenship* entailed participation; It was a sacred duty and the full-time occupation of the citizen. The purpose of *political participation* was the *common good* of the state. This *common good* was independent of, and prior to, individual interests and desires. It is when citizens set aside their private interests, completely *identify* with the community, and give it their best that common good can be achieved. The underlying philosophy was that there was a single, shared, substantive idea of good life for the whole community; the separation between state and society did not exist. Participation in the collective affairs of the community was considered important for the rational self-development of the citizens; it was the highest form of good life that they could hope to achieve, fulfill themselves, and live honourably. *Republican Rome* shared some features of Athenian democracy, namely, the notion of popular participation in civic life, a strong sense of duty to the community, the idea of public good, and civic virtue as being of higher value than private individual interests. This is also called *civic republicanism*. *Rousseau*, an early critic of liberal democracy, was heavily inspired by this model. Writing in the 18th century, Rousseau was critical of electoral democracy and representative mechanisms which were emerging in various European states. For Rousseau, democracy was the way by which citizens could achieve freedom. By freedom he did not mean the absence of constraints on the individual's pursuit of self-interest. Instead, he articulated a *positive notion* of freedom. (See Chapter 3 on *liberty* for the distinction between *negative* and *positive freedom*.) Individuals are free only when they participate directly, actively, and continuously in shaping the life of the community, especially in the making of laws. For him, *law-making* was an exercise of *sovereignty* (which cannot be transferred, or represented by anyone else) and an expression of the *will* of the people. For Rousseau, participation was essential for the *self-development* of the individual, and democracy was a means of individual development, but not the pursuit of selfish interests. Rousseau made a distinction between *private will* and what he called 'general will.' *General will* is not an aggregation of private will, or interests of individual citizens. Instead, general will is that which emerges when people set aside their selfish interests, and deliberate on the collective common good of the community. Freedom lies in obedience to the general will, by doing so they are obeying their own true nature. Rousseau goes to the extent of saying that people can be 'forced to be free', i.e. obey the general will. Such conceptions of *participatory self-governance*, active *citizenship*, and community life have been an attractive one for all those critical of liberal democracy. Socialists, feminists, radical, and *deliberative democrats* have drawn on this legacy. However, the very conditions in which this model has been practised provides a note of caution. The successful operation of the Athenian democracy depended on a system of exclusivity and *inequality*. Only citizens were worthy of the good life, and a majority of the population—women, slaves, and resident aliens—were kept out of citizenship. Indeed, it was on the basis of their labour and economic activities that the free adult male could be freed for citizenship. *Aristotle*, even as he was critical of *democracy*, justified this denial of political equality to women, and slaves both on the grounds of necessity, and the latter's *natural inferiority*. (We shall examine Plato and Aristotle's critique of democracy in a later section.) Rousseau, too, explicitly kept out women from *political participation*. He argued that women were primarily meant to perform *sexual* and *domestic* roles, and their public presence would be a distraction. Rousseau did, however, consider a certain measure of *economic equality* essential for the *exercise* of citizenship. For any renewal of strong and active participation, a society has to work out a balance between the satisfaction of material needs and political participation in a framework which treats all adults equally. A further point of debate is whether present societies can work with a single notion of common good, which can be oppressive, not just to individual freedom, as liberals fear, but also to the diverse groups and cultures which comprise most societies. In other words, a participatory system is seen to put pressure on attaining homogeneity. Rousseau's theory, as we observed, has *totalitarian implications*. ## Liberal Democracy Today, when we talk of *democracy*, we often have what is known as *liberal democracy* in mind. It is the dominant form of democracy, as most countries seen to practice this *model* in one form or the other. However, it is important to remember that liberal democracy is a product of a long history, and it contains many strands. ### Protective Democracy For early liberals, *democracy* was meant to be protective, in the sense that it was meant to protect the rights of citizens, and safeguard them from the tyranny of state power. The 'liberal' element in *liberal democracy* preceded the democratic element, and has shaped its nature. Liberalism emerged in the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In this process, the newly emerging bourgeoisie/middle class sought to put limits on the absolute powers of the monarchs and the *feudal aristocracies* in European states from the 16th century onwards. (See the chapters on Liberalism and the State.) Underlying this challenge to *absolute* and *unaccountable power* is the new doctrine of *individualism*. According to this notion, all individuals are free and autonomous, masters of themselves, and makers of their own destiny. Individuals are primarily rational and *self-interested* beings, intent on pursuing their desires and goals. Each individual has his/her own preferences, values, and goals. That is, *his/her own conception* of a good life. What individuals require are the basic conditions to pursue these *self-defined* goals. Liberals identify these conditions as *rights*, namely, of life, liberty, and property, which are fundamental and inviolable in nature. What binds individuals to each other is a common interest in protecting these rights, which would allow them the maximum freedom for free exchange among themselves. The emergence of liberalism is linked to that of capitalism, and market society. That is why property is understood as a fundamental right. An individual's property is considered an extension of the self, and an individual is the *master of his/her* own self. According to liberal thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, individuals *do not* derive their identity from the community and are not bound to it by any sense of duty, nor do they see themselves as part of a hierarchical system or a divine plan. Thus, liberalism's lasting contribution to political thought is a radical notion of equality among human beings. This view on human nature meant a re-conceptualization of the role and purpose of *government*. Liberals make a distinction between the state and civil society, or the public and the private life of individuals. The public realm is the realm of politics; this is where they are bound to take collective decisions. The *economy*, family, associations, etc., are part of *civil society*, the realm where individuals interact with each other in the *pursuit* of their interests. This is the realm of competition, conflict, and cooperation among them. In order to resolve these conflicts that a regulated framework is required. Thus, the role of the government is to *create* and *maintain* a system of *individual rights*, and undertake activities to that end. The coercive power of the state is required to ensure that individuals in their interaction with each other in a civil society *do not* encroach on each other’s rights. Governments were not meant to arrive at *or promote* a common good, since individuals *do not* share a substantive notion of *good life.* The state is a *neutral arbiter*; it is *not* supposed to interfere in the functioning of *civil society*. At the same time, liberals share a deep *fear* that governments will abuse this power and encroach on these rights. Liberals were giving voice to the struggle by the *bourgeoisie* to unshackle the restrictions of feudal, and aristocratic authority. In other words, there is need for a strong but limited government. Moreover, among free and equal individuals any institution of authority over them *requires* their consent, otherwise it will be illegitimate. Thus, there is need for a mechanism *through which people* can consent to a government, and retain control over it to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to it, and restrain it from exceeding its limits. This is where liberals turn to *democracy* as a solution. Liberals advocate a *representative democracy*. The task of governance requires expertise, but those in power must be made accountable. *Political participation* is not considered a good in itself, like in Athenian democracy, but a means to control the government, and ensure the protection of individual liberties. Through franchise and competitive elections, individuals choose representatives, who then form governments on the majority principle. *Political decisions* can be made *only* by these representatives, because they are the *only* ones enjoying the consent of the people. This ultimate authority of the people is affirmed, and people can keep a check on the representatives through periodic elections. The *powers* and *tasks* of the government are defined *through* the constitution, especially by including within the provision of *fundamental rights*, and through the principle of *rule of law*, and the presence of an *independent judiciary* (for example, the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution and the Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution). The *separation of powers* among different branches of government is meant to provide a system of checks and balances, preventing the concentration of power. Even though the model of representative democracy was based on the principle of equality, in early liberal democracies *franchise*, or political equality was in effect restricted to a few. They were more in the nature of oligarchies. Early liberals were as *fearful* of the 'tyranny of the masses' as they were of the tyranny of state power. *Locke*, *James Mill*, *Madison*, and *Montesquieu* were all opposed to universal franchise. For example, *John Locke*, who was the first to articulate the key ideas of *liberal democracy*, *restricted franchise* to property owners, defended property as a 'natural' right, as well as the unequal distribution of property, and modified his powerful notion of consent to mean 'active' consent of the propertied and 'tacit' consent of the rest. Even *John Stuart Mill*, who supported *universal adult franchise* and was among the first to support enfranchisement of women, sought to restrict the right to vote to those with basic educational qualifications, and desired provisions for giving extra votes to educated, and better qualified individuals. It was feared that if vested with political freedoms, the majority would not use their right to vote responsibly, but would overturn the distribution of (unequal) property in society. In *Indian courts*, a series of cases came up after the adoption of the *Constitution*, which challenged the *land redistribution* policies of the government as being violations of the *fundamental right* to property. *Understood as popular rule* without the restrictions of *individual rights*, *democracy*, thus, becomes a threat to liberty. There is a *conflict* between the 'liberal' and 'democratic' components. It was in the aftermath of the *French*, and the American *Revolutions* that popular democratic struggles emerged. The 19th and 20th centuries were marked by increasing and often *violent struggles* by the working class, *African Americans*, and women, demanding the extension of suffrage on the basis of the very ideas of *individualism* that had been invoked by the *propertied male* to win freedom from *aristocracies*, and monarchies. The implicit radical potential of the notion of *individualism*, rights and equality was realized by these struggles. It is only with this acceptance of *universal adult franchise* that *liberal democracy* acquired its current form. ## John Stuart Mill and Developmental Democracy Predominantly, liberal democracy is concerned with the *protection of individual rights* and prevention of *abuse of power*. Participation in this context is of value because it allows the individual to put forward his/her interests and keep a check on the activities of those in positions of power. It is of no intrinsic value in terms of the *self-development* of the individual. James Mill controversially claimed that since individuals find political activity a distraction *from* the pursuit of self-interest, *franchise* need not be extended to those whose interests are subsumed under those of others. Not *only* did he exclude women in this way, but also men under the age of 40, whose fathers could represent their interests. The views of John Stuart Mill, known as the best advocate of *liberal representative democracy*, present a contrast to this. For Mill, a *representative system* must create maximum space for people to take part in the functioning of the government, and not restrict their involvement by merely allowing them to vote. He *considered* participation important because it develops the confidence of the people in their ability to govern themselves. Mill, *thus, understood democracy as a system which allows for the development of an individual’s personality*. It develops the intellectual talents of people and is the best condition for liberty to flourish. Participation makes informed, and intelligent debate possible. It is through thorough debate, and discussion, where there is space for rational persuasion of each other, that the best argument emerges and this helps in solving the problems affecting the whole community. This is why he *regarded* the parliament as the forum where all kinds of opinion should find a space and be vigorously debated. Mill *considers* a measure of socio-economic *equality* as necessary for democracy, and liberty to be actualized. Despite his insistence on the value of participation, he was sceptical of the capability of every citizen to govern and considered governance a task requiring expertise. He sought to balance this by recommending *maximum participation* at the local level so that people get educated in the task of governance. In the next section, we shall see how he suggested institutional measures to counter the ills of democracy. ## Policy Making and the Pluralist View *Decision making* in a liberal democracy is an outcome of the *aggregation* of individual preferences or choices. In a *protective model*, these choices are aggregated *over the choice* of government personnel, and *not* over *the activities* of the government. That is, the vote and electoral processes allow people to choose, or reject, a representative, or a political party, *but not* to determine *what* policies the government *should* undertake. This is because *protective democracy* offers minimal scope to government activity. However, as the functions and activities of the *government increased*, the *focus* turned to the policy-making process itself. Utilitarian thinkers like *Bentham* and *James Mill* propounded the principle of 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' (see the chapter on *liberty*) as the basis of determining functions of the government. While they advocated *minimal government* and *free market*, they did make space for selective state intervention in the *economy* for welfare activities, like education, and wage reforms. But the idea that government policies must reflect the aggregate choices of the majority became important for *liberal democracies*. The welfare state model of liberalism assigns more tasks to the government in the economy, and these tasks, like the provisions for social security, education, regulation of industry, and making employment opportunities available, are justified in the name of democracy. *John Rawls*, for example, justifies extensive intervention in the economy to provide equality of opportunity to all (for more details see chapter on justice), but most liberals are sceptical of extensive redistribution of wealth. How do people influence policy? The pluralist theory provides an answer. The pluralist view, associated with the work of *Robert Dahl*, is a specifically *American understanding* of political processes, but still has relevance for understanding liberal democratic practice in general. Power, according to Dahl, is the capacity to influence ... the process and outcome of *decision-making*. People form groups, and associations based on their specific interests; so in any society there will be a wide variety of interest groups. *Interest* or *pressure groups* are the mechanisms that people adopt in order to advance their interest, promote their causes, and achieve preferred policy outcomes. For example, *kisan sabhas*, teachers, and students' unions, women's organizations, trade unions, associations of industries like FICCI, or CII *in India*, and The policy making arena is like *the market*, where different groups pursue their interests, and the outcomes are not pre-determined, *but* a balance is achieved out of conflicts; through a sort of an ‘*invisible hand*’ mechanism. Political decision making is a complicated process and involves bargaining between various actors. In the process, people use a wide range of means at their disposal like economic, and social position, education, organization skills, reputation, religion, etc. Unlike elitist, and Marxist views, *pluralists understand power* as *not* concentrated in a particular class, but as spread throughout society. It is a democracy that provides opportunities for everyone to articulate interests, mobilize *support*, and seek representation. A vigorous *interest group* activity keeps the wielders *of political power* in check. *Democracy* here is identified with certain institutional *mechanisms* and procedures, representative institutions, *accountability* of the executive to elected assemblies, *basic liberties* for all including the freedom of expression, and organization, and an independent judiciary. As long as these *procedures* are followed, a system can be referred *to as being democratic*. This is also called *procedural democracy* as distinguished from a *substantive democracy*; the latter is concerned with the attainment of certain ends, like equality, or justice. The chief merit of the pluralist analysis is that all modern democracies *do have* a plurality of forces struggling, and competing for their interests. However, *procedural democracy* is compatible with the results which are always skewed in favor of particular interests, and groups. Social and economic inequalities *reduce* the opportunity of disadvantaged groups to influence policy outcomes. Thus, an agricultural landless labourer's collective effort cannot hope to match CII or FICCI either in resources or in influence. In his later writing, Dahl does acknowledge the fact that inequalities *can be* debilitating, and consistently leave certain groups *out* of the political process, despite the formal freedoms of a democracy, in which every citizen has the right to participate in *the decision-making* process. Thus, there are structural and ideological constraints which *prevent* democracies from operating *as an* *open*, equal marketplace of competing interests. In this process, the *existence* of *democratic procedures* and its openness to conflicting views, interests, and methods of influence *is valuable* for a democracy, but *the outcomes are liable to be undemocratic*. Thus, in the liberal view, the aim of *democracy* is to aggregate individual choices, and preferences in the best possible way. This *aggregation* of choices could be restricted to *the choice* of government (by voting for a representative who usually belongs to a *political party*) or should constitute a mechanism of policy making. In the first view, the role of *democracy* *is to basically provide* a defence *against arbitrary* and *unaccountable government through elections and constitutional government*. In the second view, *democracy* has a more direct link with choosing, and influencing the activities of the *government*. This is usually done through a wide range of interest groups, political parties, and pressure groups. Today, *liberal democracy* is both at a moment of triumph and crisis. On the one hand, the collapse of the communist block, introduction of liberal democratic institutions in the former communist countries, as well as the military *intervention of the USA* in West Asia to introduce democratic regimes signal its *near universal acceptance* as the *only* practical model of government. Indeed, the key ideas, and institutions of *liberal democracy* like representative governments, *rule of law*, *individual rights*, *electoral competition*, and *multi-party system* have become central to any conception of democracy. *Francis Fukuyama* in his 'end of history' thesis argues that there is no *credible alternative* to *liberal democracy*. On the other hand, *liberal democracy continues* to be subjected to a scathing critique by socialists, feminists, multiculturalists, and deliberative *democrats* for *not being democratic enough*, and these critiques have sharpened in the context of *globalization*. They observe how the form of *liberal democracy* currently advocated is *minimalist*, or *what Benjamin Barber calls a ‘weak democracy’,* emphasizing elections, and a choice of political parties. Before we examine these critiques, *let us look* at *some of the common objections to democracy*. ## Objections to Democracy Critics of *democracy* can be classified into two groups those who are dissatisfied with a *particular kind* of democratic practice, and seek to *deepen* it, and those who are critical of *the democratic principle* as such. We have *observed* how the *positive value* attached to *democracy* is a recent one in history. The very principle *of popular power continues* to be subjected to trenchant critiques. *Let us examine* the *main objections* to *democracy*. A key objection to *democracy* is that it produces *incompetent* and *inefficient governments*. In his critique of Athenian democracy, *Plato argues* that governance is a matter of skill, and *expertise*, and therefore should be left to experts. Human beings *are by* *nature fundamentally* unequal. However, democracy *presumes* that every-one *can handle* complex matters of *governance*, and is, therefore, based on a *false understanding* of *human nature*. Thereby, it substitutes ignorance and incompetence for excellence, and expertise. Because it allows non-experts to rule, democracy is *an irrational form* of government. He recommended a strict division of tasks *depending* on one's ability. Matters of the state would thereby be left to a particular class of people *who by nature* and training *were most fit* to *rule*, whom he called 'philosopher-kings.' To rule meant ensuring that everybody else performed tasks they were most fit for. A distinction is made here between popular rule, and public interest, whereby governments are *prevented* from functioning in *public interest*, and taking strong purposive action due to the compulsions of *democracy*. In India, for example, *democracy* is often blamed for the ills afflicting the country. Common middle-class assessments blame the government for following 'populist' policies (and not ‘correct', or 'rational' policies), *like* *providing slum-dwellers with ration cards because of* the compulsion to seek votes. *A deep fear* and *distrust of the masses* runs *through* the history of *democracy.* *Aristotle in his classification* of governments placed *democracy as an ‘impure’ system* where the *multitude rule* in their own interest. As already *observed, early liberals* were sceptical of mass suffrage and considered *political equality* a threat to liberty. *Constitutionalism*, and an elaborate system of checks and balances were devised to prevent *majoritarianism*. Writing in the 19th century in the context of the emerging democratic society in Europe, and America, *Tocqueville* coined the phrase 'tyranny of the majority' to describe the threat that *democracy posed* to minorities, and individual liberty. He particularly feared its *cultural repercussions*. Since the cultural standards of the majority are dominant, general morals, manners, and creativity are often debased in a *democracy*. For example, when Bollywood films are discussed, a distinction is often made between films for the ‘masses’ and those for the ‘classes’, or between ‘popular’ and 'art' films. Even *J. S. Mill* for all his defence of democracy and political participation, considered majoritarianism and mediocre *government* as the biggest weaknesses of *democracy*. Not only does majoritarianism *exclude minority voices,* but it lowers the *standards of the government*. Subsequently, people with a lower level of intelligence perform the most important task of *legislation*, and administration. Mill suggested a number of *institutional mechanisms* to counter these ills. Through *proportional representation*, *minorities* can obtain a place in the *legislative assembly,* and, through *plural voting*, educated, and intellectually superior individuals can have more say in the choice of representatives. He was particularly *concerned about the opinion* of minorities the experts, and the geniuses—who get sidelined when the majority principle is applied. *Majority rule* has a tendency to promote uniformity, and conformity, whereas the main catalysts of progress are the non-conformist geniuses. This system of plural voting, in fact, violates the basic democratic principle *of political equality.* He also recommended a *separation* of the *tasks of government*, wherein the all-important task of *law formulation* would *be done* by an expert *constitutional committee*, and the administrative tasks were to be carried out by a skilled bureaucracy. The task of the representative assembly was to debate, and deliberate on the legislation, and to monitor *the functioning* of the *government*. Mill's philosophy, thus, combines a *value for participation* and *equality* (which is unique among liberal thinkers) *with elitism*, where *governance* is seen as the task of the educated, and the experts. Moreover, despite his *egalitarianism*, he *did not* recommend *representative governments* for colonies like *India*. *Democracy* was possible *only* in 'civilized' countries and not in 'barbaric' ones and, therefore, despotic rule was suitable *till* the time the people of the colonies were ready, and capable of democracy. While Plato and Mill draw attention to the dangers of majority rule, *elite theorists* consider a *functioning democracy* impossible because of *the inevitability of concentration of power*. While Mill, and Plato among others are elitist *in their views*, *elitist theory* is attributed to a specific critique developed by *Pareto*, *Mosca*, *Mills*, and *Michels* about the inevitability of elite rule. Classical elite theorists like *Pareto*, and *Mosca* say that *political power in every society* has always been in the *hands of a minority*, the elite, which has ruled over the majority in its own interest. These elite manage to dominate because they possess exceptional skills, *especially* the *psychological attributes* and *political skills* of manipulation, and coercion. They are *far better organized* than the masses and *also possess* qualities which are considered valuable, and hence *use it* to justify their privileged *position* in the *society*. *C. Wright Mills‘* study of the American political system refers to a ‘*power elite*’ which dominated executive power, and members of this class were closely knit, sharing the same background and common values. Thus, they dispute the *pluralist contention* that power is widely distributed in *society*. In his study of socialist parties, *Michels* noted how despite socialist principles, the actual working of the decision-making process tended to *concentrate power* in the leadership due to bureaucratization and centralization. Not only did the leaders not consult *the working-class members*, the decisions taken were often contrary to *their interests*. This led *Michels* to postulate *an ‘iron law of oligarchy’* which applied to all organizations *resulting in undemocratic outcomes*. In India, we note the wide prevalence of *dynastic rule*, and the involvement of all *members* of a family in politics. This phenomenon is observed in almost all countries and *is an evidence* of the tendency of concentration of power among a few who *have access* to the political system. The merit of these critiques lies insofar *as they* expose the *myths* of *democratic practice* by exposing who *actually wields power*. But in considering this *concentration of power* *as inevitable*, these critiques affirm a belief *in the* natural inequality among human beings, and are pessimistic in nature. In this view, the value of *democracy*, given the inevitability of elite rule, is