Japan's Foreign and Defence Policies PDF

JAPAN’S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES - A BRIEF OVERVIEW -  FOREIGN POLICY IDEAS WHEN STILL UNDER OCCUPATION 1) PERMANENT (UNARMED) NEUTRALITY 2) RELY ON THE UN’S COLLECTIVE SECURITY 3) US FORCES STATIONED ONLY WHEN IN CRISIS  YOSHIDA YOSHIDA SHIGERU: PM AFTER THE WAR (MAY 22,...

JAPAN’S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES - A BRIEF OVERVIEW -  FOREIGN POLICY IDEAS WHEN STILL UNDER OCCUPATION 1) PERMANENT (UNARMED) NEUTRALITY 2) RELY ON THE UN’S COLLECTIVE SECURITY 3) US FORCES STATIONED ONLY WHEN IN CRISIS  YOSHIDA YOSHIDA SHIGERU: PM AFTER THE WAR (MAY 22, 1946-MAY 24,1947, OCT. 15, 1948- DEC. 10, 1954 ） , DOCTRINE FORMER DIPLOMAT (AMB. TO THE UK) AND AGAINST THE WAR NONE OF THE ABOVE: PERMANENT US BASES AND LIGHTLY ARMED DUE TO THE START OF THE COLD WAR AND ALSO KOREAN WAR  YOSHIDA DOCTRINE THREE FEATURES: 1)LIGHTLY ARMED WITH MINIMUM NECESSARY CAPABILITIES 2)FOCUS ON ECONOMY (ECONOMIC RECOVERY FIRST) 3)THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US.  ECONOMY J’S ECONOMY WITHIN THE FREE TRADE SYSTEM ACCESS TO THE BIGGEST US MARKET IMPORT CUTTING EDGE US TECHNOLOGIES AND SHORT- AND LONG-TERM CAPITAL US HELPED TO LIFT ART.35 OF THE GATT （ LATER WTO) THAT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST JAPAN (JAPAN EXCLUDED FROM THE MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS). WHY US HELPED : THE BULWARK IN EAST ASIA AGAINST COMMUNISM YOSHIDA DOCTRINE: REGARDED AS SUCCESSFUL YOSHIDA’S CHOICE TO RELY ON THE US IS NOT UNIQUE, BUT LIGHTLY ARMED IS.  YOSHIDA’S NEGOTIATION WITH DULLES (US SEC. OF STATE) SUCCESSFUL IN SIGNING PEACE TREATIES WITH THE MAJORITY (=THE WEST) NO STANDING ARMY YET NOT TOO HEAVY INDEMNITIES THE COST: HE USED ART. 9 TO REBUFF THE AMERICAN DEMAND TO BUILD UP ARMED CAPABILITIES, BUT TACITLY ACCEPTED SLOW INCREMENTAL BUILD-UP. ART. 9 IS NO LONGER THE BULWARK AGAINST BEEFING UP SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. LOST A FREE-HAND IN CHINA POLICY DUE TO THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US ACCEPTED HAVING MANY US BASES IN OKINAWA WITH LITTLE DISCUSSION OKINAWA WAS UNDER US OCCUPATION/ADMINISTRATION UNTIL 1972  THE SF PEACE CONFERENCE SIGNED IN SEPT. 1951 IN SF 49 COUNTRIES SINGED, BUT NOT MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES: ONLY PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA, VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, THAILAND, PAKISTAN, AND CEYLON, ETC. PRC, ROC(TAIWAN) NOT SIGNED, KOREA NOT INVITED (NOT PARTY IN THE WAR) USSR ALSO TOOK PART IN, BUT NOT SIGNED : HER DEMANDS REJECTED : BAN ANY FOREIGN TROOPS IN JAPAN : HUGE INDEMNITY (=REPARATION) : THE SOYA STRAITS ETC. NOT MILITARIZED. THE USSR AND PRC SIGNED THE PEACE AND MUTUAL AID TREATY IN 1950: ART 1 : JAPAN AND HER ALLIED COUNTRIES ARE ENEMIES  INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PRE-WAR JAPAN RELIED ON ITS OWN DEFENSE FORCES EXCEPT THE ALLIANCE WITH THE UK (1902-1923) AND THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE (1940-43/45) AFTER THE WAR JAPAN AS A MEMBER OF THE WESTERN CAMP TO GAIN EARLY INDEPENDENCE=TO COOPERATE WITH THE US, UK RELIED ON THE US AND MINIMUM NECESSARY DEFENSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: NO COUNTRY CAN RELY ON ITS OWN, NEED US PROTECTION (NUCLEAR UMBRELLA=EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE)  COLD WAR’S IMPACT THE LIBERAL AND SOCIALIST “NO ARMS” CAMP IDEALISTIC AND FOR TOTAL PEACE WITH EVERY COUNTRY (= JAPAN NEEDS TO BE NEUTRAL), INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, DESPITE THE COLD WAR ADVOCATED (ESP. SOCIALISTS) NO ARMED CAPABILITIES EVEN FOR SELF-DEFENSE, RELYING ON THE GOOD RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.  THE CONSERVATIVE, OVERALL, THE MORE MORE PRAGMATIC CAMP HAS PRAGMATIC CAMP HAD THE MAJORITY SUPPORT. CAN ONLY THE FORMER NO ARMS ALIGN WITH POLICY HAD THE SUPPORT THE WEST OF 1/3 UNTIL 1990S DUE TO THE COLD WAR IT IS CHANGING NOW  BASIC ORIENTATIONS AMONG THE PRAGMATISTS AND CONSERVATIVES TWO SCHOOLS ： THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE AND THE OTHER NATIONALISTIC SCHOOL PM YOSHIDA SHIGERU PM ABE SHINZO  RATIONALE FOR THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE RECOVERY FROM THE DEVASTATION FIRST THE COLD WAR STARTED AND THE KOREAN WAR FROM 1950-53 ⇒THE US DEMANDED JAPAN TO REARM: YOSHIDA REFUSED. (PMS HATOYAMA AND ASHIDA WERE IN FAVOR) TO SECURE THE SAFETY OF JAPAN THROUGH THE ALLIANCE WITH THE US. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE BURDEN OF DEFENSE BUDGET. THIS WOULD ENABLE JAPAN TO CONCENTRATE ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND MAKE JAPAN A TRADING NATION, NOT A MILITARY ONE. GAIN INDEPENDENCE BY SIGNING THE SF PEACE TREATY AND JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY IN 1951  CONTROVERSY ON THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE TOO MUCH DEPENDENCE ON THE US, ESP. ON DEFENSE?? 1) YOSHIDA: JAPAN WAS TO PLAY A SECONDARY ROLE TO THE US ２） THE OPPOSITION (SOCIALIST) CAMP: CHINA WAS THE BIGGEST MARKET FOR JAPAN BEFORE THE WAR (MORE THAN 30%). JAPAN LOST THE CHINA MARKET, WHICH WAS DETRIMENTAL FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, BY JOINING THE WEST (SUPPORTING THE CONTAINMENT POLICY) LOST A CHANCE TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION (AND PRC), WHICH DELAYED JAPAN’S ENTRY INTO THE UN UNTIL DEC. 1956 BY A SOVIET VETO. 3) THE MORE CONSERVATIVE NATIONALIST CAMP: FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION RE/ARTICLE 9 MORE INDEPENDENT POSTURE  DEBATE CONTINUED 1) CONSERVATIVE VS SOCIAL DEMOCRAT, SOCIALIST, AND COMMUNIST ⇒ AFTER THE WAR, JAPAN WAS IN TURMOIL AND THERE WAS A STRONG SOCIALIST BASE THERE WERE SOME LIBERAL TO SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS, INCLUDING ONE SOCIALIST ADMINISTRATION. BUT THEY WERE NOT LONG LASTING (WITHIN A YEAR OR SO). THEY REMAINED IN THE MINORITY, ABOUT 1/3 TO 40% MOST OF THE POST WAR, COLD WAR ERA. THE SOCIALISTS (1/3 OF THE PARLIAMENT) ADVOCATED UNARMED NEUTRALITY (EVEN FOR SELF-DEFENSE). 2) WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE CAMP: YOSHIDA DOCTRINE (LINE) VS NON-YOSHIDA (HATOYAMA ) LINE  THE NATIONALIST, MORE INDEPENDENCE SCHOOL FOR MORE INDEPENDENT (FROM THE US) POLICY TO BE EQUAL WITH THE US (NO SECONDARY ROLE) (LIKE THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST IDEAS) REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION ESP. ARTICLE 9 SO THAT JAPAN CAN HAVE A NORMAL BONA FIDE STANDING ARMY (=COLLECTIVE-SELF DEFENSE), NOT A SELF-DEFENSE FORCE THAT IS CONSTRAINED WITH MANY LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS REVISE THE ORIGINAL SECURITY TREATY WITH THE US (DONE IN 1960)  BASIC HISTORICAL TREND THE YOSHIDA DOCTRINE UNTIL THE GULF WAR IN 1991 AFTER THE GULF WAR, A GRADUAL CHANGE TOWARD MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION (SDF) IN UN PKO ACTIVITIES ARMED BUILD-UP (CHANGING NOW) STARTING IN CAMBODIA IN THE UNTAC(UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA) IN 1992: FIRST EVER AS A UN PKO MISSION AS WELL AS A DISPATCH OF THE GROUND SDF (ENGINEERING AND FACILITIES UNIT) TO OVERSEAS NOW, MORE TOWARDS STRENGTHENING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES  WHY MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION? TUNING POINT THE FIRST GULF WAR OF 1991: PAID $13 BILLION WITH A TAX INCREASE BUT NOT EVEN MENTIONED IN A THANK YOU NEWSPAPER AD BY KUWAIT JAPAN DID NOTHING BUT FINANCIAL AID WHY NOT JAPAN WHO DEPENDS 70% OF OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST?  NOT EVEN MENTIONED IN A UTTER THANK YOU NEWSPAPER AD BY KUWAIT SHOCK 2 CRITICIZED AS “TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE” AS WELL AS “NO BOOTS ON THE GROUND” PROBABLY, JAPANESE FACES ARE A “MUST” FOR CONTRIBUTION  WHY NOT? WHY NOT CONTRIBUTING ON THE GROUND? (NO REAL APPARENT DISPATCH OF THE SDF) UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO DISPATCH SDF PERSONNEL IN A COMBAT ZONE APRIL 1991 AFTER THE WAR WAS OVER, 4 MINE SWEEPERS DISPATCHED TO THE GULF (UNTIL SEPT.) IRAQ LAID ABOUT 1,200 MINES ALONG KUWAIT LOTS OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION BUT HIGHLY REGARDED OVERSEAS  SEA CHANGE IN RE-INTERPRETING ARTICLE 9 SEPT. 2015: RE-INTERPRETATION ON THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE ACCEPTED = (LIMITED) COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE MADE CONSTITUTIONAL BEFORE: THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE ITSELF WAS STRICTLY PROHIBITED BY CONSTITUTION