Political Law Outline Reviewer 2014 PDF

OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 2014 Antonio E.B. Nachura  OUTLINE REVIEWER in POLITICAL LAW : by Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura 2014  Philippine Copyright 2014 All Rights Reserved Any copy of th...

OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 2014 Antonio E.B. Nachura  OUTLINE REVIEWER in POLITICAL LAW : by Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura 2014  Philippine Copyright 2014 All Rights Reserved Any copy of this book without the corresponding number and signature of the author on this page either proceeds from an illegitimate source or is in the possession of one who has no authority to dispose of the same. -*V ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA No. 9225 Printed by VJ GRAPHIC ARTS, INC. 2/F PDP Bldg., 1400 Quezon Avenue Quezon City, Metro Manila Philippines  TABLE OF CONTENTS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1. General Principles 1 II. The Philippine Constitution 2 III. The Philippines as a State 31 IV. The Fundamental Powers of the State 47 V. Principles and State Policies 73 VI. Bill of Rights 91 VII. Citizenship 232 VIII. The Legislative Department 251 IX. The Executive Department 281 X. The Judicial Department 309 XI. Constitutional Commissions 325 XII. Local Government 367 XIII. Accountability of Public Officers 367 XIV. National Economy and Patrimony 379 XV. Social Justice and Human Rights 392 XVI. Education, Science and Technology Arts, Culture and Sports 396 XVII. The Family 403 XVIII. General Provisions 403 XIX. Transitory Provisions 405 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW i. General Principles 413 II. Powers of Administrative Bodies 415 in. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 429 IV. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions 438 LAW OFPUBLIC OFFICERS i. General Principles 445 II. Eligibility and Qualifications 447 in. De Facto Officers 451 IV. Commencement of Official Relations 454 V. Powers and Duties of Public Officers 471 VI. Liability o Public Officers 476 VII. Rights of Public Officers 479 VIII. Termination of Official Relationship 487 ELECTION LAW I. General Principles 513 II. Commission on Elections 515 III. Voters: Qualification and Registration 515 IV. Political Parties 521 V. Candidates; Certificates of Candidacy 524 VI. Campaign; Election Propaganda; Contributions and Expenses 534 VII. Board of Election Inspectors; Watchers 537 VIII. Casting of Votes 539 IX. Counting of Votes 540 X. Canvass and Proclamation 544 XI. Pre-Proclamation Controversy 549 XII. Election Contests 559 XIII. Election Offenses 570 LOCAL GOVERNMENT I. General Principles 575 II. General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units 586 III. Municipal Liability 605 IV. Local Officials 610 V. Inter-Governmental Relations 628 VI. Local Initiative and Referendum 632 VII. Local Government Units 635 PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW I. General Principles 641 II. Subjects of International Law 646 III. Fundamental Rights of States 658 IV. Right to Territorial Integrity andJurisdiction 662 V. Right to Legation 675 VI. Treaties 682 VII. Nationality and Statelessness 689 VIII. Treatment of Aliens 692 IX. Settlement of Disputes 699 X. War and Neutrality 702 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Constitutional Law 1 I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES A. Political Law defined. That branch of public law which deals with the organization ,and operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory [People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887; Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77]. B. Scope/Divisions of Political Law. 1. Constitutional Law. The study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights [Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 1]. 2. Administrative Law. That branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines the competence of the administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his rights. 3. Law on Municipal Corporations. 4. Law of Public Officers. 5. Election Laws. C. Basis of the Study. 1. 1987 Constitution 2. 1973 and 1935 Constitutions 3. Other organic laws made to apply to the Philippines, e.g., Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of 1916, and Tydings-McDuffie Law of 1934. 4. Statutes, executive orders and decrees, and judicial decisions 5. U.S. Constitution. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW  2 Constitutional Law II. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION A. Nature of the Constitution. 1 Constitution defined. That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 4]. With particular reference to the Constitution of the Philippines: That written instrument enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic [Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6]. 2. Purpose. To prescribe the permanent framework of a system of government, to assign to the several departments their respective powers and duties, and to establish certain first principles on which the government is founded [11 Am. Jur. 606]. 3. Classification: a) Written or unwritten. Awritten constitution is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents; while an unwritten constitution consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles [Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp. 4-5]. b) Enacted (Conventional) or Evolved (Cumulative^. A conventional constitution is enacted, formally struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler; while a cumulative constitution is the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method [Cruz, ibid., p. 5]. c) Rigid or Flexible. A rigid Constitution is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process; while a flexible Constitution is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation [Cruz, ibid., p. 5]. 4. Qualities of a good written Constitution: a) Broad. Not just because it provides for the organization of the entire government and covers all persons and things within the territory of OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 3 the State but because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency. b) Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. c) Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in confusion and divisiveness among the people [Cruz, ibid,, pp. 5-6], 5. Essential parts of a good written Constitution: a) Constitution of Liberty. The series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights, e.g., Art. III. b) Constitution of Government. The series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its administration, and defining the electorate, e.g., Arts. VI, VII, VIII and IX. c) Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought about, e.g., Art. XVII. 6. Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution. a) In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, the Supreme Court made reference to the use of well- settled principles of constitutional construction, namely: First, verba leais. i. e., whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have a common use. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers. Thus, in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, it was held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision shall be examined in light of the history of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. Third, ut maais valeat auam pereat. i.e., the Constitution has to be OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 4 Constitutional Law interpreted as a whole. In Civil Liberties Union, it was declared that sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. b) If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. Again in Civil Liberties Union, supra., it was held that while it is permissible to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. We think it safer to construe the Constitution from what “appears upon its face”. The proper interpretation, therefore, depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof. c) In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered selfexecuting; mandatory rather than directory; and prospective rather than retroactive. d) Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. i) Thus, a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action [Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03, 1997]. ' ii) Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of this provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts [Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 5 B. Brief Constitutional History. 1. The Malolos Constitution. a) The Philippine Revolution of 1896. b) Proclamation of Philippine independence, at Kawit, Cavite, on June 12, 1898. c) Revolutionary Congress convened at Barasoain Church, Malolos, Bulacan, on September 15, 1898. Three drafts were submitted, namely, the drafts of Pedro Paterno, Apolinario Mabini and Felipe Calderon. d) The Calderon proposal was reported to the Congress on October 8, 1898, and the Congress approved the proposed Constitution on November 29, 1898. e) President Emilio Aguinaldo approved the same on December 23, 1898; Congress ratified it on January 20, 1899. f) Aguinaldo promulgated the Constitution the following day, along with the establishment of the Philippine Republic on January 21, 1899. g) This was the first republican constitution in Asia, framed by a revolutionary convention which included 40 lawyers, 16 physicians, 5 pharmacists, 2 engineers and 1 priest. The Constitution recognized that sovereign power was vested in the people, provided for a parliamentary government, acknowledged separation of powers, and contained a bill of rights. 2. The American Regime and the Organic Acts a) The Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The treaty of peace entered into between the US and Spain upon the cessation of the Spanish- American War. It provided, among others, for the cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the US. b) US President McKinley’s Instructions of April 7, 1900, to transform the military into a civil government as rapidly as conditions would permit. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise that part of the military power of the US President which is legislative in character was transferred from the military government to the Philippine Commission [first, the Schurman Commission, then, the Taft Commission]. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 6 Constitutional Law c) The Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of March 2, 1901 provided that all military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands shall be exercised in such manner x x x for the establishment of a civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion. On July 1, 1901, the Office of the Civil Governor was created, and the executive authority previously exercised by the military governor was transferred to the Civil Governor. d) The Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 continued the existing civil government, with the co mmitmentfrom the US Congress to convene and organize in the Philippines a legislative body of their own representatives. On October 16,1907, the Philippine Assembly was convened to sit as the Lower House in a bicameral legislature, with the Philippine Commission as the Upper House. e) The Jones Law [Philippine Autonomy Act] of August 29, 1916. It superseded the Spooner Amendment and the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was the principal organic act of the Philippines until November 15,1935, when the Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated (under the 1935 Constitution). It contained a preamble, a bill of rights, provisions defining the organization and powers of the departments of government, provisions defining the electorate, and miscellaneous provisions on finance, franchises and salaries of important officials. Executive power was vested in the Governor General, legislative power in a bicameral legislature composed of the Senate and House of Representatives, and judicial power in the Supreme Court, the Courts of First Instance and inferior courts. f) The Tydings-McDuffie Act [Philippine Independence Act] of March 24, 1934 authorized the drafting of a Constitution for the Philippines, the establishment of a Commonwelath Government and, after ten years, independence. 3. The 1935 Constitution a) Pursuant to the authority granted under the Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 4125 (May 26,1934) calling for the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. b) Election of delegates: July 10, 1934; Constitutional Convention inaugural: July 30,1934. c) Draft Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on February 8, 1935; brought to Washington on March 18, 1935, and on March OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 1 23, 1935, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt certified that the draft constitution conformed substantially with the Tydings-McDuffie Law. d) The Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite held on May 14, 1935. e) The Philippine Commonwealth established under the Constitution was inaugurated on November 15, 1935; full independence was attained with the inauguration of the (Third) Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. - f) The Constitution was amended in 1939: Ordinance appended to the Constitution, in accordance with the Tydings-Kocialkowski Act of August 7, 1939 [Resolution of Congress: September 15, 1939; Plebiscite: October 24, 1939] g) It was amended again in 1940: Changed President’s and Vice President’s term from six to four years, but no person shall serve as President for more than 8 years; changed the unicameral to a bicameral legislature; established an independent Commission on Elections [Resolution: April 11, 1940; Plebiscite: June 18, 1940] i) Another amendment was adopted in 1947: Parity Amendment, effective July 4, 1949, granting to Americans, for a period of twenty-five years, the same privileges as Filipinos in the utilization and exploitation of natural resources in the Philippines [Resolution: September 18, 1946; Plebiscite: March 11, 1947], See: Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1. 4. The Japanese (Belligerent) Occupation a) With the occupation of Manila, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed, on January 2, 1942, the military administration over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that “all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past”, and “all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before”. b) Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, organized the Philippine Executive Commission. c) Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 6, 1942, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 8 Constitutional Law the Courts of First Instance and Justices of the Peace Courts, with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with later instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Army in Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942. d) October 14, 1943, the (Second) Philippine Republic was inaugurated, with Jose P. Laurel as President. 5. The 1973 Constitution a) Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 1, March 16, 1967, increasing the membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180 b) RBH No. 2, March 16,1967, calling for a Constitutional Convention to revise the 1935 Constitution c) RBH No. 3, March 16, 1967, allowing members of Congress to sit as delegates in the Constitutional Convention without forfeiting their seats in Congress d) RBH 1 and RBH 3 were submitted to the people in a plebiscite simultaneously with local elections in November 1967, but both were rejected by the people. e) RBH No. 4, June 17, 1969, amending RBH No. 2, and authorizing that specific apportionment of delegates to the Constitutional Convention and other details relating to the election of delegates be embodied in an implementing legislation f) Republic Act No. 6132: Constitutional Convention Act of 1970. i) See Imbong v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28, where the constitutionality of the RA 6132 was challenged because it had to do with the calling of a Constitutional Convention but was not passed by % of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, voting separately. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the law, declaring that after Congress had exercised its constituent power by adopting RBH 2 and RBH 4, with the requisite % vote as required by the 1935 Constitution, it may, by simply exercising legislative power, pass a law providing for the details for the implementation of the resolutions passed in the exercise of its constituent power. g) Election of delegates: November 10, 1970; Constitutional Convention was inaugurated on June 1, 1971. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 9 i) Attempt of the Constitutional Convention to submit for ratification one resolution (reducing the voting age from 21 to 18) in a plebiscite to coincide with the 1971 local elections was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702. The Court held that when a Constitutional Convention is called for the purpose of revising the Constitution, it may not submit for ratification “piecemeal amendments”because the 1935 Constitution speaks of submission of the proposed amendments in “an election” (in the singular), and also because to allow the submission would deprive the people of a “proper frame of reference”. h) Presidential Proclamation No. 1081, on September 21, 1972: Declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. i) Constitutional Convention approved the draft Constitution on November 29, 1972. j) On November 30,1972, President Marcos issued a decree setting the plebiscite for the ratification of the new Constitution on January 15, 1973; on December 17, 1972, issued an order suspending the effects of Presidential Proclamation 1081 in order to allow free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.. i) Planas v. Comelec, 49 SCRA 105, and companion cases (collectively known as the Plebiscite Cases) sought to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite. The cases were eventually dismissed for being moot and academic when President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation 1102, declaring that the Constitution had been ratified and has come into force and effect. k) On December 23, 1972, President Marcos announced the postponement of the plebiscite, but it was only on January 7, 1973, that General Order No. 20 was issued, directing that the plebiscite scheduled on January 15,1973, be postponed until further notice, and withdrawing the order of December 17, 1972, suspending the effects of Pres. Proclamation 1081 which allowed free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. l) On December 31, 1972, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 86, organizing the Citizens Assemblies to be consulted on certain public issues; and on January 5, 1973, issued Presidential Decree No. 86-A, calling the Citizens Assemblies to meet on January 10-15, 1973, to vote on certain questions, among them: “Do you approve of the new Constitution?” and “Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?” OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW  10 Constitutional Law m) On January 17, 1973, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, declaring that the new Constitution had been ratified by the Citizens Assemblies, and “has thereby come into force and effect”. i) The validity of the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was challenged in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, and companion cases (collectively known as the Ratification Cases). The basic issues and the votes of the SC justices were: (1) Whether the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a justiciable question - Six justices said it is justiciable, three said it is political, and one justice qualified his vote. (2) Whether the new Constitution was validly ratified (with substantial if not strict compliance) conformably with the 1935 Constitution - Six justices said no, three said there was substantial compliance, and one qualified his vote. (3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new Constitution (with or without valid ratification) - Four justices said the people had already accepted the new Constitution, two said that there can be no free expression by the people qualified to vote of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under martial law, one said he is not prepared to state that a new Constitution once accepted by the people must be accorded recognition independently of valid ratification, and three expressed their lack of knowledge or competence to rule on the question because under a regime of martial law with the free expression of opinions restricted, they have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution. (4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief - Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions, while four were for giving due course to the petitions. (5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force - Four said yes by virtue of the people’s acceptance of the same, four said they could not with judicial certainty whether or not the people had accepted the Constitution, and two declared that the new Constitution is not in force, “with the result that there are not enough votes to declare tha the new Constitution is not in force”. The SC decision concluded: “Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six votes x x x. with four dissenting votes x x x all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. ” n) The 1973 Constitution was amended in 1976: Package often (10) amendments, proposed by Marcos on September 2, 1976, without specifying the particular provisions being changed. This package contained the infamous Amendment No. 6. The amendments were ratified in a plebiscite held on October 16, 1976. i) In Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, where the authority of President Marcos to propose amendments to the Constitution was challenged, OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 11 the high tribunal said: “If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative powers of the interim (National) Assembly (which was never convened), there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the functions of the Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, though peculiar, to its gross legislative power x x x (W)ith the interim Natiional Assembly not convened and only the President'and the Supreme Court in operation, the urge of absolute necessity renders it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution.” o) The Constitution was amended again on January 30, 1980: Restored original retirement age of judges to 70 years of age p) Another amendment was adopted on April 7, 1981: Restored the presidential system, while retaining certain features of the parliamentary system; granted natural-born Filipinos who had been naturalized in a foreign country the right to own a limited area of residential land in the Philippines q) Still another amendment was made on January 27,1984: Provided for new rules on presidential succession, replaced the Executive Committee with a revived Office of the Vice President, and changed the composition of the Batasan Pambansa r) Snap presidential election of 1986. i) A petition to prohibit the holding of the snap election was filed with the SC in Philippine Bar Association v. Comelec, 140 SCRA 455. But the petition was dismissed because considerations other than legal had already set in, the candidates were in the thick of the campaign, and the people were already looking forward to the election. s) February 22-25,1986: EDSAI People’s Revolution. See: Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Corazon Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986, where the Supreme Court held that the Cory Aquino government was not only a de facto but a de jure government. C. The 1987 Constitution. 1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution a) Proclamation No. 1, February 25, 1986, announcing that she (Corazon Aquino) and Vice President Laurel were assuming power. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 12 Constitutional Law b) Executive Order No. 1 [February 28, 1986] c) Proclamation No. 3, March 25,1986, announced the promulgation of the Provisional [Freedom] Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new Constitution. It adopted certain provisions of the 1973 Constitution, contained additional articles on the executive department, on government reorganization, and on existing laws. It also provided for the calling of a Constitutional Commission to be composed of 30-50 members, to draft a new Constitution. See: Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986; In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160. i) As stated in Proclamation No. 3, the EDSA revolution was “done in defiance of the 1973 Constitution”. The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)]. ii) During the interregnum, after the actual take-over of power by the revolutionary government (on February 25, 1986) up to March 24, 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution), the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during this interregnum, a person could not invoke an exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a Constitution nor a Bill of Rights [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10]. 2. Adoption of the Constitution a) Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of 50 members. b) Approval of draft Constitution by the Constitutional Commission on October 15, 1986. c) Plebiscite held on February 2, 1987. d) Proclamation No. 58, proclaiming the ratification of the Constitution. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 13 3. Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution: February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite when the people ratified the Constitution [De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602]. D. Amendment. 1. Amendment vs. Revision. a) Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, enumerates the distinctions between revision and amendment, as follows: Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks and balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the Constitution; while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. i) In determining whether the Lambino proposal involves an amendment or a revision, the Court considered the two-part test. First, the quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the “substance entirety” of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. Second, the qualitative test, which inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the Constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far-reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision”. ii) The Lambino proposal constituted a revision, not simply an amendment, of the Constitution, because it involved a change in the form of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and a shift from the present bicameral to a a unicameral legislature. 2 3 2. Constituent v. Legislative Power. See Imbong v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28, where the Supreme Court declared R.A. 6132 constitutional, as it merely provided the details for the implementation of Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) Nos. 2 and 4. 3. Steps in the amendatory process: a) Proposal [Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII]. The adoption of the suggested change in the Constitution. A proposed amendment may come from: OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW  14 Constitutional Law i.) Congress, by a vote of % of all its members. Majority of authorities opine that this is to be understood as 3/4 of the Senate and 3/4 of the House of Representatives. ia) See Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1, which is authority for the principle that the choice of method of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of the legislature. ii) Constitutional Convention, which may be called into existence either by a 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress, or (if such vote is not obtained) by a majority vote of all the members of Congress with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the people in a plebiscite [Sec. 3, Art. XVII]. iia) Three Theories on the position of a Constitutional Convention vis-a-vis the regular departments of government: (1) Theory of Conventional Sovereignty [Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613]; (2) Convention is inferior to the other departments [Wood’s Appeal, 79 Pa. 59]; (3) Independent of and co-equal to the other departments [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1], iii) People, through the power of initiative [Sec. 2, Art. XVI/]. Requisite: A petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. iiia) Limitation: No amendment in this manner shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor more often than once every five years thereafter. iiib) Under Republic Act No. 6735 [An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum], approved on August 4, 1989, initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three systems of initiative, namely: initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal or bararigay law, resolution or ordinance [Sec. 2(a), R.A. 6735]. Indirect Initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action [Sec. 2(b) R.A. 6735]. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 15 iiibl) In the Resolution (on the Motion for Reconsideration) in Lambino v. Comelec, the Court noted that the majority of the justices had voted to declare RA 6735 sufficient and adequate for a people’s intitiative. Lambino thus effectively abandoned the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, where the Supreme Court declared R.A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. iiic) Procedure. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition of the people. Thus, two essential elements must be present: (1) The people must author and sign the entire proposal; no agent or representative can sign in their behalf. (2) As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in the petition. The rationale for these requisites is that the signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he is signing, and more importantly, a loose interpretation of the subscription requirement would pose a significant potential for fraud. In Lambino, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing; they were not apprised of the nature and effect of the proposed amendments. Failure to comply with these requirements was fatal to the validity of the initiative petition [Lambino v. Comelec, supra.]. iiid) People’s initiative applies only to an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Apeople’s inititiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution, inasmuch as the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments, as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The Lambino initiative constituted a revision because it proposed to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary and the bicameral to a unicameral legislature. Thus, the people’s initiative as a mode to effect these proposed amendments was invalid [Lambino v. Comelec, supra.]. b) Ratification [Sec. 4, Art. XVII], The proposed amendment shall become part of the Constitution when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60 nor later than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or the Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition for initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII. i) i) Doctrine of proper submission. Because the Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which the plebiscite is to be held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time given to the people to determine the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment is adequate. Other related principles: OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 16 Constitutional Law ia) The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections [Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774; Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1; Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69]. ib) The use of the word “election" in the singular meant that the entire Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only; furthermore, the people have to be given a “proper frame of reference” in arriving at their decision. Thus, submission for ratification of piece-meal amendments by the Constitutional Convention (which is tasked to revise the Constitution) was disallowed since the people had, at that time, no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would be [Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702]. 4. Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is now regarded as subject to judicial review, because invariably, the issue will boil down to whether or not the constitutional provisions had been followed [Sanidad v. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333; Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 50], E. The Power of Judicial Review. 1. Judicial Review: The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139]. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld [Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183]. The power is inherent in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers. a) That duty is part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution which states: “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of Government” [Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792]. b) Explicit constitutional recognition of the power is also found in Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII, which provides, among others: “ x x x all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 17 decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberation on the issues in the case and voted thereon”. 2. Who may exercise the power. Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to decide constitutional questions. On the issue of whether the power can be exercised by lower courts, see: a) Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII, which prescribes the constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and implicitly recognizes the authority of lower courts to decide questions involving the constitutionality of laws, treaties, international agreements, etc.. Thus, in Ynotv. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, the Supreme Court said that the lower courts should not shy away from the task of deciding constitutional questions when properly raised before them. However, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA 444, it was held that the fact that the constitutional question was properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass upon the issue of constitutionality; every court should approach a constitutional question with grave care and considerable caution. b) In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, it was held that the Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the Supreme Court but also in Regional Trial Courts (RTC). Furthermore, BP. 129 grants RTCs the authority to rule on the conformity of laws and treaties with the Constitution. However, in all actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order or proclamation — and not just in actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies — notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory, as required in Sec. 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The purpose of this mandatory notice is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the action is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. 3. Functions of Judicial Review a) Checking b) Legitimating c) Symbolic [See: Salonga v. Pano, 134 SCRA 438] 4. Requisites of Judicial Review/lnquiry: a) Actual case or controversy. A conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence [Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998], OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 18 Constitutional Law In John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24, 2003, it was held that the controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests. It is not enough that the controversy exists at the outset; to qualify for adjudication, it is necessary that the actual controversy be extant at all stages of the review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed [Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct.2759 (2008)]. i) A request for an advisory opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But an action for declaratory relief is proper for judicial determination. See PACU v. Secretary of Education, 91 Phil 806; Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392; Perez v. Provincial Board, 113 SCRA 187. ii) The issues raised in the case must not be moot and academic, or because of subsequent developments, have become moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004] so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value [Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Tuazon, Jr., G.R. No. 132795, March 10, 2004], Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case [Royal Cargo Corporation v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 10305556, January 26, 2004] or dismiss it on ground of mootness [Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001]. iia) Thus, in Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal and Pimentel, G.R. No. 132986, May 19, 2004, because the term of the contested position had expired on June 30, 1998, the electoral contest had become moot and academic, and thus, there was no occasion for judicial review. In Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, where cases were filed questioning the declaration by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of a “state of rebellion” in Metro Manila (under General Order No. 1), the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions because on May 6, 2001, the President ordered the lifting of the “state of rebellion”, and, thus, the issue raised in the petitions had become moot and academic. Likewise, in Gonzales v. Narvasa, G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000, where the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was questioned, the Court dismissed the petition because by then the PCCR had ceased to exist having finished its work and having submitted its recommendations to President Estrada. Subsequent events had overtaken the petition and the Court had nothing left to rule upon. Similarly, in Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998, the Court declared that since witness Potenciano Roque had already been admitted into the Witness Protection Program and had actually finished testifying, the petition contesting the side opinion of the OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 19 Court of Appeals that the admission of Roque into the program could be made only if his testimony is substantially corroborated on material points, was held to have raised an issue which had become moot and academic. The same conclusion was reached in Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 93100, June 19, 1997, because Congress had already passed amendatory laws excluding fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of CARL, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed provisions had become moot and academic, and therefore, not ripe for judicial review. iib) In David v. Macapagai-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, the Supreme Court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of Presidential Proclamation 1021 (recalling Proclamation No. 1017 which declared a “state of emergency”) did not render the petitions moot and academic. There remained the need to determine the validity of Proclamation No. 1017 and G O. No. 5, because during the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal.acts in implementing it and only in resolving the issue can it be determined if the acts committed by the implementing officers were justified. iii) However, the moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., it was held that courts will still decide cases otherwise moot and academic if: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra.]; (b) there is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved [Lacson v. Perez, supra.] (c) the constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public [Salonga v. Pano, supra.]; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of review [Saniakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004]. iiia) Thus, the court decided Alunan III v. Mirasol, G.R. No. 108399, July 31, 1997, because it raised a question, otherwise moot, but “capable of repetition yet evading review”. In a U.S. case, it was held that the application of this principle presupposes that the life of the controversy is too short to be fully litigated prior to its termination, and that there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiff will again be subjected to the same problem. Saniakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, and companion cases, relative to the validity of the declaration by President Arroyo of a “state of rebellion” after the Oakwood incident, was similarly decided on that ground. iiib) The Court also exercised the power of judicial review even when the issue had become moot and academic in Salonga v. Pano, 134 ft OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 20 Constitutional Law SCRA 438, where it was held that the Court had the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules, and the symbolic function to educate the bench and the bar on the extent of protection given by the constitutional guarantees. Likewise, in Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, although the issue had become moot and academic because the policemen (alleged whistle-blowers) had already been removed from the Witness Protection Program, the Court still decided the case for the future guidance of the bench and the baron the application of RA 6981, and for the proper disposition of the issue on whether the two policemen should return whatever monetary benefits they may have received under the program. iv) Some cases showing the existence of an actual case or controversy: In Tanadav. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, on the challenge posed by the petitioners that the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement violated the Constitution, particularly Sec. 19, Art. II (which mandates the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy), the Supreme Court held that this was a justiciable controversy, because where an action of the Legislature is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. In Op/e v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141, it was held that the petition’s ripeness for adjudication was not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of Administrative Order No. 308 (Adopting a National Computerized Identification Reference System) had not yet been promulgated, because Senator Ople assailed AO 308 as invalid per se and infirm on its face; thus, his action was not premature. After all, the implementing rules could not cure the fatal defects of the Administrative Order. v) Some cases held not ripe for judicial determination. In Montesclaros v. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002, it was held that a proposed bill is not subject to judicial review, because it creates no rights and imposes no duties enforceable by the courts. In Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211, the petition to declare RA 7854 (converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City) as unconstitutional was dismissed, because it was premised on many contingent events the happening of which was uncertain; petitioner, thus, posed a hypothetical issue which had not yet ripened into an actual case or controversy. In Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489, for failure of the petitioners to allege that they had applied for exemption, or that it would have been futile to apply for exemption, from DOLE Circular No. 1-91 (banning deployment outside the Philippines of Filipino performing artists below 23 years of age), the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as having been prematurely filed; thus, there is no actual case or controversy. Similarly, in Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272, the Court noted that PPI failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 21 the Comelec designed to enforce or implement Sec. 8, Res. No. 2772; thus, the case was deemed not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy. In Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, because the petitioner had not shown that he was prevented from performing his duties as Consultant of the DPWH by the challenged provisions of RA 7279, it was held that there was no actual case or controversy. In Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, inasmuch a? respondents Optometry Practitioners Association of the Philippines, Cenvis Optometrist Association, et al., failed to show that they are juridical entities (as certified by the Securities and Exchange Commission), they cannot be deemed real parties in interest in whose name the action may be prosecuted. Neither can some individuals be considered parties in representation of the optometrists, as their names do not appear in the registry list of the Board. Thus, there is no actual case or controversy yet, because an actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. b) The constitutional question must be raised bv the proper party. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. To be a proper party, one must have “legal standing”, or locus standi. i) Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question [Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991]. In private suits, standing is governed by the real parties in interest rule, as contained in Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit [Salonga v. Warner Barnes, 88 Phil. 125], The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits where the plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing the validity of an official act, and he does so as a representative of the general public. To establish legal standing, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and securing relief as a citizen or taxpayer [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.]. ia) To determine legal standing, the Court, in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, adopted the direct injury test, which states that a person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result. In IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, it was clarified that the term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the challenged official act, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW  Constitutional Law ib) However, in numerous decisions particularly in recent ones, the Supreme Court has adopted a liberal attitude and recognized the legal standing of petitioners who have invoked a public right allegedly breached by a governmental act. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Supreme Court summarized its earlier rulings and declared that petitioners may be accorded standing to sue provided that the following requirements are met: (1) The case involves constitutional issues: (2) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional (the prevailing doctrine is that taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national government or by government-owned or -controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law [Abaya v. Ebdane, 515 SCRA 720]; (3) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question: (4) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early: and (5) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators. ic) To this enumeration may be added the ruling in People v. Vera, supra., where the Supreme Court declared that the Government of the Philippines is a proper party to question the validity of its own laws, because more than any one, it should be concerned with the constitutionality of its acts. In that case, it was held that the government has substantial interest in having the Probation Law declared as unconstitutional, because more than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal would inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. ii) Illustrative cases: proper party. In David v. Macapagal Arroyo, the Court held that all the petitioners were proper parties. David and Llamas, as they alleged “direct injury” from the “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by the police officers in the enforcement of PP 1017; the opposition Congressmen who alleged usurpation of legislative powers by the President; the Alternative Law Group, under the liberality rule as the issue involved a public right; KMU as an organization for asserting the rights of their members; and the other petitioners, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. In Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, even as petitioner Chavez had not met the requisite legal standing, the Court took cognizance of the case consistent with the principle that it will not wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest. In Senate v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, on the issue of the validity of Calibrated Preempted Response (CPR), Bayan Muna was held to have locus standi because it is a party-list group with three seats in the House of Representatives entitled to participate in the legislative process; OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 23 the three Bayan Muna representatives, on the basis of their allegation that their rights and duties as members of the Hoouse of Representatives had been infringed; and Chavez, for having asserted a public right, his being a citizen is sufficient. In Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008, the Court declared that non-governmental organizations, Congress persons, citizens and taxpayers have legal standing to file the petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to produce a copy of the Japan Philippines Economic Package Agreement (JPEPA), as the petition is anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern which is a public right. In Anak Mindanao Party List Group (AMIN) v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007, it was held that AMIN, as member of Congress, had legal standing to institute the suit questioning the validity of Executive Order No. 364 placing the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP under the supervision and control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. iia) In Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, the petitioner, an association consisting of rank-and-file employees in the Commission on Human Rights, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission, resulting in the demoralization of rank-and-file employees. This, according to the Supreme Court, meets the injury test. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003, the petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, were declared proper parties because they stood to lose their source of livelihood by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts. The financial prejudice brought about by the said PIATCO contracts on them are legitimate interests sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing to file the instant petitions. The Province of Batangas was held to have legal standing to question the validity of the provisions of the General Appropriation Act and the guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution relative to projects funded from the internal revenue allotment, inasmuch as the petitioner had an interest in its share in the national taxes [Provinice of Batangas v. Romulo, supra.]. iib) In Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141, the Supreme Court held that Senator Bias Ople was a proper party to question the constitutionality of AO 308 in his capacity as Senator, as taxpayer and as member of the GSIS. As Senator, he had the requisite standing to bring suit assailing the issuance of the AO as a usurpation of legislative power; as taxpayer and GSIS member, he could impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of the GSIS to implement the AO. In Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, it was held that where the Presidential veto is claimed to have been made in 24 Constitutional Law excess of authority, the issue of impermissible intrusion by the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises. To the extent that the power of Congress is impaired, so is the power of each member thereof. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by any member of Congress. The same ruling was made in Del Mar v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000, where members of Congress sought to prevent PAGCOR from managing, maintaining and operating jai alai. This vyas reiterated in Jaworski v. PAGCOR,419 SCRA 420, where Senator Jaworski was held to have legal standing to question the operation of a jai alai fronton by PAGCOR on the ground that it needs a legislative francshise. A similar conclusion was reached in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra., where Representatives Suplico, et al., and Senator Pimentel were considered as proper parties to contest the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s proclamation of a “state of rebellion” after the Oakwood incident. iic) In Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334, even as it was held that the petitioners, as members of Congress, did not have locus standi to question the bidding and sale of the 40% block of Petron shares to Aramco in the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, nonetheless, they were allowed to bring action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, infra. In KMU Labor Center v. Garcia, 239 SCRA 386, the Court held that KMU members who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys every day are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increases in passenger fares." They are, therefore, proper parties to contest the validity of DOTC memoranda, etc., authorizing provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease transportation fares. In the same vein, an association of registered recruitment agencies had legal standing to question the constitutionality of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, in order to assert the concern of its constituents. iii) Illustrative cases; not proper parties. In Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157509, January 18,2005, the petitioners, composed often labor unions, seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 185, dated March 10, 2003, which transfer administrative supervision over the NLRC from the NLRC Chairman to the Secretary of Labor, could not show that their members sustained or were in danger of sustaining injury from EO 185. This was because the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor did not extend to the power to review, revise, reverse or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, supra., petitioners Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 25 were declared to be without legal standing. Citing Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, the Supreme Court said that petitioners are juridical persons not subject to arrest. Even if they were “people’s organizations”, they still would have no requisite personality, as held in Kilosbayan v. Morato, infra.. Neither were petitioners Social Justice Society Officers/Members, in their capacity as taxpayers and citizens, proper parties. In Domingo v. Carague, G.R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005, the petitioners failed to show any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan; there was no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation; and they admitted that “they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents”. Clearly, then, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit. In Cutaran v. DENR, G.R. No. 134958, January 31, 2001, the Supreme Court refused to give due course to a petition seeking to enjoin the DENR from processing the ancestral land claim of private respondent over a property located at Camp John Hay reservation in Baguio, on the ground that there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioner’s asserted right. Courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its legality. Until such time, petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at a future time. In Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568, the petitioners having failed to show that they were the owners of the masters’ paintings and antique silverware, were not deemed proper parties to enjoin the PCGG from selling at public auction the aforesaid items seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum as allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 337, it was held that the petitioner, an association of lawyers of radio and television broadcast companies, was not a proper party, because the members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered any injury as a result of Sec. 92, B.P. 881. They do not have any interest as registered voters, because the case does not involve the right of suffrage. Neither do they have an interest as taxpayers because the case does not include the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. (However, a co-petitioner, a broadcast company, was deemed to have locus standi because it would suffer losses from the implementation of Sec. 92, B.P. 881, since it would be required to give free airtime to the Comelec.) Likewise, in Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the petition seeking to nullify the order of President Estrada for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the Metro Manila area, was dismissed on the ground that the IBP had no legal standing to question the presidential act. 26 Constitutional Law iv) Related principles: iva) A party’s standing in court is a procedural technicality, which mav be set aside bv the Court in view of the importance of the issues involved. Thus, where the issues raised by the petitioners are of paramount public interest, the Court may, in the exercise of its discretion, brush aside the procedural barrier [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110]. This was reiterated in Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997 (and in the companion case, Lagman v. Torres, G.R. No. 127867), where, because of the far-reaching importance of the validity of R.A. 8180 deregulating the downstream oil industry, the Supreme Court brushed aside technicalities and took cognizance of the petition. Similarly, in Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s submission that the petitioners, by their being lawyers, are not invested with sufficient personality to institute the action, aside from their having failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury. But because of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petition, the Court in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushed aside the procedural barrier and took cognizance of the petitions. Likewise, in Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, it was held that the subject matter of the case is “a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest”; in other words, it is of “paramount public interest” and of “transcendental importance”. The nation”s political and economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections; accordingly, the award for the automation of the electoral process was a matter of public concern, imbued with the public interest. This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our society”. ivb) A taxpayer, or group of taxpayers, is a proper party to question the validity of a law appropriating public funds [Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702; Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333], In Chavezv. Public Estates Authority and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 09, 2002, the Supreme Court said that the petitioner has legal standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petitioner seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. In this case, there were two constitutional issues involved: first, the right of the citizen to information on matters of public concern; and second, the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. In Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436, it was held that the prevailing doctrine in taxpayer suits is to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or -controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 27 law (citing the Kilosbayan ruling). Accordingly, in Information Technology Foundation v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, reiterated the principle that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement of public funds”, or if public money is being “deflected to any improper purpose”, or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from “wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law”. In this case, the individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used, claiming that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the contract contrary to law and regulations. Likewise, in Brillantes v. Comelec, G.R.No. 163193, June 15, 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that the representatives of political parties and the citizens’ arms authorized to conduct an unofficial quick count are proper parties to question the Comelec resolution directing the transmission to it electronically by computers of the results of the elections in the precincts, to be used for advanced unofficial tabulation. In Jumamil v.Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, the petitioner, as taxpayer, was held to be a proper party to question the constitutionality of several municipal resolutions and ordinances appropriating certain amounts for the construction of stalls in a public market, as well as the lease contracts entered into pursuant thereto. Considering the importance to the public of the suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the case. ivb1) In Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, it was held that the Court has discretion on whether a taxpayer suit may be given due course. v) Facial challenge. The established rule is that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. The exception is the so-called ‘facial challenge”. But the only time a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the “overbreadth doctrine” permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute “on its face”, rather than “as applied”, is permitted in the interest of preventing a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression [Justice Mendoza’s concurring opinion in Cruz v. DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 06, 2000], A facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the ' challenge must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid [Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001]. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 28 Constitutional Law va) In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., the Court held that a facial review of PP 1017 using the overbreadth doctrine is uncalled for. First, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their face statutes in free speech cases, not for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered “harmful” and “unconstitutionally protected conduct”. The incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be used sparingly and only as a last resort, thus, is generally disfavored. A facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. vb) Void-for-Vagueness. Related to “overbreadth”, this doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is subject to the same principles governing the “overbreadth” doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., cited in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008]. The test to determine whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The Court has stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. Thus, Sec. 45 (j) of R.A. No. 8189 which provides that violation of any of the provisions of the law is an election offense is specific enough, since as held in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “a statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining tehm, much less do we have to define every word we use [Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra.]. vb1) As to the issue of vagueness, the petitioners did not attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in its application. They failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017 [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.]. c) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. In Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, it was OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it In the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, If not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. i) Thus, in Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006, where the petitioner, who had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman for dishonesty and grave misconduct, raised the issue of constitutionality of the provision in RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) for the first time before the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that petitioner raised the issue at the earliest opportunity. He could not raise it in his motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, because the Office of the Ombudsman is without jurisdiction to entertain questions of the constitutionality of a law. ii) But in Umali v. Guingona, G.R. No. 131124, March 21, 1999, the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Commission on Anti- Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) was not entertained because the issue was raised by the petitioner only in his motion for reconsideration before the RTC of Makati. It was too late to raise the issue for the first time at that stage of the proceedings. iii) However, in criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the court; in civil cases, the question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the case itself; and in every case, except when there is estoppel, it can be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court [People v. Vera, supra., Zandueta v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 115]. d) The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself. Because of the doctrine of separation of powers which demands that proper respect be accorded the other departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other basis that can be used for a decision. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case. See: Zandueta v. de la Costs, supra.; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294. i) In Planters Products v. Fertiphll Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, where Fertiphil Corporation sought the refund of the capital recovery component it had paid to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority levied under LOI No. 1465 by challenging the validity of the LOI, the Supreme Court held that the issue of constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine the claim without resolving the issue of constitutionality. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 30 Constitutional Law ii) However, In Tarrosa v. Singson, 232 SCRA 553, the Court refrained from passing upon the constitutionality of the assailed provision in R.A, 7653 (which provided that the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments) because of the principle that bars judicial inquiry into a constitutional question unless the resolution thereof is indispensable to the determination of the case. In Ty v. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500, the Court stressed that it will not pass upon a question of constitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. Likewise, in Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, supra., since the issue was primarily for accounting and specific performance which could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. 579, the Court refused to exercise the power of judicial review. iii) In Arceta v. Judge Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004, in a new challenge to the constitutionality of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court did not find the constitutional question to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy. Every law has in its favour the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 5. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality. Two views: - a) Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all. See Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines. b) Modern view: Courts simply refuse to recognize the law and determine the rights of the parties as if the statute had no existence. See: Manila Motors v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738; Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB, 35 SCRA 429; Republic v. Henda, 119 SCRA 411. Certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. See: Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569. Thus, a public officer who implemented an unconstitutional law prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality cannot be held liable [Ynot v. IAC, supra], 6. Partial Unconstitutionality. Requisites: a) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and b) The valid portion can stand independently as law. See: In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534; Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 31 III. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE A. Definition of a State. A community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of external control, and possessing a government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience. See: Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23. 1. Distinguished from Nation. State is a legal or juristic concept, while nation is an ethnic or racial concept. 2. Distinguished from Government. Government is merely an instrumentality of the State through which the will of the State is implemented and realized. B. Elements of a State.. 1. People. a) Different meanings as used in the Constitution: (i) Inhabitants [Sec. 2, Art. Ill; Sec. 1, Art. XIII]; (ii) Citizens [Preamble; Secs. 1 & 4, Art. II; Sec. 7, Art. Ill]; (iii) Electors [Sec. 4, Art. VII]. b) As requisite for Statehood: Adequate number for self-sufficiency and defense; of both sexes for perpetuity. 2. Territory [Art. I; R.A. 3046; R.A. 5446]. a) The National Territory: “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas” [Sec. 1, Art. !]. b) Components: Terrestrial, Fluvial, Maritime and Aerial domains. c) The Philippine Archipelago: (i) Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898 (Cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain to the United States); (ii) Treaty between Spain and US at Washington, November 7, 1900 (Cagayan, Sulu & Sibuto); (iii) Treaty between US and Great Britain, January 2, 1930 (Turtle & Mangsee Islands). OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW 32 Constitutional Law d) Other territories over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction. (i) Batanes [1935 Constitution]; (ii) Those contemplated in Art. I, 1973 Constitution [belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title]; (iii) PD 1596, June 11, 1978. e) Archipelago Doctrine: “The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines” [2nd sentence, Sec. 1, Art II i) This articulates the archipelagic doctrine of national territory, based on the principle that an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated by bodies of water, should be treated as one integral unit. ii) Straight baseline method: Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the outermost points of outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be considered internal waters; while the breadth of the territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines. iii) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [April 30,1982; ratified by the Philippines in August, 1983] provides (i) Contiguous Zone of 12 miles; (ii) Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles. Although the contiguous zone and most of the exclusive economic zone may not, technically, be part of the territory of the.State, nonetheless, the coastal State enjoys preferential rights over the marine resources found within these zones. See also P.D. 1599, June 11, 1978. 3. Government a) Defined. The agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized. See U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil 332. i) i) Government of the Philippines is “the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government" [Sec. 2 (1), Administrative Code of 1987]. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 33 b) Functions: i) Traditionally, the functions of government have been classified into constituent, which are mandatory for the Government to perform because they constitute the very bonds of society, such as the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and property rights, the administration of justice, etc; and ministrant, those intended to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people, and which are merely optional for Government to perform. ii) In Romualdez-Yap v. Civil Service Commission, 225 SCRA 285, the Court declared that a distinction can be made on the validity of the reorganization between a government bureau or office performing constituent functions (like the Bureau of Customs) and a government-owned or -controlled corporation performing ministrant functions (like the PNB). Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental, but a private sector, endeavor. It is an optional function of government. [However, reorganization in either must meet a common test, the test of good faith.] In Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486, the Supreme Court said that the functions of government are classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and therefore compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. iii) In Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20,2001, it was held that the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), created under R.A. 7227, performs functions which are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal for enhancement, in general, do not make BCDA equivalent to Government. Other corporations, such as SSS, GSIS, NIA, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not invested with government attributes. [Thus, with the transfer to BCDA of Camp Wallace, the government no longer had a right or interest to protect; the real party in interest to recover the property is, thus, the BCDA, not the Republic of the Philippines.] iv) In PVTA v. CIR, 65 SCRA 416, the Court noted that the distinction between the two functions had become blurred. See also Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, where the Supreme Court declared that, as early as the 1935 Constitution, we had already repudiated the laissez faire doctrine. The repudiation of the laissez faire doctrine is reiterated in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998, where it was held that although the 1987 Constitution enshrines free OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW  34 Constitutional Law enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare, as reflected in Secs. 6 and 19, Art. XII. c) Doctrine of Parens Patriae. Literally, parent of the people. As such, the Government may act as guardian of the rights of people who may be disadvantaged or suffering from some disability or misfortune. See Government of the Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738; Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94. d) Classification: i) De jure vs. De facto. See: Co Kim Chan v. Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113; Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, supra.. ia) Kinds of de facto government: That which takes possession or control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter; that which is established by the inhabitants of a territory who rise in insurrection against the parent state; and that which is established by the invading forces of an enemy who occupy a territory in the course of war. The last is denominated a de facto government of paramount force. ii) Presidential vs. parliamentary government. The principal distinction is that in a presidential government, there is separation of executive and legislative powers (the first is lodged in the President, while the second is vested in Congress); while in a parliamentary government, there is fusion of both executive and legislative powers in Parliament, although the actual exercise of the executive powers is vested in a Prime Minister who is chosen by, and accountable to, Parliament. iii) Unitary vs. federal government. A unitary government is a single, centralized government, exercising powers over both the internal and external affairs of the State; while a federal government consists of autonomous state (local) government units merged into a single State, with the national government exercising a limited degree of power over the domestic affairs but generally full direction of the external affairs of the State. 4. Sovereignty a) Defined: The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed. OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW Constitutional Law 35 b) Kinds: i) Legal, which is the power to issue final commands; or Political, which is the sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law. ii) Internal, or the supreme power over everything within its territory; or External, also known as independence, which is freedom from external control. c) Characteristics: permanence, exclusiveness, comprehensive- ness, absoluteness, indivisibility, inalienability, imprescriptibility. See Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856. d) Effects of change in sovereignty: Political laws are abrogated [People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887; Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77]; municipal laws remain in force [Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 US 345]. e) Effects of belli