Ch. 5 Intel Staff Support PDF

PART TWO Major Intelligence Activities The doctrinal concepts in part I—intelligence and operational fundamentals—are important to fully understand the content in part II, which discusses major intelligence activities—intelligence staff support (chapter 5) and intell...

PART TWO Major Intelligence Activities The doctrinal concepts in part I—intelligence and operational fundamentals—are important to fully understand the content in part II, which discusses major intelligence activities—intelligence staff support (chapter 5) and intelligence operations (chapter 6). Chapters 5 and 6 further set the foundation to understand the specifics of fighting for intelligence, which is discussed in detail in part III. Chapter 5 Intelligence Staff Support SECTION I – OVERVIEW 5-1. Staffs support commanders in making and implementing decisions and in integrating and synchronizing combat power. Competent staffs multiply a unit’s effectiveness. They provide timely and relevant information and analysis, make estimates and recommendations, prepare plans and orders, assist in controlling operations, and assess the progress of operations for the commander. A staff primarily— ⚫ Supports the commander. ⚫ Assists subordinate commanders, staffs, and units. ⚫ Informs units and organizations outside the headquarters. 5-2. Effective intelligence support is multifaceted, and the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff are ultimately responsible for providing intelligence support to the commander and staff. The complexities of collecting against and conducting analysis on a determined and adaptive, threat that is technologically capable across all domains, creates challenges for the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff. Other complexities that can challenge the intelligence staff include but are not limited to— ⚫ A multitude of factors within the OE (across the human, information, and physical dimensions). ⚫ Sophisticated intelligence capabilities. ⚫ The intelligence architecture. ⚫ Time constraints during the execution of the intelligence process. ⚫ The many requirements to support multidomain operations. 5-3. This chapter discusses how the intelligence staff provides intelligence support to the commander and staff, including— ⚫ Intelligence staff composition and responsibilities. ⚫ Key IWFTs. ⚫ Situational understanding, the CIP, and the COP. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-1 Chapter 5 5-4. Figure 5-1 shows important aspects of fighting for intelligence from the context of the intelligence process, with emphasis on the commander’s role in driving the intelligence warfighting function and the G-2/S-2’s role in synchronizing intelligence. Figure 5-1. Military intelligence activities SECTION II – INTELLIGENCE STAFF COMPOSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 5-5. The first aspect of understanding intelligence staff support is understanding the intelligence staff’s composition and responsibilities, which differ by echelon but are also similar across echelons. The G-2/S-2 organizes its staff, provides focus, assigns tasks, and synchronizes the entire intelligence effort. However, the discussions about staff responsibilities interrelate with preceding discussions about staff teamwork, the operations process, integrating processes, and leveraging intelligence and collaborating with higher, subordinate, and adjacent units and organizations. 5-2 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support INTELLIGENCE STAFF COMPOSITION 5-6. The composition of the intelligence staff differs significantly across echelons—from theater army to BCT levels. The G-2/S-2 organizes its staff, to include the supporting intelligence analytical element, to meet the various requirements resulting from the conduct of operations. The higher the echelon, the more personnel within the intelligence staff and the more sophisticated the structure. Generally, certain functions are common across echelons and drive the organization of the intelligence staff. Forming permanent instead of ad hoc teams or sections is preferable because of the skills and proficiency necessary to perform those functions. Although there are intelligence staff elements in other CP cells, most of the intelligence staff sections reside in the main CP intelligence cell. Additional staff integration occurs through cross-functional working groups such as the information collection, protection, and targeting working groups. 5-7. The intelligence functional cell commonly includes the following: ⚫ The G-2X/S-2X. ⚫ Collection management. ⚫ Targeting. ⚫ The ACE or BISE (at the BCT level [see ATP 2-19.4]). ⚫ IEW maintenance and intelligence sustainment. ⚫ Intelligence communications. ⚫ The USAF SWO or staff weather team, when augmented. Notes. Higher headquarters may augment the intelligence cell with additional capabilities to meet mission requirements. This chapter discusses the intelligence staff, to include the supporting intelligence analytical element as a critical element of the intelligence staff. Intelligence analytical elements are either attached, under OPCON, DS, or in another support relationship to the headquarters and headquarters company or other headquarters that includes the staff at that echelon. For example, at the division level, the division ACE is controlled by the division G-2. INTELLIGENCE STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES 5-8. Staff members have specific duties and responsibilities associated with their area of expertise. They must be ready to advise the commander and other senior leaders about issues pertaining to their area of expertise without advanced notice. However, regardless of their career field or duty billet, all staff sections share a common set of duties and responsibilities, to include— ⚫ Managing information within their area of expertise. ⚫ Building and maintaining running estimates. ⚫ Conducting staff research. ⚫ Analyzing problems. ⚫ Performing IPOE. ⚫ Developing information requirements. ⚫ Advising and informing the commander. ⚫ Providing recommendations. ⚫ Preparing plans, orders, and other staff writing, including recommendations on Annex A (Task Organization). ⚫ Exercising staff supervision. ⚫ Performing risk management. ⚫ Assessing operations. ⚫ Conducting staff inspections and assistance visits. ⚫ Performing staff administrative procedures. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-3 Chapter 5 5-9. The intelligence staff is primarily responsible for providing the commander and staff with intelligence on the threat, terrain, weather and weather effects, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE. Other intelligence staff responsibilities include but are not limited to— ⚫ Enabling an effective intelligence process: ▪ Plan, establish, and revise an intelligence architecture in close collaboration with the G-6/S-6 and other staff members. ▪ Leverage data, information, and intelligence to provide the best intelligence support possible. ▪ Lead collection management, which drives information collection. Develop a draft of Annex L (Information Collection) of the order to assist the G-3/S-3. ▪ Ensure ongoing information collection—collecting the information needed for anticipated decisions and intelligence requirements. ▪ Use knowledge management techniques to optimize intelligence support. ▪ Answer requests for information (RFIs) from higher, subordinate, and adjacent units. ▪ Disseminate intelligence to higher, subordinate, and adjacent units and organizations. ⚫ Determining and requesting foreign disclosure office/representative support to facilitate collaboration with unified action partners and allies. ⚫ Facilitating an understanding of the OE, with the greatest emphasis on the threat, terrain, weather and weather effects, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE: ▪ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE, including analysis of threat capabilities and the population (especially information dimension effects) across the domains and dimensions. ▪ Lead IPOE and produce the various IPOE products. ▪ Analyze and evaluate civil considerations in close collaboration with the G-9/S-9. ▪ Facilitate the USAF SWO or staff weather team in effectively providing forecasts and weather effects on friendly and enemy capabilities. Note. Commanders, supported by their staffs, must develop and maintain the best possible understanding of their OE, including the domains, dimensions, and the operational and mission variables. (See paragraph 2-31 for means to understanding the OE.) Figures 2-5 and 2-6 on pages 2-18 and 2-20, respectively, illustrate the inclusion of the domains, dimensions, and the operational and mission variables into staff activities and analysis, specifically the intelligence staff’s responsibility to provide the commander and staff with intelligence on the threat, terrain, weather and weather effects, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE. ⚫ Supporting all forms of planning and assessments, to include targeting and the other integrating processes: ▪ Write Annex B (Intelligence) of the order. ▪ Provide intelligence support to targeting (through lethal and nonlethal means). ▪ Provide intelligence support to CA units executing operations with unified action partners and regional and local populations and institutions. ▪ Provide intelligence support to psychological operations, operations security (OPSEC), military deception, and other information advantage activities. ▪ Provide intelligence support to risk management. ▪ Provide intelligence support to knowledge management. ⚫ Supporting the conduct of operations and the commander’s decisions: ▪ Answer intelligence requirements and provide advice. ▪ Perform situation development, maintain the intelligence running estimate, and develop the CIP and the intelligence portion of the COP. ▪ Provide support to protection and sustainment (including specific requirements in the rear area). ▪ Provide support to combat assessment. 5-4 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support ⚫ Supporting security programs, to include the following: ▪ Supervise command and personnel security programs. ▪ Evaluate physical security vulnerabilities to support staff sections, particularly the operations and signal staffs. ▪ Perform staff planning and supervise the special security office, when applicable. The G-2/S-2 The G-2/S-2 leads the intelligence staff and has responsibility for what the intelligence staff does and does not accomplish. The G-2/S-2 is the primary advisor to the commander and staff on the intelligence warfighting function. Additionally, the G-2/S-2 has staff responsibility for the USAF SWO. Successful intelligence support is based on the successful execution of the intelligence process, which the G-2/S-2 enables through intelligence synchronization. However, the G-2/S-2, as one person, must depend on its staff to provide effective intelligence support to the unit and facilitate situational understanding and effective targeting. The G-2/S-2 is not responsible for the conduct of intelligence operations by the MI unit beyond conducting collection management. (See ATP 2-01.) The MI unit commander is responsible for the conduct of intelligence operations by the MI unit. Chapter 3 discusses the roles of the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, collection manager/collection management team, and MI unit commander/MI unit related to intelligence operations. Notes. Due to the nature and fluidity of large-scale combat operations, commanders will have to make decisions with imperfect intelligence. Intelligence that is too late for commanders to make timely decisions results in a loss of the initiative and lost battles and engagements. As much as possible, the intelligence staff depends on thorough and disciplined all-source analysis. All-source analysis reduces the possibility of error, bias, deception, disinformation, and misinformation by considering multiple sources of information and intelligence. However, when necessary, the commander and staff may have to depend on either single-source intelligence or combat information without all-source intelligence analysis or verification. The cyberspace domain and the information dimension require specialized expertise from outside the traditional military staff, such as industry and academia. Intelligence support to the cyberspace domain and the information dimension often requires specific authorities, moves at a high tempo, and requires close coordination with higher-level friendly military cyberspace activities and sometimes with nonmilitary cyberspace activities. SECTION III – KEY INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS 5-10. Chapter 1 describes how the intelligence warfighting function supports operations through a broad range of doctrinal tasks referred to as IWFTs. The intelligence staff is responsible for some of those tasks, MI units are responsible for other tasks, and both the intelligence staff and MI unit have shared responsibility for some tasks. Figure 5-2 on page 5-6 illustrates key IWFTs from an understanding the OE perspective; this section discusses the most important IWFTs from the intelligence staff’s perspective. Appendix B provides a detailed discussion of the IWFTs. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-5 Chapter 5 Figure 5-2. Key intelligence tasks that support understanding the operational environment PLAN, ESTABLISH, AND REVISE AN INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE 5-11. As discussed in chapter 1, the intelligence architecture has an important role in providing intelligence support. The G-2/S-2 and the intelligence staff plan, establish, and revise the intelligence architecture in close collaboration with higher-level and subordinate G-2/S-2s and the MI unit commander and staff at that echelon. Additionally, the intelligence staff must coordinate with key members of the staff, especially the G-6/S-6 and G-3/S-3. (See chapter 8 for the intelligence architecture during large-scale combat operations.) 5-6 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support 5-12. The intelligence architecture consists of more than a unit’s organic collection capabilities, systems, and personnel. It also includes all elements of the intelligence network and associated communications architectures (including the PACE communications plan) to enable intelligence operations and support to mission requirements. (See FM 6-02 for doctrine on PACE planning.) PLANNING 5-13. Planning the intelligence architecture is inseparable from long-range planning for future intelligence operations. The intelligence staff can neither perform long-range planning without carefully considering the intelligence architecture nor plan an intelligence architecture without carefully considering long-range planning. The intelligence architecture is connected directly to the types and methods of intelligence support necessary for future operational plans. This planning is roughly equivalent to developing a blueprint for a house that is based on a larger plan to build a housing area in that area. The unit cannot count on using intelligence capabilities during an operation if those capabilities are not accounted for in the intelligence architecture and supported by a larger communications plan. Once the intelligence architecture is in place and the unit is conducting operations, periodic changes are necessary; these changes are called revisions. 5-14. When developing the intelligence architecture, the intelligence staff collaborates with the MI unit staff to consider the personnel, organizations, systems, and procedures necessary for developing intelligence, including those required for intelligence operations. It is critical for the intelligence staff to collaborate with the commander and staff as early as possible and throughout planning to ensure the intelligence architecture is adequately planned and established as soon as possible. 5-15. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff also ensure the higher-headquarters linkage to the unit and subordinate unit requirements are adequately integrated into their intelligence architecture to enable effective information collection, PED, and analysis and production to support mission requirements. This ensures the intelligence architecture supports the necessary operational and technical connections between collection assets, control elements, PED capabilities, analytical cells, and various CPs to enable an effective information flow of intelligence to commanders and staffs and access (both inward and outward) across the intelligence enterprise. The intelligence architecture must also account for all complementary capabilities and intelligence-related missions and operations employed by the unit. ARCHITECTURE DETAILS 5-16. The intelligence staff portrays the intelligence architecture in a series of planning products that map the operational and technical aspects of the interoperability between the many components of the architecture. The planning products include but are not limited to the different— ⚫ Intelligence capabilities. Chapter 7 provides a list of organic and supporting general intelligence collection and all-source intelligence capabilities by echelon; each general intelligence collection capability comprises specific collection assets (platforms and collectors) with specific technical collection capabilities and associated PED. The intelligence staff must compile a list of all appropriate general intelligence capabilities that are part of the architecture, which must address bandwidth requirements, preparing for operations, collecting the required information, and the associated PED. The intelligence staff must then assess all applicable general intelligence capabilities to list the specific intelligence capabilities required for the architecture. ⚫ Communications means. Collection assets operate through many different communications means, which include formal message traffic, databases, product libraries, chat rooms, intelligence dissemination systems, and various voice methods. ⚫ Technical networks. Technical networks are those information management and information system connections that enable resource and information sharing. Intelligence architecture products capture not only networks and their technical specifications but also how architecture elements relate and interoperate with each other. Intelligence personnel disseminate and access information and intelligence on several networks, including NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS, coalition networks, and intelligence broadcast systems. ⚫ Tactical considerations. The intelligence architecture should address likely tactical considerations such as mission tasks, technical control means, tipping and cueing, IEW and other maintenance, security measures, and medical support. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-7 Chapter 5 COLLECTION MANAGEMENT Collection management is, in intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required (JP 2-0). Collection management includes ensuring information collection, intelligence reach, RFIs, and requests for collection result in adequate information, combat information, and intelligence to support operations. (See ATP 2-01.) Note. In the Army, tasking authority derives from the commander and resides with the G-3/S-3. Within Army operations, neither the collection manager, G-2/S-2, nor intelligence staff members have tasking authority. To retask an asset, the G-2/S-2 must closely collaborate with the G-3/S-3, as well as address information collection issues within the COIC so intelligence is continually ready to support decision making, targeting, and other aspects of operations. It is important for the collection manager, ACE or BISE chief, and the appropriate G-3/S-3 representative to quickly work through information collection issues. Collection management is the primary driver for overall information collection planning, as discussed in paragraph 3-30. The overlap of collection management and information collection planning occurs in the— ⚫ Development of the collection management plan. ⚫ Use of intelligence handover lines and other graphic measures. ⚫ Feasibility and details of employing ground reconnaissance. ⚫ Planning of fires and sustainment to support the information collection effort. The following are inherent in conducting collection management: ⚫ Intelligence reach and RFIs. ⚫ Monitoring available collection assets and assessing their ability to provide the required information. ⚫ Recommending adjustments to new requirements or locations of collection assets, if required. ⚫ Collection orchestration, as part of the operational-level model. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 5-20. During any phase of military operations, CCIRs are critical to the commander’s decisions and staff control. The intelligence warfighting function focuses on answering intelligence requirements. Both collection management and intelligence analysis are driven by PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements, and other intelligence requirements that subsequently drive the development of specific information requirements (SIRs). SIRs assist in tasking or requesting collection assets to collect information that results in effective intelligence that answers the commander’s requirements. 5-21. Collection management supports the intelligence analysis process and intelligence analysis supports the collection management process and both must account for PED activities. These activities must be synchronized, and analysts within both activities must collaborate closely to enable the intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence analysis sets the stage for collection management, which includes developing information requirements that later result in intelligence requirements that drive effective information collection. This enables intelligence analysts to answer the commander’s intelligence requirements. The intelligence staff conducts collection management in collaboration with the operations staff to collect, process, and analyze information that affects operations. (See ATP 2-33.4 for doctrine on intelligence analysis.) 5-8 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support COLLECTION MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS The collection management functions—requirements management, mission management, and execution management—provide a useful way of viewing collection management as a whole. They also provide a potential means of structuring the collection management team and filling positions. These functions divide those processes and tasks associated with collection management to assist the collection management team in collaborating with and synchronizing information collection across the staff, various echelons, and other units and organizations. Army and joint doctrine have their own doctrinal models for the collection management functions. The Army developed its model (except for execution management) based on its tactical-level point of view; the joint force developed an operational-level model. Similar to the intelligence process, each model represents a framework that guides thought; they are not prescriptive. Units can use either the Army or joint model based on whichever is most useful to their needs. (See ATP 2-01.) A Tactical-Level Model Collection management teams consider the commander’s information collection guidance, information requirements (which become intelligence requirements), IPOE outputs, and intelligence analysis in the context of friendly operations in order to develop an effective collection management plan. During collection management, the three functions effectively divide the collection management effort, ensuring its success. (See figure 5-3.) Figure 5-3. Collection management using the Army tactical-level model An Operational-Level Model JP 2-0 describes the distinct functions of collection requirements management (CRM), collection operations management (COM), and collection orchestration in a joint intelligence context and provides some useful and detailed techniques associated with these functions. Units can adapt this joint operational-level model to Army operations with some modifications. For example, units can use this model at higher echelons during inherently joint operations or during operations that require significant interactions with a joint headquarters. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-9 Chapter 5 At the appropriate echelons, Army collection orchestration is the integration, synchronization, and optimization of the intelligence process and operations, including national and theater collection integration; all-domain, multidiscipline collection strategy development; and the end-to-end synchronization of CRM, COM, reconnaissance, DOD ISR mission management, and PED. Note. Collection orchestration outside of the operational-level model for collection management belongs to the G-3/S-3, who has overall responsibility for information collection and tasking collection assets to conduct information collection. In the joint operational-level model, collection management teams also consider the commander’s information collection guidance, information requirements (which become intelligence requirements), IPOE outputs, and intelligence analysis in the context of friendly operations to develop an effective collection management plan. The most significant modification required to use this model for Army operations is accounting for the G-3/S-3’s information collection requirements. (See figure 5-4.) The G-3/S-3— ⚫ Integrates information collection during plans and operations in coordination with the rest of the staff. ⚫ Is the only staff officer with tasking authority from the commander. ⚫ Can authenticate all plans and orders and synchronize all warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose. Figure 5-4. Collection management using the joint operational-level model COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PROCESS Conducting the complex and detailed tasks associated with collection management is inherent in the collection management process. Based on the commander and staff’s participation, the collection management team, in close coordination with the operations staff, performs the five tasks of the collection management process—each discussed in detail in ATP 2-01: ⚫ Develop requirements. ⚫ Develop the collection management plan. ⚫ Support tasking and directing. 5-10 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support ⚫ Assess collection. ⚫ Update the collection management plan. The collection management tasks are continuous but not necessarily sequential; they are the basis for creating, tasking, and executing the information collection plan. (See figure 5-5.) This is accomplished through the challenging balance of— ⚫ Developing requirements that effectively support operations during requirements management. ⚫ Developing recommendations to task collection assets, including associated details such as the where, when, and how for that collection, and coordinating with those assets or their C2 element to ensure an effective information collection effort throughout the entire operation during mission management. ⚫ Ensuring a continuous integrated and synchronized information collection effort through timely and flexible adjustments to collection throughout the operation during execution management. Figure 5-5. The collection management process Effective collection management focuses on answering intelligence requirements by analyzing these requirements, planning collection based on tasks to collection assets, and then assigning these tasks in an order. The collection management plan synchronizes and coordinates collection assets and PED in the overall concept of operations, and positions and tasks collection assets so they can collect the right information, shift priorities as the situation develops, or execute a branch or sequel. Note. Concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state (ADP 5-0). THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CONTINUUM 5-31. There is far more to intelligence analysis than simply IPOE. Intelligence analysis must support the commander’s decisions, situational understanding, ADM, the MDMP, information advantage activities, targeting, planning and executing deception operations, force protection considerations, and continuous operational assessments. In any operation, friendly and enemy forces will endeavor to set conditions to develop positions of relative advantage. Setting these conditions begins with pre-mission analysis of the OE, which provides relevant knowledge about the OE that is incorporated into the ADM and then used later during other intelligence analysis tasks. (See figure 5-6 on page 5-12.) 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-11 Chapter 5 Figure 5-6. The intelligence analysis continuum 5-32. During the MDMP, the intelligence staff leads IPOE and conducts continuous intelligence analysis to understand the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat capabilities. For example, threat databases and signatures developed during pre-mission analysis of the OE assist in assessing threat capabilities and vulnerabilities during IPOE. This information facilitates decision making during the MDMP and provides a common understanding on how friendly forces may gain positions of relative advantage across multiple domains and dimensions. This is essential when determining how best to mitigate sophisticated threat A2 and AD systems, IADSs, deception, information warfare, systems warfare, the EMS and EW, UASs, robotic capabilities, and long-range fires capabilities, as well as accounting for civil considerations in the OE. 5-33. Based on relevant aspects of the OE (determined during IPOE), including the domains and dimensions, the commander and staff continuously assess information, operations, and changes in the OE. Warnings intelligence, situation development, intelligence support to targeting, and intelligence support to information advantage activities assist the commander and staff in further shaping the OE to facilitate mission success. The continuous assessment of collected information also mitigates risk to friendly forces while identifying opportunities to leverage friendly capabilities to open a window of opportunity. 5-12 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support LEVERAGE DATA, INFORMATION, AND INTELLIGENCE 5-34. Several areas in this publication mention leveraging and collaborating across the intelligence enterprise and intelligence architecture but in different contexts. This task is an inherent part of intelligence support and pertains to every other task in this chapter. An echelon does not collect all the information it needs, and an intelligence staff does not conduct all the intelligence analysis and production it needs to support the commander and staff. Every echelon uses data, information, and intelligence from higher, lower, and adjacent intelligence staffs and elements. 5-35. Information outside of military sources can be valuable, especially for the operational variables (PMESII-PT) and civil considerations. Academia, industry, and non-DOD information can be especially valuable, as well as PAI, in providing critical insight and awareness across all domains and dimensions, especially the human and information dimensions. Allies and other multinational partners have unique collection capabilities and valuable intelligence, including insight into specific regions and ongoing tensions. The joint force and other Services have unique and specialized data, information, and intelligence on many areas, especially within the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains (including ES data and information). Generally, higher-level Army echelons have more time, resources, and a broader context to produce intelligence; lower-level echelons may often have a more detailed and timelier picture of the enemy they face in the close area. Optimizing the task of leveraging data, information, and intelligence and effectively collaborating across echelons are both an art and the application of science. CONDUCT PRE-MISSION ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 5-36. To perform IPOE and the other important intelligence tasks that support operations, the intelligence staff must conduct a significant amount of analysis before receipt of mission. The intelligence staff cannot wait until receipt of mission to start intelligence analysis. As discussed in chapter 2, there are several tools and processes, some led by the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff, that assist the commander and staff in understanding the OE. Intelligence analysis plays an important role in facilitating this understanding; therefore, the analytical effort must start as early as possible. As operational planning occurs in terms of theater campaign plans, contingency plans, and other planning (such as the ADM), the intelligence staff provides intelligence support, which is connected to facilitating an understanding of the OE through sequential analysis and developing various intelligence products. The result is an ever-increasing level of operational focus: ⚫ Analysis and products that account for the different aspects of the domains and dimensions, including their interrelationships. Note. While considering the domains and dimensions, these intelligence products may not be structured based on the domains and dimensions. ⚫ Analysis and products that account for the operational variables and how they interrelate. ⚫ Analysis and products that specifically address a threat; localized terrain; weather and weather effects; civil considerations, including cultural aspects of the OE; and other significant aspects of that area to prepare the staff for the MDMP, including IPOE. DOMAINS AND DIMENSIONS (GENERAL INTELLIGENCE) 5-37. During competition, for those units and organizations without much operational or geographic focus, the intelligence staff must first understand a threat and the regional civilian population and other significant factors (for example, destabilizing natural disasters across a region). Using the domains and dimensions as a framework provides a helpful context and checklist to ensure the intelligence staff’s holdings are as complete as possible and to build a comprehensive understanding of the OE. Information and intelligence usually flow first from the U.S. IC, academia, DIA, the theater army G-2 and military intelligence brigades-theater (MIB-Ts), and other higher-echelon intelligence units and organizations (such as MDTFs [see paragraph 2- 82]) in various forms. Some of this information and intelligence is or can be databased and some cannot. As this occurs, it is useful for intelligence staffs to practice their intelligence skills and compile or create intelligence products to further build their knowledge and proficiency as analysts. Analyzing and describing threat force capabilities, and even the whole of a threat government, are especially valuable in preparing for potential future operations. Producing these products should also assist intelligence staffs in finding information and intelligence gaps. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-13 Chapter 5 5-38. During crisis and armed conflict with a specific operational or geographic focus, as time and the situation allows, producing general intelligence products on the threat and regional civilian population is of value. The greater the level of understanding of the OE at the general or holistic level, the better the understanding of the OE for a specific mission. OPERATIONAL VARIABLES (INTELLIGENCE FOR CONTINGENCY AND FUTURE PLANS) 5-39. The next level of operational focus is moving from generalized analysis, information, and intelligence to analysis, information, and intelligence specific to a contingency, possible operation, or known future operation. This can include the employment of ADM. In these instances, the joint force may perform joint IPOE, and higher-level Army echelons may perform a rather broad IPOE. However, lower-level Army echelons that have not received a mission do not perform IPOE yet. Another important aspect of intelligence support at this point during competition is analysis of threat systems, which is different from joint TSA. Joint intelligence and higher-level Army intelligence, even when not structured based on the operational variables, directly address one or more of the operational variables. This joint intelligence and higher-level Army intelligence flow to lower-level units and organizations. 5-40. The operational variables provide a second useful checklist, along with the domains and dimensions, to judge the completeness of intelligence products and information and intelligence gaps. The operational variables assist the commander and staff in understanding important factors, within and across the domains and dimensions, in a more focused manner and relevant to Army operations. At all echelons, intelligence staffs must practice their intelligence skills and compile or create intelligence products (focusing on one or more operational variables) to further build their knowledge and proficiency as analysts. THREAT, TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS (PREPARING FOR THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS) 5-41. After contingency or other future plans are established, the next level of operational focus is preparing for receipt of mission, which starts the MDMP. Data, information, and intelligence focused on a specific threat (including the human and information dimensions), as well as localized terrain, weather and weather effects, and civil considerations (including the human and information dimensions) are invaluable to successfully performing IPOE. Beyond compiling data, information, and intelligence from other sources, conducting analysis and developing intelligence products for these categories are very similar to performing steps 2 and 3 of the IPOE process. While all aspects of building as much data, information, and intelligence are important, it is especially crucial to prepare detailed threat characteristics, models, and capabilities (considering the dimensions and domains), as much as possible, before receipt of mission. PERFORM INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Notes. IPOE should not be confused with joint IPOE. IPOE is used during Army operations; joint IPOE is used by joint headquarters and joint units. JP 2-0 describes joint IPOE differently than the conduct of the Army’s IPOE. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. IPOE was previously known as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). FM 2-0 has changed the term from IPB to IPOE to better reflect the multidomain aspects of the OE within the name of the process. However, IPB has already accounted for and discussed the domains and dimensions of the OE across its four steps; therefore, there is no change to the definition of IPOE, which matches the definition of IPB, and there is no change to the four steps of IPB, now IPOE. Despite the name change, readers should still refer to ATP 2-01.3. 5-14 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support 5-42. IPOE allows commanders and staffs to start from a mission-focused holistic approach to analyze the OE to support the mission. The approach— ⚫ Describes all relevant aspects of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces. ⚫ Considers all relevant domains and dimensions that may impact friendly and threat operations. ⚫ Identifies windows of opportunity to leverage friendly capabilities against threat forces to reach a position of relative advantage (human, information, or physical). ⚫ Allows commanders to leverage positions of relative advantage at a time and place most advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available. 5-43. IPOE results in intelligence products used during the MDMP to assist in developing friendly COAs and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products (which are included in the intelligence estimate) developed during IPOE are critical in planning information collection and conducting targeting. When discussing IPOE, it is natural to discuss the various IPOE products; however, the following outcomes of the IPOE process are as important as developing IPOE products: ⚫ Collaboration across the staff and with the commander. ⚫ Effective consideration of the range of possible threat COAs and capabilities (not just the most dangerous and most likely). ⚫ Careful analysis and detailed consideration of the terrain, weather, and significant mission and/or operational variable considerations. ⚫ A fair and accurate portrayal of the threat during COA development and analysis (war game). 5-44. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff lead the staff effort, but IPOE must include the entire staff—at least during key portions of the process. Often IPOE’s success is either set or not set, depending on what has occurred before IPOE. This intelligence effort applies the IWFTs of— ⚫ Plan, establish, and revise an intelligence architecture. ⚫ Leverage data, information, and intelligence. ⚫ Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE. MISSION FOCUS 5-45. Upon receipt of a WARNORD or mission (or in anticipation of a mission), the commander and staff draw relevant information categorized by the operational variables and filter it into the mission variables (METT-TC [I]) used during mission analysis. During IPOE, the staff focuses on the relevant aspects of the OE regarding the staff’s warfighting function. The staff focuses primarily on the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. However, based on the staff’s echelon, type of OE, type of operation, and changes in the OE, the staff may need to account for other significant aspects of the OE. 5-46. To be effective, IPOE must— ⚫ Consider all domains and dimensions. ⚫ Define the commander’s AOI by its geographic boundaries and across all domains to focus collection and analysis within the AOI. ⚫ Describe how the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations will affect friendly and threat operations. This subtask involves the commander and the entire staff collaborating to determine these effects. No matter how complex, the staff must thoroughly consider the civil considerations (including information) that are significant to the mission. ⚫ Include relevant aspects of the OE that relate to relative advantages and defeat or stability mechanisms. ⚫ Support each step of the MDMP with IPOE products. ⚫ Consider the operational framework. (See chapter 2.) ⚫ Facilitate the commander’s ability to visualize the desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape current conditions into that end state. ⚫ Support the commander in directing the intelligence effort. ⚫ Facilitate understanding threat characteristics and threat goals, objectives, and COAs. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-15 Chapter 5 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PROCESS STEPS 5-47. The IPOE process consists of the following four steps: ⚫ Define the OE. ⚫ Describe environmental effects on operations. ⚫ Evaluate the threat. ⚫ Determine threat COAs. Note. Although there are four steps to the IPOE process, IPOE must seamlessly combine with pre- mission analysis of the OE; the leveraging of data, information, and intelligence; and situation development to serve as a continuous effort, with all staff members providing support to the intelligence warfighting function. Continuous analysis and assessments are necessary to maintain situational understanding of the OE in constant flux. Step 1—Define the Operational Environment 5-48. An OE for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (such as politics, economics) that affect OE conditions and operations. Thus, each commander’s OE is part of a higher commander’s OE. Defining the OE results in the identification of— ⚫ Significant characteristics of the OE that can affect friendly and threat operations. ⚫ Gaps in current intelligence holdings. 5-49. Step 1 is important because it assists the commander in defining relevant aspects of the OE in time and space. This is equally important when considering characteristics of the domains and dimensions of the OE. Aspects of the OE may act simultaneously across the battlefield but may only factor in friendly or threat operations at specific times and locations. 5-50. During step 1, the intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission. The staff evaluates significant characteristics to identify gaps and initiate information collection. The staff then justifies the analysis to the commander. Failure to identify or misidentifying the effect these variables may have on operations at a given time and place can hinder decision making and result in developing an ineffective information collection strategy. During step 1, the AO, AOI, and area of influence must also be identified and established. 5-51. Understanding friendly and threat forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, languages, tribal affiliations, and operational and mission variables, can be equally important. Identifying the significant characteristics of the OE is essential in identifying the additional information needed to complete IPOE. Once approved by the commander, this information becomes the commander’s initial intelligence requirement, which focuses the commander’s initial information collection effort and the remaining IPOE process steps. 5-52. Additionally, where a unit will be assigned and how its operations will synchronize with other associated operations must be considered. For example, the intelligence staff should be forming questions about where the unit will deploy within the entire theater and the specific logistics requirements to handle the operation’s contingency plans. Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects on Operations 5-53. During step 2 of the IPOE process, the staff describes how significant characteristics affect friendly operations. The intelligence staff also describes how terrain, weather, civil considerations, and friendly forces affect threat forces. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until the development of threat COAs in step 4 of IPOE and friendly COAs later in the MDMP. The entire staff determines the effects of friendly and threat force actions on the population. 5-16 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support 5-54. If the intelligence staff does not have the information required to form conclusions, it uses assumptions to fill information gaps—always careful to ensure the commander understands when assumptions are used in place of facts to form conclusions. Step 3—Evaluate the Threat 5-55. The purpose of evaluating the threat is to understand how a threat can affect friendly operations. Although threat forces may conform to some of the fundamental principles of warfare that guide Army operations, these forces have obvious, as well as subtle, differences in how they approach situations and problem solving. Understanding these differences is essential to understanding how a threat force will react in each situation. 5-56. Threat evaluation does not begin with IPOE. The intelligence staff conducts threat evaluations and creates threat models during the pre-mission analysis of the OE. Using this information, the intelligence staff refines threat models, as necessary, to support IPOE. When analyzing a well-known threat, the intelligence staff may be able to rely on previously developed threat models. When analyzing a new or lesser-known threat, the intelligence staff may have to evaluate the threat and develop threat models during the MDMP’s mission analysis step. When this occurs, the intelligence staff relies heavily on the threat evaluation conducted by higher headquarters and other intelligence agencies. 5-57. In situations where the mission is not oriented on a threat force, intelligence analysis and intelligence products may focus on terrain, weather, and civil considerations. (An example of this type of situation is a natural disaster.) However, IPOE must consider potential hazards and threats, such as terrorism, to any operation, as well as how friendly forces are under constant observation and contact by peer threats. Step 4—Determine Threat Courses of Action 5-58. During step 4, the intelligence staff identifies and develops possible threat COAs that can affect accomplishing the friendly mission. The staff uses the products associated with determining threat COAs to assist in developing and selecting friendly COAs during the COA steps of the MDMP. Identifying and developing valid threat COAs minimize the potential of surprise to the commander by an unanticipated threat action and support the development of important branches and sequels. 5-59. Failure to fully identify and develop valid threat COAs may lead to the development of an information collection strategy that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the threat has taken, potentially resulting in friendly forces being surprised and possibly defeated. When needed, the staff should identify all significant civil considerations (those identified as OE significant characteristics) to portray the interrelationship of the threat, friendly forces, and population activities. 5-60. The staff develops threat COAs in the same manner friendly COAs are developed. ADP 5-0 provides a model for developing valid threat COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with threat doctrine or patterns of operation. Although the intelligence staff has the primary responsibility for developing threat COAs, it needs assistance from the rest of the staff to present the most accurate and complete analysis to the commander. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PRODUCTS 5-61. While there are other important IPOE process outcomes, the development of several IPOE products is also important. These products assist in driving subsequent steps of the MDMP, targeting, collection management, protection, risk management, other processes, and the conduct of IPOE at lower echelons. While not all inclusive, figure 5-7 on page 5-18 shows the flow of common products across IPOE’s four steps. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-17 Chapter 5 Figure 5-7. Common intelligence preparation of the operational environment products PROVIDE WARNINGS 5-62. Across the range of military operations, various collection assets provide early warnings of threat action. As analysts screen incoming information and message traffic, they provide the commander with advanced warnings of threat activities or intentions that may change the basic nature of the operation. These warnings enable the commander and staff to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and to shape the OE. 5-63. Analysts can use analytic techniques and their current knowledge databases to project multiple scenarios and develop indicators as guidelines for providing warning intelligence. An indicator is, in intelligence usage, an item of information that reflects the intention or capability of an enemy and/or adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). Analysts project future events and identify event characteristics that can be manipulated or affected. Characteristics that cannot be manipulated or affected should be incorporated into unit SOPs as warning intelligence criteria. (See ATP 2-01 and ATP 2-01.3 for doctrine on indicators.) 5-18 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING 5-64. Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to support the targeting effort, which includes the selection, prioritization, execution, and assessment of targets. Therefore, the intelligence support to targeting effort must be resourced, carefully planned, and supported by a large portion of the intelligence architecture. Intelligence support to targeting occurs across most of the intelligence warfighting function. While all intelligence disciplines and complementary capabilities support targeting, the effort is ultimately focused by the close collaboration between the all-source intelligence analysis element (whether dedicated to targeting or ad hoc), the collection management element, and various targeting and fires elements, including the target development working group, if applicable. Certain staff elements, including the USAF SWO, CEMA officer, and space operations officer, also have an important role. Intelligence support to targeting includes support to planning (target development), identifying (target detection), and assessing the effect of those operations (combat assessment). 5-65. Characteristics that best describe the intelligence support to targeting effort include deliberate planning, collaboration across intelligence enterprise echelons, and precise intelligence to target threat capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity to achieve positions of relative advantage. Unfortunately, providing precise intelligence is challenging because threats, especially peer threats, make it difficult to collect on and analyze threat systems. Intelligence analysis to predict threat COAs (considering terrain and weather effects), provide intelligence specific to a location and time, and accurately assess the employment of capabilities is difficult. Intelligence support to targeting includes tracking highly mobile targets and simultaneously engaging targets, including targets in complex terrain (such as subterranean and urban areas and jungle and mountainous terrain) and targets across multiple domains and dimensions (for example, targeting threat information systems). 5-66. The intelligence warfighting function provides support during D3A—from developing plans through the MDMP and executing the operation after the MDMP. The targeting process is continuous and so is intelligence support to targeting. Just like IPOE, intelligence support to targeting is based on the data, information, and intelligence that result from planning, establishing, and revising the intelligence architecture; conducting pre-mission analysis of the OE; and leveraging data, information, and intelligence. While not all-inclusive, figure 5-8 illustrates intelligence support to targeting before receipt of mission and during and after the MDMP. Figure 5-8. Intelligence support to targeting over time 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-19 Chapter 5 DECIDE 5-67. During the MDMP, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander’s guidance and intent. Once the commander determines objectives, the intelligence staff must continuously review them with respect to the threat and the changing situation to ensure they remain relevant to the commander’s intent. Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the threat in terms of probable intent, objectives, strengths, vulnerabilities, and COAs (at a minimum, most likely and most dangerous). Additionally, intelligence analysts recommend objectives based on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and likely COAs. 5-68. The decide function of the targeting methodology provides the overall focus and sets priorities for information collection and attack planning. Decide, the most important targeting function, requires close interaction between the intelligence, plans, operations, CEMA, fire support, space, and legal. The intelligence staff analyzes threat systems and their components to make a recommendation for generating the commander’s intended effect on the target, although the fire support officer, in collaboration with the G-3/S- 3, makes the final decision. The intelligence input is based primarily on the AGM, determining the most effective friendly means available to produce the commander’s desired effect on the target. The decide function draws heavily on the staff’s knowledge of the threat, a detailed IPOE (which occurs simultaneously), and a continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities are addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. 5-69. During the targeting meeting, the collection management team advises the targeting working group on the ability of available collection systems to acquire and identify HPTs, track HPTs, and support BDA on HPTs. The team assists the working group, as needed, in revising the intelligence architecture to disseminate target-related intelligence to attack systems in near real time. The targeting working group further refines event templates and associated event matrices (developed during IPOE) into targeting matrices, which provide the level of detail the collection management team requires to focus information collection to support targeting. The team uses targeting matrices, IPOE products, and TSS to divide HPTs into collection functions (acquire and identify, track, and support BDA), SIRs, NAIs and TAIs, and specific collection tasks. (See figure 5-9.) (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4.) Figure 5-9. High-payoff target to specific information requirements 5-20 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support DETECT 5-70. The COIC is primarily responsible for directing the execution of the information collection effort to detect HPTs identified during the decide function. The intelligence cell (with the COIC) must focus its intelligence analysis efforts to support both situation development and the targeting effort. Therefore, close coordination between the intelligence cell and the FSE is critical. Key staff members in this effort include the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, information operations officer, FAIO, targeting officer, fire support coordinator, and fire support officer. 5-71. The collection manager directs the information collection synchronization effort, focusing on PIRs and target intelligence requirements. The collection manager ensures the information collection plan supports the finalized targeting plan. The collection management team, in coordination with the targeting team (or intelligence targeting officer), develops collection strategies to satisfy PIRs and targeting intelligence requirements. The collection management team may have to differentiate collection tasks to support the acquire and identify or track collection function when a collection asset cannot perform both collection functions. This is a major challenge during large-scale combat operations at which time the concept of persistent surveillance is often not possible. National technical means may have to serve as an intermittent form of surveillance, in conjunction with Army collection assets, to acquire and identify and track HPTs and may be one of the primary means to detect targets in the space and cyberspace domains. Some collection assets provide actual targetable information while information from other collection assets requires PED to produce valid targets. 5-72. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. The collection management team— ⚫ Plans for synchronized collection, focusing on the proper HPT at each phase in the COA. ⚫ Plans collection to satisfy that set of SIRs, if BDA is required to support the COA. ⚫ Plans and arranges, when possible, direct dissemination of targeting intelligence from the collector to the targeting cell or the appropriate fires element. 5-73. During operations, the collection management team— ⚫ Monitors the execution of the collection management plan. ⚫ Uses the information collection matrix to ensure collection assets focus on the proper HPTs (and their associated NAIs and TAIs). ⚫ Alerts the appropriate fires element as targets of opportunity present themselves. ⚫ Cross-cues collection assets to support the targeting effort. 5-74. When detecting an HPT, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO to determine if the target meets the commander’s attack guidance, the target’s priority, and if the target complies with TSS. To ensure target-related intelligence is disseminated quickly, the FAIO is normally collocated in the intelligence cell with communications to the FSE/fires cell. The intelligence cell also supports targeting through other means in conjunction with the CEMA cell, space operations officer, and the rest of the staff. The FAIO coordinates with the intelligence cell and disseminates target-related intelligence directly to the FSE/fires cell. If the target meets the commander’s attack guidance and targeting priorities, it is actioned in accordance with the commander’s intent. In those instances when the situation dictates developing a new HPT, or when the staff assesses a significant change to an existing HPT, subsequent target development must occur. HPTs have the potential to change by targeting cycle, phase, activating event, or other criteria directed by the commander. When subsequent target development is necessary, the targeting information is forwarded for intelligence analysis and the target development process must occur quickly. Upon identifying a target specified for attack, analysts pass the target to the FSE/fires cell or the appropriate staff proponent, who directs the desired prosecution of effects against the target. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4.) DELIVER 5-75. During the deliver function, the intelligence staff analyzes threat systems and their components to make a recommendation for generating the commander’s intended effect on the target although the fire support officer, in collaboration with the G-3/S-3, makes the final decision. The intelligence input is based primarily on the AGM—determining the most effective friendly means available to produce the commander’s desired 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-21 Chapter 5 effect on the target. During the deliver function, the collection management team cues collectors to continue tracking targets during its engagement. Preplanned or cued BDA collection and reporting assist in determining if the engagement produced the desired effects; if not, continued tracking supports immediate reengagement. (See ATP 2-01, ATP 2-01.3, and ATP 2-33.4.) ASSESS 5-76. Intelligence supports the assessment function by determining if targeting actions have met the desired effects and if reattack is necessary to perform essential fires tasks and achieve the commander’s intent for fires. Intelligence support to combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing physical damage assessments and functional damage assessments. During the assess function, the collection management team continuously assesses the information collection effort and compares ongoing actions to the collection management plan and the original intent. As operations progress and the situation deviates from the plan, it is important to ensure information collection supports all requirements. If the staff’s assessment reveals that some requirements are not answered, the collection management team must reevaluate the collection management plan. Then the team and staff must provide input on adjustments to the collection effort, retasking, or the development of new tasks. The collection management team and current operations track the situation relative to those requirements to determine the completion of the collection task, the effectiveness of targeting and resulting effects on the target, continued synchronization with other operations or emerging collection opportunities, and most critically, the requirements for target reattack, if required. 5-77. The assess function is nested in the overall continuous assessment of operations within the operations and intelligence processes. Assessments are directly connected to the commander’s decisions throughout the conduct of operations. Planning for assessment identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander directs be closely monitored and identifies where the commander wants to make the decisions. Intelligence has a major role in assessments. 5-78. The assess function is performed through combat assessment—the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Operational assessments are normally conducted only at echelons above brigade. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations. PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION ADVANTAGE 5-79. Chapter 2 discusses the OE dimensions; human, information, and physical advantages; and positions of relative advantage in accordance with FM 3-0. Initially, commanders and staffs should maintain a balanced outlook and approach to reaching human, information, and physical advantages. While not entirely new in execution, the recent doctrinal articulation of identifying and reaching advantages within and across dimensions can be somewhat complex. For example, most information advantages result from human and physical advantages, and several considerations to apply lethal and nonlethal means to reach a targeting effect span across all three dimensions. Additionally, most information advantages result from human and physical factors that are activities intrinsic to Army operations. 5-80. In many instances, especially during competition and crisis, commanders and staffs must understand many relevant aspects of the OE, including friendly and enemy capabilities and factors across the domains and dimensions, to conduct operations and activities to reach an information advantage. Additionally, commanders and staffs must understand and appreciate the complex interrelationship between the human, information, and physical dimensions from a friendly, threat, and other actors’ perspective. Units and intelligence organizations should leverage the Army Cyber Command G-2 and the Cyber Military Intelligence Group, the JFC information planning cell, and the Deputy Director for Global Operations for assistance in developing information advantage-specific support requirements. 5-81. Intelligence support to information advantage includes the following: ⚫ Support to understanding the OE, including the domains and dimensions. ⚫ Understanding threat information warfare capabilities and ongoing activities so friendly forces can preempt with their own messaging. 5-22 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support ⚫ IPOE. ⚫ Situation development. ⚫ Collection management. ⚫ Support to all information aspects of targeting. ⚫ Support to countering misinformation and disinformation efforts, including OSINT support. ⚫ Support to determining protection and security activities to mitigate threat activities. ⚫ Many aspects of CI, including technology protection. FM 2-0 modified the IWFTs to support information advantage: ART 2.4.2, Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations, from FM 2-0, dated 06 July 2018, has been deleted. ART 2.4.2, Provide Intelligence Support to Information Operations, subtasks have been captured under IWFT 2.2.5, Provide Intelligence Support to Unique Missions. Some of the subtasks include—provide intelligence support to public affairs, military information support operations, CEMA, cybersecurity, OPSEC, and military deception. (See appendix B.) (ART Army tactical task) PERFORM SITUATION DEVELOPMENT 5-82. The intelligence staff performs continual situation development once IPOE is completed to support the unit’s MDMP. Situation development involves the logical next steps of taking IPOE and MDMP results and continuing to support the commander and staff in terms of understanding, visualizing, and decision making— except for support to targeting, which is a separate task. IPOE products are converted into threat-tracking intelligence products as well as into the development of standard intelligence products that support situational understanding and a unit/organization’s battle rhythm. Analysts continually produce current intelligence to answer the commander’s requirements; update and refine IPOE products, as needed; and support transitions to the next phase of an operation, branch, or sequel. 5-83. While IPOE initially shapes the development of situation development products, performing situation development is different from performing IPOE. Situation development products are more useful when key staff members collaborate with the intelligence staff. There are several standard doctrinal intelligence products associated with this task. Different units should freely modify these doctrinal products or develop their own, as long as they meet the doctrinal intent of providing relevant and timely support to the commander and staff. Some of these intelligence products include— ⚫ Event templates and associated event matrices. (See ATP 2-01.3.) ⚫ Intelligence estimates. (See ATP 2-33.4.) ⚫ Intelligence running estimates. (See ATP 2-33.4.) ⚫ INTSUMs. (See ATP 2-33.4.) ⚫ Graphic INTSUMs. (See ATP 2-33.4.) ⚫ Intelligence reports. (See ATP 2-33.4.) ⚫ Periodic intelligence reports. (See ATP 2-33.4.) ⚫ BDA charts. ⚫ Visualization products (according to the commander’s preference). 5-84. The intelligence staff can develop these products in digital, hardcopy, and/or acetate formats, depending on the echelon; various C2 and intelligence systems; DDIL communications environments; and the unit’s PACE plan. Performing situation development at any echelon also depends on how commanders and staffs decide to share, integrate, and synchronize the CIP and COP across echelons. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-23 Chapter 5 SECTION VI – SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, THE COMMON INTELLIGENCE PICTURE, AND THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE 5-85. As an operation progresses, the intelligence staff facilitates the commander and staff’s situational understanding through as timely and accurate situation development as possible. Information collection at and across echelons results in combat information and the dissemination of data and information to intelligence elements for analysis and the production of intelligence. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff perform many activities to integrate and synchronize intelligence collection, PED, and intelligence analysis at and across echelons, including collection management. Each echelon performs information collection and also collaborates across echelons to share data, information, and intelligence, which can be maintained at or accessed by that echelon. 5-86. The fog and friction of operations and information collection, as well as time constraints, can significantly challenge the intelligence staff. As this occurs, the intelligence staff provides continuous intelligence products, within the capabilities of intelligence analysis systems, including the COP, to facilitate the commander and staff’s situational understanding. The COP is the most important operational product used to establish a shared understanding between echelons. The intelligence staff provides the intelligence portion of the COP to the rest of the staff for integration into the COP. However, the G-2/S-2 ultimately succeeds or fails—not by producing any particular intelligence product or CIP; the G-2/S-2 succeeds by providing the commander what the commander needs, with respect to accurate intelligence, when the commander needs it. 5-87. Concurrent with producing intelligence, the intelligence staff collaborates across echelons to maintain a shared or common interpretation of threat locations, capabilities, objectives and intent, COAs, strengths, and vulnerabilities. While the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff’s primary responsibility is to their commander and staff, they must also continually collaborate and share products, such as the CIP and intelligence portion of the COP across echelons. This open collaboration—usually up and down at least one echelon and with adjacent units—and a common intelligence interpretation result in better intelligence for each echelon’s commander and staff and supports a shared operational understanding between echelons. Figure 5-10 depicts the complex and intense effort to both support the commander and staff and collaborate across echelons with other intelligence staffs to support a common interpretation. 5-88. There are several areas where friction occurs while providing the commander and staff with intelligence to drive decision making and targeting and have a common interpretation between echelons: ⚫ The commander can disagree with the analysis. After providing the commander with the logic, if the commander still disagrees, the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff must adopt the commander’s analysis while still considering other possible threat actions to support branches and sequels. ⚫ The higher- or lower-level or adjacent-unit G-2/S-2 or representative can disagree with the intelligence interpretation of many threat aspects of the situation. ⚫ Commanders across echelons can have a very different understanding, including their interpretation of the threat situation. ⚫ Communications between echelons can be degraded, intermittent, and limited. 5-89. The intelligence warfighting function works through this friction and then resets the CIP, as needed. Resetting a common interpretation of the situation and building a new CIP are necessary as commanders make decisions, operations transition, or echelons start a new MDMP and IPOE. 5-24 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support Figure 5-10. The effort to support the commander and maintain common intelligence across echelons and laterally THE COMMON INTELLIGENCE PICTURE 5-90. The common intelligence picture is a single, identical display of relevant, instructive, and contextual intelligence information regarding enemy, adversary, and neutral force disposition, and supporting infrastructures derived from all sources at any level of classification, shared by more than one command, that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to enhance situational awareness and decision making (JP 2-0). For Army purposes, the CIP is viewed as a single display or any combination of displays and products that— ⚫ Support the commander and staff’s situational understanding. ⚫ Allow the development of the intelligence portion of the COP. ⚫ Assist collaboration between echelons to support a common interpretation of key aspects of the threat. Note. In most instances, current technology and systems do not support a single CIP accomplishing all that is mentioned above. Therefore, the CIP can be any combination of the intelligence products discussed under situation development (see paragraph 5-83) as well as overlays, either digital or acetate. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-25 Chapter 5 5-91. The CIP relies on constant intelligence synchronization and continuing assessments. Specifically, the CIP is based on— ⚫ Data, information, and intelligence from multiple echelons, organizations, and agencies. ⚫ Leveraging the intelligence enterprise. 5-92. The commander often directs how information and intelligence should be displayed on the CIP; the G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff should ensure the information and intelligence are tailored to the commander’s requirements. The following include some key aspects of the CIP: ⚫ The CIP is derived from— ▪ All intelligence disciplines, complementary capabilities, and ancillary collection assets. ▪ Threat and civil considerations information across all domains and dimensions of the OE. ⚫ The CIP is driven by unit SOPs and collaboration up and down one echelon. 5-93. G-2/S-2s must consider the following (not all-inclusive) when developing the CIP: ⚫ Commander’s requirements. ⚫ The unit’s mission. ⚫ CIP classification. ⚫ Echelon of CIP development. ⚫ CIP management procedures. ⚫ Available intelligence architecture and bandwidth. ⚫ Types of information to be displayed. ⚫ How information is to be displayed. ⚫ Dissemination and ingestion methods and procedures. ⚫ Reporting timelines. 5-94. The CIP focuses on describing the OE, the threat, and threat COAs. This product should have both a visual and textual component. If organized appropriately, both components will convey a clear and relevant threat narrative consistent with operational terminology. Intelligence staffs must exercise high control over the threat narrative to ensure consistency, which supports the commander and staff’s situational understanding. Chapter 8 discusses developing the CIP during large-scale combat operations. INTELLIGENCE PORTION OF THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE 5-95. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff carefully consider what aspects of the CIP to disseminate to the operations staff as the intelligence portion of the COP. The common operational picture is a display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADP 6-0). Although the COP is ideally a single display, it may include more than one display and information in other forms, such as graphic representations or written reports, automatic updates, and overlays, often digitally stored in a common database. The intelligence portions of the COP are those messages and overlays relating to threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations in the common database. The G-2/S-2 and intelligence staff ensure the common database reflects the most current information and intelligence available to maintain the timeliness, accuracy, and relevancy of the intelligence portion of the COP. 5-96. The commander and staff must account for and mitigate any limitations in the COP based on the C2 system and technology used to generate the COP. The threat situation and civil considerations portions of the COP, while updated by the intelligence staff regularly, are sometimes limited to displaying somewhat latent and composite locations and threat force dispositions. Somewhat latent indicates that in most situations, those locations were captured at a specific time and are not automatically updated. Composite indicates that in some situations, those locations were captured across multiple dates/times. The intelligence portion of the COP may also require further explanation from the intelligence staff or other intelligence products due to the complexity of the threat situation and mission variables. 5-26 FM 2-0 01 October 2023  Intelligence Staff Support 5-97. With the complexity of the OE, the intelligence staff must be prepared to— ⚫ Validate and maintain the threat portions of the COP in a timely and flexible manner. ⚫ Collaborate with the rest of the staff to ensure the appropriate operational and mission variables are displayed. ⚫ Effectively display the multiple types and layers of information the commander requires. 5-98. A COP is key to achieving and maintaining shared situational understanding in all domains and making effective decisions faster than the threat. The difficulty of maintaining a COP in a multinational environment varies based on training levels, language differences, level of data sharing, technical compatibility of systems, restrictions based on classification, and other national caveats. 5-99. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists commanders at all echelons in achieving shared situational understanding. The COP must consider relevant factors in domains affecting the operation as well as provide and enable a common understanding of the interrelationships between actions and effects through the human, information, and physical dimensions. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to visualize the effects of their decisions on other elements of the force and the overall operation. 01 October 2023 FM 2-0 5-27