MV_Lecture6_The Government (1) (1).pptx

INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 2023-2024 Dr. Maxime Vandenberghe TODAY’S LECTURE 18 MARCH The Government 1. Coalition formation 2. Functioning & coalition management 3. Government termination 4. Caretaker cabinets & current affairs GOVERNMENT FORMATION LENGTHY BUSINESS...

INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS 2023-2024 Dr. Maxime Vandenberghe TODAY’S LECTURE 18 MARCH The Government 1. Coalition formation 2. Functioning & coalition management 3. Government termination 4. Caretaker cabinets & current affairs GOVERNMENT FORMATION LENGTHY BUSINESS Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 3 Belgium is a typical example of a partitocracy. How is this visible during coalition negotiations? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 4  GOVERNMENTS IN BELGIUM INTRODUCTION Belgium = parliamentary democracy Parliament (legislative branch) = only direct representative of the people Government (executive branch) = appointed by and accountable to parliament Vote of confidence Vote of no-confidence Belgium = constitutional monarchy King = head of state Limited powers Government (accountable to parliament) acts on his behalf … (at least in theory) Begian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 5 GOVERNMENT FORMATION GUINNESS WORLD RECORD “World Record for longest time without a government during peacetime” Belgium experienced 541 days without a government in peacetime after elections held on 13 June 2010. A caretaker government ruled in the interim period. On 5 December 2011, Belgium's King Albert II appointed a new cabinet and a new prime minister: Elio di Rupo. The new government took office on the following day. Previously, Cambodia held the record in peacetime, having taken 354 days to form a government from elections in 2003-2004. In 2010, Iraq went without an official government for 289 days from the elections to the day on which the new administration took office. Iraq's record was set for the longest time without a democratic government after a period of conflict, however. Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 6 GOVERNMENT FORMATION GUINNESS WORLD RECORD Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 7 GOVERNMENT FORMATION SKYROCKETING DURATION “From a comparative perspective, this situation is highly exceptional. Belgian cabinet negotiations are characterized by the largest number of failed attempts of all West- European countries (De Winter & Dumont, 2021, p. 115) and while the duration of negotiations is also rising elsewhere, no other country is burdened by an increase as spectacular as the one noted in Belgium (Louwerse & Van Aelst, 2013, p. 14).” Vandenberghe, M. (2023). Power- sharing and the paradox of federalism. PhD thesis, Ghent: Ghent University Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 8 GOVERNMENT FORMATION SKYROCKETING DURATION 2007 Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 9 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Rational-choice models of coalition formation (e.g. Riker, 1962) Predictable process Elections provide parties with ‘bargaining power’ Number of seats Kingmaker? Ideology (centrist?) Parties make ‘strategic choices’ Minimize costs (e.g. ideological concessions) Maximize benefits (e.g. ministerial portfolios)  Basic theoretical models: minimum winning coalition, minimum connected coalition,…  No ‘surplus parties’ and ‘oversized coalitions’ Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 10 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? But… Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 11 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? But… Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 12 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Electoral context 1. High party system fragmentation A lot of parties = fragmentation of ‘bargaining power’ = higher ‘costs’ and fewer ‘benefits’ Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 13 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Electoral context 1. High party system fragmentation A lot of parties = fragmentation of ‘bargaining power’ = higher ‘costs’ and fewer ‘benefits’ Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 14 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Electoral context 2. Split party system Last two-party coalition: 1960s From then: at least (!) four parties Party families score differently in North and South Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 15 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Electoral context 3. Electoral volatility Increases the potential ‘cost of ruling’ Most outgoing majority parties lose votes Some very heavily (e.g. Greens in 2003) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 16 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Electoral context 4. Absence of a market leader Christian democrats (FL) and Socialists (FR) have lost their electoral dominance. No more ‘constant factor’ in government. Varying ‘leading’ parties Largest party in Belgium is quite small … Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 17 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Electoral context 5. Frequent elections (at different levels) Before 2014: often ‘midterm’ elections Federal elections (4y or less): 1999 ---- 2003 ---- 2007--- 2010 Regional elections (5y): 1999 ------ 2004 ---- 2009 Constant ‘campaign mode’ Since 2014: “coinciding elections” (5y) But… Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 18 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Formal and informal constraints further complicate negotiations 1. Coalitions need formal majority of votes in parliament Survive investiture vote (vote of confidence) No ‘minority cabinets’ Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 19 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Exception: Wilmès government (2020) Resigning government Wilmès (36 out of 150 seats) Open VLD, MR, CD&V Caretaker government But: crisis situation (COVID) Takes office as full-fledged minority government Parliamentary support by socialists, Greens, CdH + Défi Investiture vote: 88/150 votes Highly exceptional! (But crisis, temporary solution) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 20 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Formal and informal constraints further complicate negotiations 2. Frequent formal need for ‘supermajorities’ State reforms since 1970s Changing constitution: 2/3 seats Changing special maj. laws: 2/3 + 50% seats in each linguistic group = oversized coalitions Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 21 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Formal and informal constraints further complicate negotiations 3. Informal quest for parliamentary majority in each linguistic group No formal requirement! (But needed for many state reforms) Symbolic: broader electoral support and legitimacy Michel I (2014-2018): No francophone majority in parliament De Croo (2020-now): No Flemish majority in parliament Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 22 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? ‘From one day to the next, I became a political pariah because the MR was the only Francophone party joining the coalition. (…) I was convicted a priori, not because the policies were good or bad, but because I was the only one who dared to join a coalition with the N-VA. (…) I was mentally capable of coming to terms with the criticism on the Walloon side, but perhaps I should have been more sensitive to it. The caricatures were so exaggerated.’ (Hoflack, 2021, pp. 100-101) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 23 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Bouteca, N., Vandenberghe, M., Devos, C., Moens, P., Ossenblok, K., & Terriere, L. (2024). Belgisch federalisme. Gent: Academia Press. Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 24 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Formal and informal constraints further complicate negotiations 4. Informal habit: ideological ‘sister parties’ stick together Together in government or in opposition Often leads to surplus parties (and oversized coalitions) E.g. Vooruit/Groen  surplus parties But: exceptions E.g. CD&V (10y) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 25 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Formal and informal constraints further complicate negotiations 5. Informal quest for ‘symmetrical’ cabinets Federal + regional cabinets with same coalition parties Easier for policy-making (cooperative federalism) Less awkward party strategies & positions E.g. situation N-VA today Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 26 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Walloon government Symmetrical coalitions (2014-2019)? Federal government Flemish government Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 27 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Symmetrical coalitions (2019-now)? Walloon government Federal government Flemish government Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 28 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Formal and informal constraints further complicate negotiations 6. Refusal to govern with ideological extremes Flanders: ‘cordon sanitaire’ against VB Not even engage in coalition talks Cultivated by VB (‘exclusion by established parties’) BUT 2019: party president invited by King (first time) and Flemish formateur Wallonia: reluctance to govern with PTB-PVDA Less ‘formalized’. Mostly expressed by centre-right parties Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 29 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 30 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Flemish parliament (2019-now) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 31 GOVERNMENT FORMATION WHY SO LONG, COMPLEX AND UNPREDICTABLE? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 32 How does Belgium’s complex state structure complicate coalition negotiations at the federal level? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 33 Questions? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023| 34 GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL Federal formation: follows classic pattern Role played by King But: influence and autonomy is limited Several stages Consultations, information round, formation round… Important role for party leaders ! Advise the King Main negotiators Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 35 GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL First Monday after elections Outgoing PM goes to Royal Palace Offers resignation of cabinet to King King accepts and starts consultation round Meetings with party presidents (not VB, except in 2019) Discuss electoral outcome and possibilities King selects ‘informateur’ Based on suggestions of party leaders Often future coalition partner Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 36 GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL Information round Takes a few weeks Informateur: invites all party leaders (and leaders of major interest groups). Main demands for new government? Which parties are willing to proceed to concrete negotiations?  Mathematically and politically viable options? Writes an ‘information report’ for the King King selects ‘formateur’ No real choice: often obvious choice for future prime minister Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 37 GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL Formation round Formateur organizes negotiations between future coalition parties Party leaders + top negotiators/party experts Negotiate about 1. Governmental policies (coalition agreement) Longest and most difficult stage 2. Distribution of ministerial portfolios (between parties) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 38 GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL What if (in)formateur fails? Back to the King May select new informateur (alternative coalitions) or new formateur (new negotiations) Or more creativity: select new ‘explorers’, ‘mediators’ or ‘Royal assignment holders’ Often very senior (bilingual) politicians Clear the minefield ; win some time Pave the way for new (in)formateur Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 39  GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL Edit Master text styles Fourth level Elections of 26 May 2019 Fifth level ▶ Second level Informateurs Reynders & Vande Lanotte (30 May) ▶ Third level Pre-formateurs Bourgeois & Demotte (8 October) Informateur Magnette (5 November) Informateurs Coens & Bouchez (10 December) Royal Assignment Holder Geens (31 January) Royal Assignment Holders Dewael & Laruelle (19 February) Formateur Wilmés (16 March)  Temporary minority goverment Wilmès I Initiative Magnette + Rousseau (13 mei) Initiative Bouchez, Lachaert, Coens (17 juni) Preformateurs De Wever & Magnette (20 juli) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 40 Royal Assignment Holder Lachaert (4 augustus)  GOVERNMENT FORMATION THE CONTENT After negotiations on coalition (who joins?) (of course related) Longest phase of the formation Outcome = coalition agreement Very long and detailed documents in Belgium Federal (2019): 84 p. (230 p. in 2014) Flanders (2019): 303 p. Very important and consequential Determines policy agenda for next term Binds coalition parties (prevent conflict) Negotiated by party presidents  power! Constrains room for MPs (party discipline) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 41  GOVERNMENT FORMATION DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS After policy negotiations: distribution of ministerial portfolios Gamson’s law: proportionality (based on parliamentary seats) But: Smaller parties tend to be slightly overrepresented Not all portfolios are the same (budget, prestige, influence) Federal/Brussels: linguistic parity  some parties overrepresented (e.g. MR in 2014: half of all minister portfolios) (Bassi, 2013) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 42  GOVERNMENT FORMATION DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS Federal government = 15 ministers (linguistic parity) + state secretaries (unlimited). Distributed by ‘system of points’ Prime Minister = 3 points Minister = 2 points State secretaries: 1 point Also distributed: speakers of parliament, EU commissioner  2 points Several steps 1. Determine points per linguistic group 2. Determine points per party (proportionality) 3. Party leaders pick portfolio, in order of size (largest party has first choice)  Ministerial parity = advantage for Francophone parties? But in reality … typically compensated by more Flemish state secretaries Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 43  GOVERNMENT FORMATION DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIOS Who becomes minister on behalf of the party? Selection = privilege of party leader (partitocracy) Choice is respected and not contested by other parties Ministers are not necessarily elected MPs Also non-elected officials (leaders of interest groups, professors) Elected politicians but on other levels (e.g. Jan Jambon) MPs who become minister must resign  substituted Each coalition party selects ‘vice prime minister’ Leader of the party-in-government Follow general policies (besides own portfolios) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 44  GOVERNMENT FORMATION FINAL FORMALITIES Once negotiations have finished: 1. Party congress votes on government participation Discussion of coalition agreement Generally without any difficulty: Little time (night/day) to critically assess the coalition agreement (long) Opportunity for policy influence, office spoils (extra staff) 2. New cabinet takes oath in the Royal Palace 3. Prime Ministers presents policy plans to parliament and asks confidence (investiture vote) So … parliament only involved at the very end of the process Unlikely that MPs will vote against (= against own party members ~ party congress; against party leadership; etc.) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 45  GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE IN THE REGIONS/COMMUNITIES Very similar procedures at for regional/community governments Party leaders Extensive coalition agreements Division of portfolios with ‘system of points’ Party congress + investiture vote But some differences King is not involved (only takes the oath of the prime minister, other ministers  parliament) Largest party (leader) takes the initiative Less complex: Less parties No linguistic barriers to bridge (except Brussels) No need for 2/3 majorities or majorities in both language groups Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 46  GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE IN THE REGIONS/COMMUNITIES Flemish government Merger of region + community = one coalition agreement Max 11 ministers (no state secretaries) 1 minister from Brussels Government of the Walloon region/Francophone community Generally same coalition parties Two separate coalition agreements But overlap in ministers + portfolios (is allowed) WAL: Max 9 ministers (no state secretaries) FR: Max 8 ministers (no state secretaries) 1 minister from Brussels Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 47  GOVERNMENT FORMATION PROCEDURE IN THE REGIONS/COMMUNITIES Brussels Regional Government Fixed language groups + ministerial parity Two step process 1. Formation of coalition within each linguistic group Search for symmetry but not necessary 2. Two coalitions join to negotiate a common coalition agreement  Approval by Brussels divisions of political parties (quite autonomous) Distribution of portfolios: NL: 2 ministers + 1 secretary of state FR: Two ministers + PM + 2 secretaries of state Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 48 Questions? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023| 49 THE FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT MANAGING A FRAGILE, MULTIPARTY COALITION Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 50  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT COALITION MANAGEMENT Bringing together parties (formation) is difficult Keeping them together is equally difficult Parties eventually face the electorate separately Might lead to conflicts Therefore: control mechanisms Ex-ante control: coalition agreement Ex-post control: ‘extremely’ collective and hierarchical decision-making Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 51  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT A CONTRACT-STYLE COALITION AGREEMENT Coalition agreement ‘Bible’ or ‘contract’: filled with package deals Main purpose: provide governmental stability Prevent later ‘surprises’ or different interpretations. Detailed list of concrete policies that will be implemented By government (MPs are not supposed to interfere with these policies) Including timing & procedure Equally important: what is not written in the agreement Informal habit: no new policies without consent of all coalition parties No alternative majorities in parliament (!) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 52  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT EXTREMELY COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING Council of Ministers Meets every Friday Chaired by PM, only ministers present (and state secretary if needed) Decide on general policies, bill proposals, ministerial executive orders, budget changes… Consensus decision-making Government never votes Principle of solidarity and collegiality: defend decisions or resign as minister Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 53  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT EXTREMELY COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING Preparation by ‘Ministerial Cabinets’ (‘Kabinetten’) = personal advisors of minister Very large in Belgium (federal: around 800 personal ministerial advisors in total) Staff recruited from parties and public administrations Headed by ‘chef de cabinet’ Inter-cabinet working groups Frequent contacts with other ‘chefs de cabinet’ Also among specialized advisors Moens, P. (2020) Kabinetards: de souffleurs van de Wetstraat  Prepare Council of Ministers Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 54  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT EXTREMELY COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING The ‘core’ cabinet (‘Kern’) Chaired by PM One ‘Vice-PM’ per coalition party Get extra staff (vice-cabinet) Follow general policies + policies of other ministers (watchdog function) Informal meeting but very important Discusses general policies, budgets, most important bills & difficult issues Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 55  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT EXTREMELY COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING Further coordination by political parties Government crisis  PM might decide to talk directly to party presidents Also within parties: weekly informal meetings Between party leader, (Vice-Prime) Ministers, parliamentary group leaders  Prepare Council of Ministers, discuss party positions and strategies. Government in Belgium = party government ! Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 56  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT WHAT ABOUT THE REGIONS/COMMUNITIES? Very similar to the functioning of federal government Detailed coalition agreements Collective decision-making Friday: council of ministers Extensive ministerial cabinets (advisors) Core decision-making in Kern Coordination and follow-up within parties Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 57  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT WHICH ROLE FOR THE KING? Central role during government formation (although limited influence) During governing period: very modest role Once a week: PM briefs King about public affairs King co-signs acts of government & bills Head of state (symbolic & ceremonial tasks) Earlier Kings (before King Phillippe + Father Albert II) Tried to have more influence Foreign Affairs (WWs, Congo) but also Home Affairs (selection of ministers) Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 58  FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT WHICH ROLE FOR THE KING? Mini Royal Question (1991) King needs to co-sign acts of government & bills King Baudouin refuses to give Royal Assent to bill that would depenalize abortion Matter of conscience, religion + personal life (Controversial) constitutional solution  King declared ‘temporarily unable to reign’ Entire government became ‘head of state’ (for a day) Sign bill Next day: declare that King is able to reign again. Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 59 ENDING OF A GOVERNMENT SURVIVAL AND RESIGNATION Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 60 SURVIVAL OF GOVERNMENT RELATIVE CABINET DURATION Relative cabinet duration is comparatively low Somewhat distorted by period of high instability in 1970s-1980s Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 61 SURVIVAL OF GOVERNMENT RELATIVE CABINET DURATION Comparatively high share of premature government resignations Again somewhat distorted by period of high instability in 1970s-1980s Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 62 SURVIVAL OF GOVERNMENT RESIGNATION OF ENTIRE GOVERNMENT Parliamentary democracy: government will resign when it loses the confidence/support of a parliamentary majority Does not happen in practice Regions/communities: fixed term parliaments  constructive motion of no-confidence) Government resignation = party business Often result of conflict and disagreement among coalition parties PM offers resignation to King  ‘current affairs’ and new parliamentary elections Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 63  SURVIVAL OF GOVERNMENT RESIGNATION OF MINISTER = again party business Not decided by PM But by party president Ministers may decide to resign when he/she feels that it has become impossible to function normally Political errors/mistakes Personal/ideological disagreements Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 64  CURRENT AFFAIRS/CARETAKER CABINETS AFTER RESIGNATION When? After resignation because of crisis Or simply after new elections Government loses ‘full’ competences Only finish ‘current affairs’ = No new initiatives (unless very urgent) Parliament still has full competences More legislative autonomy Approval of temporary budgets Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023 | 65 Questions? Belgian Society and Politics 20-3-2023| 66