Sunningdale Agreement (1972-1973) - PDF

*Account for the Downfall of Stormont and the Sunningdale Agreement* On the *23^rd^ March 1972* the British government announced they were taking direct control of Northern Ireland. This marked the beginning of direct rule and the end of a 52-year unionist rule in Stormont. The NI governments suspe...

*Account for the Downfall of Stormont and the Sunningdale Agreement* On the *23^rd^ March 1972* the British government announced they were taking direct control of Northern Ireland. This marked the beginning of direct rule and the end of a 52-year unionist rule in Stormont. The NI governments suspension was due to their inability to stop paramilitary violence, and because of the reaction of the catholic population to the introduction of internment. Neither Stormont nor the RUC were able to control the increasing violence. The "Battle of the Bogside" forced the British Army's intervention, yet not even this was enough to maintain order and after the events of Bloody Sunday, Direct Rule was inevitable.\ \ There were several circumstances that made it necessary for the British to take control. The largest being the escalating hostility by both Unionists and Catholics, leading to a two-day riot during the Battle of the Bogside *August 12th 1969*, when the civil right movement indicated a move towards civil strife. With the RUC incapable of controlling the mobs and use of arson, Stormant desperately enlisted the British army, who entered NI *14th August 1969*. To keep peace between protestant and catholic areas, barbed wire barricades were allowed be erected, however soon turning to concrete *'peace walls'*. Hiding and organising attacks from behind the barricades, the IRA could rise to their most powerful by *1970*. Temporary control by the British Army ended shortly, and they whom the nationalists had initially welcomed, had only worsened matters, making Direct Rule unavoidable.\ \ Violence continued throughout *1970* and *1971*. PM of NI B. Faulkner decided progress would be to intern the ringleaders, yet this turned out to be a political disaster. IRA lists used were from pre WW11, and many who were arrested were innocent and elderly. Internment caused an influx in violence, as just Nationalists were subjected to the imposition. With the high-speed descending chaos came bad publicity for Faulker, seen as an incapable man unable to maintain control over the people he ruled over. As NI was part of the British empire, Britain too was viewed in a negative light. To reject the attention, Westminster leaned more and more towards the introduction of direct rule. The final straw was drawn on the *30th January 1972*, Westminster had waited long enough as bystanders. What started as a simple march against internment, Bloody Sunday became an unforgettable day in Irish History. It was suspected this was Britain seizing the opportunity to clear some of the derry hooligans *"ringleaders"*, following the battle of the Bogside, but since the Saville Enquiry this was disproven. Both Official and Provisional IRA members turned out, comprising as part of the 15000 people. Derry youths began pelting British troops with stones, who retaliated with open fire, under 'shoot to kill' regiment. On end, 1 woman and 12 men were wounded, with 13 dead, seven under nineteen. Bloody Sunday not only resulted in *"sheer\ unadulterated murder"* and further tensions, but also in Direct Rule. When Britain took direct control of NI they appointed William Whitelaw as the first secretary of state. In an effort to undermine the paramilitaries on both sides he published a *'White Paper'* for negotiations that would lead to a power sharing agreement between Nationalists and Unionists. Almost immediately division arose in the Ulster Unionist Party of the measures it proposed. *'Pledged unionists'* like Faulkner supported the proposals, whilst those who opposed, *'unpledged unionists'*, included Paisly, Craig, and Hess. It was later remarked Whitelaw was *"only doing what he thought was the best in very difficult circumstances"*. It was clear even before the negotiations of the Sunningdale Agreement, that its damning divisions were already beginning to emerge. The White Paper caused huge controversies and division between the DUP and UUP, which became the prime factor in the failure of the Sunningdale Agreement. Within the Catholic community, Nationalists around the SDLP such as Humes supported the measures, while Republicans including some of Sinn Fein opposed the White paper, on that it reinforced partition. Majority Catholics supported the efforts towards power sharing as it would be a significant improvement on existing arrangements. New assembly elections were held on *29th June 1973*. Results had almost two thirds of the supporting candidates in favour of a power sharing agreement despite gerrymandering influences. However majority elected Unionists were *'unpledged'*. Faulkner, head of UUP, was placed in a difficult position to try convince Unionists to support the agreement. Unionists' main opposition to the agreement lay in its **'power sharing'** and the promise of a **'Council of Ireland'**. The Council was for *"consultation and co-operation between NI and the Republic of Ireland"*, acknowledging nationalists' sense of Irish Identity. On *1st January 1974*, after months of negotiations, the executive came to life. However, the start of the executive did not end Unionist opposition, P. Devlin saying the SDLP *"aimed generally at reducing loyalist resistance to the concepts of a council of Ireland and a power sharing executive"*. Just before the executive came into play, Whitelaw was summoned to Britian, leaving his successor Pym, who had no prior knowledge of NI and its troubles. The Norths first blow was in losing their skilled negotiator. A second came as Kevin Boland took a case to the Supreme Court in Dublin, claiming the Sunningdale Agreement was against De Valera's *1937* Constitution in recognising Northern Ireland. To oppose, the government needed a strong case against articles two and three, *"the Irish Free State has moral and geographical ownership over Northern Ireland"*. As the case progressed, Taoiseach Jack lynch and the gov were unable to issue a promised statement, without seeing to influence legal proceedings, that NI would remain part of the UK as long as majority wished. This case only heightened Unionist animosity which by case end was thriving and it was far too late to make such announcement. Opposition steadily increased, eventually to a level that caused the fall of the Sunningdale Agreement.\ \ In Britian the Labour government controlled by a preoccupied Wilson won the general election and replaced conservatives in power. A hesitant indecisive man Rees was appointed as NI's secretary. He failed to force the unionists to withdraw their barricades blocking the UWC strike, suggesting he simply did not want to go against the majority of unionists opposing the PSE. Catholics concluded he must be hesitant for three reasons. The general election proved that most unionists were in opposition to the PSE, the army were unwilling to take on unionists, and finally the newcoming labour party were unconcerned and uninterested in this agreement. The labour Party realised the difficulties surrounding the PSE and did not want association with its failure. A prominent cause in the collapse of Stormont was the number of Unionists against the agreement in support of the Ulster's Workers Council strike. On the *15th of May 1974*, the strike commenced. Many workers abstained from power stations with a Protestant majority, which began by cutting electricity supplies, resulting in a halt in household cooking, factories, sewage plants, and with a threat on hospitals. Harry Murray, UWC said *"it is a grave responsibility, but it is not ours. It is Brian Faulkner's He and his friends are ignoring the wishes of 400,000 people who voted against them in the general election and in doing so they must take responsibility for this strike"*. These workers were supported by the Unionist parliament who blocked roads and threatened both protestant and catholic workers who wanted to work. The RUC and Army refused involvement believing it was not their duty to stop a strike. The strike gained support when an accusation was made by PM Wilson who accused the Irish people in the North of *"sponging off the British People"*. Fearing a breakdown in society the executive resigned.\ \ Direct rule was introduced due to augmenting conflicts, internment and the reaction of the Catholic population. It was Britain's bad publicity that forced them take control. The Sunningdale Agreement failed to reach power sharing because of a compound of Unionist and protestant opposition and Paramilitary campaigns, an example of their siege mentality. The failure of The Sunningdale Agreement was its greatest importance, simply described as *"an agreement too soon"*, as its terms were the same as the **Downing Street Declaration 1993** and **the Good Friday Agreement 1998**. The Agreement was the first attempt at peace in NI. Its failure allowed politicians and people of NI to come around and eventually accept lasting peace in NI. \[Sinn Fein had been in secret talks with Hume since *1992*, and by *1994* all sides wanted peace, ultimately the DSD repeated the need to engage with any parties willing to find a peaceful settlement, and the principle of self-determination.\]