2024 PREWEEK IN POLITICAL LAW.pdf

The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected]...

The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 1 of 95  1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) A constitutional convention.1 Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.2 The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.3 Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 or 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.4 2. REVISION broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, AMENDMENT broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.5 3. The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.6 4. A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.7 5. TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE - The territorial sea is an area extending from a State’s internal waters to its seaward side. According to Article 2 of UNCLOS, ‘the sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.’ Pursuant to Article 3 of UNCLOS, it is now recognised that ‘every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.’ Simply stated, the territorial sea is part of the territory of the State in its fullest meaning, and the State has full prescriptive jurisdiction over this area. Sovereignty over the territorial seas, however, does not mean that the coastal State enjoys an absolute enforcement jurisdiction over vessels and persons crossing these waters. In fact, as Article 2.3 of the UNCLOS specifies, a State’s authority over the territorial seas is ‘subject to this Convention and other rules of international law.’ The most relevant provision restricting state enforcement jurisdiction within the territorial seas is the one set forth in Article 27, establishing a specific limitation for the exercise of a coastal State’s jurisdiction over a foreign vessel that is navigating within its territorial waters. According to this provision: ‘The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing 1 SEC 1, ART. XVII 2 SEC 2, ART. XVII 3 SEC 3, ART. XVII 4 See SEC 4, ART. XVII 5 LAMBINO VS. COMELEC 6 Id., 7 Id., The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 2 of 95  through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases: (a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; (b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested [...] (d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.’ Besides claiming their territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from their shore, coastal States may also proclaim a ‘contiguous zone’ beyond the territorial waters. The contiguous zone can be defined pursuant to Article 33.2 of UNCOLS as ‘a narrow belt of water lying seaward of the territorial sea [… which] may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.’ Within this area, a State may, pursuant to Article 33.1: ‘[… E]xercise the control necessary to: a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.’ Hence, the UNCLOS recognises the contiguous zone as a maritime area of limited state control where the coastal State does not have full sovereignty, but where its authority over foreign vessels can be exercised in order to prevent or pursue some specific violations that had been committed on the State’s territory or within its territorial sea. According to most authors, by stating that the State ‘may exercise the control’, Article 33.1 ‘literally means that the coastal State may exercise only enforcement, not legislative, jurisdiction within its contiguous zone.’ Hence, it follows that ‘relevant laws and regulations of the coastal State are not extended to its contiguous zone; and that infringement of municipal laws of the coastal State within the zone is outside the scope of this provision.’8 6. THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) - The exclusive economic zone has been a significant innovation made by UNCLOS. Beyond the previously mentioned 12 and 24 nautical mile limits, the seas are considered international waters, i.e. not belonging to any State. Nevertheless, it was agreed that coastal States could enjoy some exclusive economic rights for exploiting natural resources within a broader area, provided that this broader maritime zone was not under the sovereign control of another coastal State, and provided that the traditional freedoms of the high seas were preserved. Hence, Part V of the UNCLOS created the so-called Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which is ‘an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea’, and which is subject to a sui generis legal regime. Pursuant to Article 57, the EEZ ‘shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’. Within this zone, the coastal State has, on one hand, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS to exploit, conserve and manage fisheries and other natural resources, and, on the other hand, JURISDICTION with regard to i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; ii) marine scientific research; iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The coastal State has prescriptive jurisdiction in relation to these matters, and can thus pass laws and regulations establishing, inter alia, the limits for fishing, the species that might be caught and the conditions for the construction of artificial islands and other installations. Concerning enforcement jurisdiction, Article 73 states that: ‘the coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention’. It is important to notice that, since the EEZ can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the coast, EEZ and contiguous zone often overlap. Hence, in the maritime zone between 12 and 24 nautical miles from a State’s baseline, both the rules of the EEZ and those of the contiguous zone are applicable.9 8 CRIMES COMMITTED AT SEA ANDM CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: CURRENT ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AWAITING THE ‘ENRICA LEXIE’ DECISION, Daniele Fabris 9 Id. The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 3 of 95  7. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. 8. Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether. Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.10 9. A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump- sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.11 10. Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman, is unconstitutional. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-granted independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but 10 BELGICA VS. OCHOA, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, EN BANC 11 BELGICA VS. OCHOA, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, EN BANC The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 4 of 95  inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily be true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. The fear of external reprisal from the very office he is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the Office of the Ombudsman. We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.12 11. The State may not be sued without its consent.13 There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. 12. If the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.14 13. SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCY; Suability depends on whether the agency is incorporated (i.e. there is a separate charter) or unincorporated (i.e. no separate personality). In the case of government agencies, the question of its suability depends on whether it is incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a Charter of its own with a separate juridical personality while an unincorporated agency has none. In addition, the Charter of an incorporated agency shall explicitly provide that it has waived its immunity from suit by granting it with the authority to sue and be sued. This applies regardless of whether its functions are governmental or proprietary in nature.15 INCORPORATED – If the charter provides that the agency can sue, then the suit will lie. The provision in the charter constitutes express consent. UNINCORPORATED – There must be an inquiry unto the principal functions of government. This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. 14. Indubitably, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (CBP), which was created under RA 265 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 72 (PD 72), is a government corporation with separate juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Specifically, Sections 1 and 4 of RA 265, as amended, provided for the creation of the CBP, a corporate body with certain corporate powers which include the authority to sue and be sued. Its main function is to administer the monetary, banking and credit system of the Philippines which is primarily governmental in nature. CBP is a corporate body performing governmental functions. Operating a clearing house facility for regional checks is within CBP's governmental functions and duties as the central monetary authority. Nonetheless, while the CBP performed a governmental function in providing clearing house facilities, it is not immune from suit as its Charter, by express provision, waived its immunity from suit. However, although the CBP allowed itself to be sued, it 12 Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 2014, EN BANC 13 Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution 14 Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120 15 BPI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS), SECOND DIVISION, October 12, 2020, G.R. No. 197593; HERNANDO The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 5 of 95  did not necessarily mean that it conceded its liability. Petitioner BPI had been given the right to bring suit against CBP, such as in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from torts, subject, however, to the right of CBP to interpose any lawful defense. Anent the issue of whether CBP is liable for the torts committed by its employees Valentino and Estacio, the test of liability depends on whether or not the employees, acting in behalf of CBP, were performing governmental or proprietary functions. The State in the performance of its governmental functions is liable only for the tortuous acts of its special agents. On the other hand, the State becomes liable as an ordinary employer when performing its proprietary functions. Thus, Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide that the responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. To reiterate, CBP's establishment of clearing house facilities for its member banks to which Valentino and Estacio were assigned as Bookkeeper and Janitor-Messenger, respectively, is a governmental function. As such, the State or CBP in this case, is liable only for the torts committed by its employee when the latter acts as a special agent but not when the said employee or official performs his or her functions that naturally pertain to his or her office. A special agent is defined as one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office. Evidently, both Valentino and Estacio are not considered as special agents of CBP during their commission of the fraudulent acts against petitioner BPI as they were regular employees performing tasks pertaining to their offices, namely, bookkeeping and janitorial-messenger. Thus, CBP cannot be held liable for any damage caused to petitioner BPI by reason of Valentino and Estacio's unlawful acts. Nonetheless, even assuming that CBP is an ordinary employer, it still cannot be held liable. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that an employer shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. An act is deemed an assigned task if it is "done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage." Obviously, Valentino and Estacio's fraudulent acts of tampering with and pilfering of documents are not in furtherance of CBP's interests nor done for its account as the said acts were unauthorized and unlawful. Also, petitioner BPI has the burden to prove that Valentino and Estacio's fraudulent acts were performed within the scope of their assigned tasks, which it failed to do. It is only then that the presumption that CBP, as employer, was negligent would arise which then compels CBP to show evidence that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Thus, where a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury or damage caused by such acts is his or her own personal liability and cannot be imputed to the State.16 15. Doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.17 16. In the instant case, it is not disputed that PTRI is an unincorporated national government agency. Hence, being an unincorporated government agency that exercises a governmental function, ordinarily, the PTRI enjoys immunity from suit. Further, the employees of PTRI acting in their official capacity likewise enjoy this immunity from suit, as "public officials may not be sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope of their authority." However, needless to say, the rule on State immunity from suit is not absolute. The State may be sued with its consent. The State's consent to be sued may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. As held in Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations 16 Id., 17 ARIGO VS. SWIFT, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014 The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 6 of 95  Commission, "the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government 'consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Applying the foregoing, it is not disputed that PTRI entered into a Contract of Works for the Rehabilitation of Electrical Facilities of PTRI Main Building and Three Pilot Plants with E.A. Ramirez. It is likewise not disputed that the cause of action of E.A. Ramirez's Complaint is the alleged breach of the subject Contract. In other words, PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability arising from a contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from suit finds application. Furthermore, there is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit when the State enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non- suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the instant case, not only did PTRI descend to the level of a contracting party by entering into the subject Contract, under the subject Contract itself, which contemplated a situation wherein legal action may arise from the execution of the agreement and incorporating provisions on the procedures to be undertaken in settling legal disputes, PTRI also manifested unequivocally its consent to be subjected to suit with respect to disputes arising from the subject Contract. Further, the subject Contract was clearly not executed in the exercise of PTRI's governmental function of aiding the textile industry. The subject Contract dealt solely with the rehabilitation works of the electrical facilities of PTRI's buildings.18 17. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.19 18. Under the first test or the so-called COMPLETENESS TEST, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test or the SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Simply put, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and (2) the presence of a sufficient standard. To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions of the law must leave nothing to the delegate except to implement it. "What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced." More relevant here, however, is the presence of a sufficient standard under the law. Enforcement of a delegated power may only be effected in conformity with a sufficient standard, which is used "to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus 'prevent the delegation from running riot.'" The law must contain the limitations or guidelines to determine the scope of authority of the delegate.20 19. Hence, the Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix the contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts for the monthly salary credits. It is within the scope of the Social Security Commission's power to fix them, as clearly laid out in the law.21 20. Here, RA No. 10029 satisfied the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The law states the policy to guide the implementing agencies in carrying out its provisions. The clear legislative intent is to regulate 18 PHILIPPINE TEXTILE RESEARCH INSTITUTES VS. CA, G.R. No. 223319, October 09, 2019 19 DTI VS. STEELASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 238263, November 16, 2020 20 DTI VS. STEELASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 238263, November 16, 2020 21 KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. AQUINO III, April 2, 2019, G.R. No. 210500 The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 7 of 95  the practice of psychology and to protect the public from incompetent individuals offering psychological services. Before the enactment of the law, persons who studied and graduated from the academic discipline of psychology were not required to obtain a license to practice their profession. Corollarily, Section 16 of RA No. 10029 granted a window period for practitioners to register without examination and crafted sufficient standards on who may avail the exemption measured in terms of educational attainment and work experience. Specifically, the law provides that applicants who have Bachelor's Degree in Psychology may be registered without examination if they accumulated a "minimum of ten (10) years of work experience in the practice of psychology as a psychologist" and "updated their professional education in various psychology-related functions." Contrary to Florentina's contention, the use of these phrases neither render the law incomplete nor grant the PRC and the BOP a wide latitude of discretion. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of the administrative bodies' rule making authority are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standards may be either expressed or implied. The standards do not have to be spelled out specifically, and could be implied from the purpose of the act considered as a whole. This Court has recognized "public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy, and welfare" as sufficient standards.20 In this case, the declared policy of the law and the body of the statute complied with the requirements of valid delegation of legislative power. The guidelines for persons seeking to practice psychology are infused with the public interest.22 21. LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER: (i) that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise; and (ii) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly oppressive upon individuals. [If police power is asked in the BAR and you don’t know the specific case, just cite these two requisites then apply it to the given facts] 22. Ordinance No. 092-2000, which regulates the construction and installation of building and other structures such as billboards within Davao City, is an exercise of police power. Republic Act No. 4354 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Davao (Davao City Charter), enacted on June 19, 1965, vested the local Sangguniang Panlungsod with the legislative power to regulate, prohibit, and fix license fees for the display, construction, and maintenance of billboards and similar structures. As stated earlier, the power to regulate billboards within its territorial jurisdiction has been delegated by Congress to the city government via the Davao City Charter. This direct and specific grant takes precedence over requirements set forth in another law of general application, in this case the National Building Code. Stated differently, the city government does not need to refer to the procedures laid down in the National Building Code to exercise this power. Thus, the consistency between Ordinance No. 092-2000 with the National Building Code is irrelevant to the validity of the former. To be clear, even if the National Building Code imposes minimum requirements as to the construction and regulation of billboards, the city government may impose stricter limitations because its police power to do so originates from its charter and not from the National Building Code. The ordinance specifically governs billboards and other similar structures situated within Davao City, independent of the provisions of the National Building Code.23 23. More importantly, Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 emanates from the valid exercise of police power to prescribe regulations that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare of the people. This fundamental power is immense in relation to the principle of subordinate legislation. The exercise of police power should be given a wide latitude when delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions. The State through the implementing agencies should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the need arises. Indeed, the Court has held that persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical 22 SOBREJUANITE-FLORES VS. PILANDO, JR., G.R. No. 251816, November 23, 2021, LOPEZ 23 EVASCO, JR VS. MONTANEZ, February 21, 2018, G.R. No. 199172 The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 8 of 95  knowledge may be subjected to reasonable and fair admission requirements. xxx The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of psychology which consists of the delivery of psychological services that involve the application of psychological principles and procedures to describe, understand, predict and influence the behavior of individuals or groups, in order to assist in the attainment of optimal human growth and functioning. Thus, an applicant may be refused admission as a psychologist absent compliance with the conditions of the law and its IRR. As intimated earlier, the required updating workshops and training programs under Section 16(c) of the IRR of RA No. 10029 to qualify for registration without examination as a psychologist is not oppressive and discriminatory.24 24. It is settled that a property already devoted to public use can still be subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to a delegate.25 25. It is established that the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question. However, when the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a matter that the Legislature can decide and determine (it becomes political question!). As in this case, the express authority of MORE to expropriate is embodied in R.A. No. 11212. The expropriation of the distribution system of PECO was directed by legislation.26 26. DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS JUDICIAL FUNCTION; The determination of just compensation is inherently a judicial function, which cannot be curtailed by legislation.27 The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and any valuation for just compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.28 27. MEANING OF TAKING – It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.29’ 28. WHO MAY EXERCISE – the power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private enterprises performing public services.30 When the power of eminent domain is exercised by an agent of the State and by means of expropriation of real property, farther limitations are imposed by law, the rules of court and jurisprudence. In essence, these requirements are: (1) A valid delegation to a public utility to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) An identified public use, purpose or welfare for which eminent domain or expropriation is exercised; (3) Previous tender of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the 24 SOBREJUANITE-FLORES VS. PILANDO, G.R. No. 251816. November 23, 2021; EN BANC 25 MORE ELECTRIC AND POWER CORPORATION VS. PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 248061, March 09, 2021, EN BANC 26 MORE ELECTRIC AND POWER CORPORATION VS. PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 248061, March 09, 2021, EN BANC 27 REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES VALENTINA , G.R. No. 226734, May 10, 2021 28 VERGARA VS. GRECIA, G.R. No. 185638, August 10, 2016 29 NPC VS. HEIRS OF SANGKAY, G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011 30 MORE ELECTRIC AND POWER CORPORATION VS. PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 248061, March 09, 2021, EN BANC The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 9 of 95  property sought to be expropriated, but which offer is not accepted; and (4) Payment of just compensation.31 29. REQUISITES OF EMINENT DOMAIN OF LGU; From the foregoing, several requisites must concur before a local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit: (1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) the power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; (3) there is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and (4) a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.32 30. From the foregoing jurisprudential and statutory definitions, it can be gleaned that the purpose of an imposition will determine its nature as either a tax or a fee. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is at least one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly classified as an exercise of the power to tax. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed an exercise of police power in the form of a fee, even though revenue is incidentally generated. Stated otherwise, if generation of revenue is the primary purpose, the imposition is a tax but, if regulation is the primary purpose, the imposition is properly categorized as a regulatory fee.33 A cursory reading of the whereas clauses makes it is apparent that the purpose of the ordinance is to regulate the construction and maintenance of electric and telecommunications posts erected within Cagayan de Oro City. On account of the foregoing, it is clear that the ordinance in this case serves a regulatory purpose and is, hence, an exercise of police power. Nowhere in the text of the ordinance is it shown that it was enacted to raise revenue. On the contrary, the third whereas clause expressly states the city's need to impose some form of regulation on the construction of electric and telecommunications poles. As in Smart Communications, the fee is not imposed on the structure itself, but on the activity subject of government regulation, which is the installation and establishment of utility posts. Thus, it can be concluded without argument that the ordinance imposes a fee since it was enacted pursuant to the city's police power and serves to regulate, not to raise revenue.34 Proceeding to the question of non-exhaustion, the Court rules that ordinances that impose regulatory fees do not need to be challenged before the Secretary of Justice. It can be gleaned from the provision that review by the Secretary of Justice is mandatory only when what is being questioned is a tax ordinance or revenue measure. Section 187of LGC does not require the same from parties who assail ordinances imposing regulatory fees.35 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 31. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.36 32. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long 31 MORE ELECTRIC AND POWER CORPORATION VS. PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. 248061, September 15, 2020, EN BANC 32 CITY OF MANILA VS. PRIETO, July 8, 2019, G.R. No. 221366 33 CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, V. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC. (CEPALCO), G.R. No. 224825, October 17, 2018 34 Id 35 Id 36 Section 26, Article VI The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 10 of 95  as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.37 33. The Senate's definition of a joint resolution states that it is no different from a bill. However, under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only a bill can be enacted into law after following certain requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution. A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution into a law even if it follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into a law. However, a joint resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law itself. A joint resolution can also be treated as a recommendation to the Executive on how the law can be implemented. Further, neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the House of Representatives can amend the Constitution which recognizes only a bill can become law.38 34. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.39 35. Context: Article XII, Section 17 of the Constitution provides for the takeover of operations of privately owned public utilities or businesses affected with public interest. Related to this, Article VI, Section 23 of the Constitution provides limitations on the takeover power. Thus, in times of national emergency, the Constitution gives the Legislature the authority to grant the president temporary emergency powers to address a threat the country is facing. To be a valid delegation, the legislative enactment must authorize the president, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe. However, the contention lies in the legislative grant of the takeover power to the Department of Energy instead of the president. Valid or Not? Ruling: Yes, by virtue of Qualified Political Doctrine. The president may carry out their functions through the heads of the executive departments. The secretaries of each department function as the president's alter egos; however, they are not given complete discretion over how to exercise the delegated authority. The doctrine dictates that the president retains control, having the authority to "confirm, modify, or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. Nevertheless, the doctrine of qualified political agency cannot apply to situations that call for the president's personal performance. Notably, and as observed by Justice Caguioa, the temporary takeover power does not belong to the "special class of constitutionally[ ]vested powers" exclusive to the president. Certainly, the temporary control over oil industry entities does not involve the suspension of constitutionally protected liberties, but the regulation of the operation of a public utility or a private enterprise that affects public interest. This does not entail that the president personally handle the takeover. While the language of Section 14(e) appears to allow an interpretation that permits the energy secretary to act independently or without instructions from the president, the doctrine of qualified political agency entails that a cabinet secretary may only exercise the authority acting as the president's alter ego. As such, their actions related to their official duties and responsibilities are presumed to be the president's. These acts are valid and binding unless the president disapproves or repudiates them. In addition, their acts are subject to the subsequent ratification or rejection of the president; any exercise contrary to the president's intent or instructions shall be deemed ultra vires and an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power.40 36. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business 37 GIRON VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013; EN BANC 38 Ang Nars Party-List v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746 2019, EN BANC 39 SEC 23(2), ART VI 40 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No. 209216, FEB 21, 2023, EN BANC The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 11 of 95  affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.41 37. Senate is a continuing institution. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of the Senate during the expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.42 38. Legislative APPORTIONMENT is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. REAPPORTIONMENT, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.43 39. A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, a case that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.44 40. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.45 41. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.46 42. It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an 41 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 42 Balag vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018, EN BANC 43 Bagabuyo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008 44 Id., 45 Section 11, Article VI 46 Id., The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 12 of 95  official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.47 43. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.48 44. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.49 45. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.50 46. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.51 47. Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean that what is prohibited is the use of public money or property for the sole purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the furtherance of a particular church. It has also been held that the afore cited constitutional provision "does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally if it may also be used for a political assemblage. Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics. Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana.52 48. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.53 49. By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has 47 TRILLANES VS. ASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018 48 Section 13, Article VI 49 SEC 16(3), ART VI 50 SEC 23(1), ART VI 51 SEC 28(4), ART VI 52 RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. V ALENCIANO, HOLDING OF RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN QUEZON CITY, March 7, 2017, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC 53 SEC 25(5), Section VI The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 13 of 95  delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such transfers of funds CROSS-BORDER TRANSFERS OR CROSS-BORDER AUGMENTATIONS. To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.54 50. The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA; Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.55 51. Consequently, the savings from one branch or constitutional body cannot be transferred to another branch or body. Moreover, as the Court stressed in Sanchez, a valid realignment requires: (1) the existence of savings in the programmed appropriation of the transferring agency; and (2) the existence of an item, project, or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred. Pursuant to the strict constitutional limitations, the postponement of the December 2022 BSKE in order to realign the COMELEC's budget allocation for the same under the 2022 General Appropriations Act to the executive's COVID-19 and economic recovery programs constitutes as an impermissible transfer of appropriations. As explicitly provided under Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution, this COMELEC allocation can only be constitutionally transferred by the COMELEC's chairperson, and only with respect to the COMELEC's "item, project, or activity with an appropriation." It cannot be transferred to another branch or constitutional body. Verily, this intended transfer by the legislature — no matter how well-intentioned it might have been — constitutes an arbitrary and unconstitutional consideration that renders RA 11935 unconstitutional.56 52. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the Election, Returns, and Qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.57 53. A cursory reading of the foregoing unmistakably would show that the SET has no express, inherent or implied power to declare void or unconstitutional Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts, which requires the protestant to shoulder the retention costs. The authority of the SET is limited to matters affecting the validity of the protestant's title. While it may be true that the SET has the power to control its proceedings, such power cannot, by any means, be construed as including the power to interpret much less invalidate a contract between third parties. Thus, any issue concerning the contract 54 ARAULLO VS. AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 55 ARAULLO VS. AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015 56 MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 263590. June 27, 2023, EN BANC 57 SEC 17, Section VI The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 14 of 95  between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM is beyond the jurisdiction and constitutional mandate of the SET. To rule otherwise is to overstretch if not to go astray from the interpretation of the SET's constitutional grant of jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the Senate, as laid down in Javier.58 54. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins once a winning candidate is duly proclaimed, has taken his oath of office and has assumed the functions of the office, because it is only then that he is said to be member of the office. Once a winning candidate had been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to their election, returns, and qualifications ceases, and the SET assumes jurisdiction. Pearson failed to timely file the appropriate case before the SET and cannot remedy this failure by invoking the Court’s certiorari powers.59 55. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.60 As provided in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, however, the power of legislative investigation is subject to three limitations: (1) the inquiry must be "in aid of legislation;" (2) the inquiry must be conducted in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure; and (3) "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. " Also, where there is factual basis for the contempt, the resource person's detention should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.61 It bears underscoring that the purpose of the Committee's proceedings is to conduct an inquiry or investigation to aid the Senate in crafting relevant legislation, and not to conduct a trial or make an adjudication. Legislative inquiries do not share the same goals as the criminal trial process, and "cannot be punitive in the sense that they cannot result in legally binding deprivation of a person's life, liberty or property." Thus, punishment for legislative contempt, albeit sui generis in character, must similarly observe the minimum requirements of due process. As succinctly pointed out by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, witnesses who are charged by Congress with "giving false or evasive testimony" must be accorded stricter due process requirements, such as the opportunity to explain one's side before being penalized, consistent with the due process safeguards used in criminal proceedings. Considering the broad definition of "giving false or evasive testimony," the witness must, at the very least, given a chance to explain why his or her testimony is not false or evasive. In the case, the Committee's grave abuse of discretion lay in its precipitate act of citing petitioners Ong and Yang in contempt and ordering their arrests without giving them the opportunity to be heard.62 56. RIGHT TO PRIVACY vis-à-vis Senate inquiry; First, in Standard Chartered Bank, the Court stressed that the right to privacy is not an absolute right. While the Constitution guarantees the respect of persons affected by a legislative inquiry under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, not every assertion of one's right to privacy must be allowed to prevent a legitimate legislative inquiry. Too, in Sabio, the Court elucidated that the right to privacy is recognized and protected by laws. Any intrusion to one's right to privacy is not allowed unless it is excused by law and in accordance with established legal process. Definitely, "'no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his [or her] privacy' and 'everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."' 163 In that case, the Court explained that in resolving whether a person's right to privacy was violated, a court must determine two important questions: (1) did the concerned person exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) did the government violate such expectation?63 To underscore, central to the inquiry in aid of 58 TOLENTINO VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; G.R. No. 248005. May 11, 2021; EN BANC 59 G.R. No. 266053, decided on April 3, 2024 60 SEC 21, Article VI 61 ONG VS. THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 257401, MARCH 28, 2023, EN BANC 62 Id. 63 Id The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 15 of 95  legislation and of which Yang was invited by the Senate is his alleged participation in the Pharmally controversy. In this regard, the Senate Committee's inquiry covers the acts ofYang related to the contemplated legislation to improve government procurement procedure and processes in relation to RA 11494. It follows that the presentation of documents with regard to Yang's properties and business interests is allowed as it is intimately related to the issue of whether he acquired and/or accumulated wealth in connection with the subject goverment funds. [Id.,] Yang therefore had no reasonable expectations of privacy over matters relating to Pharmally and his business interests therein as the government itself has an interest insofar as the Congress contemplates the enactment and/or amendment of a law relating government procurement law. While there must be ideally a balance between the interest of resource persons and the demand by the Congress for information, the right to privacy cannot prevail where there is an overriding compelling state interest, as in the present case. In other words, the right to privacy of Yang cannot prevail over the compelling state interest as the Senate Committee conducts inquiries anent a contemplated legislation relating to RA No. 11494. The purpose of the inquiry of the Senate to res.olve the misuse of government funds in connection with the pandemic response of the government is a compelling state reason for it to proceed with its inquiry and require Yang to produce the subject documents. [Id.,] Second, pieces of information which relate to personal circumstances are not by themselves beyond the scope of legislative inquiry especially so where, as above stated, a contemplated legislation is being considered by the Congress. Verily, in the absence of showing that the production of the subject documents will in any way prejudice Yang, his contention that his right to privacy was violated remains as a bare allegation without proof supporting the claim. [Id.,] Third, Yang failed to convince the Court of any recognized public interest in the confidentiality of the information asked by the Senate Committee. 57. Indeed, the exercise of the contempt power by the Legislature is anchored on the principle of self- preservation. As that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it independently of the Judicial Branch. Such power of the Legislature is sui generis as it "attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the Legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. 64 The Senate, or the Congress as a whole, may effectively and wisely legislate for as long as it may compel the availability of information which in turn will be basis of a proposed law emanating from the proceedings in aid of legislation. The Congress is not precluded from causing the appearance of a resource person who is not before it. As long as the testimony of a resource person is primordial in the Legislature's inquiry in aid of legislation, then any House of Congress or its committees may compel, by way of an arrest, his or her appearance in the inquiry proceedings. Necessarily, compelled testimony connotes truthful declaration by a resource person subject of the legislative inquiry.65 58. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.66 59. The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 SEC 22, Article VI The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 16 of 95  inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness. Legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances: (a) upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report; or (b) upon the expiration of one (1) Congress.67 It was ruled therein that had contempt been exercised by the House of Representatives, the contempt could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the said Congress. 60. The requirement of securing prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress applies only to Cabinet Members and not to other public officials and only when either House of Congress conducts a Question Hour and not in cases of inquiries in aid of legislation as the latter should be untrammeled because it is co-extensive with the power to legislate.68 61. Certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings. Only the President can invoke it. She may also authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case, the Executive Secretary must state that the Act is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with the President on such matters of concern.69 62. Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.70 63. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, 67 Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018, EN BANC 68 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 (2006) 69 Id., 70 ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008 The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 17 of 95  other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.71 64. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.72 65. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.73 66. In fine, a judgment of impeachment per se connotes mere removal from the post. Since our Constitution expressly limited the nature of impeachment, its effects must consequently and necessarily be confined within the constitutional limits. Impeachment proceedings are entirely separate, distinct, and independent from any other actionable wrong or cause of action a party may have against the impeached officer, even if such wrong or cause of action may have a colorable connection to the grounds for which the officer have been impeached.74 An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established may be considered involuntarily retired from service. A respondent in impeachment proceedings does not risk forfeiture of the constitutional rights to life, liberty, or property. A separate determination of liability under the courts of law is necessary to withhold such rights. Sans judicial conviction, the impeached official shall only be removed from office, with the Senate being empowered with the discretion to impose the additional penalty of permanent disqualification from holding any and all further public office. Having been removed by the Congress from office with a lifetime ban from occupying any and all future public posts, but without a proper determination of or even a basis for any recoverable liability under the law due to causes beyond his control, Chief Justice Corona may be considered involuntarily retired from public service. Impeachment is only preparatory to liability. Since a removal by impeachment does not explicitly provide for forfeiture as a consequence thereof, as opposed to a criminal conviction carrying the penalty of 71 SEC 2, ART. XI 72 SEC 2, ART. XI 73 GUTIERREZ VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011 74 RE: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA, AM. NO. 20-07-10-SC, JANUARY 12, 2021 The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 18 of 95  perpetual or absolute disqualification, an impeached official, like former Chief Justice Corona, cannot be deprived of his retirement benefits on the sole ground of his removal. Such forfeiture could have been imposed upon criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by his death. Viewing it from another angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is a resolutory condition after a verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in that the impeached official retains all the post-employment privileges already earned unless otherwise declared by the competent tribunals. Until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law, retirement eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by impeachment on May 29, 2012. There being no such determination of liability, his entitlement thereto subsisted.75 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 67. Settled is the rule that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued during his/her tenure. This immunity from suit applies to President Rodrigo Duterte (President Duterte) regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him for as long as he sits as the President of the Republic of the Philippines.76 68. Estrada, thus, clarifies that presidential immunity is not absolute immunity from all types of suit. It simply cloths the president with immunity from civil, criminal, and administrative liability during his or her incumbency or tenure in office. Liability, therefore, is not absolved. It is merely held in abeyance until the president's end of incumbency.77 69. By petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima (Sen. De Lima) seeks to enjoin respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive of the Philippines, from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security. Indeed, the Constitution provides remedies for violations committed by the Chief Executive except an ordinary suit before the courts. The Chief Executive must first be allowed to end his tenure (not his term) either through resignation or removal by impeachment.78 70. Certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress, such as Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings. Only the President can invoke it. She may also authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case, the Executive Secretary must state that the Act is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with the President on such matters of concern.79 71. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution [e.g., Vice President appointed as a member of the Cabinet, Secretary of Justice sits as an ex-officio member on Judicial and Bar Council], hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure 75 I 76 NEPOMUCENO VS. DUTERTE, UDK No. 16838, May 11, 2021, EN BANC 77 DE LIMA VS. DUTERTE, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019; EN BANC – J Leonen Separate Concurring opinion 78 DE LIMA VS. DUTERTE, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019; EN BANC 79 Senate v. Ermita The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 19 of 95  be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.80 72. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, NO APPOINTIVE OFFICIAL shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.81 73. [T]hus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.82 74. These terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby.83 75. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so provided. It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or government controlled- corporations was concerned.84 76. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.85 77. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in his in his Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers 80 Section 13, Article VII 81 Art. IX-B; Section 7 82 Public Interest Group v. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006 83 Id., 84 FUNA VS. AGRA, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013 85 Id., The author reserves exclusive right over this material. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior consent from the author. | Atty. Red-Gelo M. Agbayani | [email protected] Page 20 of 95  lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.86 78. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights).87 The congress cannot, by law, require confirmation of appointments of government official other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. 16. 79. There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. An ad interim appointment that is by- passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A BY-PASSED APPOINTMENT is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.88 80. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.89 81. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appoin