International Institutions and War PDF

1~4 International institutions and war Collective security organizations ○ After WWI, US president Woodrow Wilson argued for a permanent peace promoting institutions ■ The League of Nations was formed 1919 ■ Forced to die with the start of WWII ○ UN created in 1945 to replace LoN ○ Both the LoN and...

1~4 International institutions and war Collective security organizations ○ After WWI, US president Woodrow Wilson argued for a permanent peace promoting institutions ■ The League of Nations was formed 1919 ■ Forced to die with the start of WWII ○ UN created in 1945 to replace LoN ○ Both the LoN and UN are examples of collective security organizations: ■ CSO: institutions that facilitate cooperation among their members ■ Believing that all states have a common interest in preventing war ■ International security as public goods ● Eg. Korean military industries benefit from the Ukrainian war. As SK. sells artilery to Poland who are preparing their defense in the cases Russia attacks ● Consequences of war, fuel ■ Public goods are undersupplied so an institution is formalized to make it stable ○ An attack on one member is considered an attack on the whole community ■ Goal to deter the attacker ○ Collective security organizations vs. alliances ■ Alliances have a common interest, CSO may have conflicting interests ■ Alliances have stronger mandates ■ Broader interests in CSO ■ Regular joint military exercises in alliances ● The dilemmas of collective security ○ Two major challenges: ■ Collective action problem ■ Joint decision making problems ■ After WWI, US president Woodrow Wilson argued for a permanent peace promoting institutions ● The League of Nations was formed 1919 ● Forced to die with the start of WWII ■ UN created in 1945 to replace LoN ■ Both the LoN and UN are examples of collective security organizations: ● CSO: institutions that facilitate cooperation among their members ● Believing that all states have a common interest in preventing war ● International security as public goods ○ Eg. Korean military industries benefit from the Ukrainian war. As SK. sells artilery to Poland who are preparing their defense in the cases Russia attacks ○ Consequences of war, fuel ● Public goods are undersupplied so an institution is formalized to make it stable ■ An attack on one member is considered an attack on the whole community ● Goal to deter the attacker ■ Collective security organizations vs. alliances ● Alliances have a common interest, CSO may have conflicting interests ● Alliances have stronger mandates ● Broader interests in CSO ● Regular joint military exercises in alliances ○ The dilemmas of collective security ■ Two major challenges: ● Collective action problem ● Joint decision making problems ○ A collective action problem arises becuase: ■ International peace and security is a public good ■ Member states are tempted to free-ride ○ Challenges of joint/collective decision making ■ Determining which acts are considered threats to the community ■ Deciding which states are aggressors ■ Selecting the right response to the aggressors Institutional settings of collective security organizations ● In the LoN and UN, decision-making powers was mostly held by the strongest states in the system ● The UN Security Council ○ 10 permanent member ○ The permanent 5 (P5) with Veto Power: the US, Britain, France, Russia, and China ● Advantages of granting authority to powerful states: ○ Reduces the cost of coming to an agreement ○ Fewer decision -makers mean quicker responses ○ Actions have consent of the strongest powers ○ Yet, permanent member veto allows for biased policy outcomes ● Collective security organizations are most likely to succeed when: ○ Powerful member states agree on the desirability of collective action ○ Enough members value the collective good to pay the costs of action ○ Successful cases ■ The Korean War ■ The Gulf War What does the UN do? ● The Security Council can authorize two different kinds of military operations: ○ A peace-enforcing operation ■ ● A peacekeeping operation ○ The United Nations has also sought to prevent violence within states: peacekeeping ○ Typically requires a host nation agreement ○ Pressure for the UN to deal with human rights issues, such as genocide ■ ● Tend to be more heavily armed and are generally targeted against perceived aggressors. Genocide: the systematic slaughter of an identifiable group of people UNSC Resolution 1674, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative, April 2006, asserts the UN’s responsibility to protect populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.” The “Triumph of the Lack of Will”: Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Darfur ● ● ● ● ● ● ● After the Gulf War, multiple crises exposed the limits of the UN. A civil war in Bosnia was the bloodiest of several wars after the breakup of Yugoslavia. ○ Bosnia was home to three ethnic groups: the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims When Bosnia declared its independence in 1992, militant Serbs and Croats rebelled. ○ 300,000 were killed, mostly civilians ○ At least 2 million became homeless Despite unanimous condemnation of the violence, the UN responded half-heartedly. In 1994, a conflict erupted in Rwanda between the country’s two ethnic groups: the Hutu and the Tutsi. ○ 800,000 people were killed, including 75% of the Tutsi population After 10 peacekeepers were killed on the first day, Belgium withdrew its forces and other nations followed suit. Since 2003, government-supported militias have carried out systematic killings of civilians in western Sudan. ○ Member states of the UN have been unwilling to support a military operation to end the violence From 9/11 to Iraq: Consensus Lost ● ● ● US efforts to mount a war against Iraq after the 9/11 attacks divided the Security Council. The UN faces two essential requirements: ○ UN operations must not threaten the interests of veto-holders ○ Member states must devote resources and take necessary risks ■ => Fundamental limitations of a (powerful)-member-driven organization The UN does make a difference? ○ Plays a constructive role in organizing peacekeeping efforts ○ Helps facilitate joint decision-making without “reinventing the wheel.” Conclusion: Are Poor Police Better Than None? ● ● ● ● ● Is it worth having alliances and collective security organizations? Former UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjold: ○ “The UN was not created to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell” ○ Hammarskjold’s statement reminds us that even an imperfect police force may be better than none. It is likely that the world would be a more violent place without alliances and collective security organizations. Institutions such as NATO can be a source of peace through credible deterrence. The UN is most successful when strong states agree, and when at least one strong state takes an interest in the conflict and is willing to pay costs.