Psych131 All Notes PDF

4. CL Object Recognition lecture notes done date @October 15, 2024 revision Perception the process of discovering from our senses what is present in the world, and where it is....

4. CL Object Recognition lecture notes done date @October 15, 2024 revision Perception the process of discovering from our senses what is present in the world, and where it is. Object recognition the process of identifying the objects that surround us. perceptual organisation Figure-background segregation - It is the process of identifying one object as a figure, whereas the rest forms the ground. Bottom-up processes - Stimulus driven Top-down processes - Cognition driven gestalt psychology; School of psychology originated in Germany and Austria in the early 20th century. Moved to the US, as a result of European unrest. Look at the mind and behaviour as a whole. Organism perceives patterns or configurations, not the elementary components criticism - description, not explanation natural scene statistics physical regularities object recognition 4. CL Object Recognition 1  marrs theory: structuralist approach object recognition as a computational problem model as a programme for computer vision generalised cones - objects can be decomposed into elementary units called generalised cones model as a programme for computer vision object recognition - matching the 3-D model constructed from the stimulus against a catalogue of 3-D models stored in memory biedermans theory viewpoint dependence vs independence brain system is object recognition neuropsychology modularity apperceptive agnosia associative agnosia Impaired ability to consciously Relatively preserved ability to perceive and discriminate stimuli (i.e. perceive stimuli, but inability to a perceptual deficit). interpret what was seen (i.e., a gnostic deficit) face recognition great significance in daily life 4. CL Object Recognition 2  faces may be ‘special’ can be selectively compromised after brain damage - prosopagnosia activates specific brain reigons bruce and young - model of face recognition gauthier and tarr - recognition at individual levelis more common for faces than for other objects. - considerably more experience visual imagery seeing with the minds eye occurs when a visual represnetation is prexent in sshort term memory but the stimulus is not viewed can be compromised following brain damage mental rotations - shepard and metzler analogus brain mechanisms for perception and imagery 4. CL Object Recognition 3  11. CL Emotion and Cognition lecture notes done date @December 3, 2024 revision exam - questions for exam are highlighted in lecture slides whatat are emotions? “Any short-term evaluative, affective intentional, psychological state” (Colman, 2015, p.244) emotions moods short lasting longer lasting intense not as intense as emotions generally caused by specific event reason for a specific mood often unclear affect - emotions and mood valence - emotional value (positivity, negativity) taking emotions to the next dimension categorical approach dimensional approach Izard (2007) and others argue for a number of distinct emotions, including: Happiness Anger 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 1  Fear Disgust Sadness Categories of emotions can fit into this two-dimensional space, as well. What is the structure of emotions? Cowen and Keltner identified 27 distinct emotions (categorical). Barrett & Russell: 2 independent/orthogonal dimensions of positive and negative affect. These are categorized by 2 further dimensions of misery-pleasure and arousal-sleep. appraisal theories what is cognitive appraisal? The interpretation of emotional states in a given situation When we experience the emotional state What emotional state we are in “Emotional responses are elicited as the organism evaluates the relevance of environmental changes for its wellbeing” (Brosch, 2013, p.370) Appraisal theories assume each emotion is elicited by its own specific appraisal pattern. 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 2  Original: Suddenly you hear a loud domestic argument break out on the train. You have a primary gut reaction to this, but you can use conscious secondary appraisal to assess and respond to the situation. You can then reappraise the situation based on how you’re feeling now: is this situation actually OK? Updated: Is this situation relevant to me? Should I be concerned? Is this situation eliciting emotions congruent with how I want to feel? Am I responsible for this? Or someone else? Is there anything I can do to mitigate the situation? Is this going to alleviate my negative emotions? Is this possibly going to happen again? Lazarus’s (1966, 1982) Original Smith and Lazarus’s (1993) Formulation Reappraisal Three forms of appraisal: Six appraisal components: Primary appraisal Primary An environmental situation Motivational relevance is regarded as positive, Motivational congruence stressful, or irrelevant to well-being Secondary Secondary appraisal Accountability Account is taken of the Problem-focused coping resources the individual potential has available to cope with Emotion-focused coping the situation potential Reappraisal Future expectancy The stimulus situation and Different emotional states can be the coping strategies are distinguished by: monitored, with the primary Which components are and secondary appraisals involved being monitored if necessary How they are involved There are two kinds of appraisal processes: 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 3  Automatic Conscious/Deliberate parallel appraisal processes appraisal theories: evidence for against Speisman et al. (1964) Kuppens and van Mechelen (2007) Manipulating cognitive Differing emotional reactions appraisal results in are produced by individual physiological differences differences in situational appraisal 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 4  Speisman et al, 1964: presented an Kuppens & van Mechelen: the introduction to a film portraying same situation can be evaluated as genital mutilation, either ‘The film self-induced or out of their control, described the joyful and and people react with different exhilarating experience of young emotions based on this boys of a primitive tribe who are Chartrand, van Baaren, and Bargh being initiated into manhood.” or (2006) “The film showed initiation rituals during which a number of natives Subconscious appraisal undergo subincision, a painful processes can influence procedure performed under people’s emotional state unsanitary conditions.“ Chartrand et al 2006: using Kuppens et al. (2003) priming of very brief positive or negative emotional stimuli, they Any given emotion can be could see changes in mood produced by various combinations of appraisals Kuppens et al 2003: no component of appraisal-action tendencies (accountability, personality factors) is necessary or sufficient to induce anger hypothetical scenarios: concerns Much research on appraisal theory has involved hypothetical scenarios, in which: Little or no genuine emotion is typically experienced However, findings from hypothetical scenarios do appear to generalise to more emotional situations (Robinson & Clore, 2001; Bennett et al., 2003) It is difficult to tell whether emotional reactions occur directly as a response to situations or indirectly, as a response to appraisals Appraisals do predict the intensity of emotions (Siemer et al., 2007) 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 5  Data are correlational, thereby not speaking directly to causality But it is possible to manipulate appraisals (Roseman & Evdokas, 2004) Manipulate appraisals: by providing context (trauma-film example) or training (positive cognitive appraisal, e.g., finding the silver-lining) appraisal theories: evaluated strengths limitations Appraisal processes: Appraisal may not always be crucial in determining emotional Determine whether we experience experience emotion Just as appraisal can cause Strongly influence the precise emotional experience, the reverse emotion experienced can often be true Individual differences in emotional De-emphasise the social context in experience can be partially which most emotion is explained by variations in experienced appraisals Unclear when and how deliberate Smith and Kirby’s (2001) distinction and controlled processes operate between associative processes and reasoning have clarified Lazarus’s list of emotions demands understanding of appraisal fuller justification processes emotion regulation “The set of processes whereby people seek to redirect the spontaneous flow of their emotions” (Koole, 2009, p. 6) Methods of mood regulation include (but are not limited to): Cognitive appraisal Controlled breathing Progressive muscle relaxation 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 6  Stress-induced eating Distraction Gross and Thompson’s (2007) Process Model of Emotion-Regulation Central assumption: Emotion regulation strategies can be used at various points in time cognitive change appears to be the most effective strategy Situation selection: avoid potentially stress-inducing situations Modification: ask a friend to accompany them Attention deployment: distract oneself from stress-inducing thoughts Cognitive change: most people don’t remember others’ embarrassing moments Response modulation: inhibit the behavioral expression of anxiety/stress Used to be linear, but updated model can start with response modulation to set off a new chain of processes – for example, taking a beta blocker and then choosing to give a speech on stage attentional deployment Van Dillen and Koole (2007) Overwhelming the limited working memory capacity (via distraction) leaves little room to process negative emotional information Van Dillen, Heslenfeld, and Koole (2009) 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 7  A demanding task activates parts of the working memory system (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) This has the effect of dampening negative emotion at the physiological (i.e., amygdala) and experiential (self-report) levels Rothermund, Voss, and Wentura (2008) Attentional counter-regulation Directing attention to information opposite in valence to the current state Most emotion-regulation strategies involve the attention deployment stage or the cognitive change stage Attention deployment example: playing tetris following a traumatic event distracts attention from the event and lowers chances of PTSD. Distraction is less cognitively demanding than reappraisal, and can be used early on to stop a negative emotion from forming cognitive reappraisal - not on exam?????? Ochsner and Gross (2008) Identified two types of reappraisal strategies: Reinterpretation – Changing the meaning of the context in which a stimulus is presented Distancing – Taking a detached, third-person perspective fMRI data (along with those of Wagner et al., 2008) suggest that successful reappraisal is associated with: Engagement of cognitive control regions Prefrontal cortex Dorsal for reinterpretation strategies Medial for distancing strategies Anterior cingulate 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 8  A dampening of negative affect Activation reductions in the amygdala Increases in positive affect Increased activation in the nucleus accumbens eg Reinterpretation: This is fine, Distancing: It’s just a movie, nobody actually got hurt limitations of emotion regulation research Blurry boundary between emotion generation and emotion regulation Behavioral emotion-regulation strategies (e.g., cursing when you hit your thumb) are not well-researched Effectiveness of emotion regulation is determined by complex interactions of individual, strategy, and situation People do not often use emotion-regulation strategies, even if trained Individual differences in ability to use a given strategy? mood and cognition attention Attention and memory are intrinsically intertwined: you remember what you focus your attention on Attention may have a narrow or broad focus see Chapter 5 and Eriksen & St James (1986) It is thought that the scope of attention is: narrower with negative mood – ‘tunnel vision’ (Easterbrook, 1959) wider with positive mood (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005) Motivational intensity (Gable et al, 2015a): 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 9  Having the goal of approaching or avoiding a stimulus High motivational intensity: attentional narrowing Low motivational intensity: attention broadening It is thought that processing strategy will stay the same with a happy mood, but change with negative mood Evidence from ‘flanker incompatibility effect’ (Huntsinger, 2012) attention: conclusions The idea that ‘negative affect = attentional narrowing’ and ‘positive affect = attentional broadening’ are oversimplified Instead: positive affect encourages individuals to maintain their cognitive strategies, whereas negative affect leads individuals to change their processing strategies Affective influences on cognition are flexible Participants initially performed a task with broad or narrow attentional focus, followed by deciding whether a central letter was an H or an S. This could either be flanked by compatible or incompatible letters (the same or different letters appeared on either side of the one in the center). Those in a happy mood showed a stronger effect if they were trained in the global processing condition (trained broad = flanker effect) whereas those in a sad mood showed a stronger effect if they were trained in the local processing condition (trained narrow = flanker effect), even though the flanker effect relied on a currently broad focus of attention memory Mood congruity: people generally recall negative memories while in a negative mood, and happy memories when in a happy mood Negative mood congruency effects tend to be small/non-existent People in negative moods may attempt to change their mood by retrieving pleasant thoughts, thereby reducing the expected effect 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 10  Rusting and DeHart, 2000 Encoding specificity principle Memory depends on overlap of information at retrieval and in the memory trace (Tulving, 1979) Fiedler et al. (2001) Mood congruity effects may reflect a genuine memorial advantage for mood-congruent material They may, instead, reflect a response bias People may be more willing to report memories matching their current mood state, even if not genuine Data support the former but not the latter explanation mood-state-dependent memory Mood-state-dependent memory (Kenealy, 1997) Memory performance is better when the individual’s mood state is the same at learning and retrieval 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 11  Participants learned a route on a map, then were later asked to recreate the route either with (cued) or without (free) a map outline. Mood-state- dependent memory effect in free recall (participants had no cues to remember the map). That is, if participants were sad at learning, they performed best in the free recall condition if they were also sad during the recall phase. And if they were happy during learning, they performed better if they were happy in the recall phase. Regardless of mood during learning, if mood changed during recall, participants performed worse. mood-state dependent memory dissociative identity disorder Kenealy (1997) Bower (1994) Strong mood-state-dependent Predicted patients with two or effects in free recall more personalities should exhibit inter-identity amnesia But not cued recall Thought to be an effect of Eich (1995) mood-state-dependent Do-it-yourself principle memory, as each identity Mood state exerts less has its own characteristic influence when crucial mood state information is explicitly Effects should be stronger presented on explicit memory tests Free recall is a more “do-it- Supportive evidence: yourself” test because it 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 12  involves generating one’s Huntjens et al. (2003; own retrieval cues 2005; 2007) Mood intensity: stronger effects with more intense mood Moral dilemmas Trolley problem: Say you can see a trolley barrelling toward 4 people on A – Trolley problem the tracks. You can either pull a level No personal involvement to divert the trolley to another track, Weak emotional reaction which will kill 1 person instead of 4, or you can do nothing and let 4 people Utilitarian judgement die. What do you do? Use cognitive system Footbridge problem: You and another Slow person can see a trolley coming down the tracks toward 4 people. You can B – Footbridge problem either push the other person in front of Personal involvement the trolley, which will slow it down long Strong emotional reaction enough to save the 4 on the tracks (but killing the 1 you pushed), or you Deontological judgement can do nothing and let 4 people die. Use affective system Fast decision making - using heart or head dual-process model Two types of decision making: utilitarian vs. deontological Greene et al., 2008; Greene, 2014 Oversimplified? Moral dilemmas lack ecological validity (Bostyn 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 13  et al, 2018) Evidence? Utilitarian judgments can be just as fast as (and performed in parallel to) deontological judgements (Bialek & De Neys, 2017) mood and decision making Major mood states (anger, sadness, anxiety, positive) have different effects on judgment and decision-making Angie et al., 2011 Personality and decision-making Strong links between personality and mood Mood valence Negative moods are correlated with pessimism and risk-aversion Positive mood states are correlated with optimism and risk-seeking Our everyday goal is to avoid negative and increase positive feelings – affects decisions (Lerner et al, 2015) Integral emotions: Emotions elicited by making judgements or decisions Example: feeling good about proposing to your partner Incidental emotions: 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 14  Emotions experienced during a judgement/decision that are unrelated to the situation Example: Feeling good that your partner said yes, so deciding to happily listen to a pitch for donations Decision-making is affected by anxiety and sadness Anxious individuals are risk averse Sad individuals are risk seeking Myopic misery Misery leads to excessive focus on replacing lost rewards Misery-is-not-miserly effect The tendency for sad individuals to be willing to pay more (for a bottle of water) 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 15  Happy people are more likely to use a heuristic processing strategy than sad people (de Vries et al., 2008) But angry people also use heuristics, are risk-seeking and have an optimism bias (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Waters, 2008) Positive mood affects how easy one is to persuade Effects of mood states on judgement and decision making 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 16  Anxiety: occurs in threatening situations of unpredictability - reduce anxiety by increasing predictability Sadness: occurs when people discover a desired goal is unattainable, encourages thinking about new goals to reduce sadness Anger: can be used to overcome obstacles by taking direct and aggressive action, increasing feeling of control and optimism that goals can be achieved Positive mood: goal is to maintain current mood, so happy individuals avoid risk- taking that might endanger this state emotion and anxiety Emotional experience is likely associatively-mediated: Following repeated experience with a particular object/event With certain items for which humans have developed a phobia as a result of evolution (e.g., spiders; snakes) Preparedness anxiety and depression Eysenck, Payne, and Santos (2006) Past losses are associated mainly with depression Future threats are associated mainly with anxiety Why study cognitive processes in anxious and depressed individuals? Anxiety and depression may increase vulnerability to cognitive biases Cognitive therapy (and cognitive behavioural therapy) should focus on reducing or eliminating these cognitive biases as a major goal of treatment 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 17  Williams et al 1997 Anxiety and depression fulfil different functions Anxiety functions to anticipate danger or threat Gives priority to perceptual encoding of threat-related stimuli Data-driven, fast and automatic, implicit Anxious people should show an implicit memory bias when perceptual processes are involved Depression involves the replacement of failed goals Facilitates the conceptual processing of threatening information Top-down, slower, more controlled, explicit Depressed people should show an explicit memory bias when conceptual processing is involved attentional biases - tasks 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 18  dot-probe task Detect the dot that replaces either the emotional or neutral face Attentional bias is indicated by shorter detection latencies for positive emotions emotional stroop task Name the colour in which words are printed as quickly as possible Attention bias is indicated by taking longer to name colours of emotional words compared to neutral words attentional biases - summary Most findings are consistent with Williams et al.’s (2007) predictions 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 19  Anxious individuals: Show an attentional bias early in processing (e.g., with subliminal stimuli) Bar-Haim et al. (2007); Rinck and Becker (2006) Avoid threat-related stimuli later in processing Rinck and Becker (2006); Calvo and Avero (2005) Depressed individuals (Donaldson et al., 2007): Do not show an attentional bias with subliminal stimuli Are most likely to show such a bias when stimuli are presented for long durations interpretive bias anxiety depression Eysenck, MacLeod, and Matthews Rusting (1998) (1987) Cognitive Bias Questionnaire +0.60 correlation between trait Depressed patients select anxiety and number of more negative threatening homophone interpretations of interpretations ambiguous events Eysenck et al. (1991) Relies on self-report data Mogg, Bradbury, and Bradley (2006) No evidence of interpretive bias in depression when not relying on self-report data and ambiguous materials don’t require participants to process them in a self-referential way 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 20  memory biases anxiety depression Coles and Heimberg (2002) Rink and Becker (2005) Anxiety patients exhibit implicit Depressed patients typically memory biases exhibit an explicit memory bias Anxious patients also show an Murray et al. (1999) explicit memory bias Depressed patients don’t This runs contrary to exhibit an explicit memory bias Williams et al.’s prediction for forced-recall Herrera et al. (2017) Watkins et al. (2000) Explicit memory bias for free One of a very small number of recall but not cued recall reports of implicit memory bias in depression No implicit memory bias This runs contrary to Contrary to Williams et al.’s Williams et al.’s prediction prediction cognitive control of biases Joormann et al (2007) Depression associated with cognitive control impairments Eysenck et al (2007) Anxiety reduces available capacity of working memory, impairs cognitive control Impairments in both inhibition of irrelevant stimuli and attention shifting 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 21  causality and biases Attentional Bias Interpretive Bias Evidence that attentional Work with the Dysfunctional training can reduce anxiety Attitude Scale indicates negative thoughts/attitudes Mobini and Grant (2007) caused by depression and Papageorgiou and Wells reduced after recovery (1998) Otto et al. (2007) Yet to be determined Dysfunctional negative whether it can reduce attitudes seem to be a risk automatic/ involuntary factor for later developing attentional biases major depressive disorder Evidence that attentional Lewinsohn et al. (2001) biases can alter anxiety levels Evans et al. (2005) MacLeod et al. (2002) 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 22  Matthews and MacLeod Changing interpretive biases (2002) can change anxiety levels Wilson et al. (2006) Mathews et al. (2007) from research to practice attention training - a case series Read the full article here: https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0879(199712)4:43.0.CO;2- M ATT: Attention Training Procedure 1. selective attention: focus attention on instructed stimuli, surrounded by distraction 2. Attention switching: switch from one selected stimulus to another 3. Divided attention: divide attention among as many different stimuli as possible Meant to be used outside of anxiety episodes and not as a coping mechanism Full procedure: Three patients with anxiety disorders provided baseline and post-training (A) ratings of panic frequency, and were instructed to practice ATT 10-15 minutes a day for several weeks (B) Panic effectively alleviated long-term (even 6 months post-training) 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 23 11. CL Emotion and Cognition 24  10. CL Problem Solving lecture notes done date @November 26, 2024 revision problem solving: there are two states of affairs the agent [problem solver] is in one state and wants to be in the other state it is not apparent to the agent how the gap between the two states is to be bridged bridging the gap is a consciously guided multi-step process analogical problem solving we constantly use past experience and knowledge to assist us in our current task We detect (and make effective use of) analogies or similarities between a current problem and ones solved in the past expertise Specialist knowledge in one area or domain Knowledge is typically more important in research on expertise than problem solving Focus on individual differences in expertise research (between experts and novices) problem solving - important aspects 10. CL Problem Solving 1  It is purposeful (i.e., goal-directed) It involves controlled processes and is not totally reliant on “automatic” processes A problem exists when someone lacks the relevant knowledge to produce an immediate solution problem solving - important distinctions Well defined vs ill defined problems Problems in which the initial state, the goal and the methods available for solving them are clearly laid out VS Problems in which the problem is imprecisely specified Knowledge-rich vs knowledge-lean problems Role of prior knowledge insight and role of experience Gestaltists distinguished Reproductive vs productive thinking systematic re-use of previous experience vs novel problem restructuring well-defined vs ill-defined problems Problems requiring productive thinking are solved using insight “any sudden comprehension, realisation, or problem solution that involves a reorganisation of the elements of a person’s mental representation of a stimulus, situation, or event to yield a non-obvious or non-dominant interpretation” (Kounios & Beeman, 2014, p. 74). insight - example 10. CL Problem Solving 2  Key insight is to realise that this constraint must be relaxed The insight need to be followed by an efficient search process for the problem to be solved Differs from controlled processes Aha! experiences reported with insight anterior superior temporal gyrus(and others) involved in insight insight and role of experience Ohlsson (1992, 2011) argued that: We often encounter a block or impasse when solving a problem because we have represented it wrongly E.g., the mutilated draughtboard problem (Black, 1946) 10. CL Problem Solving 3  impasse Representational change theory Ohlsson (1992, 2011), Őllinger et al. (2014) To overcome it we need to change the problem representation: Constraint relaxation: inhibitions on what is regarded as permissible are removed. Re-encoding: some aspect of the problem representation is reinterpreted. Elaboration: new problem information is added to the representation. insight and role of experience - Knoblich et al. (1999) Our experience of arithmetic tells us that many operations change the values (numbers) in an equation (as with Type A problems) In contrast, relatively few operations change the operators as is required in type B problems 10. CL Problem Solving 4  It was much harder to relax the normal constraints of arithmetic (and so show insight) for Type B problems Participants initially spent much more time fixating on the values than on the operators for both types of problems Thus, their initial representation was based on the assumption that values had to be changed Facilitating insight: hints and incubation We can facilitate insight by providing subtle hints. Maier’s (1931) pendulum problem Wallas (1926) claimed problem solving can benefit from incubation, which “arises when the solution... comes to mind after a temporary shift of attention to another domain” mental set Past experience generally increases our ability to solve problems. 10. CL Problem Solving 5  However, the Gestaltists argued persuasively we sometimes fail to solve problems because we are misled by our past experience Often we continue to use a previously successful problem-solving strategy even when inappropriate or suboptimal This also affects experts: chess players fail to identify shorter way to win a game, while using familiar strategies functional fixedness The inflexible focus on the usual function(s) of an object in problem solving (Duncker, 1945) How to solve - Challoner (2009) Focus on an infrequently noticed or new feature. Form a solution based on that obscure feature. problem solving strategies - Foundational work from Simon and Newell problem space A problem space consists of the initial problem state, the goal state, all possible mental operators (e.g., moves) that can be applied to any state to change it into a different state, and all the intermediate problem states. To solve problems, we use heuristics Heuristics can be contrasted with algorithms Heuristics - Hill climbing (Newell & Simon, 1972) Involves changing the present state within the problem into one closer to the goal Mostly used when the problem solver has no clear understanding of the problem structure Involves a focus on short-term goals 10. CL Problem Solving 6  Often does not lead to problem solution Heuristics – Means-ends analysis(Newell & Simon, 1972) The most important heuristic method (Newell & Simon, 1972) Note the difference between the current problem state and the goal state Form a subgoal to reduce the difference between the current and goal states Select a mental operator (e.g., move or moves) that permits attainment of the subgoal Very useful and assists problem solution However, it was reported that people sometimes persist with that heuristic even when it severely impairs performance (Sweller & Levine, 1982) Heuristics – Meta-reasoning Progress monitoring (Ackerman & Thompson, 2017) Individuals engaged in problem solving use this heuristic Assessing their rate of progress towards the goal If progress is too slow to solve the problem within the maximum number of moves allowed, people adopt a different strategy The nine-dot problem (MacGregor et al., 2001) Worse performance when participants had the illusion of making progress (and so were slow to switch strategies) than where it was more obvious that little progress was being made cognitive miserliness Cognitive miser Someone who is economical with their time and effort when performing a thinking task. 10. CL Problem Solving 7  Cognitive Reflection Test A test assessing individuals’ tendencies to override intuitive (but incorrect) answers to problems. Newell and Simon assumed our limited pro- cessing capacity forces us to use heuristics. In contrast, cognitive misers use heuristics because they are reluctant to engage in effortful processing rather than because they cannot summary Most research on problem solving focuses on problems requiring no special knowledge Research supports the notion of insight. insight is hard to measure “insight” problems are often solved with no evidence of insight According to the representational change theory solving insight problems often requires constraint relaxation and/or re-encoding of the problem representation 10. CL Problem Solving 8  2. CL Perception lecture notes done date @October 1, 2024 revision material not started https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1rbcMSBSHu4ahYwDhIbRBgeHr2UghKoVU_8TRT1FyEK0/edit#slid e=id.p16 https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1rbcMSBSHu4ahYwDhIbRBgeHr2UghKoVU_8TRT1FyEK0/edit#slide=id.p1 lecture slides ^ aims Learn about the basic structure of the retina Learn about the projections from retinal to visual cortex at the back of the head Learn about functional specialization in the visual cortex Learn about perception-action model Learn about colour perception and colour constancy Learn about depth perception Learn about size perception and size constancy Learn about blindsight and visual awareness reading visual perception chapter 2 of cognitive psychology handbook notes not in exam (basic neuroscience - just the foundation for the content) the cell basic neuroscience 2. CL Perception 1  Learn about the basic structure of the retina 2. CL Perception 2  retina through a microscope Retinal ganglion cells receive input from a few cones or hundreds of rods cones colour detail perception mostly in fovea rods dim light located in periphery Learn about the projections from retinal to visual cortex at the back of the head: from eye to cortex: 1. reception 2. transduction 3. coding 2. CL Perception 3  brain projections 2. CL Perception 4  visual cortical areas box sizes reflect sizes of each brain reigon arrows show proportion of fibres in each pathway vertical positions of boxes indicate response latencies of cells in each area figure de-emphasises parallel processing and top-down processing Learn about functional specialisation in the visual cortex: functional specialisation theory - zeki 1993 2016 V1 & V2 - Basic visual processing V3 & V3A - Form perception (especially of moving stimuli) V4 Colour perception and shape perception V5 (MT in humans) - Motion perception LOC – Object perception OFA – Face perception visual cortex ^ FFA – Face perception evaluation of Zekis functional specialisation theory selectivity of cells in visual cortex ambitious and extremely influences theoretical percentage of cells in each area approach responding selectively to four stimulus features visual brain areas less specialised than assumed theoretically visual brain much more complex than assumed binding problem remains unresolved 2. CL Perception 5  the binding problem Learn about perception-action model: ventral stream “What” pathway Vision-for-perception Allocentric (object-centred) coding Sustained representation Usually conscious awareness Input from the fovea dorsal stream “Where” pathway Vision-for-action Egocentric (body-centred) coding Short-lived representations Usually unconscious effects of brain damage perception-action model 2. CL Perception 6  visual illusions Müller–Lyer illusion Both vertical lines are the same length Does illusion require use of the vision-for- perception system? Findings (Bruno et al., 2008): When pointing (using vision-for-action system), illusion size was 5.5% When verbalising a response (using vision-for- perception system), the illusion size was 22.4% Ebbinghaus illusion Both centre circles are same size but the one in the top figure looks larger than the one in the bottom figure Illusion greater with vision-for-perception system than vision-for-action system Only perceptual judgements influenced by distance between centre circle and contextual circles (Knol et al., 2017) complexities of grasping movements requires ventral stream as well as dorsal stream when: 2. CL Perception 7  information from memory required to control grasping movements conceptual knowledge needed to make most appropriate grasping movement evaluation very influential theoretical approach theories relating perception (red) and action (green) Learn about colour perception and colour constancy: colour perception hue - colour itself brightness - perceived intensity of light saturation - vivid or pale, influenced by amount of white present dual-process theory 3 types of cone cells - red,green,blue red - long green - medium blue - short provide input to 3 channels to determine perceived colour of objects electromagnetic spectrum colour constancy colour constancy - perceived colour remains the same despite chances in light source chromatic adaptation - sensitivity to illuminant of any given colour decreases over time land 1986 - retinex theory - observers compare light reflected from a surface against that related from adjacent surfaces evaluation : colour constancy several factors influencing colour constancy have been identified little known about how factors combine to produce colour constancy 2. CL Perception 8  research focuses on artificial visual environments which are much simpler than the natural world generally less colour constancy when observers try to make objective judgements rather than subjective ones large individual differences in colour constancy are poorly understood Learn about depth perception: monocular cues linear perspective texture interposition familiar size blur motion parallax binocular cues - stereopsis enhances depth perception based on slight difference between two retinal images very powerful but only at short distances amblyopia (lazy eye) - impaired stereopsis depth perception how is information from different cues combined additivity selection weighting of cues Learn about size perception and size constancy: size constancy Object size can be measured in centimetres. It can also be measured in ‘degrees of visual angle’. If objects they are nearer, they take up more degrees of visual angle. Try moving you hand nearer and father from your eye. With a little attention, you can see it occludes more or less background. But objects often appear the same size (e.g 10 cm tall) if we move back and the retinal image shrinks. We achieve size constancy. Size constancy and colour constancy are both examples of perceptual constancy. Artists have to undo perceptual constancy. size-distance invariance hypothesis Perceived size is proportional to retinal size and perceived distance. We have retinal size (degrees of visual angle subtended by an object) We can infer distance from the depth cues. Two objects are the same retinal size. but one is further away. It must be bigger Two objects are the same distance away. One has a larger retinal size. It must be bigger. 2. CL Perception 9  In the Ames room the back wall is sloped. But perceived distance on the left and right corners is the same because most depth cues are blocked. The person in the right corner looks giant. If you had the depth cues, the people would look the same size, and the one on right would look nearer. size perception Size perception of objects depends on memory of their familiar size + perceptual information It is better with familiar objects having invariant size (e.g., bicycles) than variable size (e.g., TV sets) Learn about blindsight and visual awareness: blindsight - perception without awareness Ability to respond appropriately to visual stimuli in the absence of conscious visual experience in patients with damaged primary visual cortex (V1) Type-1 blindsight: no conscious experience; Type-2 blindsight: some residual awareness Blindsight patients often show evidence of degraded conscious vision when sensitive measures of conscious awareness are used Reorganisation of brain connectivity in blindsight patients explains many findings subliminal perception Subliminal perception involves: Subjective measure Observer’s failure to report awareness of a stimulus Objective measure Observer’s ability to make accurate forced-choice decisions about a stimulus Numerous studies support subliminal perception BUT less evidence for subliminal perception with more sensitive measures of conscious awareness: partial awareness? Evidence of weak awareness + response bias (reluctance to report awareness) (Koivisto & Grassini, 2016) further questions 2. CL Perception 10  3. CL Consciousness lecture notes done date @October 8, 2024 revision material not started Learning Outcomes Ask whether consciousness animates the body, and whether we have free will Understand attempts to measure consciousness objectively Know about brain areas associated with consciousness Understand two theories of consciousness (Global Neural Workspace and Dehaene and Naccache’s model) Understand the distinction between consciousness and selective attention, and then importance of neural integration Understand work on split brain patients, and what it shows us about the unified stream of consciousness and narrative self introduction - what is consciousness? The first thing to understand about consciousness research is that the word ‘consciousness’ is ambiguous. Perhaps 90% of arguments about consciousness come from people using the word in different ways. Pinker (1997) distinguished 3 possible meanings. There could be many more. 1. Sentience. Subjective experience or phenomenological awareness [animals probably have this] 2. Access to information. The ability to report our subjective experience [one defining feature of conscious experience is that it is verbally reportable]. 3. CL Consciousness 1  3. Self awareness. I cannot only feel pain and see red, but think to myself, hey, here I am, Steven Pinker, feeling pain and seeing red’ [consciousness comes with a narrative self, corresponding to the pronoun I] possible functions of consciousness Humphrey (1983) said construction of the narrative self, (corresponding to the pronoun ‘I’) is adaptive because it helps us navigate the social world. It is a consequence of having developed theory of mind. We can see how this self- referential aspect of consciousness could have evolved. where is your skull? What we think of as the ‘outside world’ is a stream of visual consciousness, inside our physical skull (Velmans, 2009). All visual experience is as ‘internal’ as a dream. When we are awake the dream is systematically constrained by information coming in from the sense organs. easy & hard problems of consciousness Chalmers is famous for distinguishing between the easy and hard problems of consciousness. The easy problems are to do with the functions which are carried out by conscious brain systems. The hard problem is why it’s not all unconscious. Most things that happen in the nervous system work unconsciously. The brain would seem to work just the same without consciousness experience. What is this extra ingredient? Why is it like something to be a brain, but not like anything to be a rock? According to Chalmers, all attempts to ‘explain consciousness’ focus on the easy problems, and leave the (interesting) hard problem untouched, or dismiss it rhetorically. “Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina 3. CL Consciousness 2  and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery.” - Chalmers (1995) does consciousness animate the body? Introspectively it feels that conscious thoughts cause actions. Day to day life is full of moments where we think, ‘Oh, I’ll look at my phone’ then a few seconds later, we pick up our phone. Wegner (2003) said ‘It certainly doesn’t take a rocket scientist to draw the obvious conclusion… consciousness is an active force, an engine of will. The possibility that this intuition is misleading is another profound thing psychology can teach us (Blackmore, 2013). This is linked to questions about free will and determinism. Are we really free to do what we feel like? I’ll largely sidestep most of this debate. can we feel the force of the will? Hume realized that humans infer causation from temporal sequences, but they do not literally ‘see’ causation, even on billiard tables. They same applies to internally willed causation. We introspect a thought, the we observe an action, so we infer causation.. Wegner and Wheatley (1999) think normal introspection leads to the illusion of a force of the will. Some conditions enhance the strength of the illusion. the minds best trick - Wegner 2003 3. CL Consciousness 3  theory of apparent mental causation This theory suggests that conscious will is experienced when we draw the inference that our thought has caused our action – whether or not this inference is correct. The inference occurs in accordance with principles that follow from research on cause perception and attribution [23 – 27] – principles of priority, consistency, and exclusivity. When a thought appears in consciousness just before an action (priority), is consistent with the action (consistency), and is not accompanied by conspicuous alternative causes of the action (exclusivity), we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Wegners I spy experiment Confederate and participant share control of the mouse cursor. They listen to music and scroll around the array of objects depicted on the screen. Sometimes they stop and click on a picture. Some stopping events are self initiated by participant, some were initiated by the confederate at precise 3. CL Consciousness 4  times. Words labelling pictures on the screen were presented through headphones, interrupting the music. Subjects rated how much they intended each stopping event. If the timing of the words was right (priority), and words were consistent with objects on the screen (consistency) subjects felt control over forced stopping events. Benjamin Libet’s readiness potentials Libet (1983) measured readiness potentials in the pre-motor cortex before people were aware of the conscious decision to act. Conscious decision to act > brain initiates action > action happens? No! The brain initiates action > become conscious of a decision to act > action happens. But can we really introspect with such high temporal resolution (Banks & Isham, 2009)? After all, the conscious experience of ‘intending’ is quite thin and evasive (Haggard, 2009). 3. CL Consciousness 5  Soon et al.’s MVPA experiment (2008) This was a more advanced version of Libet using modern multi-voxel pattern analysis fMRI. Can I predict whether subjects will press left or right above chance from pattern of voxel activations in a brain area? Which brain areas code the decision? What is the earliest point when above chance prediction becomes possible? Some of the methodological worries about Libet do not apply here. 3. CL Consciousness 6  Evaluation of whether consciousness animates the body At least some of our conscious decisions are already prepared pre- consciously. This research only investigates super-simple actions, like pressing a button. We are unsure about the role of consciousness in big life decisions (e.g. who to marry). Brass and Haggard’s (2008) What When Whether (WWW) model of characterizes a few more stages of ‘free decision making’ and points to the pre-motor circuitry that could mediate this. Introspectively, it feels like consciousness controls action. Wegner claims this feeling is an illusion. The illusion is strongest when thought immediately precedes action, and priority, consistency and exclusivity conditions are met. Libet found that the readiness potential (measured with EEG) is generated from the motor cortex before people report conscious decision to act Soon et al. extended this with fMRI and found that brain activity could be used to predict decisions up to 10 seconds before conscious awareness. 3. CL Consciousness 7  Haggard et al. attempted to capture other dimensions of will with their WWW model of decision making. brain areas associated with consciousness There is no single brain area which ‘does consciousness’ in the same sense that area MT does motion. Dehaene et al. (2001) compared brain activation on trials where words were processed Activations were confined to the consciously, and trials where they visual cortex when the words were were only perceived subliminally. presented subliminally. There were widespread activations throughout the brain when words were perceived consciously. brain areas associated with shifting attention, we become conscious of different things Rees (2007) looked at brain areas activated during changes in visual awareness (when we switch from being aware of A to B or vice versa) and found that there was a clustering of activation around superior parietal and dorsolateral pre-frontal areas. Parietal lobe function is essential for maintaining awareness of spatial regions in the contralateral visual field (e.g. Driver et al. 2001). Damage to the right parietal lobe leads to left hemifield neglect, even if the visual cortex responds to left hemifield stimuli. evaluation 3. CL Consciousness 8  Even subliminally presented words, can be processed semantically (Mack and Rock, 1998). Kiefer and Brendel (2006) found that words still generate meaning-related ERP, even when they were not processed consciously. A large brain network must have been activated, despite lack of consciousness. Rees (2007) surmised unconscious and conscious processing activate the same networks, but activation is higher when we are conscious. theories of consciousness global neural workspace theory The most famous neural theory of consciousness is global neural workspace theory, developed over decades by Baars (Baars and Franklin, 2007). Most information is unconscious and processed locally. Information that is selectively attended is integrated into the global workspace. The informational contents of the global workspace are the contents of consciousness. Baars clarifies the role of attention by saying: ‘We look in order to see’. The act of looking is the deployment of selective attention, the result, seeing, is caused by integration in the global workspace. Dehaene and Naccache’s theory Conscious state: There is much activation in areas involved in visual processing, and sufficient top-down attention to connect this to other brain areas. (+V, + A) Pre-conscious state. There is sufficient basic visual processing to permit conscious awareness but insufficient top-down attention. (+V, -A) Subliminal state: There is insufficient basic visual processing to permit conscious awareness, regardless of the involvement of attention. (-V +A) V = visual activation, A = Selective attention 3. CL Consciousness 9  evaluation There is reasonable support for both theories. These theories overlap and are not mutually exclusive. Both say binding of information across different cortical regions is central to consciousness. However, it is mysterious why integrated cortical information should be consciously experienced (this is not a solution to the hard problem, Chalmers, 2007). Most of this work has only looked at visual consciousness. distinction between consciousness and selective attention Attention without consciousness during continuous flash suppression 3. CL Consciousness 10  consciousness requires cortical integration Everyone agrees that consciousness has something to do with integration of information across distributed cortical areas. Tononi and Koch (2008) have noted that you cannot consciously perceive shapes independently of color. Melloni et al. (2007) found that this integration probably involves synchronization of cortical oscillations, as measured with EEG. is consciousness unitary Consciousness seems to be like beads on a string. One ‘now’ follows another. It seems impossible to have two simultaneous but independent streams of conscious in one head. But can we split consciousness? The classic split-brain experiments by Gazzaniga and Sperry are interesting here. Sometimes we need surgery to cut the corpus callosum to save people from intractable epilepsy. No one has ever woken up after this surgery and felt ‘oh no, I’m cut in half! There are two of me in the same body!’. 3. CL Consciousness 11  Even though the left side of the brain controls the right side of the body and vice versa, split brain patients function quite effectively. They can move their eyes and heads purposefully to deliver information into each hemisphere. split brain patients Only the left hemisphere control speech. If you ask a split-brain patient a question, the left hemisphere gives a sensible answer based on the information it has available. If something funny is presented to the right hemisphere, we the patients start laughing, the left hemisphere doesn’t know why, but it rapidly confabulates a verbal answer based on the partial information available to it. The right hemisphere can give some verbal answers and draw sensible pictures. Both hemispheres can recognize one's own face. Left hemisphere consciousness may be considered superior to that of the right hemisphere. Left hemisphere might be the home of the ‘narrative self’ (Pinker’s third type of consciousness). 3. CL Consciousness 12 3. CL Consciousness 13  5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting lecture notes done date @October 22, 2024 revision the need for working memory Working memory = Mental workspace Working memory is a system that allows us to temporary retain and manipulate a restricted set of information components to perform activities such as reasoning, learning, and comprehension leading to a mental or behavioural response. We use the term short-term memory (STM) to refer to the retention and basic processing of information in simple tasks. STM is part of Working Memory. But should STM be distinct from Long Term Memory? amnesics Patients with pure organic amnesia have great difficulty in creating new memories (i.e. learning). But they do well in a variety of tasks that require memory have a brief conversation, perform information processing tasks, score as expected on IQ tests, etc. Amnesics forget quickly after a few minutes or if distracted. These data suggest that there must be a form of memory of limited duration and capacity, a form of short-term memory. The storage capacity of short-term memory “The magical number” 7±2 (Miller, 1956) 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 1  Most people can remember 5-9 numbers in their correct sequence Verbal digit span tests, require people to listen to a series of digits and repeat them in the correct sequence immediately after. The length of the sequence increases gradually (number of digits read out) until the participant fails (twice). The last correctly completed sequence represents the participant’s digit span. STM stores chunks of information - meaningful groupings of individual elements. Ability to create chunks makes it easier to retain and process large amounts of information but difficult to measure capacity accurately! With training we can exceed substantially the “magic number” limit. Information in STM can be organised in various ways to increase capacity or efficiency… personal semantics prosodic preferences phonological plausibility expertise chunks demonstrate that STM interacts with LTM Why does STM have a capacity limit? Some suggestions from Cowan (2010) Biological restrictions Limitations in neuronal firing speed may make it impossible to activate more than four chunks within a given time window. Chunks cannot be considered as part of the same event if not activated close together. Limitations in neuronal firing speed may be useful to avoid interference: seeing a blue square, followed by a red circle could be confused into a blue circle and a red square. Computational benefit 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 2  Smaller number of chunks allows for faster and more efficient processing. We can ignore irrelevant information. Explaining STM/WM Phenomena The multi-store model Atkinson & Shiffrin (1968, 1971) Three memory stores: sensory memory (sensory buffers), short-term memory and long-term memory. Sensory and short-term memory retain information for brief periods of time whereas long-term memory is much longer lasting. Sensory memory and STM have limited capacity whereas long-term memory is vast. A serial model where information is transferred from one store to the next. Input to STM from the environment (via sensory stores) or from LTM. For information to be retained in STM it needs to be rehearsed – rehearsal guarantees LTM transfer and storage. Information in STM is lost through displacement. strengths of multi-store model Highly influential Experimental and brain-damaged patient evidence Evidence for different memory stores: Duration 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 3  Capacity Forgetting mechanisms Effects of brain damage: some patients have intact STM but impaired LTM and others have opposite pattern: double dissociation But this one is not as straighforward… neuropsychological evidence: STM impairments Neurological patient KF showed impaired STM functions with very limited digit span (only 1 item), but apparently normal LTM. Similar dissociations between STM and LTM have been reported with other patients since. Supports the idea of two separate stores. But this is also problematic for the model: There cannot be compulsory transfer of information from STM to LTM. Stores are not serially connected. Parallel inputs from sensory stores go to both STM and LTM. Patient KF and other patients show deficits in verbal short-term memory but are fine when tested on visual-spatial short-term tests such as the Corsi block tapping test. Other patients show the reverse impairment: deficits in spatial short-term memory but preserved verbal memory. The evidence therefore suggests that STM comprises more than one store or more than one processing unit. 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 4  There are similar dissociations between verbal and spatial STM in neurologically intact individuals. Problems with the multi-store model STM cannot be seen as a single, unitary system: More than one store/system exist to deal with different information. The probability of creating long-term memories does not depend upon amount of rehearsal but type of processing that takes place with semantic processing producing in most cases the strongest memories. There is no serial transfer of information across stores. Intact STM not a prerequisite for normal LTM. Emphasis on storage. Model fails to account for complex aspects of cognition (decision making, reasoning, language comprehension etc.) and complex behaviours (having a conversation, driving) i.e., for working memory. Forgetting from STM may not be due to displacement but interference. The multicomponent model of working memory the phonological loop 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 5  The Phonological loop is a model of a verbal STM as it stores for a brief period of time verbal (i.e., language based) information (similar to Atkinson & Shiffrin’s model) It deals with two types of input: Auditory (spoken words) and Visual (written words). Two components The Phonological Store (inner ear) which retains spoken language in phonological (sound based) code The Articulatory Control (inner voice) process which is engaged in subvocal articulation (silent pronunciation) which updates the contents of the store and converts written words into sounds so that they can access the store. 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 6  why do we need the phonological loop Patient PV presented with unrelated word pairs from her native Italian (top) and pairs consisting of an Italian word and its translation in Russian (bottom) over a number of trials. Able to learn the native word pairs at a normal rate but failed to learn the Russian vocabulary (i.e., Italian-Russian pairs). Native word pair learning relies on existing semantic links (limited need for phonological coding) but foreign word learning relies on phonological processing. Need to retain the Russian word in STM long enough to associate with the native word. Is the PL important in native language acquisition? The study involved a group of 8 year-old children with language impairments (language abilities of a 6 year-old), other 8 years olds with no language impairment and 6 year-olds with no language impairment. The study examined the verbal WM in these children and specifically the ability to repeat nonwords (e.g. woogalamic). As we have seen with PV, this 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 7  test measures the integrity of the phonological loop. Language-impaired children performed worse than both age and ability matched children and the effect became clearer as the phonological load increased (from 1 to 4 syllables). In a different study, ability to repeat non-words (differences in phonological loop efficiency) correlated highly with vocabulary scores at age 4 in normally developing children (Gathercole & Baddeley, 1989). Language skill development and vocabulary acquisition is based on the phonological loop (i.e., the ability to retain and rehearse nonwords/words in WM and connect with existing knowledge). The Visuo-Spatial Sketch pad Initially, the VSSP was considered to include both visual and spatial information in a single store. Logie (1995) proposed that visual and spatial information depend on different stores within the VSSP The Visual Cache which stores visual information about object shapes, patterns and colours. Visual stimuli gain direct access to the store. The Inner Scribe which stores spatial information including object location and movement and also rehearses the contents of the visual cache. the episodic buffer The EB is the newest component in the model (added in 2000). It was added to address two main difficulties within the multicomponent model. Buffer stores (PL and Sketchpad) need to interact with LTM. This is essential for organising information into chunks (semantic and episodic LTM). Incoming information is in the form of whole events both visual and verbal. There needs to be a storage area for these integrated forms. It is proposed that the EB has a capacity limited to 4 chunks (see the earlier discussion on capacity). Making use of the Episodic Buffer 5. CL Memory: learning and forgetting 8  Do we really need the Episodic buffer for integration of verbal and visuospatial information? Maybe the phonological loop and the VSSP can facilitate each other directly without the need of the episodic buffer?