Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person PDF

488 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 11. “Lettre & Mr. Coste de la Nécessité et de la 13. Cf. D. P. Henry, “Saint Anselm’s De ‘Gramma- Contingence” (1707) in Opera Philosophica, ed. tico’,” Philosophical Quarterly, x (1960), 115-2...

488 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 11. “Lettre & Mr. Coste de la Nécessité et de la 13. Cf. D. P. Henry, “Saint Anselm’s De ‘Gramma- Contingence” (1707) in Opera Philosophica, ed. tico’,” Philosophical Quarterly, x (1960), 115-26. Erdmann, 447-9. St. Anselm noted that (i) and (iii), respectively, 12. In the Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of may be thought ofas forming the upper left and Ethics, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and the upper right corners of a square of opposi- Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, ed. T. K. tion, and (ii) and (iv) the lower left and the lower Abbott (London, 1959), 303. right. Freedom of the Will and the Concept ofa Person HARRY FRANKFURT Harry Frankfurt (1929-) is an American philosopher known for his work in ethics, philoso- phy of mind, and the history of philosophy. He spent most of his career teaching at Yale and Princeton Universities. His 2005 book On Bullshit (a reissue of a 1986 paper with the same title) became a national best-seller, even earning him a spot on Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show. The selection that follows is excerpted from an article that was originally published in a phi- losophy journal in 1971. In it, Frankfurt articulates a view about what sort of freedom we are actually interested in when we ask whether free will and determinism are truly compatible. What philosophers have lately come to acceptas anal- Whether the members of some animal species are ysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis persons is surely not to be settled merely by deter- ofthat concept at all. Strawson,* whose usage repre- mining whether it is correct to apply to them, in ad- sents the current standard, identifies the concept of dition to predicates ascribing corporeal characteris- a person as “the concept of a type of entity such that tics, predicates that ascribe states of consciousness. It both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and does violence to our language to endorse the appli- predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics... are cation of the term “person” to those numerous crea- equally applicable to a single individual ofthat single tures which do have both psychological and mate- type.” But there are many entities besides persons rial properties but which are manifestly not persons that have both mental and physical properties. As it in any normal sense of the word. This misuse oflan- happens—though it seems extraordinary that this guage is doubtless innocent of any theoretical error. should be so—there is no common English word for But although the offense is “merely verbal,” it does the type of entity Strawson has in mind, a type that significant harm. For it gratuitously diminishes our includes not only human beings but animals of vari- philosophical vocabulary, and it increases the like- ous lesser species as well. Still, this hardly justifies the lihood that we will overlook the important area of misappropriation of a valuable philosophical term. inquiry with which the term “person” is most natu- rally associated. It might have been expected that no problem would be of more central and persistent * A selection from Strawson’s writings appears as the next entry concern to philosophers than that of understanding in the volume. what we ourselves essentially are. Yet this problem From “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy LXVIII, | January 14, 1941).  FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 489 is so generally neglected that it has been possible to of wanting to be different, in their preferences and make off with its very name almost without being purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear noticed and, evidently, without evoking any wide- to have the capacity for what I shall call “first-order spread feeling ofloss. desires” or “desires of the first order,” which are sim- There is a sense in which the word “person” is ply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. merely the singular form of “people” and in which No animal other than man, however, appears to have both terms connote no more than membership in a the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is man- certain biological species. In those senses of the word ifested in the formation of second-order desires.’ which are of greater philosophical interest, however, the criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. Rather, they are de- signed to capture those attributes which are the sub- The concept designated by the verb “to want” is ex- ject of our most humane concern with ourselves and traordinarily elusive. A statement of the form “A the source of what we regard as most important and wants to X”—taken by itself, apart from a context most problematical in our lives. Now these attributes that serves to amplify or to specify its meaning— would be of equal significance to us even if they were conveys remarkably little information. Such a state- not in fact peculiar and common to the members of ment may be consistent, for example, with each of our own species. What interests us most in the human the following statements: (a) the prospect of doing condition would not interest us less if it were also a X elicits no sensation or introspectible emotional re- feature ofthe condition ofother creatures as well. sponse in A; (b) A is unaware that he wants to X; Our concept of ourselves as persons is not to be (c) A believes that he does not want to X; (d).A wants understood, therefore, as a concept of attributes to refrain from X-ing; (e)A wants to Y and believes that are necessarily species-specific. It is conceptu- that it is impossible for him both to Yand to X; (f)A ally possible that members of novel or even of fa- does not “really” want to X; (g) A would rather die miliar nonhuman species should be persons; and it than X; and so on. It is therefore hardly sufficient is also conceptually possible that some members of to formulate the distinction between first-order and the human species are not persons. We do in fact second-order desires, as I have done, by suggesting assume, on the other hand, that no member of an- merely that someone has a first-order desire when other species is a person. Accordingly, there is a pre- he wants to do or not to do such-and-such, and that sumption that what is essential to persons is a set of he has a second-order desire when he wants to have characteristics that we generally suppose—whether or not to have a certain desire ofthe first order. rightly or wrongly—to be uniquely human. As I shall understand them, statements of the It is my view that one essential difference be- form “A wants to X” cover a rather broad range of tween persons and other creatures is to be found possibilities.» They may be true even when state- in the structure of a person’s will. Human beings ments like (a) through (g) are true: when A is un- are not alone in having desires and motives, or in aware of any feelings concerning X-ing, when he is making choices. They share these things with the unaware that he wants to X, when he deceives him- members of certain other species, some of whom self about what he wants and believes falsely that he even appear to engage in deliberation and to make does not want to X, when he also has other desires decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be that conflict with his desire to X, or when he is am- peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that bivalent. The desires in question may be conscious or they are able to form what I shall call “second-order unconscious, they need not be univocal, and A may desires” or “desires of the second order.” be mistaken about them. There isa further source of Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to uncertainty with regard to statements that identify do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to someone's desires, however, and here it is important have) certain desires and motives. They are capable for my purposes to be less permissive. 49() METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY Consider first those statements of the form “A he wants to have a desire toX despite the fact that he wants to X” which identify first-order desires—that has a univocal desire, altogether free of conflict and is, statements in which the term “to X” refers to an ac- ambivalence, to refrain from X-ing. Someone might tion. A statement ofthis kind does not, by itself, in- want to have a certain desire, in other words, but dicate the relative strength of A’s desire to X. It does univocally want that desire to be unsatisfied. not make it clear whether this desire is at all likely to Suppose that a physician engaged in psycho- play a decisive role in whatA actually does or tries therapy with narcotics addicts believes that his abil- to do. For it may correctly be said that A wants to ity to help his patients would be enhanced if he un- X even when his desire to X is only one among his derstood better what it is like for them to desire the desires and when it is far from being paramount drug to which they are addicted. Suppose that he is among them. Thus, it may be true that A wants to led in this way to want to have a desire for the drug. X when he strongly prefers to do something else in- If it is a genuine desire that he wants, then what he stead; and it may be true that he wants to X despite wants is not merely to feel the sensations that addicts the fact that, when he acts, it is not the desire to X characteristically feel when they are gripped by their that motivates him to do what he does. On the other desires for the drug. What the physician wants, in- hand, someone who states that A wants to X may sofar as he wants to have a desire, is to be inclined or mean to convey that it is this desire that is motivat- moved to some extent to take the drug. ing or moving A to do what he is actually doing or It is entirely possible, however, that, although he thatA will in fact be moved by this desire (unless he wants to be moved by a desire to take the drug, he changes his mind) when he acts. does not want this desire to be effective. He may not It is only when it is used in the second of these want it to move him all the way to action. He need ways that, given the special usage of “will” that I not be interested in finding out what it is like to take propose to adopt, the statement identifies A’s will. To the drug. And insofar as he now wants only to want identify an agent’s will is either to identify the desire to take it, and not to sake it, there is nothing in what (or desires) by which he is motivated in some action he now wants that would be satisfied by the drug it- he performs or to identify the desire (or desires) by self. He may now have, in fact, an altogether univocal which he will or would be motivated when or if he desire not to take the drug; and he may prudently acts. An agent’s will, then, is identical with one or arrange to make it impossible for him to satisfy the more of his first-order desires. But the notion of the desire he would have if his desire to want the drug will, as 1am employing it, is not coextensive with the should in time be satisfied. notion of first-order desires. It is not the notion of It would thus be incorrect to infer, from the something that merely inclines an agent in some de- fact that the physician now wants to desire to take gree to act in a certain way. Rather, it is the notion of the drug, that he already does desire to take it. His an effective desire—one that moves (or will or would second-order desire to be moved to take the drug move) a person all the way to action. Thus the notion does not entail that he has a first-order desire to take of the will is not coextensive with the notion of what it. If the drug were now to be administered to him, an agent intends to do. For even though someone this might satisfy no desire that is implicit in his de- may have a settled intention to do X, he may none- sire to want to take it. While he wants to want to theless do something else instead of doing X because, take the drug, he may have no desire to take it; it may despite his intention, his desire to do X proves to be be that a// he wants is to taste the desire for it. That weaker or less effective than some conflicting desire. is, his desire to have a certain desire that he does not Now consider those statements of the form “A have may not be a desire that his will should be at all wants to X” which identify second-order desires— different than it is. that is, statements in which the term “to X” refers to Someone who wants only in this truncated way to a desire of the first order. There are also two kinds want to X stands at the margin of preciosity, and the of situation in which it may be true that A wants to fact that he wants to want to X is not pertinent to the want to X. In the first place, it might be true ofA that identification of his will. There is, however, a second  FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 49] kind ofsituation that may be described by “A wants that I regard as essential to being a person. It is logi- to want to X”; and when the statement is used to cally possible, however unlikely, that there should describe a situation of this second kind, then it does be an agent with second-order desires but with no pertain to what A wants his will to be. In such cases volitions of the second order. Such a creature, in my the statement means that A wants the desire to X to view, would not be a person. I shall use the term be the desire that moves him effectively to act. It is “wanton” to refer to agents who have first-order de- not merely that he wants the desire to X to be among sires but who are not persons because, whether or the desires by which, to one degree or another, he is not they have desires of the second order, they have moved or inclined to act. He wants this desire to be no second-order volitions.’ effective—that is, to provide the motive in what he The essential characteristic of awanton is that he actually does. Now when the statement thatA wants does not care about his will. His desires move him to want to X is used in this way, it does entail that A to do certain things, without its being true of him already has a desire to X. It could not be true both either that he wants to be moved by those desires or thatA wants the desire toX to move him into action that he prefers to be moved by other desires. The and that he does not want to X. It is only if he does class of wantons includes all nonhuman animals that want to X that he can coherently want the desire to have desires and all very young children. Perhaps it X not merely to be one of his desires but, more deci- also includes some adult human beings as well. In sively, to be his will.* any case, adult humans may be more or less wanton; Suppose a man wants to be motivated in what he they may act wantonly, in response to first-order de- does by the desire to concentrate on his work. It is sires concerning which they have no volitions of the necessarily true, if this supposition is correct, that second order, more or less frequently. he already wants to concentrate on his work. This The fact that a wanton has no second-order voli- desire is now among his desires. But the question of tions does not mean that each of his first-order de- whether or not his second-order desire is fulfilled sires is translated heedlessly and at once into action. does not turn merely on whether the desire he wants He may have no opportunity to act in accordance is one of his desires. It turns on whether this desire with some ofhis desires. Moreover, the translation of is, as he wants it to be, his effective desire or will. If, his desires into action may be delayed or precluded when the chips are down, it is his desire to concen- either by conflicting desires of the first order or by trate on his work that moves him to do what he does, the intervention of deliberation. For a wanton may then what he wants at that time is indeed (in the rele- possess and employ rational faculties of a high order. vant sense) what he wants to want. If it is some other Nothing in the concept of a wanton implies that desire that actually moves him when he acts, on the he cannot reason or that he cannot deliberate con- other hand, then what he wants at that time is not (in cerning how to do what he wants to do. What dis- the relevant sense) what he wants to want. This will tinguishes the rational wanton from other rational be so despite the fact that the desire to concentrate on agents is that he is not concerned with the desirability his work continues to be among his desires. of his desires themselves. He ignores the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he pursue what- ever course ofaction he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his inclina- tions is the strongest. Someone has a desire of the second order either Thus a rational creature, who reflects upon the when he wants simply to have a certain desire or suitability to his desires of one course of action or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In situ- another, may nonetheless be a wanton. In main- ations ofthe latter kind, I shall call his second-order taining that the essence of being a person lies not in desires “second-order volitions” or “volitions of the reason but in will, I am far from suggesting that a second order.” Now it is having second-order voli- creature without reason may be a person. For it 1s tions, and not having second-order desires generally, only in virtue ofhis rational capacities that a person 492 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY is capable of becoming critically aware of his own ing it. Unlike the unwilling addict, however, he does will and of forming volitions of the second order. not prefer that one ofhis conflicting desires should be The structure of aperson’s will presupposes, accord- paramount over the other; he does not prefer that one ingly, that he is a rational being. first-order desire rather than the other should consti- The distinction between a person and a wanton tute his will. It would be misleading to say that he may be illustrated by the difference between two is neutral as to the conflict between his desires, since narcotics addicts. Let us suppose that the physio- this would suggest that he regards them as equally logical condition accounting for the addiction is the acceptable. Since he has no identity apart from his same in both men, and that both succumb tnevita- first-order desires, it is true neither that he prefers bly to their periodic desires for the drug to which one to the other nor that he prefers not to take sides. they are addicted. One of the addicts hates his addic- It makes a difference to the unwilling addict, tion and always struggles desperately, although to no who is a person, which of his conflicting first-order avail, against its thrust. He tries everything that he desires wins out. Both desires are his, to be sure; and thinks might enable him to overcome his desires for whether he finally takes the drug or finally succeeds the drug. But these desires are too powerful for him in refraining from taking it, he acts to satisfy what is to withstand, and invariably, in the end, they con- ina literal sense his own desire. In either case he does quer him. He is an unwilling addict, helplessly vio- something he himself wants to do, and he does it not lated by his own desires. because of some external influence whose aim hap- The unwilling addict has conflicting first-order pens to coincide with his own but because ofhis de- desires: he wants to take the drug, and he also wants sire to do it. The unwilling addict identifies himself, to refrain from taking it. In addition to these first- however, through the formation of a second-order order desires, however, he has a volition of the second volition, with one rather than with the other of his order. He is not neutral with regard to the conflict conflicting first-order desires. He makes one of them between his desire to take the drug and his desire more truly his own and, in so doing, he withdraws to refrain from taking it. It is the latter desire, and himself from the other. It is in virtue of this iden- not the former, that he wants to constitute his will; tification and withdrawal, accomplished through the it is the latter desire, rather than the former, that he formation of a second-order volition, that the unwill- wants to be effective and to provide the purpose that ing addict may meaningfully make the analytically he will seek to realize in what he actually does. puzzling statements that the force moving him to The other addict is a wanton. His actions reflect take the drug is a force other than his own, and that the economy of his first-order desires, without his it is not of his own free will but rather against his being concerned whether the desires that move him will that this force moves him to take it. to act are desires by which he wants to be moved to The wanton addict cannot or does not care which act. If he encounters problems in obtaining the drug of his conflicting first-order desires wins out. His or in administering it to himself, his responses to lack of concern is not due to his inability to find a his urges to take it may involve deliberation. But it convincing basis for preference. It is due either to his never occurs to him to consider whether he wants lack of the capacity for reflection or to his mindless the relations among his desires to result in his hav- indifference to the enterprise of evaluating his own ing the will he has. The wanton addict may be an desires and motives.’ There is only one issue in the animal, and thus incapable of being concerned about struggle to which his first-order conflict may lead: his will. In any event he is, in respect ofhis wanton whether the one or the other of his conflicting desires lack of concern, no different from an animal. is the stronger. Since he is moved by both desires, he The second of these addicts may suffer a first- will not be altogether satisfied by what he does no order conflict similar to the first-order conflict suf- matter which of them is effective. But it makes no fered by the first. Whether he is human or not, the difference to him whether his craving or his aversion wanton may (perhaps due to conditioning) both gets the upper hand. He has no stake in the conflict want to take the drug and want to refrain from tak- between them and so, unlike the unwilling addict, he  FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 493 can neither win nor lose the struggle in which he is may be free to run in whatever direction it wants. engaged. When a person acts, the desire by which he Thus, having the freedom to do what one wants to is moved is either the will he wants or a will he wants do is not a sufficient condition of having a free will. to be without. When a wanron acts, it is neither. It is not a necessary condition either. For to deprive someone of his freedom of action is not necessar- ily to undermine the freedom of his will. When an agent is aware that there are certain things he is not free to do, this doubtless affects his desires and limits There isa very close relationship between the capacity the range of choices he can make. But suppose that for forming second-order volitions and another ca- someone, without being aware ofit, has in fact lost or pacity that is essential to persons—one that has often been deprived of his freedom ofaction. Even though been considered a distinguishing mark of the human he is no longer free to do what he wants to do, his condition. It is only because a person has volitions of will may remain as free as it was before. Despite the the second order that he is capable both of enjoying fact that he is not free to translate his desires into ac- and of lacking freedom ofthe will. The concept of a tions or to act according to the determinations of his person is not only, then, the concept of a type ofentity will, he may still form those desires and make those that has both first-order desires and volitions of the determinations as freely as if his freedom of action second order. It can also be construed as the concept had not been impaired. of a type of entity for whom the freedom of its will When we ask whether a person’s will is free we may be a problem. This concept excludes all wantons, are not asking whether he is in a position to translate both infrahuman and human, since they fail to satisfy his first-order desires into actions. That is the ques- an essential condition for the enjoyment of freedom tion of whether he is free to do as he pleases. The of the will. And it excludes those suprahuman be- question of the freedom of his will does not con- ings, if any, whose wills are necessarily free. cern the relation between what he does and what Just what kind of freedom is the freedom of the he wants to do. Rather, it concerns his desires them- will? This question calls for an identification of selves. But what question about them 1s it? the special area of human experience to which the It seems to me both natural and useful to con- concept of freedom of the will, as distinct from the strue the question of whether a person’s will is free concepts of other sorts of freedom, 1s particularly in close analogy to the question of whether an agent germane. In dealing with it, my aim will be pri- enjoys freedom ofaction. Now freedom of action is marily to locate the problem with which a person 1s (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants most immediately concerned when he is concerned to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a person with the freedom of his will. enjoys freedom ofthe will means (also roughly) that According to one familiar philosophical tradi- he is free to want what he wants to want. More pre- tion, being free is fundamentally a matter of doing cisely, it means that he 1s free to will what he wants to what one wants to do. Now the notion of an agent will, or to have the will he wants. Just as the question who does what he wants to do is by no means an al- about the freedom ofan agent’s action has to do with together clear one: both the doing and the wanting, whether it is the action he wants to perform, so the and the appropriate relation between them as well, question about the freedom ofhis will has to do with require elucidation. But although its focus needs to whether it is the will he wants to have. be sharpened and its formulation refined, I believe It is in securing the conformity of his will to his that this notion does capture at least part of what second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises is implicit in the idea of an agent who acts freely. It freedom of the will. And it is in the discrepancy misses entirely, however, the peculiar content ofthe between his will and his second-order volitions, or quite different idea ofan agent whose will is free. in his awareness that their coincidence is not his We do not suppose that animals enjoy freedom own doing but only a happy chance, that a person of the will, although we recognize that an animal who does not have this freedom feels its lack. The 494 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY unwilling addict’s will is not free. This is shown by to concentrate on his work. The fact that his sec- the fact that it is not the will he wants. It is also true, ond-order volition to be moved by this desire is a though in a different way, that the will of the wan- decisive one means that there is no room for ques- ton addict is not free. The wanton addict neither has tions concerning the pertinence of desires or voli- the will he wants nor has a will that differs from the tions of higher orders. Suppose the person is asked will he wants. Since he has no volitions of the second whether he wants to want to want to concentrate order, the freedom of his will cannot be a problem on his work. He can properly insist that this ques- for him. He lacks it, so to speak, by default. tion concerning a third-order desire does not arise. People are generally far more complicated than It would be a mistake to claim that, because he my sketchy account of the structure of a person’s has not considered whether he wants the second- will may suggest. There is as much opportunity for order volition he has formed, he is indifferent to ambivalence, conflict, and self-deception with re- the question of whether it is with this volition or gard to desires of the second order, for example, as with some other that he wants his will to accord. there is with regard to first-order desires. If there The decisiveness of the commitment he has made is an unresolved conflict among someone's second- means that he has decided that no further ques- order desires, then he is in danger of having no tion about his second-order volition, at any higher second-order volition; for unless this conflict is re- order, remains to be asked. It is relatively unim- solved, he has no preference concerning which ofhis portant whether we explain this by saying that this first-order desires is to be his will. This condition, commitment implicitly generates an endless series if it is so severe that it prevents him from identify- ofconfirming desires of higher orders, or by saying ing himself in a sufficiently decisive way with any that the commitment is tantamount to a dissolu- ofhis conflicting first-order desires, destroys him as tion of the pointedness ofall questions concerning a person. For it either tends to paralyze his will and higher orders ofdesire. to keep him from acting at all, or it tends to remove Examples such as the one concerning the unwill- him from his will so that his will operates without ing addict may suggest that volitions of the second his participation. In both cases he becomes, like the order, or of higher orders, must be formed deliber- unwilling addict though in a different way, a help- ately and that a person characteristically struggles to less bystander to the forces that move him. ensure that they are satisfied. But the conformity of a Another complexity is that a person may have, person’s will to his higher-order volitions may be far especially if his second-order desires are in conflict, more thoughtless and spontaneous than this. Some desires and volitions of a higher order than the sec- people are naturally moved by kindness when they ond. There is no theoretical limit to the length of want to be kind, and by nastiness when they want to the series of desires of higher and higher orders; be nasty, without any explicit forethought and with- nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a sav- out any need for energetic self-control. Others are ing fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively moved by nastiness when they want to be kind and by refusing to identify himself with any of his desires kindness when they intend to be nasty, equally with- until he forms a desire of the next higher order. The out forethought and without active resistance to these tendency to generate such a series ofacts of forming violations of their higher-order desires. The enjoy- desires, which would be a case of humanization run ment of freedom comes easily to some. Others must wild, also leads toward the destruction ofa person. struggle to achieve it. It is possible, however, to terminate such a se- ries of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his IV first-order desires, this commitment “resounds” throughout the potentially endless array of higher My theory concerning the freedom of the will ac- orders. Consider a person who, without reserva- counts easily for our disinclination to allow that this tion or conflict, wants to be motivated by the desire freedom is enjoyed by the members of any species  FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 495 inferior to our own. It also satisfies another condi- when it moves its leg than that a man does so when tion that must be met by any such theory, by mak- he moves his hand. But why, in any case, should ing it apparent why the freedom ofthe will should be anyone care whether he can interrupt the natu- regarded as desirable. The enjoyment of a free will ral order of causes in the way Chisholm describes? means the satisfaction of certain desires—desires of Chisholm offers no reason for believing that there the second or of higher orders—whereas its absence is a discernible difference between the experience of means their frustration. The satisfactions at stake a man who miraculously initiates a series of causes are those which accrue to a person of whom it may when he moves his hand and a man who moves his be said that his will is his own. The corresponding hand without any such breach of the normal causal frustrations are those suffered by a person of whom it sequence. There appears to be no concrete basis for may be said that he is estranged from himself, or that preferring to be involved in the one state of affairs he finds himself a helpless or a passive bystander to rather than in the other.” the forces that move him. It is generally supposed that, in addition to satis- A person who is free to do what he wants to do fying the two conditions I have mentioned, a satis- may yet not be ina position to have the will he wants. factory theory of the freedom of the will necessarily Suppose, however, that he enjoys both freedom of provides an analysis ofone of the conditions of moral action and freedom of the will. Then he is not only responsibility. The most common recent approach free to do what he wants to do; he is also free to want to the problem of understanding the freedom of the what he wants to want. It seems to me that he has, in will has been, indeed, to inquire what is entailed by that case, all the freedom it is possible to desire or to the assumption that someone is morally responsible conceive. There are other good things in life, and he for what he has done. In my view, however, the rela- may not possess some of them. But there is nothing tion between moral responsibility and the freedom in the way of freedom that he lacks. of the will has been very widely misunderstood. It is It is far from clear that certain other theories of not true that a person is morally responsible for what the freedom of the will meet these elementary but he has done only if his will was free when he did it. essential conditions: that it be understandable why He may be morally responsible for having done it we desire this freedom and why we refuse to as- even though his will was not free at all. cribe it to animals. Consider, for example, Roder- A person’s will is free only if he is free to have ick Chisholm’s* quaint version of the doctrine that the will he wants. This means that, with regard human freedom entails an absence of causal de- to any of his first-order desires, he is free either to termination.’ Whenever a person performs a free make that desire his will or to make some other action, according to Chisholm, it’s a miracle. The first-order desire his will instead. Whatever his motion of a person’s hand, when the person moves will, then, the will of the person whose will is free it, is the outcome of a series of physical causes; but could have been otherwise; he could have done oth- some event in this series, “and presumably one of erwise than to constitute his will as he did. It is a those that took place within the brain, was caused vexed question just how “he could have done oth- by the agent and not by any other events” (18). A erwise” is to be understood in contexts such as this free agent has, therefore, “a prerogative which some one. But although this question is important to the would attribute only to God: each of us, when we theory of freedom, it has no bearing on the theory act, is a prime mover unmoved” (23). of moral responsibility. For the assumption that a This account fails to provide any basis for doubt- person is morally responsible for what he has done ing that animals of subhuman species enjoy the free- does not entail that the person was in a position to dom it defines. Chisholm says nothing that makes have whatever will he wanted. it seem less likely that a rabbit performs a miracle This assumption does entail that the person did what he did freely, or that he did it of his own free * A selection from Chisholm’s writings appears as the previous will. It is a mistake, however, to believe that some- entry in the volume. one acts freely only when he is free to do whatever 496 METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY he wants or that he acts of his own free will only wants to want. Ifthis is conceivable, then it might be if his will is free. Suppose that a person has done causally determined that a person enjoys a free will. what he wanted to do, that he did it because he There is no more than an innocuous appearance wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was of paradox in the proposition that it is determined, moved when he did it was his will because it was ineluctably and by forces beyond their control, that the will he wanted. Then he did it freely and of his certain people have free wills and that others do not. own free will. Even supposing that he could have There is no incoherence in the proposition that some done otherwise, he would not have done otherwise; agency other than a person’s own is responsible (even and even supposing that he could have had a differ- morally responsible) for the fact that he enjoys or fails ent will, he would not have wanted his will to dif- to enjoy freedom ofthe will. It is possible that a per- fer from what it was. Moreover, since the will that son should be morally responsible for what he does of moved him when he acted was his will because he his own free will and that some other person should wanted it to be, he cannot claim that his will was also be morally responsible for his having done it."” forced upon him or that he was a passive bystander On the other hand, it seems conceivable that it to its constitution. Under these conditions, it is quite should come about by chance that a person is free to irrelevant to the evaluation of his moral responsibil- have the will he wants. If this is conceivable, then it ity to inquire whether the alternatives that he opted might be a matter of chance that certain people enjoy against were actually available to him.’ freedom ofthe will and that certain others do not. Per- In illustration, consider a third kind of addict. haps it is also conceivable, as a number ofphilosophers Suppose that his addiction has the same physio- believe, for states of affairs to come about in a way logical basis and the same irresistible thrust as the other than by chance or as the outcome of a sequence addictions of the unwilling and wanton addicts, but ofnatural causes. If itis indeed conceivable for the rel- that he is altogether delighted with his condition. evant states of affairs to come about in some third way, He is a willing addict, who would not have things then it is also possible that a person should in that third any other way. If the grip of his addiction should way come to enjoy the freedom ofthe will. somehow weaken, he would do whatever he could to reinstate 1t; if his desire for the drug should begin to fade, he would take steps to renew its intensity. NOTES The willing addict’s will is not free, for his de- sire to take the drug will be effective regardless of 1. P. FE Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his 1959), pp. 101-102. Ayer’s usage of “person” is will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely similar: “it is characteristic of persons in this sense and ofhis own free will. lam inclined to understand that besides having various physical properties his situation as involving the overdetermination of. they are also credited with various forms of his first-order desire to take the drug. This desire consciousness” [A. J. Ayer, The Concept ofa Per- is his effective desire because he is physiologically son (New York: St. Martin’s, 1963), p. 82]. What addicted. But it is his effective desire also because he concerns Strawson and Ayer is the problem of un- wants it to be. His will is outside his control, but, by derstanding the relation between mind and body, his second-order desire that his desire for the drug rather than the quite different problem of under- should be effective, he has made this will his own. standing what it 1s to be a creature that not only Given that it is therefore not only because of his has a mind and a body but is also a person. addiction that his desire for the drug is effective, he 2. For the sake of simplicity, I shall deal only with may be morally responsible for taking the drug. what someone wants or desires, neglecting related My conception of the freedom of the will appears phenomena such as choices and decisions. I pro- to be neutral with regard to the problem of deter- pose to use the verbs “to want” and “to desire” minism, It seems conceivable that it should be caus- interchangeably, although they are by no means ally determined that a person is free to want what he perfect synonyms. My motive in forsaking the  FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON 497 established nuances of these words arises from I do not mean to suggest that a person’s second- the fact that the yerb “to want,” which suits my order volitions necessarily manifest a moral stance purposes better so far as its meaning is concerned, on his part toward his first-order desires. It may does not lend itself so readily to the formation of not be from the point of view of morality that the nouns as does the verb “to desire.” [t is perhaps person evaluates his first-order desires. Moreover, acceptable, albeit graceless, to speak in the plural a person may be capricious and irresponsible in of someone’s “wants.” But to speak in the singular forming his second-order volitions and give no of someone’s “want” would be an abomination. serious consideration to what is at stake. Second- What I say in this paragraph applies not only to order volitions express evaluations only in the cases in which “to X” refers to a possible action sense that they are preferences. There is no essen- or inaction. It also applies to cases in which “to tial restriction on the kind of basis, if any, upon X” refers to a first-order desire and in which the which they are formed. statement that “A wants to X” is therefore a short- “Freedom and Action,” in K. Lehrer, ed., Freedom ened version of a statement “A wants to want to and Determinism (New York: Random House, X”—that identifies a desire of the second order. 1966), pp. 11-44. It is not so clear that the entailment relation I am not suggesting that the alleged difference described here holds in certain kinds of cases, between these two states of affairs is unverifiable. which I think may fairly be regarded as non- On the contrary, physiologists might well be able standard, where the essential difference between to show that Chisholm’s conditions for a free ac- the standard and the nonstandard cases lies in the tion are not satisfied, by establishing that there is kind of description by which the first-order de- no relevant brain event for which a sufficient phys- sire in question is identified. Thus, suppose that ical cause cannot be found. A admires B so fulsomely that, even though he For another discussion of the considerations that does not know what B wants to do, he wants to be cast doubt on the principle that a person is mor- effectively moved by whatever desire effectively ally responsible for what he has done only if he moves B; without knowing what B’s will is, in could have done otherwise, see my “Alternate other words,A wants his own will to be the same. Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The Jour- It certainly does not follow that A already has, nal of Philosophy Lxvi, 23 (December 4, 1969): among his desires, a desire like the one that consti- 829-839. tutes B’s will. I shall not pursue here the questions 10. There is a difference between being fully respon- of whether there are genuine counterexamples to sible and being solely responsible. Suppose that the claim made in the text or of how, if there are, the willing addict has been made an addict by the that claim should be altered. deliberate and calculated work of another. Then Creatures with second-order desires but no second- it may be that both the addict and this other per- order volitions differ significantly from brute ani- son are fully responsible for the addict’s taking mals, and, for some purposes, it would be desirable the drug, while neither of them is solely responsi- to regard them as persons. My usage, which with- ble for it. That there is a distinction between full holds the designation “person” from them, is thus moral responsibility and sole moral responsibility somewhat arbitrary. | adopt it largely because it is apparent in the following example. A certain facilitates the formulation of some of the points | light can be turned on or off by flicking either of wish to make. Hereafter, whenever I consider state- two switches, and each of these switches 1s simula- ments of the form “A wants to want to X,” I shall taneously flicked to the “on” position by a differ- have in mind statements identifying second-order ent person, neither of whom is aware of the other. volitions and not statements identifying second- Neither person is solely responsible for the light’s order desires that are not second-order volitions. going on, nor do they share the responsibility in In speaking of the evaluation of his own desires the sense that each is partially responsible; rather, and motives as being characteristic of a person, each of them is fully responsible.