Climate Emergency & Securitization Politics PDF

Globalizations ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rglo20 Climate emergency and securitization politics: towards a climate politics of the extraordinary Michael Albert To cite this article: Michael Albert (2023) Climate emergency and securitization politics: towards a climate politics of the extraordinary, Globalizations, 20:4, 533-547, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2022.2117501 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2022.2117501 © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 04 Sep 2022. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 5559 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 7 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rglo20 GLOBALIZATIONS 2023, VOL. 20, NO. 4, 533–547 https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2022.2117501 Climate emergency and securitization politics: towards a climate politics of the extraordinary Michael Albert Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS University of London, London, UK ABSTRACT KEYWORDS There is an ongoing debate among climate activists and scholars on the merits Climate change; of ‘climate emergency’ frames, which mirrors debates in critical security studies securitization theory; on the beneﬁts and risks of ‘securitization’. Climate emergency advocates emergency; sustainability transitions demonstrate that rapid transformative action beyond ‘normal’ politics is needed to meet the Paris agreement targets. Critics, on the other hand, highlight the risks of deploying emergency frames to galvanize climate action, which may simply result in failed securitizations or even in emergency suspensions of democratic norms that advance climate action at the expense of climate justice. This paper will engage this debate by exploring the question: could climate emergency mobilizations be compatible with climate justice? I will argue, following Andreas Kalyvas, that the climate emergency can be framed as an opportunity for an ‘extraordinary politics’ of democratic constituent power, though this would involve risks and trade-oﬀs that must be negotiated in practice. I want you to act as if the house is on ﬁre, because it is. –Greta Thunberg (2019) A nascent discourse of ‘climate emergency’ has taken oﬀ in recent years as increasing numbers of scientists and activists highlight the existential dangers that may emerge if states fail to limit global temperature rises to below 2°C. In 2019 over 11,000 scientists declared ‘clearly and unequivocally that planet Earth is facing a climate emergency’ (Ripple, & 11,262 Scientist Signatories, 2019, p. 1), a sentiment bolstered by evidence of more severe than expected climate impacts at 1.1°C, continu- ously rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations (rising by a record 6.2% in 2021 after a 5%–6% pan- demic-induced dip in 2020), insuﬃcient policies to put the world on track to meet the Paris agreement targets, and evidence of approaching tipping points that could trigger a ‘hothouse earth’ pathway in which warming becomes self-amplifying (IEA, 2021; Lenton et al., 2019). In con- junction with this scientiﬁc discourse, a worldwide movement to enact climate emergency mobil- izations is gaining steam: as of August 2022, 2,252 jurisdictions in 39 countries, including 18 national governments and covering over a billion citizens, have oﬃcially ‘declared a climate emer- gency’, which were largely galvanized by grassroots climate activist movements like Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, Sunrise, and Action for the Climate Emergency (Climate Emergency Declaration, 2022). The political eﬀects of such declarations remain contested and uncertain, but CONTACT Michael Albert [email protected] © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. 534 M. ALBERT they at least amount to a symbolic shift in the discursive landscape of global climate politics (Pat- terson et al., 2021; Ruiz-Campillo et al., 2021). On the other hand, while often sympathetic to the urgency of the climate problem, other scholars and activists contest climate emergency strategies. Often drawing from the Copenhagen School’s understanding of securitization (Buzan et al., 1997), critics highlight the risks of using emergency discourse and related war metaphors to galvanize climate action. They argue that these eﬀorts typi- cally result in failed securitizations (Warner & Boas, 2020), but could also plausibly in the future lead to inequitable forms of rapid climate action that prioritize emissions reduction while margin- alizing concerns about historic and contemporary injustice (Hodder & Martin, 2009; Hulme, 2019; Kester & Sovacool, 2017). This paper will engage this debate by exploring the promise and pitfalls of climate emergency strategies. Unlike most scholars of climate securitization, I take seriously the agency of grassroots activist movements calling for climate emergency mobilizations, which can be understood as coun- ter-hegemonic securitization or ‘crisiﬁcation’ speech acts attempting to shift the cognitive–aﬀective dispositions, priorities, and resources of governments and their constituencies (Paglia, 2018; Pat- terson et al., 2021). In this way my approach follows Ben Anderson’s call to ‘start from the use of emergency by non-state and non-sovereign actors to disrupt systems of rule’, rather than only viewing emergency frames as a technique of sovereign power (2017, p. 475). However, I also take seriously the critiques levelled at climate emergency discourses and strategies. For those who simultaneously agree with the ‘objectivist’ framing of climate change as an ‘emergency’ that demands rapid transformative action, as well as the critics who highlight the pitfalls of securitiza- tion or ‘emergency mode’ politics, an urgent question arises: could climate emergency mobiliz- ations be compatible with climate justice? In other words, are emergency disruptions of business-as-usual liberal capitalist democracy possible that could accelerate decarbonization while also advancing social justice objectives? My core argument is that while climate emergency action would likely involve certain trade-oﬀs in practice (e.g. between speed, justice, and democratic inclusion), it is nonetheless possible to con- ceptualize and enact climate emergency mobilizations that are capable of advancing climate justice objectives – including increased democratic participation, a more fair distribution of the beneﬁts and burdens of mitigation, and deeper recognition of and reparations for historic injustices. In this sense, rather than inevitably ushering in a Schmittian ‘state of exception’ that intensiﬁes sover- eign power, climate emergency mobilizations are possible that would instantiate what Andreas Kalyvas calls the ‘politics of the extraordinary’: moments of ‘genuine rupture and transformation’ that break from the sterility of ‘normal’ institutionalized democracy and reaﬃrm the power of orga- nized citizens ‘to substantially rearrange or alter the fundamental norms, values, and institutions that regulate ordinary legislation and institutionalized politics’ (2008, p. 1, 7). But the politics of the extraordinary carries risks alongside democratic potential (Williams, 2015): such periods of institutional change and experimentation, while unleashing the latent ‘constituent power’ of citi- zens, can also devolve into unchecked sovereign power and military-police repression of dissent, as we have seen in revolutionary contexts historically. It is thus critical for climate emergency movements to reﬂect systematically on how – and in what future conditions – they might help cat- alyze an extraordinary politics of climate emergency action, the risks and trade-oﬀs that would likely emerge in the process, and how these could be eﬀectively negotiated and (hopefully) softened in practice. I will begin with a brief overview of the literature on climate securitization, and then shift to ongoing debates about climate emergency strategies. Next, I will engage with scholars like Andreas GLOBALIZATIONS 535 Kalyvas, Michael Williams, and Ben Anderson who can help us imagine a diﬀerent kind of emer- gency mode politics that may avoid its more authoritarian expressions. Finally, I will speculate on the future conditions in which extraordinary climate emergency mobilizations may become poss- ible, and explore the tensions between speed, justice, and democratic inclusion that would likely surface during such mobilizations. I will focus on climate emergency movements in the global north, which is a limitation of the present study, but justiﬁed by the fact that it is the rich over- developed countries where emergency mitigation is most necessary according to principles of glo- bal climate justice, and where the power to unlock the ﬁnance needed to help decarbonize much of the global south lies. Securitization theory and climate change Declarations of climate emergency ﬁt within a grammar or set of speech acts that Barry Buzan and colleagues famously described as ‘securitization’ moves: speech acts through which vulnerabilities are articulated as ‘existential threat[s] to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby gen- erates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind’ (1997, p. 5). The Copenhagen School assumes a distinction between ‘normal politics’, or the routine haggling between interest groups constrained by rule of law and routine procedures in liberal democratic states, and security or ‘emergency mode’ politics in which extraordinary measures are legitimized to deal with a threatening situation (4, 21). Politicians, military oﬃcials, defense experts, and intel- ligence agencies are those who hold the most power to ‘“do” or “speak” security successfully’, in the sense that their security claims are more likely to resonate with and persuade a target audience that exceptional measures are needed (27). But Buzan et al note that this power is ‘never absolute’ (31), and it is thus possible for other actors with diﬀerent social positionalities to enunciate security or emergency claims. Thierry Balzacq’s sociological reworking of securitization theory allows us to develop this insight further, which emphasizes that ‘securitization occurs in a ﬁeld of struggles … a conﬁguration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’ (2011, p. 15, 1–2). This approach facilitates more insight into the variable contexts, strategies, and outcomes of securitization processes. It explores, for instance, how securitizing actors mobilize ‘heuristic arte- facts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc)’ in order ‘to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object’ (3). Securitization theory has been highly inﬂuential among scholars of the climate-security nexus, though it has not been uncritically adopted. The period between 2003 and 2009 is often seen as the time when perceptions of climate change as an existential threat began to take oﬀ, which was the result of unprecedented climate-related disasters striking the global north (e.g. the 2003 European heatwave and 2005 Hurricane Katrina), increasing certainty about the science of climate change and its projected impacts articulated in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, and the ‘dis- cursive entrepreneurialism’ of scientists, activists, national security agencies, and inﬂuential ﬁgures like Al Gore to successfully communicate climate change as an urgent crisis to a broader audience (Paglia, 2018). From a Copenhagen School lens, these eﬀorts can only be interpreted as failed secur- itization eﬀorts – attributable to the seemingly distant, abstract, uncertain, and contested conse- quences of climate change – since states have not yet adopted anything like ‘emergency’ measures that suspend routine democratic procedures in order to accelerate decarbonization eﬀorts. However, other scholars claim that a more ﬂuid and dynamic understanding of 536 M. ALBERT securitization is needed to grasp how climate change has reshaped security discourses and practices. Maria Trombetta, for instance, argues that securitizing climate change is ‘not about applying a ﬁxed meaning of security and the practices associated with it’, but has rather involved diﬀerent modal- ities and logics of response that are closer to risk management practices – i.e. practices that aim to calculate and mitigate rather than eliminate the risks that climate change poses (2008, p. 600). Simi- larly, Oels (2012, p. 185) suggests that the ‘failed’ securitization of climate change is ‘better under- stood as the successful “climatization” of the security ﬁeld’, in the sense that traditional security practices like scenario planning and early warning systems are being applied to climate change, while the security ﬁeld is also expanding to include techniques from climate science like modelling and risk analysis (see also von Lucke, 2020). Thus while pushing back against Copenhagen School assumptions about a universalizing logic and consequences associated with securitization, these approaches nonetheless share its insight that to securitize an issue ‘allows for measures that other- wise would not have been undertaken’ by mobilizing the language and aﬀect of urgency (Trom- betta, 2019, p. 102), though the speciﬁc policy measures that ﬂow from such securitizations are subject to context and political struggles. The literature on the securitization of climate change has so far done an excellent job illuminat- ing the politics of climate securitization in diﬀerent national and/or institutional contexts, their pol- icy consequences, and their lessons for securitization theory more broadly. But it contains two gaps that this paper will address. First, scholars of climate securitization have not yet systematically investigated grassroots activist movements as actors with the capacity to ‘speak security’ (e.g. by declaring climate emergencies) and in doing so reshape global climate politics. Occasionally their agency is recognized (e.g. von Lucke, 2020, p. 5), but questions regarding their capacities to aﬀect climate policy outcomes and the conditions under which they may succeed in driving more radical climate emergency mobilizations have not received much (if any) attention. Second and relatedly, these scholars focus overwhelmingly on past and present patterns of climate secur- itization rather than considering how these may change in the future (both as a result of worsening socio-climate shocks and intensifying climate activism). Both of these oversights are understand- able: grassroots activist movements remain marginal (if increasingly eﬃcacious) actors in global climate politics, and claims about possible futures are inherently unveriﬁable and thus avoided by most social scientists. However, as Heikki Patomaki argues, ‘anticipation of the future is a necessary part of social action … Consequently, if the social sciences are to be relevant they should be able to also say something about possible and likely futures’ (2006, p. 5). Similarly, in a context of worsening climate change and multiplying calls for climate emergency action, scholarship on cli- mate securitization should be able to say something about the prospects, potential, and possible pit- falls of grassroots-driven climate emergency mobilizations in the coming years. If scholars have been primarily interested in the limits of mainstream climate securitization strategies to date, we should also be asking whether and how more radical ‘emergency mode’ disruptions to business- as-usual liberal-capitalist democracy may emerge, the role grassroots movements can play in catalyzing such shifts, and the possibilities and risks of such strategies. Debating climate emergency To declare or not to declare a climate emergency? That is one of the questions facing climate scientists and activists around the world seeking more radical climate action. For climate emergency activists like Salamon (2019), co-founder of The Climate Mobilization (an Amer- ican NGO), the main goal is to shift states and the broader public towards what she calls GLOBALIZATIONS 537 ‘emergency mode’ – a cognitive and aﬀective state involving heightened sense of urgency about the risks we face and the need for rapid transformative action. Following Kathryn Davidson and colleagues, ‘climate emergency mode’ can in this sense be deﬁned as ‘action that goes well beyond business-as-usual by demanding a radical, urgent mobilisation of econ- omic and social resources at an abnormal level of intensity and scale so to appropriately address the climate crisis’ (2020, p. 2). There is no straightforward way to precisely deﬁne how climate change constitutes an ‘emer- gency’ (which, from a constructivist perspective, is merely an intersubjective discourse and/or aﬀect rather than a material situation that can be objectively deﬁned) (Paglia, 2018). But Paul Gild- ing suggests that three criteria must be met for a situation to warrant the ‘emergency’ designation: (1) the risk is high; (2) the consequences of failure are unmanageable or unacceptable; and (3) there is a ‘time constraint governing whether a response will be eﬀective’ (2019, p. 6). Such a deﬁnition arguably raises more questions than it answers – what is the threshold of risk that distinguishes an emergency from any other hazard or vulnerability? Unmanageable or unacceptable for who? And in what sense? But we can say that climate emergency advocates generally agree on two key points: (1) exceeding 1.5°C and especially 2°C of global warming risks triggering a ‘domino-like cascade’ of tipping points that would push the earth to ever hotter temperatures (Steﬀen et al., 2018), creating an existential risk for humanity and the biosphere; and (2) ensuring that global temperatures are kept below this threshold requires a rapid transformation of the global political-economy that goes well beyond business-as-usual market-based strategies (e.g. emissions trading, carbon taxes, subsidies and tax credits for renewable energy and electric vehicles, etc.) (Spratt & Sutton, 2008, pp. 224–230). While the ﬁrst point is contested by many climate scientists who claim that the risks of tipping cascades are often exaggerated (e.g. Mann, 2021), the second has become increas- ingly conventional wisdom since the publication of the IPCC’s 2018 Special Report on 1.5°C, which called for ‘rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban, and infrastructure’ that ‘are unprecedented in terms of scale’ (IPCC, 2018, p. 21). Current policies – which prioritize economic growth over climate action, aim to minimize disruption to businesses and consumers, and assume the continued expansion of fossil fuel production at least into the mid-2030s – put the earth on pace for an estimated 2.7°C by 2100 (Climate Action Tracker, 2021). In contrast, the policy shifts needed to bring the 1.5°C target within reach would entail ‘nothing less than the rapid and dramatic rever- sal of our present direction as a civilisation’, as Jason Hickel puts it – a massive 5%–7% drop in emissions every year between now and 2050, and the rate would need to be even higher for rich countries (10%–15% annual reductions) in accordance with the principle of common but diﬀeren- tiated responsibility (2020, p. 137). Climate activists and NGOs demanding climate emergency action are thus in eﬀect calling on states to move beyond hollow ‘net zero’ rhetoric to push through the decisive, disruptive, and trans- formative policy shifts needed to put the world economy on pace for the 1.5°C target. Such move- ments are diverse and vary in terms of their speciﬁc policy prescriptions. But they typically share two primary goals. The ﬁrst, as noted, is to get governments (both local and national) to ‘declare a climate emergency’, or to oﬃcially acknowledge the gravity of the climate crisis and the necessity of transformative action. Following Balzacq (2011, p. 3), climate emergency declarations could be understood as symbolic actions or speech acts that mobilize ‘heuristic artefacts’ (e.g. future projec- tions of climate catastrophe, war metaphors, analogies to the World War II experience of rapidly reorienting economic production) in order to prompt a ‘coherent network of implications’ among target audiences (e.g. feelings of fear, hope that the emergency can be averted through transforma- tive action, and belief in the need for national solidarity and sacriﬁce). Studies so far suggest that 538 M. ALBERT such declarations, while largely symbolic, can also lay a foundation for concrete policies while rein- vigorating democratic participation in climate action (Howarth et al., 2021; Ruiz-Campillo et al., 2021), though in most cases so far they have at best led to ‘incremental rather than transformative action agendas’ (Patterson et al., 2021, p. 847). The second and primary goal of such movements, however, is to eventually push national gov- ernments to adopt radical climate emergency plans that accord with the scientiﬁc evidence on what should be done to keep global temperatures as close to 1.5°C as possible. The Club of Rome’s ‘Climate Emergency Plan’ (2018), for instance, calls for immediately halting fossil fuel expansion and fossil fuel subsidies, tripling annual investments in renewable energy, creating a globally coordinated carbon pricing system that imposes border adjustment tariﬀs on non-par- ticipating countries, dramatically increasing circular economy practices, and replacing GDP with alternative indicators for measuring social ‘progress’. This last recommendation is supported by evidence that continued compound GDP growth is incompatible with the speed of emissions reductions needed to reach the 1.5°C target, though breakthroughs in ‘Negative Emissions Tech- nologies’ could plausibly alter this calculus (Kallis & Hickel, 2020). Other plans go even further by calling for World War II style-rationing provisions, which go well beyond current market-based strategies by placing a hard cap on emissions and energy consumption and equitably sharing emissions allowances among critical industries, individuals, and other users – a strategy often lauded for its perceived fairness and eﬀectiveness in meeting strict targets (Lieven, 2021, pp. 92–106; Spratt & Sutton, 2008). Also informed by the experience of the World War II mobil- ization in the US, Laurence Delina envisions ‘national mitigation plans’ for states composed of the following elements: legally binding targets for emissions reductions; new institutional coor- dinating bodies to conduct comprehensive studies on available resources, labour requirements, and needs for the renewable energy transition; expedited re-training programmes for displaced workers; universal basic income and/or state-backed job guarantees to ensure economic security for all; and a ‘super-tax’ on individuals earning more than a given income threshold (2016, pp. 121–138). Recent calls for ‘Green New Deals’ in the US and Europe provide similar approaches, which in their more radical forms call for state-driven mitigation plans in the global north combined with ‘Marshall plan’-scale aid for mitigation and adaptation, technology trans- fers, and debt cancellation (Aronoﬀ et al., 2019; Klein, 2019). The overall objective of these move- ments is to get rich countries to net zero emissions in the 2030s and by 2040 at latest, and the rest of the world to net zero by 2050 or shortly thereafter, which (according to the IPCC) would give the world a 50/50 chance at stabilizing global average temperature increases at 1.5°C (Delina, 2016; Klein, 2019). In contrast, critics of climate emergency movements, while usually sympathetic to their goals, are wary of emergency-based strategies for at least three reasons. First, some simply counsel that the strategy is highly unlikely to motivate rapid climate action and may even backﬁre. Jeroen War- ner and Ingrid Boas, for instance, show that emergency and security frames often ‘come across as strategic and calculated’ to target audiences, which means they are received with skepticism; fur- thermore, rather than galvanizing support for accelerated action, they suggest these climate secur- itization moves may instil ‘a sense of ontological insecurity in the intended audience’ in a way that promotes pushback and disengagement rather than action (2020, p. 1472, 1475). Second, others argue that climate emergency frames create an overly restrictive lens on global challenges that exceptionalizes the climate problem while potentially diverting attention and resources away from other goals. Mike Hulme, in this sense, asks ‘why is the the scandal of deepening economic inequality in the world not subject to emergency politics? Why should an emergency be declared GLOBALIZATIONS 539 for the planet, but not for the poor?’ (Hulme, 2019). The fear here is that focusing on the climate emergency ‘narrows the policy gaze to the restrictive logic of equating human well-being with reduced carbon emissions’, rather than facilitating a multi-dimensional platform for political-econ- omic change that targets intersecting global challenges (Hulme, 2019). Third, following the Copenhagen School, many are concerned that if such strategies do at some point succeed in galvanizing climate emergency action, then this would be done by over- riding concerns about justice and democratic accountability. For example, Johannes Kester and Benjamin Sovacool claim that ‘the cure may be worse than the disease’, since a ‘partly successful mobilization that entices government support but not broad public acceptance would push towards a police state’ (2017, p. 52, 53). Similarly, while supportive of climate emergency action, Laurence Delina and Mark Diesendorf acknowledge that climate emergency declarations may be used to legitimate intrusive state surveillance and coercion to ensure mitigation targets are met, and there would be ‘no guarantee that a state of normal democracy would return’ after the end of the transition period (2013, p. 378). In addition to the usual fears about the suspension of demo- cratic rights and procedures during an emergency, there is also the danger that single-minded determination to accelerate emissions reductions would intensify new forms of dispossession. ‘Green sacriﬁce zones’, for example, refer to spaces and communities negatively impacted by ‘the sourcing, transportation, installation, and operation of solutions for powering low-carbon transitions’, including end-of-life waste disposal (Zografos & Robbins, 2020, p. 543). Disposses- sion of and/or harms to indigenous and rural communities to build solar and wind farms; win carbon credits from carbon sequestration projects; and ramp up mining for lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel, and other minerals needed for the renewable energy transition (projected to increase by 40, 25, 21, and 19 times respectively above contemporary levels by 2050 to meet the Paris targets) have already been amply documented (Dunlap, 2018; IEA, 2021; Sovacool et al., 2021). In the context of a climate emergency mobilization, community concerns about and resistance to such projects would most likely be marginalized at best, and crushed via mili- tary-police repression at worst. In sum, if we take the arguments of both the advocates and critics of climate emergency strat- egies seriously, this suggests that we may be confronting a ‘tragic’ predicament, or a situation where core values with equal claim on us (e.g. rapid mitigation, democracy, and justice) are in tension if not irreconcilable opposition (Foster, 2022, p. 11). Emergency disruptions of business-as-usual lib- eral capitalist democracies are almost certainly needed to put the world economy on pace to meet the 1.5°C target, yet such strategies carry evident authoritarian risks. Most climate emergency plans developed by scholars and NGOs explicitly foreground concerns about climate justice (e.g. Club of Rome, 2018; Gilding, 2019; Klein, 2019; Salamon, 2019; Spratt & Sutton, 2008), but critics would argue that these are idealist gestures that would be overridden in any real-world climate emergency mobilization. In contrast, Anatol Lieven’s approach, which tries to derive the imperative of climate emergency action from political realist principles – national security, survival, and the motivating power of nationalism – may provide a more accurate account of what a climate emergency mobil- ization would entail in practice. For Lieven, the primary goal of climate securitization should be ‘to get through or around the dogmatic free-market capitalist ideology of contemporary Western elites’, though for him this must come at the expense of ‘ideological luxuries’ like climate justice (2021, p. 133). As he writes: ‘the ﬁrst things that get tossed out in a real emergency are luxuries’ (xxv). Also coming from a political realist approach, John Foster sees it as delusional ‘that our key social-political values, justice and democracy and liberty … and universal material well- being on a habitable planet, can all be achieved together’ (2022, p. 135). Instead, he argues that 540 M. ALBERT the climate emergency demands whole system transformation ‘at whatever cost’, which ‘will inevi- tably come at the sacriﬁce of important values’ (128–129; italics original). Is this the best we could hope for? Must climate emergency action necessarily override demo- cratic norms and accelerate decarbonization at the expense of climate justice in the name of urgency? Is a diﬀerent, more just and democratic form of climate emergency action possible? I agree with realists like Lieven and Foster that the goal of emergency mitigation may be in conﬂict with the values of justice and democracy (at least in its current institutionalized forms), and that certain trade-oﬀs will likely be unavoidable in practice. We need a framework that can help us con- front and work through these tensions and trade-oﬀs (Ciplett & Harrison, 2020), rather than hold- ing unshakably to an ‘all or nothing’ approach. But the trade-oﬀs are not as ironclad as these authors suggest. When viewed through the lens of the ‘politics of the extraordinary’, I argue that it is possible to imagine more ‘just emergency mobilizations’ that can accelerate decarbonization while advancing many (if not all) climate justice objectives – including increased democratic par- ticipation, a more fair distribution of the beneﬁts and burdens of mitigation (both nationally and globally), and deeper recognition of and reparations for historic injustices – though this could only occur in a context of organized grassroots power on a massive scale. This argument is unavoidably speculative and relies on what Foster calls ‘counter-empirical hope’, since the scale, speed, and depth of transformation we are hoping for is historically unprecedented and faces long odds at best (Foster, 2022, p. 45). But theoretically and empirically-informed speculation is needed to ima- gine how climate emergency movements can help create an alternative future that is climactically stable and more just. Certain trade-oﬀs and ethical quandaries – what Ciplett and Harrison (2020) call ‘transition tensions’ – may be unavoidable in any real-world climate emergency mobilization, but exploration of future scenarios can help clarify what these might be and inform strategic reﬂec- tions on how they might be negotiated (and hopefully softened) in practice (Albert, 2022). Climate emergency and the politics of the extraordinary To envision how climate emergency strategies may galvanize democratic political-economic trans- formation rather than resulting in either failed securitizations or authoritarian erosion of democ- racy, we can begin by taking inspiration from Kalyvas’s (2008) concept of the ‘politics of the extraordinary’. As opposed to the relatively ‘static and frozen’ periods of ‘normal’ institutionalized democratic politics, the politics of the extraordinary involves high levels of collective mobilization; extensive popular support for some fundamental changes; the emergence of irregular and informal public spaces; and the formation of extra-institutional and anti- statist movements that directly challenge the established balance of forces, the prevailing politico-social status quo, the state legality, and the dominant value system (6–7). In short, these are periods of revolutionary rupture catalyzed by ‘self-organized insurgent publics’ that institute the basis of a new kind of political-economic order (13). If ‘state of emergency’ sus- pensions of ordinary legality represent one form of extraordinary politics, then a diﬀerent form emerges when the latent ‘constituent power’ of a demos manifests itself to disrupt prevailing sys- tems of rule. The ultimate goal of such movements at such times, as Kalyvas writes, is to mobilize and encompass broader strata of the population, to form wider organic alliances, to articulate new norms and rights, to formulate original collective aims that transcend the conﬁnes of the existing regime, and to propose a new hegemonic founding project (299). GLOBALIZATIONS 541 Michael Williams suggests that by rethinking securitization theory through the lens of extraordi- nary politics, it is possible to develop a more positive understanding of securitization as ‘a process of openness and self-determination with democratic potential’ that may enable ‘a more founda- tional – if always fraught – revaluation of the political order itself in ways that can be inclusive and reformative as well as violently exclusionary’ (2015, p. 115). In other words, from this view, there is no inevitability that emergency claims (if accepted) lead to suppression of democracy and exclusionary injustice, though this is always a danger. Instead, enunciations of security or declarations of emergency from grassroots movements may be viewed as expressions of latent con- stituent power that also have democratizing potential. As Ben Anderson shows, both climate and racial justice movements use emergency declarations as ‘a pragmatic-contextual intervention in the present that aims precisely to disrupt what has already become normal’, or to fold ‘a sense emer- gency into the mode of operation of the very systems and infrastructures that, for some, once pro- duced a sense of stability’ (2017, p. 473, 472). In this way they aim to generate urgency among otherwise complacent publics, erode the legitimacy of constituted political regimes, inspire hope that rapid transformative action can stave oﬀ the emergency and create a better future, and call forth ‘self-organized insurgent publics’ capable of realizing this alternative future (Anderson, 2017, pp. 469–470; Kalyvas, 2008, p. 13). The strategy of Extinction Rebellion can usefully be read in this way. Their key demands – for- cing governments to ‘tell the truth’ about the climate emergency, bring emissions to zero within a decade, and create ‘citizen’s assemblies’ to democratically determine how societies decarbonize – aim to disrupt and transform dominant cognitive–aﬀective dispositions by highlighting the unsus- tainability of business-as-usual, the criminal negligence of existing governments vis-à-vis the cli- mate emergency, and the necessity of decisive emergency action. Like earlier forms of civil disobedience, their disruptive actions ‘target directly the existing symbolic and juridical structures of instituted power’ in order to rearticulate the ‘illegal’ as ‘extra-legal’, or subject to a ‘higher law’ or rationality beyond the arbitrariness of instituted state authority (Kalyvas, 2008, p. 299). Further- more, by calling for citizen’s assemblies they explicitly aim to supplement institutionalized demo- cratic decision-making with ‘extraconstitutional forms of participation that strive to narrow the distance between rulers and ruled, active and passive citizens, representatives and represented’ (7). But of course there is no guarantee that grassroots climate emergency strategies will result in the desired outcome: target audiences may remain unpersuaded by the urgency of the crisis and/or the need for emergency action beyond current policies, and dominant interests and their media mouth- pieces may eﬀectively write them oﬀ as ‘eco-extremists’ or ‘millenarian cultists’ (the common dis- cursive strategy employed by rightwing UK media outlets). On the other hand, in conditions of worsening climate shocks and deepening political-economic crises, climate emergency movements may indeed help trigger ‘social tipping points’ in which the need for emergency action rapidly becomes popular common sense (Otto et al., 2020), though the outcome may be eco-authoritarian securitization more than climate justice (as I’ll elaborate below). Critics of climate emergency strat- egies are thus not wrong when they highlight the risks of such strategies. They are simply one-sided, ignoring or downplaying their democratic and constituent potential. The politics of the extraordinary provides a useful theoretical interpretation of climate emer- gency movements that highlights their democratic constituent potential as well as their risks. But rather than just theorizing these possibilities in the abstract, we should also consider more con- cretely whether and how these movements might succeed in catalyzing climate emergency mobil- izations in the global north, as well as the tensions and trade-oﬀs that would most likely surface in the process. To start, as I’ve alluded to, worsening climate shocks over time may push more and 542 M. ALBERT more individuals towards either active or passive support for climate emergency action. But it is also often recognized that the ‘slow emergency’ of climate change will likely lack so-called ‘focusing events’ in the global north that are powerful enough to trigger social tipping points that dramati- cally alter public consciousness about the need for rapid political-economic transformation (at least within the timeframe needed to meet the 1.5°C target) (Davidson et al., 2020; Patterson et al., 2021, p. 847). Unprecedented socio-climate disasters and ‘record-shattering’ events like Hurricane Har- vey in 2017, the 2019–2020 Australian bushﬁres, and summer 2021 ﬂoods in Central Europe, while certainly raising public concern about the climate crisis, have had at best marginal eﬀects on climate policy (Patterson et al., 2021). The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, shows that con- cerns about energy security can have ‘far greater mobilizing force that the climate catastrophe para- digm’ due to the capacity of rising energy prices to inﬂict more immediate, widespread, and synchronized economic pain for producers and consumers (Hook & Hume, 2022). The ongoing energy crisis is leading some European states to develop emergency plans to ration energy, cut con- sumption, and ramp up permitting and deployment of renewable energy, though they currently take the form of ‘all of the above’ energy strategies that include re-opening coal plants, building up liquiﬁed natural gas terminals and pipelines, and supporting fossil fuel extraction-for-export in the global south (Dempsey et al, 2022). We can thus hypothesize that if fossil fuel supply shocks of similar or worse magnitude emerge synchronously with increasingly intense and relentless climate shocks (e.g. in the 2030s, when the world economy will be dealing with the consequences of roughly 1.5°C of warming, as well as higher dependence on ‘unconventional’ oil and gas supplies that are more expensive and diﬀuse), then together these shocks may motivate concerted action among G7 countries to accel- erate the renewable energy transition (Ahmed, 2017). But as we see in the contemporary context, incumbent elites can also eﬀectively exploit energy and economic crises to justify continuation or even deepening of the fossil fuelled status quo. Thus a radical emergency programme to address the root causes of worsening climate shocks and energy insecurity will only materialize if pushed suc- cessfully by increasingly powerful grassroots climate movements with much greater numbers, organizational strength, and coherence than at present. Such movements would need to be at least capable of coordinating massive general strikes, far larger than the 2019–2020 strikes and civil disobedience actions organized by movements like Fridays for Future, Sunrise, Extinction Rebellion, and Black Lives Matter, while interfacing with progressive political parties that can trans- late their demands into concrete political gains. It is questionable to what extent and how quickly such movements can scale up their organizational strength to be capable of pushing governments and elites towards more than reformist responses. But if these three conditions converge – (1) intensifying climate shocks that galvanize heightened collective urgency about the climate emer- gency, (2) intractable energy insecurity and resulting political-economic crises that politicize broader sectors of populations in rich countries, and (3) strengthening networks of climate, labour, and antiracist movements that are able to persuade democratic majorities that radical action is needed to address these crises – then the scene may be set for climate emergency mobilizations that look something like those envisioned by Lieven, Delina, the Club of Rome, and others (Club of Rome, 2019; Delina, 2016; Klein, 2019; Lieven, 2021). This would of course be an unlikely best-case scenario. But even then we must consider dangers and trade-oﬀs that may emerge in the course of extraordinary climate emergency action. First, as noted by some critics, would be the risks of non-inclusive policy processes, unchecked executive power, and repression of dissent that would accompany a climate emergency programme (Delina & Diesendorf, 2013; Kester & Sovacool, 2017). For instance, there is already intense local resistance GLOBALIZATIONS 543 to solar and wind development across the US and Europe – much of it the product of NIMBYism, some of it fuelled by disinformation, but also often reﬂecting legitimate concerns about negative social and ecological impacts (Groom, 2022; Shankleman & Paulsson, 2020). In a context of accel- erated renewable energy deployment in a climate emergency programme, would such resistance simply need to be crushed in the interests of speed, or must it be accommodated in the interests of procedural justice while slowing the pace of transition? Incentivizing community ownership of renewable energy systems, innovation in rooftop and water-based solar (‘ﬂoatovoltaics’), and intelligent land-use and siting practices can soften these trade-oﬀs (Goodstein & Lovins, 2019), but they would likely be unavoidable to some extent. An even bigger issue would be sustaining a multi-decadal climate emergency programme in a context of polarized democratic constituencies and gridlocked legislatures (particularly, but not solely, in the US). Even if such programmes are (at least initially) backed by solid majorities, they will undoubtedly face intense resistance from incumbent elites, rightwing parties, far-right movements, and in certain national contexts the court system. If a climate emergency regime intends to push through and sustain its radical platform in the face of such resistance, will existing democratic institutions and norms need to be weakened or suspended? Might there even be pressure to erode electoral democracy if oppositional regimes bent on overturning climate emer- gency protocols risk coming to power? In an extraordinary political context of ‘high levels of col- lective mobilization; extensive popular support for some fundamental changes … [and] extraconstitutional forms of participation that strive to narrow the distance between rulers and ruled’ (Kalyvas, 2008, pp. 6–7), new and more radically democratic institutions may emerge even if older ones wither away. But the time-sensitive pressures of climate emergency action in a context of gridlocked political systems may push democratically elected regimes to erode checks and balances and consolidate executive authority (like we’ve seen, for instance, with the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela) in order to push through controversial mitigation measures like carbon rationing, land-use transformations, bans on carbon-intensive products and services, and ‘super- taxes’ on the rich (Albert, 2022; Foster, 2022; Delina, 2016, pp. 121–138; Kester & Sovacool, 2017). A trade-oﬀ between rapid emergency mitigation and the stability of institutionalized plur- alist democracy may in this sense be unavoidable, though it could be softened by post-consumerist cultural change or near-term technological breakthroughs that minimize disruption to current rich-world lifestyles. Furthermore, there is the question of whether and how climate emergency action in the global north could also pursue the ends of global climate justice, since even best-case emergency mobil- ization scenarios in these countries may be accompanied by a rapid increase in green sacriﬁce zones (GSZs) across the global south, insuﬃcient climate ﬁnance, and political-economic destabilization in southern fossil fuel producers. There at least two challenging questions here that climate emer- gency movements in the global north must think through: (1) how to prevent or limit the extension of GSZs, and (2) how to couple a global programme of ‘climate reparations’ to domestic climate emergency action. On the ﬁrst, we know that a signiﬁcant expansion of mining for transition metals will be necessary (IEA, 2021), though this can be limited through strategies like energy demand reduction, extended producer responsibility, massive investments in recycling infrastructure, prior- itizing public transportation over private cars, and urban mining (Aronoﬀ et al., 2019; War on Want, 2019; Zografos & Robbins, 2020). A broader context of rising energy prices and energy inse- curity would make such strategies more feasible. But some further extractivism is unavoidable, which will require global governance initiatives to ensure supply-chain transparency, labour pro- tections, free and prior informed consent among communities aﬀected by mining, and fair trade 544 M. ALBERT practices to prevent imperialist rent extraction (Aronoﬀ et al., 2019; Sovacool et al., 2021). In prac- tice, however, it would be challenging to enforce such policies, and the imperatives of emergency mitigation will pressure northern states to accept transition metals at whatever cost. Again, this may constitute a tragic dilemma, one that can be softened but will be diﬃcult to resolve without causing further injustice. On the issue of climate reparations – which would include debt cancellation and ramped up ﬁnance for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage for the global south (likely needed in the trillions of dollars annually by 2030, far beyond the paltry sums currently being oﬀered mostly in the form of loans) (Taiwo & Bigger, 2022) – it will be diﬃcult to sustain political-economic coalitions in rich countries that support accelerated domestic action alongside expensive commit- ments to global reparations, particularly in conditions of worsening economic insecurity caused by climate and energy shocks. As a result, some analysts perceive an inherent trade-oﬀ between the goals of eﬀective mitigation and distributive global climate justice (Lieven, 2021; Symons, 2019). However, this trade-oﬀ may be attenuated if such programmes are successfully framed as matters of the ‘national interest’ and security (rather than just morality). This undoubtedly entails risks – e.g. that geopolitically strategic states and regions will receive largesse while others are sacriﬁced. The challenge for climate emergency movements will be to persuade democratic majorities that cli- mate reparations are both ethically imperative as well as essential to the goals of climate stabiliz- ation and national security, rather than being mere ‘ideological luxuries’ (Lieven, 2021), but it remains to be seen whether and how such programmes might become adequately just, expansive, and sustainable. Conclusion This paper has engaged the debate on climate emergency strategies in order to illuminate their promise as well as their potential risks and pitfalls. It has argued that the climate emergency may pose a tragic predicament – one with no ideal solution, and which will necessarily entail trade-oﬀs – though it is nonetheless possible to conceptualize and enact climate emergency mobil- izations that can advance climate justice objectives. It follows scholars who suggest that emergency declarations, like securitization speech acts more broadly, can disrupt and challenge prevailing sys- tems of rule rather than inevitably reinforcing existing forms of sovereign power (Anderson, 2017; Williams, 2015), though it acknowledges that such strategies carry risks and may backﬁre. But the truth is that both emergency as well as non-emergency frames contain risks: if the former risk failed securitizations or intensiﬁcations of sovereign power and unjust mitigation policies, the latter risk the continuation of incrementalist climate policies that have proven utterly inadequate to put the world on track to meet the 2°C target, let alone 1.5°C. Thus rather than rejecting emergency frames tout court, a better approach is to work with them critically and constructively, mindful of their tensions and risks as well as their openness and democratic potential. This requires further explora- tion of the ethical quandaries, trade-oﬀs, and risks that would accompany any real-world implementation of climate emergency programmes. In particular, deeper investigation is needed of where the goals of emergency action and climate justice can be synergistic, where they are in tension, how such tensions can be softened, and where (if at all) they might be in tragically irrecon- cilable opposition (e.g. Ciplett & Harrison, 2020). It is probable that not all climate justice objectives could be met in a context of climate emergency action, given the trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent values and competing justice claims in diﬀerent regions, at diﬀerent scales, and between present and future generations (Caney, 2016). But climate emergency mobilizations are nonetheless possible GLOBALIZATIONS 545 that could advance many (though perhaps not all) of these objectives, though the discussion above shows that they would be challenging to achieve in practice. 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