Summa Theologica - Law - Question 90 - PDF

SUMMA THEOLOGICA LAW said before. For it belongs to reason to order us to our end, which is the primary source regarding our...

SUMMA THEOLOGICA LAW ST I–II QUESTION 90 On the Essence of Law FIRST ARTICLE Does Law Belong to Reason? We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that law does not belong to reason, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The Apostle in Rom. 7:23 says: “I perceive another law in my bodily members,” etc. But nothing belonging to reason belongs to bodily members, since reason does not use bodily organs. Therefore, law does not belong to reason. Obj. 2. Only power, habits, and acts belong to rea- son. But law is not the very power of reason. Likewise, law is not a habit of reason, since habits of reason are intellectual virtues, about which I have spoken before. Nor is law an act of reason, since law would cease when the lawmaker ceased to reason (e.g., when he is sleep- ing). Therefore, law does not belong to reason. Obj. 3. Law induces those subject to the law to act rightly. But inducing to act rightly belongs in the strict sense to the will, as is evident from what I have said before. Therefore, law belongs to the will rather than to reason, as the Jurist also says: “The pleasure of the ruler has the force of law.” On the contrary, it belongs to law to command and forbid. But to command belongs to reason, as I have maintained before. Therefore, law belongs to reason. I answer that law is a rule and measure of acts that induces persons to act or refrain from acting. For law [Lat.: lex] is derived from binding [Lat.: ligare] because law obliges persons to act. And the rule and measure of human acts is reason, which is the primary source of human acts, as is evident from what I have 464 commands means because one wills ends. But an act of reason needs to rule the will regarding the means commanded in order that the willing have the nature of law. And we in this way understand that the will of a ruler has the force of law. Otherwise, the will- ing of the ruler would be injustice rather than law. SECOND ARTICLE Is Law Always Ordained for the Common Good? We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that law is not ordained for the common good as its end, for the following reasons: Objection 1. It belongs to law to command and forbid. But precepts are ordained for particular goods. Therefore, the end of law is not always the com- mon good. Obj. 2. Law directs the actions of human beings. But human acts regard particulars. Therefore, law is likewise ordained for particular goods. Obj. 3. Isidore says in his Etymologies: “If law is based on reason, everything founded on reason will be law.” But both things ordained for the common good and things ordained for private good are based on reason. Therefore, law is ordained both for the common good and for the private good of individuals. On the contrary, Isidore says in his Etymologies that laws are “enacted for no private convenience but for the common benefit of citizens.” I answer that as I have said, law belongs to the source of human acts, since law is their rule and measure. And as reason is the source of human acts, so also is there in reason itself something source of all other kinds of acts. And so law needs chiefly and especially to belong to this source. And the first source in practical matters, with which practical reason is concerned, is the ultimate end. But the ultimate end of human life is happiness or blessedness, as I have maintained before. And so law especially needs to regard the ordination to bless- edness. Moreover, law in the strict sense needs to concern ordination to happiness in general, since every part is related to a whole as something imperfect to some- thing perfect. And so also the Philosopher, regarding the cited definition of laws, speaks of both happiness Summa Theologica, Law, Question 90 Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says in the Ethics, “law- makers aim to induce human beings to virtue.” But any human being can lead others to virtue. Therefore, the reason of any human being is competent to make law. Obj. 3. As the ruler of a political community erns that community, so the head of a household governs his household. But the ruler of a political community can make laws regarding the political community. Therefore, any head of a household can make laws regarding his household. On the contrary, Isidore says in his Etymologies, and the Decretum maintains: “Laws are ordinances of the people whereby elders and commoners together prescribe things.” Therefore, not every person’s reason is competent to make law. I answer that law in the strict sense primarily and chiefly regards ordaining things for the common good. But ordaining things for the common good belongs either to the whole people or to persons acting in the name of the whole people. And so lawmaking belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has the care of the whole people. For also in all other matters, ordaining things for ends belongs to those to whom the ends belong. Reply Obj. 1. As I have said before law belongs both to those who rule, and by participation to those who are ruled. And it is in the latter way that everyone makes law for oneself, as one participates in the ordi- nations of the ruler. And so also the Apostle adds in v. 15: “And they manifest the law’s operation written in their hearts.” Reply Obj. 2. Private persons cannot effectively induce others to virtue. For private persons can only offer advice and have no coercive power if their advice should not be accepted. And law should have coercive power in order to induce others effectively to virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics. But the people or a public personage has such coercive power and the right to inflict punishment, as I shall explain later. And so it belongs only to the people or a public personage to make law. Reply Obj. 3. As human beings are parts of a household, so households are parts of a political com- munity, as the Politics says. And so, as the good of a human being is not the ultimate end of that individual but is ordained for the common good, so also the 466 it known to them, or it can become known to them after it has been promulgated. Reply Obj. 3. The present promulgation of a law reaches into the future through the durability of writ- ten words, which in a way are always promulgating it. And so Isidore says in his Etymologies that “we derive law [Lat.: lex] from reading [Lat.: legere], since law is written.” QUESTION 91 On Different Kinds of Law FIRST ARTICLE Is There an Eternal Law? We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that there is no eternal law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. Every law is imposed on particular persons. But there was no one from eternity on whom law could be imposed, since only God was from eternity. Therefore, no law is eternal. Obj. 2. Promulgation is an essential component of law. But there could be no promulgation from eternity, since there was no one from eternity to whom a law would be be promulgated. Therefore, no law can be eternal. Obj. 3. Law signifies the direction to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal, since only the ultimate end is eternal. Therefore, no law is eternal. On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “No one with intelligence can perceive the law called supreme reason not to be immutable and eternal.” I answer that as I have said before, law is simply a dictate of practical reason by a ruler who governs a perfect community. But supposing that God’s provi- dence rules the world, as I maintained in the First Part, his reason evidently governs the entire commu- nity of the universe. And so the plan of governance of the world existing in God as the ruler of the universe has the nature of law. And since God’s reason con- ceives eternally, as Prov. 8:23 says, not temporally, we need to say that such law is eternal. Reply Obj. 1. Things that do not exist in them- selves exist with God insofar as he foreknows and foreordains them, as Rom. 4:17 says: “And he calls Summa Theologica, Law, Question 91 things prescribed by the law,” etc., says: “Although they do not have the written law, they have a natural law, whereby each of them understands and is con- scious of good and evil.” I answer that as I have said before, law, a rule or measure, can belong to things in two ways: in one way to those who rule and measure; in a second way to those ruled and measured, since are ruled or measured insofar as they partake of the rule or measure. But the eternal law rules and mea- sures everything subject to God’s providence, as is evident from what I have said before. And so every- thing evidently shares in some way in the eternal law, namely, insofar as all things have inclinations to their own acts and ends from its imprint on them. But the rational creature is subject to God’s providence in a more excellent way than other things, since such a creature also shares in God’s providence in providing for itself and others. And so it shares in the eternal plan whereby it has its natural inclination to its requisite activity and end. And we call such participation in the eternal law by rational creatures the natural law. And so Ps. 4:6, after saying, “Offer just sacrifices,” asks: “Who shows us just things?” and replies: “The light of your countenance, O Lord, has been inscribed on us.” The Psalmist thus signifies that the light of natural reason whereby we discern good and evil is simply the imprint of God’s light in us. And so it is clear that the natural law is simply rational creatures’ participation in the eternal law. Reply Obj. 1. The argument of this objection would be valid if the natural law were to be something different from the eternal law. But the natural law shares in the eternal law, as I have said. Reply Obj. 2. Every activity of reason and the will in us is derived from what exists by nature, as I have maintained before, since every process of reasoning is derived from first principles known by nature, and every desire of means is derived from the natural desire of our ultimate end. And so also the natural law needs first to direct our acts to their end. Reply Obj. 3. Even irrational animals, like ratio- nal creatures, share in the eternal law in their own way. But because rational creatures share in the eternal law by using their intellect and reason, we call their participation in the eternal law law in the strict sense, since law belongs to reason, as I 468 rational benefit. Then fear and reverence for law validated things that both sprang from nature and were approved by custom.” Reply Obj. 1. Human reason cannot partake of the complete dictates of God’s reason but partakes of them in its own way and incompletely. And so regard- ing theoretical reason, we by our natural participation in God’s wisdom know general principles but do not specifically know every truth, as God’s wisdom does. Just so regarding practical reason, human beings by nature partake of the eternal law as to general princi- ples but not as to particular specifications of particular matters, although such specifications belong to the eternal law. And so human reason needs to proceed further to determine the particular prescriptions of human law. Reply Obj. 2. Human reason as such is not the rule of things, but the first principles implanted by nature in human reason are the general rules or mea- sures of everything related to human conduct. And natural reason is the rule and measure of such things, although not of things from nature. Reply Obj. 3. Practical reason regards practical matters, which are particular and contingent, and does not regard necessary things, as theoretical reason does. And so human laws cannot have the absolute certainty of demonstrated scientific conclusions. Nor need every measure be unerring and certain in every respect. Rather, every measure needs to be such only to the extent possible in its kind of thing. FOURTH ARTICLE Did Human Beings Need a Divine Law? We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that human beings did not need any divine law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The natural law is our participation in the eternal law, as I have said. But eternal law is divine law, as I have said. Therefore, we do not need another divine law besides the natural law and the human laws derived from natural law. Obj. 2. Sir. 15:14 says that “God left human beings in the hands of their own deliberation.” But delibera- tion is an act of reason, as I have maintained before. Therefore, God left human beings to the governance of their own reason. But the dictates of human reason Summa Theologica, Law, Question 94 and not benefit the common good necessary for hu- man companionship. Therefore, in order that no evil remain unforbidden or unpunished, there needed to be a divine law forbidding all sins. And Ps. 19:7 touches on these four reasons when it says: “The law of the Lord is pure,” that is, permit- ting no sinful wickedness; “converting souls,” since it directs both external and internal acts; “the Lord’s faithful witness” because of its certain truth and recti- tude; “offering wisdom to the little ones,” since it ordains human beings for a supernatural and di- vine end. Reply Obj. 1. The natural law partakes of the eter- nal law in proportion to the capacity of human nature. But human beings need to be directed in a higher way to their ultimate supernatural end. And so God gives an additional law that partakes of the eternal law in a higher way. Reply Obj. 2. Deliberation is an inquiry, and so deliberation needs to advance from some principles. And it does not suffice that it advance from first princi- ples implanted by nature, that is, precepts of the natural law, for the aforementioned reasons. Rather, other principles, namely, precepts of divine law, need to be supplied. Reply Obj. 3. Irrational creatures are not ordained for higher ends than those proportioned to their natu- ral powers. And so the argument of the objection is inapplicable. QUESTION 94 On the Natural Law FIRST ARTICLE Is the Natural Law a Habit? We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that the natural law is a habit, for the following reasons: Objection 1. “Three things belong to the soul: pow- ers, habits, and emotions,” as the Philosopher says in the Ethics. But the natural law is neither a power of the soul nor an emotion. Therefore, the natural law is a habit. Obj. 2. Basil says that conscience, that is, syndere- sis, is “the law of our intellect,” and we can only understand such regarding the natural law. But synde- 470 Reply Obj. 3. The argument of this objection reaches the conclusion that we possess the natural law in a habitual way, and we concede this. Qualification to the argument in the section On the contrary. Sometimes, due to an impediment, one cannot make use of what one possesses habitu- ally. For example, human beings cannot make use of habitual knowledge when they are asleep. And likewise, children cannot make use of habitual understanding of first principles, or even of the natural law, which they possess habitually, due to their immature age. SECOND ARTICLE Does the Natural Law Include Several Precepts or Only One? We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that that the natural law includes only one precept, not several, for the following reasons: Objection 1. Law belongs to the genus of precept, as I have maintained before. Therefore, if there were to be many precepts of the natural law, it would follow logically that there would also be many natural laws. Obj. 2. The natural law results from the nature of human beings. But human nature as a whole is one, although multiple regarding its parts. There- fore, either there is only one precept of the natural law because of the unity of the whole, or there are many precepts because of the many parts of human nature. And so even things that regard inclinations of concupiscible power will need to belong to the natural law. Obj. 3. Law belongs to reason, as I have said before. But there is only one power of reason in human beings. Therefore, there is only one precept of the natural law. On the contrary, the precepts of the natural law in human beings are related to action as the first principles in scientific matters are related to theoretical knowledge. But there are several inde- monstrable first principles of theoretical knowledge. Therefore, there are also several precepts of the natural law. I answer that as I have said before, the precepts of the natural law are related to practical reason as the Summa Theologica, Law, Question 94 namely, that all the things that practical reason by nature understands to be human goods or evils belong to precepts of the natural law as things to be done or shunned. And since good has the nature of end, and evil the nature of the contrary, reason by nature understands to be good all the things for which human beings have a natural inclination, and so to be things to be actively sought, and understands contrary things as evil and to be shunned. Therefore, the ordination of our natural inclinations ordains the precepts of the natural law. First, for example, human beings have an inclina- tion for good by the nature they share with all sub- stances, namely, as every substance by nature seeks to preserve itself. And regarding this inclination, means that preserve our human life and prevent the contrary belong to the natural law. Second, human beings have more particular incli- nations by the nature they share with other animals. And so the Digest says that things “that nature has taught all animals,” such as the sexual union of male and female, and the upbringing of children, and the like, belong to the natural law. Third, human beings have inclinations for good by their rational nature, which is proper to them. For example, human beings by nature have inclinations to know truths about God and to live in society with other human beings. And so things that relate to such inclinations belong to the natural law (e.g., that human beings shun ignorance, that they not offend those with whom they ought to live sociably, and other such things regarding those inclinations). Reply Obj. 1. All the precepts of the natural law, insofar as they relate to one first precept, have the nature of one natural law. Reply Obj. 2. All the inclinations of any part of human nature (e.g., the concupiscible and irascible powers), insofar as reason rules them, belong to the natural law and are traced to one first precept, as I have said. And so there are many precepts of the natural law as such, but they share a common foun- dation. Reply Obj. 3. Reason, although as such one power, ordains everything that concerns human beings. And so the law of reason includes everything that reason can rule. 472 human beings by the inquiry of reason have discov- ered to be useful for living righteously. Reply Obj. 1. Moderation concerns the natural desires for food and drink and sex, which desires are indeed ordained for the natural common good, just as other prescriptions of the natural law are ordained for the common moral good. Reply Obj. 2. We can call the nature proper to human beings the nature of human beings. And so all sins, insofar as they are contrary to reason, are also contrary to nature, as Damascene makes clear in his work On Orthodox Faith. Or else we can call the nature common to human beings and other animals the nature of human beings. And so we speak of certain particular sins being contrary to nature. For example, the sexual intercourse of males, which we specifically call the sin contrary to nature, is contrary to the sexual union of male and female, and such sexual union is natural for all animals. Reply Obj. 3. The argument of this objection is valid regarding virtuous acts as such and such. For then, because of the different conditions of human beings, some acts may be virtuous for some persons, as proportionate and suitable for them, which are nonetheless wicked for other persons, as dispropor- tionate for them. FOURTH ARTICLE Is the Natural Law the Same for All Human Beings? We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that the natural law is not the same for all human beings, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The Decretum says that “the natural law is contained in the [Old] Law and the Gospel.” But what is contained in the Law and the Gospel is not in the common possession of all, since Rom. 10:16 says: “Some do not heed the Gospel.” Therefore, the natural law is not the same for all human beings. Obj. 2. “We call things in accord with law just,” as the Ethics says. But the same work says that nothing is so universally just that it is not otherwise for some. Therefore, even the natural law is not the same for all human beings. Obj. 3. Things to which human beings’ nature inclines them belong to the natural law, as I have said Summa Theologica, Law, Question 94 act in accord with reason. And it follows as a particular conclusion from this principle that those holding goods in trust should return the goods to the goods’ owners. And this is indeed true for the most part, but it might in particular cases be injurious, and so contrary to reason, to return the goods (e.g., if the owner should be seeking to attack one’s country). And the more the particular conclusion goes into particulars, the more exceptions there are (e.g., if one should declare that entrusted goods should be returned to their owners with such and such safeguards or in such and such ways). For the more particular conditions are added to the particular conclusion, the more ways there may be exceptions, so that the conclusion about returning or not returning entrusted goods is erroneous. Therefore, we should say that the natural law re- garding general first principles is the same for all persons both as to their rectitude and as to knowledge of them. And the natural law regarding particulars, which are, as it were, conclusions from the general principles, is for the most part the same for all persons both as to its rectitude and as to knowledge of it. Nonetheless, it can be wanting in rather few cases both as to its rectitude and as to knowledge of it. As to rectitude, the natural law can be wanting because of particular obstacles, just as natures that come to be and pass away are wanting in rather few cases because of obstacles. And also as to knowledge of the natural law, the law can be wanting because emotions or evil habituation or evil natural disposition has per- verted the reason of some. For example, the Germans of old did not consider robbery wicked, as Caesar’s Gallic Wars relates, although robbery is expressly con- trary to the natural law. Reply Obj. 1. We should not understand the cited statement to mean that all the matters included in the Law and the Gospel belong to the natural law, since the Law and the Gospel transmit to us many things above nature. Rather, we should understand the statement to mean that the Law and the Gospel completely transmit to us the things that belong to the natural law. And so Gratian, after saying that “the natural law is contained in the Law and the Gospel,” immediately adds by way of example: “And everyone is thereby commanded to do unto others what one wishes to be done to oneself.” 474 We can understand the mutability of the natural law in a second way by way of substraction, namely, that things previously subject to the law cease to be so. And then the natural law is altogether immutable as to its first principles. And as to its secondary pre- cepts, which we said are proper proximate conclu- sions, as it were, from the first principles, the natural law is not so changed that what it prescribes is not for the most part completely correct. But it can be changed regarding particulars and in rather few cases, due to special causes that prevent observance precepts, as I have said before. Reply Obj. 1. We say that written law has been given to correct the natural law either because the written law supplements what the natural law or because the natural law in the hearts of some regarding particulars had been corrupted insofar as they thought that things by nature evil were good. And such corruption needed correction. Reply Obj. 2. All human beings, without excep- tion, both the innocent and the guilty, die when natural death comes. And God’s power indeed inflicts such natural death on human beings because of origi- nal sin, as 1 Sam. 2:6 says: “The Lord causes death and life.” And so, at the command of God, death can without any injustice be inflicted on any human being, whether guilty or innocent. Likewise, adultery is sexual intercourse with an- other man’s wife, whom the law handed down by God has allotted to him. And so there is no adultery or fornication in having intercourse with any woman at the command of God. And the argument is the same regarding theft, which consists of taking another’s property. One does not take without the consent of the owner (i.e., steal) anything that one takes at the command of God, who is the owner of all property. Nor is it only regarding human affairs that every- thing God commands is owed to him. Rather, regard- ing things of nature, everything God does is also in one respect natural, as I said in the First Part. Reply Obj. 3. We speak of things belonging to the natural law in two ways. We speak of them belonging in one way because nature inclines us to them. For example, one should not cause injury to another. We speak of them belonging in a second way because nature did not introduce the contrary. For example, Summa Theologica, Law, Question 95 emotions prevent reason from applying the general principles to particular actions, as I have said before. And the natural law can be excised from the hearts of human be ings regarding the other, secondary precepts, either because of wicked opin ions, just as errors in theoretical matters happen regard ing nec- essary conclusions, or because of evil customs or cor- rupt habits. For example, some did not think robbery a sin, or even sins against nature to be sinful, as the Apostle also says in Rom. 1:24–28. Reply Obj. 1. Sin wipes out the natural law regard- ing particulars but not in general, except perhaps re- garding secondary precepts of the natural la w, in the way I mentioned. Reply Obj. 2. Although grace is more efﬁ cacious than nature, nature is nonetheless more essential to human beings and so more abiding. Reply Obj. 3. The argument of this objection is valid regarding the secondary precepts of the natural law, contrary to which some la wmakers have passed wicked statutes. Question 95 On Human Law First Article Was It Beneficial That Human Beings Establish Laws? We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that it was not beneﬁ cial that human beings establish laws, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The purpose of every la w is to make human beings good, as I have said before. But admo- nitions induce human beings willingly to live rightly more than laws do coercively. Therefore, there was no need to establish laws. Obj. 2. The Philosopher says in theEthics: “Human beings have recourse to judges as justice-in-the-ﬂesh.” But justice-in-the-ﬂesh is better than the inan imate justice contained in laws. Therefore, it would have been better to commit the execution of justice to the decisions of judges than to est ablish laws to supple- ment their decisions. Obj. 3. Every law directs human actions, as is evi- dent from what I have said before. But since human 476 as the Philosopher says in the Politics: “As human be- ings, if perfect in virtue, are the best of animals, so are they, if cut off from la w and justice, the worst of all animals.” This is because human beings, unlike other animals, have the tools of reason to satisfy their disor- dered desires and beastly rages. Reply Obj. 1. Voluntary admonitions induce well disposed human beings to virtue better than compul- sion does, but there are some who are not induced to virtue unless they be compelled. Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher says in the Rheto- ric: “It is better that law direct all things than that they be left to the dec isions of judges.” And this is so for three reasons. First, indeed, it is easier to ﬁnd the few wise persons sufﬁcient to establish right laws than the many wise persons necessary to judge rightly about particular matters. Second, lawmakers consider over a long time what to impose by la w, but judges reach decisions about particular deeds as cases spont ane- ously arise. And human be ings can more easily per- ceive what is right by considering many inst ances than they can by considering only one deed. Third, lawmakers decide in general and about future events, but presiding judges decide current cases, and love or hatred or covetousness affects such decisions. And so their decisions are perverted. Therefore, since few embody the justice req uired of a judge, and since that justice can be perverted, it was necessary that law determine, whenever possible, what judges should dec ide, and comm it very few matters to the decisions of human beings. Reply Obj. 3. “We need to commit to judges” cer- tain particular details, which laws cannot encompass, as the Philosopher also says in the Rhetoric, such as, “whether alleged deeds have or have not been done,” and the like. Second Article Is Every Human Law Derived from the Natural Law? We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that not every human law is derived from the natural law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that “it does not at all matter originally whether one effects legal justice in this or that way.” But regarding Summa Theologica, Law, Question 95 shape of a house. Therefore, some things are derived from general principles of the natural law as conclu- sions. For example, one can derive the prohibition against homicide from the general principle that one should do no evil to anyone. And some things are derived from general principles of the natural law as speciﬁcations. For example, the natural la w ordains that criminals should be punished, but that criminals be punished in this or that way is a spec iﬁcation of the natural law. Therefore, human laws are derived from the natu- ral law in both ways. Things derived from the natural law in the ﬁrst way are not only contained in human laws as est ablished by those laws, but they also have part of their binding force from the natural la w. But things derived from the natural law in the second way have all of their binding force from human law. Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking about the things laws decreed by determining or specifying one of the precepts of the natural law. Reply Obj. 2. The argument of this objection is valid regarding things derived from the natural law as conclusions. Reply Obj. 3. The general principles of the natu- ral law cannot be applied to all peoples in the same way because of the great variety of human affairs. And so there are d ifferent positive laws for different peoples. Reply Obj. 4. We should underst and the J urist’s statement to regard things decreed by rulers about particular speciﬁcations of the natural la w. And the judgments of experienced and prudent persons are indeed related to such speciﬁcations as certain prin- ciples underlying their judgments, namely, inasmuch as they immediately perceive what is the most ﬁ tting particular speciﬁcation. And so the Philosopher says in the Ethics that “we should” in such matters “at- tend to the intuitive st atements and opinions of the experienced and the mature or prudent no less than to their arguments.” Third Article Does Isidore Appropriately Describe the Characteristics of Positive Law? We thus proceed to the third inquiry. Isidore says: “Laws should be virtuous, just, possible by nature, in 478 related to the natural law), that human human law be useful for the commonweal (i.e., as human la w is properly related to human usefulness). And all the other conditions that he later mentions are traceable to these three things. F or what he calls virtuous is a reference to what beﬁts religion. And by adding that human laws be “just, possible by nature, in accord with a country’ s customs, suit able to the place and time,” he indicates that the laws should be suitable for train ing. For we indeed ﬁ rst consider human training in relation to the ord ination of rea- son, which ordination is implied in what he calls just. Second, we consider human train ing in relation to the capacity of human agents. F or training ought to be suitable to each according to the capacity of each, including natural capacity. (For example, one should not impose the same train ing on children that one imposes on adults.) And training ought to be suitable according to human customs, since human beings do not live in soc iety by themselves, not man ifesting their behavior to others. Third, in relation to requisite circumstances, he says: “suit able to the place and time.” And the add itional words, “necessary,” “use- ful,” and so forth, refer to what fac ilitates the com- monweal. For example, necessity refers to removing evils, usefulness to acq uiring beneﬁts, and clariﬁ - cation to preventing harm that could arise from the laws themselves. And he indicates that human laws are ordained for the common good, as I have previously afﬁ rmed, in the last part of the deﬁnition. Reply Objs. 1–4. The answer makes clear the re- plies to the objections. Fourth Article Does Isidore Appropriately Designate Kinds of Human Law? We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that Isidore does not appropriately designate kinds of human law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. Isidore includes in human la w “the common law of peoples,” which he so names, as he says, because “almost every people possesses it.” But “natural law is common to all peoples, ” as he him- self says. Therefore, the common la w of peoples is Summa Theologica, Law, Question 96 one another). And living sociably with others belongs to the natural law, since human beings are by nature social animals, as the Politics proves. But precepts derived from the natural la w by way of particular speciﬁcations belong to the la ws of particular com- monwealths, whereby each commonwealth speciﬁes things suitable for itself. Second, it belongs to the nature of human la ws that they be ordained for the common good of a po- litical community. And we can in this respect d istin- guish human laws by the d ifferent kinds of persons who perform particular t asks for the common good (e.g., priests, who pray to God for the people; rulers, who govern the people; sold iers, who ﬁ ght for the safety of the people). And so special laws are adapted for such persons. Third, it belongs to the nature of human laws that they be established by those who govern the community, as I have said before. And we in spect distinguish human laws by the d ifferent forms of governing political communities. And as the Phi- losopher says in the Politics, one of these forms is monarchy (i.e., rule by one person). And we under- stand the laws of monarchical regimes as royal de- crees. And aristocracy (i.e., rule by the aristocrats) is another form of government. And we understand the laws of aristocratic regimes as the au- thoritative legal opinions of the wise, and also as the decrees of the senate. And oligarchy (i.e., rule by a few rich and po werful persons) is another form of government. And we underst and the laws of oligar- chical regimes as magisterial la w, also called la w by dignitaries. And another form of government is by the people, which form we call democracy. And we un- derstand the laws of democratic regimes as la ws by the people. (Tyranny is another form of government, an altogether corrupt form, and so we do not under- stand the la ws of tyrann ical regimes as any la w.) There is also a form of government that is a m ixture of the good forms, and this m ixed form of govern- ment is the best. And we understand the laws of such regimes as law “prescribed by elders and the people,” as Isidore says. Fourth, it belongs to the nature of human la ws that they direct human actions. And we in this re- spect distinguish laws, which we sometimes desig- 480 On the contrary, the Jurist says: “Laws need to be framed to suit things that more freq uently happen, and laws are not framed to suit things that can hap- pen once in a while.” I answer that everything for an end needs to be pro- portioned to the end. But the end of la w is the com- mon good, since “laws should be framed for the com- mon beneﬁt of citizens, not for any private beneﬁ t,” as Isidore says in his Etymologies. And so need to be proportioned to the common good. But the common good consists of many things. And need to regard many things, both persons, times. For the political community consists of many persons, and its good is procured by many actions. Nor is it instituted to endure only for a short time but to last for all time through successive generations of citizens, as Augustine says in The City of God. Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher in the Ethics posits three parts of legal justice (i.e., positive la w). For there are certain prescriptions framed only in general terms, and these are general laws. And regarding such laws, he says that “legal justice indeed does not origi- nally differentiate in particulars but does once est ab- lished.” For example, captives are ransomed at a ﬁxed price. And there are some laws that are general in one respect and particular in another. And we call such laws privileges, that is, private laws, since they regard particular persons, and yet the po wer of these la ws extends to many matters. And it is regard ing these that the Philosopher adds: “And, further, everything laws decree in particular cases.” And we call some things legal because general laws are applied to particular cases, not because the applications are laws. For example, judges hand down decisions that we consider legally bind ing. And it is regarding such that the Philosopher adds: “And judi- cial decisions.” Reply Obj. 2. Something directive needs to direct several things, and so the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics that all the things belonging to a gen us are measured by the one of them that primarily be- longs to the gen us. For if there were to be as many rules or measures as things measured or ruled, a rule or measure, which is that one thing enable many things to be kno wn, would cease to be of any use. And so a la w would have no usefulness if it were to cover only a single action. For wise persons give indi- Summa Theologica, Law, Question 96 virtuous habits do not have the same po wer to act. Just so, children and adults do not have the same power to act, and so the la w is not the same dren and adults. For example, many things are per- mitted children that the la w punishes in adults, or even that public opin ion censures. And likewise, many things are tolerated in persons of imperfect vir- tue that would not be tolerated in virtuous persons. And human law is est ablished for the collectivity of human beings, most of whom have imperfect virtue. And so human la w does not prohibit every kind of vice, from which the virtuous abstain. Rather, human law prohibits only the more serious kinds of vice, from which most persons can abstain, and especially those vices that inﬂ ict harm on others, without the prohibition of which human soc iety could not be preserved. For example, human laws prohibit mur- ders, thefts, and the like. Reply Obj. 1. Audacity seems to belong to att acks on others. And so audacity belongs chieﬂy to the sins that inﬂict injury on neighbors, and human law pro- hibits such sins, as I have said. Reply Obj. 2. Human laws aim to induce human beings to virtue little by little, not all at once. And so the laws do not immediately impose on the many im- perfect citizens what already belongs to virtuous citi- zens, namely, that c itizens abstain from everything evil. Otherwise, the imperfect c itizens, unable to endure those commands, would erupt into worse evil things. Just so, Prov. 30:33 says: “Those who blo w their nose too strongly , emit blood.” And Mt. 9:17 says: “If one should put new wine, ” that is, the pre- cepts of a perfect life, “into old wineskins, ” that is, imperfect human beings, “the wineskins burst, and the wine is spilled,” that is, the precepts are despised, and human beings burst into worse evil things out of contempt. Reply Obj. 3. The natural law is our participation in the eternal la w, but human la w falls short of the eternal law. For Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “The laws framed for the governance of political communities permit and leave unpunished many things that God’ s providence pun ishes. Nor, indeed, should we critic ize what the la ws do do be- cause of the fact that they do not do everything.” And so also human la ws cannot prohibit everything that the natural law prohibits. 482 Reply Obj. 2. We call actions virtuous in two ways. We call them virtuous in one way because persons perform virtuous deeds. F or example, just actions consist of doing just things, brave actions consist of doing brave things. And human laws command virtu- ous acts in this way. We call actions virtuous in a sec- ond way because persons per said before. For it belongs to reason to order us to our end, which is the primary source regarding our prospective action, as the Philosopher says. And the source in any kind of thing is the measure and rule of that kind of thing (e.g., units in numbers and first movements in movements). And so we conclude that law belongs to reason. Reply Obj. 1. We say that law, since it is a rule or measure, belongs to something in two ways. It belongs in one way as to what measures and rules. And law in this way belongs only to reason, since measuring and ruling belong to reason. Law belongs to some- thing in a second way as to what is ruled and mea- sured. And then law applies to everything that a law induces to something, so that we can call every incli- nation resulting from a law, law by participation, as it were, not essentially. And we in this way call the very inclination of bodily members to concupiscence the law of the bodily members. Reply Obj. 2. Regarding external acts, we can con- sider the activity and the product of the activity (e.g., building and the building constructed). Just so, re- garding acts of reason, we can consider the very acts of reason (i.e., acts of understanding and reasoning) and the things produced by such acts. And regarding theoretical reason, definitions are indeed the first product. Propositions are the second product. And syllogisms and arguments the third product. And prac- tical reason also uses a kind of syllogism regarding prospective actions, as I have maintained before, and as the Philosopher teaches in the Ethics. Therefore, there are things in practical reason that are related to actions as propositions in theoretical reason are related to conclusions. And such universal proposi- tions of practical reason related to actions have the nature of law. And reason indeed sometimes actually contemplates and sometimes only habitually retains these propositions. Reply Obj. 3. Reason has from the will the power to induce activity, as I have said before, since reason 463 AQUINAS and political community. For he says in the Ethics that “we call those laws just that constitute and pre- serve happiness and its particulars by citizens’ sharing in a political community.” For the political commu- nity is the perfect community, as he says in the Pol- itics. And regarding any kind of thing, the one most such is the source of the others, and we call the others such by their relation to that one. For example, fire, which is hottest, causes heat in composite material substances, which we call hot insofar as they share in fire. And so, since we speak of law in the first place because of its ordination to the common good, every other precept regarding particular acts has the nature of law only because of its ordination to the common good. And so every law is ordained for the com- mon good. Reply Obj. 1. Precepts signify the application of laws to things regulated by the laws. And the ordina- tion to the common good, which belongs to law, can be applied to particular ends. And so there can be precepts even regarding particular matters. Reply Obj. 2. Actions indeed concern particular matters, but such particulars can be related to the common good by sharing in the final cause, insofar as we call the common good the final cause, not by sharing in a genus or species. Reply Obj. 3. As theoretical reason firmly estab- lishes nothing except by tracing things back to first indemonstrable principles, so practical reason firmly establishes nothing except by ordering things to our ultimate end, that is, our common good. And what reason so establishes has the nature of law. that is the THIRD ARTICLE Is Any Person’s Reason Competent to Make Law? We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that any person’s reason is competent to make law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The Apostle says in Rom. 2:14 that “when the Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do the things the law prescribes, they make law for themselves.” But we say the same about everybody. Therefore, anyone can make law for oneself. 465 good of a household is ordained for the good of a political community, which is a perfect community. And so those who govern households can indeed make precepts and rules, but such precepts and rules do not have the nature of law in the strict sense. gov- FOURTH ARTICLE Is Promulgation an Essential Component of Law? We thus proceed to the fourth inquiry. It seems that promulgation is not an essential component of law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The natural law most has the nature of law. But the natural law does not need to be prom- ulgated. Therefore, promulgation is not an essential component of law. Obj. 2. Obligation to do or not to do things belongs in the strict sense to law. But both those to whom laws have been promulgated and those to whom laws have not, are obliged to obey laws. Therefore, promul- gation is not an essential component of law. Obj. 3. The obligation to obey laws also extends to the future, since “laws impose obligation regarding future affairs,” as the Code says. But laws are promul- gated to those present at their promulgation. There- fore, promulgation is not an essential component of law. On the contrary, the Decretum says that “laws are established when they are promulgated.” I answer that laws are imposed on others as rules and measures, as I have said. But rules and measures are imposed by being applied to those ruled and measured. And so laws, in order to oblige persons, as is proper to law, need to be applied to those who are to be ruled by the laws. But the promulgation leading them to knowledge achieves such application. And so promulgation is necessary for laws to be in force. And so we can compose the definition of law from the four characteristics I have mentioned: law is an ordination of reason for the common good by one who has the care of the community, and promulgated. Reply Obj. 1. The natural law is promulgated by God when he implants it in the minds of human beings so that they know it by nature. Reply Obj. 2. Those to whom a law is not promul- gated are obliged to observe it insofar as others make AQUINAS nonexisting things into existence.” Therefore, the eternal conception of God’s law has the nature of an eternal law insofar as he ordains that law for gover- nance of the world he foreknows. Reply Obj. 2. Word and inscription promulgate law. And God promulgates his eternal law in both ways, since the Word of God and the inscription of the predestined in the Book of Life are eternal. But as regards the creatures who hear or read God’s law, the promulgation cannot be eternal. Reply Obj. 3. Law signifies actively ordaining things for an end, namely, that law ordain things for an end. And law does not signify being ordained for an end, that is, that law itself be ordained for another end, except incidentally in the case of human rulers, whose end is extrinsic to themselves. And then the rulers’ laws also need to be ordained for that extrinsic end. But the end of God’s governance is God himself, and his law is indistinguishable from himself. And so the eternal law is not ordained for another end. SECOND ARTICLE Is There a Natural Law in Us? We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that there is no natural law in us, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The eternal law sufficiently governs human beings. For Augustine says in his work On Free Choice that “the eternal law is that whereby it is right that all things be most orderly.” But nature does not abound in superfluities, nor is it wanting in necessities. Therefore, there is no natural law for human beings. Obj. 2. Law ordains human beings to their end regarding their actions, as I have maintained before. But nature does not ordain human actions to their end, as happens in the case of irrational creatures, which act for their ends only by natural appetites. Rather, human beings act for their end by the use of their reason and will. Therefore, there is no natural law for human beings. Obj. 3. The freer one is, the less one is subject to law. But human beings are freer than all other animals because human beings, unlike other animals, have free choice. Therefore, since other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither are human beings. On the contrary, a gloss on Rom. 2:14, “When the Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature 467 have said before. And irrational creatures do not share in the eternal law by the use of reason. And so we can call the latter participation law only by analogy. since it is THIRD ARTICLE Are There Human Laws? things We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that there are no human laws, for the following reasons: Objection. 1. The natural law shares in the eternal law, as I have said. But the eternal law “renders all things most orderly,” as Augustine says in his work On Free Choice. Therefore, the natural law suffices for ordering all human affairs. Therefore, there is no need for human laws. Obj. 2. Law has the nature of a measure, as I have said. But human reason is not the measure of things. Rather, the converse is true, as the Metaphysics says. Therefore, human reason can produce no law. Obj. 3. A measure should be most certain, as the Metaphysics says. But dictates of human reason about things to be done are uncertain, as Wis. 9:14 says: “The thoughts of mortal human beings are fraught with fear, and our foresight uncertain.” Therefore, human reason cannot produce laws. On the contrary, Augustine in his work On Free Choice posits two kinds of law, one kind eternal, and the other temporal, which he calls human. I answer that law is a dictate of practical reason, as I have said before. But there are similar processes of practical and theoretical reason, since both proceed from principles to conclusions, as I have maintained before. Therefore, we should say that we advance in theoretical reason from indemonstrable first princi- ples, naturally known, to the conclusions of different sciences, conclusions not implanted in us by nature but discovered by exercising reason. Just so, human reason needs to advance from the precepts of the natural law, as general and indemonstrable first prin- ciples, to matters that are to be more particularly regulated. And we call such regulations devised by human reason human laws, provided that the other conditions belonging to the nature of law are ob- served, as I have said before. And so also Cicero says in his Rhetoric: “Human law originally sprang from nature. Then things became customs because of their AQUINAS are human laws, as I have said. Therefore, human beings do not need to be governed by another di- vine law. Obj. 3. Human nature is more self-sufficient than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no divine law besides the inclinations that nature im- plants in them. Therefore, much less should rational creatures have a divine law besides the natural law. On the contrary, David petitioned God to lay out the law before him, saying in Ps. 119:33: “Teach me the law, O Lord, in the way of your statutes.” I answer that in addition to the natural law and human laws, divine law was necessary to give direc- tion to human life. And there are four reasons for this. First, indeed, law directs our acts in relation to our ultimate end. And human beings, if they were indeed ordained only for an end that did not surpass the proportion of their natural ability, would not, regard- ing reason, need to have any direction superior to the natural law and human laws derived from the natural law. But because human beings are ordained for the end of eternal blessedness, which surpasses their proportional natural human capacity, as I have maintained before, God needed to lay down a law superior to the natural law and human laws to direct human beings to their end. Second, because of the uncertainty of human judg- ment, especially regarding contingent and particular matters, different persons may judge differently about various human actions, and so even different and contrary laws result. Therefore, in order that human beings can know beyond any doubt what they should do or should not do, a divinely revealed law, regarding which error is impossible, was needed to direct hu- man beings in their actions. Third, human beings can make laws regarding things they are able to judge. But human beings can judge only sensibly perceptible external acts, not hid- den internal movements. And yet human beings need to live righteously regarding both kinds of acts in order to attain complete virtue. And so human laws could not prohibit or adequately ordain internal acts, and divine law needed to supplement human laws. Fourth, human laws cannot punish or prohibit all evil deeds, as Augustine says in his work On Free Choice. This is because in seeking to eliminate all evils, one would thereby also take away many goods 469 resis is a habit, as I maintained in the First Part. Therefore, the natural law is a habit. Obj. 3. The natural law always abides in human beings, as I shall make clear later. But human beings’ reason, to which that law belongs, is not always think- ing about the natural law. Therefore, the natural law is a habit, not an act. On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On the Marital Good that “habits are the means whereby we do things when we need to.” But the natural law is not such, since that law belongs to infants and the damned, who cannot act by reason of its presence. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit. I answer that we can speak about habits in two ways. We speak of them in one way in the strict sense and essentially, and then the natural law is not a habit. For I have said before that the natural law is constituted by reason, just as propositions are works of reason. And what one does, and the means whereby one does it, are not the same. For example, one makes a fitting speech by means of the habit of grammar. Therefore, since habits are the means whereby one does things, the natural law cannot be a habit in the strict sense and essentially. We can speak of habits in a second way as what we possess by reason of habits. For example, we call faith what we have by reason of the habit of faith. And so, as reason sometimes actually considers precepts of the natural law and sometimes only habitually possesses them, we can in the latter way say that the natural law is a habit. Just so, the indemonstrable first principles in theoretical matters are principles belonging to the habit of first principles, not the very habit. Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher in the cited text is attempting to discover the genus of virtues. And since virtues are evidently sources of activity, he posits only things that are sources of human activity, namely, powers, habits, and emotions. But other things belong to the soul besides the latter three. For example, certain acts belong to the soul: willing to those willing, and things known to those knowing. And the natural properties of the soul, such as immortality and the like, belong to the soul. Reply Obj. 2. Basil calls synderesis the law of our intellect insofar as it is the habit that contains the precepts of the natural law, that is, the first principles of human actions. AQUINAS first principles of scientific demonstrations are related to theoretical reason. For both the precepts of the natural law and the first principles of scientific dem- onstrations are self-evident principles. And we speak of things being self-evident in two ways: in one way as such; in a second way in relation to ourselves. We indeed speak of self-evident propositions as such when their predicates belong to the nature of their subjects, although such propositions may not be self-evident to those who do not know the definition of the sub- jects. For example, the proposition “Human beings are rational” is by its nature self-evident, since to speak of something human is to speak of something rational, although the proposition is not self-evident to one who does not know what a human being is. And so, as Boethius says in his work On Groups of Seven, there are axioms or universally self-evident proposi- tions, and propositions whose terms all persons know (e.g., “Every whole is greater than one of its parts” and “Things equal to the same thing are themselves equal”) are such. But some propositions are self- evident only to the wise, who understand what the proposition’s terms signify. For example, for those who understand that angels are not material substances, it is self-evident that angels are not circumscriptively in a place, something not evident to the uneducated, who do not understand the nature of angels. And there is a priority regarding the things that fall within the understanding of all persons. For what first falls within our understanding is being, the under- standing of which is included in everything that one understands. And so the first indemonstrable princi- ple is that one cannot at the same time affirm and deny the same thing. And this principle is based on the nature of being and nonbeing, and all other prin- ciples are based on it, as the Metaphysics says. And as being is the first thing that without qualification falls within our understanding, so good is the first thing that falls within the understanding of practical reason. And practical reason is ordered to action, since every efficient cause acts for the sake of an end, which has the nature of good. And so the first principle in practical reason is one based on the nature of good, namely, that good is what all things seek. Therefore, the first precept of the natural law is that we should do and seek good, and shun evil. And all the other precepts of the natural law are based on that precept, 471 THIRD ARTICLE Do All Virtuous Acts Belong to the Natural Law? We proceed thus to the third inquiry. It seems that not all virtuous acts belong to the natural law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. It belongs to the nature of law that law be ordained for the common good, as I have said before. But some virtuous acts are ordained for the private good of an individual, as is particularly evident in the case of acts of the virtue of moderation. There- fore, not all virtuous acts are subject to the natural law. Obj. 2. All sins are contrary to certain virtuous acts. Therefore, if all virtuous acts belong to the natu- ral law, it seems that all sins are consequently contrary to nature. And yet we say this in a special way about some sins. Obj. 3. Everybody agrees about things that are in accord with nature. But not everybody agrees about virtuous acts, for things that are virtuous for some are vicious for others. Therefore, not all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. On the contrary, Damascene says in his work On Orthodox Faith that “virtues are natural.” Therefore, virtuous acts are subject to the natural law. I answer that we can speak about virtuous acts in two ways: in one way as virtuous; in a second way as we consider such acts in their own species. Therefore, if we are speaking about virtuous acts as virtuous, then all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For I have said that everything to which human beings are inclined by their nature belongs to the natural law. But everything is by its nature inclined to the activity that its form renders fitting. For example, fire is inclined to heat things. And so, since the rational soul is the specific form of human beings, everyone has an inclination from one’s nature to act in accord with reason. And this is to act virtuously. And so in this regard, all virtuous acts belong to the natural law, since one’s own reason by nature dictates that one act virtuously. But if we should be speaking about virtuous acts as such and such, namely, as we consider them in their own species, then not all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For we do many things virtuously to which nature does not at first incline us, but which AQUINAS before. But nature inclines different human beings to different things. For example, nature inclines some to desire pleasures, others to desire honors, others to desire other things. Therefore, the natural law is not the same for all human beings. On the contrary, Isidore says in his Etymologies: “The natural law is common to all nations.” I answer that things to which nature inclines hu- man beings belong to the natural law, as I have said before, and one of the things proper to human beings is that their nature inclines them to act in accord with reason. And it belongs to reason to advance from the general to the particular, as the Physics makes clear. And regarding that process, theoretical reason proceeds in one way, and practical reason in another way. For inasmuch as theoretical reason is especially concerned about necessary things, which cannot be otherwise disposed, its particular conclusions, just like its general principles, are true without exception. But practical reason is concerned about contingent things, which include human actions. And so the more reason goes from the general to the particular, the more excep- tions we find, although there is some necessity in the general principles. Therefore, truth in theoretical mat- ters, both first principles and conclusions, is the same for all human beings, although some know only the truth of the principles, which we call universal proposi- tions, and not the truth of the conclusions. But truth in practical matters, or practical rectitude, is the same for all human beings only regarding the general princi- ples, not regarding the particular conclusions. And not all of those with practical rectitude regarding particu- lars know the truth in equal measure. Therefore, the truth or rectitude regarding the gen- eral principles of both theoretical and practical reason is the same for all persons and known in equal mea- sure by all of them. And the truth regarding the particular conclusions of theoretical reason is the same for all persons, but some know such truth less than others. For example, it is true for all persons that triangles have three angles equal to two right angles, although not everybody knows this. But the truth or rectitude regarding particular conclusions of practical reason is neither the same for all persons nor known in equal measure even by those for whom it is the same. For example, it is correct and true for all persons that they should 473 Reply Obj. 2. We should understand the cited statement of the Philosopher regarding things just by nature as conclusions derived from general principles, not as the general principles. And such conclusions are correct for the most part and are wanting in rather few cases. Reply Obj. 3. As the power of reason in human beings rules and commands other powers, so reason needs to direct all the natural inclinations belong- ing to other powers. And so it is universally correct for all persons to direct all their inclinations by reason. FIFTH ARTICLE Can the Natural Law Vary? We thus proceed to the fifth inquiry. It seems that the natural law can vary, for the following reasons: Objection 1. A gloss on Sir. 17:9, “He [God] sup- plied them with instruction and the law of life,” says: “He wanted the [Old] Law to be written in order to correct the natural law.” But what is corrected is changed. Therefore, the natural law can vary. Obj. 2. The killing of innocent human beings as well as adultery and theft are contrary to the natural law. But God altered these precepts. For example, God on one occasion commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son, as Gen. 22:2 relates. And God on another occasion commanded the Jews to steal vessels the Egyptians had lent them, as Ex. 12:35–36 relates. And God on another occasion commanded Hosea to take a fornicating wife, as Hos. 1:2 relates. Therefore, the natural law can vary. Obj. 3. Isidore says in his Etymologies that “the common possession of all property and the same free- dom for all persons belong to the natural law.” But we perceive that human laws have altered these pre- scriptions. Therefore, it seems that the natural law can vary. On the contrary, the Decretum says: “The natural law originates with rational creatures. It does not vary over time and abides without change.” I answer that we can understand the mutability of the natural law in two ways. We can understand it in one way by things being added to it. And then nothing prevents the natural law changing, since both divine law and human laws add to natural law many things beneficial to human life. AQUINAS we could say that it belongs to the natural law that human beings are naked, since nature did not endow them with clothes, which human skill created. And it is in the latter way that we say that “the common possession of all property and the same freedom for all persons” belong to the natural law, namely, that the reason of human beings, not nature, introduced private property and compulsory servitude. And so the natural law in this respect varies only by way of addition. of such SIXTH ARTICLE Can the Natural Law Be Excised from the Hearts of Human Beings? lacked, We thus proceed to the sixth inquiry. It seems that the natural law can be excised from the hearts of human beings, for the following reasons: Objection 1. A gloss on Rom. 2:14, “When the Gentiles, who do not have the law,” etc., says: “The law of righteousness, which sin had wiped out, is inscribed on the inner human being renewed by grace.” But the law of righteousness is the natural law. Therefore, the natural law can be wiped out. Obj. 2. The law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But sin destroys the law of grace. Therefore, much more can the natural law be wiped out. Obj. 3. What law establishes is rendered just, as it were. But human beings have established many things contrary to the natural law. Therefore, the natural law can be excised from the hearts of hu- man beings. On the contrary, Augustine says in his Confessions: “Your law is inscribed on the hearts of human beings, and indeed no wickedness wipes it out.” But the law inscribed on the hearts of human beings is the natural law. Therefore, the natural law cannot be wiped out. I answer that as I have said before, there belong to the natural law, indeed primarily, very general precepts, precepts that everyone knows, and more particular, secondary precepts, which are like proxi- mate conclusions from first principles. Therefore, re- garding the general principles, the natural law in general can in no way be excised from the hearts of human beings. But the natural law is wiped out regarding particular actions insofar as desires or other 475 acts regard particular things, which are potentially inﬁnite, no one except wise persons, who regard par- ticulars, can sufﬁ ciently contemplate the things that belong to the direction of human acts. Therefore, it would have been better that the decisions of wise per- sons direct human actions than that any est ablished law should. Therefore, there was no need to est ab- lish human laws. On the contrary, Isidore says in his Etymologies: “Laws were est ablished so that fear of them curb human audacity, and that innocence be safe in the midst of the wicked, and that the fear of punishment restrain the ability of the wicked to inﬂict harm.” But the human race most needs such things. Therefore, it was necessary to establish human laws. I answer that, as is evident from what I have said before, human beings by nature have a capac ity for virtue, but they need to arrive at the very perfection of virtue by some training. Just so, we perceive that in- dustriousness helps them regard ing their necessities (e.g., food and clothing). And nature gives them the sources to provide these necessities, namely , reason and hands, not the full complement of the necessities that nature gives other animals, for whom nature has sufﬁciently provided covering and food. But human beings are not readily self-sufﬁcient in regard to this training, since the perfection of virtue consists chieﬂy of human be ings’ restraint from ex- cessive pleasures, toward which they are most prone. And this is especially true of youths, for whom train- ing is more efﬁcacious. And so human beings receive such training, whereby they arrive at virtue, from oth- ers. And indeed regard ing youths prone to virtuous acts by good natural d isposition or habituation (or, rather, a gift from God), paternal train ing, which consists of admonitions, sufﬁces. But some persons are wicked and prone to vices, and cannot be easily persuaded by words. Therefore, force and fear were needed to restrain them from evil. Consequently, at least desisting from evil deeds, they would both leave others in peace and be them- selves at length brought by such habituation to do voluntarily what they hitherto did out of fear, and so become virtuous. But such train ing, which compels by fear of punishment, is the training administered by laws. And so it was necessary to establish laws in order that human beings live in peace and have virtue. For, AQUINAS obligations to which the natural law gives rise, it does matter whether one effects justice in this or that way. Therefore, not all the things est ablished by human laws are derived from the natural law. Obj. 2. Positive law differs from natural la w, as Isidore makes clear in his Etymologies and the Phi- losopher makes clear in the Ethics. But things de- rived as conclusions from the general princ iples of the natural law belong to the natural la w, as I have said before. Therefore, things proper to human la w are not derived from the natural law. Obj. 3. The natural la w is the same for all per- sons. For the Philosopher says in the Ethics that “natural justice has the same force everywhere. ” Therefore, if human laws were to be derived from the natural law, human laws would likewise be the same for all persons. But such a conclusion is evidently false. Obj. 4. We can assign reasons for things derived from the natural law. But “one cannot assign reasons for all the st atutes rulers have decreed,” as the Jurist says. Therefore, some human la ws are not derived from the natural law. On the contrary, Cicero says in his Rhetoric: “Fear and reverence for the laws have prescribed things de- rived from nature and approved by custom.” I answer that Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “Unjust laws do not seem to be laws.” And so laws have binding force insofar as they have justice. And we say regard ing human affairs that things are just because they are right accord ing to the rule of reason. But the primary rule of reason is the natural law, as is evident from what I have said before. And so every human law has as much of the nature of law as it is derived from the natural la w. And a human la w diverging in any way from the natural la w will be a perversion of law and no longer a law. But we should note that we can derive things from the natural law in two ways: in one way as con- clusions from its ﬁ rst principles; in a second way as speciﬁcations of cert ain general princ iples. Indeed, the ﬁrst way is like the way in which we dra w con- clusions from ﬁ rst principles in theoretical sciences. And the second way is like the way that craftsmen in the course of exerc ising their skill adapt general forms to speciﬁc things. For example, a builder needs to adapt the general form of a house to this or that 477 accord with a country’s customs, suitable to time and place, necessary, useful, so clear that they cont ain nothing obscure to cause deception, and decreed for the common beneﬁ t of all c itizens, not the private beneﬁt of some.” It seems that he in this way inap- propriately describes the characteristics of positive law, for the following reasons: Objection 1. Isidore previously had explained the characteristics of la w in terms of three cond itions: “Laws should be everything constituted by reason if beﬁtting religion, suitable for training, and useful for the commonweal.” Therefore, he later unnecessarily added further conditions of law. Obj. 2. Justice is a virtue, as Cicero says in his work On Duties. Therefore, Isidore needlessly adds “just” after he mentioned “virtuous.” Obj. 3. Isidore contrad istinguished written la ws from customs. Therefore, he ought not to have pos- ited in the deﬁ nition of law that laws be “in accord with a country’s customs.” Obj. 4. We call things necessary in two ways. Things that cannot be otherwise, are absolutely nec- essary, and such necessary things are not subject to human judgment. And so such necessity does not be- long to human la w. Other things are necessary for ends, and such necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore, Isidore needlessly posits both “necessary” and “useful” as characteristics of law. On the contrary, there stands the authority of Isidore himself. I answer that we need to determine the form of any means in relation to the end desired. F or example, the form of a saw is such as to be suit able for cutting wood, as the Physics makes clear. Likewise, every- thing ruled and measured needs to have a form ap- portioned to its rule or measure. And human law has both, since it is both something ordained for an end and a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And the higher measure is indeed of two kinds, namely, the divine law and the natural law, as is evident from what I have said before. But the end of human law is the beneﬁ t of human beings, as the Jurist also says. And so indeed Isidore ﬁ rst posited three things as conditions of human law, namely, that human law beneﬁt religion (i.e., as human la w is properly related to the divine law), that human law be suitable for training (i.e., as human law is properly AQUINAS contained in the natural la w rather than positive human law. Obj. 2. Things that have the same bind ing force seem to differ only materially, not formally. But “stat- utes, plebiscites, decrees of the senate,” and the other like things Isidore describes all have the same bind- ing force. Therefore, they seem to differ only mate- rially. But artisans should pay no attention to such differences, since there can be an endless number of them. Therefore, Isidore inappropriately introduces such divisions. Obj. 3. As there are rulers and priests and soldiers in political communities, so human beings also have other public duties. Therefore, as Isidore posits “mili- tary law” and “public law” (which govern priests and magistrates), so he should also posit other la ws per- taining to other public duties. Obj. 4. We should ignore accidental things. But it is accidental to laws whether they are framed by this or that human being. Therefore, Isidore inappropri- ately posits a d ivision of laws by the names of the ir framers, namely, that one is called the Cornelian law, another the Falcidian law, and so forth. On the contrary, the authority of Isidore sufﬁces. I answer that we can intrinsically distinguish each thing by what belongs to its nature. For example, the nature of animals includes a soul that is rational or nonrational. And so we properly and intrinsically dis- tinguish animals by whether they are rational or irra- tional, and not by whether they are black or white, which are characteristics altogether outside the nature of animals. And many characteristics belong to the nature of human laws, and we can properly and intrinsically distinguish human laws by any of those things. F or example, it ﬁrst of all belongs to the nature of human laws that they be derived from the natural la w, as is evident from what I have said before. And we in this respect divide positive laws into the common la w of peoples and the la ws of particular commonwealths by the two ways in which things may be derived from the natural law, as I have said before. F or precepts derived from the natural la w as conclusions from its general principles belong to the common law of peo- ples (e.g., just buying and selling, and the like, with- out which human be ings cannot live soc iably with 479 nate by the ir authors, by the la ws’ different subject matter. For example, we d istinguish the Julian Law on adultery, the Cornelian Law on assassination, and the like, because of their subject matter, not because of their authors. Reply Obj. 1. The common la w of peoples is in- deed natural for human beings in one respect, insofar as it is rational, since it is derived from the natural law as conclusions not very remote from general princ i- ples of the natural la w. And so human be ings easily agree about such matters. But we distinguish the com- mon law of peoples from the natural la w, especially from what is common to all animals. Reply Objs. 2–4. The replies to these objections is evident from what I have said. Question 96 political this re- On the Power of Human Laws First Article Should Human Laws Be Framed in Particular Rather Than General Terms? best persons or We thus proceed to the first inquiry. It seems that human laws should be framed in particular rather than general terms, for the following reasons: Objection 1. The Philosopher says in the Ethics that “things of the legal order consist of everything laws decree about individual matters, and likewise of judicial decisions,” which also concern particular matters, since judges hand down decisions on partic- ular cases. Therefore, laws are framed both in general and in particular terms. Obj. 2. Laws direct human actions, as I have said before. But human actions consist of particular things. Therefore, laws should be framed in particu- lar rather than general terms. Obj. 3. Laws are the rules and measures of human actions, as I have said before. But measures should be most certain, as the Metaphysics says. Therefore, since nothing about human actions can be so univer- sally certain as not to be wanting in particular cases, it seems that la ws need to be framed in particular rather than general terms. AQUINAS vidual commands to d irect individual actions, but law is a general command, as I have said. Reply Obj. 3. “One should not look for the same certainty in all kinds of things, ” as the Ethics says. And so in the case of contingent things like natural events and human affairs, there is sufﬁcient certainty if things are true for the most part, even though they sometimes fail to happen in relatively few cases. human laws Second Article so laws Does It Belong to Human Laws to matters, and Prohibit All Vices? We thus proceed to the second inquiry. It seems that it belongs to human la ws to prohibit all vices, for the following reasons: Objection 1. Isidore says in his Etymologies that “laws have been est ablished in order to curb human audacity out of fear of them. ” But human audac ity would not be sufﬁ ciently curbed unless laws were to prohibit everything evil. Therefore, human laws ought to prohibit everything evil. Obj. 2. The aim of lawmakers is to make c itizens virtuous. But citizens can be virtuous only if they are curbed of all vices. Therefore, it belongs to human law to curb all vices. Obj. 3. Human law is derived from natural law, as I have said before. But all sins are contrary to the natural law. Therefore, human law ought to prohibit all vices. On the contrary, Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “It seems to me that laws written for the people’s governance rightly perm it such things, and that God’s providence pun ishes them.” But God’ s providence only punishes sins. Therefore, human laws, by not prohibiting some sins, rightly permit them. I answer that laws are est ablished as the rules or measures of human actions, as I have already said. But measures should be homogeneous with what they measure, as the Metaphysics says, since different kinds of things are measured by d ifferent kinds of measures. And so la ws need also to be imposed on human beings according to the ir condition, since laws ought to be “possible regarding both nature and a country’s customs,” as Isidore says. And the po wer or ability to act results from internal habituation or disposition, since the virtuous and those without 481 Third Article Do Human Laws Command Every for chil- Virtuous Action? We thus proceed to the third inquiry. It seems that human laws do not command every virtuous action, for the following reasons: Objection 1. Vicious actions are the contrary of virtuous actions. But human laws do not prohibit all vices, as I have said. Therefore, human la ws also do not command every virtuous action. Obj. 2. Virtuous actions come from virtue. But virtue is the aim of la ws, and so what comes from virtue cannot fall within legal precepts. Therefore, human laws do not command every virtuous action. Obj. 3. Laws are ordained for the common good, as I have said. But some virtuous actions are ordained for private, not the common, good. Therefore, la ws do not command every virtuous action. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics: “Laws command courageous and temperate and gen- tle behavior, and likewise regarding other virtues and vices, commanding the former and forbidd ing the latter.” I answer that we distinguish speciﬁc virtues by their objects, as is evident from what I have said be- fore. But we can relate all the objects of virtues either to the private good of a person or to the common good of the people. F or example, one can perform courageous acts either to preserve the political com- munity or to uphold the rights of one’ s friends, and similarly with other virtuous acts. And la ws are or- dained for the common good, as I have said. And so there are no virtues regard ing whose actions la ws could not command. But la ws do not command re- garding every action of every virtue. Rather, they only command things that can be ordained for the com- mon good, whether immediately, as when things are done directly for that good, or med iately, as when lawmakers ordain things belonging to good train ing, which trains citizens to preserve the common good of justice and peace. Reply Obj. 1. Human laws do not by strict com- mand prohibit every vic ious action, just as they do not command every virtuous action. But human laws prohibit some acts of particular vices, just as they command some acts of particular virtues. AQUINAS I answer that laws established by human beings are either just or unjust. If just, they indeed have obliga- tory force in the court of conscience from the eternal law, from which they are derived. J ust so, Prov. 8:15 says: “Kings rule through me, and la wmakers decree justice.” And we call la ws just from three perspec-

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