Ch. 1 Fundamentals PDF

PART ONE Fundamental Principles, Process Activities, and Relationships Chapter 1 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (...

PART ONE Fundamental Principles, Process Activities, and Relationships Chapter 1 Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (IPOE) DEFINED 1-1. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (FM 2-0). IPOE allows commanders and staffs to take a holistic approach to analyzing the operational environment (OE). A holistic approach— ⚫ Describes the totality of relevant aspects of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces. ⚫ Accounts for all relevant domains that may impact friendly and threat operations. ⚫ Identifies windows of opportunity to leverage friendly capabilities against threat forces. ⚫ Allows commanders to leverage positions of relative advantage at a time and place most advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available. 1-2. IPOE results in intelligence products that are used during the military decision-making process (MDMP) to assist in developing friendly courses of action (COAs) and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products (which are included in the intelligence estimate) developed during IPOE are critical to planning information collection and targeting operations. IPOE products include— ⚫ Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and high-value target (HVT) lists. ⚫ Event templates and associated event matrices. ⚫ Modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOOs), terrain effects matrices, and terrain assessments. ⚫ Weather effects work aids—weather forecast charts, weather effects matrices, light and illumination tables, and weather estimates. ⚫ Civil considerations overlays and assessments. 1-3. The J-2/G-2/S-2 leads the staff effort and begins preparing for IPOE during generate intelligence knowledge, which is associated with the intelligence support to force generation task of the intelligence warfighting function and incorporated into the Army design methodology. (See FM 2-0 for intelligence warfighting function tasks.) 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-1 Chapter 1 1-4. During generate intelligence knowledge, intelligence staffs create data files for their OE based on existing information and their evaluation of the information and intelligence related to the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]). The intelligence staff can also access holdings maintained by the military intelligence brigade-theater (also called MIB-T). This theater-aligned unit processes, refines, and stores intelligence products daily, which benefit nonregionally aligned units. 1-5. When generating intelligence knowledge, the intelligence staff should begin by determining the information needed to collect on the OE. As the staff begins to collect data on the OE, the data should be organized into baseline data files in accordance with the commander’s guidance. +These files must be compatible with the unit’s command and control (C2) information systems. Generally, tactical echelons create primary data files based on the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Strategic and operational echelons create data files based on the commander’s operational requirements. 1-6. Given the limited time available to collect and evaluate information and intelligence on the operational variables, the information obtained from these data files may not be specific enough to support the IPOE process and the MDMP. However, the commander and staff can use the information to assist in framing the OE during the Army design methodology. 1-7. Throughout the operations process, the commander and staff continually collect information and analyze the operational variables in order to provide increased situational understanding due to possible contingency operations. +Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). 1-8. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, the commander and staff draw relevant information categorized by the operational variables and filter it into the mission variables used during mission analysis. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC). During IPOE, the staff focuses on the relevant aspects of the OE as they pertain to the staff’s warfighting function. The staff focuses primarily on the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. However, depending on the staff’s echelon, the type of OE, the type of operation, and changes in the OE, the staff may need to update its analysis to ensure the mission focus is both relevant and accurate. 1-9. To be effective, IPOE must— ⚫ Be a continuous process with all staff members providing input. ⚫ Account for all domains, the information environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). (See chapter 8.) ⚫ Define the commander’s area of interest (AOI) by its geographic boundaries to focus collection and analysis within the AOI. ⚫ Describe how the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations will affect friendly and threat operations. ⚫ Include relevant aspects of the OE for decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. (See FM 3-0 for more on these operations.) ⚫ Support each step of the MDMP with IPOE products. ⚫ Determine how the interactions of friendly forces, threat forces, and local populations affect each other to continually create outcomes that positively affect friendly operations. This aspect of IPOE is not the sole responsibility of the intelligence staff. It involves the commander and the entire staff collaborating to determine these effects. ⚫ Support the operational framework considerations—physical, temporal, cognitive, and virtual. (See paragraph 1-60.) ⚫ Facilitate the commander’s ability to visualize the desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape current conditions into that end state. ⚫ Support the commander in directing the intelligence effort. ⚫ Facilitate understanding threat characteristics and the threat’s goals, objectives, and COAs. 1-2 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals 1-10. IPOE is most effective and best aids the commander’s decision making when the intelligence staff integrates the expertise of the other staff sections and supporting elements into its analysis. (See paragraphs 1- 27 through 1-33.) This is especially true when operating in environments where the effects of the operational and mission variables are complex, multidimensional, and not easily determined. 1-11. IPOE assists commanders in reducing uncertainty by evaluating how the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations may affect operations and decision making. Most intelligence requirements are generated because of IPOE and its interrelationship with decision making. 1-12. A key aspect of IPOE is refinement. The conclusions and the products developed during IPOE are continually refined throughout the operation. This information is incorporated into the running estimate as new information is obtained and further analysis is conducted during situation development. (See FM 6-0 for more information on the running estimate.) This refinement ensures the commander’s decisions are based on the most current information and intelligence available. IPOE PROCESS ACTIVITIES 1-13. The IPOE process consists of the following four steps: ⚫ Define the OE. ⚫ Describe environmental effects on operations. ⚫ Evaluate the threat. ⚫ Determine threat COAs. Note. Although there are four steps to the IPOE process, it is important to note that IPOE is a continuous process. Continuous analysis and assessment are necessary to maintain situational understanding of an OE in constant flux. STEP 1—DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-14. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An OE for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (such as politics, economics) that affect OE conditions and operations. Thus, each commander’s OE is part of a higher commander’s OE. Defining the OE results in the identification of— ⚫ Significant characteristics of the OE that can affect friendly and threat operations. ⚫ Gaps in current intelligence holdings. 1-15. Step 1 is important because it assists the commander in defining relative aspects of the OE in time and space. This is equally important when considering characteristics of multi-domain OEs. Aspects of these OEs may act simultaneously across the battlefield but may only factor in friendly or threat operations at specific times and locations. 1-16. During step 1, the intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission. The intelligence staff evaluates significant characteristics to identify gaps and initiate information collection. The intelligence staff then justifies the analysis to the commander. Failure to identify or misidentifying the effect these variables may have on operations at a given time and place can hinder decision making and result in the development of an ineffective information collection strategy. During step 1, the area of operations (AO), AOI, and area of influence must also be identified and established. (Chapter 3 discusses step 1 fully.) 1-17. Understanding friendly and threat forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, languages, tribal affiliations, and operational and mission variables, can be equally important. Identifying the significant characteristics of the OE is essential in identifying the additional information needed to complete IPOE. Once approved by the commander, this information becomes the commander’s initial intelligence requirements— which focus the commander’s initial information collection efforts and the remaining steps of the IPOE process. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-3 Chapter 1 1-18. Additionally, where a unit will be assigned and how its operations will synchronize with other associated operations must be considered. For example, the G-2/S-2 should be forming questions regarding where the unit will deploy within the entire theater of operations and the specific logistics requirements needed to handle the operation’s contingency plans. STEP 2—DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS 1-19. During step 2 of the IPOE process, the intelligence staff describes how significant characteristics affect friendly operations. The intelligence staff also describes how terrain, weather, civil considerations, and friendly forces affect threat forces. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until the development of threat COAs in step 4 of IPOE and friendly COAs later in the MDMP. The entire staff determines the effects of friendly and threat force actions on the population. 1-20. If the intelligence staff does not have the information required to form conclusions, it uses assumptions to fill information gaps—always careful to ensure the commander understands when assumptions are used in place of facts to form conclusions. (Chapter 4 discusses step 2 fully.) STEP 3—EVALUATE THE THREAT 1-21. The purpose of evaluating the threat is to understand how a threat can affect friendly operations. Although threat forces may conform to some of the fundamental principles of warfare that guide Army operations, these forces will have obvious, as well as subtle, differences in how they approach situations and problem solving. Understanding these differences is essential to understanding how a threat force will react in a given situation. 1-22. Threat evaluation does not begin with IPOE. The intelligence staff conducts threat evaluations and creates threat models during generate intelligence knowledge of the intelligence support to force generation task. Using this information, the intelligence staff refines threat models, as necessary, to support IPOE. When analyzing a well-known threat, the intelligence staff may be able to rely on previously developed threat models. When analyzing a new or less well-known threat, the intelligence staff may need to evaluate the threat and develop threat models during the MDMP’s mission analysis step. When this occurs, the intelligence staff relies heavily on the threat evaluation conducted by higher headquarters and other intelligence agencies. 1-23. In situations where there is no threat force, the intelligence analysis conducted and the products developed relating to terrain, weather, and civil considerations may be sufficient to support planning. An example of this type of situation is a natural disaster. (Chapter 5 discusses step 3 more fully.) STEP 4—DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION 1-24. During step 4, the intelligence staff identifies and develops possible threat COAs that can affect accomplishing the friendly mission. The staff uses the products associated with determining threat COAs to assist in developing and selecting friendly COAs during COA steps of the MDMP. Identifying and developing all valid threat COAs minimize the potential of surprise to the commander by an unanticipated threat action. 1-25. Failure to fully identify and develop all valid threat COAs may lead to the development of an information collection strategy that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the threat has taken and may result in friendly forces being surprised and possibly defeated. When needed, the staff should identify all significant civil considerations (this refers to those civil considerations identified as OE significant characteristics) to portray the interrelationship of the threat, friendly forces, and population activities. 1-26. The staff develops threat COAs in the same manner friendly COAs are developed. The COA development discussion in ADP 5-0 is an excellent model for developing valid threat COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with threat doctrine or patterns of operation. Although the intelligence staff has the primary responsibility for developing threat COAs, it needs assistance from the rest of the staff to present the most accurate and complete analysis to the commander. (Chapter 6 discusses step 4 fully.) 1-4 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals STAFF COLLABORATION 1-27. Precise intelligence is critical to targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity across domains. Commanders and staffs receive effective intelligence when they direct and participate in intelligence warfighting function activities. +Close interaction between the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the rest of the staff is essential, as the entire staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes. 1-28. From the perspective of fighting for intelligence, the first aspect of supporting operations is developing good information requirements and designating priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) resulting from IPOE and the completion of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute friendly operations. Staff collaboration assists in developing this detailed knowledge and accounts for possible threat COAs. 1-29. Commanders drive intelligence, intelligence facilitates operations, and operations enable intelligence; this relationship is continuous. Commanders provide tactical and operational experience as it relates to various OEs and missions; they also provide an understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. Commanders assist in shaping the focus and scope of IPOE to facilitate an effective MDMP. 1-30. G-2/S-2s facilitate the IPOE effort; however, G-2/S-2s and their staffs cannot provide all of the information the commander requires for situational understanding. Other staff sections or supporting elements must assist the intelligence staff in producing and continuously refining all IPOE products. Total staff integration ensures a holistic view of the OE, reduces the initial time required for IPOE development, and assists the commander in timely decision making. This coordination also improves the quality and accuracy of IPOE products. 1-31. Staff sections bring their expertise to IPOE as follows: ⚫ The chief of staff or executive officer— ◼ Ensures IPOE is performed as a collaborative effort. ◼ Synchronizes staff activities during IPOE. ◼ Using tools, such as the one-third to two-thirds planning rule as a guide, determines how long each step of the MDMP will take, how much time is allocated to mission analysis, and how much time within mission analysis can be suballocated to IPOE. ⚫ The G-1/S-1 assists in analyzing the OE to identify its relevant aspects and how they will impact the following, including but not limited to— ◼ Casualty assistance operations. ◼ Personnel accountability. ◼ Essential human resources services. ◼ Personnel support activities. ⚫ The G-2/S-2 analyzes the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations and assists the commander in improving the understanding of how these variables can affect operations. +The G-2/S-2 does this through the production of an intelligence assessment that supports the MDMP; the integrating processes of targeting, risk management, and information collection; and security operations. The rest of the staff assists the G-2/S-2 in this effort. The G-2/S- 2 also informs the staff on intelligence capabilities, limitations, and operations. (Appendix A provides the “how to” of IPOE as a checklist for the S-2.) Additionally, the G-2/S-2— ◼ Facilitates generating intelligence knowledge. ◼ Continually coordinates with the staff, outside agencies, and organizations for input to situational understanding. ◼ Identifies AOIs and areas of influence. ◼ Assists the staff with threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent. ◼ Conducts terrain analysis. ◼ Determines the threat’s composition and disposition. ◼ Develops threat templates by warfighting function. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-5 Chapter 1 ◼ With assistance from the other staff sections, determines threat missions, objectives, schemes of maneuver, and desired end states. ◼ Coordinates with the staff to identify HVTs and threat COAs. ◼ Determines named areas of interest (NAIs) with staff input. ⚫ The G-3/S-3 provides subject matter expertise on the art and science of military operations and— ◼ Reviews the G-2/S-2’s evaluation of threat COAs. ◼ Reviews the G-2/S-2’s identification and evaluation of the threat’s composition and disposition. ◼ Assists the G-2/S-2 with terrain and weather effects on friendly and threat operations. ◼ Ensures the G-2/S-2 and other staff members understand the AO and other friendly maneuver limitations and parameters specified by higher headquarters. ◼ Ensures the G-2/S-2 and other staff members understand available friendly maneuver forces. ◼ Assists in selecting high-payoff targets (HPTs), target areas of interest (TAIs), and decision points. ◼ Assists in developing the decision support template (DST). ◼ Evaluates threat COAs to ensure they are valid from an operational perspective. ◼ Evaluates threat situation templates, COA statements, HVT lists, and civil considerations overlays and assessments to ensure they contain the information necessary to support friendly COA development and analysis. ◼ Evaluates the event template and matrix to ensure they contain the information necessary to support friendly COA analysis and the development of the DST. ⚫ +The G-4/S-4 provides subject matter expertise on sustainment operations and assists the G-2/S-2 in— ◼ Identifying and evaluating threat and host-nation logistics capabilities. ◼ Potential supply routes and resupply points. ⚫ The G-5/S-5 is the principal staff officer for planning mid- to long-range operations. Coordination with the G-5/S-5 ensures the synchronization of IPOE and information collection for future operations or the next phase of an operation. The G-5/S-5 also assists in developing branches and sequels as well as deception plans. ⚫ The G-6/S-6 provides subject matter expertise on friendly communications systems and assists the G-2/S-2 in identifying and evaluating friendly communications systems’ vulnerabilities to cyberspace and electronic attack. Additionally, the G-6/S-6 coordinates with the spectrum manager to determine friendly forces’ vulnerabilities to known threat systems. ⚫ The G-9/S-9 provides subject matter expertise on civil affairs operations. This staff assists the G-2/S-2 in— ◼ Identifying and evaluating civil considerations on military operations and evaluating the effect of military operations on civilian populations, in conjunction with the G-3/S-3. ◼ Identifying protected targets. (The civil affairs staff, along with the chief of fires or fire support officer, provides this assistance.) ◼ Creating and maintaining civil considerations overlay, assessments, and data files and/or databases. ◼ Providing information on the neutral population, and how it supports/opposes the host nation and friendly and threat forces. 1-32. The intelligence staff coordinates with key supporting elements, whose expertise supports IPOE: ⚫ The operations security officer, co-located with the S-3, provides subject matter expertise on friendly vulnerabilities during the phases of an operation. For example, friendly forces may be vulnerable to different threat capabilities; the operations security officer can assist in identifying by phase which threat assets and capabilities should be the focus of information collection and targeting. 1-6 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals ⚫ Information operations provide subject matter expertise on shaping operational activities in and through the information environment and cyberspace. (See FM 3-13.) The information operations officer is responsible for— ◼ Integrating information-related capabilities. ◼ Assisting the G-2/S-2 to identify and evaluate threat information capabilities and deception and denial capabilities, as well as the means to influence the population. ◼ Providing information on friendly, neutral, and threat key communicators to use as part of a nonlethal engagement strategy through various information-related capabilities. ⚫ The chief of fires at division and above and the fire support officer at brigade and below provide subject matter expertise on fires. The fires (artillery and air defense) subject matter expert— ◼ Assists the G-2/S-2 in— ⎯ Developing threat fires-related HVTs. ⎯ Evaluating threat fire support operations, including identifying potential friendly HPTs from the threat perspective. ⎯ Assessing potential threat artillery. ⎯ Developing situation and event templates of probable threat employment of fire support assets. ⎯ Positioning threat fire support assets on the situation template. ◼ Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 in identifying types of threat artillery and evaluating likely threat artillery and/or missile positions. ◼ Assists the staff in identifying and evaluating potential engagement areas and kill zones. ◼ Assists, in coordination with the G-2/S-2 and the staff weather officer, in determining what effect weather and terrain will have on threat artillery systems. ◼ Participates in the selection of HPTs, TAIs, and decision points. ◼ Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 in determining the fire support effort to the friendly information collection effort and in countering the threat information collection effort. ◼ Assists the staff on protection from threat air. ⚫ The engineer coordinator provides subject matter expertise on mobility and countermobility and assists the G-2/S-2 in developing threat obstacle plans for the situation template. The engineer coordinator— ◼ Assists the staff in identifying and assessing obstacles along friendly and avenues of approach (AAs). ◼ Assists the G-2/S-2 with terrain analysis and those terrain analysis products that support IPOE. ◼ Assists the G-2/S-2 in developing the MCOO. ◼ Provides staff input concerning threat mobility, countermobility, and survivability doctrine, tactics, and equipment capabilities. ◼ Assists in developing situation and event templates regarding the probable employment of threat engineer assets and obstacle emplacement. ◼ Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 in determining engineer support to the friendly information collection effort and in countering the threat information collection effort. ◼ Provides engineer reconnaissance input, including the military load-capacity of bridges. (See ATP 3-34.81.) ⚫ The chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer provides subject matter expertise and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of CBRN assets, production, and storage facilities; the availability of precursor chemicals and materials; and the potential areas of CBRN employment. The CBRN officer— ◼ Provides input to the G-2/S-2 on threat CBRN doctrine, capabilities, and employment. ◼ Assists the staff in templating likely locations of threat CBRN assets. ◼ Advises the staff on threat doctrine concerning the use of obscurants, likely triggers for its employment, and types of obscurant-generating equipment. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-7 Chapter 1 ◼ Assists the staff in locating water sources that friendly and threat forces could use for CBRN decontamination operations. ◼ Advises the G-2/S-2, in coordination with the staff weather officer, on the impact of the weather and terrain on friendly and threat CBRN operations. ⚫ The air defense artillery (ADA) officer provides subject matter expertise on ADA and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of ADA assets and potential areas of employment. The ADA officer— ◼ Advises the G-2/S-2, in coordination with the staff weather officer, on the impact of the weather and terrain on friendly and threat ADA operations. ◼ Provides input to the G-2/S-2 on threat ADA doctrine, capabilities, and employment. ◼ Assists the staff in templating likely locations of threat ADA assets. ◼ Assists the staff in determining weather and terrain effects on friendly and threat ADA operations. ◼ Provides staff input concerning threat ADA doctrine, tactics, capabilities, and equipment. ◼ Assists in developing threat HVTs. ◼ Assists in identifying threat air AAs and assessing threat fixed-wing and rotary-wing air defense capabilities. Note. An air AA refers to the air route of a threat aerial or tactical ballistic missile force of a given size leading to its objective or to the key terrain in its path. (See ATP 3-01.16.) ⚫ The spectrum manager provides subject matter expertise on procedures for using the EMS and for avoiding communications interferences. ⚫ The electromagnetic warfare (EW) officer— ◼ Provides subject matter expertise on ground-based, airborne, and functional EW employment considerations. ◼ Assists in developing threat EW-, communications-, and radar-related HVTs. ◼ Has additional responsibilities as the cyberspace planner. (See FM 3-12.) ◼ Assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of EW assets and potential areas and methods of employment. ◼ Assists in determining friendly forces’ vulnerabilities to known threat systems. ⚫ The surgeon provides subject matter expertise for the analysis and disposition of captured enemy medical materiel and for the analysis of any medications carried by captured or detained threat personnel. 1-33. External assets, such as the following, provide additional subject matter expertise for input to the IPOE process: red teams, red cells, foreign-area officers, international affairs officers, cultural enablers, State Department officers, regional experts, psychological operations units, and other special operations units. RELATIONSHIPS 1-34. As one of the integrating processes, IPOE is integral to targeting, risk management, information collection, planning, and decision making. (See chapter 2.) IPOE is also related to the generate intelligence knowledge and situation development tasks. TARGETING 1-35. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). During steps 3 and 4 of IPOE, the intelligence staff identifies HVTs associated with each threat capability or COA. This assists the fires cell in conducting target-value analysis. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60). 1-8 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals 1-36. The following techniques may be useful in identifying and evaluating HVTs: ⚫ Identify HVTs from existing intelligence studies, database evaluations, patrol debriefs, and size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (also called SALUTE) reports. Reviewing threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and previous threat operations as well as understanding the threat task, purpose, method, and end state are useful. ⚫ Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation, branches, or sequels. ⚫ Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the threat’s ability to substitute other assets and adopt branches or sequels. ⚫ Consider AO and AOI effects and potentially broader effects. ⚫ Consider how the threat may use multiple capabilities to create the effects of one or more HVTs. ⚫ Consider how the threat may use assets by phases of an operation, which may lead to classifying certain threat assets, functions, or systems as HVTs across all domains, the information environment, and the EMS. ⚫ Consider the multi-domain nature of complex OEs and how threat forces may use assets to disrupt friendly operations at multiple echelons and locations. ⚫ After identifying HVTs, place them in order of their relative worth to the threat’s operation and record them as part of the threat model. The value of an HVT varies throughout an operation. 1-37. A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). HPTs are those HVTs that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. The staff develops HPTs, which can include various threat considerations that can be detrimental to the friendly mission’s success. 1-38. The intelligence staff, aided by other staff sections, also identifies indicators associated with those targets that can assist in determining their locations and activities. Identifying HVTs during IPOE is essential to developing HPTs during the COA development step of the MDMP, and to refining those targets throughout the operations process, particularly during targeting boards and meetings. (Chapter 6 discusses the identification of HVTs and indicators.) 1-39. During targeting meetings, the intelligence officer, along with other staff sections or supporting elements, assesses friendly capabilities, friendly missions, and the effects of friendly actions on the civilian populace. As HPTs are developed, the analysis of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations conducted during IPOE assists in developing intelligence target packages on those targets. (See FM 3-60.) RISK MANAGEMENT 1-40. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and mitigate risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). IPOE assists in identifying, quantifying, and mitigating risks. For example, a commander may consider attacking a target on the protected target list. However, because the entire staff performs IPOE, which provides an understanding of the OE based on analysis of the mission variables, the true impact of attacking the target can be articulated (the reason the target is on the protected target list), and the commander can make an informed decision to balance risk with mission benefit. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs use risk management to mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill friendly and civilian personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. (See ATP 5-19 for additional information on risk management.) INFORMATION COLLECTION 1-41. Information collection relies on IPOE results. The staff’s continuous input to IPOE provides an analysis of the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. It also provides the following information required to plan information collection activities: ⚫ Characteristics of the AOI that will influence friendly and threat operations (including civil considerations). ⚫ Threat event templates, including decision points and matrices critical to information collection planning. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-9 Chapter 1 ⚫ Information collection assets’ sensitivities to weather and the effects of weather on planned or potential operations. ⚫ Threat characteristics, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and behavior. ⚫ Possible and likely threat COAs. ⚫ HVTs. 1-42. The Army executes information collection through the operations and intelligence processes (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging national to tactical intelligence). Even if the mission is new, the intelligence staff can identify and tap into ongoing or existing information collection activities or joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (also called ISR) collection that may offer relevant information to fill gaps. These requirements identify the critical pieces of information the commander must know to successfully conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) operations. 1-43. Ideally, information collection should enable staffs to develop a perception of the threat and the situation on the battlefield that matches the actual threat and situation on the battlefield. In reality, information collection does not eliminate all information gaps that concern commanders and staffs. Intelligence staffs, in conjunction with the other staff sections, should be prepared to fill gaps with reasonable assumptions and continually send out additional requests for information to refine IPOE. 1-44. There is a relationship between IPOE and information collection—the IPOE products that feed intelligence drive information collection requirements. This means that the IPOE process identifies intelligence gaps that are translated into information requirements and PIRs, which are then answered through collection. 1-45. The staff collaborates on information considerations and integrates available resources into an integrated information collection plan. Well-stated information requirements assist the commander in accomplishing the mission by illustrating those key knowledge gaps and earmarking them for collection. 1-46. Developing requirements also supports the commander’s decision making regarding targeting. To target the threat effectively, the staff develops NAIs and TAIs. A named area of interest is the geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of enemy and adversary courses of action (JP 2-0). A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (JP 2-0). NAIs should not be tied to a specific terrain; rather, they should be based on threat locations or suspected locations. NAI Example Instead of focusing on an area surrounding a hilltop named 1631 where the enemy may have placed an air defense unit, analysts should focus NAIs on the enemy’s unit or functional capability. For example, analysts should focus on the suspected locations where the enemy may place its combined arms reserve or subterranean locations to conduct a counterattack. To refine the locations, analysts should study the enemy’s doctrinal or historical use of the combined arms reserve, the capabilities of the critical combat systems associated with the combined arms reserve, and the known rates of march for the terrain in which the combined arms reserve will be operating. 1-47. Units need to conduct information collection consistently and continuously. To be effective, information collection must be based on IPOE results; it must be adjusted as IPOE results are refined through the situation development process. Conversely, the results of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations—the primary means for information collection—drive the refinement of IPOE results as appropriate. The staff must understand the roles and relationships of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations, and how the commander assesses ongoing operations as the unit develops the situation through action. 1-10 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals GENERATE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE 1-48. Not all information required to conduct IPOE will be readily available to intelligence staffs upon receipt of mission. Generate intelligence knowledge is critical for G-2/S-2s to maintain analytical proficiency and situational awareness of possible impending missions and contingencies. Generate intelligence knowledge begins before mission receipt and provides the relevant knowledge required about the OE for the conduct of operations. Once the intelligence officer and other staff sections collect data on the OE, they organize the data into databases. The information obtained is refined into knowledge for use in mission analysis through functional analysis. (See ATP 2-33.4 for more on functional analysis.) Information is obtained through intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; open-source intelligence; reconnaissance and security operations; and other information sources. Sources for generating intelligence knowledge include but are not limited to— ⚫ Internet: ◼ Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (also called NIPRNET). ◼ SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (also called SIPRNET). ◼ Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (also called JWICS). ◼ Intelligence databases. ⚫ Other military Services or agencies: ◼ United States (U.S.) Air Force. ◼ U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department. ◼ Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. ◼ National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (also called NGA). ◼ National Ground Intelligence Center (also called NGIC). ◼ Defense Intelligence Agency (also called DIA). ◼ Office of Naval Intelligence (also called ONI). ◼ U.S. Coast Guard. ◼ Army and other Service special operations forces. ⚫ Outside agencies: ◼ Central Intelligence Agency (also called CIA). ◼ National Security Agency (also called NSA). ◼ U.S. Agency for International Development (also called USAID). ⚫ Outside organizations: ◼ World Health Organization (also called WHO). ◼ International Committee of the Red Cross (also called ICRC). ⚫ University research. ⚫ Country studies. ⚫ Area estimates. ⚫ Intelligence summaries. ⚫ Open-source information. 1-49. The types of useful information obtained from sources for generating intelligence knowledge include but are not limited to— ⚫ Order of battle data files. ⚫ Centers of gravity. ⚫ Current situation. ⚫ Demographics. ⚫ Geography. ⚫ Regional partners. ⚫ Economy. ⚫ Threat systems and functions. ⚫ Population. ⚫ Past conflicts. ⚫ Government and military ⚫ Rule of law status. leadership. ⚫ Infrastructure development. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-11 Chapter 1 1-50. Information gained though generate intelligence knowledge can also be used to identify intelligence gaps for possible contingencies, therefore reducing the time needed for research in the event of mission receipt. Generate intelligence knowledge is the foundation for performing IPOE and mission analysis. The primary product of the generate intelligence knowledge task is the initial data file, which is created based on the analysis of the operational variables (PMESII-PT). (See FM 2-0 for more information on the generate intelligence knowledge task.) SITUATION DEVELOPMENT 1-51. Situation development is a process for analyzing information and producing current intelligence concerning the relevant aspects of the OE (the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations) within the AO before and during operations. The process assists the intelligence staff in recognizing and interpreting indicators of threat intentions and objectives. Situation development— ⚫ Confirms or denies threat COAs. ⚫ Provides threat locations. ⚫ Explains what the threat is doing in relation to the friendly force commander’s intent. ⚫ Provides an estimate of threat combat effectiveness. 1-52. The locations and actions of noncombatant elements and nongovernmental and other civilian organizations in the AO that may impact operations should also be considered. Through situation development, the intelligence officer— ⚫ Quickly identifies information gaps. ⚫ Recommends new information requirements. ⚫ Explains threat activities in relation to the unit’s operations. ⚫ Assists the commander in gaining and maintaining situational understanding. 1-53. Situation development assists commanders in their decision making, including when to execute branches and sequels. The intelligence staff uses the products developed during IPOE as a baseline to begin situation development. MULTI-DOMAIN UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-54. The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains, the information environment (which includes cyberspace), and the EMS requires a multi-domain situational understanding of the OE. (See FM 3-0.) Seeing, understanding, and responding to windows of vulnerability or opportunity within each domain and the information environment can reduce risk to the force and enhance success in chaotic and high-tempo operations, such as large-scale combat operations. This makes situational understanding essential to managing risk. 1-55. When commanders and staffs seek to understand friendly and threat capabilities, they consider how, when, and why those capabilities are employed in each domain, the information environment, and the EMS. From this understanding, commanders can better identify windows of opportunity during operations. This allows a portion of the joint force to establish a decisive point for the multi-domain convergence of capabilities, which must be supported by continuous intelligence operations across the domains for the best effect. Since many friendly capabilities are not organic to Army forces, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other unified action partner capabilities in a multi-domain approach to operations. Note. Decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). 1-12 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals 1-56. During large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, ground-force commanders may be required to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to shape the OE and gain a position of relative advantage for activities, such as joint fires, within the other domains. Once that position is achieved, operations would continue to increase the position of relative advantage in order to create a longer window of superiority to facilitate follow-on missions and operations across the domains. Note. Position of relative advantage is a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage (ADP 3-0). 1-57. Intelligence supports the commander by visualizing the threat and detecting possible threat COAs. Army forces must integrate and synchronize these actions across multiple domains to create opportunities to dislocate, isolate, disintegrate, and destroy enemy forces. (See FM 3-0 for more information on these defeat mechanisms.) Army forces strive to use intelligence, mobility, protection, and firepower to strike the enemy unexpectedly in multiple domains and from multiple directions, denying the enemy freedom to maneuver by creating multiple dilemmas that the enemy commander cannot effectively address. Intelligence supports these operations by facilitating situational understanding and supporting decision making. Intelligence assists commanders in seeing through the fog and friction of war. 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Tensions between Israel and the Arab alliance of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria were heightened following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Closed to Israeli shipping since 1950 by Egypt, the Straits of Tiran, located in the Red Sea between the Sinai Peninsula and Tiran Island, were critical to the shipping of oil and other imports to Israel. The re- opening of the straits was a chief Israeli objective. Egypt’s blockade of the straits continued to cause strained relations between Egypt and Israel, leading up to May 1967 when Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasir deployed Egyptian forces along Egypt’s border with Israel and banned Israeli ships from using the Gulf of Aqaba, the location of Israel’s primary port in Eilat. Sensing further Egyptian and Arab military alliance actions, Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol ordered a preemptive strike against Egyptian Air Force assets still on the ground. The strike destroyed more than 90 percent of the Egyptian Air Force and facilitated Israeli freedom of action in the air domain to counter an overwhelming Egyptian force in the land domain. Without Egyptian Air Force availability to provide cover to mobilized Egyptian armored assets, Egyptian tank units were soundly defeated in less than 96 hours. Window of Opportunity Exploit the Window Position of Relative Advantage Israeli Air Force superior to Israeli Air Force establishes Israeli Air Force destroys the Egyptian Air Force. freedom of action in the air mobilized Egyptian tank units. domain. IPOE Products to Identify Threat overlay, threat model, threat template, situation template, threat model, threat template, situation template, and event template and matrix Enable DST and matrix. Note. Although not IPB products, the DST and matrix assist in identifying friendly actions to counter threat COAs. (See figure 6-14 on page 6-23.) Information collection matrix. Note. Although not an IPB product, the information collection matrix can assist in answering information gaps and identifying indicators of threat intentions. (See figure 6-15 on page 6-24.) 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-13 Chapter 1 IMPORTANCE OF DOMAIN INTERDEPENDENCE 1-58. Domain interdependence refers to the reliance on one or multiple domains to leverage effects or information. Domains provide a means of viewing the OE based on how capabilities are arrayed and employed. An OE does not comprise a single domain; a capability’s effects are not limited to a single domain; and a capability is not employed in a single domain. For example, a satellite is launched from the ground and uses space as a medium for flight. The satellite may collect information from multiple domains and transmit that information using cyberspace as a medium to reach the ground, where the information can be processed, exploited, and disseminated. It is important for commanders and staffs to understand interdependence in order to visualize when and where capabilities can be leveraged by friendly, neutral, and threat forces. 1-59. Because a multitude of effects (including threat, terrain, and weather) can cross multiple domains, the interdependence of the domains, the information environment, and the EMS must be considered when performing IPOE. To do this, the S-2, with assistance from other staff members and possibly outside organizations, must address the operational framework considerations and view the OE holistically. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS 1-60. A thorough IPOE effort and intelligence analysis assist each echelon in focusing operations on all significant aspects of the OE in time and space across multiple domains. This prevents each echelon from focusing only on the close fight and current operations. A broad focus across the operational framework considerations assists commanders and staffs in better identifying friendly windows of opportunity and threat windows of vulnerability within and across each domain and the information environment. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Table 1-1 lists the operational framework considerations and how IPOE and subsequent intelligence analysis support each consideration. (See FM 3-0 for details on operational framework considerations.) Table 1-1. IPOE and intelligence analysis support to operational framework considerations Operational framework Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) and intelligence considerations analysis support Intelligence support begins well before the deployment of forces, through generate intelligence knowledge, which addresses the operational variables. Information gained during generate intelligence knowledge is used by commanders and staffs to assist in Physical considerations include framing the operational environment during the Army design methodology. geography, terrain, infrastructure, IPOE provides detailed analysis of the mission variables of threat, terrain and weather, populations, distance, weapons and civil considerations to determine effects on operations. ranges and effects, and known IPOE and intelligence analysis assist in determining relevant aspects within an area of threat locations. operations (such as civil considerations characteristics) that are critical in determining how friendly operations may be impacted during the consolidation of gains. Intelligence analysis is critical to the designation of a deep area, the fire support coordination line, and the area of interdiction. Temporal considerations are IPOE is a process that is both geographically and temporally specific. related to time, including when Developing threat courses of action during IPOE is based on identifying threat capabilities can be used, how long objectives, goals, timelines, and end states. they take to generate and employ, IPOE provides a temporal context using rates of movement, time phase lines, phases and how long they must be used to of threat fires, and other templates to capture threat timing. achieve desired effects. Cognitive considerations relate to IPOE accounts for aspects associated with the center of gravity and the threat’s morale people and how they behave. They and willingness to continue operations. include information pertaining to Intelligence support to continuous operational assessments considers many relevant threat decision making, threat will, aspects of the operational environment, including sociocultural factors. the nation’s will, and the population’s IPOE also considers all significant aspects of the operational environment associated behavior. with the various civil considerations. Virtual considerations pertain to IPOE and intelligence analysis, in coordination with the cyberspace electromagnetic activities and entities, both friendly activities section, provide intelligence on the threat’s likely activities within the and threat, residing in cyberspace. information environment, which includes cyberspace. 1-14 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024  Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Fundamentals HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-61. During IPOE, each staff section and supporting element provide input. This ensures a holistic view of the OE. Subsequently, the IPOE effort assists in identifying domain windows of opportunity to exploit threat vulnerabilities. A holistic view of the OE assists the commander in understanding and visualizing the multi- domain extended battlefield. Analysis of the five domains and where, how, and when information flows is required to understand how friendly and threat force capabilities may be impacted by aspects within each domain. Friendly, threat, and neutral capabilities often depend on a variety of aspects, such as nodes, systems, and subsystems across the five domains. Knowing how threat forces may use their capabilities throughout the five domains, the information environment, and the EMS is essential to understanding the threat’s intent and desired end state as well assessing the impacts friendly and threat operations may have on the OE. The holistic view of the OE encompasses— ⚫ The physical areas and factors of the five domains. ⚫ The information environment. (See chapter 8 for a detailed discussion.) ⚫ The systems perspective, which includes the relationships and interdependencies of friendly, threat, and neutral PMESII-PT systems, subsystems, objects, and affiliated attributes. 1-62. Analysts must also consider the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and the decisions of the commander. This includes understanding those considerations, both independently and as a composite, to apply combat power, protect the force, and complete a mission. Physical areas, nonphysical aspects, factors, and a systems perspective are means of identifying and understanding the conditions, circumstances, and influences within the OE. These means may be outcomes of IPOE or identified before IPOE—either way, each staff member participating in the IPOE process must consider them. Physical Areas and Factors 1-63. Within the OE, physical areas include the assigned operational area and the associated AOI and area of influence necessary to conduct operations within the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and the information environment. Factors, including but not limited to terrain, threat forces, weather, and the location of man-made obstacles and structures, can impact operations in a given physical area. The identification of physical areas and factors residing within the OE is critical to understanding effects on friendly and threat operations. Systems Perspective 1-64. A systems perspective focuses on a multitude of systems in the OE and their associated functions. The identification of which systems are associated with specific functions and their interdependence with other systems is critical to understanding when and where threats may decide to use them. A systems perspective generates understanding that facilitates identifying potential cues and warnings, lines of operations, centers of gravity, and decision points. No single staff section or capability attached to or organic to the commander can employ a systems perspective in isolation. Just as IPOE is a staff process, so is employing a systems perspective to facilitate IPOE. (For additional information on systems perspective, see JP 3-0.) IPOE AND THE ARMY’S STRATEGIC ROLES 1-65. Operations to shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains summarize the Army’s strategic roles as part of a joint force. Each strategic role presents a unique set of intelligence requirements discussed fully in FM 2-0. Table 1-2 on page 1-16 discusses IPOE throughout each strategic role. 23 January 2024 ATP 2-01.3, C2 1-15 Chapter 1 Table 1-2. +IPOE and the Army’s strategic roles Army strategic role Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) support Shape operational Time is usually not a constraint. Each echelon performs generate intelligence knowledge, warning environments intelligence, and IPOE to support operational planning, regionally aligned activities, and training focused on large-scale ground combat operations. IPOE and other intelligence products are constantly refined. A Prevent conflict large portion of the IPOE products generated are pushed down from the joint level to military intelligence brigades-theater and then customized for each specific echelon. Time is often a major constraint. When possible, the staff uses intelligence products developed before combat. At echelons corps and below, despite multi-domain considerations, the focus is on tactical Prevail during considerations, especially threat characteristics (including the correlation of forces data), weather, large-scale ground terrain, and other significant characteristics of the operational environment. Each echelon must combat effectively perform IPOE and quickly generate those products that drive the rest of the military decision- making process. Time is usually not a constraint. IPOE products tend to flow both top down and bottom up. Often, the IPOE focus shifts to address not only the threat but also stability operations, the local environment, and Consolidate gains the information environment. At echelons corps and below, more complexities within the operational environment become important considerations. 1-16 ATP 2-01.3, C2 23 January 2024