Conceptualizing The Arab Spring 2nd Half Notes PDF
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These notes provide an overview of the Arab Spring, examining its causes, defining the term, and discussing the long-term effects on the Middle East. It considers various factors, including political corruption, economic inequality, and social unrest. The notes also include a brief historical context.
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10/24: Conceptualizing the Arab Spring What’s in the name? ○ The term “Arab Spring” has emerged as a commonly-used concept to identify a long series of protestations — mostly peaceful but some violent — designed to change the political situation in the Arab wo...
10/24: Conceptualizing the Arab Spring What’s in the name? ○ The term “Arab Spring” has emerged as a commonly-used concept to identify a long series of protestations — mostly peaceful but some violent — designed to change the political situation in the Arab world through revolution or reform. It erupted in December 2010 in Tunisia and lasted for a long time in numerous Middle Eastern countries. Even today we see the impact/continuation of the A.S. in different settings. ○ The meaning: Marc Lynch of GW argues that he coined the term (Foreign Policy, 1/2011) Many think it is too positive/optimistic/Orientalist It hints at other “Springs” — 1848, 1968, 1989 — and revolutions Are these comparisons useful? Or damaging? Alternatives to “Spring” — Revolution, uprising? It was a pro-democratic revolt of the masses against the “regime.” It failed, but in the long run? Main causes of the Arab Spring ○ Authoritarian regimes, based on dictatorial/familial/military rule ○ Political fraud (sham elections, nepotism) and glaring economic inequality ○ Increasing poverty (middle class decline), hunger, rising unemployment ○ Rise of prices of basic foods & energy ○ Unsuccessful transformation from Arab Socialism to Neo-Liberalism ○ Food insecurity: Drought and economic collapse ○ The internet, social media, globalization ○ Revolution of dignity (human development) ○ IP: the Arab Spring is a multivariate phenomenon (constellation of factors) Examples of the main factors leading to the Arab Spring ○ Mubarak passing his rule to his son: “Monarchical Republicanism” ○ Special status to military; undemocratic; arbitrariness of internal security ○ Extreme and increased poverty: Wheat prices rose 2.5x from 2002 to 2010 ○ Civil society institutions and free press destroyed — Arab Spring as an alternative ○ Islamization as a unique way to maintain some power beyond the regime ○ Globalization and unprecedented information dissemination expose regime’s weakness ○ Loss of hope for peaceful change ○ Lack of social/economic mobility ○ Pressure on young people — unemployment — who tend to be most connected and “internationalized” ○ The Liberal Factor — educated and urban elements within society The Arab Spring as a Revolutionary Wave ○ There was a “wave”: one country influenced others (“domino effect”), TV impact; similar factors such as religion, language, and culture ○ Social networking facilitated communication across the world/region ○ BUT, the character of the Spring was different in different countries — peaceful in Tunisia/Egypt, violent in Syria/Yemen. Some regimes acted violently, some did not. ○ Diverse agendas of the participants: (1) Reforms by the regime; (2) change in the regime itself; (3) overthrow the regime (=Revolution) ○ Ideological diversity Islamism, Statism, Liberal Democracy ○ Lack of unified, effective leadership ○ Eventually, the Arab Spring did not succeed in its main goal, democratizing the Arab World 10/29: A Historical Perspective on the Arab Spring A broad, theoretical-historical perspective on the Arab Spring ○ The Arab Spring is usually read from 2 major perspectives: (1) current/contemporary events; (2) Western perspectives (democracy, constitutionalism, etc.) ○ Both are too narrow — we need a longer-term, historical, non-Western perspective in order to understand the Arab Spring from within the region (Weber’s “verstehen”) ○ The Arab Spring ought to be seen from the perspective of a long series of Arab/Muslim historically-rooted triumphs and traumas as seen by Arabs/Muslims themselves Broad Outline of Arab/Muslim History ○ 7th century: recently Islamized and unified Arabs broke out of traditionally-fragmented tribal Arabia, establishing their huge Muslim empire over the Middle East, North Africa, and large parts of Asia and Europe. Essentially, a global triumph of Islam/Arabism. ○ Center of science/art/philosophy, open culture (translates Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Sanskrit work). Islam’s GOLDEN AGE. ○ Christian “pushback”: by 11th century, European crusaders establish the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the midst of the Muslim world ○ 1187: Saladin soundly defeats the crusaders in Hattin; Muslims retake Jerusalem ○ 1299-1922: The Ottoman Empire ○ 15th-16th centuries: Muslims are pushed out of Spain (Reconquista) Arab/Muslim Triumphs and Traumas in Modern History ○ 1916 - Muslims/Arabs were promised by the British a new caliphate, but are double-crossed in Sykes-Picot (Triumph into trauma) ○ 1919-39: Arab states established all over ME (Triumph) ○ 1948: Israel established (Arab Trauma) ○ 1952-67: Anti-West Pan Arabism under Nasser (Triumph) ○ 1967: Arabs are humiliated by Israel (June War) ○ 1973: Arab “honor” restored in October war despite military defeat/setback ○ 1978: Sadat signs peace deal with Israel (trauma or triumph? Arab World is greatly divided)[end of Pan Arabism under Egyptian leadership] ○ 1979: Iranian Shia revolution (historical threat to Sunni Arab power). Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) ○ 1990: Saddam Hussein takes Kuwait (triumph) but is beaten militarily by West-Arab coalition (trauma) ○ 9/11/2001: Terrorist attacks (triumph?), but US response in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) ○ 2011: ARAB SPRING — triumph or trauma? The masses rebel but the non-democratic institutions (military, monarchy) survive The Case of Tunisia: Implications for the Arab Spring ○ Tunisia became a model for other Arab Spring revolutions (mass demonstrations, get rid of the dictator with the support of the elite). But, in many ways it has been unique or greatly different. ○ The revolution there was about human dignity, poverty, police brutality, authoritarianism, democracy, and huge corruption by the Ben Ali ruling family. ○ Tunisia demonstrates the power of new technological environment to shape politics and lead to political change ○ But it is important to note Tunisia’s uniqueness: Other Arab/Muslim countries were very different…3 11/5: Egypt & the Arab Spring Egypt — general background ○ The largest & most important Arab state: center of religion, press, intellectual life ○ Population: 116+ million; mostly Sunni Muslims; 10-15% Christian Copts ○ Ancient civilization; separate strong national identity ○ Strategic location in Eastern Mediterranean: Suez Canal, Aswan Dam, Red Sea. Sizable military of close to 500,000 ○ Military & politics: privileged status of armed forces — increasing! Nasserism, 1952-1970: Modern Egypt’s Foundation ○ The 7/23/52 Coup of the “Free Officers” resulted in the armed forces as the nation’s leaders. ○ Ideology: 1. Egyptian nationalism, but with strong “Pan-Arabism”; 2. Anti-Imperialism; 3. Non-alignment; 4. Arab Socialism; 5. Anti-Israel ○ “Informal social contact” with the people: authoritarian rule (Nasser’s centralized state), BUT improved economy with heavy subsidies (food, electricity, schools, clinics, transportation), public projects like the Aswan Dam, assertive/aggressive foreign policy (prestige to the people) Assessing the Nasserist Reality ○ Internationally, foreign policy “cocktail” of Pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism, and non-alignment led Nasser to intervene in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel ○ Economically, the “model” did not work effectively: huge public sector, low productivity, population expansion, huge foreign debt ○ Strategically, increased dependence on the USSR, pressures from Arab countries to defend them (Syria) ○ Politically, internal authoritarianism of Nasser, confrontation with Muslim Brotherhood, and liberal elements Nasser’s successors, Sadat (1970-81) & Mubarak (1981-2011) ○ Following Nasser’s death, his VP Sadat took over, then Mubarak, and now Sisi (2013) — all military officers ○ Sadat & Mubarak deviated from Nasserism in 4 ways: Egyptian nationalism (not Pan-Arabism), pro-US, neo-liberal policies, peace with Israel and not confrontation or war ○ Neoliberalism implementation: new economic elite, increased poverty, huge unemployment, military class still highly privileged ○ Heavy-hand on any real or imagined opponents ○ Economic & political corruption (faked elections) The Egyptian Spring & Counter-Revolution ○ Causes for success: Tunisian effect; Mubarak regime political corruption & economic corruption; U.S. support for change; “neutrality” of the army toward Mubarak (hostile toward the new economic class) ○ Immediate result was the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power: shocking development (given history/ideology of the Brotherhood) ○ 7/2013: Morsi arrested by the military (supported heavily by a civilian movement) ○ Most observers look very critically at Morsi’s regime — heavily Islamist, failed to democratize Egypt, biased on Copts/women ○ The new al-Sissi regime: internally Nasserist but much more authoritarian + less Pan-Arab: oppression of all, big economic projects, reaffirming army privileges ○ 60K detainees for long times, heavy int’l criticism 11/7: Syria and the Arab Spring: The Decisive Battleground? 11/14: Saudi Arabia: The Emerging Desert Monarchy Society and politics ○ Demographics: about 34m, 10m non-citizens (Arabs, South-East Asians — foreign workers), all non-voters (no parliament) ○ Religion: over 80% Sunni Wahhabis (State’s religion); Shiites 15%, possibly 1.5 m Christians (but no religious services allowed) ○ Politics: a totalitarian, non-democratic, absolute, theocratic monarchy ○ Identity: birthplace of Islam (7th century), with Mecca/Medina ○ Large, oil-based economy dominates (but efforts to diversify) ○ Huge territory; mostly desert ○ A major regional conservative power (involved in conflict in Syria, Iran, Yemen, Iraq). Often a counterrevolutionary power. The Historical Roots of Saudi Arabia ○ Under nominal control of the Ottomans and then the British (1918): in reality autonomous tribes (often warring). Entirely neglected/deserted part of the world. ○ 1916: The Great Arab Revolt led by Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, leader of the Hashemite tribe. Saw himself as King of the Arabs and even the Caliph. Put Arabia on the map. ○ 1924: Hashemites lost the war to the Saud family and left Saudi Arabia. ○ 1932: the establishment of Saudi Arabia ○ 1938: the discovery of a huge amount of oil reserves in the Eastern Province ○ 1941: the establishment of ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Co.) ○ 1945: the US-SA “deal”(Saud-Roosevelt): oil for security and close political relations. ○ Saudi Arabia as the quintessential “Rentier State”, a country where revenues are based completely on “renting” its assets (oil) SA’s International Politics ○ Highly and increasingly influential among Arabs & Muslims (in the Middle East and beyond) ○ Traditional promoter of Wahhabism, 18th century fundamentalist movement started by the preacher, Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab — link to terrorism ○ Heavily involved in counter-revolution (response to Arab Spring), anti-reform in most of the ME. Diverse policies toward Egypt, Syria, Iraq, invasion of Bahrain, military attack on Yemen ○ Increasingly involved in Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Saudi Peace Plan) ○ Leader of anti-Iranian coalition (Syrian civil war, Yemen). Recent “detente” (China’s role) ○ Close US ally since 1939: huge arms deals, oil protection, war of 1990-91 to liberate Kuwait and save Saudi Arabia. Tensions with Obama admin over Iran agreement. Tensions with Biden, but improved relations. ○ Trump-Salman relations are especially very close (Iran, Yemen, Israel-Palestine, etc.) ○ Increasing relations w/ Russia and China ○ The Jamal Khashoggi affair (Istanbul) has focused the world’s attention on SA’s human rights record (freedom of expression, democratization, legal system) ○ What is the future of SA? What are the implications for the interests of the West/World? The Jamal Khashoggi Affair, October 2018 ○ The shocking case of Khashoggi reveals the true face of SA and its leaders ○ Khas. was a prominent Saudi man and journalist for the Washington Post ○ Somewhat of a radical on Arab-Israeli relations, opposed to all Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, especially by SA ○ A critic of the Saudi regime: close to Muslim Brotherhood, and even Bin Laden, against Saudi policy toward Qatar, Canada, Lebanon, policies on women ○ Passionate supporter of the Arab Spring ○ 10/2/2018: went to the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Was murdered there in the most cruel manner imaginable. ○ Worldwide criticism of SA & esp. MBS ○ The U.S. was critical of SA but did not cut off relations. Saudi Arabia & The US today ○ The traditional relations have been under strain over the last few years. The reasons: The US is not as dependent on SA as it was in the past Current SA leadership is not as concerned about its reputation SA is stronger and powerful countries are interested in close relations ○ These new relationships were tested when SA joined others in cutting oil production (thus causing economic hardship and helping Russia) ○ Pres. Biden announced publicly that the US will reassess relationships with SA ○ IP prediction: the US-SA relations will survive the crisis since they are too important for both countries. We can already see the evolvement of a new deal designed to respond to the rise in Iran’s power (NATO-like American guarantee + weapons; possible Saudi-Israeli component) Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) ○ MBS is Crown Prince & PM of SA, but in reality the ruler of SA (future King) ○ Push hard to dominate SA, the Region, and became a Global Power actor ○ “Reformer”: restricts religious police & Wahhabism, allows women drivers, entertainment (Western culture), sport, “moderate Islam” ○ F-P: Pushed war in Yemen (unsuccessful), good w/ Russia/PRC ○ Purged the economic/political elite by arresting 200+ ○ Authoritarian: against opponents in SA/abroad, limits Wahhabi judges’ power, elite members ○ Economy: restructure, Vision 2030 ○ Big projects: high-speed train Mecca-Medina, 16 nuclear reactors ○ Israel: MBS for normalization, not Salman 11/19: Jordan: The Politics of Survival Sharif (“Noble”) Hussein bin Ali ○ Ruler of Mecca, 1854-1931 ○ Proclaimed the Great Arab Revolt in 1916 ○ Founder, of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan ○ 37th descendant of the Prophet Muhammad Historical background, 1918-1948: The first 30 years ○ Following WW I, the British rewarded the Hashemites with Iraq (Feisal I) and Transjordan/Jordan (Abdullah I) ○ The Emirate of Transjordan was underdeveloped, only 450,000, and divided between the ruling Hashemites & the old tribes (later becoming the “East Bankers”) ○ The Hashemites were kicked out of Arabia by the Saudis (1920s) but promoted a claim on J-M’s Haram es-Sharif with al-Aqsa & the Dome of the Rock. This claim remains part of Jordan’s objective until today. ○ Abdullah I saw himself as the future King of All the Arabs and the Muslim Caliph, so he desired to gain control over the Temple Mount. Competition between the Hashemites and the indigenous Arabs of Palestine evolved. ○ This rivalry led to a quiet understanding between the Hashemites and the Israelis, a reality till today. In the 1948 war, the Arab Legion remained semi-neutral (but not in Jerusalem). The Emergence of Jordan, 1949-1967 ○ 1949: Armistice between Jordan-Israel (mostly observed) ○ 1950: Jordan formally annexes the “West Bank”; huge identity change ○ 1951: Abdullah I assassinated on Temple Mount; grandson Hussein at his side ○ King Hussein, 1952-1999: moderate, wise, impressive survivor against powerful enemies (pan-Arab Nasser, Palestinians, Muslim Brothers) ○ Survival methods: alliances (Israel, Iraq, US, UK), use of Arab Legion, careful diplomatic balancing act, pragmatism ○ 1967: involved in Six-Day War due to pressure (loses WB); 1973— remains neutral (Israel’s warning) ○ A long history of Israeli-Jordanian secret relations King Hussein and the Peace Process, 1967-1999 ○ After 1967 — expectations for a “Jordanian Solution” (possibly as a Jordanian-Palestinian linkage, federation or even confederation). But increasing challenge to Hussein’s rule by Palestinians in Jordan, PLO, Arab States ○ 1970: Hussein “solves” his PLO problem; Israel blocks Syria ○ 1973: Hussein refuses to join Egypt+Syria war. Reports to US+Israel ○ 1974: The Rabat Summit of the Arab League declares PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people ○ 1987: The Intifada strengthened Palestinian claim over the WB. Jordan withdraws claim to the WB. The death of the Jordanian option. ○ 1994: Following Oslo/1993, a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. Abdullah II, 1999-2024 ○ Abdullah, Hussein’s son, had a tough act to follow (like Bashar Al-Assad). But he has done quite well. ○ The first 11 years he acted smartly: helping the US after 9/11, staying neutral during the 2003 war, marrying a Palestinian woman from Nablus, keeping peace w/ Israel. ○ But then the Arab Spring arrived: high unemployment, tight budget, no oil, East Bankers’ complaints, promises of reforms look unserious Jordan’s Foreign Policy ○ Jordan is, inherently and persistently, the most pro-Western Arab state (the West has guaranteed Jordan’s existence) ○ Relations are particularly close with US & UK (but Jordan’s neutrality during the Gulf Wars created tensions although after the 2003 war relations fully restored) ○ Jordan has also been in the front of the “peace process” with Israel; future role unknown. ○ Since 2013 Jordan is a base for training Syrian rebels by the CIA ○ Because of Israeli policy toward the Palestinian people and territory, esp. In Jerusalem, there have been tensions between Jordan and Israel. Yet even right-wingers support Jordan now. 11/21: Turkey: Ataturk’s Tradition & Erdogan Neo-Ottomanism Ataturk’s Tradition in Turkey, 1923-1938 ○ Turkey is one of the largest and most powerful countries in the ME: population of 85m, 2nd largest NATO military, Asian/European non-Arab-but-Muslim identity, Ottoman historical tradition, ethnic split (Kurds) ○ The founder of modern Turkey was Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” (1881-1938) ○ A military officer established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A true revolutionary who promoted a westernized, modernized, and secularized Turkish society/polity ○ Eliminated the Ottoman tradition of multi-ethnic, religiously-based country ○ The Turkish Model of Ataturk - the military and its leadership as modernizers and “guardians” of the nationalist republic (essentially a non-democratic model). But it has been emulated by Nasser & others ○ But, has the Turkish Model succeeded — even in Turkey itself? (No…) The Rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 2003-2022 ○ After Ataturk premature death, his legacy was maintained by the Army, the political party he established, and the personality cult of the dead leader ○ Yet, since 2003, Ataturk’s legacy has been seriously challenged under the leadership of Prime Minister and since 2014 President Erdogan: Turkey has moved toward authoritarianism, the power of the military as the “guardian” of Kemalism/Ataturkism declined Democracy has declined, Turkey will probably not become an EU member ○ Erdogan is considered one of the most effective, aggressive Populist leaders in the world, determined to change the Turkish polity (domestically and internationally) Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erdogan ○ In the pre-Erdogan era, Turkey was a reliable NATO member, US ally, candidate for membership in the EU, maintaining peaceful relations with most ME countries ○ Today, it is a Revisionist (anti-status quo) Power, claiming special status in the area, increasing conflicts with previous allies and others, NATO/EU doubts. Has it turned from the West to the East? ○ Erdogan’s goals: establish Turkey’s greatness as leader of the Muslim world, replace Ataturk, change Turkey domestically & internationally ○ Specifics of nationalist foreign policy: Past and future invasion of Syria, support Azerbaijan vs. Armenia, involvement in conflicts in Libya/Israel/Cyprus/Greece, confronting France about Islam & HRs, purchasing the Russian S-400 aircraft missiles (anti-NATO action), Putin/Erdogan alliance? ○ From “zero conflict” stance to “maximum confrontation” policy Biden & Erdogan ○ Trump & Erdogan got along well: Although Sissi was Trump’s “favorite dictator”, Erdogan has emerged as a close second. ○ Biden Erdogan “an authoritarian ruler” & promised that he will pay a heavy price for his behavior ○ Biden’s associates were even harsher, questioning Turkey’s position as an ally ○ Criticism on all fronts: HRs violations, oppression of Kurds; interventions in Mediterranean ○ Effectiveness of pressuring Erdogan depends on his popularity in Turkey itself. In 2022, his position was on the decline — deep economic crisis, Turkish lira decline, 10m unemployed, huge inflation, no international investment ○ How to deal with Erdogan? Work very closely with the Europeans, deploy economic sanctions when needed, condition Turkey’s NATO status on acceptable behavior ○ While Erdogan’s party still leads, Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party is coming up. Turkey and the Ukraine War ○ Ukraine War could have brought Turkey back into Western alliance: Russia revealed itself a revisionist power, and Turkey needed to strengthen its security ○ While not joining the sanction “regime,” Turkey condemned Russia in the UN vote ○ Importantly, Turkey called the Ukraine invasion a “war”, and Art. 19 of the Montreux Convention allows it to close the Turkish Straits to Russian military vessels. Huge. Should it be considered if Russian aggression doesn’t end? ○ While Putin & Erdogan are “friends,” R-T disagree on Cyprus, Syria, Armenia, etc., so Ukraine could have been the last straw & bring Turkey and the West together (EU?) ○ Even before Ukraine, Turkey seems to have begun to change its attitude: improved relations with Egypt, Armenia, the Gulf states, and Israel. Had Ukraine solidified this trend, it may have become a real game changer. ○ Despite hopes, Putin-Erdogan relations got stronger: Turkey has disappointed the West on the issue of Ukraine. 11/26: Iraq: The 2003 War and the Rise of ISIS Iraq as an “invented”, artificial polity ○ Like most Arab states, Iraq (traditionally under pro-Sunni Ottoman rule) came into being only in the post-WWI era ○ In fact, it was invented by Churchill w/ 3 provinces (Shiite, Sunni, Kurds) combined under a Hashemite king, not an indigenous leader ○ The never-popular monarchy was violently overthrown in 1958 by a Sunni Baathist officer (Kassem), himself assassinated in 1963 by an even more Baathist group ○ This eventually led to the long brutal dictatorship of Sadam Hussein (-2003): anti-Shiite, expansionist toward Iran & Kuwait ○ 1980: Hussein attacks Iran (US aided Iraq) ○ But, after his conquest of Kuwait, he is defeated by a US coalition (First Gulf War), leading to the Madrid conference in 1991 ○ After 9/11, Hussein becomes a target for the US, leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Second Gulf War), deposing Hussein US Foreign-policy, 2003: The anatomy of a disastrous Neo-Conservative war: Regime Change, Democratization, Exceptionalism ○ The 2003 war was a highly important episode in US-ME relations: first direct US intervention (war), resulting in the conquest of an Arab capital (Baghdad). A colossal mistake: ambitious Neocon ideology, faulty decision making ○ Why? Post-9/11 punishing act, taking oil fields, gaining a strategic center in ME, establish democracy in the ME, removing weapons of mass destruction ○ Clumsy operation, total chaos, open the gates for Iran expansion, no WMDs, establish Shiite rule, demilitarization ○ Marginalized dominant Sunnis, led to ISIS IP’s interpretation of the 2003 War ○ The Neocon ideology: Nationalism (America First?) Radicalism Interventionist militarism Exceptionalism Optimism Imperial universalism Conversion and evangelism Unilateralism ○ Decision-making: Neocon’s influence, the role of VP Cheney, Neocon DMU, President lacks knowledge/interest/abilities, marginality of State Department, low bar for interventionist war after 9/11 ○ The 2003 War was the result of world conditions, ideology, and faulty decision-making The Islamic State (ISIS) ○ The so-called Islamic State emerged to a large extent due to the US invasion of Iraq, the instability in Iraq under Shia, Sunni Baathist Iraqi officers key to ISIS ○ Fundamentalist jihadist theology against all “others”, established a worldwide “Caliphate” over all Muslims and toward world domination ○ In its height— ruled 10m people, ⅓ of W. Iraq & E. Syria, large economic assets, 30K soldiers ○ Terrorist attacks all over the world ○ Unbelievable cruelty & barbarism on video, public beheadings, destruction of cultural sites ○ Close to 60 states against it (US, Russia, NATO, UN) ○ The “Caliph,” Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi killed himself in 2019 (about to be captured by US forces) 12/3: Israel and the Arab Spring Background, context, thesis ○ The eruption of the Arab Spring had nothing to do with Israel. But it had huge real/potential impact on Israel, the ME, US role, etc. ○ Topics for discussion: Describe the Israeli majority reaction and alternatives to it Explain and contextualize the Israeli reaction Assess actual policies impacted by the Arab Spring Evaluate the impact of the Israeli response on US-Israel relations Future look. ○ Overall thesis: The Israeli reaction to the Arab Spring was greatly exaggerated in terms of its negativity/pessimism; an alternative and more balanced view is needed, emphasizing the potentially, long-term positive consequences of the Arab Spring. ○ The “Alternative Perspective” is validated by examining the Arab Spring on the eve of the 14th year anniversary of the Arab Spring The paradigm of the Netanyahu government ○ The majority Israeli reaction to the Arab Spring was formulated by PM Netanyahu (11/2011): “The AS had taken the Arabs backwards… Israel is surrounded by a sea of illiberal, anti-Western, anti-Israeli, & anti-democratic fundamentalism” ○ The PM’s harsh statement met an echo-chamber, group thinking, consensual response: Israel’s borders endangered (terrorism) The Pan-Arab coalition will re-emerge The peace treaties will collapse Islamism as a threat Palestinians in Israel & beyond will be radicalized US hesitant & will pressure Israel ○ In examining an alternative reading of the Arab Spring, it is argued that the Govt/majority has reacted hysterically, over-generalizing on the basis of discrete events, thinking in a binary or dichotomous manner, reflecting ideological biases.