Final Study Guide POLI 324 PDF

FINAL - EXAM PREPARATION - POLI 324. Tips by the TA from another Douek course: Comfortable with the authors, ideas and how to answer the broader question Thesis that directly answers the question, topic sentences Mobilize two articles per question It’s more of an info dump than argumentation, but he...

FINAL - EXAM PREPARATION - POLI 324. Tips by the TA from another Douek course: Comfortable with the authors, ideas and how to answer the broader question Thesis that directly answers the question, topic sentences Mobilize two articles per question It’s more of an info dump than argumentation, but helps if there’s good structure Link to all readings recap Format of studying: Concept like ‘Democratization’ Key Study Cases and Associated Readings and concepts like ‘coups’ for authors for case studies other key words POLI 324 - Final Study Guide Democratization The Third Wave of Democratization The Third Wave of Democratization, coined by Samuel Huntington, describes the global wave of democratic transitions from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, including significant developments in Africa, such as Benin’s peaceful transition to democracy in 1991. Huntington emphasized that democratization is a complex process, not an instantaneous event, and its success is not guaranteed. He highlighted the possibility of democratic backsliding, even in wealthy and institutionalized democracies, although such systems are generally more resilient to instability. This wave also demonstrated that while many countries embraced democracy, maintaining it requires enduring structural and societal commitments. Economic Bases of Democratization (Bates) Bates explains why democracy has been a challenge specifically for Africa: natural resources/resource curse. Bates argues that the economic base of democracy is rooted in the relationship between taxation and representation. In Western democracies, tax revenue meant that they had to give rights and a voice in governance to the taxpayers. In contrast, many African states are built on resource-extractive economies, allowing governments to raise revenue through natural resource taxes without relying on broad taxation of the population. As a result, they can sidestep the need to offer representation or compromise with society. While this model is not universally accepted, it has been influential in explaining the challenges of democratization in resource-dependent states. + Less middle class, a triangle society not a diamond one = democratization efforts come from international actors since the middle class who is usually the driver of change is divided along ethnic lines or non-existent. The rich are benefitting, the poor are using informal economy so they don’t even care about the state, no middle class, so internationals come in. => General case for Africa, but DRC is a good example: DRC = cobalt and diamonds. DRC and the resource curse, 1997, when Kabila seized power during the First Congo War. This marked the beginning of a regime that heavily relied on resource wealth, particularly mining contracts, to consolidate power, exacerbating corruption and undermining democratic governance. Klopp Kenya: "More Murder in the Middle" by Klopp and Zuern This concept highlights that political violence tends to be higher during transitional periods when regimes are shifting from authoritarianism to democracy. These moments are marked by heightened contestation between authoritarian governments and opposition actors, and violence between ethnic groups fighting for the power vacuum, creating instability during democratic transitions. Klopp also talks abt : Police brutality during protests in Kenya in 1997 and South Africa in 1990 led to violence Kenya (1991-1997): (Klopp) (CASE STUDY OF TRANSITIONAL VIOLENCE) - Mechanism: Weakened state control creates a power vacuum, emboldening opposition groups to push for reforms, while old security forces loyal to the regime use authoritarian tactics to suppress dissent. Simultaneously, the fight for the empty spot = ethnic tensions During its transition from a one-party system under Daniel arap Moi to multi-party politics due to domestic and international pressure to democratize, there was a lot of violence during the elections because Moi claimed that legalization of opposition parties would usher in tribal conflict and destroy national unity, and killed opposition through the old state police because old forces still loyal to the regime. In parallel to Moi killing opposition, infighting between opposition due to 1) Ethnicization of politics and relation to unequal land distribution. (Violence mainly between Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups, In Kenya, KANU Kenya African National Union leaders ethnicized land disputes between Maasai pastoralists and Kikuyu agriculturalists to fuel violence and rally Maasai support (Klopp & Zuern, p. 138).) 2) Elites’ use of extra- legal force to suppress opposition => The transitional phase created a volatile environment where political contestation escalated into violence, supporting the idea that regimes are often more stable at the extremes of authoritarianism or democracy than in the transitional "middle." Inverted U Successful Ghana Democratization case: Ghana (Abdul Gafaru) Ghana held successful elections in 2000 and 2008 with peaceful transitions of power.Transitions occurred between the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP).Defeated candidates accepted the results, reinforcing democratic norms. These peaceful transitions demonstrated Ghana's commitment to democratic processes. Abdul Gafaru explains which factors contribute to a successful democratization, using the case of Ghana. Since its return to democratic rule in 1992, Ghana has successfully held multiple elections. Behaviorally, no significant political groups seek to overthrow the democratic regime. Attitudinally, most Ghanaians support democracy and reject alternatives like military rule, participating actively in elections. Constitutionally, conflicts are resolved through democratic frameworks, such as courts for election disputes. Ghana also performs well across 5 arenas of democracy. - Its civil society is active, with a vibrant media and various organizations, though they exert limited influence on government policies. - Political society is stable, with a functioning two-party system, though women’s political participation remains low. - While Ghana’s laws protect rights, the rule of law is weakened by excessive presidential control over judicial appointments. - The state bureaucracy faces inefficiency and corruption despite reform efforts, and economic society balances state regulation and market forces, albeit heavily influenced by IMF and World Bank policies. - Overall, Ghana’s democracy thrives due to popular support and institutional mechanisms, despite persistent challenges in governance and equity. African Model for democracy (Cheeseman) Cheeseman argues that Africa should focus more on participation and consensus rather than Western-style multiparty elections. Example: Julius Nyerere (Tanzania): Promoted a one-party state, arguing that multiparty competition was "unAfrican" and that forced consensus aligned with African traditions of communal decision-making. Post-independence, leaders like Nyerere reinforced this silencing by promoting one-party systems as more in line with African values of unity and development. Hybrid regimes The majority of African countries, however, qualify as “hybrid” regimes that are neither fully democratic nor entirely hard authoritarian. Hybrid regimes are those political systems that regularly hold elections but in which either voting polls themselves or governing practices do not fully conform to democratic principles. One can further differentiate between two groups within hybrid regimes Moderate autocracies: Countries like Mauritania and Togo lean towards authoritarian rule (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2022). Defective democracies: Countries closer to democracy but flawed; examples include Senegal, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia (recent elections in these countries were relatively free and fair). Failed states: Governments lack territorial control and functionality. Examples: Central African Republic, Somalia, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, and many Sahelian states like Mali (showing signs of state failure). African Economic Reform and Crisis Source of African Economic Crisis: Historical roots:  Dependence on the International Economy Underdevelopment of Human Resources Lack of Public Services Bias towards Western rather than local markets (arguably neocolonial) Economies over-reliant on primary sector (arguably colonial, dependency theory legacies) Over-reliance on Exports Infrastructure thin internally External factors: In the 1970s, African countries faced a big problem: the value of their exports, like raw materials and crops, dropped compared to the cost of imports like machinery and fuel. This got worse after the 1973-74 oil crisis, which made everything more expensive. To cope, African governments borrowed a lot of money from Western banks that were giving out loans easily at first. But later, these loans became harder to pay back because the terms got stricter and less forgiving, especially since most of the debt was owed to private banks rather than friendly governments or organizations. => This led to a major debt crisis across Africa. Efforts and Obstacles African economic reform refers to efforts to address chronic underdevelopment, fiscal crises, and economic stagnation that plagued many post-independence African states. Central to these reforms were Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) introduced by international financial institutions (IFIs) like the IMF and World Bank. These programs aimed to stabilize economies through liberalization, privatization, and reductions in state spending. However, as Van de Walle (2001) explains, reforms were often incomplete, creating what he termed "partial reform syndrome," where governments selectively implemented reforms to maintain elite power structures while presenting an image of compliance to international donors​. gives the impression that the state is working, but it’s actually not trying to work The logic behind these SAPs rested on the assumption that state-led economic policies—marked by protectionism and extensive public spending—were responsible for stagnation. IFIs argued that reducing state intervention and promoting market efficiency would attract foreign investment, stimulate economic growth, and ensure long-term stability. However, THEY FORGOR IT’S AFRICA where the socio-political context in Africa, characterized by neopatrimonialism and fragile institutions, with no checks and balances made the implementation of these reforms lead to elites taking all the money because there is no institutional accountability and therefore the money wasn’t actually helping anyone except for the already enriched elite => “Neo-Patrimonial Policies led to rent seeking and corruption” (lecture) Critiques of SAPs for Africa - Economically: Dependency cycle: external debt - Obstruct economic recovery: Currency devaluation and trade liberalization hurts domestic manufacturing; higher interest rates => making credit inaccessible for many firms and farmers - POLITICAL CORRUPTION: Privatization goes to elites Ghana Case Study Ghana provides a classic example of both the promises and pitfalls of SAPs. Under the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) of the 1980s, Ghana experienced initial economic stabilization, characterized by reduced inflation and increased GDP growth. However, this recovery was short-lived, as structural inequalities deepened, social safety nets eroded, and dependency on commodity exports left the economy vulnerable to global price shocks. This aligns with Mkandawire's critique that SAPs and quick liberalization do not work in the African context bcs state intervention is necessary to allocate needs to those who need it and cancel out legacies, which liberalization doesn’t do. Mkandawire discusses how SAPs prioritized market liberalization over building institutional capacity, which frequently led to social discontent and economic instability. Neopatrimonialism: Describes how state resources are used for patronage, undermining reforms. - Jerry Rawlings is the one who implemented the SAPs in 1980s. Small note: GDP vs GNP - The gross domestic product (GDP) is the US dollar value of all goods and services produced in a particular economy within a country’s borders in a given year. - Gross National Product (GNP) is defined as the "value of all (final) goods and services produced in a country in one year by the nation Civil Conflict/Violence Civil conflict in Africa refers to internal wars often fueled by ethnic divisions, resource disputes, and weak state institutions. Historical roots: Colonial methods of “Divide and rule” and native administration spurring up ethnic conflict Belgian colonizers thought Tutsi were racially superior to Hutu; gave them access to education and jobs as native ruling class (indirect rule) No history of violence between Hutu and Tutsi prior to 1950s => underscoring the role of Belgian Macro-Explanation for Mass Violence in Rwanda and Burundi “…the existence of long-standing, widespread, and institutionalized prejudice; the radicalization of animosity and routinization of violence; the "moral exclusion" of a category of people, allowing first their "social death” and then their physical death.” (Peter Uvin, 1999) How Mass Violence occurs: “Bureaucracy communicated the state claim to legitimate violence, the procedural invocation of a motif of law that ran through the catastrophe of repression” (Russell) Burundi Civil Violence Case Study As in Rwanda, Belgian colonial authorities in Burundi gave political privileges to Tutsi ethnic minority. IN FACT, Belgian colonizers encourage Hutu (majority) to rise against Tutsi (minority) political class who the Belgian previously favored - represented first instance of mass violence in 1959 => This happened as Burundi’s 1972 genocide, killed an estimated 100,000–200,000 Hutus following a failed rebellion, illustrates how colonial favoritism toward Tutsis (minority) over Hutus (majority) entrenched divisions that were later weaponized by political elites. The post-independence Hutu rebellion triggered state-sponsored mass killings, further institutionalizing ethnic animosities. Russell: as much as it was a state act, this selective genocide constituted a ‘joint process’, penetrating society through the collaboration of society itself Burundi Genocide ends: 1976 President Micombero is deposed in a military coup by Bagaza. then, ongoing unrest - Makes us think about state weakness and border control in Weberian state: - wave of Hutu refugees fleeing into Rwanda, where they brought accounts of atrocities and resentment against Tutsis. - Leading up to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, in which nearly 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, sent Tutsi refugees into Burundi. So… civil conflicts are a sign of state weakness 1) because colonial legacies of ethnic politics still persist, and Hutu elite wants to keep the advantages they were given by Belgians 2) because they are affected from exterior, conflict bleed out through borders Côte d’Ivoire Violence Study What it shows about Civil conflict: Unlike other Western African nations, this civil war wasn’t about power politics. It’s identity politics without the power part. So, civil conflicts don’t always stem from state weakness and wanting to keep power/advantage to your ethnic group. What was the Civil War about "Ivoirité" emerged in the 1990s under President Bédié as a political and cultural ideology emphasizing the “true Ivorian” identity, laying the foundation for the Civil war in 2002. It was used to differentiate between Ivorians of "pure" descent and those with origins in neighboring countries, particularly Burkina Faso and Mali. This concept became a tool for political exclusion, marginalizing northern populations (predominantly Muslim) who were often perceived as immigrants, even if they had lived in Côte d’Ivoire for generations, no national cards allowed. - Belligerents: The Government Forces (South) vs The Forces Nouvelles (Rebels, North) - As Bah (2009) explains, the Ivorian civil war of 2002 illustrates 2 things: 1) Bah argues that the root of Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war lies in systemic political and social grievances over citizenship and identity exclusion, rather than power-hungry warlords or economic motives (p. 597). 2) The peace efforts by the international community (ECOWAS, UN, AU, and France) overlooked the citizenship grievances fueling the conflict. The international approach was based on "traditional peace formulas" emphasizing power-sharing and elections but insufficiently addressing "the underlying grievance of citizenship" (p. 605). => These examples underscore how DOMESTIC and INTERNATIONAL institutions failed to address the underlying and politicized identities that contribute to cycles of violence, not always politics. Kenya Klopp Check document at the top. Transitional democracy = civil conflict (recycle knowledge lol)  Ethnicity and Religion Chandra and Wilkinson: “Ethnicity,” like “politics,” is a big concept – so big as to be meaningless (Chandra and Wilkinson)So vast and all-encompassing Ethnic entrepreneurs: instrumentalization of ethnicity. ELF: Ethno-linguistic factionalization index: Ethnicity refers to shared cultural, linguistic, or ancestral traits, while religion provides an additional layer of identity that can unify or divide groups. However, these factors often become salient only when economic or political grievances, state weakness, or elite manipulation exacerbate tensions. In Africa, colonial legacies hardened previously fluid identities. Elites often exploit these identities as tools to mobilize support, consolidate power, or access resources. Thus, so-called "ethnic" or "religious" conflicts are more accurately understood as struggles over power, land, and resources framed through identity. Weak states, which fail to provide security, services, and equitable governance, exacerbate these dynamics, allowing ethnic and religious identities to become rallying points for grievance-based mobilization. Structure: The ethnic “structure of a population consists of the distributions of attributes in that population and is typically multidimensional Practice: Ethnic “practice” refers to the ethnic categories activated in different contexts ○ Can be linguistic ○ Sometimes has nothing to do with religion ○ Can be regional ○ Ethnicities can overlap and their definitions are often incomplete => Ethnicity will always be vague and flexible, leading to ethnic conflicts => Instrumentalization of ethnicity Burundi Check the above to explain how ethnicity and identity can define the political situation of a country. Mali In Mali, ethnicity and religion intersect with weak governance and socio-economic disparities to fuel cycles of conflict. The Tuareg population, historically marginalized by the central government, has long demanded greater autonomy, with grievances intensifying during periods of economic stagnation and political exclusion. Tuareg separatists, such as the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), have used these grievances to mobilize support for rebellion in the north. - Jihadist groups like Ansar Dine have further exploited this marginalization, aligning themselves with local grievances to gain legitimacy and recruit fighters. While religion is a unifying factor for much of Mali’s population, radical Islamist groups use it to justify their insurgencies, especially in regions where the state fails to provide justice or basic services. These dynamics demonstrate how ethnic and religious identities, often politicized by elites, interact with state weakness to perpetuate insecurity and fragmentation in Mali.  Jihadism/Islamism ​Jihadism refers to militant Islamic movements that advocate for establishing an Islamic state or society governed by strict interpretations of Sharia law, often through violent means. In Africa, jihadist movements have emerged in regions marked by weak governance, pervasive poverty, and socio-political marginalization. Islamism is not synonymous with armed militancy; it is: the intersection of Islam and Politics, the Use of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations as an instrument to pursue political and ideological objectives Historical Roots Islam has been present in Africa for at least a millenium, and countries such as Somalia and Djibouti, along with Mauritania, have long been nearly entirely Muslim From Sufism to Salafism: The global Islamist revival of the 1970s and 1980s played a significant role in the rise of jihadism. Funding from oil-rich Gulf states, coupled with the spread of Wahhabi ideologies, introduced more conservative interpretations of Islam to African communities. Somalia and Sahel Emergence in Africa Somalia: Al-Ittihad al-Islami and later Al-Shabaab (affiliate of Al-Qaeda) to emerge. Seeks to install sharia law and spread fundamentalist islam. These groups gained influence by offering services such as justice and security through Sharia courts, exploiting the absence of effective government institutions​. ​ Similarly, the Sahel region has seen the rise of groups like Ansar Dine (Mali) and Boko Haram, fueled by marginalization of local communities and grievances over state neglect. These groups often position themselves as alternatives to corrupt or ineffective state institutions, using religion as a unifying ideology. State Weakness => Vacuum and Jihadist Services Jihadism in Africa has proliferated due to weak state structures and socio-economic inequalities, state vacuum, providing services not filled by the state=fertile ground. For example, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 created a governance vacuum that allowed groups like Al-Shabaab to emerge. These groups gained influence by offering services such as justice and security through Sharia courts, exploiting the absence of effective government institutions​. => Example of jihadist groups gaining influence by filling state vacuum of no justice: Consequence of state weakness: In Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) gained legitimacy by providing justice and security in Mogadishu, a city fragmented by clan-based violence and weak state authority. International influence from outside The transnational nature of jihadism in Africa: many groups have drawn inspiration from global Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (EGY) or Wahhabism (Saudi), which were introduced through migration, education, and external funding. For example, the Somali jihadist movement Al-Ittihad traced its origins to the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, demonstrating the interconnectedness of local and international Islamist networks​ Impact on African state strength 1- Exacerbates existing weaknesses. By undermining state authority and challenging its monopoly on violence, jihadist movements erode the legitimacy of formal governments. Example: In Somalia, Al-Shabaab’s control over significant territories has limited the reach of the central government, creating a de facto state of fragmentation. 2- International interventions and increased militarization, which can weaken state institutions by prioritizing security over governance. This dynamic often creates a cycle of dependency on external actors, further undermining the state’s ability to function independently. Example: 2014 France launched Operation Barkhane, a broader anti-jihadist mission covering the Sahel, including Mali, Niger, Chad, and more Social and Women's Movements Social movements in Africa often arise from institutional failures and grassroots mobilization. These movements aim to influence power structures, seek justice, and advocate for rights and reforms. As Tilly’s framework highlights, campaigns, repertoires of action, and public displays of unity are key elements that define the strategic and performative aspects of these movements. African social movements frequently arise in contexts of state weakness, repression, or inequality, making their mechanisms and strategies uniquely adaptive and resilient. 🎀 Liberia African Mobilization is special : grassroots and traditional identities. - African social movements effectively frame issues to resonate with collective identities. For instance, Liberia’s women’s peace movement framed peace as a maternal responsibility, uniting women across ethnic and religious lines to advocate for an end to the civil war. This framing allowed them to transcend traditional gender roles and engage in political activism (Fuest, 2009)​ - It begins at the community level, leveraging ties of kinship, religion, and local associations to unify individuals around a common cause. For example, Liberia’s women-led peace movement during the civil war, embodied by groups like MARWOPNET (Mano River Women’s Peace Network), established in 2000 during the peak of civil wars in the Mano River Union countries: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. used shared roles as mothers and caregivers to frame their advocacy for peace, transcending ethnic and religious divides. - It is a grassroots women-led peace organization that sought to address the devastating effects of conflict in the region through advocacy, dialogue, and reconciliation efforts. MARWOPNET played a critical role in mediating conflicts, fostering dialogue between warring parties, and advocating for peace at both local and regional levels. 1) What were the main concerns of women’s organization in Liberia? - Big concern of sexual assault - women bringing peace - International recognition The Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia (AFELL) brought justice to women victims of the Mano River Union Women Peace Network (MARWOPNET), and the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) are among the most influential and visible orga- nizations. 17 AFELL was established in 1994 to offer legal assistance to women and children who had suffered from violence and has effected the passing of two laws: the Act to Govern the Devolution of Estates and Establish the Rights of Inheritance for Spouses of Both Statutory and Customary Marriages (2003), The MARWOPNET social movement brought long-term changes for women - in short the ‘inheritance law’ that aims to regulate women’s marriage rights, rights to property and access to their children after divorce or the death of their spouse, and - the ‘rape law’ (2006), which has turned rape into an non-bailable offence. MARWOPNET was established in 2000 by women peace activists from Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia on the occasion of a conference in Conakry of the regional economic grouping, the Economic Community of West - How the civil war was destabilizing - Gender violence - Racial and sectarian divides - Men dying = needs need to be met by women - Impact on economic development: - Entrepreneurial lens: not just humanitarian 2) The formation of the women’s groups and the barriers? a) 3 elements: i) Repertoire ii) Campaigning iii) Concerted public representation in public b) Women’s groups in Liberia were able to get these elements down c) It was a post-civil war situation i) Gender violence so men lost their lives so the women were able to bring peace ii) Rural communities moving not just the urban => a lot of activism d) Barriers: i) Urban-rural divides: Afro-Americans and Afro-Liberians (elite vs non-elite) e) Unity as a strength but the attempt at unity like sectarian and class borders might have been a challenge with meeting resistance i) Int’l orgs seeing educated elite women are palpable and urban women would not be in power because also the NGOs are the ones who allowed for the mvt to go so well ii) Monolith f) Afro-American vs Indigenous population: g) Western ideal as strings attached of the aid which guided the movement into it 3) how did shared experiences of the war contribute to the development of the social movement? a) Rising sexual violence during the war led to a bigger need for women’s orgs to protect them i) Women took over the roles of men when they died ii) Also, men with time saw them as good negotiators b) Interesting: women weren’t seen as just as capable as men but just a different role, nurturing while the men are violent => caretakers of the country  4) How did int’l agencies play a role in the social movement? a) from Liberia to the international scale b) End of the reading: women who receive more training become less c) Monetary funding: strings attached ===> FGM What do women inspire in social movements? - Trust. Women are more likely to garner trust by the domestic and international communities. - Women are more likely to get international aid. 💅 Nigeria #EndSARS (Special Anti-Robbery Squad -SARS) African Mobilization challenges state repression w social media (slay ) In Nigeria, the #EndSARS protests against police brutality highlighted how social media amplified youth-driven activism, challenging state repression (Iwuoha and Aniche, 2021)​ 1. Social Media as a Mobilization Tool: The #EndSARS movement exemplified the transformative power of social media in countering state repression. Platforms like Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp were instrumental in coordinating protests, sharing real-time updates, and documenting abuses. Hashtags such as #EndSARS and #LekkiMassacre trended globally. Social media also helped decentralize leadership, making it harder for the state to suppress the movement by targeting specific individuals. This decentralized model ensured continuity, even as key activists faced intimidation. 2. Crowdsourced Funding and Legal Aid: Protesters relied on crowdfunding to sustain the movement, including providing food, water, and medical supplies to demonstrators. => In Nigeria, the #EndSARS protests highlighted youth-driven activism against state repression and police brutality + role of women in social movements Gender and Political Representation Gender and political representation refer to the inclusion of women in political decision-making processes and their presence in legislative bodies to ensure their voices and interests are represented. This involves not only the descriptive representation of women (the proportion of women in political positions mirroring their share of the population) but also substantive representation, which focuses on whether their participation leads to policies advancing women’s rights and interests. Gender mainstreaming: integration of gender-sensitive policies across all government institutions to promote equity. South Africa Post-apartheid gender mainstreaming South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 provides a compelling case study of how a post-conflict society can institutionalize gender equity through reforms, quotas, and mainstreaming efforts. - Under apartheid, black women were treated as legal minors, while white women were subordinated to their husbands upon marriage, leaving women across racial lines with little autonomy or access to financial resources. - During the country’s first free and fair elections, women won 106 out of 400 seats in the National Assembly, propelling South Africa from 141st to 7th place globally. - The 1996 Constitution enshrined gender equality as a foundational principle, prohibiting discrimination based on gender, race, sexual orientation, motherhood, pregnancy, and other identities, making it one of the most egalitarian constitutions globally. - Gender mainstreaming became central to governance, requiring all government agencies to diversify their personnel and adopt gender-sensitive policies. For example, a groundbreaking The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act embedded in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution. - While South Africa’s gender quotas and constitutional reforms significantly increased descriptive representation—women in political positions—their translation into substantive representation remains a challenge, as systemic issues like gender-based violence persist. Nonetheless, South Africa’s achievements illustrate how institutional mechanisms can drive gender equity, particularly in post-conflict societies committed to inclusive nation-building Uganda: Amanda Clayton reading Uganda's implementation of gender quotas starting in 1989. Unlike South Africa’s voluntary quotas, Uganda introduced a system that reserved seats for female legislators while also allowing women to compete for unreserved seats against men. This dual mechanism created three categories of Members of Parliament (MPs): quota-elected women, non-quota-elected women, and male MPs. 2016 : Uganda had allocated 112 reserved seats for women, contributing to women holding 33.5% of the total parliamentary seats - female MPs in the Ugandan Parliament, regardless of how they achieve office, devote more legislative speech to women’s issues than male legislator - In Uganda → the positive descriptive effects = positive substantial effects Informal Economies & State Weakness Informal economies refer to unregulated and untaxed economic activities that operate outside formal state institutions. These economies often emerge to fill gaps left by weak or absent state institutions, providing individuals with critical means of survival in contexts of instability. However, they can simultaneously undermine state capacity by reducing tax revenues, eroding state legitimacy, and making the state more reliant on remittances and piracy for economic survival​. In Sub-Saharan Africa, informal economies are particularly prevalent, with an estimated 78% of the non-agricultural workforce engaged in informal activities. This dual nature of informal economies is evident in Somalia, where state collapse has made the informal sector both a survival mechanism and a source of further instability Somalia: Informal Economy = State Weakness - The collapse of Somalia’s state in 1991, following the overthrow of General Siad Barre, left a governance vacuum filled by clan militias, warlords, and informal networks. Without functioning state institutions, the informal economy became the primary means of survival for millions of Somalis. - One prominent example is the hawala system, an informal money transfer network that facilitates rapid and cost-effective remittances. Hawale mechanism: A sender gives money to a hawala agent in one location, who then contacts a counterpart in the recipient’s location to disburse an equivalent amount, often using codes or personal connections to verify the transaction. This process is fast, low-cost, and unregulated, making it vital for remittance-dependent communities like Somalia, where formal banking is limited or nonexistent. => In a country where 40% of urban households rely on remittances for survival, hawala networks have become essential. The Hawala system exemplifies the role of informal financial networks in sustaining livelihoods but complicates state-building (no incentive to develop the formal institutions since informal created a parallel power structure) => Medani Piracy = bad for Somalia Piracy in Somalia emerged in 1991 following the failure of the government. (Medani) Somalis explain motivations for piracy 1) weak governance left the country’s vast coastline unprotected, making it a target for illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping by foreign entities. 2) Lack of economic opportunity is principal driver of pirate recruitment Local fishermen, unable to compete with industrial trawlers, initially turned to piracy as a means of survival and protest, framing their actions as efforts to protect Somalia’s waters. Over time, however, piracy became a lucrative criminal enterprise, evolving into a well-organized economy that capitalized on high-value ransom payments from hijacked commercial vessels. First attack in 1994: gave them 1$M in ransom At its height between 2005 and 2012, Somali piracy generated hundreds of millions of dollars, with an estimated $150–$300 million in annual revenues at its peak. These funds were funneled into local clans and militias, reinforcing their power and creating parallel economies that further undermined state-building efforts. => informal economies as the cause and consequence of weak states. Reno: clandestine economies create cycles of instability by redirecting resources away from state-building efforts and into parallel systems of power. Somaliland: Informal Economy = State-Building Piracy = good for Somaliland In contrast to the destabilizing effects of piracy in southern Somalia, Somaliland, a self-declared independent region in the north, provides an example of how informal networks can support localized governance and state-building. Following the collapse of the Somali state, Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and embarked on a unique process of reconstruction that relied heavily on clan-based governance and informal economies. Remittances from the Somali diaspora, facilitated by the hawala system, played a critical role in funding peace-building initiatives, rebuilding infrastructure, and establishing basic government functions. - Somaliland’s governance model is often described as a hybrid system, combining traditional clan structures with modern political institutions. Although Somaliland lacks international recognition, it has used its informal economy to establish a degree of financial independence. Remittances, hawala networks, and informal trade with neighboring countries have been critical in sustaining its governance and public services. The lack of external interference in Somaliland’s informal systems allowed local leaders to shape these networks to align with state-building goals​ - Somaliland’s locally driven process allowed it to establish relative stability. Remittance flows, estimated at $1.3 billion annually, not only sustained households but also provided a financial base for the government to build schools, health facilities, and a basic tax system. State weakness What is state weakness?  - Failure to exert authority over territory - unable to meet basic demands - failure to provide legitimacy through transparency 3 ways of state failure 1) regional instability 2) failure to provide basic security + public goods 3) failure to provide environment to reduce poverty State-Building How do post-conflict societies address issues of governance and justice? State-building in Africa faces challenges from weak institutions and fragmented legitimacy. Rwanda post-genocide Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery illustrates the benefits of centralized control but highlights the trade-offs with political freedoms (Reyntjens, 2011)​ Rwanda’s state-building efforts after the 1994 genocide exemplify a top-down, centralized approach. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Paul Kagame, prioritized the reconstruction of state institutions, economic development, and reconciliation. One of the most significant aspects of Rwanda’s state-building was the creation of the Gacaca court system, which sought to address the massive backlog of genocide-related cases while promoting community-level justice and reconciliation. Authoritarian tendencies of state-building Rwanda Rwanda demonstrated the authoritarian tendencies of state-building: Rwanda’s state-building has been characterized by strong centralization, with the RPF consolidating power and controlling all aspects of governance. This approach allowed the government to implement ambitious development programs, such as Vision 2020, which focused on economic transformation and poverty reduction. However, Reyntjens critiques the authoritarian nature of Rwanda’s governance, arguing that state-building in Rwanda has come at the cost of political freedoms and the suppression of dissent Somaliland Unlike southern Somalia, Somaliland has demonstrated that locally driven, bottom-up state-building can lead to stability. Following its declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland leveraged traditional clan structures to mediate conflicts and establish governance frameworks. This hybrid model of governance, combining clan-based systems with modern state institutions, has allowed Somaliland to achieve relative peace and functionality, even without international recognition​ Ecology (skip lol..) Ecology in Africa examines the interaction between natural environments and human activity, focusing on the challenges of resource management, environmental degradation, and climate change. Africa's diverse ecosystems, including savannahs, rainforests, and deserts, play a central role in shaping economic and social systems. However, issues such as deforestation, desertification, and climate variability increasingly threaten livelihoods. Kenya In Kenya, ecological challenges such as deforestation, desertification, and climate change have profoundly impacted livelihoods, particularly for rural and indigenous communities like the Maasai. The Maasai face diminishing access to grazing lands due to erratic rainfall, prolonged droughts, and conservation policies prioritizing wildlife tourism over pastoralist needs. Initiatives like the Green Belt Movement, led by Wangari Maathai, have sought to address ecological degradation by mobilizing grassroots communities to plant trees and promote sustainable land use, directly linking environmental restoration to social and economic justice. However, large-scale infrastructure projects and commercial farming, often funded by foreign investments, exacerbate land conflicts and displacement, further marginalizing communities reliant on traditional land-use practices. These dynamics underscore the need for ecological solutions that prioritize both environmental sustainability and the livelihoods of affected populations. China’s Role in Africa China’s Role in Africa: An Overview China’s engagement with Africa has grown exponentially since the early 2000s, characterized by investments in infrastructure, trade, and resource extraction. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has funded large-scale projects, including roads, ports, and railways, aimed at improving connectivity and fostering economic growth. These investments have made China Africa’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $254 billion by 2021. While this partnership has filled critical gaps left by Western aid and investment, it has also raised concerns about dependency, environmental degradation, and governance. Critics argue that Chinese-funded projects often prioritize extracting natural resources over long-term local development, creating uneven benefits for African populations. Impact on Infrastructure and Resources China’s focus on infrastructure development has transformed African economies by addressing critical gaps in connectivity and energy. Projects like Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and Zambia’s copper mining infrastructure have boosted trade and resource extraction capabilities. These developments= tap into global markets= economic growth. However, resource-driven projects often come with environmental and social costs, including deforestation, displacement, and labor exploitation. Because Africa isn’t better off without it but also it’s not the best => Positive sum game—could be mutually beneficial Myth: China’s only in it for the resources But also China does not seem to give more official development aid to countries with more resources What is their motive? Not only the resources but also paving the way for development, 1) Interested in Africa as a market (import-export relations, prompting the African market for Chinese goods, but also importing African minerals) 2) international image 3) “One China” policy => not recognizing the legitimacy of Taiwan Debt Dependency and Sovereignty Concerns A central critique of China’s role in Africa is the risk of "debt-trap diplomacy", where countries become heavily indebted to China through opaque loan agreements. Nations like Zambia and Djibouti have faced mounting debt burdens, with concerns that failure to repay loans could lead to the forfeiture of strategic assets, such as ports or mines, to Chinese control. While Chinese officials deny such allegations, the lack of transparency in these agreements undermines public trust and raises questions about sovereignty. On the other hand, proponents highlight how Chinese investment has financed critical projects that Western donors have ignored, helping to close Africa’s infrastructure gap. EXAM INSTRUCTIONS → Final Exam in class: 4 out of 6 essays For the final: 4 long essays like the last one in the midterm, engage with 2 authors from the second part of the course, prioritize material after the midterm Very probable we get something on democratization, ethnicity and identity, state weakness, state-building Bring pen Essay: Use historically accurate examples to explain a key theme and its related concepts Use authors’names Can use highlighter to underscore smth → Time : 3 hours, 45 mins each shoot for 40 mins per question Total Time Breakdown: 1. planning and writing essay 1: 2-2;45 2. planning and writing essay 2: 2;45-3:30 3. planning and writing essay 3: 3:30-4:15 4. planning and writing essay 4: 4:15-5.