M1b_ SpezialVO Basics of Political Science PDF

1. - The challenges of democratization in Eastern Europe 1 Claus Offe - Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Tripie Transition in East Central Europe...

1. - The challenges of democratization in Eastern Europe 1 Claus Offe - Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Tripie Transition in East Central Europe 1 Carothers - The end of the transition paradigm 4 2. - Democratic Backsliding in Eastern Europe 6 Lührmann, Lindberg: 3. Wave of autocratization is here: what’s new about it 6 Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, Teorell, Dem: A new way to measure democracy 8 Five principles 9 3 - Beyond populism: hegemonic strategies of Eastern Europe´s ultraconservatives 10 Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe 10 Gramscian Politics of EU’s rule of law crisis 12 4- Polarisation in Austrian politics 15 Wagner & Praprotnik: Affective polarisation and coalition signals 16 5 - Media and politics in Austria 17 Media and politics in Austria 17 Mediatization of Politics: Towards a Theoretical Framework - Strömbäck & Esser 18 6 - Party colonization of the state 21 Kitschelt: 21 Müller - Party Patronage and party colonization of the state 22 Ennser-Jedenastik - The politics of patronage and coalition: How parties allocate managerial positions in state-owned enterprises 25 7 26 Dissatisfied or disengaged citizens? Citizen support for democratic values and institutions and their satisfaction with democracy 26 Easton- A Re-Assessment of the Concept of political support 27 Linde, J., & Ekman, J. (2003). Satisfaction with democracy 29 1. - The challenges of democratization in Eastern Europe Claus Offe - Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Tripie Transition in East Central Europe - Convergence theories 1960-70s => two rival political-economic systems would more or less rapidly assimilate each other - East: enriched with market elements - Western capitalism enriched with state intervention into production and distribution processes - ‘Reforms from above’ ruled out by soviet leadership => would lead to complications and reforms or revolutions from below - Soviet revolution (Gorbachev): from the top - Many other states and groups of states underwent a transition to democracy, but they were different from central and eastern europe in 2 respects 1. The territorial integrity and organisation of each country were preserved, whereas in central and eastern europe the scene is dominated by territorial disputes, migrations,  minority or nationality conflicts and corresponding secessionist longings (also germany included here) 2. Modernising processes are of strictly political and constitutional sort “they concern the form of government and the legal relationships between the state and society, whereas at the end of socialism the additional task of reforming the economy is the order of the day” => “In countries that underwent a transition to democracy => capital remained in the hands of its owners, owners remained in charge of their capital. In the Soviet Union and satellites: transfer of state-owned productive assets to other forms of property, and the creation of an entirely new class of entrepreneurs and owners in a way that has to be decided and justified in a political way and through politically visible actors.” - 3 hierarchical levels of decision making and the 3 human capabilities distinguished by early modern pol philosophers 1. Decision of identity, citizenship and territorial, social and cultural boundaries of the nation state (who we are) => passions, virtue, honor, patriotism 2. Rules, procedures and rights, constitution or institutional framework of the regime => reason 3. Who gets what, when and how (pol power and econ resources) => interest - Issue: nations last for centuries, constitutions for decades and governments or positive law for just a few years - What used to be the soviet union is undergoing transformation on all three levels; there are no moder cases to be imitated, no power that can impose its will from the outside The dilemma of simultaneity Revolutionary transformation in eastern europe can be analyzed only with conceptual means not used in western and southern europe since WW1 - Territorial issue: determination and consolidation of borders - Democracy: dissolution of party monopoly, replacement by constitutionally tamed exercise of authority and party competition, guarantees of basic human and citizen rights (glasnost) and economic and property order (perestroika) Stages of process in normal western states (nation-state to capitalism to democracy) occur simultaneously in eastern europe Only circumstance under which the market economy and democracy can be simultaneously implanted and prosper is the one in which both are forced upon a society from the outside and guaranteed by international relations of dependency and supervision for a long period of time Only a somewhat developed free-market society with a relatively high level of wealth enables competitive democracy to work as a procedure for the arbitration and reconciliation of interests. - In a very uniform society competitive democracy lacks sufficiently formed protagonists, actors and issues considered worth processing through the machinery of democratic politics => lack of developed complexity leads to the dominance of themes that are also not suited to compromise - "As long as the economic foundations for a genuine civil society do not exist, the massive political mobilization of the population is only possible along nationalist or fundamentalist lines" => market must precede democracy as themes of mobilisation would lead to the perversion of the democratic openness into a populist authoritarian regime  - Rudimentary democratic procedures are necessary at the initial stage of transformation (holding pol accountable, political participation) - Democratization: precondition of economic transformation - Market economy emerging in eastern europe will be political capitalism: capitalism designed, organized and set into motion by reform elites - In the EAST: Elites help start a capitalist economic mechanism, representing the interests of society without being able to rely upon and comply with the demands of an already existing class of capitalist owners - In the west: privatization and marketization not rights-driven but outcome-oriented, elite-initiated - Capitalism not trusted by the majority of the population: 1. Suspicion that privatizing initiatives might be in the interest of the enrichment of the members of state apparatus and its clientele 2. No guarantee that improvement of economic situation will occur => when a state-managed withdrawal of the state from the economy is to be undertaken, democracy is a necessary precondition of economic transformation - RO and BG: authoritarian egalitarianism stands in the way of both a market economy and democracy - Market economy set in motion only under predemocratic conditions; to promote it, democratic rights must be held back in order to allow the original accumulation => Only a developed market economy produces the social structural conditions for stable democracy and makes it possible to form compromises within the framework of what is perceived as a positive sum game. The introduction of a market economy in the postsocialist societies is a "political" project, which has prospects of success only if it rests on a strong democratic legitimation. And it is possible that the majority of the population finds neither democracy nor a market economy a desirable perspective. - Problem of the political and economic modernization of former socialist societies => lack noncontingent givens that would be suitable parameters of the politics of reform => system is at a deadlock, everything becomes contingent, nothing can stay as it is - Quiet for reliable foundations of societal and political accord clings to national identities and desires for ethnic self-assertion, inventing traditions and dogmas - Eastern european citizen movements have an anti-institutional, antipolitical bent to them, they cannot refer to already established routines - Elster: key aspects of economic reform: price reform (deregulation and reducing subsidies) and property reform (privatization). - Price reform without property reform would lead managers of state-owned firms to ignore price signals and continue inefficient practices. - Price reform combined with property reform would establish a fully capitalist system, which would result in significant layoffs and business closures. - political reform: - constitutional guarantee of citizens' rights - democratic rights of participation. - The first one without the second would amount to a classical liberal constitutional state, - In Elster’ s model, constitutional and economic reforms involve 3 steps: 1. Institutional frameworks 2. Unfolding process 3. Desired outcome - Democratic reforms: setting up a constitutional framework of citizen rights and parliamentary government => "normal" competitive democratic politics and the allocation of  power and material resources through it. The overall result is the peaceful resolution of social and political conflict. - Economic reforms: property rights and privatisation, an unfolding process of competitive price-setting, and the desired result of productivity gains, growth, and prosperity. Moreover, both chains of structure-process-result are intertwined and are supposed to mutually reinforce each other. 7 possible problems 1. Democratic politics may block or distort the road to privatization and hence marketization. 2. Privatization may occur but falter due to conservation of cartels 3. Privatisation may succeed, but lead to the obstruction of democratic politics through powerful interferences originating from domestic or international owners of capital. 4. Democratic politics may evolve, but fail to lead to the peaceful resolution of social conflict as it is dominated by ethnic, territorial, and minority conflicts that do not lend themselves to democratic forms of compromise. 5. Marketisation may succeed but fail to generate an equitable distribution of its benefits 6. Accumulated disappointments and frustrations => demands for a type of democracy based on an institutional structure other than civil liberties and representative government 7. frustrations with economic performance and distribution may also lead to demands for marketization without private property; for example, a return to state ownership of productive assets Carothers - The end of the transition paradigm Last 25 years of the 20th century: 1. the fall of right-wing authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in the mid 1970s; 2. the replacement of military dictatorships by elected civilian governments across Latin America from the late 1970s through the late 1980s; 3. the decline of authoritarian rule in parts of East and South Asia starting in the mid-1980s; 4. the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s; 5. the breakup of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 post-Soviet republics in 1991; 6. the decline of one-party regimes in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa in the first half of the 1990s; 7. a weak but recognizable liberalising trend in some Middle Eastern countries in the 1990s. Mid 80s, americans referred to this as the “worldwide democratic revolution” => analytic model of democratic transition derived from their own interpretation of the patterns of democratic change taking place Transition paradigm: 1. Country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered to be a country in transition toward democracy 2. Democratization unfolds in stages (opening, breakthrough, consolidation) 3. Elections are crucial for further democratic reforms 4. Underlying conditions won’t play a major factor, all that’s required is a decision 5. State-building not part of the process, democratic transitions on coherent, functioning states Feckless pluralism. ➔ significant political freedom, regular elections, alternation of power between different political groupings ➔ BUT democracy remains shallow and troubled. ➔ Political participation, though broad at election time, extends little beyond voting. ➔ Political elites from all the major parties or groupings are widely perceived as corrupt, self-interested, and ineffective. Dominant power systems ➔ State tends to be as weak and poorly performing in dominant power countries as in feckless-pluralist countries, though the problem is often a bureaucracy decaying under the stagnancy of de facto one party rule rather than the disorganised, unstable nature of state management (such as the constant turnover of ministers) typical of feckless pluralism. ➔ vary in their degree of freedom and political direction → some have very limited political space and are close to being dictatorships. Others allow much more freedom, albeit still with limits. Crash of assumptions 1. Assumption hat a country moving away from a dictatorship is in transition to democracy is inaccurate; Political patterns among transitional countries include elements of democracy; 2. Assumed sequence of stages of democracy is defied by record of experience 3. Assumption that regular, genuine elections will confer democratic legitimacy on new governments and deepen political participation and democratic accountability has come up short => issues are rooted in structural conditions, such as the concentration of wealth or certain socio culturaltraditions that elections don’t overcome => expectations on elections should be lowered 4. Various structural conditions weigh heavily in shaping political outcomes, relative economic wealth and past experiences with political pluralism contributes to the chances for democratic success, specific institutional legacies from predecessor regimes affect the outcomes of attempted transitions 5. State-building much large and problematic than originally envisaged; state-building from scratch => core impulses and interests of powerholders ran directly contrary to what democracy-building would have required => emphasis on diffusing power and weakening the relative power of the executive branch, they were more about redistribution of state power than state-building No longer appropriate to assume: - That most countries are in a transition to democracy - Countries moving away from authoritarianism follow a 3 part process of democratization (opening-breakthrough-consolidation) - Elections will grant democratic legitimacy and foster deepening of democratic participation and accountability - that a country’s chances for successfully democratizing depend primarily on the political intentions and actions of its political elites without significant influence from underlying economic, social, and institutional conditions and legacies; - That state-building is a secondary challenge to democracy-building More general and open-ended questions must be asked, no optimistic assumptions which stunt analysis 2. - Democratic Backsliding in Eastern Europe Lührmann, Lindberg: 3. Wave of autocratization is here: what’s new about it 2 key issues not settled: 1. Contemporary democracies tend to erode gradually and under legal disguise 2. General disagreement about how momentous the current wave of autocratization is State of the art - Global reversal challenges many established democracies => autocratization - Process of autocratization has changed => - decline of more blatant forms of backsliding (military coups and election day vote fraud) - More clandestine ways of autocratization (harassment of opposition, subversion of horizontal accountability) - Risk of military coups has declined, risk of self-coup remains - Executive aggrandizement: elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences - Not yet a systematic way of measuring the new mode of autocratization - Illiberal democracy: subverting electoral standards without breaking democratic facade completely - Electoral authoritarianism: competitive advantage is secured through subtler tactics such as censoring and harassing media, restricting civil society and political parties and undermining autonomy of election management bodies 3 terms for moves away from democracy: 1. Backsliding a. Bermeo: “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy. b. Waldner & Lust: “deterioration of entails a deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime” (move away from an exclusive focus on democracies) c. Problematic (Lührmann, Lindberg): 1. Decline in terms of democracy, conceptual extension beyond demo regimes would border to conceptual stretching 2. Regimes slide back, whereas they may just slide in a different direction; Sliding has an involuntary nature, whereas political changes are made consciously 3. overarching, or superior (Sartori) concept is autocratization; a. Semantically, it signals that we study the opposite of democratization, thus describing “any move away from [full] democracy”. b. autocratization covers: sudden breakdowns of democracy and gradual processes within and outside of democratic regimes where democratic traits decline resulting in less democratic, or more autocratic, situations => enables the study of both the pace and the methods of bringing a regime closer to a closed dictatorship, while keeping the distinction between democratic recessions starting in democracies, democratic breakdowns, and further consolidation of already authoritarian regimes.  2. Breakdown of democracy: a. requires a crisp approach to the difference between democracy and dictatorship to enable the identification of the point of breakdown. b. Excludes: undermining of democratic institutions (autogolpe) and unfinished degeneration of qualities in democracies, waning away from partial democratic qualities in electoral authoritarian regimes. c. problematic for the contemporary period when instances of sudden autocratization– coups d’état for instance– are rare. 3. Autocratization: matter of degree that can occur both in democracies and autocracies a. Democracies can lose democratic traits to varying degrees without fully, and long before breaking down. b. Some autocracies can have democratic traits Other terms may be more useful: - democratic recession: Autocratization processes taking place within democracies - Democratic breakdown: democracy turns into an autocracy - Autocratic consolidation: gradual declines of democratic traits in already authoritarian situations Operationalisation We define countries as democracies if they hold free and fair and de-facto multiparty elections, and achieve at least a minimal level of institutional guarantees captured by the EDI (universal suffrage, officials elected in multiparty elections, freedom of association and alternative sources of information). Huntington: 3 waves of democratization and 2 waves of reverse waves: 1. Democratization: 1820s => widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies. 2. Reverse wave: 1922 the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy, by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. 3. Second wave of democratization: The triumph of the Allies in World War II, reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically 4. second reverse wave (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30 5. By the early 1970s, most of the Protestant countries in the world had already become democratic. The third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a Catholic wave. Beginning in Portugal and Spain, it swept through six South American and three Central American countries, moved on to the Philippines, doubled back to Mexico and Chile, and then burst through in the two Catholic  countries of Eastern Europe, Poland and Hungary. Roughly threequarters of the countries that transited to democracy between 1974 and 1989 were predominantly Catholic. European Community played a key role in consolidating democracy in southern Europe => Democratic erosion became the modal tactic during the third wave of autocratization. Here, incumbents legally access power and then gradually, but substantially, undermine democratic norms without abolishing key democratic institutions. - Almost all contemporary autocratization episodes affect democracies - fewer autocracies are affected by autocratization, that is, transition from electoral to closed autocracy Maximal annual depletion rate: how fast democratic traits decline during an autocratization episode in terms of changes from one year to the other on the V-Dem EDI. Lindberg, Coppedge, Gerring, Teorell, Dem: A new way to measure democracy Five features distinguish V-Dem from previous endeavors to measure democracy: 1. approaching democracy as multidimensional, measuring multiple varieties of democracy and allowing users to choose the one that reflects their own understanding of the concept. 2. collecting information on indicators relevant to democracy at a highly disaggregated level and make both aggregated and disaggregated data freely available. 3. enlisting multiple experts to code each subjective indicator, permitting intercoder reliability tests (for nonfactual questions).  4. extend indicators for each country back through modern history to 1900 (whenever possible) 5. point scores measuring various dimensions of democracy and confidence bounds for every point estimate. While other projects that attempt to measure democracy may contain one or several of these features, none combines them all. Five principles 1. Electoral 2. Liberal 3. Participatory 4. Deliberative 5. Egalitarian => a thin version: “component” => distinct, with no overlapping attributes (components measure conceptually distinct aspects, not overall levels of democracy) 1. Electoral component: core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections; without it, we can’t call a regime democratic in any sense 2. Liberal component: intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the majority.” => achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances that limit the use of executive power. 3. Participatory component: value of direct rule, active participation by citizens in all political processes; also nonelectoral forms (civil society organisations and mechanisms of direct democracy) 4. Deliberative component: political decisions in pursuit of the public good should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion 5. Egalitarian component: more equal distribution of resources, education and health that would enhance political equality => material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties Thick versions of all 5 concepts, with one overlapping element: electoral component =-> no regime should be called a democracy unless it builds on this foundation: Electoral democracy is a combination of the thin electoral component plus freedom of association and access to alternative sources of information => varieties of democracy Most notable tendency: close correlation among electoral, liberal, deliberative and participatory components => track closely with the major waves of democratisation and reversal over the past century. 3 - Beyond populism: hegemonic strategies of Eastern Europe´s ultraconservatives Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe - European Union’s post-communist region (EU East for short) stand out is incumbency– the incum bency of ethnopopulist parties engaged in democratic backsliding. - Hungary is now an authoritarian regime.  - ethnopopulism is a strategy both for winning votes and for concentrating power - ethnopopulism affords political leaders greater flexibility than ethnic nationalism in identifying friends and enemies, and in justifying attacks on independent and counter majoritarian institutions. - racializing the immigrant threat and manipulating opposition to neo-liberal economic policies have played a critical part in smoothing the way for democratic backsliding. 1. Ethnopopulism as an electoral strategy: how does it appeal to voters? - Politicians promise to defend “the people” against establishment elites by arguing that these elites are protecting and expanding their privileges at the expense of ordinary citizens - distinguishes among different kinds of populist parties is how they define “the people”– - challenge mainstream parties from the left, on the economic axis of competition, - LAtin America, Southern Europe ⇒ class dimension, politicians promise to better the lot of the powerless and poor - from the right, on the cultural axis. - Western and Central Europe ⇒ people as an ethnicity, culture, nation, religion, civilisation and race under threat and promise to defend it - (ethnopoulism) ⇒ fabricate external enemies of the people, external enemies conspire with internal ones (those who advocate for liberal democracy) - Ethnopopulism and ethnic nationalism similar but different ⇒ populism more flexible and wider (can also be defined very flexibly in terms of a culture, ethnicity, reli gion or even civilisation) ⇒ not a threat to surrounding coutnries - 1.1. Rising support for populist parties: bottom up and top down reasons for changing attitudes 2 broad explanations: 1. how the attitudes of voters have shifted to reflect feelings of injustice and resentment owing to social and economic changes in their daily lives. - impact of globalisation on the quality of low skilled jobs and the rise in immigration, both of which are linked to lower wages and higher unemployment. - expanding powers of the EU - national political institutions have failed to represent these disaffected voters effectively - steep decline in participation ⇒ Working class have drifted away in search of parties that represent their attitudes and are responsive to their concerns 2. popular attitudes have changed ⇒ changes also due to choices by party leaders about what positions to take and how to challenge other parties - creating an exaggerated sense of threat, by spreading xenophobia, - Here the causal arrows are reversed. They are top down, from parties to voters: it is cueing and manipulation by well-positioned elites that have caused voters to support ethnopopulist parties. 1.2. Race and ethnicity: why do ethnopopulist appeals resonate in homogenous states? causal arrows go both ways: from voters to parties, and from parties to voters 2 puzzles related to race and ethnicity 1. Why did the “threat” of Muslim immigration become an issue ⇒ virtually no Muslim refugees or migrants present in the region. a. ‘90s => bottom issue, where population exerted influence on politicians  b. not the product of an established identity-based cleavage 2. why have ethnopopulists come to power in some of the most homogeneous states in the region rather than in states with longstanding conflict between ethnic majorities and minorities a. “heterogeneity normalises otherness” 1.3. Economic wellbeing: why do ethnopopulist appeals resonate in prosperous states? - Welfare has improved dramatically - First explanation: strong economic performance has unsettled traditional voters by accelerating social change - second explanation: strong economic performance increases perceptions of inequality among different groups within a state as part of a “revolution of rising expectations” - over the past five years, as their ethno populist narrative has hardened, PiS and ANO have seen their voters become older, more rural and less educated– and potentially more resentful of urban and educated citizens - Third explanation: more prosperous states can afford more social spending ⇒ far right parties have attracted working class voters across Europe, they have “blurred” their positions on the traditional economic left-right spectrum and adopted some left positions ( 1.4. Conflating neo-liberal economic policies and liberal democracy: the rewards for ethnopopulists and the dangers for scholarship - like incumbents in the US and the UK today, they enrich themselves by lowering taxes, by eliminating environmental safe guards and by cutting or changing regulations to benefit their own businesses. - like incumbents in the US and the UK today, they enrich themselves by lowering taxes, by eliminating environmental safe guards and by cutting or changing regulations to benefit their own businesses. 2. Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding - ethnopopulists set about dismantling liberal democracy ⇒ strategy to end political turnover and expand opportunities for rent-seeking. - Ethnopopulists in Poland and Hungary: have told their supporters that in 1989 opposition forces betrayed the nation by colluding with the communists. The opposition must therefore not only be kept out of office,butincumbents mustbegivenextraordinary powerin orderto undo this historic mistake and finally rid the country of communism 2.1. Conceptualising democratic backsliding: is it binary and is it just about institutions? Definition democratic backsliding: the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy (Bermeo) ⇒ conceptualise the work of incumbents as a collage that layers ethnopopulist appeals together with moves to control the policy making process, to eliminate independent state institutions and independent media, and to control the cultural, academic, artistic and economic life of the country as it suits them 2 questions: 1. should scholars identify democratic backsliding in a dichotomous “yes” or “no” way– or \as a continuum? ⇒ continuum 2. should scholars disentangle attacks on democratic institutions from the ethnopopulist discourse that legitimises them and how? ⇒ if vilification of women and lgbt is reflected in legislation, it  constitutes democratic backsliding; some kinds of appeals by politicians also constitute demo backsliding 2.2. The tools of democratic backsliding: how do they do it? four tools for concentrating power that can help us identify democratic backsliding 1. eliminating “horizontal” checks and balances ( seizing control of the constitutional court and the prosecutor’s office, ending the independence of judges, changing electoral rules, side-lining the opposition and controlling the media) ⇒ creating a culture of self-censorship to abate criticism and silence whistleblowers 2. capturing the economy ⇒ centralised system of supportive crony capitalism 3. deepening polarisation of society ⇒ use state-funded media and also institutions to spread illiberal narratives throughout society 4. supplanting existing civil society groups with a “parallel civil society” that embraces ethnopopulist narratives and the fusion of the party with the state Democratic backsliding and historical memory: why are the standard bearers of liberal demo the ones to fall? - Flexibility has created the opportunity for ethnopopulists to appeal to voters and to concentrate power - Strong opposition to communism because of liberal democratic values ⇒ used to spin conspiracy with communists (not in romania and bulgaria, where incumbent communists kept strong grip on polity after 1989) - Opposition must be kept out of office, incumbents need unprecedented power to undo this historical betrayal and pure communists - Joining EU doesn’t guarantee steadfast liberal democracy - Hungary is transforming EU membership into a safe place for authoritarian regime ⇒ strengths of EU accession process (clear legal foundations, apolitical technocratic assessment mechanism and credible promises and threats) have been degraded and need to be restored - The factors that seemed good for liberal democracy during and after fall of communism have contained the seeds of its degradation at the hands of ethnopopulist leaders Gramscian Politics of EU’s rule of law crisis ⇒ radicalization of Polish andHungarianleaders’positionontheruleoflawandliberalvaluesisfueledby these leaders’ long-term ideological commitment ⇒ multipronged Gramscian counter-hegemonic strategies to reshape domestic and EU polities in line with an alternative, nationalist sovereignsits and right wing Christian vision\ - Threshold of passing to radicalization when governments turn to attack the EU headon Explaining radicalization - Western societies ⇒ bourgeois hegemony had developed through a dense cultural and civil society ⇒ generating broad consensus ⇒ not enough for communism to occupy existing state institutions and change economic ownership structures - Gramsci: hegemony as political leadership which provides moral, cultural and ideological guidance  - Any counter hegemonic strategy needs to penetrate cultural, moral and ideological spheres, appeal to ppl’s common sense 2 strategies for gramsci: 1. War of position: penetration of civil society and a slow displacement of previously held views in society 2. War of manoeuvre: a frontal and speedy attack on existing state institutions radicalization of the Hungarian and Polish stance on the rule of law, the EU and liberal norms is the result of a long term counter-hegemonic project. - ethnopopulism ‘to describe political parties that intertwine the defense of “the people” with the defense of an ethnicity, culture, nation, religion, and/or race’ Phases 1. Core ideology production and penetration of civil society 2. War of maneuver combined with pre-existing war of position Counter-hegemonic ideology and strategy under Orban Ideological continuity - Stark contrast between old christian europe and open-society eu of today Building civil society - Accumulate social capital through forging of identity Taking over institutions and strengthening illiberal civil society from above Struggle for hegemonic power ⇒ investment in developing cultural leadership 4- Polarisation in Austrian politics Lelkes: MASS POLARISATION: MANIFESTATIONS AND MEASUREMENTS four distinct manifestations of polarisation ⇒ Much of the disagreement comes down to varied definitions. 1. ideological consistency a. Pew b. 2. ideological divergence, a. Fiorina and Dickinson b. 3. perceived polarisation, 4. affective polarisation Lelkes focuses on polarisation as a trend and focuses on 2 sets of groups: mass public and partisans Americans at the mass level have not become more consist ent ideologically, nor have they diverged, but partisans have; perceptions of polarization have increased among partisans; and partisans increasingly dis like one another. Ideological Polarisation - Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders ⇒ America is in the midst of a culture war ⇒ polarisation is consistency - Morris Fiorina, Samuel Abrams, Jeremy Pope, and Matthew Levendusky ⇒ claims of a culture war are exaggerated ⇒ polarisation is divergence ⇒ define polarisation differently ⇒ debate goes in circles Definition - On the one hand, polarisation can be defined as alignment, which refers to the degree to which party identity increasingly matches ideology (sorting) and the degree to which attitudes become more internally consistent - On the other hand, polarisation has been defined as divergence or the degree to which the distribution of ideology has moved apart. Ideological Consistency Pew Report relied on Abramowitz and Saunders ⇒ the degree to which people consistently align themselves with one side or another Baldassarri and Gelman: political polarisation constitutes a threat to the extent that it induces alignment along multiple lines of potential conflict and organises individuals and groups around exclusive identities, thus crystallising interests into opposite factions ⇒ consistency consists of 2 components: 1. Sorting: degree to which ideology matches identity 2. Constraint: correlation between issue positions Sorting: increase in alignment between party identity and issue attitudes => has increased the most on moral issues over the past four decades ⇒ BUT: relationship between economic issues and partisan identification has always been stronger than that of moral issues and partisan identification. Ideological Divergence the liberal–conservative scale may be a poor measure of ideological polarisation bimodality has stayed entirely stable in the mass public, one bump aside in 1998. Latent ideology among the mass public is not currently polarised, nor has it been polarising. Partisans were actually more similar to one another in 1972 than the self-reported ideology measure shows mass public has not diverged ideologically; partisans have diverged quite a bit Perceived Ideological Polarisation - Increasing perceptions of polarisation cause people to moderate their issue positions while increasing inter party animosity. - perceived polarization increased by about 10 percent. - t respondents exaggerate party extremity as a way to criticize the other side and engage in partisan cheerleading. Hence, the increase in perceived polarisation among partisans may be an artefact of other forms of polarization. Affective Polarization seems to be a unique form of prejudice. Social norms seem to pressure individuals to overstate their feelings of antipathy ⇒ likely exacerbated by priming partisan identity polarized elite choices yield polarised mass opinions Wagner & Praprotnik: Affective polarisation and coalition signals - Levendusky: depictions of the public as moderate rather than extreme reduce affective polarisation; events that prime higher order national identities—such as the July 4 national holiday—reduce affective polarisation - Interpersonal contact, even if only imagined, can increase inter partisan affect - heightening partisan ambivalence (i.e., highlighting aspects of one’s in-party one disagrees with) and self-affirmation techniques fail to robustly reduce affective polarisation - cooperating with rivals reduces affective distance - In a multiparty system, rival parties whose political plans and projects can be seen as a danger to voters’ worldview and identities will therefore disliked more  - The perceived threat will thus depend on factors such as the ideological distance between one’s own preferences and those of the party (Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016) or the extent to which groups have solidified into stable, deep-seated social identities or even tribes - Affective polarization is based not just on ideological distance, but also on whether out-party politicians and voters are seen as socially distinct, distant groups. - To understand why this is the case, our starting point is that in many European countries not all out-parties are alike. Instead, party systems operate as ideological blocs, where left-wing parties are distinct from right-wing parties. Affective polarization thus occurs across blocs as well as across parties, with radical-right parties arguably forming a distinct bloc. Thus, voters form distinctive affective groups not just based on parties, but also based on ideological camps. Hence, affect toward partisans within one bloc will be positive, even if not as high as toward the in-party. Interestingly, part of the reason why these ideological and affective camps may be precisely due to repeated elite signals, with party leaders indicating their willingness to cooperate across party lines or even declare pre-election pacts. - partisans will feel more positively toward out-partisans if their party signals that it might form a coalition with the out-party - There is little difference in the effects of coalition signals depending on whether warm personal relations are described or not. If anything, coalition signals have a stronger effect without personal connections. This is also true if we look at party-level effects - willingness to compromise among non-bloc parties is clearly not viewed negatively, even though both parties are out-groups Summary: - when parties signal that they can cooperate with one another, their supporters feel less affective distance toward each other ⇒ particularly clear for mainstream party supporter evaluations of the radical-right party supporters 5 - Media and politics in Austria Media and politics in Austria - Media capture: mutually corrupting relationship between political actors and media organizations ⇒ threat to media independence - It can distort public opinion, suppress dissent and undermine investigative journalism - Inseratenaffäre: ÖVP tried to skew public opinion by making a deal with a tabloid newspaper to publish manipulated polling data in 2016 and arranging for it to be reported favorably in return for generous purchases of advertising space by government institutions ⇒ aim of this quid pro quo was not only to attain favorable media bias but to influence intra-party opinion as well as public opinion in favor of Kurz’s rise to power - Advertising resources emerged in order to reduce political biases in news coverage - “captured media outlets,” willingly prioritizing the interests of their advertisers over objectively informing the public and holding politicians accountable - political parties and government institutions - view media advertisements not only as a means to convey their political message directly and unfiltered to potential voters - tool to exert influence over media outlets and (co-)shape media content discreetly, potentially without raising direct suspicion of impropriety or bribery Advertisement Placements: Pressure & Bribe - Discreet avenue for financial transactions in plain sight - Giving in to financial bribes violates journalistic norms of objectivity  - Media entities can also instigate ⇒ threat of unfavorable news coverage unless advertisement placed - Whether and how strongly editorial integrity may be compromised to please advertisers or punish advertiser abstinence is argued to be mitigated mainly by two crucial factors: 1. adherence to journalistic routines & norms (separation between editorial and commercial departments) 2. financial pressure advertisers can exert on an individual outlet - some news outlets do reward advertisers by producing more, positively biased coverage of their product, and/or increased negative coverage of direct competitors ⇒ particularly evident in newspapers distributed free of charge (reliant on ads) - Austria (political advertisements are common) ⇒ relationship between political advertisements and beneficial news coverage may be again particularly driven by tabloid media The Austrian Case: “Inseratenaffäre” - AT media system: democratic-corporatist model, similar to neighboring countries (CH, DE); with elements of polarized pluralist model (concerning low ethical standards) ⇒ shows inclination toward political influence in newsroom editorial processes and significant degree of closeness btw pol figures and journalists - Relative weak mechanisms for media accountability ⇒ potential gateways for mechanisms of media capture - From 2010 - 2015, AT gov agencies spent 15 Mio Euro on ads in newspapers ⇒ increased from 2016 to 2019 to over 20 million Euros a year Kurz and his associates conspired to seize party leadership prior to the 2017 national elections ⇒ orchestrated allocation of government funds to finance doctored opinion polls that would portray Kurz favorably and facilitate his rise to power (within party and within the government). Additionally, Kurz faces allegations of coordinating with OE24 to ensure the publication of the aforementioned manipulated opinion polls alongside more positive coverage, reciprocated by the ÖVP-controlled Ministry of Finance’s purchase of advertising space in the newspaper (€1,116,000) ⇒ arrangement commenced 2016 and persisted until 2019 Study measures: - Actor visibility: Nr of paragraph on Kurz doubled due to the alleged arrangements - Actor Favorability: no compelling stat pattern concerning change in differences; other politicians get worse coverage ⇒ didn’t write better about Kurz, just worse about others Mediatization of Politics: Towards a Theoretical Framework - Strömbäck & Esser - today there is no alternative political system that enjoys the same worldwide support and legitimacy as democracy - many established democracies ⇒ transformation towards increasing complexity, less deferential and increasingly critical and dissatisfied citizens, lower electoral turnout and trust in politicians and political institutions, increasingly autonomous, market-driven and critical media - paradox: global trend towards an expanding number of electoral democracies has occurred at roughly the same time as the trend within many established democracies towards an increasing gap between expectations and demands and what political institutions are able to deliver. The demand for political action to solve pressing problems may be stronger than ever, but the preconditions for political decision-making, public deliberation and political legitimacy have at the same time weakened.  - Media can have major influence on public opinion and the structure and processes of political decision-making and political communication - Key concept to understand role of media in transformation of established democracies: mediatization ⇒ media become increasingly influential and deeply ingrained into different spheres of society ⇒ extension of influence of the media (both cultural technology and organization) into all spheres of society and social life - Mazzoleni: mediatization: the extension of the influence of the media (both cultural technology and organization) into all spheres of society and social life - Hjarvard: mediatization as “the process whereby society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media and their logic - Asp and Esaiasson: mediatization as a development towards increasing media influence - Different from mediation ⇒ more neutral act of transmitting messages and communicating through different media (static and descriptive) Mediatization of politics as a four-dimensional concept - long-term process of increasing media importance and direct and indirect media influence in various spheres in society (individual, organizational, societal) ⇒ mediatization of politics may be defined as a long-term process through which the importance of the media and their spill-over effects on political processes, institutions, organizations and actors have increased ⇒ Mazzoleni and Schulz: politics lost autonomy and became dependent on mass media and is shaped by interactions with mass media - Can vary by domain (some parts of pol sphere more affected than others) - Contingent ⇒ time, space and context matter 4 dimensions of mediatization (strongly linked together): 1. Information source: degree to which media constitute the most important source of information about politics and society ⇒ the extent to which politics has become mediated a. The modern democracy is a mass democracy ⇒ Mio of ppl, requires the media for organization and representation (needed at a larger scale where ppl can’t physically meet and discuss) b. Extension of franchise → mass democracy → mass media 2. Media autonomy: degree to which the media have become independent from other political and social institutions ⇒ form an institution in their own right a. Emerged in correspondence with mass pol parties (SPÖ, ÖVP) ⇒ had their own parties with substantial circulation until late 20th century b. Gradually more independent from direct party control c. Last party owned daily newspaper shut down last year “Oberösterreichischer Volksblatt” 3. Media practices: degree to which media content and the coverage of politics and current affairs is guided by media logic or political logic ⇒ the extent to which the media’s own needs and standards of newsworthiness, rather than those of political actors or institutions, are decisive for what the media cover and how they cover it a. Media content follows media logic ⇒ 3 dimensions 1. Professionalism: autonomy from outside influences and control, norms and values among journalists 2. Commercialism: should compete with each other to offer the least expensive mix of content that protects the interests of sponsors and investors while garnering the largest audience advertisers will pay to reach”; ads on entire pages ⇒ source of income, cheaper production as less content, plan ruined by internet 3. media technology: pressures the news media to adapt to and take advantage of the particular format of that medium  4. Political practices: the extent to which political institutions, organizations and actors are guided by media logic or political logic ⇒ the ripple effects of media in political processes and on political actors and institutions a. Change their structure to adapt to media logic b. Increased resource allocation to media monitoring (ads) c. Change their behavior to adapt to media logic → greater output, diversification of channels d. Some parties are stakeholders in media and comm companies e. Campaign posters increasingly personalized ⇒ bc. voting behavior increasingly determined by voters’ attitude towards party leader AT pol → strong signs of mediatization on all dimensions: - Media most important for info - News media more independent from pol Mediatization happens L → R Schulz: what is media influence 1. Extension across time and space 2. Substitution of face to face interaction 3. Amalgamation ⇒ virtually everywhere, the media’s definition of reality amalgamates with the social definition of reality (everything you know comes from the combo of what you find out through diff forms of media) 4. Accommodation: induces social changes, incentivises social and political actors to accommodate and adapt to the media there is no part of contemporary society unaffected by the media, and that it consequently has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the media and other parts of society Media influence is different from Media effects 1. main focus of most effect theories is on media effects on individual perceptions and opinions. 2. most media effect theories focus on the individual level of analysis, whereas mediatization is a process also involving the meso and macro levels of analysis. 3. most media effect theories assume that media effects follow from content, whereas mediatization also includes how the media through their very existence and semi-structural properties exert influence.  4. traditional media effect theories do not take the anticipatory effects of the media into account, that is, when effects occur because social actors anticipate how the media will behave “transorganizational agreement on news processes and content” Neo-institutionalism: different news media can be grouped together as an interorganizational field and be conceived of as a singular institution. Various news media constitute the building blocks of the news media as an institution, but the rules and norms that govern the news media as a whole are typically more important than what distinguishes one news media company, outlet, type, or format from another Neo institutionalism consequently conceptualizes the news media as exerting influence through overall rather consistent operational behavior and consonant and cumulative coverage of politics and current affairs A significant portion of the influence that the media exert arises out of the double-sided development in which they have become an integral part of other institutions’ operations, while also achieving a degree of self-determination and authority that forces other institutions, to greater or lesser degrees, to submit to their logic. What matters most is not the technical form of the media, but whether the organizations behind different individual media form part of the news media as an institution. There is also some evidence that commercial media such as private television and tabloids have a stronger tendency to frame politics as a strategic game– often used as an indicator of commercialism and media logic rather than political logic– than public service media or broadsheets 6 - Party colonization of the state Kitschelt: Parties should solve 2 problems - Collective action problem - More effective to cooperate and solve issues together, & pool resources under a common label - Social choice problem - Individual politicians have different priorities and preferences → parties provide joint preference ranking (program); - simplify issue positions → easier decision making (also for voters); top down, what’s necessary for politicians to organize Parties provide: - Solution to Collective action problem (organizational problem): - Party bureaucracy, organizational infrastructure - Solution to social choice problem - Interest aggregation & program formation, mechanisms for deciding coherent positions ⇒ we assume both happen at the same time What if no organization and investment in program formation? - charismatic leadership becomes the only thing that holds them together → if that person leaves the party falls apart No organization but program formation - Competitive oligarchies 19th century cadre parties Organization but no program formation - Clientelism → direct, material benefits (vote buyout strategy) (if jobs are given out → party patronage) Investment in both - Programmatic linkages between parties and followers (doesn’t exclude clientelism or party patronage, but it’s a broad explanation) Organizational structure (at least) required for clientelism → otherwise you can’t contact ppl. 2 types of clientelist exchange: 1. Constituencies are resource-rich but vote-poor a. Provide financial resources 2. Constituencies are resource-poor but vote-rich a. In mass participatory system b. Electoral support c. Jobs, public housing, welfare benefits Müller - Party Patronage and party colonization of the state - Party patronage: the use of public resources in particularistic and direct exchanges between clients and party politicians or party functionaries, disguised for official purposes as norm application; they don’t necessarily break laws; clients who receive public goods and services understand that their party connection has been critical for that purpose. - Kopecky: Power of party to appoint ppl in public and semi-public life - Directness: parties are able to identify their clients individually and engage in a contract-like exchange relationship in which politicians provide goods and services in exchange for some kind of support. - When is it necessary? because the bureaucracy is inefficient and unresponsive and/or because it helps to use administrative discretion to the benefit of the client, indeed, up to the point of bending the law. Kopecky: Motivations for power - Control: - Exerting influence - Party can implement policy goals → management tool - If meritocracy as well → greater element of democratic legitimacy - Reward - For loyal service (for ambassador positions) ⇒ whether control or reward is more important depends on european region (Control in western europe, both in EE) Party patronage in AT much higher than the WE average - High levels of party membership (demand) - High levels of state ownership (supply) - Low partisan turnover in gov Voter behavior ⇒ increasingly volatile, remains still there. Mentality and political culture → can’t be used to explain phenomena Gov composition doesn’t change all that much in AT. Coalitions have mechanisms of allocating positions (typically ministerial posts) between coalition parties What determines allocation in coalition governments? Seat shares in parliament Control of ministerial portfolios (ministers, junior ministers) Portfolio salience (= how valuable is a specific position?) Implications: - seat share in parliament (the stronger the party the more positions) - Control of ministry (The party that holds the responsible minister will have a higher proportion of positions on managerial boards; This effect will be smaller if there is a watchdog junior minister in the respective ministry) - Portfolio salience (diff pos have diff value → more important ones see more more party appointance; appointance by parties according to their interests) Benefits of clients can be located on a continuum between: - Incentive: - client receives something of value to him - Compulsion: - client is protected from some negative event (patron not only is able to prevent negative events but also can make them more likely to occur in the case of disobedience) There are non-material and material patronage goods: - Non-material: know-how: Complex bureaucracy in public services can force citizens to rely on party-backed intermediaries, who may then misuse this power to control access to the services themselves. - Material: - Public money used directly: grants, subsidies, government contracts, tax reliefs, and sponsored credits - Licenses: for practicing certain professions or businesses - Public housing - Jobs in the public sector (the decisive question in selecting personnel is what the client, once appointed, will be able and willing to do for the party) - service patronage: employment or promotion in exchange for the client's loyalty outside his or her job. - power patronage: allocation of important positions. - waiving administrative penalties: rather than providing ‘preferential treatment’ for party donors, non-donors are punished The greater the public sector the bigger the potential for patronage BUT shrinking the public sector leads to enormous increases in patronage resources in the short term. Privatization driven by patronage gives decision-makers greater resources for patronage, allowing them to use the full "capital" of public assets, unlike their predecessors who could only use the "interest." Benefits of parties - Votes: clients vote for the party that has provided the goods or services (policing the deal is difficult for the party), party can use proxies for the electoral loyalty of its clients, such as their participation in  elections, or use institutional remedies ⇒ Political parties may therefore be better off concentrating on other potential benefits of patronage relations - Labour and Money: Dues-paying members, in turn, provide the party with financial resources, party patronage never was confined to the masses of the lower social strata (because labor and money can substitute one another), money can be used for ads, consulting, opinion polls - Strategic flexibility: Party activists typically have some influence on the course of their party (withholding resources) - Policy-Making Capacity: can increase it by exercising patronage, The bulk of expertise required for policy-making, however, comes from people on the public payroll. - Power patronage: faithful implementers when party in power, spies when not, good to have adherents in the wings so suitable candidates are ready then top positions become vacant New Public Management (NPM) - administrators have fixed goals in terms of outputs or outcomes - criterion for performance evaluation: goal achievement → little room for patronage - If the performance of the administrators is subject to interpretation by the incumbent politicians, patronage rather than efficiency may be the result. Party patronage openly recognized under US spoils system → appointments under the other systems can be made in a partisan manner but disguised as merit or technocratic ⇒ in most countries political parties have entrenched themselves in the bureaucracy → in most clientelist systems - Austria, Belgium, and Italy -relevant civil service appointments are routinely made with a strong partisan bias. In judicial branch of government, party patronage seems to be less widespread and less consequential BUT considerable party patronage in appointing judges who have to settle political disputes in some systems Maintaining patronage system - Bureaucrats and public sector managers control a wealth of other resources that can be used in party patronage - Having party comrades appointed to relevant positions, parties will often find it easy to get civil servants to do them a ‘favor’ and to provide resources required for patronage - politicians and officials share the bonds of co-partisanship, and if patronage has the intended effects it will help to keep both of them in office Systemic consequences of patronage - Political and social integration: - parties that exercise patronage ‘fulfill existing needs somewhat more effectively’ than the official structure - patronage party ‘fulfills the important social function of humanizing and personalizing all manner of assistance to those in need’ and provides help for the ‘deprived classes’ - provides alternative channels of social mobility patronage systems have the inherent tendency to develop towards less desirable consequences → patronage undermines horizontal social relations. Instead of class and status solidarity, the vertical patron-client relationship dominates and clients see other people merely as rivals for patronage benefits ‘democratization’ always needs to remain incomplete in a patronage system ⇒ Maintaining the effectiveness of the patronage system means that the parties must refrain from leveling social dependencies and inequalities  - Economic inefficiency: - tends to develop a strong dynamic of its own, constantly drawing in new areas until a patronage system exists - Party patronage is expensive and economically inefficient. - bloated civil service. - inflates demands its costs increase over time - leads to overinvestment in those goods that are required as a means in patronage exchanges - Positions are often superfluous and the relevant appointments suboptimal; - public funds distributed of only very limited value in achieving the nominal goal - Systemic Corruption: - violates the ideal of bureaucratic rationality and undermines central constitutional principles (equality before the law) - Populist Backlash: - Unjustified preferential treatment of individuals and firms, economic inefficiency, a bloated public sector, and the resulting consequences of high taxation and/or increasing public debt are likely to outrage citizens. - the western European countries with the highest levels of party patronage have the strongest populist parties, the rise of which owes much to their targeting of party patronage and corruption - On the demand side we see that the market increasingly offers substitutes to the goods traded by political actors in mass patronage deals and that an increasing proportion of the citizens are able to purchase these goods there and hence no longer depend on patronage exchange. - Money has turned out to be the most valuable resource in (the permanent) campaign, given the large markets of voters without any party attachment. As a consequence patronage may place itself more clearly under the label of political corruption than traditionally was the case. The future of Party patronage: - In time, party patronage changes in scope and form - mass patronage comes under pressure from the resource side. - It’s expensive and inflationary Ennser-Jedenastik - The politics of patronage and coalition: How parties allocate managerial positions in state-owned enterprises - party patronage: ‘the use of public resources in particularistic and direct exchanges between clients and party politicians’ ⇒ typically viewed as an immoral, if not outright illegal, activity BUT constitutes an inherent feature of party government - party patronage is one of several forms of linkage between the government and the parties that support it - Conceptualization of party government revolve around relationship between political parties and the executive (coalition research -- processes by which parties form governments,distribute ministerial offices, bargain over policy output, how parties enter and act in government) - Some conceptualizations delineate the concept of patronage from related concepts such as (in practice they overlap) - clientelism (material goods for votes) - pork-barrel politics (the distribution of funds and legislation to territorial units in return for electoral support) - corruption (making public decisions in exchange for private gain) All conceptualisations of patronage revolve around four elements: 1. characteristics of the two actors involved (patron and client)  2. nature of the two goods to be exchanged (from patron to client and vice versa); 3. Patrons (political parties) 4. clients (party loyalists) Two motivations for patronage: - Reward: parties hand out jobs and appointments to fellow partisans in return for their loyalty - Control: parties intend to exert influence over some area of public policy as party patronage, according to the above definition, involves the distribution of appointments, it is even more apt to equate reward and control with the concepts of: - Intrinsic office seeking: will perceive patronage appointments as an end in themselves - instrumental office seeking: use patronage as a means to an end, most typically as a mechanism to exercise control over public policy ‘Gamson’s Law’: ‘[a]ny participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition’. → not all pay-offs are equal in value. → the formal power to make appointments nowadays rests with the minister under whose jurisdiction a public sector corporation falls - There is ample support for the presumption that theories of government formation, portfolio allocation and coalition governance have substantial explanatory power when it comes to analyzing party patronage. This, in turn, reinforces the conceptualisation of patronage as a linkage mechanism by which parties exert control over integral parts of the state apparatus beyond the Cabinet - Patronage patterns can thus be expected to co-vary with changes in the partisan make-up of the executive - ‘value’ of a corporation corresponds with the overall level of patronage - party patronage in public corporations follows the logic of ministerial government → ministerial partisanship is arguably the single most important predictor of the partisan composition of management boards in state-owned enterprises, albeit that the freedom of individual ministers to hand out appointments can be severely constrained by watchdog junior ministers - predicted share of board members thus increases from 9 to 23% when the respective party holds the portfolio with no interference by a watchdog junior minister 7 Dissatisfied or disengaged citizens? Citizen support for democratic values and institutions and their satisfaction with democracy Easton- A Re-Assessment of the Concept of political support - There no longer exists, except in a few places such as Switzerland, that general acceptance of the conduct of national affairs that adds to the vigor of government and society alike → WW1 broke up the structure of society which, before 1914, had provided the necessary basis of confidence between government and governed What does political support even mean? 3 major areas: 1. Can a valid distinction be made between specific and diffuse support? 2. Ought support in either of these modes to be construed as uni- or multidimensional ? 3. To what extent, if any, might some of the presumed constituent elements of support be more usefully regarded instead as indicators, determinants or consequences of it? General meaning of support: - Overt behavior, action, advocacy - Underlying attitudes are implicit in such overt behavior Important distinction of support: Political discontent is not always, or even usually, the signal for basic political change - Specific → contingent on the authorities behavior - it is enough that the members have knowledge of the authorities as a class or undifferentiated group even if they cannot name names or describe functions. - Specific support is a response to the authorities; it is only indirectly relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime or political community. - Object specific → directed to the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances or the general style of these authorities BUT unless behavior is apparent to the members, support cannot be generated - Extended only to incumbent authorities - people must perceive that the fulfillment of their needs it associated with the authorities → members can blame or praise authorities - Sources: - Perceived outputs to articulated demands (can extend minimal support) - Perceived general performance → can blame them for general social conditions - Often difficult to establish a relationship between social cause and event BUT freedom in allocating blame and responsibility is afforded to everyone. - Evaluations may turn on the assessment of the perceived general performance of the authorities → This support is still of a specific kind since its extension or withdrawal is contingent on the authorities' presumed behavior - Specific support may arise from perceptions of the behavior of the authorities in the aggregate, from the patterns of outputs as they emerge over time. This experience may generate the feeling of being well governed and may continue to evoke support as long as that feeling remains. - In short: - directed towards the political authorities and authoritative institutions. - assumes members have sufficient political awareness to be able to associate satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the perceived behavior of these authorities, whether the behavior is in the form of identifiable actions or some attributed general performance. - possible only under conditions in which the culture permits the members to entertain the notion that the authorities can be held responsible for what happens in the society. - varies with perceived benefits or satisfactions.  - Objections: - Cognitive incapacity: makes little sense to talk of members matching unknown outputs to unarticulated or non-existent demands - can’t relate his own political attitudes or actions to the behavior or policies of the authorities - likely to be attracted to candidates because of their personality or party identification than because of the stands they take on issues. - presumed policy differences among party candidates themselves are less likely to influence political outputs than the level of economic development - Under circumstances when issues appear to be more directly related to the felt interests of the population concerned, issues do seem to influence candidate preferences markedly - BUT: ppl are far more interested in politics than this seems to imply, often there’s an issue in the nature of the electoral system - Electoral mechanism - Contact mechanism:individual likely to contact authorities for issues that touch him directly - → voting mechanism is likely to depress issue interests and actions, the contact mechanism to stimulate and reward them - Measurement barriers: - Doesn’t suffice to say that sometimes the support is low level and of short duration - Muller: quid pro quo: involves members' evaluations of the. performance of political authorities → 3 types of authorities 1. Instrumental: may derive satisfaction or dissatisfaction from efforts to meet their policy preferences 2. Expressive: symbolic behavior → authorities are 'reassuring to the members in a political context', authorities favored because they are viewed as generally qualified persons 3. Extraneous: even when members have little knowledge of the authorities, the latter may be perceived simply as being likable - Diffuse → refers to an evaluation of a person and what is represents, not what it does - Reserve of good/ill will that ensures support is not affected by outputs or performance - More durable than specific support, but can change - More difficult to strengthen once damaged - Sudden frustration of expectation can truly be damaging - Properties: 1. Where diffuse support doesn’t exist, beneficial outputs over a long period of time can build up goodwill reserve 2. Extended to offices themselves as well as their individual occupants; Underlies the regime as a whole and the political community 3. Arises in childhood and from direct experience ( may be a product of spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance over a long period of time.( (miranda and credenda of power) - Elements constituting diffuse support vary depending on the object (pol authorities → trust or confidence in them, pol community → we-feeling, common consciousness or group identification - support for the political authorities and regime will typically express itself in two forms: 1. Trust: a. that political system will produce preferred outcomes even if left unattended b. Can be gained through processes of socialization  c. Stimulated by the experiences that members have of the authorities over time d. Loss in specific support → converts into a decline in support for one part of the regime (authority roles) e. Unlikely to uncover more than satisfaction with particular authorities ⇒ difficult to empirically isolate trust and specific support 2. legitimacy a. Conviction to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime 1. ideological 2. structural 3. Personal b. Commitment: willingness to maintain and defend the structures or norms of a regime even if they produce unfavorable consequences - Dimensions excluded: compliance, alienation It is the unpredictability of the outcome of the relationship between political dissatisfaction and tension on the one hand and the acceptance of basic political arrangements on the other that constitutes a persistent puzzle for research. Transparently, not all expressions of unfavorable orientations have the same degree of gravity for a political system. Some may be consistent with its maintenance ; others may lead to fundamental change Linde, J., & Ekman, J. (2003). Satisfaction with democracy - ‘Satisfaction with the way democracy works’ is not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy → taps the level of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice - A stable democracy requires citizens who believe in the principles of democracy. - Consolidation cannot occur if the democratic regime lacks popular legitimacy, or if democracy is seen as more imperfect than its alternatives - Linz & Stepan (1996): ‘attitudinal’ consolidation of democracy – support for democracy on the mass public level, democracy needs to be constitutionally (political institution) and behaviourally (of elites and organizations) consolidated as well. - Democracy probably can never become an alternative that all members of society support and pledge their allegiance to. - Democracy can, however, enjoy strong legitimacy when only a small minority endorse non-democratic alternatives, and the majority believes that democracy is – in Winston Churchill’s  famous words – ‘the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’ - Popular support for the principles of democracy as a fundamental feature of democratic consolidation Operationalizing & measuring political support David Easton 3 fold distinction btw diff objects of support: 1. political community (diffuse) 2. regime (diffuse) 3. authorities (diffuse or specific) Pippa Norris: five-fold model of political support 1. political community: basic attachment or a sense of belonging to a political system 2. regime principles: support for democracy as a principle or ideal 3. regime performance: attitudes towards the way democracy works in practice in a particular country at a given point in time 4. regime institutions: support or lack thereof for a particular political institutions → trust in institutions often asked, their performance 5. political actors: support for a particular person or particular party in reality, support for the legitimacy of democracy is relative → democracy could be supported not necessarily as an ideal form of government, but as preferable to the known alternatives Collapse of soviet regime ⇒ “return to Europe” ⇒ accession to EU and NATO ⇒ Europhoria ⇒ more realistic and pessimistic outlook → expectation and demand for democratic prosperity Support for democracy in EE has decreased over time ⇒ IMPORTANT to distinguish between support for democracy as an ideal form of government, and support for the performance of the regime ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item not an adequate indicator of support for the principles or the legitimacy of democracy - sensitive to different contexts (different understandings of the word) - respondent can be a convinced democrat but nonetheless be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in his or her country at a specific point in time ⇒ dissatisfaction with performance of democracy doesn’t imply dissatisfaction with democracy or preference for authoritarian alternative - respondent may acknowledge the way a democratic regime is working at the moment, but nevertheless be prepared to support a non-democratic alternative in times of trouble (instrumental, or output-oriented conditional democratic support → not enough to be considered consolidated on the attitudinal level) - Respondents may be strong supporters of democracy as the principally superior form of government, but still feel that their own country is not ready for democracy for one reason or another → pragmatic expectation that a ‘strong man’ rule for a couple of years could enable the country to work better; and democracy could be restored thereafter - Legitimacy of a democratic regime is heavily influenced by the performance of the regime If we are interested in measuring the level of democratic legitimacy, we need items that explicitly ask the citizens about the most appropriate form of government for their own country at the current time → avoid using ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works’ as an indicator of support for democracy as a normative ideal. - ‘effectiveness’ means the actual performance in the eyes of the public  - ‘legitimacy’ ‘involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society Hofferbert and Klingemann: perceived human rights situation in a country is a more powerful predictor of democratic satisfaction than self ascribed economic prospects. - evaluation of performance of a certain regime → influenced by the political ideological orientations of the respondents. Party preference can impact satisfaction with democracy ⇒ winners more satisfied with the performance of the government and the democracy works than the losers democratic legitimacy (support for the principles of democracy) derives to a great extent from the long-term performance of the democratic regime. Slide 19: because trust in gov and parliament is more specific it fluctuates more than the demo satisfaction which is more diffuse ⇒ financial crisis and economic performance impacts satisfaction If ppl become dissatisfied with demo institutions their satisfaction with democracy performance may decline Explaining the dynamics of political support Sociological explanations: Declining Social Trust and Civic Engagement? ○ → Extent to which ppl trust e/o Political explanations: The Failure of Government Performance? ○ Failure of govs Institutional explanations: The Failure of Constitutional Design? ○ Constitutionally based difficulty in changing incumbent, etc ○ Instability, difficult choosing a government Cultural explanations: Modernization and Changing Values? ○ 60s-70s, economic stability → began caring about other issues (environment, LGBT, other civic issues) Consequences of low support: - Decrease in conventional participation → may compensate in other areas - Increase in protests - Unwillingness to obey the law  - Can low performance-related support decrease support for the regime? (i.e. support for democratic principles) - Can the engagement of critical citizens lead to an improvement of democratic institutions? Can it improve accountability? 8 Is democracy currently in great danger? Myth and reality of the legitimacy crisis Foa & Mounk - The Democratic Disconnect - It can happen that political scientists, policy makers and journalists misjudge the signs of the times - Over the last three decades, trust in political institutions, voter turnout, party identification, and party membership have declined across the established democracies of North America and Western Europe - voters increasingly endorse single-issue movements, vote for populist candidates, or support “antisystem” parties that define themselves in opposition to the status quo ⇒ these signs generally interpreted as benign indications of the increasing political sophistication of younger generations of “critical” citizens who are less willing to defer to traditional elites. - “government legitimacy,”has declined - “regime legitimacy,” (support for democracy) remains robust. - ⇒ people may feel that democracy is not working well in their country or the government is doing a poor job, but this only makes them all the more appreciative of the fact that liberal democracy allows them to protest the government or vote it out of office ⇒ this interpretation may no longer be tenable -