Sunningdale Agreement 1973 PDF

What was the Significance of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and why did it fail? Opening : [Why significant and why failed] The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was hugely significant to the development of peace in Northern Ireland. The agreement centred around the idea of **power-sharing;** it wo...

What was the Significance of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and why did it fail? Opening : [Why significant and why failed] The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was hugely significant to the development of peace in Northern Ireland. The agreement centred around the idea of **power-sharing;** it would involve both nationalist and unionist politicians sharing the control of Northern Ireland. **It was the first of its kind** and went on to influence other agreements that followed because unfortunately, the Sunningdale Agreement did not last and failed after only five months. It was inevitably a complete failure but that does not mean that it didn't hold great significance; **it shaped agreements** like the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Downing Street Declaration and the Good Friday Agreement. [Origins: where idea came from( 1972 worst year of Troubles)] The beginning of the Sunningdale Agreement can be traced back to the start of **1972,** with the tragic event of **Bloody Sunday.** It all began with a peaceful march that ended with extreme violence. On the thirtieth of January, an anti-internment march planned by Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) went ahead despite it not being allowed by the police; they called for any IRA men to leave their guns at home, in order for it to be a peaceful march. The purpose of this march was to turn the country's eye towards the people who were wrongly detained as political prisoners. Fifteen thousand people arrived for the march, but due to the large number of people there was a miscommunication over the course the march would take. A portion of the marchers turned down the wrong way and broke away from the rest of the group; this is where it all went wrong. General Ford turned the army on the Young Derry Houligans by telling the army to shoot any ''ringleaders''; the paramilitaries were unsuitable for crowd control as they were taught to react with maximum force. When the marchers met the paramilitaries, they began to throw projectiles at the paramilitaries such as stray bricks. Their projectiles were met with rubber bullets and CS gas. Ford ordered for rounds to be fired on the crowd, despite it being filled with innocent men, women and children. In total there were over one hundred and eighty rounds fired into the crowd. Soldiers later claimed to have been shot at by IRA members, however there were no guns found on any of the marchers and none of the soldiers were injured. At the end of the brutal bloodbath, there were thirteen people dead, one woman and twelve men, and thirteen people were injured with seven of the thirteen being nineteen and under. The majority of the victims were shot in the back proving that they were attacked without any way for them to defend themselves. The Derry coroner was quoted after saying '' I say without reservation it was clear, unadulterated murder''. The tension led to an immediate increase in tensions and violence in the city of Derry. **The English Prime Minister, Edward Heath, decided that Northern Ireland was completely out of control and closed down Stormont.** It was decided that direct rule would be implemented in Northern Ireland and a Secretary of State would be appointed instead. It was a highly significant event that shaped Northern Ireland's history. [William Whitelaw and his twin track approach] **William Whitelaw was appointed as the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland under direct rule;** he was an English conservative and knew very little about Northern Ireland and its very fragile ecosystem. Faulkner described him as '' a large, genial, and humane man who was armed with wrong ideas about our problems'' and said he '' had the necessary sense of humour to allow him to survive in Northern Ireland''. Whitelaw knew that if he was to succeed in Northern Ireland then he would have to win over the Catholics and Nationalists. To do this he had three main ideas: restrain the British army, phase out internment, and persuade the IRA to put an end to the violence. But he also knew that he couldn't neglect the Protestants and Unionists, so he had ideas to appease them as well: restore order and get police into the no-go areas. If peace was reached he could create a new framework for the constitution that would give the minority a role in government; this was the main idea of power-sharing. Whitelaw was the mind behind the **''twin track'' approach;** which meant that the opposing parties would work alongside each other in government. **Whitelaw held a border poll t**o ease the Unionists\' worries regarding this idea; this poll wasn't an accurate representation because it was boycotted by Nationalists and the result ended up being ninety-nine percent in favour of remaining a part of the UK. **Whitelaw then wrote a White Paper** stating the four parts that would make up this new twin track approach: an Assembly, the Executive, the Council of Ireland, and a guarantee that Northern Ireland would stay a part of the UK as long as that is what the majority of the population voted for.However, cracks already began to form soon after the White Paper's release. Unionists were split over Whitelaw's idea; Faulkner and the other moderates pledged their support whereas Paisley, the DUP, the Vanguard Party, the Orange Order were all unpledged and were led by Harry West. The Nationalists were also split; the SDLP party representing the moderate nationalists welcomed the idea of power-sharing as it would significantly improve Catholic's standing in the government whereas the Republicans rejected the idea as they thought it reinforced the idea of partition. **The parties were at odds** within themselves which is why there were so many cracks in the Sunningdale Agreement before it barely began; it is why it failed so quickly. [Initial concerns.] Faulkner struggled to unite those in his party and those outside of it, saying '' We are not prepared to participate in a government with those whose primary objective is to break union with Great Britain''. **The Unionists biggest concerns centred around the idea of the Council of Ireland.** It went to an Assembly election and the result ended up being sixty-four percent in favour for power-sharing and thirty-four percent against it. These results disappointed Whitelaw as it showed just how deep the divisions were in Northern Ireland. The lack of enthusiasm for the White Paper proposals was evident; Faulkner's party only won twenty-four seats and 211,00 first-preference seats while Anti- White Paper won twenty-six seats and 230,00 first-preference votes. Even two of Faukner's pledged unionists said they couldn't support a deal with the SDLP party. The Nationalists were also divided but this wasn't seen as Sinn Féin were not represented and the two cross-community parties only won nine seats between them. The Assembly met in July and it erupted into absolute rowdiness. The DUP and Vanguard parties called other members names, had a sit-in, and physically attacked other members. Despite all these objections, there was a clear majority in favour of a negotiated settlement. There were two stages to these negotiations: getting parties from both sides to agree to set up a power-sharing Executive to rule Northern Ireland and getting agreement between the Executive, the British government and the Irish government on a Council of Ireland and the role it should play. Talks to set up the Executive started on the fifth of October. There were six Unionists representatives led by Faulkner, six SDLP representatives led by Fitt, and three from Alliance led by Olive Napier. The meeting was chaired by William Whitelaw. The parties found it relatively easy to agree upon the principle of setting up the Executive; it would consist of eleven cabinet ministers, six of them being Unionists, four being SDLP, and one Alliance. The Council of Ireland as a concept was also agreed upon. Faulkner wanted a team of representatives from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to deal with matters such as tourism, whereas Hume wanted representatives from the Dáil and the Assembly to make up the Council of Ireland. He believed that the Council of Ireland should have wider powers and control things like policing. William Whitelaw sided with SDLP on this matter. **Days before the second round of negotiations for the Council of Ireland in Sunningdale, Heath pulled Whitelaw back to England to deal with trade unions** who were causing problems. **He was replaced by Francis Pym, who had no idea of the delicate intricacies of Northern Ireland.** This is one of the major reasons why the Sunningdale Agreement failed, since Whitelaw was a driving force behind it. The conference was left without his excellent negotiating abilities. [The Sunningdale Conference and agreement] The sixth of December 1973 marked the beginning of the conference at Sunningdale, Berkshire. Heath chaired all of the meetings and was very impatient towards the Unionists and held great admiration for Hume; Heath supported the Nationalists desire to expand the Council of Ireland and allow them to hold a greater power than originally proposed. There were many politicians from the Republic of Ireland as well, the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, and the Foreign Ministers, Gerry Fitzgerald and Conor Cruise O'Brien, were all present. **Faulkner and the British had hoped that the Irish government would agree to certain things in return for a Council of Ireland but they were gravely mistaken and were left disappointed. They wanted the Irish government to give them a guarantee that they would extradite IRA members, who were arrested in the Republic, to Northern Ireland for their trials. However this wasn't possible as it was up to the courts and the Irish government could not dictate what the judges decisions would be. Faulkner also wanted Articles 2 and 3 to be removed from the constitution. These articles offended Unionists as they claimed that the South had the right to rule the entire of the island. Irish ministers pointed out that they would have to hold a referendum in order to change the constitution; it was likely if one was held that Fianna Fáil would oppose any changes to the constitution and the referendum would fail. In the end, they claimed that the articles were only symbolic and held no power. The Irish government only felt comfortable with giving Faulkner a verbal commitment to more cooperation on policing and that they would release a statement saying that they recognised the right of Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority of the population wanted it to be.** On the ninth of December 1973, the conference came to an end. The agreement was decided upon and created a path for the Executive to take their place in the Northern Irish government. It took over on the first of January 1974, with **Brian Faulkner as the Chief Minister and Gerry Fitt as the Deputy Minister;** but it wasn't long before the opposition began to devise plans to tear apart the Sunningdale Agreement. Those against were trying to make it fail from the moment the agreement was signed, which is why it inevitably fell apart. [Problems] It was once quoted that the '**'ink was hardly dry on the agreement''** before people started pulling at the agreement. There were even some plotting the downfall of the agreement during the conferences; on the sixth of December, the Orange Order, the DUP, Vanguard, and unpledged members of the Unionist party, like Harry West, came together to form the United Ulster Unionist Council or the UUUC. Its main purpose was to resist power-sharing and the Council of Ireland. Four days after the Executive came into effect, the Ulster Unionist Council, the governing body of Faulkner's party, called for a meeting; a motion was passed opposing the Council of Ireland with a vote of 427 to 374. **Faulkner then resigned as leader of the Unionist** party and was replaced by Harry West. Agreement was not bringing peace like it had promised, it was dividing people daily. It did little in stopping the violence of the IRA and the Loyalist terrorist groups. Faulkner was then undermined again by **Kevin Boland, who took a case to the Supreme Court claiming that the Sunningdale Agreement was against the Irish Constitution since it recognised Northern Ireland and its place in the United Kingdom. The case lasted until March and harmed Faulkner in two major ways: in order to go against Boland, the Irish government had to make a strong case for Article 2 and 3, which disregarded their earlier claim that they were merely symbolic and Cosgrave also couldn't release a statement while the case was ongoing and by the time he could, the damage was already done**. It didn't help that **Heath called for a sudden general election for the twenty-eighth of February because of the industrial unrest in Britain.** This idea was discouraged by Pym, Fitt, and Faulkner but Heath disregarded their pleas and went ahead with the election; which would soon appear to be very destructive for the Executive and the Sunningdale Agreement as a whole. The UUUC decided to use this election as a makeshift referendum on the Sunningdale Agreement; they campaigned with the slogan, ''Dublin is only a Sunningdale away. The UUUC put up one Anti-Agreement candidate in each of Northern Ireland's twelve Westminster constituencies. Faulkner had formed a new party by this time, the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, but they were not properly organised for an election but put up candidates who competed for votes with the other power-sharing parties, SDLP, NILP, and Alliance. The UUUC won with 366,000 Unionists (51%) voting for them and only 94,000 Unionists (13%) voting for Faulkner's party. Paisley, Craig and West were all elected and they secured eleven out of the twelve Westminster seats. Gerry Fitt was the only Pro-Agreement candidate to earn a seat. Heath was also defeated and Wilson returned as Prime Minister; with this Merlyn Rys was elected as the Secretary of Northern Ireland. Rys was an unsuitable candidate for this job as he was known to be an indecisive man who was inclined to hesitate and question before taking action. This new government promised to support the Sunningdale Agreement but the Labour politicians weren't nearly as dedicated to the cause as the Conservatives were as they didn't play a part in forming it. However all of these changes weren't the cause of the Sunningdale Agreement's death, they simply weakened it; but the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement was fast approaching, they just hadn't realised it yet. [Final blow: UWC Strike] All of these actions definitely undermined the Executive and the Sunningdale Agreement but it wasn't destroyed yet. The Assembly remained but the meetings were looked down upon due to the violence nature they would devolve into. **The final nail in the Sunningdale Agreement's coffin would actually come from a small group of Unionist workers.** Discrimination in employment was a major issue in Northern Ireland, which meant that the majority of the employees in the country's industries were Protestants and Unionists. **The Unionist Workers' Council (UWC) was a group of loyalist workers in major industries, ship-building, engineering, and most importantly electricity management.** They had suggested to some Anti-Agreement politicians that they should hold a strike but were ignored. On the fifteenth of May 1974, after a vote of confidence was passed in the Executive by the Assembly, they decided to take matters into their own hands. **They decided to strike. It wasn't long before the loyalist paramilitaries became involved; their ''tartan gangs'' would ''persuade'' not to go into work. If that failed, they sent men to the factory to ''suggest'' that they close. They blocked the roads with barricades that they made from burnt out cars and buses, which is where the youths would sit armed with clubs so they could turn away lorries delivering milk, groceries, or petrol**. There were so many hijacked buses that they just stopped the service all together; it was pandemonium. But the strikers' real tool was their control of Northern Ireland\'s power; within days they cut the energy output by sixty percent. This forced many more businesses to close and left people without power for lights or cookers, endangered sewage plants and put those in hospitals lives at risk. Through all of this the British army and the RUC stood by; there were a few attempts to dismantle the barricades but the soldiers and police mostly stayed out of it. Some officers were even seen chatting amicably with the strikers. It didn't help that the striker had the majority of the Protestant population standing behind them; this was due to the strikers not alienating their own people, they allowed for some suppliers to get through with supplies so grocers, bakers and chemists could stay open for a couple of hours each day. The large of number of people supporting the strikers and their cause is why it brought the Sunningdale Agreement to its knees and made it fail after only five months. [Violence in the South also] The aggression didn't keep to the North either, it even began to spread to the south. On the seventeenth of May, **two car bombs went off in busy Dublin streets and a third went off in Monaghan; t**hese bombs ended up killing thirty-two people, including a pregnant woman and her unborn child. This is recorded as the highest casualty toll for a singular day in the thirty year span that was The Troubles. No one was ever actually charged but it was highly suspected that Loyalist terrorist groups were behind it. A striker leader was even quoted saying, ''There is a war in the Free State and now we are laughing at them''. The Sunningdale Agreement's purpose was to bring a sense of peace but was only breeding more violence. During this time, the Executive was completely isolated; they did not have any control over the police or army and they noted that Rees failed to use them to put an end to the strike. Rees replied that any attempt to take back the power stations could lead to sabotage and leave them in a situation worse than the one they were already in. The country was torn over who was to blame for the mess that had been created: the Nationalists blamed Rees' unwillingness to use the police or army to stop the strike in the early stages. It is speculated that a quick response could have ended the strike almost immediately, but Rees was a hesitant man and waited until the strike was properly established and when he tried to act, it was far too late. Other Nationalists believed that the British army were also Anti-Agreement and were happy to see the strike destroy it. There is no evidence to back this claim, but the army claimed that they didn't intervene as they didn't want to fight the Loyalists at the same time they were fighting the IRA. In the end, it was the force of people supporting the strike that forced the government's hand; the reason there were so many supporters is because the Unionists feared the Council of Ireland and were worried it would lead to a United Ireland. All of this culminated in them ending the Sunningdale Agreement after five months, marking it a complete and utter failure. [Legacy] In conclusion, hindsight is key in a situation like this. The immediate view of the Sunningdale Agreement was that it was a complete failure, due to it only lasting five months and the mass of those against. But in years to come, it would shape the future agreements and hold great significance. **It helped form the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which still holds today, twenty-five years later. The Good Friday Agreement was even described as '' Sunningdale but for slow learners''.** This proves that the agreement itself wasn't actually a failure, it was just ahead of its time and its significance wasn't understood yet.