Cognitive Development in Early Childhood PDF

ne rainy morning, as we observed in our laboratory preschool, Leslie, the children's teacher, joined us at the back of the room I for a moment. "Preschoolers' minds are such a curious blend of logic, fantasy, and faulty reasoning," Leslie reflected. "Every day, I'm startled What's Ahead in chapter 9...

ne rainy morning, as we observed in our laboratory preschool, Leslie, the children's teacher, joined us at the back of the room I for a moment. "Preschoolers' minds are such a curious blend of logic, fantasy, and faulty reasoning," Leslie reflected. "Every day, I'm startled What's Ahead in chapter 9 Piaget*s Theory: The Preoperational Stage by the maturity and originality of what they say and do. Yet at other Advances in Mental Representation Make-Believe Play Sym bol-Rea I-Wo rid Relations * Limitations of Preoperational Thought * Follow-Up Research on times, their thinking seems limited and inflexible.” Leslies comments sum up the puzzling contradictions of early childhood cogni­ tion. That day, for example, 3-year-old Sammy looked up, startled, after a loud crash of thunder outside. “A magic man turned on the thunder'” he pronounced. Even when Leslie patiently explained that thunder is caused by lightning, not by a person turning Preoperational Thought * Evaluation of the Preoperational Stage * Piaget and Education it on or off, Sammy persisted: "Then a magic lady did it.” In other respects, Sammy’s thinking was surprisingly advanced. At snack time, he accurately counted, “One, two, three, four!” and then got four cartons of milk, one SOCIAL ISSUES: EDUCATION for each child at his table. Sammy’s keen memory and ability to categorize were also Children's Questions: Catalyst for Cognitive Development evident. He could recite by heart The Vtry Hungry Coterp/T/or, a story he had heard many times. And he could name and classify dozens of animals. Vygotsky's Sociocultural Theory But when his snack group included more than four children, Sammy’s counting Private Speech « Social Origins of Early Childhood Cognition * broke down. And some of his notions about quantity seemed as fantastic as his under­ standing of thunder. After Priti dumped out her raisins, scattering them in front of her, Vygotsky and Early Childhood Education Evaluation of Vygotsky's Theory Sammy asked, “How come you got lots, and II only got this little bit?" He didn't realize that he had just as many raisins; his were simply all bunched up in a tiny red box. While Priti was washing her hands after snack, Sammy put her remaining raisins in her CULTURAL INFLUENCES cubby. When Priti returned and looked for her raisins, Sammy pronounced, “You know Children in Village and Tribo/ Cultures Observe and Participate where they are!" He failed to grasp that Priti, who hadn't seen him move the raisins, in Adu/t Work would expect them to be where she had left them. Information Processing In this chapter, we explore early childhood cognition, drawing on three theories Attention Memory Problem Solving The Young Child’s Theory of Mind Early Literacy with which you are already familiar. To understand Sammy’s reasoning, we turn first to Piaget's and Vygotsky's theories along with evidence highlighting the strengths and limitations of each. Then we examine additional research on young children's cognition and Mathematical Development inspired by the information-processing perspective. Next, we address factors that con­ BIOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT tribute to individual differences in mental development—the home environment, the Autism and Theory of Mind quality of preschool and child care, and the many hours young children spend with Individual Differences in Mental Development electronic media. Our chapter concludes with the dramatic expansion of language in Early Childhood Intelligence early childhood. Tests Home Environment and Mental Development Preschool, Kindergarten, and Piaget's Theory: The Preoperational Stage Child Care Educational Media Language Development Vocabulary Grammar Conversation Supporting Language Learning in Early Childhood As children, move from the sensorimotor to the preoperational stage* which spans the years 2 to 7* the most obvious change is an. extraordinary increase in representa­ tional or symbolic* activity. Recall that infants and toddlers have considerable ability to mentally represent their world. In early childhood* this capacity blossoms. I 311 312 CHAPTERS Cognitive Development in Early Childhood 9.1 Descri be adva nces in mental representation, and limitations of Advances in Mental Representation thinking, during the preoperational stage. Piaget acknowledged that language is our most flexible means of mental representation. By detaching thought from action, it permits far more efficient thinking than was possible earlier. When we think in words, we overcome the limits of our momentary experiences. We can deal with past, present, and future at once and combine concepts in unique ways, as when we imag­ ine a hungry caterpillar eating bananas or monsters flying through the forest at night. But Piaget did not regard language as a primary ingredient in childhood cognitive change. Instead, he believed that sensorimotor activity leads to internal images of experience, which children then label with words (Piaget, 1936/1952). In support of Piaget's view, recall from Chapter 6 that children's first words have a strong sensorimotor basis. And toddlers acquire an. impressive range of categories long before they use words to label them (see page 219). But as we will see, Piaget underestimated the power of language to spur childrens cognition. 9.2 What does follow-up research imply about the accuracy of Piaget's preoperational stage? 93 What educational principles can be derived from Piaget's theory? Make-Believe Play Make-believe play is another excellent example of the development of representation in early childhood. Piaget believed that through pretending, young children practice and strengthen, newiy acquired representational schemes. Drawing on his ideas, several investigators have traced changes in make-believe play during the preschool years. DEVELOPMENT OF M AKE-BELI EVE One day, Sammy’s 20-month old brother, Dwayne, visited the classroom. Dwayne wandered around, picked up a toy telephone receiver, eyed his mother, said, "Hi, Mommy," and then, dropped it. Next, he found a cup, pretended to drink, and then toddled off again. Meanwhile, Sammy joined Vance and Lynette in the block area for a space shuttle launch. "That can be our control tower," Sammy suggested, pointing to a corner by a bookshelf. "Countdown!” he announced, speaking into his "walkie-talkie"— a small wooden block. "Five, six, two, four, one, blastoff!” Lynette made a doll push a pretend button, and the rocket was off! Comparing Dwaynes pretend play with Sammy’s, we see three important changes that reflect the preschool child's growing symbolic mastery: LOOK and LISTEN Observe the make-believe play of several 2- lo 4-year olds al home or hi a preschool or child­ care center. Describe pretend acts thal exemplify important developmental changes. PZay dctadies/rotti the mil-life conditions dissociated with if. In early pretending, toddlers use only realistic objects—a toy telephone to talk into or a cup to drink from. Their earli­ est pretend acts usually imitate adults actions and are not yet flexible. Children younger than age 2, for example, will pretend to drink from a cup but refuse to pretend a cup is a hat (Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2005). They have trouble using an object (cup) that already has an obvious use as a symbol of another object (hat). After age 2, children pretend with less realistic toys—for example, a block for a telephone receiver. Gradually, they can imagine objects and events without any support from the real world, as Sammy's imaginary control towrer illustrates (O’Reilly, 1995; Striano, Tomasello, & Rochat, 2001). And by age 3, they flexibly understand that an object (a yellow stick) may take on one fictional identity (a toothbrush) in one pretend game and another fictional identity (a carrot) in a different pretend game (Wyman, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2009). Piety becomes Jess se?y-cenfered. At first, make-believe is directed toward the self. For exam­ ple, Dwayne pretends to feed only himself. Soon, children begin to direct pretend actions toward objects, as when a child feeds a doll. Early in the third year, they become detached participants, making a doll feed itself or pushing a button to launch a rocket (McCune, 1993). Make-believe becomes less self-centered as children realize that agents and recipi­ ents of pretend actions can. be independent of themselves. Piety fnc/udies more complex combmations ofsdremes. Dwayne can pretend to drink from a cup, but he does not yet combine drinking writh pouring. Later, children combine schemes with those of peers in sociodramatic play, the make-believe with others that is under wray by the end of the second year and that increases rapidly in complexity during early child­ hood (Kavanaugh, 2006a). Already, Sammy and his classmates can create and coordinate several roles in an elaborate plot. By the end of the preschool, years, children have a sophis­ ticated understanding of role relationships and story lines. CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood 313 Children as young as age 2 display awareness that | make-believe is a representational activity. They distinguish | make-believe from real experiences and grasp that pre- | tending is a deliberate effort, to act out imaginary ideas— an. understanding that strengthens over early childhood J (Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004; Sobel, 2006). TAKE g A MOMENT..,. Listen closely to preschoolers as they S assign roles and negotiate plans in sociodramatic play: “Kju pretend to be the astronaut, J7I act itfce I’m operating the control tower!” "Wait, I gotta set up the spaceship.” hi com­ municating about pretend, children think about their own and others’ fanciful representations—evidence that they have begun to reason about people's mental activities, a topic we will, return to later in this chapter. B E N E F ITS 0 F MA K E-B E LI EV E Today Piaget’s view of make-believe as mere practice of representational schemes is regarded as too limited. Play not only reflects but also Makc-bclicvc play increases in septi isticalion during the preschool years. Children contributes to children’s cognitive and social skills. Socioincreasingly coordinate make-believe rolesand pretend with less realistic lays. These dramatic play has been studied most thoroughly. Com­ children ‘drive," using plastic dower pl ales as steering wheels. pared with social nonpretend activities (such as drawing or putting puzzles together), during sociodramatic play preschoolers’ interactions last longer, show more involvement, draw more children into the activity, and are more cooperative (Creasey, Jarvis, & Berk, 1998). It is not surprising, then, that preschoolers who spend more time in sociodramatic play are rated by observers as more socially competent a year later (Lindsey & Colwell, 2013). And many studies reveal that make-believe strengthens a wide variety of cognitive capacities: sustained attention, inhibiting impulses, memory, logical reasoning, language and literacy (including story comprehension and storytelling skills), imagination, creativity, and the ability to reflect on. one’s own thinking, regulate one's own behavior, and take another’s perspective (Berk & Meyers, 2013; Buchsbaum et al., 2012; Carlson & White, 2013; Mettweiler & Taylor, 2014; Nicolopoulou & Ilgaz, 2013; Roskos & Christie, 2013). Between 25 and 45 percent of preschoolers and young school-age children spend much time in solitary make-believe, creating iffiqgmaity companions—special fantasized friends endowed with humanlike qualities. For example, one preschooler created Nutsy and Nutsy, a pair of boisterous birds who lived outside her bedroom window and often went along on. family outings (Gleason, Sebanc, & Hartup, 2000; Taylor et al., 2004). Imaginary companions were once viewed as a sign of maladjustment, but research challenges this assumption. Chil­ dren with an invisible playmate typically treat it with care and affection and say it offers caring, comfort, and good company, just as their real friendships do (Gleason & Hohmann, 2006; Hoff, 2005). Such children also display more complex and imaginative pretend play, are advanced in understanding others’ viewpoints and emotions, and are more sociable with peers (Bouldin, 2006; Gleason, 2013; Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Trionfi & Reese, 2009). Applying What We Know on. page 314 lists ways to enhance preschoolers’ make-believe. Later we will return, to the origins and consequences of make-believe from an alternative pe rspective—that of Vygotsky. Symbol-Real-World Relations In a corner of the classroom, Leslie set up a dollhouse, replete with tiny furnishings. Sammy liked to arrange the furniture to match his real-world living room, kitchen, and bedroom. Representations of reality, like Sammy’s, are powerful cognitive tools. When we understand that a picture, model, or map corresponds to something specific in everyday life, we can use these tools to find out about objects and places we have not experienced. In Chapter 6, we saw that by the middle of the second year, children grasp the symbolic function of realistic-looking pictures (such as photos). When do children comprehend scale 314 CHAPTERS Cognitive Development in Early Childhood -Applying What We Know Enhancing Make-Believe Play in Early Childhood STRATEGY DESCRIPTION Provide sufficient space and play materials. Generous space and materials allow tor many play optionsand reduce conflict. Encourage children s play without coni rolling it. Model, guide, and build on young preschoolers' play themes. Provide open-ended suggestions [for example, “Would the animals like a train ride?"], and talk with the child about the thoughts, motivations, and emotions ot play characters. These torms of adult support lead to more elaborate pretending. Refrain from directing the child's play; excessive adult control destroys thecreativrty and pleasure of make-believe. Ctffcr a variety ol both realistic materials and materials without dear functions. Children use realistic materials, such as trucks, dolls, lea sets, dress-up clothes, and toy scenes Ensure that children have many rich, real-world experiences to inspire positive fantasy play. Opportunities to participate in real-world activities with adults and to observe adult roles in the comm unity provide children with rich social knowledge to integrate into make-believe. Restricting television viewing, especially programs with violent content, limits the degree to which violent themes and aggressive behavior become part of children s play. [Sec Chapter 10, pages 381-383.) Help children solve social conflicts constructively. Cooperation is essential lor sociodrama tic play. Guide children toward positive relationships with agemates hy helping them resolve disagreements constructively. For example, ask, "What could you do il you want a turn?" 11 the child cannot think ot possibilities, suggest options, and assist the child in implement ing them. [house, farm, garage, airport Io act out everyday roles in their culture. Materials without clear functions - such as blocks, cardboard cylinders, paper bags, and sand} inspire fantastic role play, such as "pirate" and "creature from outer space/ ______________________________________________________________________________________ Ii UUN B SUMGI Source!.: Nielsen i Christie, ItJlifl. Weinberg el al., 201 J. models as symbols for real-world spaces? In one study,. 2&- and 3-year-olds watched an adult hide a small toy (Little Snoopy) in a scale model of a room and then, were asked to retrieve it. Next, they had to find a larger toy (Big Snoopy) hidden, in the room that the model repre­ sented. Not until, age 3 could most children use the model as a guide to finding Big Snoopy in the real room (DeLoache, 1987). The 214-year-olds did not realize that the model could be both a toy room and o symbol oj dHorher room. They had trouble with dual representation—viewing a symbolic object as both, an object in its own right and a symbol­ in support of this interpretation, when researchers made the model room less prominent as an object, by plac ing it behind a window and preventing children from touching it, more -year-olds succeeded at the search task (DeLoache, 2002). Recall, also, that in make-believe play, 1 to 2-year-olds cannot use an object that has an obvious use (cup) to stand for another object (hat). Likewise, most 2-year-olds do not yet grasp that a line drawing—an object in its own right—also represents real-world objects (see page 304 in Chapter 8). Similarly, when presented with objects disguised in. various ways and asked what each "looks like” and what each "is really and truly,” preschoolers have difficulty. For example, when asked whether a stone painted to look like an egg is '"really and truly” an egg, children younger than, age 6 often responded "yes” (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1987). Children who experience a variety of symbols come to understand dual representation— But simplify these dappenmucc-rcu/ity tasks by permitting for example, that this doll house is both an object in its own right and can stand lor another, a full-sized house that people live in. children to solve them nonverbally, by selecting from an. CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood 315 array of objects the one that "really* has a particular identity, and most 3-year-olds perforin well (Deak, Ray, & Brenneman, 2003). They realize that an object can be one thing (a stone) while symbolizing another (an egg). Howr do children, grasp the dual representation of symbolic objects? When adults point out similarities between models and real-world spaces, 2 W-year-olds perform better on the find-Snoopy task (Peralta de Mendoza & Salsa* 2003). Also, insight into one type of symbolreal-world relation helps preschoolers master others. For example, children, regard realisticlooking pictures as symbols early, around 1 Vi to 2 years, because a picture's primary purpose is to stand for something; it is not an interesting object in its own right (Simcock & DeLoache, 2006). And 3-year-olds who can use a model of a room to locate Big Snoopy readily transfer their understanding to a simple map (Matzo If & DeLoache* 1994). In sum* exposing young children to diverse symbols—picture books, photographs* draw­ ings, make-believe, and maps—helps them appreciate that one object can. stand for another. With age, children, come to understand a wide range of symbols that have little physical similar­ ity to what they represent (Liben, 2009). As a result, doors open to vast realms of knowledge. Limitations of PreoperationalThought Aside from gains in representation* Piaget described preschoolers in. terms of what they ca/iHOf understand. As the term preoperational suggests, he compared them to older, more competent children who have reached the concrete operational stage. According to Piaget, young chil­ dren are not capable of npemrioHS—mental representations of actions that obey logical rules. Rather, their thinking is rigid, limited to one aspect of a situation at a time* and strongly influ­ enced by the way things appear at the moment. EGOCENTRIC AND ANIMISTIC THINKING For Piaget, the most fundamental deficiency of preoperational thinking is egocentrism ^failure to distinguish the symbolic viewpoints of others from one's own. He believed that when children first mentally represent the world* they tend to focus on their own viewpoint and assume that others perceive, think, and feel the same way they do. Piagets most convincing demonstration of egocentrism involves his tftree-moMrttatws proMem, described in Figure 9.1. He also regarded egocentrism as responsible for preoperational children's animistic thinking—the belief that inanimate objects have lifelike qualities, such as thoughts, wishes, feelings* and intentions (Piaget, 1926/1930). Recall. Sammy's insistence that someone must have turned on the thunder. According to Piaget* because young children egocentrically assign human purposes to physical events* magical thinking is com­ mon during the preschool, years. Piaget argued that preschoolers egocentric bias prevents them from or reflecting on and revising their faulty rea­ soning in response to their physical and social worlds. To understand this shortcoming, let’s consider some additional tasks that Piaget gave to children. INABILITY TO CONSERVE Piaget’s famous conservation tasks reveal several deficiencies of preoperational thinking. Conservation refers to the idea that certain physical characteristics of objects remain the same, even when their outward appearance changes. At snack time, Sammy and Priti had identical boxes of raisins, but when Priti spread her raisins out on the table, Sammy was convinced that she had more. In another conservation task involving liquid, the child is shown twro identical tall glasses of water and asked if they contain equal FIGURE 9*1 Piaget's three-mountains problem. Each mou ntain is distinguished by its color and by its summit. One has a red cross, another a small house, and the third a snow-capped peak. Children at the preoperational stage respond egocentrically. They cannot select a picture that shows the mountains from the doll's perspective. Instead, they simply choose the photo that reflects their own vantage point. 316 CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood Conservation Task Original Presentation Transformation Number Are there the same number of pennies in each row? Now are there the same number of pennies in each row, or does one row have more? ® ® $®®®® £ ® ® ® ® Mass Is there the same amount of clay in each ball? Ob. o. L'Quid Now does each piece have the same amount of clay, or does one have more? O Is there the same amount New does each glass have the same amount of water, or does one have more? Does each of the two balls of clay weigh the same? Now (without placing them back on the scale to confirm what is correct for the child) do the two pieces of clay weigh the same, or does one weigh more? FIGURE 9.2 Some Piagctian conservation tasks. Children at t he preoperational stage cannot yet co itserve. These tasks are mastered gradually over the concrete aperationaJ stage. Children in Western nations typically acquire conser­ vation of number, mass, and liquid sometime between S and 7years and conservation of weight between 8 and 10 years. - - A/ta Blue flowers Flowers amounts. Once the child agrees, the water in one glass is poured into a short, wide container, changing its appearance but not its amount. Then the child is asked whether the amount of water is the same or has changed. Preoperational children, think the quantity has changed. They explain, “There is less now because the water is way down here” {that is, its level is so low) or, "'There is more now because it is all. spread out” Figure 9.2 illustrates other conservation tasks that you can try with children. The inability to conserve highlights several related aspects of preoperational childrens thinking. First, their understanding is centered, or characterized by centratiom They focus on one aspect of a situation, neglecting other important features. In conservation of liquid, the child centers on the height of the water, failing to realize that changes in width compensate for the changes in height. Second, children are easily distracted by the perceptual appearance of objects. Third, children treat the initial and final states of the water as unrelated events, ignoring the dynamic trans/brmatton (pouring of water) between them. The most important illogical feature of preoperational thought is its irreversibility-an inability to mentally go through a series of steps in a problem and then reverse direction, returning to the start­ ing point. Reitersibdity is part of every logical operation. After Priti spills her raisins, Sammy cannot reverse by thinking, “I know Priti doesn't have more raisins than. 1 do. If we put them back in that little box, her raisins and mine would look just the same." ww Red flowers FIGURE 9 + 3 A Piagctian class inclusion problem. Children are shown 16 flowers, 4 of which are blue and 12of which are red. Asked, "Are there more red Howers or flowers?" lhe preoperational child responds, “More red Howers," failing to realize that both red and blue flowers a re included in lhe calegory "flowers." LACK OF HIERARCHICAL CLASSIFICATION Preoperational chil­ dren have difficulty with hierarchical classification—the organiza­ tion of objects into classes and subclasses on the basis of similarities and differences. Piaget's famous class mdus/on problem, illustrated in Figure 9.3, demonstrates this limitation. Preoperational children, center on the overriding feature, red. They do not think reversibly, moving from the whole class (flowers) to the parts (red and blue) and back again. CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood 317 Follow-Up Research on PreoperationalThought Over the past three decades, researchers have challenged Piaget s view of preschoolers as cog­ nitively deficient. Because many Piagetian problems contain unfamiliar elements or too many pieces of information for young children, to handle at once, preschoolers’ responses often do not reflect their true abilities. Piaget also missed many naturally occurring instances of effec­ tive reasoning by preschoolers. Let's look at some examples. EGOCENTRIC. ANIMISTIC, AND MAGICAL THINKING Do young children really believe that a person standing elsewhere in a room sees exactly what they see? When researchers use simplified tasks with familiar objects, 3-year-olds show clear awareness of others vantage points, such as recognizing how something looks to another person wrho is looking at it through a color filter (Moll. & Meltzoff, 2011). Even 2-year-olds realize that what they see sometimes differs from what another person sees. When asked to help an. adult look for a lost object, 24-month-olds (but not 18-month -olds) handed her a toy resting behind a bucket that was within their line of sight but not the adult’s {Moll & Tomasello* 2006). Nonegocentric responses also appear in young children's conversations. For example, preschoolers adapt their speech to fit the needs of their listeners. Four-year-olds use shorter, simpler expressions when talking to 2-year-olds than to agemates or adults (Gelman & Shatz, 1978). And in describing objects, children do not use such words as "big” and "little’’ in a rigid, egocentric fashion. Instead, they iidjusr their descriptions to allowr for context. By age 3, chil­ dren judge a 2-inch shoe as little when seen by itself (because it is much smaller than most shoes) but as big for a tiny 5-inch-tall doll (Ebeling & Gelman, 1994). In. previous chapters, we saw that toddlers have already begun, to infer others intentions and perspectives. And in. his later wTitings, Piaget (1945/1951) did describe preschoolers ego­ centrism as a tendency rather than an inability. As we revisit the topic of perspective taking, wre will see that it develops gradually throughout childhood and adolescence. Piaget also overestimated preschoolers’ animistic beliefs. Even infants have begun to dis­ tinguish animate from inanimate, as indicated by their remarkable categorical distinctions among living and nonliving things (see Chapter 6, page 219). By age 2Vi, children give psy­ chological explanations ("he likes to” or “she wants to”) for people and other animals but rarely for objects (Hickling 8c Wellman, 2001). And 3- to 5-vear-olds asked whether a variety of animals and objects can eat, grow, talk, think, remem­ ber, see, or feel mostly attribute these capacities to animals, not objects. In addition, they rarely attribute biological proper­ ties (like eating and growing) to robots, indicating that they are well aware that even a self-moving object with lifelike fea­ tures is not alive. But unlike adults, preschoolers often say that robots have perceptual and psychological capacities—for example, seeing, thinking, and remembering (Jipson 8c Gelman, 2007; Subrah manyam, Gelman, & Lafosse, 2002). These responses result from incomplete knowledge about certain objects, and they decline with age. Similarly, preschoolers think that magic accounts for events they otherwise cannot explain, as in Sammy’s magical explana­ tion of thunder in. the opening to this chapter. But their notions of magic are flexible and appropriate. For example, older 3-yearolds and 4-year-olds think that violations of physical laws (walk­ ing through a wall) and mental laws (turning on the TV just by thinking about it) require magic more than violations of social conventions (taking a bath with shoes on) (Browne & Woolley, 2004). And they are more likely to say that a magical process­ Three- la S-year-alds distinguish between animate and inanimate and wishing—caused an event (an object to appear in a box) when a realize, lor exam pie, that a robot with lifelike features can not cat or grow. person made the wish before the event occurred, the event was But because of incomplete knowledge, they often claim that robots haw consistent with the wish (the wished-for object rather than perceptual and psychological capacities, such as seeing, thinking, and remembering. another object appeared in the box), and no alternative causes 318 CHAPTERS Cognitive Development in Early Childhood were apparent (Woolley. Browne. & Boerger, 2006). These features of causality are the same ones preschoolers rely on in ordinary situations. Between, ages 4 and 8. as children gain familiarity with physical events and principles, their magical beliefs decline. They figure out who is really behind Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy, and they realize that magicians feats are due to trickery (Woolley & Cornelius. 2013). And increasingly children say that events in fantastical stories couldn’t really happen and that characters in such stories aren’t real. (Woolley & Cox. 2007). Still, because children entertain the possibility that something they imagine might materialize, they may react with anxiety to scary stories. TV shows, and nightmares. Religion, and culture play a role in children's fantastic and supernatural ideas. For example, Jewish children are more likely than their Christian, agemates to express disbelief in Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy. Having heard at home that Santa is imaginary, they seem to gener­ alize this attitude to other unseen agents (Woolley 1997). And cultural myths about wishing— for example, the custom of making a wish before blowing out birthday candles—probably underlie the conviction of most 3- to 6-year-olds that by wishing, you can sometimes make your desires come true (Woolley 2000). In actuality, both children and adults endorse natural and supernatural accounts of hard-to-ex plain, events, with these types of explanations coexisting. Children, however, prefer natural over supernatural explanations, even in cultures that strongly endorse supernatural beliefs (Woolley, Cornelius. & Lacey. 2011). In. one study, researchers asked 5- to 15-year-olds living in South African communities where witchcraft beliefs were widespread to explain wily certain people got AIDS (Legare & Gelman. 2008). Children of all ages—even 5-year-olds— more often gave biological explanations (contact with a sick person, exposure to germs) than, bewitchment explanations (a neighbor cast a spell). Bewitchment accounts increased in middle childhood, as children acquired their culture's belief system, but they did not replace biologi­ cal explanations. And children mentioned witchcraft as a cause of serious illness far less often than, did adults! LOOK and LISTEN Try the conservation ol number and mass tasks in Figure 9.2 with a 3- or 4-yearold. Next, simplify conservation of number by redu cing I he number of pennies, and relate conservation of mass lo the child's experience by pretending the clay is baking dough and transforming iil iinlo cupcakes. Did the child perform more competently? £ LOGICAL THOUGHT Many studies showr that when preschoolers are given tasks that are simplified and made relevant to their everyday lives, they do not display the illogical, char­ acteristics that Piaget saw in. the preoperational stage. For example, when a conservation-ofnumber task is scaled down to include only three items instead of six or seven. 3-year-olds perform well (Gelman, 1972). And when preschoolers are asked carefully worded questions about what happens to substances (such as sugar) after they are dissolved in water, they give accurate explanations. Most 3- to 5-year-olds knowr that the substance is conserved—that it continues to exist, can be tasted, and makes the liquid heavier, even though it is invisible in the water (Au. Sidle. & Rollins. 1993; Rosen & Rozin, 1993). Preschoolers’ ability to reason about transformations is evident on other problems. They can engage in impressive reasoffin# nnfl/ogy about physical changes. When presented with the picture-matching problem "Play dough is to cut-up play dough as apple is to.. even 3-year-olds choose the correct answer (a cut-up apple) from a set of alternatives, several of which (a bitten apple, a cut-up loaf of bread) share physical features with the right choice (Goswrami. 1996). These findings indicate that in familiar contexts, preschoolers can. overcome appearances and think logically about cause and effect. Finally, even without detailed biological or mechanical knowledge, preschoolers realize that the insides of animals are responsible for certain cause-effect sequences (such as willing oneself to move) that are impossible for nonliving things, such as machines (Gelman. 2003. Keil & Lockhart. 1999). Preschoolers seem to use illogical reasoning only when they must grapple with unfamiliar topics, too much information, or contradictory facts that they cannot reconcile. CATEGO RIZAT10 N Despite their difficulty with Piagetian class inclusion tasks, pre schoolers organize their everyday knowledge into nested categories at an early age. By the beginning of early childhood, children’s categories include objects that go together because of their com­ mon function, behavior, or natural kind (animate versus inanimate), challenging Piaget’s assumption that preschoolers’ thinking is wholly governed by perceptual appearances. CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood 319 Indeed, 2- to 5-year-olds readily draw appropriate inferences about non- J observable characteristics shared by category members. For example* after being told that a bird has warm blood and that a stegosaurus (dinosaur) has cold g blood, preschoolers infer that a pterodactyl (labeled a dinosaur) has cold blood, even though it closely resembles a bird (Gopnik & Nazzi, 2003). And when f shown a set of three characters—two of whom look different but share an inner £ trait (“outgoing”) and two of whom look similar but have different inner traits (one “shy” one "outgoing")—preschoolers rely on. the trait category not physical appearance, to predict similar preferred activities (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). Nevertheless, when most instances of a category have a certain perceptual property ( such as long ears), preschoolers readily categorize on the basis of per­ ceptual features. This indicates that they flexibly use different types of infor­ mation to classify, depending on the situation (Rakison & Lawson* 2013). And past experiences influence which information they decide to use. When NativeAmerican 5-year-olds growing up on the Menominee Reservation in northern Wisconsin were compared with 5-year-olds growing up in Boston, the Menomi­ nee children, often used relations in the natural world to categorize animals. For example, they grouped together wolves and eagles because of their shared forest habitat (Ross et al., 2003). The Boston children, in contrast* mostly relied on common features of the animals. During the second and third years, and perhaps earlier* childrens catego­ ries differentiate. They form many bnsic-fewef categories—ones at an inter medi­ ate level of generality, such as "chairs,” “tables,” and "beds.” By the third year, children easily move back and forth between basic-level categories and general These l-year-olds. understand! Shat a category rdlinasaurs’j can be based an underlying characteristics rcold-blaaded"), categories* such as “furniture.” And they break down, basic-level categories into nal just: on perceptual features such as upright pasture and suiicotegortes, such as “rocking chairs” and “desk chairs.” scalv skin. Preschoolers’ rapidly expanding vocabularies and general knowledge sup­ port their impressive skill at categorizing* and they benefit greatly from conver­ sations with adults, who frequently label and explain categories to young children. When adults use the word bird for hummingbirds, turkeys, and swans* they signal to children that something other than physical similarity binds these instances together (Gelman* 2003* 2006; Gelman & Kalish, 2006). Picture-book reading is an especially rich context for understand­ ing categories. In conversing about books with their preschoolers* parents provide informa­ tion that guides childrens inferences about the structure of categories: "Penguins live at the South Pole, swim, catch fish, and have thick layers of fat and feathers that help them stay warm.” Furthermore, as the Social Issues: Education box on page 320 indicates* young chil­ dren ask many questions about their world and generally get informative answers, which are particularly well-suited to advancing their conceptual understanding. In sum, although preschoolers’ category systems are less complex than those of older chil­ dren and adults, they already have the capacity to classify hierarchically and on the basis of nonobvious properties. And they use logical, causal reasoning to identify the features that form the basis of a category and to classify new members. Evaluation of the Pre ope rational Stage Table 9.1 on page 321 provides an overview of the cognitive at tainments of early child hood just considered. TAK E A MOMENT.,.,. Compare them with Piagets description of the preopera­ tional child on pages 315=316. The evidence as a whole indicate s that Piaget was partly wrong and partly right about young childrens cognitive capacities. When given simplified tasks based on familiar experiences, preschoolers show the beginnings of logical thinking. How can we make sense of the contradictions between Piagets conclusions and the findings of recent research? That preschoolers have some logical understandings that strengthen, with age indicates that they attain logical operations gradually. Over time, children rely on increasingly effective mental (as opposed to perceptual) approaches to solving problems. For example* children, who 320 CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood Social Issues: Education Children’s Questions: Catalyst for Cognitive Development ad, what's that?" asked 4-year-old Emily as her father chopped vege­ of children's questions is related to their cognitive development. Al a tables for dinner. *lt's an onion," her father said. time when vocabulary is advancing rapidly, about 60 percent of 114- *lsan onion a fruit?" Emily asked. to 2-year-olds' questions ask for *lt's a vegetable," her father replied. “A root vegetable because it grows underground.* names of objects. With age, pre­ schoolers increasingly ask about Emily wrinkled her nose. “Why does it smell yucky?* function i‘*What's it do?*), activity fWhal's he doing?"!, state (“Is she *1 don't know," her father admitted. “But after dinner we can look it up online and find out." hungry?*), and theory of mind (“How does the pilot fcoow where When young children converse with adults, to fly?*). they ask, on average, more than one question per minute’ Do inquisitive children like Emily really Context also makes a difference. Compared with everyday situations, want answers to their many questions? Or are they—as their parents sometimes conclude— a visit to a zoo elicits many more questions about biological informa­ merely clamoring for attention? tion from 2- to 4-ycar-olds: “Why is An analysis of diaries that parents diverse in SES and ethnicity kept of their children s ques­ the lion sleeping?* “Is he dead?" “What do bats eat?" “Will the baby tions and of audio recordings of parent-child interactions revealed that at every age between lion grow bigger?" Biological questions calling for explanations increased with age as 3- and frequently get “mechanism" explanations (The switch allows electricity to reach the light bulb"}. 1 and 5years, 70 to 90 percent of children's questions were i nformation-secki ng (“What's 4-year-olds tried to make sense of such processes as growth, life, illness, and death—concepts they In non-Western village cultures, young chil­ dren engage in question asking jiust as often as that [pointing to a crawfish]?**) as opposed to are currently grappling with and that will soon their Western counterparts, but they rarely ask non-information-seeking (“Can I have a cookie?"} advance (see page 4 IB in Chapter 11}. The usefulness of children's questions why-questions, aimed at getting explanations. As we will sec later in this chapter, preschoolers depends on adults' answers. Most of the lime, parents respond informatively. Il they do not, in village societies arc included in nearly all aspects of family and community life, reducing and explanations (“What do crawfish eat.?* “Why preschoolers often express dissatisfaction [Frazier, their need to ask adults to explain (Gauvain, docs it have daws?*). By age 316, these sets of “building questions" made up about half of chil­ Gelman, & Wei man, 2009). And they can be Munroe, & Beebe,2012}. In contrast, Western amazingly persistent, asking again until they get children's explanatory questions arc important dren's questions, confirming that preschoolers ask questions purposefully, to obtain clarifying the information they want. Especially for 1- and 2-year-olds, parents often respond with addi­ for acquiring the wide-ranging knowledge needed information about things that puzzle them. Answers to children's questions provide them tional relevant knowledge aimed at enhancing children's understanding and guiding further which children cannot directly experience. □early, asking questions is a major means with the precise knowledge they need at the thinking. Parents also adjust the complexity of through which Western children strrve to attain precise moment they need it. Even before chil­ dren can talk, they ask questions by gesturing their answers to fit. their children's maturity (Ca Hanan & Oakes, 1992}. To a question like adultlike understandings. Children's questions offer parents and teachers a fascinating window at objects in their environment. A pointing ges­ ture, for example, might lead a parent to say, “Why docs the light come on?" 3-year-olds typi­ cally get simpler, "prior cause" explanations into their factual and conceptual knowledge, along with a wealth of opportunities to help That's a ball. Set, it. bounces^" And the content (“I turned on the switch"!. Slightly older children them learn. (Chouinard, 2007). And from, age 2 on, children increasingly built, on their fact-oriented questions with lollow-up questions that asked for causes Preschoolers' questions are oiten purposeful efforts to understand things that puzzicthcm. Because adults' answers provide the pre­ cise knowledge children need at the precise moment they need! it, question-asking is a powerful source of cognitive development. to make sense of their complex world, much of cannot use counting to compare two sets of items do not conserve number. Rather, they rely on perceptual cues to compare the amounts in two sets of items (Rouselie, Palmers, & Noel, 2004). Once preschoolers can. count, they apply this skill to conservation-of-number tasks involving just a few items. As counting improves, they extend the strategy to problems with more items. By age 6, they understand that number remains the same after a transformation in. the length and spacing of a set of items as long as nothing is added or taken away (Halford & Andrews, 2011). Consequently, they no longer need to count to verify their answer. Evidence that preschool children can be trained to perform well on Piagetian problems also supports the idea that operational thought is not absent at one point in time and present at another (Ping & Goldin-Meadow, 2008; Siegler & Svetina, 2006). Children who possess some understanding would naturally benefit from training, unlike those with no understanding at CHAPTER 9 Cognitive Development in Early Childhood 321 TABLE 9*1 Some Cognitive Attainments of Early Childhood APPROXIMATE AGE COGNITIVE ATTAINMENTS 2-4 years Shows a dramatic, increase in representational activity, as reflected in the development ol language, makebelieve play, understanding of dual representation, and categorization Takes the perspective of others in simplified, familiar situations and in everyday, face-to-face communication Distinguishes animate beings from inanimate objects; prefers natural over supernatural explanations tor events Grasps conservation, notices translormations, reverses thinking, and understands many cause-and-eficct relationships in simplified, iamiliar situations Categorizes objects on the basis of common function, behavior, and natural kind as well as perceptual features, depending on contract; uses inner causal features to categorize objects varying w idely in external appearance Sorts familiar objects into hierarchically organized categories 4—7 years Becomes increasingly aware that make-believe (and other thought processes; are representational activities Replaces beliefs in magical creatures and events with plausible explanations Passes Piaget sconservation of number, mass, and liquid problems all. The gradual development of logical operations poses a serious challenge to Piagets assump­ tion of abrupt change toward logical reasoning around age 6 or 7. Does a preoperational stage really exist? Some no longer think so. Recall from Chapter 6 that according to the informationprocessing perspective, children work out their understanding of each type of task separately, and their thought processes are basically the same at all ages—just present to a greater or lesser extent. Other experts think that the stage concept is still valid, with modifications. For example, some rheonsfs combine Piaget's stage approach with the information-processing emphasis on task-specific change (Case. 1998; Halford & Andrews. 2011). They believe that Piagets strict stage definition must be transformed into a less tightly knit concept, one in. which a related set of competencies develops over an. extended period, depending on brain development and specific experiences. These investigators point to findings indicating that as long as the complexity of tasks and children's exposure to them are carefully controlled, chil­ dren approach those tasks in similar, stage-consistent ways. (Andrews & Halford. 2002; Case & Okamoto. 1996). For example, in drawing pictures, preschoolers depict objects separately, ignoring their spatial arrangement (return to the drawing in Figure 8.9 on. page 304 for an example). In. understanding stories, they grasp a single story line but have trouble with a main, plot plus one or more subplots. This flexible stage notion recognizes the unique qualities of early childhood thinking. At the same time, it provides a better account of why. as Leslie put it, "Preschoolers’ minds are such a blend of logic, fantasy, and faulty reasoning."