Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo (PDF)

International Peacekeeping ISSN: 1353-3312 (Print) 1743-906X (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/ﬁnp20 Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War Denis M. Tull To cite this article: Denis M. Tull (2009) Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War, International Peacekeeping, 16:2, 215-230, DOI: 10.1080/13533310802685729 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685729 Published online: 27 Apr 2009. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 5510 View related articles Citing articles: 7 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ﬁnp20 Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War DENIS M. TULL The UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has been derided as one of the world’s least effective peacekeeping forces. This article assesses its performance by using two indicators: mandate implementation and the reduction of human suffering. The analysis shows that effective peacekeeping in the Democratic Repub- lic of Congo (DRC) has been hampered by two major problems. First, MONUC has had a struggle with, and inconsistent approach to, the vague concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’. During key moments of the peace process, it tried to wage peace when it should have used force. Second it failed to adapt to a dynamic conflict environment. Both problems were underpinned by flawed assumptions about the peace process, the behaviour of local actors and the presumed benefits of ‘post-conflict’ elections. Following more than a decade of violence which cost the lives of five million Congolese, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) edged towards peace in 2006 when ‘post-conflict’ elections were completed in a generally peaceful manner. The first free elections for over four decades in the country, they were a major political achievement, not only for the DRC’s citizens, but also for the international community which had invested heavily in the peace process since the second war had broken out in 1998. The UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has been the centrepiece of international engagement, the UN’s second peacekeeping mission after its inter- vention in 1960–64.1 Initially established as a small military liaison team in 1999, MONUC was turned incrementally into a multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a broad mandate. Comprehensive assessments of it have been rare.2 This is surprising because MONUC – with 18,434 uniformed personnel in 2008 – is one of the biggest and most expensive missions ever deployed by the UN. More- over, although general criticism of UN peacekeeping is not unusual, condemnation of MONUC’s performance has been exceptionally fierce. For example, The Economist has asked ‘Is this the world’s least effective peacekeeping force?’, while Congolese citizens repeatedly assaulted peacekeepers to vent their anger at the mission and its alleged failures.3 An internal UN report even observed that the mission was tainted by a perception of ‘impotence and cowardice’.4 It is time for a more scholarly assessment of MONUC’s role in the peace process. The first part of the article provides a brief overview of the conflict, a summary of MONUC’s phases of deployment and the evolution of its mandate and troop levels. The second part assesses MONUC’s performance against the criteria of mandate achievement and reduction of human suffering. The final International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2, April 2009, pp.215– 230 ISSN 1353-3312 print/1743-906X online DOI:10.1080/13533310802685729 # 2009 Taylor & Francis 216 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING part explains MONUC’s performance by analysing three sets of factors: exogen- ous factors such as the mandate, means and resources; problems of multidimen- sional peacekeeping based on Chapter VII; and endogenous factors such as strategic assessments and strategies. It will be argued that MONUC’s mixed per- formance cannot be fully explained by resource constraints and the DRC’s diffi- cult environment. Equally important were problems in interpreting and implementing the vague concept of robust peacekeeping and flaws in adapting strategies to a quickly changing situation. The Congo Wars The DRC’s two wars (1996 – 97 and 1998 – 2003) were a concoction of inter- twined conflicts. At the regional level, the DRC was the battleground for conflicts spilling out from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola. Nationally, it was fought over control of the derelict state left behind by President Mobutu Sese Seko. Finally, a mix of local conflicts over power and resources, often with ethnic connotations, wreaked havoc in the DRC’s eastern provinces. The DRC, then Zaire, became the centre of a regional war in 1996 when an insurgency under the leadership of Laurent Kabila invaded from the east.5 Helped by Zaire’s eastern neighbours, the rebellion toppled the Mobutu regime in 1997. The biggest stakeholder of the rebellion was the new government formed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Kigali which had overthrown the genocidal government in 1994. Having fled into eastern Zaire, the former regime staged cross-border attacks to destabilize the RPF government. This security threat was the main cause of the invasion into Zaire, but it failed to eliminate the geno- cidaires. In August 1998, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi launched a new war, claiming that Kabila, now president of the renamed DRC, was unwilling to address their security concerns. As in 1996, they supported Congolese rebel groups, including the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC). The war stalled when Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe rallied to Kabila. In July 1999 a ceasefire was signed in Lusaka (Zambia). It called on the UN to deploy a Chapter VII peacekeeping force to help implement the ceasefire, to oversee the withdrawal of foreign armies and disarm Congolese and foreign rebels. It also called for national negotiations and the organization of elections. By 2001 the ceasefire largely held along the official demarcation line, but armed conflict shifted to its eastern regions.6 Implementation of the Lusaka accord was stalled until 2001, when President Kabila was murdered. His successor and son, Joseph, adopted a more flexible atti- tude towards conflict resolution. Partly as a result, most of Uganda’s 10,000 sol- diers and all of the 23,000 Rwandan soldiers left in late 2002. This paved the way for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in December 2002 in Pretoria, where a transi- tional government was agreed upon. Kabila remained president, flanked by four vice-presidents, including the two rebel leaders Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC) and Azarias Ruberwa (RCD). National and provincial elections terminated the transition in 2006. The presidential run-off election gave Kabila victory over PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 217 Bemba.7 However, violent clashes erupted repeatedly in Kinshasa and the pro- vince of Bas Congo. In the eastern DRC, violence erupted between the army and the forces of former RCD rebel commander Laurent Nkunda. By late 2008, heavy fighting in North Kivu and political unrest and human rights abuses elsewhere in the country threatened the consolidation of peace.8 Four Phases of UN Peacekeeping The involvement of MONUC in the DRC conflict over the past decade can be divided into four broad phases. The first phase began with the creation of MONUC in 1999 and ended with the Pretoria accord on the formation of a government of national unity in late 2002. Shortly after the signing of the 1999 Lusaka accord, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of 90 military personnel to establish liaison with the signatories.9 In late 1999 the mission was formally renamed MONUC and was subsequently expanded to 500 observers and a protection force of 5,037 soldiers to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.10 Following agreements between the DRC and Rwanda and Uganda, respectively, on the withdrawal of their forces from the DRC, MONUC’s troop ceiling was boosted to 8,700 soldiers in late 2002. The mission was mandated to support, ‘on a voluntary basis’, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, resettle- ment and repatriation (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups.11 During its first three years, MONUC’s role was limited but effective. Its thinly spread personnel, 455 military observers and 3,595 soldiers (as of October 2002), verified ceasefire violations and the eventual withdrawal of foreign armies. The second phase of MONUC’s deployment (2003 – 04) began in the wake of the Pretoria accord in 2002. During this period the mission’s efforts were to be geared towards supporting the transition and the government of national unity in Kinshasa.12 The transitional government moved to the centre of political atten- tion because it was to become the backbone of the implementation of the peace agreements that had been concluded in Lusaka and Pretoria. Key to MONUC’s concept for this phase was the provision of security for the members of the transi- tional government. To this effect, the UN Security Council authorized MONUC to deploy nearly 10 per cent of its troops (some 1,000 blue helmets) to the capital.13 It also chaired the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT), a body of international representatives that was to accompany the tran- sition. Hence, this phase was described by William Swing, the head of MONUC, as the ‘Kinshasa phase’, where the transitional government was expected to lead the peace process.14 However, the most disrupting events during this phase occurred in the DRC’s eastern parts. The first major crisis occurred in Bunia (Ituri district) in May 2003, when ethnic militias fought over the control of the city after the withdrawal of the Ugandan army. The 700 blue helmets in Bunia were bystanders to the massacres of 400 civilians. The crisis triggered the deployment of a 1,400 strong Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis) by the European Union.15 Equipped with a Chapter VII mandate, the force stayed for three months and 218 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING re-established basic order in Bunia. Subsequently, the Security Council increased MONUC’s troop numbers to 10,800 and provided it with a Chapter VII mandate for Ituri and the two Kivu provinces.16 Barely a year later, another crisis erupted in Bukavu, when forces led by renegade commander Laurent Nkunda, a former RCD general occupied the provincial capital of South Kivu. Again MONUC failed to prevent killings and human rights abuses.17 The Bukavu crisis in particu- lar was a major blow to MONUC’s credibility. In response, the Security Council expanded MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate to include the entire Congolese terri- tory and authorized the deployment of additional 5,900 peacekeepers, less than half the number that the mission had requested.18 The third phase, from October 2004 to December 2006, mainly revolved around the organization of presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections.19 As in other war-torn countries, the UN regarded the elections in the DRC as ‘a key element in the transition from a post-conflict to a truly democratic, unified and stable State’.20 MONUC organized a large logistical operation to prepare the registration of voters and the organization of a constitutional referendum and the elections. It also trained Congolese police officers to provide security for the elections. During the polls, MONUC was backed by an EU interim force (EUFOR DRC) of 1,500 troops.21 The mission was deployed after the Security Council had declined a request by the Secretary-General for an additional 2,590 troops to enable MONUC to deal with security contingencies during the polls. MONUC’s fourth phase started in the wake of the 2006 elections.22 Daunt- ing core tasks remained to be completed. These included the creation of a stable security environment, the planning of security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law and protecting civilians.23 MONUC was also mandated to provide assistance to the Congolese government in the preparation of local elections.24 Recurrent violence attested to the precarious post-election environment, especially in North Kivu, where renewed fighting between rebels and the army displaced tens of thousands of civilians. Insecurity was widespread as thousands of Congolese combatants remained outside of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process (DDR) for nationals. The formation of the security sector remained insignificant.25 MONUC reported physical vio- lence against civilians and serious human rights abuses ‘wherever the army [was] deployed’.26 Assessing Success and Failure The literature on peacekeeping missions offers a variety of determinants of success and failure, ranging from mandate implementation to more demanding criteria (whether a self-sustaining peace exists after peacekeepers withdraw) to even more exacting standards (whether root causes of conflict have been resolved and whether institution building has been successful).27 These ambitious stan- dards reflect unrealistic expectations about the impact that a mission can have within a limited time. This is especially true in countries that present a very diffi- cult environment. In the DRC, MONUC is also an ongoing mission, and it is thus PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 219 impossible to determine the long-term viability of peace. Therefore two relatively modest criteria are used here: whether the mission mandate has been implemented and whether human suffering has been reduced. Mandate implementation is the most widely used criterion to assess success and failure. It is also the most equitable one because it examines standards that the UN has set itself.28 It is also the politically most relevant one since decisions of the UN Security Council about ongoing peacekeeping missions take into account the extent to which mandates are being implemented. The second yard- stick is used because it directly relates to the reduction of large-scale violence which is the overall goal of every peacekeeping mission. But because violence is difficult to measure in civil wars, this article refers to human suffering as a consequence of violence, which can be roughly assessed by considering the level of internal displacement. Mandate Implementation In the following paragraphs I examine whether MONUC succeeded in imple- menting the core tasks of its mandate.29 Facilitating the DDRRR of Foreign Combatants The presence of foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC has been central to the regional dimension of the war. Of particular concern was the security threats posed by the continued presence of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an offshoot of the forces responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. To address this issue, MONUC was mandated to facilitate the DDRRR of foreign combatants.30 Repatriation of the insurgents was agonizingly slow. In 2007, it was esti- mated that 6,000 rebels remained in the DRC. The Rwandan government did not play a constructive role as it did not publish a list of the FDLR members it sought on charges of genocide, a clarification which may have encouraged lesser members of the movement to return home. Moreover, FDLR leaders held their fighters hostage, killing those who attempted to defect. But the most important reason for the slowness was that MONUC’s mandate rested on the principle of voluntary repatriation. As early as 2004, MONUC had warned that ‘the continued pursuit of its voluntary repatriation would not succeed in resolving the problem within an acceptable time’. 31 The Security Council never seriously considered a mandate to forcefully repatriate the FDLR. This left the mission with few other means than seeking to persuade foreign fighters to return to their countries.32 In late 2005 and since 2006, MONUC also gave logistical support to Forces Armées de la Republique Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) operations against the FDLR. Considering the mandate, the slow repa- triation was the best result that MONUC could realistically achieve. It fulfilled its mandate but was unable to sufficiently speed up the return of the FDLR fighters. Congo DDR and SSR MONUC contributed to the Congolese DDR programme by providing security at reception centres, collecting weapons and providing transport, helping the DRC’s 220 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING national DDR agency CONADER to process over 165,000 former combatants.33 But by late 2007, some 80,000 combatants were still awaiting registration for participation in DDR. This was partly a result of the suspension of the demobili- zation process in 2006 by donors, who claimed that CONADER was marred by mismanagement. In tune with its mandate MONUC played a rather limited role in DDR as other agencies, notably the World Bank, were in the lead. In security sector reform (SSR), MONUC’s principal role was to co-chair the Joint Commission on Security Sector Reform which was to draw up plans for the formation of the new national army and the police.34 This met three obstacles. First, Congolese commitment to a comprehensive and well-coordinated approach to DDR and SSR was largely absent.35 The transitional government was deeply dysfunctional and political elites focused on the upcoming elections and appro- priating public resources. In 2005, for example, several million dollars earmarked for military pay disappeared each month on the way to intended recipients.36 In the absence of a national political commitment to make the formation of effective security forces a priority, the SSR activities of MONUC and bilateral donors amounted to quick-fix ‘low-level capacity building’.37 Second, various donors assisted SSR by implementing their own projects, often on an ad hoc basis, that did little to overcome the structural pathologies of the security sector. This played into the hands of the Congolese government which favoured bilateral agreements to maximize financial support.38 Third, the importance that political elites and external actors placed on elections came at the expense of attention to SSR. Rather than stressing it as a long-term challenge to peace and security, the internationals emphasized army and police reform as a means to other ends, notably the organization of elections, the key objective of the transitional process.39 The completion of the polls in 2006 did not provide new momentum for SSR. Roundtables on SSR with foreign partners were either postponed by the government or it failed to outline a vision that external partners could support. A working group of foreign representatives and the DRC’s army chief eventually prepared a joint framework for SSR, but the plan was unceremo- niously shelved by the Minister of Defence.40 DDR and SSR have been a dramatic disappointment. But in the absence of Congolese and international will to commit to a long-term reform of the security sector, it would be unreasonable to attribute this failure to MONUC alone. Military Tasks Deterring Violence and Protecting Civilians. MONUC was authorized to use all ‘necessary means’ to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions and to discourage violence and ‘spoilers’.41 Regarding this element of its mandate, MONUC’s record has sometimes been one of dramatic failure. It performed abys- mally during the crises in Bunia and Bukavu and not much better during other emergencies.42 The resumption of fighting in North Kivu since November 2006, which escalated in late 2008 and triggered massive civilian displacement, did not galvanize a determined response by MONUC. The same was true during earlier episodes of fighting in Kinshasa in 2006 and 2007, which resulted in the deaths of some 400 people. MONUC’s inaction in preventing violence has PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 221 been accompanied by a poor record in protecting civilians, a notable failure in the light of the Security Council’s emphasis on this task.43 Although MONUC received ‘the most assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’, protecting civilians largely remained a ‘written ambition’.44 Organizing the Constitutional Referendum and the Elections The organization of the constitutional referendum in 2005 and of national and provincial elections in 2006 was MONUC’s most obvious achievement. It orga- nized a large-scale logistical operation to make possible the registration of 25 million citizens out of an estimated electorate of 28 million for a constitutional referendum and elections at 50,000 polling stations. Highlighting the logistical challenges, Ross Mountain, the deputy special representative of the UN Secretary-General and previously in charge of the elections in Iraq, observed, ‘Compared to the DRC, Iraq’s elections were a walk in the park’.45 Various instances of election-related violence notwithstanding, the polls were a success. Given the outstanding logistical and political support it had provided, the elections were a celebrated moment for MONUC. Reducing Human Suffering The second yardstick to assess MONUC – reduction of human suffering – was chosen for methodological reasons over other criteria. Examining alternative indicators, for example, whether large-scale violence was brought to an end, raises significant challenges in terms of the availability and quality of data, par- ticularly in war-torn countries like the DRC. Therefore I use the number of intern- ally displaced persons (IDPs) over time as a proxy to assess human suffering.46 If the number of IDPs is decreasing in the course of a peacekeeping mission, it can be expected that violence and human suffering have declined. The evolution of internal displacement in the DRC between 1999 and (June) 2008 can be traced in Figure 1. The onset of the war in 1998 resulted in 1.7 million IDPs, a level that remained relatively stable over the next four years. In 2003 internal displacement jumped to 3.4 million before it steadily decreased to 1.1 million in 2006. The resumption of fighting in North Kivu led to a new surge in 2007. The statistics require disaggregation. First, the figures show that the number of IDPs only started to decline in late 2003, six years after the conflict had started and more than two years after it had officially ended. Paradoxically, the number of IDPs rose by 662,000 to 3.4 million in the first 12 months following the Pretoria peace agreement.47 A stunning increase of 22 per cent over the pre- vious year, the surge was largely the result of the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces from the DRC. Their pull-out created a void in the eastern DRC which the overstretched MONUC was ill equipped to fill.48 Second, the aggregate figures conceal significant differences across the country. While security improved steadily in much of the DRC since 2002, the eastern parts remained insecure. For example, the surge of IDPs in 2003 was primarily caused by fighting in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. Similarly, heavy clashes in 2007 produced 500,000 newly displaced persons in North Kivu alone, a surge that is not fully 222 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING FIGURE 1 PATTERNS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND MONUC TROOP NUMBERS Source: MONUC troop numbers are based on the Reports of the Secretary-General (at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ missions/monuc/monucDrp.htm); IDPs: to 2005, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, annual World Refugees Survey (at: www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id¼2129), for 2006 to June 2008 from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, DRC, A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, Geneva, 29 Nov. 2007, pp.64 –5; OCHA Regional Office for Central and East Africa, Displaced Populations Report, Jan. –June 2008, Nairobi, 2008. reflected by the aggregate numbers because IDPs returned to their homes else- where in the country.49 Overall, internal displacement has significantly diminished from 2003 to 2006. This may be somewhat surprising. Given the often appalling performance of MONUC in terms of deterring violence and protecting civilians, it seems tenuous to attribute the reduction of human suffering to MONUC. Yet, that link is not entirely implausible. The build-up of MONUC’s military strength from 3,800 blue helmets in 2002 to 9,900 in 2003 and 15,800 in 2004 may have had a positive impact on security. The same holds for the gradual, if slow transfer of the mission’s military resources to the eastern DRC. In the absence of robust peacekeeping, the mission’s direct impact on human security may have been small. But its steadily growing presence in the DRC’s war-torn eastern parts may have enabled the peace process to move forward and may have resulted, despite pervasive insecurity, in less fighting overall and hence less human suffering. However, this view was thrown into serious doubt in view of MONUC’s passivity during the round of fighting, from 2007, in North Kivu.50 The balance sheet is decidedly mixed. In terms of mandate implementation, serial failures (civilian protection) contrast with outstanding successes (organiz- ing elections). Between these two extremes a wide range of mandated tasks PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 223 were often only partially, sometimes reasonably well implemented by the mission. Concerning the reduction of human suffering, the evidence is inconclusive. While the day-to-day peacekeeping activities of MONUC soldiers have probably done little to alleviate insecurity in the eastern DRC, their presence may have prevented even more atrocities. The build-up of the mission over time has contributed to the implementation of the peace accords which made the successful conclusion of the transition process in 2006 possible. Explaining MONUC’s Performance Three sets of factors may explain MONUC’s mixed record. The first relates to factors that were exogenous to the mission; that is, an extremely difficult political environment in the DRC and the mission’s mandate and means. A second cat- egory concerns the fundamental conceptual and operational problem of mandate interpretation. Third, the effectiveness of MONUC was also determined endogenously in terms of a lack of strategic adaptation to a rapidly evolving environment and the resulting assessments made by the mission’s leadership. Exogenous Factors First, implementing peace has been a challenge in terms of the ‘situational diffi- culty’ in the DRC. Because some environments are less favourable to the implementation of peace than others, the political context in a country partly determines success.51 It is even more relevant if the means and resources available to a mission are inadequate. The DRC displays nearly all indicators associated with a difficult political environment.52 These include the high number of warring parties, combatants and spoilers, weak state institutions, the absence of a genuine peace to keep, notably in Ituri and the Kivu provinces, the avail- ability of disposable natural resources which allowed warring factions to finance their war, and hostile neighbouring states (Rwanda, Uganda) that con- tinuously and covertly intervened in the DRC. Finally, the unresolved FDLR issue undermined prospects for peace.53 Second, the mission was given a long list of responsibilities, but without the commensurate means to implement them. In absolute terms, MONUC is one of the biggest missions ever deployed by the UN, but in relative terms it has been one of the smallest, be it in relation to the size of the DRC (one peacekeeper per 139 sq km), or its population (one soldier per 3,500 Congolese).54 Moreover, MONUC reached the peak of its troop levels of some 19,000 soldiers only in 2006, seven years after its inception. The strategic mismatch between mandated tasks and means reflected what the Brahimi Report described as ‘best-case plan- ning assumptions’ which may be justifiable only in relatively undemanding environments.55 The resolutions passed by the Security Council were signs of unwarranted optimism. Third, the Security Council’s resolutions revealed the limited interests of its five permanent members in solving the conflict, a major constraint on the mission effectiveness.56 Three years into the war, for instance, no more than 2,400 peacekeepers were deployed in the DRC.57 Despite the incremental build 224 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING up of the mission, the Security Council showed an extreme reluctance to commit to an effective peacekeeping mission. It repeatedly ignored requests by the Sec- retary-General for more soldiers.58 Nearly every time it approved additional troops, the decision followed severe crises in the DRC which only confirmed the validity of earlier calls for more peacekeepers. Lack of interest was also visible outside of UN deliberations. No major power played a consistent and active diplomatic or military role in the DRC.59 A Conceptual and Operational Flaw: Mandate Interpretation A second impediment to effective peacekeeping is associated with the vague con- cepts ‘use of force’ or ‘robust peacekeeping.’ For example, Resolution 1565 auth- orized MONUC ‘to use all necessary means, within its capacity and in the areas where its armed units are deployed’ to carry out (nearly) all the tasks mentioned in that resolution.60 Did this imply that the mission should use force ‘to seize or collect arms’, ‘to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights’ and ‘to ensure the protection of civilians’? Did the phrase ‘all means necessary’ indi- cate that MONUC should conduct joint military combat operations with the Congolese army ‘to disarm foreign combatants’, a reading that paragraphs 5c and 6 might suggest? The behaviour of the mission indicated that it did not con- strue the mandate in such an extensive way. The mission provided significant logistical support for the FARDC against the FDLR and the Nkunda rebellion but it stopped short of engaging in joint combat operations. However, because the mandate’s wording did not exclude this interpretation, MONUC repeatedly failed to live up to Congolese and international expectations and has thus been subjected to fierce criticism by the government, stone-throwing mobs and even rebels: ‘The rebels accuse MONUC of fighting against them, the Congolese army accuses it of not fighting enough with it, and the people accuse it of no longer protecting them’.61 One example illustrates the ambiguities of MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate. In 2005, MONUC launched attacks on armed groups in north-eastern Ituri district, its most robust military operations to date. Coming on the heels of one such military operation, in the course of which UN peacekeepers killed some 60 militiamen, a senior official of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) stressed the evolution of peacekeeping from traditional approaches to robust action, including military operations.62 Conscious of the blurred distinction between waging war and waging peace, the official also observed that MONUC was ‘not engaged in war. We are engaged in trying to create a peace’. Similarly MONUC force commander Babacar Gaye observed on the same episode: ‘It may look like war but it’s peacekeeping’.63 The elusiveness of the concept of ‘robust’ peacekeeping and the attendant oper- ational questions it raises are hardly unique to the case of the DRC. A UN report echoed these problems more widely. Pointing to the ‘enormous ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the most basic precepts of peacekeeping’, the report asks: What do we mean by terms such as ‘robust peacekeeping’, and what does this mean for a police officer or soldier serving in a United Nations PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 225 mission?... What are the conditions under which we adopt particular approaches to the protection of civilians? What is involved in tasks such as support for the extension of State authority, and what guidance can a civilian peacekeeper rely on? Then the report comes to the heart of the matter: The mandates... do not provide the sort of detailed guidance that personnel need in the field... Do we agree that ‘peace operations’ is a term that describes multidimensional operations with wide mandates that include capacity for robust response in support of political, humanitarian and development actions to secure a sustainable peace? And are we agreed that this description is a more accurate reflection of the functions of United Nations peacekeeping today?64 MONUC would have deflected much criticism had it pursued a more even- handed approach. Using violent means in some cases but not in others, its military actions appeared incoherent. Contrary to Ituri it had no intention to conduct or stomach for robust operations in the Kivus and in Kinshasa. One possible expla- nation may be that robust peacekeeping was encouraged by the particular situ- ation that prevailed in Ituri. Not only were the Ituri militias militarily weak, all of them also remained outside of the national peace process. MONUC’s leader- ship may have reckoned that robust action did not involve the risk of a political backlash in regard to the impartiality of the mission. In contrast, election related violence in Kinshasa and the situation in the Kivus posed a far bigger challenge. Armed actors in these theatres, including the FDLR, Nkunda and the military outfits of Bemba and Kabila were capable of derailing the peace process and the elections. Consider, for example, MONUC’s passivity in the face of Nkunda’s assault on Bukavu in 2004. Some observers have argued that the main reason for MONUC’s inaction was its fear that attacks on the advancing rebels could have provoked Nkunda’s rebel group, the RCD, to leave the transitional government.65 In this and other instances, attempts at damage limitation prevailed over military action. For example, it has been alleged that the mission struck tacit truces with Nkunda’s armed group and other militias in the Kivus, including the FDLR, with the understanding that these groups would abstain from disturbing the polls.66 MONUC has not pursued a consistently robust approach to implement its mandate. Endogenous Factors Finally, a lack of strategic adaptation to conflict dynamics explains MONUC’s mixed record.67 The initial purpose of the mission was to observe the 1999 ceasefire agreement, a classical peacekeeping task which MONUC performed reasonably well. While the disengagement accords were largely respected along the official frontline in 2001, the two Kivu provinces and Ituri turned into theatres of endemic violence where myriad armed groups confronted each other. To some extent, this was a proxy war between the government in Kinshasa and its eastern 226 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING neighbours. It was also a conflict over the control over local power and resources by the local forces. Moreover, the presence of valuable mineral resources led to the emergence of a war economy which overshadowed the initial political and security interests of the warring factions. These dynamics were utterly ignored by MONUC and the international community. From their perspective, the ‘peace to keep’ was exclusively framed by the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, later followed by the accord for a national transition process. Conflict in the eastern DRC was not a major concern until the crises in Bunia in 2003 and Bukavu 2004 were ‘a stark reminder that the political transition agreed in May 2003 [was] not synonymous with peace’.68 Belatedly recognizing that volatility in the east threatened the entire peace process, MONUC re-assessed the Kivus and Ituri as ‘key strategic areas’ and shifted some of its focus to the eastern DRC.69 The transfer of military resources to the east was only completed in early 2008 when the mission had moved 92 per cent of its troops to the area.70 But even then MONUC lacked the resolve to take robust action, as renewed conflict in North Kivu demonstrated. Finally, successful peacekeeping was also undermined by a lack of coordi- nation for strategic funding of DDR and SSR to promote sustainable outcomes during the post-conflict period. The consecutive defeats of the Congolese army against Nkunda’s rebels attest to this. Although an integrated mission, MONUC was unable to ensure UN wide coherence, let alone to harmonize the efforts of myriad bilateral and multinational agencies that undertook DDR- and SSR-related programmes. Conclusion MONUC will not enter history as a remarkable success story. But there is also little evidence that MONUC has performed much worse than peacekeeping missions elsewhere, especially in the light of the DRC’s difficult political environ- ment and the scarce resources the mission had at its disposal. The lack of consist- ent political commitment to resolve the conflict by major powers did not help MONUC either. Still it performed at least some of its mandated tasks reasonably well, notably during the first phase of its deployment and in relation to the elections. Yet it would be mistaken to explain success and failure simply as a function of resources. As important, and analytically more interesting, are determinants over which a peacekeeping mission has some leverage. In the DRC, mandate interpretation and strategy development were two outstanding issues that had a negative impact on MONUC’s performance. The mission failed to adapt its behaviour to its evolving mandate, which moved from classical peacekeeping to multidimensional and robust peacekeeping. Its inability to come to terms with the precise meaning of robust peacekeeping, in particular to protect civilians and deter violence, has been a major weakness. No amount of additional troops or international political support would have been sufficient to remedy these shortcomings. PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 227 A second major flaw of peacekeeping has been its political thrust. The principal strategy was to implement a narrowly defined peace agreement that centred on belligerents-cum-political elites in Kinshasa. Thus the ‘peace to keep’ was exclu- sively defined in terms of first the Lusaka agreement of 1999 and second the Pretoria accord of 2002. By supporting a power-sharing arrangement and the organization of post-conflict elections, MONUC followed the blueprint of international inter- ventions in war-torn countries. In the DRC the narrow focus on an elite-based tran- sition process ignored the dynamics of war. Violent conflict shifted to the east where armed groups became entrenched in the shadow of what looked increasingly like a virtual peace process. As in Rwanda or in Angola, the worst level of violence occurred not before but in the wake of the peace agreement. For far too long, MONUC considered the conflict in the east as an inconsequential problem that would somehow evaporate if the transition in Kinshasa were successfully completed. As a consequence, the mission remains bogged down in the eastern DRC, where armed groups engaged in a new war with national ramifications. In the final analysis the record of peacekeeping in the DRC is a ‘mixed bag’. Although the situational difficulty in the country has been a daunting challenge, an arguably more important impediment to peace implementation was rooted in fundamental conceptual and operational problems that relate to the use of force in robust peacekeeping operations. For decades, the use of force only for self- defence has been a cornerstone of peacekeeping. Doing away with this principle in the name of robust peacekeeping requires more than rhetorical acro- batics by UN officials to the effect that modern peacekeeping may look like the conduct of warfare, but that in effect it amounts to waging peace. Such views try to reconcile long-established principles (impartiality, use of force only for self-defence) with modern-day requirements of peacekeeping in often hostile environments. Peacekeepers require precise rules of engagement that cover a large and probably infinite number of scenarios that provide clear guidance in the field. Therefore finding solutions to the vagueness of the concept ‘robust peacekeeping’ should not be discharged to missions in the field. Efforts by the DPKO, the UN Secretariat, troop contributing countries, the UN Security Council and other members of the UN are needed to give peacekeepers unambigu- ous mandates and rules of engagement. In addition, the overall approach of the international community to stabilize war-torn countries needs to be reconsidered. A self-sustaining peace requires more than elite-centred peace and transition arrangements (plus elections) that result in a negative peace. This means that the international community needs to pay more attention to conflict dynamics and the shifting interests of local actors, especially if efforts to bring peace stretch over many years, as is so often the case. More effective peacekeeping also requires a well-defined strategy that does not treat crucial challenges like DDR and peacebuilding as residual challenges. NOTES 1. John Terrence O’Neill and Nicholas Reese, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, ch.3. 228 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING 2. Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’, in William J. Durch (ed.), Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006, pp.229– 318; Mark Malan and João Gomes Porto (eds), Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004. 3. ‘Is this the World’s Least Effective Peacekeeping Force?’, The Economist, 4 Dec. 2005, pp.43ff.; ‘Congo President Chides UN Forces over Eastern Violence’, Reuters, 25 June 2007; François Grignon and Daniela Kroslak, ‘The Problem with Peacekeeping’, Current History, Vol.107, No.708, 2008, pp.186– 7. 4. ‘UN Report Accuses Peacekeepers of Failing the Congolese People’, Financial Times (London), 23 March 2005, p.3. 5. René Lemarchand, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruc- tion, occasional paper, Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2001, pp. 17 –31. 6. Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, London: Zed Books, 2007; Michael Nest, with François Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006. 7. Electoral abuses occurred on both sides, but were not of a decisive scale. See Mission d’obser- vation électorale de l’Union Européenne en RDC, Elections 2006, Rapport Final, Kinshasa, 23 Feb. 2007, p.57. 8. Pole Institute, ‘Nord-Kivu: Les guerres derrière la guerre’ [North Kivu: wars behind the war], Goma, 26 Sept. 2008 (at: www.pole-institute.org/documents/dossier%20pole%2026908.pdf? 08.pdf). 9. Security Council Res. 1258, 6 Aug. 1999. 10. Security Council Res. 1279, 30 Nov. 1999 and 1291, 24 Feb. 2000. 11. Security Council Res. 1355, 15 June 2001, para.32. 12. Security Council Res. 1493, 28 July 2003, paras 1– 6. 13. Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN doc. S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, paras 35 –8. 14. Cited in Emeric Rogier, ‘MONUC and the Challenges of Peace Implementation in the DRC’, in Malan and Gomes Porto (see n.2 above), p.255. 15. Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.3, 2004, pp.508– 25. 16. Security Council Res. 1493 (see n.12 above), para.26. 17. Security Council Res. 1291 (see n.10 above), para.8. 18. Security Council Res. 1565, 1 Oct. 2004. 19. Ibid. 20. ‘Special Report of the Secretary-General on Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UN doc. S/2005/320, 26 May 2005, para.3. 21. Security Council Res. 1671, 25 April 2006. 22. See Security Council Res. 1756, 15 May 2007. 23. ‘Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, UN doc. S/2007/156, 20 Mar. 2007, paras 43ff.; Security Council Res. 1756 (see n.22 above). 24. Security Council Res. 1797, 30 Jan. 2008. 25. Refugees International, DR Congo: Transition Without Military Transformation, Washington, DC, 13 Dec. 2007. 26. MONUC Human Rights Division, ‘The Human Rights Situation in the DR Congo, January to June 2006’, Kinshasa, 27 July 2006, para.42. 27. For overviews of these criteria see Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.6–8; William J. Durch with Tobias C. Berkman, ‘Restoring and Maintaining Peace. What We Know So Far’, in: Durch (ed.), Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006, pp.15– 16. See also Page Fortna, ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.48, No.2, 2004, pp.269–92 and references therein. 28. Howard (see n.27 above), p.7. 29. I omit the monitoring of the arms embargo; it was inconsequential because MONUC did not have the mandate to enforce it. 30. Security Council Res. 1355 (see n.11 above), para.32. 31. ‘Twenty-third Special Report of the Secretary-General’ (see n.23 above), para.74. 32. For a revealing example see ‘Second Special Report of the Secretary-General’ (see n.13 above), para.21. PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 229 33. Security Council Res. 1493 (see n.12 above), para.17. 34. Security Council Res. 1493 (see n.12 above) and 1565 (see n.18 above). 35. Renner Onana and Hannah Taylor, ‘MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, 2008, pp.509, 514. 36. Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, ‘Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa. Flawed Ideas About Failed States’, International Security, Vol.32, No.4, 2008, p.124. 37. Refugees International (see n.25 above). 38. Onana and Taylor (see n.35 above), p.509. 39. Ibid., pp.514ff. 40. Author’s interviews with Western diplomats and senior MONUC staff, Kinshasa and Goma, Sept. 2008. 41. For example, Security Council Res. 1565 (see n.18 above), para.6. 42. On Bukavu, see Turner (n.6 above), pp.96–105; on Bunia, see Ulriksen et al. (n.15 above). 43. See Katarina Månsson, ‘Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.4, 2005, p.504. 44. Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect, and Modern Peace Operations, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006, p.91; Månsson (see n.43 above), p.516; Grignon and Kroslak (see n.3 above), pp.186–7. 45. ‘Congo, With Iraq in Mind, Faces Voting and Threats’, The New York Times, 26 Mar. 2006. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/26/international/26congo.html. 46. Sexual violence against girls and women, which is a considerable a problem in eastern DRC, could be an alternative measure to assess human suffering. However, the reliability of data on sexual violence is riddled with many problems and a great number of acts of sexual violence are probably not reported and registered. See Amnesty International, North Kivu: No End to War on Women and Children, London, 2008. 47. ‘Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, 17 Nov. 2003, UN doc. S/2003/1098, para.47. 48. ‘Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, 21 Feb. 2003, UN doc. S/2003/211, para.14. 49. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘DR Congo: New Displacements in the Congo Overshadow Returns’, New York, 15 Jan. 2008. 50. Refugees International, ‘DR Congo: Give Peacekeepers Political Support and Achievable Mandate’, Bulletin, Washington, DC, 6 Nov. 2008. 51. Howard (see n.27 above); George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, in Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds), Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp.55–7. 52. See Downs and Stedman (n.51 above), pp.55– 7. 53. On the FDLR, see Security Council Res. 1804, 13 Mar. 2008. 54. For a comparison with other cases, see the figures in Englebert and Tull (n.36 above), p.131. 55. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN doc. A/55/305-S/ 2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000, para.51. 56. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, in an interview, Le Figaro (Paris), 2 May 2008; Downs and Stedman (see n.51 above), p.58. Available from: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/05/03/01003-20080503ARTFIG00024-le-maintien- dela-paix-a-besoin-des-europeens.php. 57. ‘Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, UN doc. S/2001/970, 16 Oct. 2001, Annex, pp.15–16. 58. See, for example, ‘US Rejects Call for More Troops in Congo’, Financial Times (London), 30 Sept. 2005. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0892bf72-314e-11da-ac1- b-00000e2511c8.html; ‘More International Backing for UN Force, But Not Troops’, SouthScan (Washington, DC), 20 Sept. 2002 pp.3–4. 59. Both South Africa and the EU have more or less consistently sought to contribute to the resolution of the conflict, but they present at best medium powers. 60. Security Council Res. 1565 (see n.18 above), para.6. 61. ‘Lack of Troops, “Schizophrenic” Mandate Hamper UN in DR Congo’, Reuters, 12 Nov. 2008. See also Refugees International (see n.51 above) and the references in n.3 and n.4 above. 62. ‘UN Defends Mission in Congo’, Reuters, 4 Mar. 2005. 63. ‘U.N. Forces Using Tougher Tactics to Secure Peace’, The New York Times, 22 May 2005. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/23/international/africa/23congo.html. 230 INTERNA TIONAL P EACEKEEPING 64. ‘Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/60/640, 29 Dec. 2005, para.33. 65. International Crisis Group (ICG), The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, Nairobi/ Brussels, 30 Mar. 2005, p.24. 66. Interview with NGO worker, Berlin, May 2008. 67. Gross misbehaviour by mission personnel also tarnished the mission, including instances of sexual exploitation and involvement in the trade of arms and mineral resources. On sexual exploitation see Nicola Dahrendorf, ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned Study. Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC’, New York: DPKO, Best Practices Unit, March 2006. 68. International Crisis Group (ICG), Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, Nairobi/Brussels, 7 July 2004, p.1. 69. Second Special Report of the Secretary-General (see n.13 above), para.42. 70. Alan Doss, Head of Mission, press conference, New York, 15 April 2008.

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